Section/division Accident & Incident Investigation Form ... and Incidents Reports/8468.pdf · Type Hartzell Scimitar 3 Blade Serial Number None Hours since New 114.1 Hours since Overhaul

CA 12-12a 23 FEBRUARY 2006 Page 1 of 18

Section/division Accident & Incident Investigation Form Number: CA 12-12a

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT AND EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Reference: CA18/2/3/8468

Aircraft Registration ZU-EFC Date of Accident 1 April 2008 Time of Accident 0543Z

Type of Aircraft Lancair Legacy 2000 Type of Operation Private

Pilot-in-command Licence Type Private Age 44 Licence Valid Yes

Pilot-in-command Flying Experience Total Flying Hours 1 089.5 Hours on Type 49.0

Last point of departure Virginia Aerodrome, Kwa-Zulu Natal (FAVG)

Next point of intended landing Newcastle Aerodrome, Kwa-Zulu Natal (FANC)

Location of the accident site with reference to easily defined geographical points (GPS readings if possible)

Krugersdorp Nature Reserve (GPS co-ordinates: S 26°06’084” E 027°42’318”)

Meteorological Information Surface wind 020°TN at 5 kts, temperature 15°C, visibility 3 000 m in haze/mist

Number of people on board 1 + 0 No. of people injured 0 No. of people killed 1

Synopsis

On the morning of 1 April 2008 at 0415Z, the pilot contacted air traffic control (ATC) at Virginia Aerodrome stating that he was on a private flight with his intended destination being Newcastle, and he obtained take-off clearance. At 0539Z, the pilot established radio contact with Lanseria Aerodrome control tower on the VHF frequency 124.0 MHz, stating that he was inbound for Lanseria, approaching from the Vaal. At 0541Z, the pilot declared an emergency on the Lanseria tower frequency, saying the following: “Fire onboard, fire onboard, smoke in the cockpit, doing an emergency landing.” ATC asked the pilot if he would be able to land at Lanseria, whereupon the pilot responded by saying “Field, bearing please.” There was no further communication between the pilot of ZU-EFC and ATC, even thought ATC made several attempts to contact the pilot. ATC immediately activated search and rescue and requested the assistance of the South African Police Air Wing to look for the aircraft. The wreckage was located approximately 1½ hours later where it had impacted with terrain in the Krugersdorp Nature Reserve. The pilot was fatally injured in the accident.

Probable Cause Unsuccessful forced landing on rocky terrain following an in flight engine malfunction accompanied by reduced outside visibility due to smoke entering the cockpit.

IARC Date Release Date


Section/division Accident & Incident Investigation Form Number: CA 12-12a

AIRCRAFT ACCIDENT REPORT

Name of Owner/Operator : Grand Lake Trading 24 (Pty) Ltd Manufacturer : Lancair Model : Legacy 2000 Nationality : South African Registration Marks : ZU-EFC Place : Krugersdorp Nature Reserve Date : 1 April 2008 Time : 0543Z All times given in this report are co-ordinated universal time (UTC) and will be denoted by (Z). South African Standard Time is UTC plus two hours. Purpose of the Investigation: In terms of Regulation 12.03.1 of the Civil Aviation Regulations (1997), this report was compiled in the interests of the promotion of aviation safety and the reduction of the risk of aviation accidents or incidents and not to establish legal liability. Disclaimer: This report is produce without prejudice to the rights of the CAA, which are reserved. 1. FACTUAL INFORMATION 1.1 History of Flight: 1.1.1 On 1 April 2008 at 0415Z, the pilot of ZU-EFC obtained take-off clearance from

Virginia ATC. He indicated that he was the sole occupant onboard and that his intended destination was Newcastle.

1.1.2 At 0539Z, the pilot established radio contact with Lanseria Aerodrome control tower

on the VHF frequency 124.0 MHz, stating he was inbound from the Vaal area for Lanseria, and that he was approximately 17 nm away. ATC requested the pilot to report 10 nm from Lanseria in order to allow for IFR traffic departing Lanseria, which was acknowledged by the pilot.

1.1.3 At 0541Z, the pilot declared an emergency, stating that he was going to perform an emergency landing because he had a fire onboard, which, seconds later, he changed to smoke in the cockpit.

1.1.4 ATC asked the pilot if he would be able to land at Lanseria, whereupon the pilot

responded by saying “Field, bearing please.”


1.1.5 There was no further communication between the pilot of ZU-EFC and ATC, even though ATC made several attempts to contact the pilot. ATC immediately activated search and rescue and requested the assistance of the South African Police Air Wing to search for the aircraft. The wreckage was located approximately 1½ hours later where it had impacted with terrain in the Krugersdorp Nature Reserve. The pilot was fatally injured in the accident.

1.1.6 The accident occurred during daylight conditions at a geographical position

determined as S 26°06’084” E 027°42’318”, at an elevation of 5 111 ft above mean sea level (AMSL).

Error! Objects cannot be created from editing field codes. Figure 1: The accident site, shown by the red dot and co-ordinates

1.2 Injuries to Persons:

Injuries Pilot Crew Pass. Other Fatal 1 - - - Serious - - - - Minor - - - - None - - - -

1.3 Damage to Aircraft: 1.3.1 The aircraft was destroyed during the impact sequence.


Figure 2: The damages that the aircraft sustained

1.4 Other Damage: 1.4.1 There was no other damage caused. 1.5 Personnel Information:

Nationality South African Gender Male Age 44 Licence Number ***************** Licence Type Private Licence valid Yes Type Endorsed Yes Ratings None Medical Expiry Date 31 July 2008 Restrictions None Previous Accidents None

Flying Experience:

Total Hours as on 28 February 2008 as per CAA Documents 1 089.5 Total Past 90 Days Unknown Total on Type Past 90 Days Unknown Total on Type as on 18 January 2007 in the Flight Folio 49


1.6 Aircraft Information: Airframe: Type Lancair Legacy 2000 Serial Number L2K-152 Manufacturer Lancair Inc. Year of Manufacture 2006 Total Airframe Hours (At Time of Accident) 114.1 Last Annual Inspection (Hours & Date) 28.1 3 August 2006 Hours Since Last Annual Inspection 86.0 Authority to Fly (Issue Date) 08 August 2006 Authority to Fly (Expiry Date) 07 August 2007 C of R (Issue Date) (Present owner) 18 May 2006 Operating Categories Private Authority to Fly

Note: The Authority to Fly was invalid at the time of the accident. No evidence

could be found during the investigation to prove that the aircraft was subjected to an annual inspection after 3 August 2006. An annual inspection should be certified every 12 months as stipulated as a condition on the Authority to Fly to ensure that the aircraft is in an airworthy condition.

Engine: Type Continental IO-550-EXP Serial Number TC5645 Hours since New 114.1 Hours since Overhaul TBO not yet reached

Propeller: Type Hartzell Scimitar 3 Blade Serial Number None Hours since New 114.1 Hours since Overhaul TBO not yet reached

1.7 Meteorological Information: 1.7.1 An official weather report was obtained from the South African Weather Services

(SAWS), which indicated the following weather conditions: Surface Analysis:

A high pressure system was south-east of the country, causing low-level moisture into KwaZulu-Natal and the north-eastern parts of the country. A surface low pressure system was present over the central and south-western interior. Upper Air: At 500 hPa a high-pressure system was present over the central interior.


Satellite Image: The satellite image below shows low-level cloudy conditions in the Krugersdorp area, indicated by the green arrow.

Figure 2: Satellite image, indicating low-level cloudy conditions in the

Krugersdorp area

Airmet:

Surface visibility at 3 000 m in mist, with broken clouds at 8 00 ft above ground was forecast for Gauteng. Weather conditions in the vicinity of the accident: With the high-pressure system over the eastern part of the country, low-level moist air was present over the northern and eastern parts of the country, causing cloudy and misty conditions in the Lanseria/Krugersdorp areas. At 0500Z, Lanseria reported the following weather: METAR FALA 010500Z 00000KT 3000M OVC013 15/14 Q1024=.

At 0600Z, the weather office at OR Tambo Aerodrome reported the following weather: METAR FAJS 010600Z 04007KT 6000 BKN 007 BKN036 15/13 Q1026 NOSIG=. No official observation was available at the time and place of the incident. The most likely weather conditions at the place of the accident were as follows: Temperature: 15°C Dew Point: 14°C Surface Wind: 020°TN at 5 kts Cloud Cover: BKN cloud at 1 000 ft or lower Visibility: 3 000 m with haze or mist

Weather: 13 000 ft AMSL


1.8 Aids to Navigation: 1.8.1 The aircraft was equipped with standard navigation equipment including an Avidyne

Flitemax electronic flight instrument system (EFIS). There were no recorded defects with the navigation equipment prior to the flight according to available information.

1.9 Communications: 1.9.1 The communication equipment that was installed in the aircraft was a Garmin GMA

340 radio. There were no reported defects with any of the communication equipment.

1.9.2 A transcript of the radio communication between the pilot of ZU-EFC and ATC was

obtained from the Virginia tower, which was his point of departure, as well as Lanseria tower. Relevant communication between the pilot and both control towers can be found attached to this report as Annexure A.

1.9.3 What is of importance in the communication with the ATC at Virginia tower was the

fact that the pilot provided the ATC with erroneous information with regard to his intended destination, which he indicated to be Newcastle (Kwa-Zulu Natal). Approximately 1½ after take-off, he established radio contact with Lanseria tower. Lanseria Aerodrome was more than double the distance from Virginia Aerodrome then his ‘intended’ destination Newcastle.

1.9.4 At 0541Z, the pilot declared an emergency with Lanseria ATC, stating that he was going to perform an emergency landing as he had a fire onboard. He then stated that there was smoke in the cockpit. Shortly thereafter, communication was lost with the aircraft.

1.10 Aerodrome Information: 1.10.1 The accident did not happen at or near an aerodrome. The aircraft crashed in the

Krugersdorp Nature Reserve at a geographical position determined as S 26°06’084” E 027°42’318”.

1.11 Flight Recorders: 1.11.1 The aircraft was not equipped with a flight data recorder (FDR) or a cockpit voice

recorder (CVR), nor were these required by regulation to be fitted this type of aircraft.

1.12 Wreckage and Impact Information: 1.12.1 The aircraft’s initial impact point was with rocky terrain at a geographical position

determined as S 26°06’062’’ E 027°42’290’. The aircraft came to rest in an inverted attitude facing in a north-easterly direction at a geographical position determined as S 26°06’084” E 027°42’318”. The wreckage trail was spread along a straight line over a distance of 102.7 m.


Figure 3: The initial impact markings on rocky terrain

Figure 4: An aerial view of the wreckage trail

The wreckage trail of 102.7 m.

Initial impact markings

Wreckage path of 102.7 m

Main wreckage


Figure 5: A view of the main wreckage, which was destroyed

during the impact sequence

1.13 Medical and Pathological Information: 1.13.1 A post-mortem examination was performed on the deceased pilot following the

accident. 1.13.2 The results of the post-mortem report and toxicological tests were not available at

the time when this report was compiled. Should any of the results reveal new evidence that might have a bearing on the investigation, the report may be revised or reopened.

1.14 Fire: 1.14.1 There was no evidence of a pre- or post-impact fire. 1.15 Survival Aspects: 1.15.1 This accident was not considered to be survivable due to the destruction of the

cockpit/cabin area during the impact sequence. The pilot’s body was flung from the cockpit, resulting in serious head injuries. The safety harness was found intact and did not fail, yet it was not able to secure the pilot.


1.16 Tests and Research: 1.16.1 The engine, a Teledyne Continental IO-550 Experimental, with Serial no. TC5645,

was removed from the wreckage and was subjected to a teardown inspection at an approved engine overhaul facility, following evidence of an uncontained engine failure. The teardown inspection was conducted in the presence of an SACAA Accident Investigator. The engine displayed a hole in the crankcase in line with the no. 2 cylinder, as can be seen in the photo below.

Figure 6: The hole in the crankcase

Figure 7: Evidence of a failed conrod located

along the wreckage trail

All accessory components remained attached to the engine and were removed during the teardown procedure and accordingly inspected. The components/parts listed below did not display any abnormalities that could have contributed to or have caused the engine to fail:


• The propeller governor (ONTIC, serial no. 00466) was in an overall good

condition. • The exhaust system remained attached to the engine, displaying some

impact damage. • Magneto (type: Slick, part no. 6310): only one magneto was fitted to the

engine, as well as an electronic ignition. The magneto was still attached to the engine, without any impact damage.

• The ignition harness was intact and no visible damage was noted. • Sparkplugs (Champion RHB-32E type) were in overall good condition. All the

sparkplugs displayed evidence of wet, oily deposits. • The fuel pump was intact, with no visible damage to the unit or gasket seal.

All pipe connections to the pump were attached. • The fuel divider/manifold valve (TCM type) was intact. All fuel lines to the

valves were secured. The cover was removed and the diaphragm was inspected and found to be in a good condition, with some evidence of fuel still present in the unit.

• The oil pump was intact and undamaged and still contained some oil. No visible damage was observed to the gears.

• The oil sump was damaged but still attached. The sump contained a substantial amount of debris from inside the engine as a result of the failure.

• The oil filter (Champion Aerospace type, serial no. CH 48108-1) was intact with no visible damage. The oil filter contained no oil.

• The oil cooler sustained some impact damage. Only 50 ml of oil could be drained.

• The oil pick-up tube in the sump assembly was found intact and undamaged, with the pick-up screen free from debris.

• All the valve guides were intact and properly secured. No damage was observed.

• All the accessory gears were accounted for and were intact. All the gear teeth were observed on all gears.

• The camshaft was found to be in good condition. • The crankcase assembly showed evidence of some internal damage and

external damage in the area of the no. 2 cylinder. • The crankshaft counterweights were in good condition but did display

evidence associated with high temperatures. • Cylinders no. 1, 4 and 6 displayed normal combustion signatures. There was

no damage to these cylinders, nor was any corrosion observed. The piston and conrod assemblies from these cylinders where easily removable and displayed evidence associated with normal engine operation.

The components/parts mentioned below displayed substantial damage during the failure sequence: It was possible to remove cylinders no. 2, 3 and 5 from the crankcase assembly. However, it was not possible to remove the piston from cylinder no. 2 due to the extensive internal damage sustained during the failure sequence. The conrod from the no. 2 cylinder failed and the conrod from the no. 3 cylinder was in the process of failing, showing signs of overheating. Piston no. 5 had a broken oil ring, as can be seen in Figure 9 on the next page.


Figure 8: Conrod from cylinder no. 3 showing signs of overheating/deformation

Figure 9: Piston no. 5 had a broken oil ring

1.16.2 Following the teardown inspection, it was not possible to send the failed components for metallurgical analysis to determine the primary mode of failure due to the extensive damage sustained during the failure sequence. Only 50 ml of oil could be drained from the engine during the teardown inspection. This was not enough to perform any form of spectro analysis on the oil to determine if it was indeed the correct type of oil that was used in the engine.


1.17 Organisational and Management Information 1.17.1 This was a private flight. The pilot was the owner of the aircraft. 1.17.2 The approved person who performed the last annual inspection on the aircraft prior

to the accident on 3 August 2006 was in possession of a valid Aero Club of South Africa accreditation. The Authority to Fly of the aircraft was invalid at the time of the accident as no annual inspection had been conducted within the required time frame following the expiry of the Authority to Fly on 7 August 2007.

1.18 Additional Information 1.18.1 The last recorded flight folio entries for this aircraft were made on 18 January 2007.

According to the recorded information, the Hobbs hours were recorded at 71.7 hours. No subsequent entry was made in the flight folio, which therefore did not meet the requirements as stipulated in Part 91.03.5 of the Civil Aviation Regulations of 1997.

1.18.2 The last recorded entry in the pilot’s logbook was on 28 February 2008, and

indicated a total of 1 089.5 hours. There was no subsequent record of any flying he had conducted.

1.18.3 The pilot had a pre-arranged appointment with a person at Lanseria Aerodrome on

1 April 2008. The person stated that the pilot sent him several short text messages (SMSs) via his cell phone earlier in the morning, enquiring about the weather conditions at Lanseria. The following text messages were communicated between the two: TIME FROM MESSAGE 0433Z Pilot Airborne, is Lanseria VMC? 0433Z Person Not now but will keep you updated. 0502Z Pilot 20 out? 0505Z Person Tower says it is IMC with 1300 base and 2000 m vis not

so good right now. 0512Z Person Tower says to call in range for possible special VFR arrival. 0516Z Pilot ok thks 0549Z Person how are you doing…. 1.18.4 On-site investigation: During the on-site investigation, the following observations were made:

• The aircraft was destroyed. • The engine was still attached to the airframe structure. • All major components of the aircraft were accounted for. • The right wing was destroyed during impact with the terrain and was no longer

attached to the fuselage. The left wing was still attached but was substantially damaged.

• The rudder and horizontal elevator sustained substantial damage. • The landing gear of the aircraft was extended and severely disrupted.


• The propeller exhibited chord-wise scratching and torsional damage indicative of the engine producing some power on impact.

• The aircraft was equipped with an EFIS cockpit and after the accident, the instrumentation was removed from the wreckage and was taken to the manufacturer for possible downloading of information that might have been helpful in the investigation. It was not possible to download information from the instrumentation, because it was found that the instrumentation was previously installed in a cirrus type aircraft and the manufacturer of the instruments was unable to assist in downloading the information because the instrumentation was not in a cirrus type aircraft.

1.18.4 Witnesses on the ground stated that they observed white smoke emanating from

the aircraft as it flew overhead. One of the witnesses observed something falling from the aircraft, went to investigate what it was and found a formal jacket. It was located approximately 1 km from the accident site.

1.18.5 According to available records 142 l of 100LL Avgas were uplifted on

26 March 2008 at Virginia Aerodrome where the aircraft was based. Due to improper recordkeeping by the pilot/owner, it was not possible to determine if the aircraft had flown prior to the accident flight. Virginia control tower is not manned on a 24-hour basis, which allows for the dispatching of flights without proper monitoring.

1.19 Useful or Effective Investigation Techniques 1.19.1 None. 2. ANALYSIS 2.1 The pilot was properly licensed and held a valid medical certificate at the time of the

accident. The pilot’s logbook was not kept up to date. 2.2 Available SACAA documentation revealed that at the time of the accident, the

aircraft was flown without a valid Authority to Fly, which had lapsed on 7 August 2007. The last annual inspection prior to the accident flight was certified on 8 August 2006. The pilot/owner further neglected to keep the flight folio and aircraft logbooks up to date as stipulated in the Civil Aviation Regulations.

2.3 The official weather report that was obtained from the South African Weather

Services indicated that conditions of reduced visibility prevailed over the Gauteng area at the time of the accident (broken cloud at 1 000 ft, visibility of 3 000 m in haze or mist). It is the opinion of the investigator that the prevailing weather did not contribute to or caused the accident, as the pilot had been airborne for a substantial period of time when he declared the emergency that resulted in the accident.

2.4 The aircraft was destroyed during the impact sequence. The engine was subject to an engine teardown examination after it was found to have suffered from an uncontained failure, which had caused a hole in the crankcase. It was found that the no. 2 conrod assembly had failed in operation, with the no. 3 conrod displaying evidence of severe heat distortion and deformation. Several internal components displayed evidence of high temperatures. However, it was not possible to determine if the correct type and grade of oil was used in the engine prior to the failure.


Available maintenance records indicate that the aircraft was not maintained as prescribed, which increased the risk of failure.

2.5 The pilot displayed poor airmanship by flying to a location more than twice the

distance he had initially indicated to ATC. This and the fact that the aircraft was not properly maintained as required raised serious questions on the way he seemed to abuse the situation in not advising the ATC centres of his real intentions with respect to where he was flying. This resulted in him not being visible on radar. The reason the pilot did this would have only been known to him.

It is the opinion of the investigator that when the pilot declared the emergency and the ATC asked the pilot if he could still make the landing to Lanseria, and the pilot responded by saying, “Field, uh try and get my bearing please”, it might have been possible that the pilot thought that either the ATC had him on radar or he was visible to the ATC. This would have assisted the pilot in knowing where to fly to, because he most probably was lost and was not able to see where he was flying because of the smoke.

2.6 Witnesses confirmed smoke emanating from the aircraft. One of the witnesses

interviewed mentioned that the pilot threw something from the aircraft before he impacted with the terrain. The witnesses picked up a jacket approximately 1 km from the accident site. It is the opinion of the investigator that the pilot most probably placed the jacket in the opening of the canopy to help him to cope with the smoke in the cockpit to enable him to see where he was flying. The jacket most probably got sucked out, and this seemed to the witness that the pilot was throwing something from the aircraft.

2.7 After experiencing the smoke in the cockpit and most probably some engine power

loss, the pilot took the decision to perform a forced landing. But due to the smoke he was not able to properly access the landing area. The area from the sky might have seemed level, but was actually very rocky. When he landed, the aircraft started breaking up around him.

3. CONCLUSION 3.1 Findings 3.1.1 The pilot was the holder of valid private pilot licence and had the aircraft type

endorsed in his logbook. 3.1.2 The pilot’s medical was properly issued by an approved CAA medical

examiner.

3.1.3 The pilot was fatally injured as a result of the accident.

3.1.4 The Authority to Fly of the aircraft was not valid at the time of the accident. 3.1.5 The approved person who performed the last annual inspection prior to the

accident (on 3 August 2006) was in possession of a valid Microlight Associations of South Africa (MISASA) accreditation.


3.1.6 The aircraft logbooks and pilot’s logbook were not kept up to date.

3.1.7 The aircraft flight folio was not kept up date as required by Part 91.03.5 of the Civil Aviation Regulations of 1997.

3.1.8 The pilot provided the ATC at Virginia Aerodrome with erroneous information

with regard to his intended destination, stating it to be Newcastle. 3.1.9 The pilot had declared an emergency with Lanseria control tower while on

approach for landing at the aerodrome, as follows: “Fire onboard, fire onboard, smoke in the cockpit.”

3.1.10 The prevailing weather conditions at the time indicated the visibility to be

3000 m in haze. This was not considered to have had a bearing on the accident.

3.1.11 Witnesses reported seeing white smoke emanating from the aircraft as it flew

overhead. They also observed something falling from the aircraft, which was a jacket.

3.1.12 The aircraft was destroyed during the impact sequence. 3.1.13 The engine failure was attributed to the failure of the no. 2 conrod assembly

during normal engine operation. 3.1.14 The propeller exhibited chord-wise scratching and torsional damage

indicative of the engine producing some power at impact. 3.2 Probable Cause/s 3.2.1 Unsuccessful forced landing on rocky terrain following an in flight engine

malfunction accompanied by reduced outside visibility due to smoke entering the cockpit.

4. SAFETY RECOMMENDATIONS 4.2 None. 5. APPENDICES 5.1 Annexure A (Relevant radio communication between pilot of ZU-EFC and ATC

at Virginia Aerodrome as well as Lanseria Aerodrome)


ANNEXURE A

Relevant communication between Air Traffic Controller (ATC) at Virginia Aerodrome and the pilot of ZU-EFC on the VHF frequency 120.6 MHz.

Time From To Message 04:15:36 ZU-EFC ATC Virginia, Echo Fox Charlie. 04:16:48 ATC ZU-EFC Echo Foxtrot Charlie morning. 04:16:50 ZU-EFC ATC Good morning to you, one onboard, four hours

endurance requesting a flight to Newcastle. 04:16:58 ATC ZU-EFC Echo Foxtrot Charlie go on the departing, enter and

backtrack, correction do you require backtrack? 04:17:06 ZU-EFC ATC Negative, unreadable audio follow …………? 04:17:16 ATC ZU-EFC Echo Foxtrot Charlie line up and wait Runway 05,

QNH 1019. 04:17:22 ZU-EFC ATC 1019, 05 line up and wait. 04:17:41 ATC ZU-EFC Echo Foxtrot Charlie report ready for departure. 04:17:44 ZU-EFC ATC Ready for departure. 04:17:47 ATC ZU-EFC Echo Fox Charlie runway should be clear, report pilot’s

discretion right turn, report Uhmlanga 500 feet, squawk 2000, wind is 330° 6 knots.

04:18:01 ZU-EFC ATC Clear, 500 feet Uhmlanga next, squawking 2000, Echo Fox Charlie.

04:19:36 ZU-EFC ATC Echo Fox Charlie Uhmlanga lagoon. 04:19:39 ATC ZU-EFC Echo Foxtrot Charlie broadcast 124.2 good day to you. 04:19:44 ZU-EFC ATC 124.2 thank you very much. Relevant communication between Air Traffic Controller (ATC) at Lanseria Aerodrome and the pilot of ZU-EFC on the VHF frequency 124.0 MHz.

Time From To Message 05:39 ZU-EFC ATC Lanseria Echo Fox Charlie ATC ZU-EFC Echo Foxtrot Charlie Lanseria tower morning. ZU-EFC ATC Good morning to you routing from the Vaal area to

yours and I am 17 nautical miles out, your instructions?

ATC ZU-EFC Your aircraft type Echo Foxtrot Charlie. ZU-EFC ATC I am a Lancair Legacy and one onboard. ATC ZU-EFC Thank you, remained outside of controlled airspace

IFR traffic to depart, Echo Foxtrot Charlie report again 10 miles inbound to Lanseria.

ZU-EFC ATC 10 miles out Echo Fox Charlie. 05:41 ZU-EFC ATC Echo Fox Charlie Mayday mayday mayday. ATC ZU-EFC Echo Fox Charlie copy the mayday, what is the nature

of your emergency? ZU-EFC ATC Fire onboard fire onboard doing an emergency

landing, …….smoke in the cockpit. ATC ZU-EFC Copy that Echo Foxtrot Charlie would you like to

attempt a landing at Lanseria, how many onboard and fuel endurance remaining?

ZU-EFC ATC Field, bearing please? Smoke in the cockpit. ATC ZU-EFC Echo Foxtrot Charlie are you able to fly towards


Lanseria, do you have Lanseria insight? ATC ZU-EFC Echo Foxtrot Charlie if you can squawk 4700 for radar

identification to get the accurate position, we are India Mike Charlie (IMC).

ATC ZU-EFC Echo Foxtrot Charlie Lanseria do you read? ATC ZU-EFC Echo Foxtrot Charlie Lanseria do you read? There was no further communication between ATC and the pilot of ZU-EFC.

Report reviewed and amended by Advisory Safety Panel: 25 August 2009.

-END-