Section 8- Right to Form Association

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THIRD DIVISION[G.R. No. 85279. July 28, 1989.]

SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA),DIONISIO T. BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA,REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY, SERGIO ARANETA,

PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO, petitioners, vs. THECOURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON.

CEZAR C. PERALEJO RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY,respondents.

Vicente T. Ocampo & Associates for petitioners.

SYLLABUS1. ADMINISTRATIVE LAW; CIVIL SERVICE; PROHIBITION TOGOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES FROM STRIKING. — While the Constitution andthe Labor Code are silent as to whether or not government employeesmay strike, they are prohibited from striking, by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 series of 1987 of the Civil ServiceCommission and as implied in E.O. No. 180.2. ID.; ID.; ID.; REMEDIES IN LIEU OF RIGHT TO STRIKE. —Government employees may, therefore, through their unions orassociations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the terms

and conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation ornegotiate with the appropriate government agencies for theimprovement of those which are not f ixed by law.3. ID.; CIVIL SERVICE; SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES AREPART THEREOF AND COVERED BY MEMORANDUM PROHIBITING STRIKES.— SSS employees are part of the civil service and are covered by theCivil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes.4. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 180;ALLOWS GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES TO NEGOTIATE WHERE TERMS ANDCONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT ARE NOT AMONG THOSE FIXED BY LAW. —E.O. No. 180 which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right toorganize of government employees, allows negotiation where the termsand conditions of employment involved are not among those fixed by

law.5. ID.; ID.; TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF EMPLOYMENT INGOVERNMENT ARE GOVERNED BY LAW; EMPLOYEES SHALL NOT STRIKE TO SECURE CHANGES. — Section 4, Rule III of the Rules and Regulationsto Govern the Exercise of the Right of Government Employees to Self-Organization, which took effect after the instant dispute arose, "[t]heterms and conditions of employment in the government, including anypolitical subdivision or instrumentality thereof and government-ownedand controlled corporations with original charters are governed by lawand employees therein shall not strike for the purpose of securingchanges thereof."6. ID.; LABOR RELATIONS; STRIKES; NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONSCOMMISSION HAS NO JURISDICTION TO ISSUE AN INJUNCTION TO

RESTRAIN AN ILLEGAL STRIKE STAGED BY SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEMEMPLOYEES; REASONS. — An injunction may be issued to restrain it. It is

futile for the petitioners to assert that the subject labor dispute falls within theexclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC and, hence, the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction enjoining the continuance of the strike. The Labor Code itself provides that terms and conditions of employment of government employees shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules andregulations [Art. 276]. More importantly, E.O. No. 180 vests the Public SectorLabor-Management Council with jurisdiction over unresolved labor disputesinvolving government employees [Sec. 16]. Clearly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the dispute.7. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; REGIONAL TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION TO ISSUEAN INJUNCTION TO ENJOIN SAID STRIKE; REASON. — The Public Sector Labor-Management Council has not been granted by law authority to issue writs of injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the Council,and not the NLRC, that has jurisdiction over the instant labor dispute, resort tothe general courts of law for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin thestrike is appropriate.8. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS; CERTIORARI; NOT PROPERWHERE COURT CANNOT BE ACCUSED OF IMPRUDENCE OR OVERZEALOUSNESSAS IT PROCEEDED WITH CAUTION. — The lower Court cannot be accused of imprudence or zealousness, for after issuing a writ of injunction enjoining thecontinuance of the strike to prevent any further disruption of public service, therespondent judge, in the same order, admonished the parties to refer the

unresolved controversies emanating from their employer-employee relationshipto the Public Sector Labor-Management Council for appropriate action.9. ID.; CIVIL PROCEDURE; EXECUTION; WHEN REMEDY AVAILABLE TOPETITIONER. — Petitioners' remedy is not to petition this Court to issue aninjunction, but to cause the execution of the order of the Merit SystemsPromotion Board if it has already become final.

D E C I S I O NCORTES, J p:Primarily, the issue raised in this petition is whether or not the Regional TrialCourt can enjoin the Social Security System Employees Association (SSSEA)from striking and order the striking employees to return to work. Collaterally, itis whether or not employees of the Social Security System (SSS) have the right

to strike. The antecedents are as follows:On June 11, 1987, the SSS filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City acomplaint for damages with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction againstpetitioners, alleging that on June 9, 1987, the officers and members of SSSEAstaged an illegal strike and barricaded the entrances to the SSS Building,preventing non-striking employees from reporting for work and SSS membersfrom transacting business with the SSS; that the strike was reported to thePublic Sector Labor-Management Council, which ordered the strikers to returnto work; that the strikers refused to return to work; and that the SSS suffereddamages as a result of the strike. The complaint prayed that a writ of preliminary injunction be issued to enjoin the strike and that the strikers beordered to return to work; that the defendants (petitioners herein) be ordered

to pay damages; and that the strike be declared illegal.It appears that the SSSEA went on strike after the SSS failed to act on the



union's demands, which included: implementation of the provisions of theold SSS-SSSEA collective bargaining agreement (CBA) on check-off of union dues; payment of accrued overtime pay, night differential pay andholiday pay; conversion of temporary or contractual employees with six(6) months or more of service into regular and permanent employees andtheir entitlement to the same salaries, allowances and benefits given toother regular employees of the SSS; and payment of the children'sallowance of P30.00, and after the SSS deducted certain amounts fromthe salaries of the employees and allegedly committed acts of discrimination and unfair labor practices [Rollo, pp. 21-24]. The court a quo, on June 11, 1987, issued a temporary restraining orderpending resolution of the application for a writ of preliminary injunction[Rollo, p. 71.] In the meantime, petitioners filed a motion to dismissalleging the trial court's lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter [Rollo,pp. 72-82.] To this motion, the SSS filed an opposition, reiterating itsprayer for the issuance of a writ of injunction [Rollo, pp. 209-222]. On July22, 1987, in a four-page order, the court a quo denied the motion todismiss and converted the restraining order into an injunction uponposting of a bond, after finding that the strike was illegal [Rollo, pp. 83-86]. As petitioners' motion for the reconsideration of the aforesaid orderwas also denied on August 14, 1988 [Rollo, p. 94], petitioners filed apetition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminary injunction before

this Court. Their petition was docketed as G.R. No. 79577. In a resolutiondated October 21, 1987, the Court, through the Third Division, resolvedto refer the case to the Court of Appeals. Petitioners filed a motion forreconsideration thereof, but during its pendency the Court of Appeals onMarch 9, 1988 promulgated its decision on the referred case [Rollo, pp.130-137]. Petitioners moved to recall the Court of Appeals' decision. Inthe meantime, the Court on June 29, 1988 denied the motion forreconsideration in G.R. No. 97577 for being moot and academic.Petitioners' motion to recall the decision of the Court of Appeals was alsodenied in view of this Court's denial of the motion for reconsideration[Rollo, pp. 141-143]. Hence, the instant petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals [Rollo, pp. 12-37].Upon motion of the SSS on February 6, 1989, the Court issued a

temporary restraining order enjoining the petitioners from staginganother strike or from pursuing the notice of strike they filed with theDepartment of Labor and Employment on January 25, 1989 and tomaintain the status quo [Rollo, pp. 151-152]. The Court, taking the comment as answer, and noting the reply andsupplemental reply filed by petitioners, considered the issues joined andthe case submitted for decision. The position of the petitioners is that the Regional Trial Court had no jurisdiction to hear the case initiated by the SSS and to issue therestraining order and the writ of preliminary injunction, as jurisdiction laywith the Department of Labor and Employment or the National LaborRelations Commission, since the case involves a labor dispute.On the other hand, the SSS advances the contrary view, on the ground

that the employees of the SSS are covered by civil service laws and rulesand regulations, not the Labor Code, therefore they do not have the right

to strike. Since neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the dispute,the Regional Trial Court may enjoin the employees from striking.In dismissing the petition for certiorari and prohibition with preliminaryinjunction filed by petitioners, the Court of Appeals held that since theemployees of the SSS, are government employees, they are not allowed tostrike, and may be enjoined by the Regional Trial Court, which had jurisdictionover the SSS' complaint for damages, from continuing with their strike. Thus, the sequential questions to be resolved by the Court in deciding whetheror not the Court of Appeals erred is finding that the Regional Trial Court did notact without or in excess of jurisdiction when it took cognizance of the case andenjoined the strike are as follows:1. Do the employees of the SSS have the right to strike?2. Does the Regional Trial Court have jurisdiction to hear the case initiatedby the SSS and to enjoin the strikers from continuing with the strike and toorder them to return to work? These shall be discussed and resolved seriatim.I The 1987 Constitution, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights,provides that the State "shall guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concertedactivities, including the right to strike in accordance with law" [Art. XIII, Sec. 3].By itself, this provision would seem to recognize the right of all workers and

employees, including those in the public sector, to strike. But the Constitutionitself fails to expressly confirm this impression, for in the Sub-Article on the CivilService Commission, it provides, after defining the scope of the civil service as"all branches, subdivisions, instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government,including government-owned or controlled corporations with original charters,"that "[t]he right to self-organization shall not be denied to governmentemployees" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(1) and (5)]. Parenthetically, the Bill of Rights alsoprovides that "[t]he right of the people, including those employed in the publicand private sectors, to form unions, associations, or societies for purposes notcontrary to law shall not abridged" [Art. III, Sec. 8]. Thus, while there is noquestion that the Constitution recognizes the right of government employees toorganize, it is silent as to whether such recognition also includes the right tostrike.

Resort to the intent of the framers of the organic law becomes helpful inunderstanding the meaning of these provisions. A reading of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission that drafted the 1987 Constitution would showthat in recognizing the right of government employees to organize, thecommissioners intended to limit the right to the formation of unions orassociations only, without including the right to strike. Thus, Commissioner Eulogio R. Lerum, one of the sponsors of the provision that"[t]he right to self-organization shall not be denied to government employees"[Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(5)], in answer to the apprehensions expressed byCommissioner Ambrosio B. Padilla, Vice-President of the Commission,explained:MR. LERUM. I think what I will try to say will not take that long. When weproposed this amendment providing for self-organization of government

employees, it does not mean that because they have the right to organize, theyalso have the right to strike. That is a different matter. We are only talking



about organizing, uniting as a union. With regard to the right to strike,everyone will remember that in the Bill of Rights, there is a provision thatthe right to form associations or societies whose purpose is not contraryto law shall not be abridged. Now then, if the purpose of the state is toprohibit the strikes coming from employees exercising governmentfunctions, that could be done because the moment that is prohibited,then the union which will go on strike will be an illegal union. And thatprovision is carried in Republic Act 875. In Republic Act 875, workers,including those from the government-owned and controlled, are allowedto organize but they are prohibited from striking. So, the fear of ourhonorable Vice-President is unfounded. It does not mean that because weapprove this resolution, it carries with it the right to strike. That is adifferent matter. As a matter of fact, that subject is now being discussedin the Committee on Social Justice because we are trying to find asolution to this problem. We know that this problem exists; that themoment we allow anybody in the government to strike, then what willhappen if the members of the Armed Forces will go on strike? What willhappen to those people trying to protect us? So that is a matter of discussion in the Committee on Social Justice. But, I repeat, the right toform an organization does not carry with it the right to strike. [Record of the Constitutional Commission, vol. I, p. 569].It will be recalled that the Industrial Peace Act (R.A. No. 875), which was

repealed by the Labor Code (P.D. 442) in 1974, expressly banned strikesby employees in the Government, including instrumentalities exercisinggovernmental functions, but excluding entities entrusted with proprietaryfunctions:Sec. 11. Prohibition Against Strikes in the Government. — Theterms and conditions of employment in the Government, including anypolitical subdivision or instrumentality thereof, are governed by law and itis declared to be the policy of this Act that employees therein shall notstrike for the purpose of securing changes or modification in their termsand conditions of employment. Such employees may belong to any labororganization which does not impose the obligation to strike or to join instrike: Provided, however, That this section shall apply only to employeesemployed in governmental functions and not those employed in

proprietary functions of the Government including but not limited togovernmental corporations.No similar provision is found in the Labor Code, although at one time itrecognized the right of employees of government corporationsestablished under the Corporation Code to organize and bargaincollectively and those in the civil service to "form organizations forpurposes not contrary to law" [Art. 244, before its amendment by B.P.Blg. 70 in 1980], in the same breath it provided that "[t]he terms andconditions of employment of all government employees, includingemployees of government owned and controlled corporations, shall begoverned by the Civil Service Law, rules and regulations" [now Art. 276].Understandably, the Labor Code is silent as to whether or notgovernment employees may strike, for such are excluded from its

coverage [Ibid]. But then the Civil Service Decree [P.D. No. 807], isequally silent on the matter.

On June 1, 1987, to implement the constitutional guarantee of the right of government employees to organize, the President issued E.O. No. 180 whichprovides guidelines for the exercise of the right to organize of governmentemployees. In Section 14 thereof, it is provided that "[t]he Civil Service law andrules governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shallbe observed, subject to any legislation that may be enacted by Congress." ThePresident was apparently referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s. 1987 of the Civil Service Commission under date April 21, 1987 which, "prior to theenactment by Congress of applicable laws concerning strike by governmentemployees . . . enjoins under pain of administrative sanctions, all governmentofficers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass leaves,walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporarystoppage or disruption of public service." The air was thus cleared of theconfusion. At present, in the absence of any legislation allowing governmentemployees to strike, recognizing their right to do so, or regulating the exerciseof the right, they are prohibited from striking, by express provision of Memorandum Circular No. 6 and as implied in E.O. No. 180. [At this juncture, itmust be stated that the validity of Memorandum Circular No. 6 is not at issue].But are employees of the SSS covered by the prohibition against strikes? The Court is of the considered view that they are. Considering that under the1987 Constitution "[t]he civil service embraces all branches, subdivisions,instrumentalities, and agencies of the Government, including government-

owned or controlled corporations with original charters" [Art. IX(B), Sec. 2(1);see also Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 where the employees in the civil service aredenominated as "government employees"] and that the SSS is one suchgovernment-controlled corporation with an original charter, having beencreated under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil service[NASECO v. NLRC, G.R. Nos. 69870 & 70295, November 24, 1988] and arecovered by the Civil Service Commission's memorandum prohibiting strikes. This being the case, the strike staged by the employees of the SSS was illegal. The statement of the Court in Alliance of Government Workers v. Minister of Labor and Employment [G.R. No. 60403, August 3, 1983, 124 SCRA 1] isrelevant as it furnishes the rationale for distinguishing between workers in theprivate sector and government employees with regard to the right to strike: The general rule in the past and up to the present is that "the terms and

conditions of employment in the Government, including any political subdivisionor instrumentality thereof are governed by law" (Section 11, the IndustrialPeace Act, R.A. No. 875, as amended and Article 277, the Labor Code, P.D. No.442, as amended). Since the terms and conditions of government employmentare fixed by law, government workers cannot use the same weapons employedby workers in the private sector to secure concessions from their employers. The principle behind labor unionism in private industry is that industrial peacecannot be secured through compulsion by law. Relations between privateemployers and their employees rest on an essentially voluntary basis. Subjectto the minimum requirements of wage laws and other labor and welfarelegislation, the terms and conditions of employment in the unionized privatesector are settled through the process of collective bargaining. In governmentemployment, however, it is the legislature and, where properly given delegated

power, the administrative heads of government which fix the terms andconditions of employment. And this is effected through statutes or



administrative circulars, rules, and regulations, not through collectivebargaining agreements. [At p. 13; Emphasis supplied].Apropos is the observation of the Acting Commissioner of Civil Service, inhis position paper submitted to the 1971 Constitutional Convention, andquoted with approval by the Court in Alliance, to wit:It is the stand, therefore, of this Commission that by reason of the natureof the public employer and the peculiar character of the public service, itmust necessarily regard the right to strike given to unions in privateindustry as not applying to public employees and civil service employees.It has been stated that the Government, in contrast to the privateemployer, protects the interest of all people in the public service, andthat accordingly, such conflicting interests as are present in private laborrelations could not exist in the relations between government and thosewhom they employ. [At pp. 16-17; also quoted in National HousingCorporation v. Juco, G.R. No. 64313 January 17, 1985, 134 SCRA 172,178-179].E.O. No. 180, which provides guidelines for the exercise of the right toorganize of government employees, while clinging to the samephilosophy, has, however, relaxed the rule to allow negotiation where theterms and conditions of employment involved are not among those fixedby law. Thus:SECTION 13. Terms and conditions of employment or improvements

thereof, except those that are fixed by law, may be the subject of negotiations between duly recognized employees' organizations andappropriate government authorities. The same executive order has also provided for the general mechanismfor the settlement of labor disputes in the public sector, to wit:SECTION 16. The Civil Service and labor laws and procedures,whenever applicable, shall be followed in the resolution of complaints,grievances and cases involving government employees. In case anydispute remains unresolved after exhausting all the available remediesunder existing laws and procedures, the parties may jointly refer thedispute to the [Public Sector Labor-Management] Council for appropriateaction.Government employees may, therefore, through their unions or

associations, either petition the Congress for the betterment of the termsand conditions of employment which are within the ambit of legislation ornegotiate with the appropriate government agencies for theimprovement of those which are not fixed by law. If there be anyunresolved grievances, the dispute may be referred to the Public SectorLabor-Management Council for appropriate action. But employees in thecivil service may not resort to strikes, walkouts and other temporary workstoppages, like workers in the private sector, to pressure the Governmentto accede to their demands. As now provided under Sec. 4, Rule III of theRules and Regulations to Govern the Exercise of the Right of GovernmentEmployees to Self-Organization, which took effect after the instantdispute arose, "[t]he terms and conditions of employment in thegovernment, including any political subdivision or instrumentality thereof

and government-owned and controlled corporations with original chartersare governed by law and employees therein shall not strike for the

purpose of securing changes thereof."II The strike staged by the employees of the SSS belonging to petitioner unionbeing prohibited by law, an injunction may be issued to restrain it.It is futile for the petitioners to assert that the subject labor dispute falls withinthe exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRC and, hence, the Regional Trial Court hadno jurisdiction to issue a writ of injunction enjoining the continuance of thestrike. The Labor Code itself provides that terms and conditions of employmentof government employees shall be governed by the Civil Service Law, rules andregulations [Art. 276]. More importantly, E.O. No. 180 vests the Public SectorLabor-Management Council with jurisdiction over unresolved labor disputesinvolving government employees [Sec. 16]. Clearly, the NLRC has no jurisdiction over the dispute. This being the case, the Regional Trial Court was not precluded, in the exerciseof its general jurisdiction under B.P. Blg. 129, as amended, from assuming jurisdiction over the SSS's complaint for damages and issuing the injunctive writprayed for therein. Unlike the NLRC, the Public Sector Labor-ManagementCouncil has not been granted by law authority to issue writs of injunction inlabor disputes within its jurisdiction. Thus, since it is the Council, and not theNLRC, that has jurisdiction over the instant labor dispute, resort to the generalcourts of law for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike isappropriate. LibLex

Neither could the court a quo be accused of imprudence or overzealousness, forin fact it had proceeded with caution. Thus, after issuing a writ of injunctionenjoining the continuance of the strike to prevent any further disruption of public service, the respondent judge, in the same order, admonished the partiesto refer the unresolved controversies emanating from their employer-employeerelationship to the Public Sector Labor-Management Council for appropriateaction [Rollo, p. 86].IIIIn their "Petition/Application for Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction," andreiterated in their reply and supplemental reply, petitioners allege that the SSSunlawfully withheld bonuses and benefits due the individual petitioners andthey pray that the Court issue a writ of preliminary prohibitive and mandatoryinjunction to restrain the SSS and its agents from withholding payment thereof

and to compel the SSS to pay them. In their supplemental reply, petitionersannexed an order of the Civil Service Commission, dated May 5, 1989, whichruled that the officers of the SSSEA who are not preventively suspended andwho are reporting for work pending the resolution of the administrative casesagainst them are entitled to their salaries, year-end bonuses and other fringebenefits and affirmed the previous order of the Merit Systems Promotion Board. The matter being extraneous to the issues elevated to this Court, it is Our viewthat petitioners' remedy is not to petition this Court to issue an injunction, butto cause the execution of the aforesaid order, if it has already become final.WHEREFORE, no reversible error having been committed by the Court of Appeals, the instant petition for review is hereby DENIED and the decision of the appellate court dated March 9, 1988 in CA-G.R. SP No. 13192 is AFFIRMED.Petitioners' "Petition/Application for Preliminary and Mandatory Injunction"

dated December 13, 1988 is DENIED.SO ORDERED.



Fernan, C.J., Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano and Bidin, JJ., concur.

EN BANC[G.R. No. L-25246. September 12, 1974.]

BENJAMIN VICTORIANO, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ELIZALDE ROPEWORKERS' UNION and ELIZALDE ROPE FACTORY, INC.,

defendants, ELIZALDE ROPE WORKERS' UNION, defendant-appellant.

Salonga, Ordoñez, Yap, Sicat & Associates for plaintiff-appellee.Cipriano Cid & Associates for defendant-appellant.

D E C I S I O NZALDIVAR, J p:Appeal to this Court on purely questions of law from the decision of theCourt of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 58894. The undisputed facts that spawned the instant case follow:Benjamin Victoriano (hereinafter referred to as Appellee), a member of the religious sect known as the "Iglesia ni Cristo", had been in the employof the Elizalde Rope Factory, Inc. (hereinafter referred to as Company)since 1958. As such employee, he was a member of the Elizalde RopeWorkers' Union (hereinafter referred to as Union) which had with the

Company a collective bargaining agreement containing a closed shopprovision which reads as follows:

"Membership in the Union shall be required as a condition of employment for allpermanent employees workers covered by this Agreement." The collective bargaining agreement expired on March 3, 1964 but wasrenewed the following day, March 4, 1964.Under Section 4(a), paragraph 4, of Republic Act No. 875, prior to itsamendment by Republic Act No. 3350, the employer was not precluded "frommaking an agreement with a labor organization to require as a condition of employment membership therein, if such labor organization is therepresentative of the employees." On June 18, 1961, however, Republic Act No.3350 was enacted, introducing an amendment to paragraph (4) subsection (a)of section 4 of Republic Act No. 875, as follows: . . . "but such agreement shallnot cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of theirmembers in any such labor organization".Being a member of a religious sect that prohibits the affiliation of its memberswith any labor organization, Appellee presented his resignation to appellantUnion in 1962, and when no action was taken thereon, he reiterated hisresignation on September 3, 1974. Thereupon, the Union wrote a formal letterto the Company asking the latter to separate Appellee from the service in viewof the fact that he was resigning from the Union as a member. Themanagement of the Company in turn notified Appellee and his counsel thatunless the Appellee could achieve a satisfactory arrangement with the Union,the Company would be constrained to dismiss him from the service. This

prompted Appellee to file an action for injunction, docketed as Civil Case No.58894 in the Court of First Instance of Manila to enjoin the Company and theUnion from dismissing Appellee. 1 In its answer, the Union invoked the "unionsecurity clause" of the collective bargaining agreement; assailed theconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350; and contended that the Court had no jurisdiction over the case, pursuant to Republic Act No. 875, Sections 24 and 9(d) and (e). 2 Upon the facts agreed upon by the parties during the pre-trialconference, the Court a quo rendered its decision on August 26, 1965, thedispositive portion of which reads:"IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, judgment is rendered enjoining the defendantElizalde Rope Factory, Inc. from dismissing the plaintiff from his presentemployment and sentencing the defendant Elizalde Rope Workers' Union to paythe plaintiff P500 for attorney's fees and the costs of this action." 3

From this decision, the Union appealed directly to this Court on purely questionsof law, assigning the following errors:"I. That the lower court erred when it did not rule that Republic Act No.3350 is unconstitutional."II. That the lower court erred when it sentenced appellant herein to payplaintiff the sum of P500 as attorney's fees and the cost thereof."In support of the alleged unconstitutionality of Republic Act No. 3350, the Unioncontented, firstly, that the Act infringes on the fundamental right to form lawfulassociations; that "the very phraseology of said Republic Act 3350, thatmembership in a labor organization is banned to all those belonging to suchreligious sect prohibiting affiliation with any labor organization", 4 "prohibits allthe members of a given religious sect from joining any labor union if such sectprohibits affiliations of their members thereto"; 5 and, consequently, deprives

said members of their constitutional right to form or join lawful associations ororganizations guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, and thus becomes obnoxious to



Article III, Section 1 (6) of the 1935 Constitution. 6Secondly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 isunconstitutional for impairing the obligation of contracts in that, while theUnion is obliged to comply with its collective bargaining agreementcontaining a "closed shop provision," the Act relieves the employer fromits reciprocal obligation of cooperating in the maintenance of unionmembership as a condition of employment; and that said Act,furthermore, impairs the Union's rights as it deprives the union of duesfrom members who, under the Act, are relieved from the obligation tocontinue as such members. 7 Thirdly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 discriminatorilyfavors those religious sects which ban their members from joining laborunions, in violation of Article III, Section 1 (7) of the 1935 Constitution;and while said Act unduly protects certain religious sects, it leaves norights or protection to labor organizations. 8Fourthly, Republic Act No. 3350, asserted the Union, violates theconstitutional provision that "no religious test shall be required for theexercise of a civil right," in that the laborer's exercise of his civil right to join associations for purposes not contrary to law has to be determinedunder the Act by his affiliation with a religious sect; that conversely, if aworker has to sever his religious connection with a sect that prohibitsmembership in a labor organization in order to be able to join a labor

organization, said Act would violate religious freedom. 9Fifthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350, violates the"equal protection of laws" clause of the Constitution, it being adiscriminatory legislation, inasmuch as by exempting from the operationof closed shop agreement the members of the "Iglesia ni Cristo", it hasgranted said members undue advantages over their fellow workers, forwhile the Act exempts them from union obligation and liability, itnevertheless entitles them at the same time to the enjoyment of allconcessions, benefits and other emoluments that the union might securefrom the employer. 10Sixthly, the Union contended that Republic Act No. 3350 violates theconstitutional provision regarding the promotion of social justice. 11Appellant Union, furthermore, asserted that a "closed shop provision" in a

collective bargaining agreement cannot be considered violative of religious freedom, as to call for the amendment introduced by RepublicAct No. 3350; 12 and that unless Republic Act No. 3350 is declaredunconstitutional, trade unionism in this country would be wiped out asemployers would prefer to hire or employ members of the Iglesia ni Cristoin order to do away with labor organizations. 13Appellee, assailing appellant's arguments, contended that Republic ActNo. 3350 does not violate the right to form lawful associations, for theright to join associations includes the right not to join or to resign from alabor organization, if one's conscience does not allow his membershiptherein, and the Act has given substance to such right by prohibiting thecompulsion of workers to join labor organizations; 14 that said Act doesnot impair the obligation of contracts for said law formed part of, and was

incorporated into, the terms of the closed shop agreement; 15 that theAct does not violate the establishment of religion clause or separation of

Church and State, for Congress, in enacting said law, merely accommodatedthe religious needs of those workers whose religion prohibits its members from joining labor unions, and balanced the collective rights of organized labor withthe constitutional right of an individual to freely exercise his chosen religion;that the constitutional right to the free exercise of one's religion has primacyand preference over union security measures which are merely contractual; 16that said Act does not violate the constitutional provision of equal protection,for the classification of workers under the Act depending on their religioustenets is based on substantial distinction, is germane to the purpose of the law,and applies to all the members of a given class; 17 that said Act, finally, doesnot violate the social justice policy of the Constitution, for said Act was enactedprecisely to equalize employment opportunities for all citizens in the midst of the diversities of their religious beliefs. 18I. Before We proceed to the discussion of the first assigned error, it isnecessary to premise that there are some thoroughly established principleswhich must be followed in all cases where questions of constitutionality asobtains in the instant case are involved. All presumptions are indulged in favorof constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality mustprove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardshipdoes not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may beconceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger mustnegate all possible bases; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom,

justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation of theconstitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted. 191. Appellant Union's contention that Republic Act No. 3350 prohibits andbans the members of such religious sects that forbid affiliation of theirmembers with labor unions from joining labor unions appears nowhere in thewording of Republic Act No. 3350; neither can the same be deduced bynecessary implication therefrom. It is not surprising, therefore, that appellant,having thus misread the Act, committed the error of contending that said Act isobnoxious to the constitutional provision on freedom of association.Both the Constitution and Republic Act No. 875 recognize freedom of association. Section 1 (6) of Article III of the Constitution of 1935, as well asSection 7 of Article n of the Constitution of 1973, provide that the right to formassociations or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

Section 3 of Republic Act No. 875 provides that employees shall have the rightto self-organization and to form, join or assist labor organizations of their ownchoosing for the purpose of collective bargaining and to engage in concertedactivities for the purpose of collective bargaining and other mutual aid orprotection. What the Constitution and the Industrial Peace Act recognize andguarantee is the "right" to form or join associations. Notwithstanding thedifferent theories propounded by the different schools of jurisprudenceregarding the nature and contents of a "right", it can be safely said thatwhatever theory one subscribes to, a right comprehends at least two broadnotions, namely: first, liberty or freedom, i e., the absence of legal restraint,whereby an employee may act for himself without being prevented by law; andsecond, power, whereby an employee may, as he pleases, join or refrain from joining an association. It is, therefore, the employee who should decide for

himself whether he should join or not an association; and should he choose to join, he himself makes up his mind as to which association he would join; and



even after he has joined, he still retains the liberty and the power toleave and cancel his membership with said organization at any time. 20 Itis clear, therefore, that the right to join a union includes the right toabstain from joining any union. 21 Inasmuch as what both theConstitution and the Industrial Peace Act have recognized, andguaranteed to the employee, is the "right" to join associations of hischoice, it would be absurd to say that the law also imposes, in the samebreath, upon the employee the duty to join associations. The law doesnot enjoin an employee to sign up with any association.

The right to refrain from joining labor organizations recognized by Section3 of the Industrial Peace Act is, however, limited. The legal protectiongranted to such right to refrain from joining is withdrawn by operation of law, where a labor union and an employer have agreed on a closed shop,by virtue of which the employer may employ only members of thecollective bargaining union, and the employees must continue to bemembers of the union for the duration of the contract in order to keeptheir jobs. Thus Section 4 (a) (4) of the Industrial Peace Act, before itsamendment by Republic Act No. 3350, provides that although it would bean unfair labor practice for an employer "to discriminate in regard to hireor tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment toencourage or discourage membership in any labor organization" theemployer is, however, not precluded "from making an agreement with a

labor organization to require as a condition of employment membershiptherein, if such labor organization is the representative of theemployees". By virtue, therefore, of a closed shop agreement, before theenactment of Republic Act No. 3350, if any person, regardless of hisreligious beliefs, wishes to be employed or to keep his employment, hemust become a member of the collective bargaining union. Hence, theright of said employee not to join the labor union is curtailed andwithdrawn. To that all embracing coverage of the closed shop arrangement, RepublicAct No. 3350 introduced an exception, when it added to Section 4 (a) (4)of the Industrial Peace Act the following proviso: "but such agreementshall not cover members of any religious sects which prohibit affiliation of their members in any such labor organization". Republic Act No. 3350

merely excludes ipso jure from the application and coverage of theclosed shop agreement the employees belonging to any religious sectswhich prohibit affiliation of their members with any labor organization.What the exception provides, therefore, is that members of said religioussects cannot be compelled or coerced to join labor unions even when saidunions have closed shop agreements with the employers; that in spite of any closed shop agreement, members of said religious sects cannot berefused employment or dismissed from their jobs on the sole ground thatthey are not members of the collective bargaining union. It is clear,therefore, that the assailed Act, far from infringing the constitutionalprovision on freedom of association, upholds and reinforces it. It does notprohibit the members of said religious sects from affiliating with laborunions. It still leaves to said members the liberty and the power to

affiliate, or not to affiliate, with labor unions. If, notwithstanding theirreligious beliefs, the members of said religious sects prefer to sign up

with the labor union, they can do so. If in deference and fealty to their religiousfaith, they refuse to sign up, they can do so; the law does not coerce them to join; neither does the law prohibit them from joining; and neither may theemployer or labor union compel them to join. Republic Act No. 3350, therefore,does not violate the constitutional provision on freedom of association.2. Appellant Union also contends that the Act is unconstitutional forimpairing the obligation of its contract, specifically, the "union security clause"embodied in its Collective Bargaining Agreement with the Company, by virtueof which "membership in the union was required as a condition for employment

for all permanent employees workers". This agreement was already inexistence at the time Republic Act No. 3350 was enacted of June 18, 1961, andit cannot, therefore, be deemed to have been incorporated into the agreement.But by reason of this amendment, Appellee, as well as others similarly situated,could no longer be dismissed from his job even if he should cease to be amember, or disaffiliate from the Union, and the Company could continueemploying him notwithstanding his disaffiliation from the Union. The Act,therefore, introduced a change into the express terms of the union securityclause; the Company was partly absolved by law from the contractual obligationit had with the Union of employing only Union members in permanent positions.It cannot be denied, therefore, that there was indeed an impairment of saidunion security clause.According to Black, any statute which introduces a change into the express

terms of the contract, or its legal construction, or its validity, or its discharge, orthe remedy for its enforcement, impairs the contract. The extent of the changeis not material. It is not a question of degree or manner or cause, but of encroaching in any respect on its obligation or dispensing with any part of itsforce. There is an impairment of the contract if either party is absolved by lawfrom its performance. 22 Impairment has also been predicated on laws which,without destroying contracts, derogate from substantial contractual rights. 23It should not be overlooked, however, that the prohibition to impair theobligation of contracts is not absolute and unqualified. The prohibition isgeneral, affording a broad outline and requiring construction to fill in thedetails. The prohibition is not to be read with literal exactness like amathematical formula, for it prohibits unreasonable impairment only. 24 Inspite of the constitutional prohibition, the State continues to possess authority

to safeguard the vital interests of its people. Legislation appropriate tosafeguarding said interests may modify or abrogate contracts already in effect.25 For not only are existing laws read into contracts in order to fix theobligations as between the parties, but the reservation of essential attributes of sovereign power is also read into contracts as a postulate of the legal order. Allcontracts made with reference to any matter that is subject to regulation underthe police power must be understood as made in reference to the possibleexercise of that power. 26 Otherwise, important and valuable reforms may beprecluded by the simple device of entering into contracts for the purpose of doing that which otherwise may be prohibited. The policy of protectingcontracts against impairment presupposes the maintenance of a governmentby virtue of which contractual relations are worthwhile — a government whichretains adequate authority to secure the peace and good order of society. The

contract clause of the Constitution must, therefore, be not only in harmonywith, but also in subordination to, in appropriate instances, the reserved power



of the state to safeguard the vital interests of the people. It follows thatnot all legislations, which have the effect of impairing a contract, areobnoxious to the constitutional prohibition as to impairment, and astatute passed in the legitimate exercise of police power, although itincidentally destroys existing contract rights, must be upheld by thecourts. This has special application to contracts regulating relationsbetween capital and labor which are not merely contractual, and saidlabor contracts, for being impressed with public interest, must yield tothe common good. 27

In several occasions this Court declared that the prohibition againstimpairing the obligations of contracts has no application to statutesrelating to public subjects within the domain of the general legislativepowers of the state involving public welfare. 28 Thus, this Court also heldthat the Blue Sunday Law was not an infringement of the obligation of acontract that required the employer to furnish work on Sundays to hisemployees, the law having been enacted to secure the well-being andhappiness of the laboring class, and being, furthermore, a legitimateexercise of the police power. 29In order to determine whether legislation unconstitutionally impairscontract obligations, no unchanging yardstick, applicable at all times andunder all circumstances, by which the validity of each statute may bemeasured or determined, has been fashioned, but every case must be

determined upon its own circumstances. Legislation impairing theobligation of contracts can be sustained when it is enacted for thepromotion of the general good of the people, and when the meansadopted to secure that end are reasonable. Both the end sought and themeans adopted must be legitimate, i.e., within the scope of the reservedpower of the state construed in harmony with the constitutional limitationof that power. 30What then was the purpose sought to be achieved by Republic Act No.3350? Its purpose was to insure freedom of belief and religion, and topromote the general welfare by preventing discrimination against thosemembers of religious sects which prohibit their members from joininglabor unions, confirming thereby their natural, statutory andconstitutional right to work, the fruits of which work are usually the only

means whereby they can maintain their own life and the life of theirdependents. It cannot be gainsaid that said purpose is legitimate. The questioned Act also provides protection to members of said religioussects against two aggregates of group strength from which the individualneeds protection. The individual employee, at various times in hisworking life, is confronted by two aggregates of power — collective labor,directed by a union, and collective capital, directed by management. Theunion, an institution developed to organize labor into a collective forceand thus protect the individual employee from the power of collectivecapital, is, paradoxically, both the champion of employee rights, and anew source of their frustration. Moreover, when the Union interacts withmanagement, it produces yet a third aggregate of group strength fromwhich the individual also needs protection — the collective bargaining

relationship. 31 The aforementioned purpose of the amendatory law is clearly seen in the

Explanatory Note to House Bill No. 5859, which later became Republic Act No.3350, as follows:"It would be unthinkable indeed to refuse employing a person who, on accountof his religious beliefs and convictions, cannot accept membership in a labororganization although he possesses all the qualifications for the job. This istantamount to punishing such person for believing in a doctrine he has a rightunder the law to believe in. The law would not allow discrimination to flourish tothe detriment of those whose religion discards membership in any labororganization, Likewise, the law would not commend the deprivation of their

right to work and pursue a modest means of livelihood, without in any mannerviolating their religious faith and/or belief." 32It cannot be denied, furthermore, that the means adopted by the Act to achievethat purpose — exempting the members of said religious sects from coverageof union security agreements — is reasonable.It may not be amiss to point out here that the free exercise of religiousprofession or belief is superior to contract rights. In case of conflict, the lattermust, therefore, yield to the former. The Supreme Court of the United Stateshas also declared on several occasions that the rights in the First Amendment,which include freedom of religion, enjoy a preferred position in theconstitutional system. 33 Religious freedom, although not unlimited, is afundamental personal right and liberty, 34 and has a preferred position in thehierarchy of values. Contractual rights, therefore, must yield to freedom of

religion. It is only where unavoidably necessary to prevent an immediate andgrave danger to the security and welfare of the community that infringement of religious freedom may be justified, and only to the smallest extent necessary toavoid the danger.3. In further support of its contention that Republic Act No. 3350 isunconstitutional, appellant Union averred that said Act discriminates in favor of members of said religious sects in violation of Section 1(7) of Article III of the1935 Constitution, and which is now Section 8 of Article 8 of the 1973Constitution, which provides:"No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibitingthe free exercise thereof, and the free exercise and enjoyment of religiousprofession and worship, without. discrimination and preference, shall forever beallowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political

rights." The constitutional provision not only prohibits legislation for the support of anyreligious tenets or the modes of worship of any sect, thus forestallingcompulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the practice of any form of worship, 35 but also assures the free exercise of one's chosen form of religionwithin limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to professhis beliefs, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the libertyof others and with the common good. 36 Any legislation whose effect orpurpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminateinvidiously between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may becharacterized as being only indirect. 37 But if the stage regulates conduct by

enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect toadvance the state's secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden



on religious observance, unless the state can accomplish its purposewithout imposing such burden. 38In Aglipay v. Ruiz, 39 this Court had occasion to state that thegovernment should not be precluded from pursuing valid objectivessecular ID character even if the incidental result would be favorable to areligion or sect. It has likewise been held that the statute, in order towithstand the strictures of constitutional prohibition, must have a secularlegislative purpose and a primary effect that neither advances norinhibits religion. 40 Assessed by these criteria, Republic Act No. 3350

cannot be said to violate the constitutional inhibition of the "no-establishment" (of religion) clause of the Constitution. The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 is secular, worldly, and temporal,not spiritual or religious or holy and eternal. It was intended to serve thesecular purpose of advancing the constitutional right to the free exerciseof religion, by averting that certain persons be refused work, or bedismissed from work, or be dispossessed of their right to work and of being impeded to pursue a modest means of livelihood, by reason of union security agreements. To help its citizens to find gainfulemployment whereby they can make a living to support themselves andtheir families is a valid objective of the state. In fact, the state isenjoined, in the 1935 Constitution, to afford protection to labor, andregulate the relations between labor and capital and industry. 41 More so

now in the 1973 Constitution where it is mandated that "the State shallafford protection to labor, promote full employment and equality inemployment, ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race orcreed and regulate the relation between workers and employers." 42 The primary effects of the exemption from closed shop agreements infavor of members of religious sects that prohibit their members fromaffiliating with a labor organization, is the protection of said employeesagainst the aggregate force of the collective bargaining agreement, andrelieving certain citizens of a burden on their religious beliefs; and byeliminating to a certain extent economic insecurity due tounemployment, which is a serious menace to the health, morals, andwelfare of the people of the State, the Act also promotes the well-beingof society. It is our view that the exemption from the effects of closed

shop agreement does not directly advance, or diminish, the interests of any particular religion. Although the exemption may benefit those whoare members of religious sects that prohibit their members from joininglabor unions, the benefit upon the religious sects is merely incidental andindirect. The "establishment clause" (of religion) does not ban regulationon conduct whose reason or effect merely happens to coincide orharmonize with the tenets of some or all religions. 43 The free exerciseclause of the Constitution has been interpreted to require that religiousexercise be preferentially aided. 44We believe that in enacting Republic Act No. 3350, Congress actedconsistently with the spirit of the constitutional provision. It acted merelyto relieve the exercise of religion, by certain persons, of a burden that isimposed by union security agreements. It was Congress itself thatimposed that burden when it enacted the Industrial Peace Act (RepublicAct 875), and, certainly, Congress, if it so deems advisable, could take

away the same burden. It is certain that not every conscience can beaccommodated by all the laws of the land; but when general laws conflict withscruples of conscience, exemptions ought to be granted unless some"compelling state interest" intervenes. 45 In the instant case, We see no suchcompelling state interest to withhold exemption.Appellant bewails that while Republic Act No. 3350 protects members of certainreligious sects, it leaves no right to, and is silent as to the protection of, labororganizations. The purpose of Republic Act No. 3350 was not to grant rights tolabor unions. The rights of labor unions are amply provided for in Republic Act

No. 875 and the new Labor Code. As to the lamented silence of the Actregarding the rights and protection of labor unions, suffice it to say, first, thatthe validity of a statute is determined by its provisions, not by its silence; 46and, second, the fact that the law may work hardship does not render itunconstitutional. 47It would not be amiss to state, regarding this matter, that to compel persons to join and remain members of a union to keep their jobs in violation of theirreligious scruples, would hurt, rather than help, labor unions. Congress hasseen it fit to exempt religious objectors lest their resistance spread to otherworkers, for religious objections have contagious potentialities more thanpolitical and philosophic objections.Furthermore, let it be noted that coerced unity and loyalty even to the country,and a fortiori to a labor union - assuming that such unity and loyalty can be

attained through coercion — is not a goal that is constitutionally obtainable atthe expense of religious liberty. 48 A desirable end cannot be promoted byprohibited means.4. Appellants' fourth contention, that Republic Act No. 3350 violates theconstitutional prohibition against requiring a religious test for the exercise of acivil right or a political right, is not well taken. The Act does not require as aqualification, or condition, for joining any lawful association membership in anyparticular religion or in any religious sect; neither does the Act require affil iationwith a religious sect that prohibits Its members from joining a labor union as acondition or qualification for withdrawing from a labor union. Joining orwithdrawing from a labor union requires a positive act. Republic Act No. 3350only exempts members with such religious affiliation from the coverage of closed shop agreements. So, under this Act, a religious objector is not required

to do a positive act — to exercise the right to join or to resign from the union.He is exempted ipso jure without need of any positive act on his part. Aconscientious religious objector need not perform a positive act or exercise theright of resigning from the labor union — he is exempted from the coverage of any closed shop agreement that a labor union may have entered into. How thencan there be a religious test required for the exercise of a right when no rightneed be exercised?We have said that it was within the police power of the State to enact RepublicAct No. 3350, and that its purpose was legal and in consonance with theConstitution. It is never an illegal evasion of a constitutional provision orprohibition to accomplish a desired result, which is lawful in itself, bydiscovering or following a legal way to do it. 495. Appellant avers as its fifth ground that Republic Act No. 3350 is adiscriminatory legislation, inasmuch as it grants to the members of certainreligious sects undue advantages over other workers, thus violating Section 1 of



Article III of the 1935 Constitution which forbids the denial to any personof the equal protection of the laws. 50 The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equalityin the application of the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not,therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional prohibitionagainst inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affectedalike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not meanindiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on personsaccording to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality,

not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that things whichare different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. Theequal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things thatare different. 51 It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either inthe object to which it is directed or by the territory within which it is tooperate. The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allowsclassification. Classification in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in speculation or practicebecause they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is notinvalid because of simple inequality. 52 The very idea of classification isthat of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. 53 All

that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, whichmeans that the classification should be based on substantial distinctionswhich make for real differences; that it must be germane to the purposeof the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and thatit must apply equally to each member of the class. 54 This Court has heldthat the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based ona reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. 55In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters within its jurisdiction, the state is recognizedas enjoying a wide range of discretion. 56 It is not necessary that theclassification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or intheir relation. 57 Neither is it necessary that the classification be madewith mathematical nicety. 58 Hence legislative classification may in many

cases properly rest on narrow distinctions, 59 for the equal protectionguaranty does not preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as they may appear.We believe that Republic Act No. 3350 satisfies the aforementionedrequirements. The Act classifies employees and workers, as to the effectand coverage of union shop security agreements, into those who byreason of their religious beliefs and convictions cannot sign up with alabor union, and those whose religion does not prohibit membership inlabor unions. The classification rests on real or substantial, not merelyimaginary or whimsical, distinctions. There is such real distinction in thebeliefs, feelings and sentiments of employees. Employees do not believein the same religious faith and different religions differ in their dogmasand cannons. Religious beliefs, manifestations and practices, though theyare found in all places, and in all times, take so many varied forms as tobe almost beyond imagination. There are many views that comprise the

broad spectrum of religious beliefs among the people. There are diversemanners in which beliefs, equally paramount in the lives of their possessors,may be articulated. Today the country is far more heterogenous in religion thanbefore, differences in religion do exist, and these differences are important andshould not be ignored.Even from the psychological point of view, the classification is based on realand important differences. Religious beliefs are not mere beliefs, mere ideasexisting only in the mind, for they carry with them practical consequences andare the motives of certain rules of human conduct and the justification of

certain acts. 60 Religious sentiment makes a man view things and events intheir relation to his God. It gives to human life its distinctive-character, its tone,its happiness, or unhappiness, its enjoyment or irksomeness. Usually, a strongand passionate desire is involved in a religious belief. To certain persons, nosingle factor of their experience is more important to them than their religion,or their not having any religion. Because of differences in religious belief andsentiments, a very poor person may consider himself better than the rich, andthe man who even lacks the necessities of life may be more cheerful than theone who has all possible luxuries. Due to their religious beliefs people, like themartyrs, became resigned to the inevitable and accepted cheerfully even themost painful and excruciating pains. Because of differences in religious beliefs,the world has witnessed turmoil, civil strife, persecution, hatred, bloodshed andwar, generated to a large extent by members of sects who were intolerant of

other religious beliefs. The classification, introduced by Republic Act No. 3350,therefore, rests on substantial distinctions. The classification introduced by said Act is also germane to its purpose. Thepurpose of the law is precisely to avoid those who cannot, because of theirreligious belief, join labor unions, from being deprived of their right to work andfrom being dismissed from their work because of union shop securityagreements.Republic Act No. 3350, furthermore, is not limited in its application to conditionsexisting at the time of its enactment. The law does not provide that it is to beeffective for a certain period of time only. It is intended to apply for all times aslong as the conditions to which the law is applicable exist. As long as there areclosed shop agreements between an employer and a labor union, and there areemployees who are prohibited by their religion from affiliating with labor

unions, their exemption from the coverage of said agreements continues.Finally, the Act applies equally to all members of said religious sects; this isevident from its provision. The fact that the law grants a privilege to members of said religious sectscannot by itself render the Act unconstitutional, for as We have adverted to, theAct only restores to them their freedom of association which closed shopagreements have taken away, and puts them in the same plane as the otherworkers who are not prohibited by their religion from joining labor unions. Thecircumstance, that the other employees, because they are differently situated,are not granted the same privilege, does not render the law unconstitutional,for every classification allowed by the Constitution by its nature involvesinequality. The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality isnot violative of the right to equal protection, for every classification of personsor things for regulation by law produces inequality in some degree, but the law



is not thereby rendered invalid. A classification otherwise reasonabledoes not offend the constitution simply because in practice it results insome inequality. 61 Anent this matter, it has been said that whenever itis apparent from the scope of the law that its object is for the benefit of the public and the means by which the benefit is to be obtained are of public character, the law will be upheld even though incidentaladvantage may occur to individuals beyond those enjoyed by the generalpublic. 626. Appellant's further contention that Republic Act No. 3350 violates

the constitutional provision on social justice is also baseless. Social justice is intended to promote the welfare of all the people. 63 RepublicAct No. 3350 promotes that welfare insofar as it looks after the welfare of those who, because of their religious belief, cannot join labor unions; theAct prevents their being deprived of work and of the means of livelihood.In determining whether any particular measure is for public advantage, itis not necessary that the entire state be directly benefited — it issufficient that a portion of the state be benefited thereby.Social justice also means the adoption by the Government of measurescalculated to insure economic stability of all component elements of society, through the maintenance of a proper economic and socialequilibrium in the inter-relations of the members of the community. 64Republic Act No. 3350 insures economic stability to the members of a

religious sect, like the Iglesia ni Cristo, who are also component elementsof society, for it insures security in their employment, notwithstandingtheir failure to join a labor union having a closed shop agreement withthe employer. The Act also advances the proper economic and socialequilibrium between labor unions and employees who cannot join laborunions, for it exempts the latter from the compelling necessity of joininglabor unions that have closed shop agreements, and equalizes, in so faras opportunity to work is concerned, those whose religion prohibitsmembership in labor unions with those whose religion does not prohibitsaid membership. Social justice does not imply social equality, becausesocial inequality will always exist as long as social relations depend onpersonal or subjective proclivities. Social justice does not require legalequality because legal equality, being a relative term, is necessarily

premised on differentiations based on personal or natural conditions. 65Social justice guarantees equality of opportunity, 66 and this is preciselywhat Republic Act No. 3350 proposes to accomplish — it gives laborers,irrespective of their religious scruples, equal opportunity for work.7. As its last ground, appellant contends that the amendmentintroduced by Republic Act No. 3350 is not called for - in other words, theAct is not proper, necessary or desirable. Anent this matter, it has beenheld that a statute which is not necessary is not, for that reason,unconstitutional; that in determining the constitutional validity of legislation, the courts are unconcerned with issues as to the necessity forthe enactment of the legislation in question. 67 Courts do inquire into thewisdom of laws. 68 Moreover, legislatures, being chosen by the people,are presumed to understand and correctly appreciate the needs of thepeople, and it may change the laws accordingly. 69 The fear isentertained by appellant that unless the Act is declared unconstitutional,

employers will prefer employing members of religious sects that prohibit theirmembers from joining labor unions, and thus be a fatal blow to unionism. We donot agree. The threat to unionism will depend on the number of employees whoare members of the religious sects that control the demands of the labormarket. But there is really no occasion now to go further and anticipateproblems We cannot judge with the material now before Us. At any rate, thevalidity of a statute is to be determined from its general purpose and itsefficacy to accomplish the end desired, not from its effects on a particular case.70 The essential basis for the exercise of power, and not a mere incidental

result arising from its exertion, is the criterion by which the validity of a statuteis to be measured. 71II. We now pass on the second assignment of error, in support of which theUnion argued that the decision of the trial court ordering the Union to pay P500for attorney's fees directly contravenes Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875, forthe instant action involves an industrial dispute wherein the Union was a party,and said Union merely acted in the exercise of its rights under the union shopprovision of its existing collective bargaining contract with the Company; thatsaid order also contravenes Article 2208 of the Civil Code; that, furthermore,Appellee was never actually dismissed by the defendant Company and did nottherefore suffer any damage at all. 72In refuting appellant Union's arguments, Appellee claimed that in the instantcase there was really no industrial dispute involved in the attempt to compel

Appellee to maintain its membership in the union under pain of dismissal, andthat the Union, by its act, inflicted intentional harm on Appellee; that sinceAppellee was compelled to institute an action to protect his right to work,appellant could legally be ordered to pay attorney's fees under Articles 1704and 2208 of the Civil Code. 73 The second paragraph of Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875 which is reliedupon by appellant provides that:"No suit, action or other proceedings shall be maintainable in any court againsta labor organization or any officer or member thereof for any act done by or onbehalf of such organization in furtherance of an industrial dispute to which it isa party, on the ground only that such act induces some other person to break acontract of employment or that it is in restraint of trade or interferes with thetrade, business or employment of some other person or with the right of some

other person to dispose of his capital or labor." (Emphasis supplied) That there was a labor dispute in the instant case cannot be 'disputed forappellant sought the discharge of respondent by virtue of the closed shopagreement and under Section 2 (j) of Republic Act No. 875 a question involvingtenure of employment is included in the term "labor dispute". 74 The dischargeor the act of seeking it is the labor dispute itself. It being the labor dispute itself,that very same act of the Union in asking the employer to dismiss Appelleecannot be "an act done . . . in furtherance of an industrial dispute". The merefact that appellant is a labor union does not necessarily mean that all its actsare in furtherance of an industrial dispute. 75 Appellant Union, therefore,cannot invoke in its favor Section 24 of Republic Act No. 875. This case is notintertwined with any unfair labor practice case existing at the time whenAppellee filed his complaint before the lower court.Neither does Article 2208 of the Civil Code, invoked by the Union, serve as itsshield. The article provides that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation may



be awarded "when the defendant's act or omission has compelled theplaintiff . . . to incur expenses to protect his interest"; and "in any othercase where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees andexpenses of litigation should be recovered". In the instant case, it cannotbe gainsaid that appellant Union's act in demanding Appellee's dismissalcaused Appellee to incur expenses to prevent his being dismissed fromhis job. Costs according to Section 1, Rule 142, of the Rules of Court,shall be allowed as a matter of course to the prevailing party.WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is dismissed, and the decision, dated

August 26, 1965, of the Court of First Instance of Manila, in its Civil CaseNo. 58894, appealed from is affirmed, with costs against appellant Union.It is so ordered.Makalintal, C .J ., Castro, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio,Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ ., concur.Fernandez, J ., did not take part because he was co-author, when he wasa Senator, of Rep. Act No. 3350.Separate OpinionsFERNANDO, J ., concurring: The decision arrived at unanimously by this Court that Republic Act No.3350 is free from the constitutional infirmities imputed to it wasdemonstrated in a manner well-nigh conclusive in the learned, scholarly,and comprehensive opinion so typical of the efforts of the ponente,

Justice Zaldivar. Like the rest of my brethren, I concur fully. Consideringmoreover, the detailed attention paid to each and every objection raisedas to its validity and the clarity and persuasiveness with which it wasshown to be devoid of support in authoritative doctrines, it would appearthat the last word has been written on this particular subject.Nonetheless, I deem it proper to submit this brief expression of my viewson the transcendent character of religious freedom 1 and its primacyeven as against the claims of protection to labor, 2 also one of thefundamental principles of the Constitution.1. Religious freedom is identified with the liberty every individualpossesses to worship or not a Supreme Being, and if a devotee of anysect, to act in accordance with its creed. Thus is constitutionallysafeguarded, according to Justice Laurel, that "profession of faith to an

active power that binds and elevates man to his Creator . . ." 3 Thechoice of what a man wishes to believe in is his and his alone. That is adomain left untouched, where intrusion is not allowed, a citadel to whichthe law is denied entry, whatever be his thoughts or hopes. In thatsphere, what he wills reigns supreme. The doctrine to which he paysfealty may for some be unsupported by evidence, devoid of rationalfoundation. No matter. There is no requirement as to its conformity towhat has found acceptance. It suffices that for him such a concept holdsundisputed sway. That is a recognition of man's freedom. That for him isone of the ways of self-realization. It would be to disregard the dignitythat attaches to every human being to deprive him of such an attribute. The "fixed star on our constitutional constellation," to borrow thefelicitous phrase of Justice Jackson, is that no official, not excluding thehighest, has it in his power to prescribe what shall be orthodox in mattersof conscience — or to mundane affairs, for that matter.

Gerona v. Secretary of Education 4 speaks similarly. In the language of itsponente, Justice Montemayor: "The realm of belief and creed is infinite andlimitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believein most anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same mayappear to others, even heretical when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy ordoctrinal standards." 5 There was this qualification though: "But between thefreedom of belief and the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of roadto travel. If the exercise of said religious belief clashes with the established

institutions of society and with the law, then the former must yield and giveway to the latter. The Government steps in and either restrains said exercise oreven prosecutes the one exercising it." 6 It was on that basis that the dailycompulsory flag ceremony in accordance with a statute 7 was found free fromthe constitutional objection on the part of a religious sect, the Jehovah'sWitnesses, whose members alleged that their participation would be offensiveto their religious beliefs. In a case not dissimilar, West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 8 the American Supreme Court reached a contraryconclusion. Justice Jackson's eloquent opinion is, for this writer, highlypersuasive. Thus: "The case is made difficult not because the principles of itsdecision are obscure but because the f lag involved is our own. Nevertheless, weapply the limitations of the Constitution with no fear that freedom to beintellectually and spiritually diverse or even contrary will disintegrate the social

organization. To believe that patriotism will not flourish if patriotic ceremoniesare voluntary and spontaneous instead of a compulsory routine is to make anunflattering estimate of the appeal of our institutions to free minds. We canhave intellectual individualism and the rich cultural diversities that we owe toexceptional minds only at the price of occasional eccentricity and abnormalattitudes. When they are so harmless to others or to the State as those we dealwith here, the price is not too great. But freedom to differ is not limited tothings that do not matter much. That would be a mere shadow of freedom. Thetest of its substance is the right to differ as to things that touch the heart of theexisting order." 9 There is moreover this ringing affirmation by Chief Justice Hughes of theprimacy of religious freedom in the forum of conscience even as against thecommand of the State itself: "Much has been said of the paramount duty to the

state, a duty to be recognized, it is urged, even though it conflicts withconvictions of duty to God. Undoubtedly that duty to the state exists within thedomain of power, for government may enforce obedience to laws regardless of scruples. When one's belief collides with the power of the state, the latter issupreme within its sphere and submission or punishment follows. But, in theforum of conscience, duty to a moral power higher than the state has alwaysbeen maintained. The reservation of that supreme obligation, as a matter of principle, would unquestionably be made by many of our conscientious and law-abiding citizens. The essence of religion is belief in a relation to God involvingduties superior to those arising from any human relation." 10 The AmericanChief Justice spoke in dissent, it is true, but with him in agreement were threeof the foremost jurists who ever sat in that Tribunal, Justices Holmes, Brandeis,and Stone.2. As I view Justice Zaldivar's opinion in that light, my concurrence, as setforth earlier, is wholehearted and entire. With such a cardinal postulate as the



basis of our polity, it has a message that cannot be misread. Thus isintoned with a reverberating clang, to paraphrase Cardozo, afundamental principle that drowns all weaker sounds. The labored effortto cast doubt on the validity of the statutory provision in question is farfrom persuasive. It is attended by futility. It is not for this Court, as Iconceive of the judicial function, to restrict the scope of a preferredfreedom.3. There is, however, the question of whether such an exceptionpossesses an implication that lessens the effectiveness of state efforts to

protect labor, likewise, as noted, constitutionally ordained. Such a view,on the surface, may not be lacking in plausibility, but upon closeranalysis, it cannot stand scrutiny. Thought must be given to the freedomof association, likewise an aspect of intellectual liberty. For the lateProfessor Howe, a constitutionalist and in his lifetime the biographer of the great Holmes, it even partakes of the political theory of pluralisticsovereignty. So great is the respect for the autonomy accorded voluntarysocieties. 11 Such a right implies at the very least that one candetermine for himself whether or not he should join or refrain from joininga labor organization, an institutional device for promoting the welfare of the working man. A closed shop, on the other hand, is inherentlycoercive. That is why, as is unmistakably reflected in our decisions, thelatest of which is Guijarno v. Court of Industrial Relations, 12 it is far from

being a favorite of the law. For a statutory provision then to furthercurtail its operation, is precisely to follow the dictates of sound publicpolicy. The exhaustive and well-researched opinion of Justice Zaldivar thus is inthe mainstream of constitutional tradition. That, for me, is the channel tofollow.

EN BANC[A.C. No. 1928. August 3, 1978.]

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty.



MARCIAL A. EDILLON (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD - 1).SYNOPSIS

For respondent's stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to theIntegrated Bar of the Philippines since the latter's constitution,notwithstanding due notice, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Barof the Philippines unanimously adopted and submitted to the SupremeCourt a resolution recommending the removal of respondent's name fromits Roll of Attorneys, pursuant to Par. 2, Sec. 24, Art. III of the By-Laws of the IBP.

Respondent, although conceding the propriety and necessity of theintegration of the Bar of the Philippines, questions the all-encompassing,all-inclusive scope of membership therein and the obligation to paymembership dues arguing that the provisions therein (Section 1 and 9 of the Court Rule 139-A) constitute an invasion of his constitutional right inthe sense that he is being compelled, as a precondition to maintaining hisstatus as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and topay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelledfinancial support of the said organization to which he is admittedlypersonally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty andproperty guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Respondent likewisequestions the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court to strike his name fromthe Roll of Attorneys, contending that this matter is not among the

justiciable cases triable by the Court but is of an administrative naturepertaining to an administrative body. The Supreme Court unanimously held that all legislation directing theintegration of the Bar are valid exercise of the police power over animportant profession; that to compel a lawyer to be a member of the IBPis not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate; that therequirement to pay membership fees is imposed as a regulatory measuredesigned to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration; that the penalty provisions for non-payment are not void asunreasonable or arbitrary; that the Supreme Court's jurisdiction andpower to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys isexpressly provided by Art. X, Section 5(5) of the Constitution and held asan inherent judicial function by a host of decided cases; and that the

provisions of Rules of Court 139-A ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines and the IBP By-Laws complained of are neitherunconstitutional nor illegal.Respondent disbarred and his name ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys.SYLLABUS1. ATTORNEYS; BAR INTEGRATION; NATURE AND PURPOSE. — An"Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer mustbelong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individuallawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of theBar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is affordedan opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar aswell as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by orunder the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official nationalbody of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are,

therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the Bar,including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for theeffective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which constitutessufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper cause appearing,a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the offending member.2. ID.; ID.; INTEGRATION OF THE BAR, A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICEPOWER; PRACTICE OF LAW NOT A VESTED RIGHT BUT A PRIVILEGE. — Alllegislation directing the integration of the Bar have been uniformly and

universally sustained as a valid exercise of the police power over an importantprofession. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilegemoreover clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial dutiesnot only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts,and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of theState — the administration of justice — as an officer of the Court. The practiceof law being clothed with public interest, the holder of this privilege mustsubmit to a degree of control for the common good, to the extent of the interesthe has created. The expression "affected with a public interest" is theequivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police power"3. ID.; ID.; ID.; LEGISLATION TO EFFECT THE INTEGRATION OF THEPHILIPPINE BAR. — The Congress in enacting Republic Act No. 6397, approvedon September 17, 1971, authorizing the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court

to effect the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shallsee fit," it did so in the exercise of the paramount police power of the State. TheAct's avowal is to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve theadministration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its publicresponsibility more effectively," the Supreme Court in ordaining the integrationof the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and thePresident of the Philippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a bodycorporate through Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, wereprompted by fundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by adesire to meet the demands of pressing public necessity.4. ID.; ID.; ID.; IMPOSITION OF RESTRAINTS JUSTIFIED. — The State, inorder to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and regulate personalliberty, property and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to

restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes,"Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To thisfundamental principle of government the rights of individuals are subordinated.Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not bemade to prevail over authority because then society will fall into anarchy(Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the State torestrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from somefreedom.5. ID.; ID.; CONSTITUTION VESTS SUPREME COURT WITH PLENARY POWERIN ALL CASES REGARDING ADMISSION TO AND SUPERVISION OF THE PRACTICEOF LAW. — Even without the enabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and lookingsolely to the language of the provision of the Constitution granting the SupremeCourt the power "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice andprocedure in all courts, and the admission to the practice of law, "(Sec. 5[5],



Art. X, 1973 Costitution) it at once becomes indubitable that thisconstitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court with plenary power inall cases regarding the admission to and supervision of the practice of law.6. ID.; ID.; COMPULSORY MEMBERSHIP THEREIN NOT VIOLATIVE OFA LAWYER'S CONSTITUTIONAL FREEDOM TO ASSOCIATE. — To compel alawyer to be a member of the Integrated Bar is not violative of hisconstitutional freedom to associate. Integration does not make a lawyer amember of any group of which he is not already a member. He becomes

a member of the Bar when he passed the Bar examinations. All thatintegration actually does is to provide an official national organization forthe well-defined but unorganized and incohesive group of which everylawyer is already a member. Bar integration does not compel the lawyerto associate with anyone. He is free to attend or not attend the meetingsof his Integrated Bar Chapter or vote or refuse to vote in its elections ashe chooses. The only compulsion to which he is subjected is the paymentof annual dues. The Supreme Court, in order to further the State'slegitimate interest in elevating the quality of professional legal services,may require that the cost of improving the profession in this fashion beshared by the subjects and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — thelawyers.7. ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF MEMBERSHIP FEE; A REGULATORY

MEASURE NOT PROHIBITED BY LAW. — There is nothing in theConstitution that prohibits the Supreme Court, under its constitutionalpower and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to thepractice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section5 of the 1973 Constitution) from requiring members of a privileged class,such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable fee toward defraying theexpenses of regulation of the profession to which they belong. It is quiteapparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatory measure,designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposes of integration.8. ID.; ID.; ID.; PENALTY PROVISIONS, NOT VOID. — If the power toimpose the fee as a regulatory measure is recognize, then a penaltydesigned to enforce its payment, which penalty may be avoided

altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or arbitrary. Thepractice of law is not a property right but a mere privilege, and as suchmust bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exactcompliance with the lawyer s public responsibilities.9. ID.; POWER TO PASS UPON FITNESS TO REMAIN A MEMBER OF THE BAR VESTED IN THE SUPREME COURT. — The matters of admission,suspension, disbarment and reinstatement of lawyers and theirregulation and supervision have been and are indisputably recognized asinherent judicial functions and responsibilities. The power of the SupremeCourt to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers does notdepend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It has limitations no lessreal because they are inherent. The very burden of the duty is itself aguaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted.10. ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — The provisions of Rule 139-A of theRules of Court ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines and

the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is neither unconstitutionalnor illegal, and a lawyer's stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues to theIntegrated Bar of the Philippines, notwithstanding due notice, in violation of saidRule and By-Laws, is a ground for disbarment and striking out of his name fromthe Roll of Attorneys of the Court.R E S O L U T I O NCASTRO, C.J p: The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in thePhilippines.

On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short)Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 inAdministrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership DuesDelinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removalof the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for "stubborn refusal topay his membership dues" to the IBP since the latter's constitutionnotwithstanding due notice.On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri,submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval,pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, whichreads:". . . . Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, theBoard shall promptly inquire into the cause or causes of the continued

delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including arecommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquentmember's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall besent by registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapterconcerned."On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on theresolution and letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on February23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply. Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, theparties were required to submit memoranda in amplification of their oral

arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution.At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings wouldshow that the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar of thePhilippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however, objects toparticular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred to as the CourtRule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of the Philippines was integrated— and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws(hereinabove cited). The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the SupremeCourt the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys isfound in par. 2 Section 24, Article III of the IBP By-Laws (supra), whereas theauthority of the Court to issue the order applied for is found in Section 10 of theCourt Rule, which reads:"SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the payment of annual dues for six months



shall warrant suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, anddefault in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys." The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP isstated in these words of the Court Rule: LLphil"SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized an officialnational body to be known as the 'Integrated Bar of the Philippines,'composed of all persons whose names now appear or may hereafter beincluded in the Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court."

The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following wordsof the Court Rule:"SEC. 9. Membership dues. — Every member of the Integrated Barshall pay such annual dues as the Board of Governors shall determinewith the approval of the Supreme Court. . . . ." The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisionsconstitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he isbeing compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyerin good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay thecorresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelledfinancial support of the said organization to which he is admittedlypersonally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty andproperty guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent

concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Lawsare void and of no legal force and effect. The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strikehis name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter isnot among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body." The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating toconstitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably come up to thesurface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law,define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted forthe exercise of the legal profession. The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in aprevious case before the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In

the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines,Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered allthese matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Courtthere made the unanimous pronouncement that it was.". . . . fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious study of all thearguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526 and the authoritative materialsand the mass of factual data contained in the exhaustive Report of theCommission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the Philippine Baris 'perfectly constitutional and legally unobjectionable' . . ."Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer mustbelong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individuallawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of theBar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded

an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as wellas obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or under thedirection of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national body of which alllawyers are required to be members. They are, therefore, subject to all therules prescribed for the governance of the Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for the effective discharge of the purposesof the Bar, and adherence to a code of professional ethics or professionalresponsibility breach of which constitutes sufficient reason for investigation bythe Bar and, upon proper cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or

disbarment of the offending member. 2 The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overridingconsiderations of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as morethan constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that integrationimposes upon the personal interests and personal convenience of individuallawyers. 3Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing theintegration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a validexercise of the police power over an important profession. The practice of law isnot a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover clothed with publicinterest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but alsoto his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes partin one of the most important functions of the State — the administration of

justice — as an officer of the Court. 4 The practice of law being clothed withpublic interest, the holder of this privilege must submit to a degree of controlfor the common good, to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S.Supreme Court through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affectedwith a public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the policepower" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing theSupreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the PhilippineBar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the exercise of theparamount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is to "raise the standardsof the legal profession, improve the administration of justice, and enable theBar to discharge its public responsibility more effectivity." Hence, the Congressin enacting such Act, the Court in ordaining the integration of the Bar through

its Resolution promulgated on January 9, 1973, and the President of thePhilippines in decreeing the constitution of the IBP into a body corporatethrough Presidential Decree No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted byfundamental considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meetthe demands of pressing public necessity. The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with andregulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and property maybe subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure the general prosperityand welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus, 31 Phil. 218), for, as the Latinmaxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme lex." The public welfare is the supremelaw. To this fundamental principle of government the rights of individuals aresubordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but libertyshould not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall intoanarchy (Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of theState to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals from



some freedom.But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality andvalidity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocalgrant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article Xof the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:"Sec. 5.The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:xxx xxx xxx"(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and procedure inall courts, and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of

the Bar . . .",and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:"SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this Act, theSupreme Court may adopt rules of Court to effect the integration of thePhilippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit in order to raise thestandards of the legal profession, improve the administration of justice,and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more effectively."Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without theenabling Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the languageof the provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court thepower "to promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedurein all courts, and the admission to the practice of law, " it at oncebecomes indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the

Supreme Court with plenary power in all cases regarding the admissionto and supervision of the practice of law. Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, hispractice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect thesociety at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic torequire him to conform to such regulations as might be established bythe proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such reasonable interference and regulation, he should not haveclothed the public with an interest in his concerns.On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall. The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now conciselydeal with them seriatim. prLL

1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court iswithout power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Barof the Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutionalfor it impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and notto associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of theIntegrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate.6Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he isnot already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passedthe Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to providean official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized andincohesive group of which every lawyer is already a member. 8Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. Heis free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapteror vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only

compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. TheSupreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in elevatingthe quality of professional legal services, may require that the cost of improvingthe profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects and beneficiaries of theregulatory program — the lawyers. 9Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer to bea member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an exercise of the police power of the state. 102. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the

Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see nothing inthe Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional power andduty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the practice of law andthe integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section 5 of the 1973Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges — from requiringmembers of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to pay a reasonable feetoward defraying the expenses of regulation of the profession to which theybelong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed imposed as a regulatorymeasure, designed to raise funds for carrying out the objectives and purposesof integration. 113. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penaltyprovisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due process andhence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the practice of law

is a property right, in the sense of its being one that entitles the holder of alicense to practice a profession, we do not here pause to consider at length, asit clear that under the police power of the State, and under the necessarypowers granted to the Court to perpetuate its existence, the respondent's rightto practice law before the courts of this country should be and is a mattersubject to regulation and inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as aregulatory measure is recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce itspayment, which penalty may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void asunreasonable or arbitrary. 12But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property right buta mere privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer s public responsibilities.4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme

Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is sufficient tostate that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment and reinstatementof lawyers and their regulation and supervision have been and are indisputablyrecognized as inherent judicial functions and responsibilities, and theauthorities holding such are legion. 14In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of the Boardof Bar Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was confirmed anddisbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar Integration Act of Kentucky,said: The power to regulate the conduct and qualifications of its officers doesnot depend upon constitutional or statutory grounds. It is a power which isinherent in this court as a court — appropriate, indeed necessary, to the properadministration of justice . . . the argument that this is an arbitrary power whichthe court is arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewisemisconceives the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because theyare inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother member



of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It is agrave responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to upholdthe ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect thepublic from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. . ." The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitutionwhen it explicitly granted to the Court the power to "promulgate rulesconcerning pleading, practice . . . and the admission to the practice of law and the integration of the Bar . . ." (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to

pass upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legalprofession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-Aand of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of are neither unconstitutional nor illegal. cdllWHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the Courtthat the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is herebydisbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of Attorneys of the Court.Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma, Aquino,Concepcion Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Documents

Section 8- Right to Form Association