Secretary of [the National Security] State?

Heather McCormic

“National Security Decision-Making Since the Second World War: The Building of the National Security State”

(GOVT 391)

11/8/2012

Professor Lawrence B. Wilkerson

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Introduction

In a perfect world, written policy translates into a feasible course of action that a group,

organization, or government can expediently implement. However, such a utopia does not exist.

Instead, legislative acts and policies, executive orders and mandates, and judicial rulings and

regulations often fail because they lack enforcement or the concern of those whom they affect.

The United States has faced such a dilemma when dealing with the 1947 National Security Act.

Many entities with vested interest in U.S. national security policy gained a voice in the decision

making process due to this legislation; yet the State Department in particular has seen its role

widely fluctuate within the National Security Council (NSC) mainly due to its relations with

other Council members.

With the following research, I seek to address a series of questions concerning the State

Department and the U.S. national security apparatus. What is the role of the Secretary of State in

the National Security Council in theory and in practice? Did the National Security Act

disenfranchise the State Department and its secretary from fully participating in the NSC? If the

Act did not inherently make less of the Secretary of State, what evolutionary process reduced the

position to what it is today in the national security decision making process—an afterthought,

undermined by the Secretary of Defense and National Security Advisor? What actions are being

or will be taken to empower the State Department today? In reality, though the Secretary of State

legally possesses the potential to lead the national security advisory council, s/he has often failed

to claim his or her privileged role as the primary foreign policy advisor to the president.

A brief history of the State Department

In order to accurately analyze the role the State Department currently plays in national

security decision making, I shall explain the origins of the agency. George Washington created

the State Department in 1789, appointing John Jay as the first Secretary of State; however, Jay

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only held the office for six months, leaving a very limited legacy for future secretaries to follow.

Conversely, Thomas Jefferson occupied the position for nearly four years from March 1790 to

December 1793. Jefferson shaped the department, making it the face of the United States to

international actors. Additionally, the Secretary of State has held a high ranking position in the

presidential line of succession since its establishment as a Cabinet position. Today, the Secretary

of State is fourth in the line of succession to the presidency.1

From the outset, State has evolved according to the needs of the times though the rate of

change varied throughout history. As the world has become more interconnected and

interdependent, the State Department has generally assumed more roles in the Cabinet and,

alongside the President, is the face of America to allies and partners. Legally, the Secretary of

State acts as the president’s primary foreign affairs and policy advisor. The Department of State

establishes embassies filled with civilian and military representatives in foreign nations, and

assesses the international political, cultural, economic, and social climate in order to assist the

president in foreign and national security policy choices.2

The National Security Act 1947

The National Security Act of 1947, signed into law by President Harry S. Truman,

established the first official council of national security decision makers in the United States.

Before the National Security Act created the current structure of the Department of Defense

(called the Unified Command throughout the Act itself), the Secretaries of Navy, War, and State

comprised the main security decision making team of the United States. Consultations among

these secretaries consisted of letter writing and reading, but few in-person interactions.3 These

1 James E. Fleming, “Presidential Succession: The Art of the Possible,” Fordham Law Review 79 (2010-2011): 955.2 Alan G. Whittaker, Frederick C. Smith, and Elizabeth McKune, The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System (Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, U.S. Department of Defense, 2007), 34.3 Ernest May, “The Development of Political-Military Consultation in the United States,” Political Science Quarterly 70 (June 1955), 162.

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impersonal, non-collaborative interfaces resulted in a disjointed national security advisory panel

that rarely provided the president with useful assessments of security issues. Consequently, the

president was left responsible for aligning military capacity with the military need in foreign

relations and security matters.4

Harry Truman and his administration oriented this new security document to address

military and intelligence matters, despite the fact that in his absence Truman chose the Secretary

of State to lead NSC meetings.5 The Act created the Unified Command including the Army,

Navy, and Air Force, set in the Secretary of Defense as the civilian overseer of the Armed

Forces, and founded the Central Intelligence Agency, whose director would be double-hatted as

the head of all intelligence operations as well as director of his agency, the CIA. However, the

Department of State saw no major reforms in light of the changing international security

environment at the start of the Cold War. In fact, the Act only mentions the State Department

once—as a statutory member of the National Security Council.6

As is evidenced by the National Security Act, the NSC operates as an advisory

organization to the President for the purpose of aligning the country’s security requirements and

capabilities.7 In order to give proper advice on such national security matters, Council members

must “assess and appraise the objectives, commitments, and risks of the United States in relation

to our actual and potential military power, in the interest of national security.”8 In addition, the

4 Ibid, 163.5 Alan G. Whittaker, Frederick C. Smith, and Elizabeth McKune, The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System (Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, U.S. Department of Defense, 2007), 7.6 Some go so far as to claim that the shortfalls of the State Department in Soviet relations led the President to believe the best option to contain the Communist menace was to threated the use of military force to prevent the spread of Soviet forces. Thus began the long history of personal favoritism within the NSC.7 U.S. Congress, “Legislative Debate on the National Security Act of 1947,” Congressional Record (July 9, 1945), 8496.8 U.S. Congress, “The National Security Act of 1947,” 50 U.S.C. 401 (July 26, 1947), 8.

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Council recommends policies concerning the various agencies associated with national security

and the President.

Today, the President of the United States acts as the manager and only true authority of

the NSC, employing expert staff members for advice and assistance in an array of matters

concerning national security or foreign policies.9 The current national security apparatus allows

the State Department to suggest possible solutions for policy issues; the Secretary of Defense and

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff then assess the viability of such options according to the

military capabilities and risks associated with each.10 The National Security Advisor, an

additional position not in the original text of the Act, serves to mediate between Council

members and assist the president in reaching conclusions after hearing Council members’ advice.

The President and the Secretary of State

Historically, the President of the United States and Secretary of State had close ties as the

two primary individuals representing U.S. interests in the world arena. However, the State

Department’s hypothetical role as one of the most influential members of the National Security

Council did not always play out this way; in fact, this hypothetical role often negatively

influenced the Secretary’s rapport within the Council because many other government agencies

vied for equal status with State at the national security roundtable. Consequently, the State

Department in some ways lost its unique role in the president’s national security advisory council

and the Cabinet itself by its very inclusion in the Council.

As the results of the National Security Act began to take form under Harry Truman, the

tensions between the military and Department of State became clearly evident. Truman, having

previously served in the U.S. Army, had profound respect for George Marshall, his first

9 Theodore C. Sorensen, “The President and The Secretary of State,” Foreign Affairs 66 (Winter 1987-1988), 243.10 Ernest May, “The Development of Political-Military Consultation in the United States,” Political Science Quarterly 70 (June 1955), 166; Sidney W. Souers, “Policy Formulation for National Security,” American Political Service Review 43 (June 1949), 536.

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appointed Secretary of State.11 Before assuming Cabinet-level positions, Marshall had served as

the General of the Army and the U.S. Army Chief of Staff. Though counterintuitive, both

Truman and Marshall both tended to neglect the State Department and its jurisdiction as a

primary national security policymaking entity in favor of unilateral military decision making and

implementation.

In 1945, James Forrestal, then Secretary of the Navy, sought to combat this favoritism by

having his close friend and ally Ferdinand Eberstadt conduct a study on the organizational

challenges the U.S. national security apparatus faced, and the best solutions for such issues.12

Eberstadt concluded that “an effective national security policy calls for active, intimate and

continuous relationships not alone between the military services themselves but also between the

military services and many other departments and agencies of Government.”13 In essence, he

argued for the inclusion of diplomatic measures (the prerogative of the State Department) in

foreign policy and security decisions. Truman and Marshall noted the Forrestal-Eberstadt

Proposal when drafting the National Security Act; Marshall even recommended that the

Secretary of State chair the future security council.14 However, the failure to further discuss the

role of the State Department and the person of the Secretary in the NSC to the fullest extent with

other major security players is testimony to how distant the department remained from decision

making centered frequently in military circles.

Dean Acheson, Truman’s second Secretary of State, differed sharply from Marshall. His

national security ideology translated into his wholehearted support of military expansion and

11 Alfred D. Sander, “Truman and the National Security Council: 1945-1947,” Journal of American History 59 (September 1972), 371.12 Sidney W. Souers, “Policy Formulation for National Security,” American Political Service Review 43 (June 1949), 536; Alfred D. Sander, “Truman and the National Security Council: 1945-1947,” Journal of American History 59 (September 1972), 372.13 David Rothkopf, Running the World: the Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power, (New York: Public Affairs, 2005), 52.14 Alfred D. Sander, “Truman and the National Security Council: 1945-1947,” Journal of American History 59 (September 1972), 381.

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desire to use hard power means to advance U.S. security interests.15 Regardless, Acheson led the

State Department forward to revive its lost supremacy in foreign dealings, especially due to the

fact that Truman and Acheson maintained a close relationship.16 In fact, “probably no modern

secretary of state had more leeway to act on his own…Even when under savage criticism,

Acheson and State dominated the making of foreign policy.”17 Acheson found little competition

with the Defense Secretary, knowing his position was senior and his department operated in a

more unified fashion.18 However, this confidence was not to be inherited by future secretaries.

In the early 1970s, President Richard Nixon and his National Security Advisor Henry

Kissinger increased the Council’s activity; Kissinger immediately began his full-on assault on

the authority of the Secretary of State William Pierce Rogers in controlling foreign policy.1920

Kissinger retained his influence on national security decision making as Secretary of State under

Gerald Ford. The President and Secretary of State fostered a close relationship throughout the

administration, similar to that characterizing Truman’s second-term NSC.21

Again, this relationship crumbled with the introduction of a new NSC staff. Discouraged

by the performance of the State Department, especially when asked to recommend policy

alterations to reflect changing international circumstances, President Jimmy Carter reversed this

kinship by making the major players on the NSC staff—namely the Secretaries of Defense and

State—more coequal and encouraging interagency cooperation.22 Fortunately, Carter chose

bothhis National Security Advisor, Zbigniew Brzezinski, and Secretary of State Cyrus Vance

15 Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 276.16 Robert L. Beisner, Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 103-104.17 Ibid, 106, 110.18 Ibid, 122.19 Richard A. Best, Jr., “The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment,” (Congressional Research Service, 2011), 14.20 Theodore C. Sorensen, “The President and The Secretary of State,” Foreign Affairs 66 (Winter 1987-1988), 233.21 Ibid, 15.22 Karl F. Inderfurth, and Loch K. Johnson, Fateful Decisions – Inside the National Security Council (Oxford University Press, 2004), 73.

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wisely, as they fundamentally agreed on a vast majority of the current national security issues.23

Even still, Carter preferred to hear Brzezinski’s advice over Vance’s because of his deep ongoing

personal relationship with the National Security Advisor.24 Vance continually asserted his

opinion, however, stating that the only foreign policy spokespeople in the United States are the

President and Secretary of State.25

Since the Carter Administration, several secretaries of state have assumed incorrect roles

in the Cabinet and the National Security Council simultaneously. For example, upon the

attempted assassination of President Reagan, Secretary Haig claimed that “I’m in charge here.”26

While he was a well-versed, active secretary of state, Haig often failed to act within his legal and

political boundaries.27 Kevin Mulcahy goes into great detail on how Haig attempted to

commandeer the roles of security advisor and chief diplomat, relating to the president that he

cared little for other positions of power within the security infrastructure.28 Reagan later replaced

Haig with the much more compliant, calm, and conservative George Pierce Shultz; thus the

pendulum of power swung away from the State Department once more.29

The Secretaries of Defense and State

Ernest May characterizes foreign policy much like a game of chess where “military

forces are the rooks and bishops behind the knights and pawns of diplomacy; although the rooks

and bishops move less frequently, their role in the game is no less decisive.”30 Since the founding

23 Ibid, 153.24 Kevin V. Mulcahy, “The Secretary of State and The National Security Advisor: Foreign Policymaking in the Carter and Reagan Administrations,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 16 (Spring 1986), 284.25 Exchange between Senator Zorinsky and Secretary Vance at a Hearing of the Committee on Foreign Relations, March 27, 1980 in the National Security Adviser: Role and Accountability (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980), 173.26 Kevin V. Mulcahy, “The Secretary of State and The National Security Advisor: Foreign Policymaking in the Carter and Reagan Administrations,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 16 (Spring 1986), 288.27 Ibid, 288-291.28 Ibid, 289.29 Ibid, 293.30 Ernest May, “The Development of Political-Military Consultation in the United States,” Political Science Quarterly 70 (June 1955), 162.

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of the United States, political leaders have recognized the necessity of military prowess in the

prosperity of the nation. In Federalist Paper number 23, Alexander Hamilton acknowledges the

unpredictability of future internal and external threats to the Union. Because the nature of such

forthcoming circumstances remain unknown to this day, Hamilton was correct in emphasizing

the need for security decision makers to always have available military and diplomatic means for

preserving the state. He issued a word of caution, however—the means should always remain

proportionate to the end policymakers seek to achieve.31

Throughout the first quarter of the 20th century, political-military collaboration rose to the

forefront of security decision makers’ agendas. Members of the War and Navy Departments

realized the need for consultative interactions with the Department of State to determine what

military means were necessary to maintain peaceful relations, especially in the wake of the First

World War.32 During the interwar period, the War and State Departments cooperated with each

other with increasing frequency; however, World War II often saw State undermined or

disregarded.33

As the National Security Council developed, presidents saw fit to delegate increasing

levels of responsibility to the Defense Department. For example, President Dwight David

Eisenhower, a former General of the U.S. Army who led the June 6, 1944 D-Day Invasion of

Normandy, France, centralized the NSC structure, making it similar to a military chain of

command which benefitted military NSC staff.34 In addition, the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986

31 Alexander Hamilton, Federalist Paper 23 The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union, From the New York Packet (1787), accessed November 5, 2012, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_23.html.32 Ernest May, “The Development of Political-Military Consultation in the United States,” Political Science Quarterly 70 (June 1955), 166.33 “The need for military government directives and surrender terms caused the creation of the State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee, the National Security Council’s immediate ancestor.” See Ernest May, “The Development of Political-Military Consultation in the United States,” Political Science Quarterly 70 (June 1955), 173.34 When first established, the National Security Council consisted of seven statutory members, of which four represented the nascent Department of Defense. See Alan G. Whittaker, Frederick C. Smith, and Elizabeth McKune, The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System (Washington, D.C.:

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gave the military more authority in interagency matters, including in the NSC.35 Thus, the

Secretary of Defense gained more power while the Secretary of State’s role either remained

stagnant or declined in influence.

Changing circumstances called for a flexible, responsive NSC staff, especially among

representatives of the Defense and State Departments. Traditionally, the Department of Defense

served to support the State Department; however, because many security problems today require

politico-military responses, it has seen a dramatic increase in the role it plays in determining

foreign policy alongside (not under) State. In the end, State retains some decision making power

in that it can discourage or demand some military actions because of cultural and political

nuances of certain regions and circumstances.36 For example, the deleterious impact of U.S.

military intervention in Somalia in 1993 (partly) deterred the United States from mobilizing

forces during the Rwandan Genocide of 1994. The domestic and international political

environments were not conducive to sending troops into another armed conflict for the purpose

of restoring and keeping peace in developing nations.

Though tension between the Defense and State Departments still exists today, the

secretaries acknowledge their mutual dependence on each other. Policymakers like Senator Carl

Levin of Michigan recognize this interdependence today, arguing that in order to see continual

success in Iraq in the post-war period, “the Department of State and our other civilian agencies

[must] receive the resources that they need to take on these missions."37 Though the senator

spoke on one specific current issue, the idea that any and all military actions require diplomatic

Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, U.S. Department of Defense, 2007), 38.35 Alan G. Whittaker, Frederick C. Smith, and Elizabeth McKune, The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System (Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, U.S. Department of Defense, 2007), 39.36 Ibid, 41-42.37 Walter Pincus, “Gates pleads for 'critically urgent' funds for State Department's work in Iraq,” The Washington Post, February 17, 2011, accessed November 5, 2012, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article /2011/02/17/AR2011021706545.html.

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State Department capabilities in order to have a lasting impact remains a central fact of

international affairs. In order to fulfill the duties entrusted to its care, the State Department

requires increased funding. Critics of the State Department call attention to the fact that the

benefits of Department of State programs are external to the United States; the public would not

respond well if their taxpayer dollars were used to help other states but not their own. Thus, the

Defense budget, yielding visible results that directly influence the security of American lives and

society as a whole, consistently grows while the State budget wanes.38

The National Security Council and the Secretary of State

Because the State Department leads the country in foreign policy matters, it guides the

National Security Council by opening discussion on international and security issues. Though the

President chairs the council, the agenda setting power lies with the Secretary of State or

representative thereof present at the meeting.39 Many statements and Council papers on current

foreign policy issues originate in the State Department Policy Planning Staff and aim to inform

Council members; though these matters do not require immediate action, State steers the NSC

agenda using these papers and briefings regardless.4041

Over the years, a variety of internal security questions rose to the NSC level, despite the

fact that the State Department Staff representative very frequently headed the Council as Staff

Coordinator. The NSC required a Staff Coordinator without affiliation with any of the

departments represented in the Council. However, few individuals qualified for this position

exist outside of the Council and specifically, the Department of State. Falk argues that the man or

38 Leslie Gelb expounds upon this argument, saying that “To the expert, State may well be parochial and overly concerned with pleasing their client countries, but it is the only department in the executive branch capable of giving the long view of national interests and security, relatively free from short-run domestic political considerations.” See Leslie H. Gelb, “Why Not the State Department?” The Washington Quarterly (Autumn 1980), 28.39 Sidney W. Souers, “Policy Formulation for National Security,” American Political Service Review 43 (June 1949), 539.40 Ibid, 542.41 Stanley L. Falk, “The NSC Under Truman, Eisenhower, and Kennedy,” Political Science Quarterly 79 (September 1964), 408.

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woman entrusted with the responsibility of Staff Coordinator must remain “in close and constant

contact with the President and thus personally familiar with his views and requirements.”42

As Richard Nixon’s National Security Advisor, Henry Kissinger organized the NSC into

Inter-departmental Groups (IGs) according to regional focus area; an Assistant Secretary of State

chaired each IG respective of their subject matter expertise. IGs, though lead by State

representatives, consisted of agency representatives from the Departments of State or Defense,

the Central Intelligence Agency, or other government organization; these groups would produce

studies, white papers, and other documentation for presentation to the larger NSC at meetings.43

In addition, Kissinger delegated increasing amounts of bureaucratic power to State

Department officials. Because State had the advantage of possessing a relatively large amount of

manpower and number of experts specializing in specific regions and cultures during the Nixon

administration, Kissinger saw that the Department could implement foreign policy effectively

given the appropriate level of influence in the national security structure.44 Despite this hope,

Kissinger still felt that the Department of State lacked the operational capability to produce

effective national security policies.

Today, the State Department is set apart in its role in the National Security Council and

interagency process of decision making because of its unique composition.45 James Baker, III,

Secretary of State under George H. W. Bush, notes that:

Without a doubt, the State Department has the most unique bureaucratic culture I’ve ever encountered. In most of the federal government, the work is guided by a small number of political appointees who work together with civil service—the career bureaucracy that is designated to be above politics and provide institutional memory and substantive expertise. But at State there is also the Foreign Service, the elite corps of foreign affairs officers who staff the Department’s country and functional desks in Washington and our embassies abroad.46

42 Ibid, 411.43 John P. Leacacos, “Kissinger’s Apparat,” Foreign Policy (Winter 1971-72), 5-6.44 Ibid, 9-10.45 Alan G. Whittaker, Frederick C. Smith, and Elizabeth McKune, The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System (Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, U.S. Department of Defense, 2007), 37.46 James A. Baker, III, The Politics of Diplomacy (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New York, 1995), 28.

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The State Department provides the NSC with valuable cultural and governmental understanding

unmatched by any other entity represented. This perspective allows the NSC to recommend

policies and reach conclusions on security issues which reflect the current international climate.

In addition, President Ronald Wilson Reagan’s Secretary of State George Shultz penned that:

As secretary, I could see that I had at hand an extraordinary information machine: it could produce a flow of reports on what was happening in real time, background on what had been done before and how that had worked, analyses of alternative courses of action, and ideas on what might be done. The Department is a great engine of diplomacy for the secretary to use in carrying out the president’s foreign policy.47

Empowering today’s State Department

Taking the above research into account, I conclude that the National Security Act of

1947, partly drafted by former U.S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union George Kennan, did not

intend for the Secretary of State to have relatively less power than the Secretary of Defense in

the Council. Though only briefly mentioned, the Secretary of State has no less legal influence

within the NSC than any other statutory member, including the Vice President and Defense

Secretary. The Act itself does not define any particular NSC structure. Instead, the chain of

command and other infrastructure of the Council falls under each individual president’s

jurisdiction alone, as the NSC was established to serve him or her in an advisory capacity.48

Historically, presidents have favored military power in the NSC.49 However, former

Secretary of State Colin Powell and former Defense Secretary Robert Gates (who served under

both Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Hussein Obama) have emphasized the escalating

need for a strong diplomatic representation abroad. These men not only made speeches and

drafted memos and papers regarding this sensitive issue—they turned words into action. Colin

47 See George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph (New York: Charles Schribner’s Sons, 1993). 48 Theodore C. Sorensen, “The President and The Secretary of State,” Foreign Affairs 66 (Winter 1987-1988), 243.49 As previously mentioned, this often manifests in the distribution of the Federal budget.

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Powell in particular dramatically increased the State Department budget and hired new career

Foreign Service officers for the first time in 20 years.50

Both current Secretary of State Hilary Rodham Clinton and former Secretary of Defense

Robert Gates have adamantly supported the renewal of the State Department to its original role

as chief foreign policy advisor in the national security decision making apparatus. The financial

and logistical resources allotted to the department fail to suffice for the number of conflicts and

other international issues State aspires to address.51 Gates has in the past and continues to

articulate his views on this matter:

Several senior State Department officials [said] that the battle was already lost with the Pentagon when it came to securing funding from Congress for the State Department's growing role in field-based conflict stabilization and reconstruction. They said that there was no way to secure funding directly but that State had to continue to piggy-back on Department of Defense budgetary authority and appropriations…The reality is the Department of State and the Agency for International Development were starved for resources for decades. Now, just – just let me give you an example. Working for me are 2 million men and women in uniform. Secretary Clinton has I think somewhere south of 7,000 foreign service officers. If you took all the foreign service officers in the world, they would barely crew one aircraft carrier. So, you know, just to keep things in perspective.52

The President plays a vital role in the empowerment of the Department of State, holding

the power to appoint whomever s/he pleases as secretary (assuming the U.S. Senate grants

approval). To greatly increase the power this agency brings to the NSC table, the President can

choose a secretary who aligns with his or her views to ensure their ideal foreign policies will not

collide for the worse; also, these leaders must communicate frequently. The secretary must then

take initiative within the State Department, making it his or her own instead of relying on

50 Task Force Report, “Secretary Colin Powell’s State Department: An Independent Assessment,” (Chapel Hill, NC: American Diplomacy Publishers, 2007), accessed November 5, 2012, http://www.unc.edu/depts/diplomat/archives_ roll/2003_04-06/fac/fac.html#resources.51 Steve Clemons, “State Department Says Pentagon Doing Just a Really, Really Great Job,” the Atlantic, August 6, 2012, accessed November 5, 2012, http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2012/08/state-department-says-pentagon-doing-just-a-really-really-great-job/260771/.52 Ibid.

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(sometimes failed) precedent. Ultimately, the President holds the power to determine the fate of

the State Department and its role in foreign policy and national security decision making.53

Conclusions

Based on the research presented here, I assert that the role of the Secretary of State

remains much too limited; as Mulcahy affirms, the innumerable “unsuccessful efforts of recent

secretaries of state to claim a privileged position as the presidential adviser on foreign policy”

and national security decision making.54 The National Security Act of 1947 did not cause this

occurrence; though many of the men and women who contributed to the creation of the National

Security Council had military backgrounds, leaders ranging from Harry Truman to George

Kennan did not intend to disenfranchise the Secretary of State. Instead, historians and officials in

Washington attribute this continual failure to those individuals filling the office itself. Hence, I

argue that presidents do profoundly influence the role of the Secretary of State by the type of

leader they appoint to this Cabinet position. In summary, I would like to leave you with some

closing remarks from Leslie H. Gelb, New York Times correspondent:

For the last twenty years or so most public commissions, organization experts and foreign policy commentators who have addressed the problem of how to organize the foreign policy apparatus of the executive branch have consistently recommended that the authority to make policy should be clearly and firmly lodged in the Department of State. Every recent president has echoed this recommendation at the beginning of his term; yet none ever followed through and did it. Why…?...[T]he State Department—with some exceptions from time to time—does a poor job of framing its proposals in terms that will elicit political support, and it does not think about potential [short-term] costs to the president.55

53 Theodore C. Sorensen, “The President and The Secretary of State,” Foreign Affairs 66 (Winter 1987-1988), 245-248.54 Kevin V. Mulcahy, “The Secretary of State and The National Security Advisor: Foreign Policymaking in the Carter and Reagan Administrations,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 16 (Spring 1986), 280.55 Leslie H. Gelb, “Why Not the State Department?” The Washington Quarterly (Autumn 1980), 26-29.

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Works Cited

Alan G. Whittaker, Frederick C. Smith, and Elizabeth McKune, The National Security Policy Process: The National Security Council and Interagency System (Washington, D.C.: Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University, U.S. Department of Defense, 2007).

Alexander Hamilton, Federalist Paper 23 The Necessity of a Government as Energetic as the One Proposed to the Preservation of the Union, From the New York Packet (1787), accessed November 5, 2012, http://thomas.loc.gov/home/histdox/fed_23.html.

Alfred D. Sander, “Truman and the National Security Council: 1945-1947,” Journal of American History 59 (September 1972), 369-388.

David Rothkopf, Running the World: the Inside Story of the National Security Council and the Architects of American Power, (New York: Public Affairs, 2005).

Ernest May, “The Development of Political-Military Consultation in the United States,” Political Science Quarterly 70 (June 1955), 161-180.

Exchange between Senator Zorinsky and Secretary Vance at a Hearing of the Committee on Foreign Relations, March 27, 1980 in the National Security Adviser: Role and Accountability (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980).

George P. Shultz, Turmoil and Triumph (New York: Charles Schribner’s Sons, 1993).

James A. Baker, III, The Politics of Diplomacy (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, New York, 1995).

James E. Fleming, “Presidential Succession: The Art of the Possible,” Fordham Law Review 79 (2010-2011): 951-958.

John P. Leacacos, “Kissinger’s Apparat,” Foreign Policy (Winter 1971-72), 3-27.

Karl F. Inderfurth, and Loch K. Johnson, Fateful Decisions – Inside the National Security Council (Oxford University Press, 2004).

Kevin V. Mulcahy, “The Secretary of State and The National Security Adviser: Foreign Policymaking in the Carter and Reagan Administrations,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 16 (Spring 1986): 280-299.

Leslie H. Gelb, “Why Not the State Department?” The Washington Quarterly (Autumn 1980), 25-40.

Michael J. Hogan, A Cross of Iron: Harry S Truman and the Origins of the National Security State, 1945-1954 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000).

Richard A. Best, Jr., “The National Security Council: An Organizational Assessment,” (Congressional Research Service, 2011), 1-37.

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Robert L. Beisner, “Acheson, The President, and The State Department,” in Dean Acheson: A Life in the Cold War, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006), 103-126.

Sidney W. Souers, “Policy Formulation for National Security,” American Political Service Review 43 (June 1949), 534-543.

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