Secondary Control Equipment Modernisation

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Secondary Control Equipment

Modernisation ED2 Engineering Justification Paper

ED2-NLR(O)-SPEN-001-NCP-EJP

Issue Date Comments

Issue 1 30th June 2021 First Issue

Issue 2 30th November 2021 Second Issue

Scheme Name Secondary Control Equipment Modernisation

PCFM Cost Type Non-Load Related - Asset Replacement

Activity Secondary Control Equipment Modernisation

Primary Investment Driver Condition driven asset modernisation programme

Reference ED2-NLR(O)-SPEN-001-NCP-EJP

Output Type Operational IT and Telecoms Strategy

Cost SPD - £5.76m SPM - £2.76m

Delivery Year 2023-2028

Reporting Table CV11 (Substation RTUs, marshalling kiosks, receivers)

Outputs included in ED1 No

Business Plan Section Maintaining a Safe & Resilient Network

Primary Annex Annex 4A.16: Operational IT and Telecoms Strategy

Spend Apportionment ED1 ED2 ED3

£m £8.52m £m

ED2-NLR(O)-SPEN-001-NCP-EJP - Secondary Control Equipment Modernisation

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Technical Governance Process

Project Scope Development IP1(S)

To be completed by the Service Provider or Asset Management. The completed form, together with an accompanying report, should be endorsed by the appropriate sponsor and submitted for approval. IP1 – To request project inclusion in the investment plan and to undertake project design work or request a modification to an existing project

IP1(S) – Confirms project need case and provides an initial view of the Project Scope IP2 – Technical/Engineering approval for major system projects by the System Review Group (SRG) IP2(C) – a Codicil or Supplement to a related IP2 paper. Commonly used where approval is required at more than one SRG, typically connection projects which require

connection works at differing voltage levels and when those differing voltage levels are governed by two separate System Review Groups. IP2(R) – Restricted Technical/Engineering approval for projects such as asset refurbishment or replacement projects which are essentially on a like-for-like basis and not requiring a full IP2 IP3 – Financial Authorisation document (for schemes > £100k prime)

IP4 – Application for variation of project due to change in cost or scope

PART A – PROJECT INFORMATION

Project Title: Secondary Control Equipment Modernisation

Project Reference: ED2-NLR(O)-SPEN-001-NCP-EJP

Decision Required: To give concept approval for the project scope to replace legacy secondary control equipment.

Summary of Business Need:

To continue the ED1 replacement programme for end of life secondary control equipment. Obsolescence, cyber security

risk, age of assets, lack of manufacturer support and absence of serviceable spares have driven the targeted replacement of

legacy secondary control equipment in RIIO-ED2.

Summary of Project Scope, Change in Scope or Change in Timing:

The project will continue the ED1 programme targeting the replacement of secondary control equipment based on

obsolescence, associated support issues and component failure modes.

Expenditure Forecast (in 2020/21 Prices)

Licence

Area

Reporting

Table Description

Total

(£m)

Incidence (£m)

2023/24 2024/25 2025/26 2026/27 2027/28

SPD CV11

Op IT and Telecoms -

Substation RTUs,

marshalling kiosks,

receivers

5.76 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15

Sub-Total 5.76 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15 1.15

SPM CV11

Op IT and Telecoms -

Substation RTUs,

marshalling kiosks,

receivers

2.76 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55

Sub-Total 2.76 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55

SPEN Total 8.52 1.71 1.70 1.70 1.70 1.70

PART B – PROJECT SUBMISSION

Proposed by Chris Halliday Signature

Date: 30th Nov 2021

Endorsed by Brian Thomas Signature

Date: 30th Nov 2021

PART C – PROJECT APPROVAL

Approved by John Gray Signature

Date: 30th Nov 2021


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Contents 1 Introduction .................................................................................................................................... 3

2 Background Information ................................................................................................................. 3

3 Optioneering ................................................................................................................................... 7

4 Detailed Analysis & Costs ................................................................................................................ 8

5 Deliverability & Risk ...................................................................................................................... 10

6 Conclusion ..................................................................................................................................... 15

7 Appendices .................................................................................................................................... 16


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1 Introduction In the early 2000s, SPEN started implementing a number of initiatives to improve 11kV secondary

network system performance. These initiatives included the introduction of secondary control

equipment to enable the remote disconnection of faulted network sections and restoration of

customers from alternative sources where possible.

The Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition (SCADA) system is the means by which each item of

plant on network is securely monitored and controlled in real time. SCADA enables the network to

be managed including remote control of plant for planned and unplanned works and recovery of

critical alarms and indications. SCADA is not only critical for network management but also safety

management, risk mitigation and resource response. The SCADA central system used for electrical

network operations is referred to as the Network Management System (NMS). Legacy secondary

control equipment communicates with the NMS using insecure, vendor-locked proprietary SCADA

protocols over unencrypted radio links.

Constant monitoring and control of the secondary network is critical to ensure a safe, secure and

reliable supply to all customers. Managing the electrical network requires constant data

communications between the SPEN control room and substations. Remote Terminal Units (RTUs)

take the signals from all the plant in the secondary substation and converts them to signals suitable

to be transmitted to the NMS in the SPEN control room. Pole mounted substations come with an

inbuilt RTU so only require a communications device in order to be monitored and controlled

remotely. Secondary control equipment including ground mount RTUs and radio modems deployed

in the early to mid-2000s are now approaching end of life.

Since the initial installation of secondary control equipment, there have been radical changes in the

distribution network resulting from the electrification of transport, distributed generation, storage

and demand side response. It is no longer acceptable to operate the secondary network on a fit and

forget basis; an analogue layer of monitoring is required to improve efficiency of assets and allow

additional network capacity to be unlocked through enhanced visibility of the distribution network.

Fault management is no longer the sole consideration for secondary control equipment; the focus

must be expanded to embrace the requirement for real-time network management. Legacy

secondary control equipment is a major constraint and replacing it should be used as an opportunity

to improve the monitoring functionality of secondary substations to accelerate the transition from a

Distribution Network Operator (DNO) to a Distributed System Operator (DSO).

The majority of the secondary control equipment was installed in the early to mid-2000s. Despite

the age concerns the main drivers for the replacement of the secondary control equipment are

obsolescence, cyber security risk, lack of manufacturer support and absence of serviceable spares.

The replacement activity began in ED1, will ramp up significantly in ED2 and is due to be completed

in ED3.

This justification paper supports the intention for SPEN to invest £8.52m over the RIIO-ED2 period

to replace and upgrade the existing population of secondary control equipment.

2 Background Information This paper supports a proposal to continue the programme started in ED1 of modernising the legacy

population of secondary control equipment. Ensuring the integrity of the secondary control asset

base is critical to maintaining continuous monitoring and control of the network such that faults can

be managed quickly, safely and efficiently. The RTUs and radio modems classed as secondary control


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equipment have been assessed according to the methodology determined by Protection Equipment

Asset Health Assessment Methodology, ASSET-01-025. Using an appropriate method for

classification of protection and control equipment asset health enables all protection and control

assets to be assessed in the same way against the same criteria. This method enables SPEN to form

protection and control modernisation priorities and target appropriate investment. The RTUs and

radios covered by this justification are rated at Health Index 5 due to the following reasons

• Withdrawal of manufacturer support

• Limited ability to support as spares can no longer be purchased

• Limited means of equipment substitution as products are vendor locked

• Increasing failure rate and significant defects with a 336% increase in annual defects reported

between 2017 (237) and 2020 (796)

• Non-compliance with technical policy regarding cyber security

• Special call outs required to manually clear buffer problem

2.1 ED1 Track Record

Due to the health index rating, a programme of replacement started in RIIO-ED1. It was intended

that this programme would significantly ramp up RIIO-ED2 and be completed during the RIIO-ED3

price control.

2.2 Needs Case

Despite the age concerns the main drivers for the replacement of the secondary control equipment

are obsolescence, associated support issues, non-compliance with cyber security technical policy and

significant defects. The legacy secondary control equipment uses bespoke SCADA protocols over

unencrypted radio links to communicate with the central NMS. Proprietary SCADA protocols not

only limit competition by restricting supply to a single vendor but also fail to deliver the level of

modern cyber security required to protect the network. The secondary RTUs also have capacity

restrictions, cannot be used for analogue monitoring and are limited in their ability to communicate

with modern Intelligent Electronic Devices (IEDs) and associated substation devices which are now

installed on modern substation plant. These legacy RTUs and radios cannot be updated to meet new

cyber security or functional requirements.

The original secondary control equipment manufacturer has ceased trading and key components are

no longer manufactured. The original vendor can no longer support these assets and spares cannot

be purchased therefore critical parts cannot be replaced if faulty. This represents a critical risk to

the SCADA system as if an asset fails it can lead to loss of monitoring and control to part of the

secondary network.

The majority of these essential assets were installed in the early to mid-2000s. Secondary control

equipment has a shorter life expectancy of than that of control equipment in Grid and Primary

substations in part due to the much harsher environment secondary control equipment has to

operate in.

The secondary control system is also starting to show significant defects, the graph below shows the

total defects logged per year from 2017, 2018, 2019 and 2020. There has been a 336% increase in

annual defects reported between 2017 (237) and 2020 (796).


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Figure 1: Annual defects reported in secondary control equipment

Below is 3 months of data from 7th October 2020 to 6th January 2021. In this period, 131 devices

are showing switchgear communications failures meaning the radio modem has lost communications

with the RTU. The worst offender on the list has lost communications with the RTU 10,559 times in

the 3-month period. The switchgear communications failures are believed to be a result of a bug in

modem software that fails to acknowledge an event message from the RTU meaning the events in

RTU buffer are never cleared, resulting in the number of events continuing to increase for every

new event and the SCADA message growing bigger and communication becoming sporadic and

unstable. Special call out are required to clear the RTU buffer due to the bug in the radio modem

failing to acknowledge a SCADA event.

Figure 2: SWGR Comms Fails - 3 months of data (7th October 2020 to 6th January 2021)

0

100

200

300

400

500

600

700

800

900

2017 2018 2019 2020

An

nu

al D

efec

ts R

epo

rted

Year

Secondary Control Equipment Annual Defects Reported


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The lack of vendor support for an aging population of obsolete secondary control equipment is a

current business risk. As described in ED1, this position is unsustainable as an ongoing model and

the remaining population of legacy secondary control equipment must be replaced over the medium

term. The replacement programme started in ED1, will significantly ramp up in ED2 and be

completed in ED3. Replacing the secondary control equipment over three price control periods is

the preferred strategy to allow the telecoms network to be developed and deployed in an efficient

manner in line with requirements. The remaining population can also be temporarily supported using

healthy spares recovered as part of the replacement programme. The liberated spares help prolong

the asset life of the remaining legacy equipment although not indefinitely as the spares are already in

an aged condition.

Standalone ED2 replacement activities are shown in the table below.

Equipment Type SPD SPM Total

Ground Mount RTU 1038 425 1463

Pole Mounted Recloser 371 323 694

Pole Mounted Switch 296 398 694

Total 1705 1146 2851 Table 1: Standalone ED2 replacement activities on SPM and SPD


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3 Optioneering

# Options Decision Comment

0 Upgrade secondary control

equipment with bespoke solution

engineered to support legacy

protocols and data models

Proposed

(credible

solution)

Baseline Case (minimal intervention)


equipment with solution based

on secure, industry standard

protocols - Extended timescales

(recovered equipment used as

spares)

Adopted

(credible

solution)

Costed as Option 1 - Move to industry standard

protocols and subsequent development to telecoms

network, sets a good foundation for smart grid

initiatives to be built upon. Extended implementation

timescales defer capital and allow time for strategy and

programme implementation to mature and optimise.


equipment with solution based

on secure, industry standard

protocols - Condensed

timescales

Proposed

(credible

solution)

Costed as Option 2 - Move to industry standard

protocols and subsequent development to telecoms

network, sets a good foundation for smart grid

initiatives to be built upon.

3 Do nothing (stop programme

after ED1).

Rejected

(non-

credible

solution)

This would increase the risk of secondary control

equipment failures leading to loss of visibility and control

for secondary substations thus compromising the

control room’s ability to manage the network 24/7. This

is an unacceptable risk level. Table 2: Optioneering table


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4 Detailed Analysis & Costs

4.1 Selected Option Summary

Option 1 proposes replacing the unsupported secondary control equipment no longer available for

purchase and unsuitable for modern cyber security requirements. During the RIIO-ED1 price

control, funding was approved to commence a programme of this nature. Replacement secondary

control equipment will be cyber secure and support the most common industry protocols and

international standards; ensuring the assets can be supported for the longest period possible and

remove the risks associated with single supplier dependence. Vendor specific proprietary protocols

are no longer fit for purpose. Replacement RTUs are suitable for modern IEDs but also capable of

supporting hardwired I/O as this is the defacto arrangement for most existing substation plant

installations. The move to modern secondary control equipment will also reduce whole life cost of

assets by reducing operational expenditure and environmental impact associated with having to visit

each site to collect log files or upgrade configuration/firmware as this will be able to be carried out

remotely.

The replacement of end of life secondary control equipment started in ED1. The primary drivers for

replacement activities to commence in ED1 were obsolescence, cyber security risk and lack of

equipment support and parts. The equipment vendor has ceased trading and the key control

components are no longer manufactured. All useable spares will continue to be recovered to

support existing asset base. It is essential that this equipment is replaced before failure, as it is

integral to ensuring current levels of network performance are maintained.

The move to modern SCADA protocols required telecoms infrastructure development due to

higher bandwidth and cyber security requirements. Over the ED1 period, SPEN have trialled an

Internet Protocol (IP) based communications network suitable for modern standard SCADA

protocols. This transition from legacy slow speed serial links to higher speed IP infrastructure has

required significant development of the operational telecoms infrastructure.

Although it is possible to carry out bespoke development works to enable legacy protocols on

modern secondary control equipment and this would have reduced the work required on the

telecoms infrastructure, this would have added significant equipment development costs, severely

limited vendors capable of providing a solution and would have failed to deliver the required level of

cyber security. Continuation of legacy bespoke protocols not only restricts the range of control

equipment suppliers but also the NMS solutions on which the legacy protocols need to be

supported.

Failure to move to industry standard equipment would result in high secondary control equipment

costs in comparison to industry averages as the equipment would have been bespoke. SPEN would

also be unable to share the benefits of innovation, making it more difficult to develop smart grid

initiatives. SPEN remain firmly committed to replace legacy secondary control equipment with

equipment that utilises modern standard protocols and support industry standards. There is no

reason to halt the programme of replacement or change the programme to one based on the

installation of equipment engineered to support insecure, legacy protocols. The approach of buying

secondary control equipment which communicates using the latest generation of industry standard

protocols over an IP network is more sustainable over the long term than perpetuating legacy

protocols and also allows SPEN access to a larger supplier cohort resulting in cost reduction

through competitive tendering.


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SPEN proposes the continued deployment of modern secondary control equipment using open

standard protocols with secure, encrypted IP communications technology. This new solution will

provide the necessary infrastructure between control room and the secondary distribution network

for the data-requirements of the smart grid and will provide functionality for supporting remote

management and maintenance to increase operational efficiency.

An improvement is expected in CI/CML by moving to standard control equipment as this opens up a

range of modern telecommunications solutions to improve telecontrol availability and reliability that

bespoke control equipment could not support.






Total 1705 1146 2851

Table 3: Standalone ED2 replacement activities on SPM and SPD

4.2 Alternative Options Summary

Baseline

Bespoke engineered equipment based on current experience is more expensive to purchase than

industry standard equipment. Perpetuation of legacy protocols has many long-term risks due to

associated limited range of suppliers and even more limited range of products on which the

legacy protocols can still be supported. As a result, support is expected to be an issue in the future

and the supportable asset life of these products could be less than industry standard products.

Upgrading the secondary control equipment with a bespoke solution engineered to support legacy

protocols and data models would also fail to address to issues around cyber security and stop

modern IEDs being integrated.

Option 2

Moving to equipment which utilises modern standard protocols and supports industry standards for

substation automation opens up many benefits and opportunities. Condensing this transition and

replacing the remaining asset base in ED2 would accelerate the benefits and opportunities however

doing this would miss the opportunity to extend the existing asset life by recovering spares during

the replacement programme.

Option 3

Doing nothing in ED2 and stopping the programme after ED1 would increase the risk of secondary

control equipment failures leading to loss of visibility and control for secondary substations thus

compromising the control room’s ability to manage the network 24/7. This is an unacceptable risk

level.


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4.3 Options Technical Summary table

# Option Technical Summary

0 Baseline Replace 2851 secondary control assets in SPM and SPD with bespoke

solution. Total cost £10.25m.

1 Option 1 Replace 2851 secondary control assets in SPM and SPD with industry

standard solution (extended timescales). Total cost (excluding pension

contribution) £8.56m.

2 Option 2 Replace 5702 secondary control assets in SPM and SPD with industry

standard solution (condensed timescales). Total cost £16.76m.

Table 4: Options Technical Summary table

4.4 Options Cost summary tables

# Option Cost Breakdown £m NARMs

Risk Change £/Risk

0 Baseline Replace 1463 Sec GM units £8,63 n/a n/a

Replace 694 Sec PMAR units £0.53

Replace 694 Sec PMSW units £1.08

Total £10.25

1 Option 1 Replace 1463 Sec GM units £7.32 n/a n/a



Pension Contribution £0.18

Total £8.56

2 Option 2 Replace 2926 Sec GM units £14.63 n/a n/a



Total £16.76 Table 5: Options Cost Summary table

Please note that this analysis was carried out before a pensions adjustment was made, and so the total costs

differ slightly from the final scheme.


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5 Deliverability & Risk

5.1 Preferred Options & Output Summary

The preferred option is to upgrade the remaining secondary control equipment with a solution

based on secure, industry standard protocols over an extended timescale of 2 price control periods

RIIO-ED2 and RIIO-ED3.

5.2 Cost Benefit Analysis Results

Option 1 - Upgrade secondary control equipment with a solution based on secure, industry standard

protocols over an extended timescale of 10 years. An improvement is expected in CI/CML by

moving to standard control equipment as this opens up a range of modern telecommunications

solutions to improve telecontrol availability and reliability that bespoke control equipment could not

support.

CBA - Option 1 Extended Timescales

Term (years from first year of RIIO-

ED2) NPV (£m)

10 £1.53

20 £2.34

30 £2.82

45 £3.20

Whole Life NPV £3.27

First year of investment out flow 2024

Option 2 - Upgrade secondary control equipment with a solution based on secure, industry standard

protocols over a condensed timescale of 5 years. An improvement is expected in CI/CML by moving

to standard control equipment as this opens up a range of modern telecommunications solutions to

improve telecontrol availability and reliability that bespoke control equipment could not support.

CBA - Option 2 Condensed Timescales

Term (years from first year of RIIO-

ED2) NPV (£m)

10 (£0.20)

20 £0.75

30 £1.33

45 £1.81

Whole Life NPV £2.04

First year of investment out flow 2024


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5.3 Cost & Volumes Profile






Total 1705 1146 2851 Table 6: Standalone ED2 replacement activities

The total units delivered each year as part of standalone ED2 replacement activities are shown in the

table below.

2023/24 2024/25 2025/26 2026/27 2027/28

SPD 341 341 341 341 341

SPM 230 229 229 229 229

SPEN 571 570 570 570 570

Table 7: Delivery profile – volumes

Regional variations and site specific costs are not relevant for the high volume programme as

solutions will be standard and consistent across the network.

Total Cost £m

SPD

Expenditure Item 2023/24 2024/25 2025/26 2026/27 2027/28 Total

Total £1.15 £1.15 £1.15 £1.15 £1.15 £5.76

SPM


Total £0.55 £0.55 £0.55 £0.55 £0.55 £2.76 Table 8: Delivery profile – total costs

5.4 Risks

The scope of this paper proposes the continuation of the ED1 programme; this requires support

arrangements to modernise legacy equipment. There is therefore a dependency on existing suppliers

who were selected for their ability to provide the necessary service and have been doing so

successfully during ED1. There is no perceived increase in risk during ED2.

There is also a dependency on the internal staff to manage the proposed workload which again they

have been doing to a similar extent during ED1. The team consists of highly experienced individuals

with skills that are not widely available. Whilst this always represents a risk, the scheduling of the

programme of works has been levelled as far as possible to avoid overload and ensure deliverability.


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There is no specific contingency or explicit reference to costs due to the low levels of risk

envisaged.

5.5 Outputs Included in RIIO ED1 Plans

This is a continuation of ED1 replacement programme.

5.6 Future Pathways – Net Zero

5.6.1 Primary Economic Driver

Condition driven asset modernisation programme to reduce the risk of network damage and/or

longer network outages because of failed or compromised secondary control equipment.

5.6.2 Payback Periods

The CBA indicates that a positive NPV results in all assessment periods (10, 15, 30 & 45 years).

5.6.3 Pathways and End Points

The proposed option is consistent with the SPENs DSO Strategy and Distribution Future Energy

Scenarios.

5.6.4 Asset Stranding Risks & Future Asset Utilisation

Electricity demand and LCT uptake are forecast to increase under all scenarios. The stranding risk is

therefore considered to be very low. It has been assessed that the preferred option is consistent

with the future generation and demand scenarios and that the risk of stranding is very low.

5.6.5 Losses / Sensitivity to Carbon Prices

Not appropriate to this investment.

5.6.6 Whole Systems Benefits

The completion of this replacement programme will maintain the integrity of the distribution

network and its enduring ability to facilitate wider whole system benefits.

5.7 Environmental Considerations

5.7.1 Operational and embodied carbon emissions

The targeted replacement of secondary control equipment based on obsolescence, associated

support issues and component failure modes has the potential to result in embodied carbon from

the delivery of interventions required. There is unlikely to be any impact on SPEN’s Business Carbon

Footprint (BCF).

5.7.2 Supply chain sustainability

For us to take full account of the sustainability impacts associated of the Secondary Control

Equipment Modernisation programme, we need access to reliable data from our suppliers. The need

for carbon and other sustainability credentials to be provided now forms part of our wider

sustainable procurement policy.

5.7.3 Resource use and waste

Replacement of secondary control equipment will result in the consumption of resources and the

generation of waste materials.


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Where waste is produced it will be managed in accordance with the waste hierarchy which ranks

waste management options according to what is best for the environment. The waste hierarchy gives

top priority to preventing waste in the first instance, then preparing for re-use, recycling, recovery,

and last of all disposal (e.g. landfill).

5.7.4 Biodiversity/ natural capital

The replacement of secondary control equipment will only affect developed sites containing existing

assets. Therefore, the impact on, and the opportunity to improve biodiversity and natural capital is

expected to be minimal.

5.7.5 Preventing pollution

SPEN will always follow all relevant waste regulations and will make sure that special (hazardous)

waste produced or handled by our business is treated in such a way as to minimise any effects on

the environment.

5.7.6 Visual amenity

SPEN continually seeks to reduce the landscape and visual effects of our networks and assets. The

proposed interventions at existing sites are unlikely to generate any additional impact in relation to

visual amenity.

5.7.7 Climate change resilience

In addition to our efforts to minimise our direct carbon emissions in line with our net-zero

ambitions, we are also conscious of the need to secure the resilience of our assets and networks in

the face of a changing climate.


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6 Conclusion The options proposed have been reviewed and assessed in terms of scope, costs and risk. The

approach proposed in this paper provides the most cost-effective option to remove the risk of

secondary control equipment failures leading to loss of visibility and control for secondary

substations thus compromising the control room’s ability to manage the network 24/7. This paper is

fundamentally about justifying the continued strategic replacement of secondary control equipment

to maintain the high levels of system performance that our customers deserve.

This paper recommends continuing the replacement of end of life secondary control equipment

started in ED1 over the ED2 and ED3 price control periods. The primary drivers for replacement

are obsolescence, cyber security risk and lack of equipment support and parts. All useable spares will

continue to be recovered to support existing asset base. It is essential that this equipment is

replaced before failure, as it is integral to ensuring current levels of network performance are

maintained.

The total units delivered each year as part of standalone ED2 replacement activities are shown in the

table below.

2023/24 2024/25 2025/26 2026/27 2027/28

SPD 341 341 341 341 341

SPM 230 229 229 229 229

SPEN 571 570 570 570 570

Table 9: Delivery profile – volumes

The expenditure profile is shown in the table below.

Total Cost £m

SPD


Total £1.15 £1.15 £1.15 £1.15 £1.15 £5.76

SPM


Total £0.55 £0.55 £0.55 £0.55 £0.55 £2.76 Table 10: Delivery profile – costs


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7 Appendices N/A

Documents

Secondary Control Equipment Modernisation