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SECOND TECHNICAL PROGRESS REPORT (January – June 2007)

Second Interim Technical Report on Public Accountability Institutions in Pakistan and their macroeconomic Impacts 2

G I N I L O C A T I O N , I S L A M A B A D , P A K I S T A N


Table of Contents

Synthesis....................……………..………….………4 The Research Problem………………………………..5 Research Findings……………………….………….....5 Project Implementation and management……...6 Project Outputs and Dissemination………………11 Capacity Building………………..…………………….12 Impact………………..……………………………………12 Financial Summary………………………………....….14 Administrative Summary………………………..….15 Summary of Administrative Overview…………..18 Organogram………………………………………………23 Annex I Annex II Annex III (a) – (c) Annex IV (a) – (e) Annex V (a) – (e)


Second Interim Report Synthesis 1. The project document was formally signed on 12th May 2006. However the project

actually started on 1st July, 2006 with the establishment of the office of AHPI (GINI) at Block

23, PHA Apartments # 5, G-7/1, Islamabad. For the project, six executive staff members were

recruited of which two are designated as Directors for headquarter office (one for research and

the other for finance, administration and legal). The remaining four provincial coordinators one

for each province (NWFP, Punjab, Sindh and Baluchistan) were contracted for a period of 3 - 5

months for the first phase of the project to collect the data about all the relevant public

accountability agencies in their respective provinces. The list of Public Accountability

Institutions is attached as Annex-I. The contract with the Provincial Researchers was

completed on 31-01-2007; thereafter, four Senior Research Officers were contracted for

report writing. During the second phase they examined the data collected by the provincial

coordinators. In the third phase they have completed report writing upto 30th June 2007. In

the first year of the project quantitative side of the project was to complete its first draft by

the end of the financial year. The qualitative side of the project and its integration with

quantitative (after finalization of the integration and revision of the drafts) side after holding

a Regional seminar and as an output final report will be prepared till end June 2008.

2. The overall objective of the project is to research the evolution of public accountability

institutions in Pakistan. To understand their role and the potential for increasing the

effectiveness of possible intervention designed to strengthen the accountability performance.

This will buffer the poor and marginalized groups from the impacts of structural adjustment

policies by actually translating benefits targeting the poor to reach them without leakages.

This knowledge is to be shared with national and regional level stakeholders. The specific

objectives are as follows:

(i) To study the origins of key public accountability institutions in Pakistan, the impetus

for their formation, the composition and characteristics of their


stakeholders/beneficiaries, performance trends and their historical underlying factors

(in particular the political economy of corruption), and the relationship between the

performance of these institutions with the macroeconomic policies and the budget

process, and the impacts on the poor;

(ii) To disseminate the research results to politicians, government officials, researchers and

NGOs at the national and regional levels, discuss their implications, and make

recommendations for policy and institutional restructuring processes;

(iii) To stimulate further research and methodological capacity in order to increase policy

options and reduce risk and uncertainty for institutional restructuring;

(iv) To encourage research in the region on national accountability structures and systems

in order to facilitate understanding and provide platforms for social and institutional

change.

The first technical progress report was submitted in Nov, 2006.

Research Problem An institution is basically a historic construct. It is not possible to have proper understanding

of the structure, systems and dynamics of an institution both formal and informal without

taking into account the institutions historical evolution.

Pakistan suffers from systemic, endemic and syndicated corruption. This is despite the

existence of various national public accountability institutions which are listed in Annex – I. In

order to strengthen public accountability institutions the project endeavors to research the

genesis of the current public accountability mechanism, their origins, evolution and causes of

their failure or success. Basic research about each institution has been undertaken.

For this purpose, historical information of each institution regarding administrative, financial,

performance of institutions and legal structure, over time, was required. Acquisition and

analysis of requisite data was the first step. As a result of this analysis performance data of

each institution was considered over the time. Innovative and scientific techniques were used

for analysis of data. Actual financial data of 10 years were obtained from the budget books

source, data regarding income and expenditure of these institutions were taken since their

inception was also collected from the original source through each institution officially. In


some cases, interpolation method was used to make financial information historical

projections.

Research Findings The collected data was used to construct a historical account of the various effects these

variables have on institutional performance. This will be useful from a policy perspective to

design interventions that can actually affect better performance of these institutions. On the

basis of financial, administrative, legal and performance of the institutions matrix will be

prepared which will provide guidelines for introducing reforms that will result in better

functioning of the public accountability institutions. This in turn will have an effect on

corruption and related problems that find their roots in the dynamics of post colonial

societies/environments. The results of the research have been attached at (annexes IV (a)-

(e)). As this is the preliminary draft of this phase it is rough and needs further refinement

and integration to arrive at comprehensive conclusions. For the quantum of work involved

and the number of institutions this collection of research is impressive given the time frame.

Project Implementation and Management The research process has been split up into five phases out of which phases one to three have

been completed in the first year of the project. Brief progress is given below:

1st phase – Collection of Data

5. To collect necessary background material, information, references and data of all

specific institutions of the country; four provincial coordinators, one in each province were

hired for the purpose. They had to face lot of problems in getting the necessary data as the

departments were not readily maintaining the data we required. This caused a huge effort for

retrieval of historical information & old record etc. However, Director (Research) and

Provincial Coordinators have made progress and have obtained the relevant data in respect of

Federal as well as Provincial Public Accountability Institutions of the country. The services of

the Provincial Coordinators were completed on 31st January 2007. They remained in

coordination with GINI office till end of March to fill in the gaps in the data.


2nd phase – Review of Data

6. This phase started in December and overlapped with the month of Jan 2007 to review

the collected data. During the second phase, well known Senior Researchers, with appropriate

credentials were engaged on contract for specific tasks. Their CV’s are attached herewith at

annex V (a)-(e).

7. The contractual payments and the allocated areas of study are mentioned against their

names:

Sr. No Name of Senior Researcher Area of Study Remuneration

(i) Dr. A. R. Kemal Performance Rs. 500,000/-

(ii) Mr. Masood H. Kizilbash Financial Rs. 500,000/-

(iii) Khalid Abbas Legal (terminated) Rs. 250,000/-

(iv) Ali Raza Legal Rs. 500,000/-

(v) Dr. Iffat Idris Overall Review Rs. 700,000/-

(vi) Muhammad Nasim Khan Raja Administrative Rs. 500,000/-

(Director Research), GINI

The above Senior Researchers reviewed the collected data and pointed out some gaps in data.

The provincial coordinators were requested for supply of requisite data. The second phase was

also completed with the support of the provincial coordinators.

8. The office space was not sufficient for accommodating the senior researchers. Another

apartment in the same block was hired for the purpose in January 2007 (Annex - II).

3rd phase – Analysis and report writing design parameters

9. In the third phase, after the review of data the Senior Researchers have started the

report writing and completed first drafts as per TOR and templates of each aspect of the

study provided by GINI. Progress of the work was monitored through weekly, fortnightly and

monthly meetings. Necessary assistance was extended by the project staff. The contract with

Khalid Abbas was terminated due to non compliance of work as per project requirement. He

was paid an honorarium of Rs. 20,000/- for the work performed by him. Another well known

lawyer Mr. Ali Raza was hired for writing of the legal aspect of the institutions under study.

He was hired for Rs. 500,000/- on contractual basis.


10. Dr. Iffat Idris was assigned to review all the annual reports of the institutions since

their inception and historical changes occurred over the time. She was contracted for Rs.

700,000/- for this job. Her contract is also enclosed.

11. Dr. Evan Due from IDRC visited Project Office on 30-04-2007. Team Leader and all

Senior Researchers were present in the meeting. Mr. Daniyal Aziz briefed him about the

project. All Senior Researchers gave presentation of 10 to 15 minutes about the progress of

their areas and the salient features of the work. Discussions were also held. Dr. Evan

appreciated the effort of the Team Leader, Researchers and GINI Staff.

12. We have received the first draft from all Senior Researchers which is being edited and

integrated. This is a gigantic task. The quantitative phase of the project has been completed

as scheduled.

13. National Consultative Meeting is being designed and convened for deciding and

designing the parameters of the qualitative research in the month of July 2007 by the

domestic experts and stakeholders.

In this seminar Sr. Researchers, present and ex-heads of the institutions randomly selected

effectees, members of civil society and other stakeholders will be participating.

14. The templates utilized by the researchers for the quantitative research i.e.

Administrative, Financial, Legal, and Performance is summarized under:

I. Administrative

15. Administrative setup and the institutional management play a vital role in

institutions effectiveness. Due varying histories and legal constructs, the administrative

management governments create different types of employments/staffing

arrangements. The nature and type of these administrative arrangements often

determines the perverse or positive incentive structures for employee’s behavior. In

the administrative aspect of the study these arrangements are explored by categorizing

the organization into different type on the basis of staffing pattern and their status in

the government hierarchy. Having this information in hand we are in a position to

compare the quantitative data to determine preferable administrative arrangements. In

this regard template for the administrative arrangements is annexed as Annex – III (a)

wherein administrative setup, objectives/functions of the institutions, organogram are


under study, their staffing pattern, incentives provided to the employees, internal

administrative mechanism adopted by these institutions, capacity building plans for

staff, career planning etc.

II. Financial

16. This component compares the various aspects of financial analysis as financial

arrangements have an impact on incentive environment of the institutions as well as

the financial resources for functionality and its effect on outcomes. To delineate

functional performance in comparison with different financial arrangements this

section of the study explores the institutions history in a financial context. The

research categorizes institutions into identifiable types with differentiated financial

profiles. This is compared with performance adjudged by both quantitative and

qualitative information to determine preferable financial arrangement as a source for

increasing and decreasing accountability outcome. In this regard a template for

financial analysis is also annexed as Annex – III (b)

Besides detailed financial analysis of each institution was carried out, mainly the

following points are kept in view:

What is the budget of an institution and its real increase or decrease over time?

What is the source of funding and conditions attached to it?

What is the type of expenditure authority?

III. Legal

17. The legal structure of the institution has a direct impact on its functionality.

Legal authority determines the ability and scope of the institution to take various

actions. How this legal authority is treated amongst the different institutions is

potentially a strong determinant of institutional effectiveness. This section of the

research report also indicates the overlapping areas between offences cognizable by

different institutions and through analysis to check the redundant factors. As in the

previous sections legal construct of the institutions is analyzed with a view to

categorize type wise to compare quantitative and qualitative information to determine

preferential arrangements for delineation purpose.


Following areas of each institution are given special attention:

a. Jurisdiction

b. Autonomy of hierarchical relations

c. System and Controls

d. Inter-Institutional relations

A template for Legal analysis is also annexed as Annex – III (c)

IV. Performance

18. In this section of the study report main issues in the evaluation of performance

of a particular institution are discussed.

How discretionary powers are used which hampered the performance of an

organization

To develop performance criteria in relation to misuse of discretionary powers

What are the trends in the cases registered, decided and relief provided over the

time

A comparative analysis of the performance of each institution is given and econometric

analysis is also made.

V. Overall review

19. In this component of report details finding and reviewing of the Annual Reports of

Public Accountability Institutions under study is given. The various changes occurred in these

institutions over the time i.e. from historical perspective.

20. The qualitative research will be conducted in 4th Phase and in the next financial year

(2007-2008). The qualitative research consists of two components of interactive tools as well

as analysis identification for qualitative research and discussion with stakeholders. This

component of the research will provide comparative basis within which to analyze the

operating environment and the informal considerations of the performance. Ultimately this

will lead to substantiate recommendations.

21. The qualitative research will be conducted through interviews of prominent as well as

randomly selected individuals in both the accused and prosecuting/executive categories. The

interview questions will be structured after the initial quantitative analysis so that exact


reference can be made and specific questions to explain and elaborate on the quantitative

data.

22. 5th Phase will be after the holding of the Regional Seminar and discussing the report in

the seminar. Deliberations of the seminar participants will also be entertained and final report

will be submitted in the month ending June 2008.

Project Outputs and Dissemination 23. The outcome of the three phases of the project is the five components of the report

received as draft from the Senior Researchers as already mentioned in the preceding

paragraphs, such as overall review of the annual reports, financial, administrative, legal and

performance of each Public Accountability Institutions with historical perspective, how the

outputs are effective to Public delivery system. As a result of this the major difficulty is

integration of various components of the report. However Annex IV (a)- (e), there is no need

of any rational change in the objectives.

A quantitative research (report) will be discussed in National Seminar to design parameters for

qualitative research.

24. The GINI website available at www.giniweb.net is now operative and updated. Salient

features of the qualitative report will be given place in the web for the benefit of general

stakeholders and public at large.3333

25. GINI has also established its own library; the volumes are increasing day by day by

collecting all project related material regarding Public Accountability Institutions and Good

Governance. The other rare data has been obtained from National Archives & Provincial

Archives, Punjab by the personal effort of The Team leader and Director Research.

The Team Leader and Director Research personally visited the National Archives & Provincial

Archives, Punjab. Some data is also available on CD’s.


Capacity Building 26. Project has provided a chance for Senior Researchers as well as Junior Researchers to

apply new techniques of data collection of various categories of Public Accountability

Institutions of the country from the historical perspective and has given their intellectual

inputs.

Two female researchers Ms. Azra Rafiq (as Provincial Coordinator, Punjab) and Ms. Iffat Idris

(Senior Researcher) have been specially associated with the project.

Impact 27. This research analyzes the integral role of public accountability institutions of the

country in shaping the formulation, implementation and impacts of macro-economic policies.

Corruption is identified as the major institutional impediment to governance and has also an

impact on the overall economic wellbeing and public delivery system. The research has

identified the root causes of corruption in an effort to devise better accountability mechanism

for its effective prevention and elimination.

28. This quantitative and qualitative knowledge after discussion with all randomly selected

segments of Public and civil society members will provide more insights into the relationship

between public accountability, and macro economic development and to better understand

the macro economics of corruption and its impacts on marginalized groups of society.

29. The research findings may be used by decision makers and policy planners as well as

government functionaries involved in reforming institutions in Pakistan as direct beneficiaries,

the secondary beneficiaries will constitute economists, academicians, researchers, students

and public at large.

After holding the regional seminar resultantly, dialogue and communication at the

international level regarding effective strategies to advance accountability in the region.


Financial Summary 30. The project under report was formally signed on May 12th, 2006. However, it practically

commenced on July 1st, 2006 and the first tranche amounting to Rs.3,510,197.53/- was

received on June 29th, 2006. The second tranche amounting to Rs.3,437,950/- was received on

Feb 27th, 2007. The additional amount of Rs.1,929,940.75/-, as requested in previous report,

after deducting from year 2 budget heads, to meet the year 1 expenditure was received on

April 9th, 2007. As such, the project received a total amount of Rs. 8,878,088.28/- during year

1 of the project and the expenditure incurred during the same period from July 1st, 2006 to

June 30th, 2007 amounted to Rs.8,640,626/- including the payables by June 30th 2007. The

balance amount of Rs.262,869 will be utilized to meet the expenditures during year 2 of the

project.

The expenditure amounting to 6,642,199.25 (8572140-1929940.75) is budgeted for the year

July 1st 2007 till June 30th 2008 plus unspent amount of 262,869.00 amounting to Rs.

6,905,068.25/- is anticipated for the project duration period till June, 2008

The forecast expenditure for the period July 1st until October 12th 2007 (original reporting

period restored under the assumption that the two month will be added to project completion

date i.e. end June 2008) is Rs. 1,979,860. This expenditure is explained in accordance with

the heads mentioned in the attached tables.

Project Information Summary is annexed.

It has been preferred to retain the account in the current account keeping in view of the low

rate of interest and high taxes on savings account resulting in no substantial benefit. Expenses

exceeded budgetary heads in some cases as explained in the details.


Detailed Financial Summary








Administrative Summary 33. For the project six executive staff has been recruited. Two executives stationed at H.Q

and designated as Directors, One is responsible for Research and the other for Finance,

Administration & Legal. For four provinces, provincial coordinators have been appointed. Four

Senior Researchers are engaged for the 2nd and 3rd phase of the project. The brief of which is

as under:

Muhammad Nasim Khan Raja is appointed as Director (Research) since 1st July 2006 to 30th

June 2007 initially for a period of one year. Mr. Raja has a rich administrative and consultancy

experience of 32 years in the federal government working in various executive capacities with

a strong academic background. His emoluments for the first quarter are initially fixed @ Rs

35,000/- per month to be reconsidered later on. He is assigned the following responsibilities:

1. To assist and collect data at federal level Public Accountability Institutions, National

Archives and National Documentation Centers etc.

2. To identify researchers and assign them research work as per phases of the project

3. To prepare contracts for researchers

4. To select provincial coordinators

5. To liaison with provincial coordinators and supervise data collection and other relevant

materials of the public accountability institutions in the provinces and provide

necessary guidance.

6. To oversee on going research activities

7. To prepare research plan & coordinate with local & international research institutions

8. To hold meetings/seminars/conferences

9. Establishment and upkeep of library

In addition to his work, he has been assigned to prepare the report on the administrative

aspect of Public Accountability Institutions. Rs.500,000/- is to be paid for this task.

----------------------------------------------------------------

Mr. Sanaullah is designated as Director Finance, Administration & legal since 1st July 2006 to

30th June 2007. He has rich administrative experience of 30 years at executive levels in

various capacities in the federal government with strong academic background. His


emoluments were also initially fixed at Rs 35,000/- per month for the first quarter to be

revised later on. He is responsible for the following tasks:

1. To upkeep and maintain office accounts

2. To prepare budget

3. To purchase office equipments, stationary and other office articles

4. To arrange and maintain equipment and cleanliness

5. To upkeep office building

6. To assist in arranging meetings, seminars and conference

7. To maintain discipline and upkeep attendance of the staff

8. To prepare periodic financial statements

9. To attend legal matters

----------------------------------------------------------------

Dr. Abdul Latif is contracted to work as a coordinator for Sindh Province initially for a period

of three months since 5th September 2006 @ Rs 30,000/- per month along with Rs. 10,000/- for

research expenses. Dr. Abdul Latif has taken early retirement from National Institute of Public

Administration, Karachi from the post of Director. He is a well-known educationist &

Researcher with strong educational background. He is responsible for the following tasks:

1. To act as coordinator & representative of GINI for Sindh Province

2. To collect data of Provincial Accountability institutions of Sindh Province and other

relevant material

3. To send collected data to Head Quarter, Islamabad

4. To coordinate with other researchers in the Province

5. To liaison with Director Research at Head Quarter, Islamabad

6. To send periodic progress report to H.Q

7. To establish cordial relations with Public Accountability Institutions of the Province

----------------------------------------------------------------

Ms. Azra Rafique is deputed as coordinator for the Punjab Province since 8th September 2006

initially for a period of 3 months. She has vast training & research experience of 35 years at

National Institute of Public Administration, Lahore. She has a very strong educational

background. Her terms and conditions & emoluments are the same as for the coordinator of

Sindh mentioned above.


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Mr. Shakeel Ahmad Khalil is deputed as coordinator for NWFP initially for a period of two

months since 29th September 2006. The remuneration will be paid @ Rs. 25,000/- per month.

He will be paid research expense on actual cost basis. He has been assigned to get information

from five Public Accountability Institutions located in NWFP; other responsibilities are the

same as for the other coordinators.

----------------------------------------------------------------

Mr. Abdur Raziq is contracted as a Researcher for the collection of data of remaining five

public Accountability Institutions of NWFP initially for a period of one month from 4th Oct 2006

that is being extended on the basis of his performance for another month. He will be paid Rs.

25,000/- per month as remuneration. He will also be paid research expense on actual cost.


SUMMARY OF ADMINISTRATRIVE OVERVIEW

Directors Responsibilities Remuneration per month (Rs.)

Contract Date

Expiry Date

Muhammad Nasim Khan Raja (Director Research)

Review the collected & collated data Point out gaps/short comings in data Preparation of design parameters for

report writing Prepare report on administrative aspect of

each Public Accountability Institution as per template or TOR

To identify researchers & assign them research work

Preparing contracts for researchers Assisting in collection of data at federal

and provincial level regarding accountability institutions

Selecting Provincial coordinators Liaison with provincial coordinators Preparing research plan to coordinate with

local & international research institutions Overseeing of ongoing research activities Guidance & monitoring of research staff Holding of meetings, seminars/conferences Maintaining & upkeep of Office library

Rs. 35,000/-

1st July 2006

June 2007 (extendable for another year on new TOR)

Chaudhry Sanaullah (Director Finance, Admin & Legal)

Preparation of Budget & maintenance of

office accounts Purchasing articles for office use Repair & maintenance of equipment Upkeep of building Assisting in arranging conferences,

seminars & workshops Maintaining service record of the officials

Rs. 35,000/-

1st July 2006

June 2007 (extendable for another year on new TOR)


Up keeping of attendance of staff Assisting in legal matter

Syed Sarfraz Ali

Researcher for filling the gaps in data

Rs. 20,000/-

15th Jan 2007

15th March 2007

Senior Researchers Responsibilities

Remuneration (Rs.)

Contract Date

Expiry Date

Dr. A. R. Kemal (Senior Researcher)


report writing Analyze the data regarding the

performance of Public Accountability institutions as per TOR

Report Writing on the performance of each institution under study

Rs. 500,000/-

16th Jan 2007

30th June 2007

Mr. Masood H. Kizilbash (Senior Researcher)


report writing Analyze the budget of all institutions

under study over the time. Financial authority in the institution Financial powers delegated Comparative financial analysis of

different institutions Report writing as per TOR about the allocated Financial Area in respect of each department

Rs. 500,000/-

16th Jan 2007

30th June 2007


Mr. Khalid Abbas


report writing Legal aspect of each institution over time Prepare legal area report Furnish report as per template or TOR

Rs. 250,000/- (He was paid an honorarium of Rs. 20,000/- and the contract was terminated)

16th Jan 2007

30th June 2007

Ali Raza


report writing Legal aspect of each institution over time Prepare legal area report Furnish report as per template or TOR

Rs. 500,000/-

15th March 2007

30th June 2007

Dr. Iffat Idris


report writing To give an overview of the historical

perspective of Public Accountability Institutions through review of each Annual Report as per TOR

Rs. 700,000/-

17th April 2007

30th June 2007


Provincial Research Coordinators Responsibilities

Remuneration per month(Rs.)

Start Date

End Date

Dr. Abdul Latif (Sindh Province)

Collection of data of public accountability

institutions in Sindh province. Sending of collected & collated data Coordination with other researchers Periodic progress reports

Rs. 30,000/-

5th Sept 2006

31st Jan, 2007

Ms. Azra Rafiq (Punjab Province)

-do-

Rs. 30,000/-

8th Sept 2006

31st Jan, 2007

Mr. Abdur Raziq (NWFP)

-do-

Rs. 25,000/-

4th Oct 2006

31st Jan, 2007

Mr. Shakeel (Researcher, NWFP)

-do- Rs. 25,000/-

29th Sept 2006

31st Jan, 2007

Ch. Muhammad Anwar (Researcher, Baluchistan)

-do-

Rs. 30,000/-

15th Nov, 2006

31st Jan, 2007


IT staff Responsibilities Remuneration per month(Rs.) Start Date End Date

Faisal Yaqoob (website administrator & network administrator)

Online search of relevant Institutions

information on accountability and good governance through networking

Maintaining and updating the website (www.giniweb.net)

Other IT related work Preparation of statements and charts etc.

Rs. 15,000/- (Being Paid 20,000/- since Nov 2006)

15th Aug 2006

June 2007 (Extendable for another year on new TOR)

Other Staff Responsibilities

Remuneration per month(Rs.) Start Date End Date

4 officials

Assisting in the management of office

Rs. 35,000/-(All)

1st July 2006

June 2007


Organogram of GINI

Team Leader

Director (Finance, Admin,

Legal)

IT Specialist Director (Research)

CEO

Senior Researcher

(Administration)

Senior Researcher (Finance)

Senior Researcher

(Legal)

Senior Researcher

(Performance)

Provincial Coordinator

(Sindh)

Provincial Coordinator (Baluchistan)


(NWFP)


(Punjab) Senior Researcher

(Report Writing)

Accountant


Annex-I

1. Auditor General of Pakistan

2. Public Accounts Committee (Federal & Provincial)

3. National Accountability Bureau

4. Anti-Corruption Establishments (NWFP, Baluchistan, Punjab and Sindh)

5. Wafaqi Mohtasib

6. Provincial Mohtasib (Baluchistan, Punjab, Sindh)

7. Federal Service Tribunals

8. Provincial Service Tribunal (NWFP, Baluchistan, Punjab, Sindh)

9. Federal Public Service Commission

10. Provincial Public Service Commission (NWFP, Baluchistan, Punjab, Sindh)

11. Federal Investigation Agency

12. Prime Ministers Inspection Team

13. Chief Ministers/ Governor’s Inspection Team

14. Services and General Administration Depa


Annex-II



Template for Administrative Area of the Assignment

Service Rules Staff Strength Organization of Institutions

Brief Functions

Incentives Available

Career Planning

Own Adopted General Rules Followed

Officer Official Total Horizontally Vertically Financial Other Career Path Security of Service

Name of the Organization Status Law/Order under which established

Staffing

Own Service Contract Deputation Consultant Constitutional Appointment

Internal Administration Control Powers of Head of the Organization Training

Any inbuilt Control Mechanism in organization

Level of control over staff

Division of Work

Appointing Power

Administrative Power

Disciplinary Power

Specialized Training

Trained personnel percentage

Impact of Training

1 2 3 4

5 6 7 9 10

11

8

13 12

Annex-IIIa


Template for Legal Area of the Assignment

Autonomy under Law Systems & Controls

Appointing Delegation of Power

Financial

Fulfill the need of hierarchical structure

Adequate Power to Function

Inbuilt mechanism in Law Elaborate Control

Name of the Organization Ordinance/Act/Law applicable on the Organization

Legal Frame Work Authority for functioning

Jurisdiction

Sufficient Insufficient Overlapping Any Change needed

Inter Institutional Relations Performance of Law

Analysis of Law under overall perspective

Relationship of Law with other Institutions

Weakness in mandate Effectiveness of Law Upto what extent Law is serving its purpose

1 2 3 4

5 6

7 8

Annex-IIIb


Template for Financial Area of the Assignment

Sufficient Budget Issues raised in

expanding money Source of funding Financial Accountability

Proper Allocation as per requirement of functions

Amount not utilized Yearwise

Budget Allocated

Own source through fees etc total in %

Donations Finance Dept. External FA

Internal Audit/ External Audit

Effectiveness of Audit & existing system

Name of the Organization Status Budget

Allocation of Funds Yearwise

Expenditure Yearwise

Distribution of budget under various heads

Ratios of budget

Over the years increase/decrease

Expenditure Authority Level of Financial Autonomy Comparability with other similar institutions

Drawbacks

Financial Power to Head of the Organization

Principal Accounting Officer

Finance Dept. External FA

Head of Organization

Regional Head/ Administrative Unit Head

Delegation of Financial Power, Rules etc

Drawbacks in existing arrangements

Proposals to improve

1 3 2

4 5 6 7

8 9 10 11

Annex-IIIc


Project Output Annex – IV (A to E)

Over all Review (A) Financial Analysis (B) Administrative Aspect (C) Legal analysis (D) Performance (E)

38

TABLE OF CONTENTS Sr. TITLE PAGE (s). A. OVERALL REVIEW (6‐70)

Foreword 6 Abbreviations and Acronyms 9 Introduction 10

1. National Accountability Bureau 12 2. Federal Ombudsman 21 3. Sindh Ombudsman 31 4. Punjab Ombudsman 37 5. Balochistan Ombudsman 44 6. Federal Public Accounts Committee 48 7. Provincial Public Accounts Committees 54 8. Federal Public Service Commission 61 9. Provincial Public Service Commissions 64 10. Miscellaneous 68 11. Conclusion 70

B. FINANCIAL ANALYSIS (75‐116)

1. Introduction 75 2. Overview of Financial Data of Accountability Institutions at Federal Level 76

3. Overview of Financial Data of Accountability Institutions at Provincial Level 89

4. Analysis of Financial Data 109 5. Proposals/ Recommendations 116 Annexes (The annexes have been attached as Federal, Baluchistan, NWFP, Punjab, and Sindh)

C. ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECT (121‐301) 1. National Accountability Bureau (NAB) 121

Anti Corruption Establishment (ACE) 136

39

ACE, Baluchistan 137 ACE, Punjab 140 ACE, NWFP 146

ACE, Sindh 149 Comparison of NAB & ACE’s 153 2. Chief Ministers Inspection Team (CMIT) 172

CMIT, Punjab 178 CMIT, Baluchistan 182 CMIT, NWFP 186 CMIT, Sindh 190

3. Public Service Commission (PSC) 200 Federal Public Service Commission 201 Baluchistan Public Service Commission 208 NWFP Public Service Commission 212 Punjab Public Service Commission 216 Sindh Public Service Commission 221

4. Service Tribunals 240 Federal Service Tribunals (FST) 241

Baluchistan Service Tribunals (BST) 245 NWFP Service Tribunals (NWFP ST) 248 Punjab Service Tribunals (PST) 252 Sindh Service Tribunals (SST) 255

5. Ombudsman 270 Federal Ombudsman (Wafaqi Mohtasib) 271 Provincial Ombudsman, Baluchistan (POB) 280 Provincial Ombudsman, Punjab (POP) 283 Provincial Ombudsman, Sindh (POS) 286

6. Department of Auditor General of Pakistan & Public Accounts Committee (PAC) 301

D. LEGAL FRAMEWORK (316‐387)

1. Introduction 316 2. Historical Footsteps 320 3. The Laws 324 4. Summary 329 5. General Accountability 330 6. Institutional & Financial Accountability 387

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E. PERFORMANCE (427‐493)

1. Introduction 427

2. Corruption and Misuse of discretionary powers 430

3. Pakistan’s Governance Strategy and Corruption 433

4. Development of Performance criteria for corruption

and misuse of discretionary powers 436

5. Analysis of the organizations and their performance 438

6. Conclusions 493

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ANNEX IV (A)

OVERALL REVIEW

OF

PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY INSTITUTIONS

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Prepared by Dr Iffat Idris Foreword The simplest definition of accountability is ‘being held responsible’. It can have several meanings, depending on the context. Public accountability refers, on the one hand, to accountability by those in the public sector – encompassing government, elected representatives, semi‐autonomous and autonomous organizations, civil servants, officials and functionaries exercising authority on behalf of citizens. On the other hand it refers to accountability conducted in the open, accessible to all. The concept of public accountability is central to good governance: it provides the foundation for transparency, equity, efficiency, rule of law and, ultimately, development. Judged by legal provisions and institutions, Pakistan is very strong on public accountability. There is a plethora of laws and entities in place to ensure accountability of those in office in this country at any level, elected or non‐elected. As well as mechanisms for internal accountability within individual ministries and departments, there are several mechanisms specifically focused on public accountability. These include the National Accountability Bureau, Federal and Provincial Ombudsmen, Federal and Provincial Accounts Committees, the Auditor‐General of Pakistan, the Federal Tax Ombudsman, Prime Minister and Chief Minister’s Inspection Teams and Anti‐Corruption Establishments. Laws and policies geared towards the same goal include the National Anti‐Corruption Strategy and UN Convention against Corruption (UNCAC). In practice, however, Pakistan’s record on public accountability has not been impressive – and certainly falls short of what could be expected from the multitude of legal and institutional provisions for public accountability. The key to understanding this anomaly lies in the implementation of accountability laws and the functioning of accountability institutions. The Governance Institutions Network International (GINI) is carrying out a two‐year research project to examine these issues. Entitled ‘Public Accountability Institutions in Pakistan and their Macro‐Economic Impacts’ the project has five components. Four of these look at: the legal mandate for accountability in Pakistan; administrative arrangements for public accountability institutions; financing of public accountability

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institutions; and the performance of public accountability institutions. The fifth component looks at the annual reports of public accountability institutions to uncover aspects of their functioning not dealt with by the other components – such as priorities, challenges, constraints, future plans – and see how these have changed over time. This report details the findings of the component reviewing the annual reports of public accountability institutions in Pakistan. Taken together, the findings from the five project components provide a comprehensive picture of the status and functioning of public accountability in Pakistan. The next phase of the GINI research project will entail collation of the five components and analysis, identification of issues for qualitative research and discussion with stakeholders, ultimately leading to recommendations to improve public accountability in Pakistan.

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CONTENTS

Foreword 2 Contents 3 Abbreviations and Acronyms 4

Introduction 5

12. National Accountability Bureau 6 13. Federal Ombudsman 13 14. Sindh Ombudsman 21 15. Punjab Ombudsman 26 16. Balochistan Ombudsman 32 17. Federal Public Accounts Committee 35 18. Provincial Public Accounts Committees 40 19. Federal Public Service Commission 46 20. Provincial Public Service Commissions 49 21. Miscellaneous 52 22. Conclusion 54

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Abbreviations and Acronyms ADB Asian Development Bank ACR Annual Confidential Report CDA Capital Development Authority CMIT Chief Minister’s Inspection Team DCO District Coordination Officer DFID Department for International Development (UK) FIA Federal Investigation Agency GINI Governance Institutions Network International MNA Member of the National Assembly MPA Member of the Provincial Assembly NAB National Accountability Bureau NRB National Reconstruction Bureau PAC Public Accounts Committee PSC Public Service Commission SOP Standard Operating Procedures WAPDA Water and Power Development Authority

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Introduction This report details the findings of the component of the GINI Public Accountability Research Project, looking at the annual reports of public accountability institutions in Pakistan. As explained in the Foreword, other components of the project look at the legal, administrative and financial aspects of these institutions and at their performance. Hence the review of annual reports ignored all these aspects. It aimed to take a more qualitative look at the functioning of public accountability institutions, and identify issues, challenges, priorities, plans and see how these have changed over time. Another way of understanding this component would be to say it sought to uncover from institution’s own reports any information and insights that were not covered by the other components – to catch anything that ‘fell through the cracks’. This made the review somewhat challenging in that it was not looking at defined topics or data, but sifting through the diverse annual reports to find anything of significance. This was the basic methodology used in this component. This report is essentially a thematic review of the annual reports of each institution, with the particular themes determined by and varying from one institution to the next. Thus capacity‐building was a major issue for the National Accountability Bureau and is given considerable attention in the NAB section of the report, but did not come up at all in the context of the Public Service Commissions and is not included in the PSC section. Two caveats should be added here. One, the review assessed what was given in the annual reports, which of course were prepared by the organizations themselves. Hence the findings given in this report are from the institutions’ own perspective. The report does not provide any independent verification of the points made in the annual reports. Two, not all annual reports were available for review. In the case of the National Accountability Bureau, Federal and Provincial Ombudsmen, Public Accounts Committees and Public Service Commissions, the majority of annual reports were available and findings are detailed in this document. But in the case of several public accountability institutions, such as Prime Minister’s and Chief Minister’s Inspection Teams, Anti‐Corruption Establishments, the Federal Investigation Agency and others, there were virtually no annual reports. Hence the content of this report, in terms of institutions covered, reflects annual report availability rather than relevance to public accountability: a lot of very relevant organizations could not be included because of lack of access to their annual reports. The report is divided into four main sections detailing findings from the National Accountability Bureau, Federal and Provincial Ombudsmen, Federal and Provincial

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Public Accounts Committees and Federal and Provincial Public Service Commissions. Findings from a handful of ‘miscellaneous’ annual reports are given at the end. Each section begins with a brief introduction to the institution concerned. The aim is that this report should be accessible to the educated lay reader, and that it should be able to be read as a stand‐alone document, i.e. to make sense of it one should not have to read the other four components’ reports. The introduction is followed by the thematic review of the annual reports, and then by a summary of key points. The concluding section at the end of the report draws together the findings from individual sections and makes some general recommendations.

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1. NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU 1.1 Introduction to NAB The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) was established in 1999, replacing the Ehtesab Cell created under the Ehtesab Act 1997 to investigate corruption cases. The NAB Ordinance was promulgated on 16 November 1999, soon after the overthrow of the Nawaz Sharif government and the onset of military rule. In broad terms the Ordinance provides for:

Investigation and prosecution of cases related to corruption (including corrupt practices, misappropriation of property, abuse of power, kickbacks, and so on);

Recovery of outstanding loans from defaulters; Recovery of state money and assets misappropriated through corruption or removed abroad.

The NAB Ordinance extensively defines corruption and corrupt practices, and lays down applicable punishments. These include imprisonment, imposition of fines, confiscation of property, disqualification from public office. Amendments to the Ordinance have made procedural changes but they have not fundamentally altered NAB’s mandate and authority. NAB operations fall into three main functions: identification and intelligence; investigation; and prosecution. Whether a case proceeds to the third stage depends on the availability of sufficient evidence. In addition, the accused can apply for a plea‐bargain at any stage, even after conviction. In terms of organizational structure, NAB comprises several wings:

Identification and Intelligence; Investigation Monitoring; Prosecution; Research Analysis Training; Banking; Overseas Operations; General Administration; Experts; Media.

These have undergone minor modifications since NAB was set up; these changes are outlined below.

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In terms of geographic offices, NAB comprises a Head Office and Provincial Offices in Punjab, Sindh, NWFP and Balochistan, as well as a Rawalpindi Office. Each Provincial NAB Office comprises Identification and Intelligence, Investigation, Prosecution and Administration Wings. 1.2 Annual Reports’ Review The National Accountability Bureau has issued five Annual Reports since it was set up: 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004 and 2005. The last report for 2005 was released in March 2006. Given below is a thematic review of NAB’s annual reports. This assesses how the situation has changed from year to year with regard to specific themes or aspects of NAB functioning, e.g. staff capacity, public perceptions of the organization. The review shows the shifting emphasis in NAB priorities and challenges faced, and the extent to which these have/are being addressed. a) Approach – The NAB reports describe three phases of NAB’s operations since

it was established. In Phase 1, from inception to the second year, NAB was primarily an enforcement agency. The reports describe a negative reaction to this in the business community, something which prompted amendments to the NAB Ordinance (see below) and led to a change in approach. In Phase 2 NAB took a ‘softer’ line and entered into plea bargain arrangements with loan defaulters wherever possible – the focus being on recovering looted assets. In the third and current, on‐going Phase 3 NAB’s focus has again shifted quite dramatically. It has taken a three‐pronged approach to tackling corruption: awareness, prevention and enforcement.

Within enforcement, given the limited resources at its disposal, NAB initially chose to prioritize high‐value cases (involving corruption of Rs.50 million or more) and those cases that could have a strong deterrent effect in curbing corruption. The merger with FIA’s anti‐corruption wing from 2002 and the designation of NAB as the sole anti‐corruption agency at the federal level, removed duplication of mandate with FIA and meant NAB had to deal with ‘petty’ corruption cases as well as the ‘big fish’ it had focused on until then. Another factor prompting this change was the public perception that NAB was ineffective because it was doing little to curb the small‐scale everyday corruption that impacts ordinary people. The 2005 Report states that NAB will be taking on a bigger spread of cases, in different organizations and across all strata of society.

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Also noteworthy within enforcement, is that NAB’s focus is largely on recovering defaulted loans and stolen assets, rather than on accountability per se – investigating how corruption was allowed to happen, who was responsible, and so on. In the reports a key measure of NAB’s success/failure is seen in the amount of money it is able to get from loan defaulters/accused persons. This effectively limits NAB to a recovery agency.

b) Mandate – Each NAB report devotes considerable space to explaining the problem (including types) of corruption in Pakistan, the reason for past failures to curb this menace, and thus the rationale behind the creation of NAB. This is to be expected in the first and even initial reports, but the persistence of this justification in the fifth report produced, indicates the organization has an image problem (see c below).

NAB’s mandate is broadly to investigate and prosecute corruption, recover defaulted loans and looted assets. There is no stipulation about the scale of corruption. Hence NAB’s later shift to dealing with petty corruption alongside the ‘big fish’ it initially tackled, amounted to it fulfilling rather than changing its original mandate. However, the development and approval of the National Anti‐Corruption Strategy in 2002 did widen NAB’s mandate. NAB was designated the sole anti‐corruption agency at federal level. As well as investigating and prosecuting those accused of corruption, the organization was tasked with promoting awareness about corruption and implementing prevention measures. This expanded mandate meant considerable additional work, e.g. since 2002 all contracts over Rs.50 million concluded by public sector organizations have to be submitted to NAB.

c) Amendments – The 2001 Report was issued two years after NAB was set up. During that period Asfandyar Wali Khan challenged NAB’s creation in the Supreme Court ‘on the grounds that it exceeded the powers granted in the basic laws and was violative of fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution and that its purpose was to set up an arbitrary body to negate the rule of law and principles of natural justice’. The Supreme Court rejected the petition, but it did lead to amendments in the NAB Ordinance. These are detailed in the 2001 Report. Key among these are the stipulation that an accused person must be produced in court every 15 days for extension of remand, rather than the previous 60 days; and the provision for loan defaulters

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to appeal to the State Bank of Pakistan Governor for their cases to be heard by Conciliation Committees. Early NAB reports show concern about the impact lack of permanent status and protection from political interference will have on its ability to tackle corruption. The 2001 Report asserts the ‘organization needs to attain permanent status’. The 2002 Report thus welcomes the inclusion of the NAB Ordinance in the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution. As seen, amendments to the NAB Ordinance in 2002 added ‘prevention’ to NAB’s mandate, and made it the sole anti‐corruption agency at federal level. The subsequent merger of FIA’s economic wing and anti‐corruption wings with NAB had a major impact on NAB functioning.

The NAB Reports generally describe amendments as positive measures, geared towards improving the organization’s working and its effectiveness. The 2001 Report even claims that, since amendments were generally made to appease the concerns of particular interests, the amended Ordinance could be described as a consensual document.

d) Image and Credibility – All NAB reports show concern about NAB’s image,

public perceptions of the organization, and its credibility. The 2001 Report describes ‘a virulent media campaign, branding the Ordinance as draconian in substance and application’, [p.6]. It blames this on vested interests ‘successfully brought to justice by NAB’ but acknowledges it is ‘important that accountability should not be seen as an exercise in political victimization..‐ a difficult task, given the general mistrust of previous government accountability schemes’. Later reports blame NAB’s poor public image on various factors: i) some of NAB’s early practices that have since been amended (e.g. 60‐day remand without bail); ii) exclusion of the armed forces and judiciary from the accountability process, iii) concept of plea‐bargaining. The 2002 Report has boxes giving detailed explanations of the plea bargain process and its benefits, as well as the reasons for exclusion of the judiciary and armed forces. Other factors identified in the reports are: iv) misunderstanding of NAB’s work and a failure by the public to appreciate the limitations and constraints within which NAB operates (see e below); v) the fact that NAB’s operations do not reach the everyday corruption that affects the common man and hence its efforts are seen as ineffective.

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While the exclusion of armed forces and judiciary are consistently defended, the reports show increasing efforts being made to promote awareness and understanding of NAB’s work and to tackle petty corruption. However, all the reports show a persistent refusal to acknowledge that NAB’s poor public image could primarily be due to its own failings. ‘The criticism leveled at NAB during 2003 was biased, distorted and based on generalizations such as selective accountability’. Any decline in public perceptions of NAB’s credibility is due to ‘lack of an objective appreciation of NAB’s work’ [2004, SWOT analysis]. The later NAB reports describe considerable effort by the organization’s Media Wing to inform the public about its activities, as well as by the Awareness and Prevention Wing to convey anti‐corruption messages. These include appearances by senior NAB officers on TV discussion programs, newspaper articles and use of dramas with anti‐corruption storylines. There appears to be a contradiction between the success of these initiatives claimed in the reports, and NAB’s continued image problem.

e) Context – NAB was established by a military government, something that

contributed to its image as a tool of political victimization. But in 2002 elections to the National and Provincial Assemblies restored civilian governments to power. The reports show concern at the transition both before and after it happened. The 2001 Report asks: ‘to what extent can legislation be enacted to cushion NAB from the incursions of political expediency?’ The 2002 Report attributes NAB’s success in its first three years primarily to ‘backing of the government’ and concedes the restoration of elected governments meant NAB was no longer working in the ‘comfort zone it enjoyed in the previous regime …..(and was) bound to come under more pressure and heat.’

A point that is increasingly stressed in later reports is the fact that NAB alone cannot deal with the massive problem of corruption in Pakistan. [The NACS, launched in 2002, attempted to provide a holistic approach to the problem.] This requires, first and foremost, fundamental governance reforms and support for NAB’s work by legislative, judicial and executive institutions. The 2004 Report complains that these institutions are ‘themselves seized with their own capacity and organizational problems’ and warns: ‘The rise in incidences of corruption will continue till other national institutions also effectively integrate in our Anti‐Corruption drive in the country’. [p.iv] The 2005 Report calls for

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parliamentarians in particular to play a more active role in curbing corruption and supporting NAB.

f) Resources: Human and Material – A constant refrain in all NAB reports is the

mismatch between the resources available to the organization, and its workload. This applies to both human and material resources. NAB began work by ‘borrowing’ FIA investigators, armed forces personnel, federal and provincial staff. The return of provincial personnel to their parent organizations for the 2002 elections left a big vacuum. Similarly, NAB was initially housed in the PM Secretariat (a temporary arrangement) while regional NAB offices had to operate in even more confined spaces. The 2002 Report describes shortage of vehicles for investigative officers as a ‘critical deficiency’. Over time the reports detail improvements in the resource situation: recruitment of new staff, shift of NAB HQ to its own premises, expansion and improvement of the building’s facilities. But they also detail the increased workload of the organization, particularly following the transfer of FIA’s Economic Crimes and Anti‐Corruption wings to NAB. This resulted in NAB having to deal with all petty corruption cases, as well as the FIA’s case backlog and additional tasks of awareness‐raising and prevention. Efforts made to address the increased workload include organizational restructuring, appointment of Special Prosecutors to deal with the backlog of FIA cases in Special Courts, and assessments of NAB’s future resource requirements. The 2005 Report concedes, however, that whatever resources are made available to NAB, there will always be an upper limit to the number of cases it can handle.

g) Capacity Building – All NAB reports devote considerable attention to the

organization’s efforts to build the capacity of its personnel, and to promote automation, networking and other aspects of IT use. The reports describe steady progress in expanding IT use in NAB.

The Research, Analysis and Training Wing has primary responsibility for training. This was hampered by lack of staff, lack of a suitable training curricula and lack of training venues. The reports describe how the first two constraints were gradually overcome, but NAB not having its own dedicated training venues remains a problem. The best solution found to date has been to use training facilities of other organizations, e.g. NIBAF. By 2004 the organization was so confident about the quality of its training programs that it

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planned to invite officers of other national and international organizations to participate in them. The 2005 Report lists capacity‐building as one of the three focus areas for NAB. A related issue mentioned in the reports is NAB’s ability (or lack of it) to attract people of high caliber. Cash rewards and award of medals of honour to personnel who perform extremely well is one approach tried by the organization. However, the 2004 Report stresses the need to constantly revise recruitment procedures and incentives to get the best people.

h) Organizational Restructuring – NAB’s expanding workload has prompted significant organizational restructuring. A key objective is to streamline operations and ensure that cases can be dealt with quickly and efficiently. The various restructuring initiatives are detailed in the NAB reports. The Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the UK Department for International Development (DFID) provided technical assistance to support design of the restructuring. The 2004‐5 Reports list some measures introduced to date including: creation of an Awareness and Prevention Wing; redesignation of the Banking Wing as the Financial Crimes Investigation Wing, to reflect the expanded scope of its work; development of Standard Operating Procedures (SOPs); delegation of authority to investigate and prosecute cases involving officers below BS‐16 from the Chairman NAB to Directors General in regional NAB offices; the distribution of all NAB functions between four Divisions – Operations, Prosecution, Awareness and Prevention, Human Resources and Finance; and, of course, the merger with FIA wings.

i) Working with Others – A key mandate of NAB is to recover stolen assets

transferred abroad and bring to justice accused people who have fled abroad. This requires cooperation with relevant agencies in other countries. From the outset this has been a problem for NAB’s Overseas Cell. The 2001 Report attributes the difficulties to: 1) requirements of the legal and judicial frameworks of modern states; and 2) lack of treaties between Pakistan and other countries to deal with such issues. Pakistan had extradition treaties with only 26 countries. Later reports describe increasing international cooperation and, even more, increasing NAB participation in international anti‐corruption fora. The 2003 Report lauds Swiss court rulings against former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto and her husband Asif Zardari. But such successes appear to be the exception rather than the norm.

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Within Pakistan, the 2005 Report identifies limited cooperation from other departments as hampering NAB’s work. It notes that even in cases where Ministries/Departments have themselves made complaints about corruption to NAB, they have been slow to provide the necessary documents. This failing is, of course, in addition to the perceived wider failure to institutionalize good governance – something that would have greatly helped NAB’s anti‐corruption efforts.

j) Constraints – Many of the constraints faced by NAB have already been mentioned: lack of adequate staff and resources; lack of capacity; a poor governance environment; limited national and international cooperation; and greatly expanded workload. The 2003 Report details some of the other major operational constraints: delays in prosecuting cases, often because of delaying tactics by the defence; the general ‘undocumented’ economy in Pakistan that makes it difficult to detect money trails; difficulties in recovering loans through sale of assets of accused people; closure of investigations because of insufficient evidence (23% of cases authorized for investigation); and the fact that accused persons are at large. While the reports claim progress in some of these areas, notably capacity‐building of NAB personnel, the predominant conclusion is that these constraints persist.

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1.3 Key Points

NAB’s approach to enforcement has changed over time: from the initial focus on high‐value, high‐profile corruption cases; to making more use of plea bargaining; to the current three‐pronged approach of awareness, prevention and enforcement.

In all enforcement efforts NAB’s focus has been on recovery rather than accountability per se.

NAB has had an image problem since it was created. This persists despite the changed approach to enforcement, and considerable efforts to communicate its work and anti‐corruption messages.

Lack of human and material resources has been a constant challenge, exacerbated by a rapidly expanding workload.

NAB has responded to the capacity‐workload lag by intensive efforts on training its personnel, promoting IT use and organizational restructuring.

NAB has also been hampered by other factors including difficulties in recovering assets/getting extraditions from abroad; Pakistan’s ‘undocumented’ economy which makes tracing assets difficult; and limited governance reform.

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2. FEDERAL OMBUDSMAN 2.1 Introduction to Federal Ombudsman The 1973 Constitution provided for the establishment of the institution of Federal Ombudsman (Wafaqi Mohtasib) but this did not actually come about until the 1983 Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib Presidential Order. The mandate of the Ombudsman is to ensure bureaucratic accountability: specifically ‘to diagnose, investigate, redress and rectify any injustice done to a person through mal‐administration’. This is defined in the broadest sense covering both acts of commission and omission. There is not supposed to be any overlap between the functions of the Ombudsman and those assigned to other agencies; it is supposed to ‘fill the gaps in the system for the protection of citizens from injustice emanating from governmental mal‐administration.’1 To ensure independence, the Ombudsman is appointed for a fixed four‐year term by the President, cannot be reappointed and cannot be removed from office except for misconduct. It is to function as a non‐partisan, non‐political office. Services are to be provided free of cost and without formalities; any citizen can make a complaint to the Ombudsman and while this should be made within three months of the ‘grievance’, the Ombudsman can use his discretion to take up older complaints. The Federal Ombudsman’s jurisdiction extends to all federal agencies with exceptions such as the defence services, as well as cases that are already sub judice. In response to a complaint the Ombudsman can call witnesses, demand documents, and constitute an inspection team to search any premises. The Ombudsman has the power to punish for contempt any person who obstructs his work. Where a complaint is found to be justified, he can award costs and compensation/refunds to the aggrieved person. The Federal Ombudsman is to submit an annual report to the President within the first three months of the next calendar year. 1 Public Accountability System in Pakistan, (PM Secretariat and National Reconstruction Bureau, Government of Pakistan, 2006), p.33.

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2.2 Annual Reports’ Review The Federal Ombudsman’s office has produced Annual Reports from 1983 to 2006. The following thematic review of these annual reports looks at the challenges facing the Federal Ombudsman over the years, and how it has adapted to these: a) Mandate: Redressal vs. Accountability – The Federal Ombudsman’s mandate,

as outlined above, is basically to provide redress for members of the public who have a grievance against any federal agency. The early reports stress how the Ombudsman is distinct from other agencies with apparently similar mandates, such as the Prime Minister’s Inspection Team and the Federal Investigation Agency. The former only deals with cases referred by the Prime Minister, not ordinary citizens, and the latter deals with criminal actions. Following the 1988 elections, the distinction from MNAs/MPAs who also help citizens get redress, is clarified: elected representatives only help their constituents whereas the Ombudsman is available to all citizens, and they have limited time and expertise to pursue complaints – the Ombudsman is a specialized agency. There are many agencies, notably the defence services and provincial administration, which do not fall within the Federal Ombudsman’s jurisdiction. In these cases, the Ombudsman can use informal dispute resolution techniques to bring about reconciliation and resolve the issue. The scope for informal reconciliation effectively widens the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction to include any government body. For example, the reports show informal reconciliation used on many occasions to resolve issues relating to service pensions. The second mandated function of the Ombudsman is to identify and recommend ways in which procedures in different agencies can be improved to reduce maladministration. The 1984 report states: ‘Providing relief to complainants is not an end of itself. The Mohtasib is deeply concerned with removal of root causes of maladministration.’ Thus, in addition to findings and recommendations related to specific cases, the Ombudsman makes recommendations of a more general nature for institutional strengthening of federal government agencies. What is noticeable from this mandate – grievance redress, informal reconciliation, improved procedures to reduce mal‐administration – is the absence of accountability. It is largely left to the agencies themselves to take any

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necessary punitive action against errant officers. The 1985 report states: ‘The Mohtasib’s primary focus is on securing redressal of grievances without being overly concerned with punishment of erring functionaries in many cases.’ The justification given for this is lack of time and the large number of cases, which mean ‘he has to spend devote his full attention to securing relief for the complainant rather than spend time on any secondary matter’ [emphasis added]. Even two decades on the focus is the same: the 2007 report concedes ‘we have been careful to minimize recommendations for initiating disciplinary actions’. The impression that comes across is that the Ombudsman does not wish to antagonize Federal Agencies, and would like to take a ‘constructive’ approach to securing redress for citizens. But whether maladministration can be curbed without accountability is debatable.

b) Rules and Procedures – The Federal Ombudsman institution was established

in 1983 without defined rules and procedures in place. The first Ombudsman waited seven months after accepting the post to be sworn into office, and used the period to lay down the organizational structure and procedures. Because there was no precedent to draw on, rules appear to have been developed and applied on a somewhat informal basis. The first Ombudsman placed priority on his personal involvement in complaint handling, setting time aside each day to hear citizens’ complaints and reviewing daily reports of investigations. He also enforced a ‘horizontal’ reporting arrangement, whereby investigating officers dealt directly with him. This cut down file work but ‘resulted in convergence of work and pressure on the Ombudsman himself’.

His successor took a markedly different approach. In the interests of time and efficiency the second Ombudsman cut down his personal involvement in each case, eventually asking investigation officers to submit just monthly reports. He also tried to establish defined written rules and procedures, and issued a number of Circulars dealing with various aspects of the organization’s functioning. But it was not until 1999 that the Wafaqi Mohtasib (Investigation and Disposal of Complaints) Regulations were issued. These were revised and improved in 2003, a notable change being the development of different set formats for different types of findings. In 2004 a Handbook was prepared laying down procedures for functioning of the Federal Ombudsman’s office, followed by different handbooks for handling of complaints pertaining to specific organizations, e.g. WAPDA, PTCL. The current Ombudsman assumed his post in October 2006 and has already stated that future plans include streamlining procedures.

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The reports clearly show that the Federal Ombudsman himself has a major role in the functioning of the institution, and specifically in rules and procedures that are followed. The performance of the office, in terms of number of complaints disposed of and time taken on investigations, fell significantly during the period March‐October 2006 when the post of Federal Ombudsman was vacant. The format of the Annual Reports also tends to change every four years, when a new Ombudsman takes over.

c) Staff, Budget and Related Issues – The Ombudsman office began work with 32 officers against a sanctioned strength of 114, and a budget of Rs.10.5 million against a sanctioned budget of Rs.31.5 million. Coupled with lack of office space and transport, this obviously had an impact on the effectiveness of the organization. Later reports show increased staff numbers and slight budget increases – though after 11 years the Office was getting just Rs.40 million, and between 1998 and 1999 its budget actually fell by 8.5%. The 1992 report identifies insufficient funding and staff to deal with the huge workload as a major problem. While the Ombudsman has the authority to hire additional consultants, advisors, etc the report notes that doing so would undermine the ‘financial stability of the office’. To release funds for more regional offices to be set up, the Ombudsman was even considering giving up the high‐rent Islamabad office and moving to the smaller, less expensive regional office in Lahore. In 1985 an approx. 10,000 sq.yd. plot of land was allotted for a permanent building for the Federal Ombudsman at Zero Point in Islamabad. Subsequent reports all state that no construction has started on the site. Various reasons are cited including lack of funds, plans being under preparation, plans being revised, the 2005 earthquake which led to CDA rules for high buildings being changed, and so on. More than 20 years after the plot was allotted, work on the Federal Ombudsman’s permanent office has yet to start. Staffing of the Ombudsman office has faced challenges other than money. When the office was set up no employment rules (appointments, transfers, promotions, etc) were prepared. This meant permanent officers could not be hired and the Ombudsman had to ‘borrow’ personnel from other agencies. Given the specialist nature of work, particularly of investigation officers, it would obviously be preferable for the institution to have dedicated, permanent staff. The 1987 report states that the staff situation with regard to personnel up to BPS‐16 was much better, with direct recruitment of permanent staff almost

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complete. The process of recruitment of higher officers from other cadres was made easier, but a basic problem of finding good quality individuals remained. The 1985 report claimed there was reluctance on the part of Government agencies to release their best officers, and on the part of officers themselves to serve an institution where they miss out on the prestige and power available in the mainstream. In response to an appeal for help in this matter, President Musharraf directed the Finance Division in 2000 to find ways to incentivise recruitment to the Federal Ombudsman office.

The 1999 report states that draft service rules were prepared and disseminated to concerned quarters of government, to ultimately secure the approval of the President. The following year’s report states that the rules had reached the office of the Chief Executive. However these were subsequently found to be inadequate and the 2004 Report states that a revised draft set had been submitted for approval. The following year’s report states that Draft Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman)’s Employees (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules 2005 were under consideration of the Ministry of Law. The reports show an increasing focus on building staff capacity to carry out investigations and other functions. The 2004 report outlines progress on the development of training modules. In 2002 an Appraisal Wing was established to review and improve the quality of documentary findings prepared by investigation officers. This was later re‐designated the Appraisal and Orientation Wing to reflect the growing focus on training. The Federal Ombudsman institution also draws heavily on international best practice and experience‐sharing to improve its functioning. The reports detail considerable participation in relevant international forums. Pakistan initiated establishment of the Asian Ombudsman Association, the first meeting of which was held in Islamabad in April 1996.

d) Financial, Administrative and Operational Autonomy – The Federal Ombudsman is supposed to operate independent of the executive, but its dependence for operational requirements on other Government Agencies undermines its autonomy. E.g. re‐appropriation of amounts exceeding Rs.50,000 from one budget head to another required the concurrence of the Finance Division. There are calls from the earliest reports for the 1983 Presidential Order establishing the office to be amended to ‘make provisions for the Mohtasib himself to control both his finances and his operations’. This

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is repeated in much later reports as well, e.g. the 1995 report states that purchase of staff cars within the allocated budget needed the clearance of Cabinet, Finance and Industries Divisions; Finance Division clearance did not come until June, the end of the financial year, so the amount lapsed.

With effect from FY1998‐9, the re‐appropriation from one head to another of amounts up to Rs.0.5 million at one time could be undertaken by the office itself. In 2000 President Musharraf visited the Ombudsman’s office in Islamabad where ‘the need for administrative and financial autonomy of the Ombudsman’s Institution was stressed’. The President did direct the Finance and Establishment Divisions to look into ways of granting the Ombudsman more autonomy, but the 2002 Report notes that ‘adequate financial and administrative autonomy has yet to be delegated’. The reports periodically call for the institution of Ombudsman to be given permanent status by inclusion in the Constitution, as opposed to its current inclusion in the Fourth Schedule. The implication is that this would ensure the sustainability of the Federal Ombudsman institution, strengthen its autonomy and enable it to function more effectively.

e) Expansion – While provincial administration does not fall within the jurisdiction of the Federal Ombudsman, from the moment it was established it received many complaints related to provincial agencies. Most of these complaints did not make it past the initial screening process to see which complaints can by law be entertained by the Federal Ombudsman. [In a few cases, informal resolution was used to bring about grievance redress.] However, the ‘flood’ of provincial complaints highlighted the need for Provincial Ombudsmen. Hence from the 1985 report onwards there are repeated calls for the establishment of Provincial Ombudsmen. Progress on this is slow: the Sindh and AJK Ombudsmen were set up in 1991, Punjab in 1996, Balochistan in 2001, and there is still no Ombudsman in NWFP. As public awareness of the limitations of the Federal Ombudsman’s mandate, and of the new provincial institutions grew, so the number of provincial complaints received by the Federal Ombudsman decreased. The focus of the Federal Ombudsman’s informal resolution efforts also shifted from provincial agencies to others outside the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction, e.g. PIA, the Civil Aviation Authority.

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The reports also make repeated calls for the establishment of more regional offices, to make it easier for people to make complaints to the Federal Ombudsman. In 1987 four regional offices were set up in the provincial headquarters, and for a long time these were the only ones. The Lahore office, in particular, had a big case load – not surprising given Punjab is the largest province of Pakistan. However, following the establishment of offices in Faisalabad and Multan, the regional office in Peshawar received most complaints. Other offices were set up in Sukkur and Dera Ismail Khan. The reports describe how, when the new offices were set up, there was an initial rush to have them deal with cases so people could take advantage of ‘close‐to‐home’ facilities. However, with hindsight they concede this should have been done more slowly to allow the regional offices time to build the necessary capacity: rising pendency in regional offices was a sign of their not having this. The reports also note that the DI Khan, Sukkur and Quetta offices received far fewer complaints than other offices, but expressed resolve to maintain them because they serve backward and/or remote areas. The 1991 report highlights a new dimension to the work of the Federal Ombudsman: traveling to distant places to hold hearings, and often issuing on the spot instructions to heads of various departments present to address citizens’ complaints. The report describes the initiative as ‘taking the benefits of the institution to the doorstep of the suffering citizen’. The extent to which this practice continued was dependent on the person holding the post of Federal Ombudsman: the 1994 report says the Ombudsman covered some 50,000 km during the previous year (leading to much greater awareness of the institution), but there is little mention of touring in later reports.

As the Federal Ombudsman institution became established, the annual reports show moves to apply the concept to other organizations not falling in its jurisdiction. There are repeated calls for the establishment of a Services Tribunal to deal with complaints from those in the armed services – this is not implemented. The 1993 report details the Federal Ombudsman’s talks with various professional associations, such as the Pakistan Medical Association, to set up in‐house ombudsmen. In 2000 the Federal Tax Ombudsman was sworn into office, and a couple of years later the office of Insurance Ombudsman was set up to deal with complaints against private insurance companies. [The Federal Ombudsman can only investigate complaints against state‐owned companies, notably State Life Insurance.]

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f) Relationship with Federal Agencies: Implementation – From the earliest reports, it is clear the Federal Ombudsman tries to work ‘in unison and harmony with Federal Agencies’ rather than take an antagonistic or accusatory approach. The 1984 report claims most agencies give a positive and timely response and are ‘honest in accepting their responsibility and willing to redress grievances’. However, while subsequent reports suggest the initial conciliatory approach has been maintained, there is less praise for the response of federal agencies. As the Ombudsman institution became established, concern increasingly turned to the issue of implementation of its findings in individual cases as well as its general recommendations to reduce maladministration. With regard to the former, an early report concedes that the approach taken until then of leaving implementation follow‐up to the citizens involved was not appropriate, and that the Ombudsman should do this. Hence regular monitoring of action taken in response to the Ombudsman’s findings was initiated. With regard to general recommendations, many of the same ones are repeated in report after report because no action has been taken on them. Later reports call for committees to be set up in each federal agency to assess progress on implementation of the recommendations made in at least the three previous’ years Ombudsman Annual Reports, but this recommendation too is not implemented. If federal agencies are not happy with the findings of the Ombudsman they can, as a last resort, make a representation to the President. However, from the earliest reports on it is clear federal agencies resorted to this as a ‘first option’ – making little effort to consider the Ombudsman’s findings or present counter arguments. The Federal Ombudsman took a two‐pronged approach to dealing with the problem of multiple representations. On the one hand, in response to requests from the Ombudsman, successive Presidents issued directives to all federal agencies urging them to comply with the Ombudsman’s recommendations within the stipulated time, and to desist from making representations to the President unless absolutely necessary. Such directives were issued in1990, 1993, 1995 and 2001 – indicating they had little effect. To promote compliance and reduce the number of representations, the Ombudsman made provision for his findings to be modified based on responses from federal agencies. This allowed for agencies that had not made their case properly when a complaint was initially investigated, for example, to clarify their position. This provision was first implemented informally and

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then included through amendments in the 1983 Presidential Order. The scope for revision of findings did improve implementation somewhat, but representations to the President remain an issue. The 2002 report gives a detailed assessment of the kinds of problems encountered in implementing the Ombudsman’s findings and securing redress for people. These include: too much time having passed so relief is no longer possible; maladministration has been carried out by one agency but relief can be provided by another; the agency responsible for maladministration will not pay relief until it recovers the money from someone else; the head of an agency is not informed of the Ombudsman’s findings by his subordinates; the agency does not agree with the Ombudsman’s findings but cannot make a representation against it and so delays implementation. In the final example, the Ombudsman would under law be able to take defiance action against the agency, but the same report notes that in 20 years this has never been taken. In sum, lack of implementation of the Federal Ombudsman’s findings and recommendations is a major problem.

g) Public Awareness and Appreciation – Early reports indicate a lack of awareness on the part of the public about the existence of the Federal Ombudsman, how it could help them, and how they could access it. As a result, there are numerous complaints registered with the Ombudsman which fall outside the office’s jurisdiction. The reports highlight the need for awareness‐raising efforts to make people aware of precisely what the Ombudsman can do and how. One recommendation made in the 1986 report is for the establishment of free citizens’ advice bureaux, some of which were later reported to have been set up. The 1987 report describes initiatives by the second holder of the Ombudsman’s post to prepare information material specifically for the public about the role and limitations of the Federal Ombudsman, and guidance on how to make complaints. From as early as the 1985 report, the Ombudsman claims to have gained public confidence and trust. The following year’s report even claims that many people get their grievances resolved by telling the concerned public functionary that if they don’t get justice they will take their complaints to the Federal Ombudsman. The 1990 report states that ‘the institution is now firmly embedded in public consciousness and is universally praised.’ The 2003 reports starts the practice of including letters from members of the public to the Ombudsman, thanking him for his efforts in securing justice and relief for

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them. The letters are designed to highlight the positive impact of the Ombudsman’s work on ordinary citizens. The reports consistently praise the role of the media in raising awareness of the Federal Ombudsman, highlighting its work and individual cases, supporting its calls for strengthening of the institution and for the establishment of Provincial Ombudsmen. The reports describe the media as a major factor in the institution’s success.

2.3 Key Points

From the outset the Federal Ombudsman has taken a conciliatory approach to dealings with the federal agencies, focusing on securing relief for citizens and making general recommendations to curb maladministration. It has very much been a redressal rather than accountability agency.

The Ombudsman has used informal reconciliation to overcome jurisdictional constraints, and has had some success in this.

It has long pushed for more regional offices, as well as the establishment of Provincial Ombudsman institutions, and a dedicated Services Tribunal. Progress has varied on these but is generally slow.

The Ombudsman office was set up without rules and procedures in place, including any for permanent staff, and these were developed much later/are still under preParation.

The institution has been hampered by lack of good quality staff, funding and a permanent building. These issues have only partially been resolved.

The Ombudsman’s autonomy is undermined by its dependence on other federal agencies for operational, administrative and financial requirements. Repeated calls for operational independence have had little effect.

Weak implementation of the Ombudsman’s recommendations has been a major problem. In the case of findings from individual complaints, federal agencies tend to make representations to the President – a practice which persists despite repeated directions from the President’s Office not to do so. The agencies ignore general recommendations.

Public awareness of the Ombudsman institution and appreciation of its help has increased over time. The media have played a significant role in supporting the institution.

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3. SINDH OMBUDSMAN 3.1 Introduction to Sindh Ombudsman The Establishment of Office of Ombudsman for the Province of Sindh Act 1991 led to the Sindh Ombudsman being appointed. Alongside the AJK Ombudsman, Sindh was the first province to set up such an institution. The mandate and powers of the Sindh Ombudsman correlate to those of the Federal Ombudsman. Thus it investigates complaints of maladministration made by ordinary citizens; its jurisdiction covers all provincial government departments and agencies; it has the power to summon any person, compel the production of documents, and can authorize inspection teams to enter and search any premises; it can punish people for contempt if they obstruct its work; in the event of the Ombudsman’s findings not being implemented and no reason being given for this, it can report cases of ‘defiance of recommendations’ to the Sindh Governor. As well as grievance redress, the Sindh Ombudsman can carry out informal reconciliation, and can conduct studies to identify and recommend ways to curb maladministration and improve departmental functioning. 3.2 Annual Reports Review The Sindh Ombudsman office has produced annual reports from 1993 to 2005. Unfortunately only the first two reports – 1993 and 1994 – and some of the most recent ones – 2002, 2003, 2005 – were available for review. However these give a good indication of the functioning of the Sindh Ombudsman and the distinct nature of the issues it faces: a) Implementation – This is recognized as a challenge very early on. The 1993

report notes that the Provincial Ombudsman’s task is becoming more difficult with the passage of time because, while initially its activities centered around its own institution (processing, investigating, deciding on complaints), the main issue now was implementation. This had to be done by the Provincial departments, and the Ombudsman’s office could only follow up. It notes that the departments faced a number of ‘difficulties and problems’ in implementation. Examples listed in the 1993 report include: widow’s pension not paid because the agency lacked funds to do so; a school being run without paying rent or vacating property ‐ if the school was closed/shifted, education

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would be disrupted; an agency contracted work that was not approved in its allocated budget – when it requested the Finance Department for money to pay the contractor it refused because expenditure was not approved, in the meantime the contractor is left without payment. The examples given indicate the Ombudsman taking an overtly sensitive and understanding view of the ‘problems’ faced by the Provincial agencies – problems which in all the cases citied were clearly due to their own maladministration. The report says the Ombudsman appreciates the frustration of complainants but ‘also realizing the difficulties of the Department, has to take a realistic view which may not sometimes fully satisfy the complainant’.

In order to facilitate compliance, the Provincial Ombudsman tried to reach decisions and make recommendations through a process of consensus. Thus he insisted that senior officers of the departments concerned, with authority to make decisions, attended hearings. The early reports claim this participatory approach meant only a handful (43 out of 4,669 cases) of representations were made to the Governor. However, it does not seem to have prevented the problem of weak implementation: the outgoing Ombudsman notes in the 1994 report that ‘on the implementation side I have not been able to achieve as much result as I would have expected’. To promote this he established a seParate Implementation Section with full‐time senior officers whose job is to sort out difficult cases where there is deliberate resistance on the part of the agency. Ten years on, this is still a weak area: ‘the Institution could have produced still better results if the executive arm of the Government had been more helpful and cooperative. In many cases the decisions of the Ombudsman are not implemented by the government agencies particularly due to financial constraints’. The 2001 report also notes a flood of representations to the Governor by various agencies, relating to cases months, even years old. The overall impression that emerges from the Provincial Ombudsman reports is that they see the low number of representations made to the Sindh Governor by departments, in response to the Ombudsman’s recommendations, as proof of the success of the ‘cooperative’ approach taken by the Ombudsman. However, they appear to miss the point that the real proof of success is strong implementation – which is clearly lacking.

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b) Non‐Use of Penal Powers – The Provincial Ombudsman can report ‘Defiance of Recommendation’ to the Governor for action to be taken, including inclusion of the defiance report in the personal file of the officer(s) concerned from the non‐compliant agency. But from the earliest reports, the Ombudsman highlights and justifies his non‐use of the penal powers available to him. The main reasoning given for this is that doing so would have alienated the departments, and since the Provincial Ombudsman was already receiving full support and cooperation from them – so much so that they appreciated when an issue in their agency was brought to their attention – ‘why should I have gone out of my way to annoy, provoke and instigate them’. This justification adds to the impression that the Ombudsman is overly‐sympathetic to the provincial departments and does not wish to antagonize them in any way. Even when later reports note the weak implementation, the Ombudsman says he will stick to the approach of not exercising his coercive powers. He prefers to use his previous experience and contacts in the provincial departments to get his decisions implemented. The 1994 report notes he gets full cooperation at Secretary level, but there are sometimes problems at lower levels, particularly in far‐flung areas. One strategy adopted to overcome this is sending investigation officers into those areas to confront local officials on the spot. The early reports declare that the Ombudsman will not, if needed, hesitate to take action against any agency or official. However, given that this has not been done in a single case, the later reports concede there is some perception that the Ombudsman is a toothless organization and it is taken for granted. The 1994 report says there are plans to ‘haul up’ some defaulting officers and agencies under law to remove this perception, but immediately erodes the impact of this by adding ‘overall I will follow my policy of getting along with the Agencies in an atmosphere of understanding and mutual regard’.

c) Need for Institutional Strengthening – The Sindh Ombudsman reports do not have dedicated sections on the institution’s budget and staffing situation, but references to this indicate these are problem areas and the Ombudsman lacks sufficient funds and staff to deal with its workload efficiently. The 2005 report refers to a ban on recruitment to the Ombudsman’s office almost since its inception – adversely affecting its capabilities. Various reports detail plans for the establishment of new regional offices and use of computers and internet connectivity – but add these plans are on hold because of financial constraints. However, the institution was fortunate in finding a permanent building within

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a few years of being established. Situated opposite the Provincial Secretariat this had an ideal location. The building was in relatively poor condition when the Ombudsman took over but over time its condition was improved. As well as increased funding, the reports also call for a number of measures to increase the autonomy and effectiveness of the Ombudsman. Notable among these are: changing the word ‘recommendation’ for the outcome of an investigation by the Ombudsman – a word which can be misinterpreted and taken lightly – to something carrying real force of law; giving the Ombudsman power to issue stay orders; giving the Ombudsman more direct power to get his recommendations implemented. The early reports also bemoan the fact that Sindh is the only province with an Ombudsman: ‘Had other provinces also established this institution, it would have been easier for them to share their common problems and make a joint effort to get them resolved’. But appreciation is expressed for support provided by the Federal Ombudsman.

d) Expansion – In response to an ‘alarming increase’ in the number of complaints

against the police the Sindh Ombudsman constituted a ‘Commission for monitoring illegal detention in Sindh’. This was empowered to enter and search any police station or other premises under police control and report if any citizen was being held against the law. Similarly, in response to complaints about Zakat Committee officials embezzling Zakat funds, a Committee to monitor disbursement of Zakat to listed Mustahiqeen was set up. Geographic expansion comes across as an early priority of the Sindh Ombudsman, the aim being to set up regional offices and facilitate citizens in far‐off locations in registering their complaints. However, because of financial constraints, it was only in 2002‐3 that the first regional offices were set up – in Sukkur, Larkana, Hyderabad, and Mirpurkhas. These were followed by three more in Karachi Central, Nawabshah and Naushero Feroz, and plans for a further three to be opened in Karachi East, Dadu, Badin (depending on release of funds by Finance Dept). The 2005 report predicts that by the end of the year there would be nine regional offices and one sub‐office fully functional. One of the points which is stressed about the regional offices is that they are under the control of the Provincial Ombudsman and independent from the executive. This is a reference to the office of District Ombudsman; elsewhere

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the institution is criticized openly. The 2001 report describes the system of District Ombudsman under a Nazim as against the concept of administrative justice ‘and if it is allowed to function it will cause irreParable damage to this newly born system in the country’. It is pointed out that the Ombudsman at Federal and Provincial levels can set up regional offices to reach the grassroots. If a District Ombudsman has to be established this should not be part of the executive but should be ‘placed under the appellate and administrative jurisdiction of the Provincial Ombudsman’. The following year’s report maintains that the District Ombudsman ‘would have made a mockery of this institution eroded its very authority fibre and independence’.

e) Public Interest Matters – The later reports of the Sindh Ombudsman show its

increasing focus on matters of public interest, as opposed to investigating individual complaints. These include matters such as preventing encroachment of public amenities (e.g. stopping construction of a police station on the site of a women’s and children’s park), ensuring proper disposal of hospital waste, enforcing measures to reduce road accidents, curbing dog bites, preventing the sale of gutka and chalia which cause cancer. When such matters come to the Ombudsman’s attention, the office issues suo‐moto notices to those involved. The later reports give numerous decisions related to such public interest matters in which the Ombudsman has taken suo moto action. They also detail studies and seminars conducted on issues of public interest, e.g. road accidents, solid waste and hospital waste. As well as its heavy involvement in public interest matters, another way in which the Sindh Ombudsman’s activities differ from those of the Federal Ombudsman is in the marked absence of efforts to improve the general functioning of departments and curb maladministration.

f) Public Perceptions – The Sindh Ombudsman reports highlight the institution’s efforts to help ordinary members of the public. The 1993 report states that the Ombudsman devotes two days a week to meeting complainants, admitting fresh complaints and following up on cases in process – in addition to daily meetings. In it the Sindh Ombudsman also acknowledges and defends the fact that he focuses on small cases rather than big problems: the justification given for this is that the ‘well‐to‐do can take care of themselves’ but the bulk of the population are ‘poor and neglected with limited means’ – hence the Ombudsman tries to help them. The same report claims that, even if the Ombudsman is not able to provide the relief sought by complainants, the

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simple fact that people can make a petition and senior officers have to explain their actions gives them a lot of satisfaction – ‘much of his anger and resentment gets pacified’.

Even the early reports claim that the Sindh Ombudsman is proving a deterrent to bureaucratic high‐handedness, and has given hope to the aggrieved. They cite some officers complaining that people threaten to approach the Ombudsman if they don’t get help from the officers. Letters of appreciation from the public are included in the reports as well as press articles on the Ombudsman’s decisions. [The reports express appreciation for the big role played by the press and media in supporting the Ombudsman.] However, later reports concede there have been some negative comments and reports of the Ombudsman’s work – but account for these as due to people having excessive expectations from the Ombudsman’s office. They also note that the Ombudsman lacks the power to issue stay orders, which could have provided people with interim relief.

3.3 Key Points

The Sindh Ombudsman (SO) tries to promote a cooperative relationship with provincial departments.

The SO acknowledges that implementation of the Ombudsman’s recommendations is weak, but is very understanding about the ‘difficulties and problems’ the departments face in implementation.

The SO deliberately does not utilize coercive powers granted to the institution. The Ombudsman office faces issues with lack of funding and staff. The Ombudsman is keen to expand into regional offices, but strongly opposes the institution of District Ombudsman.

There is a strong focus on public interest matters – in which the Provincial Ombudsman takes suo moto action – but far less on general efforts to curb maladministration in provincial departments.

There are calls for increased powers to enable the Ombudsman institution to function more effectively.

There are claims to have helped the public.

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4. PUNJAB OMBUDSMAN 4.1 Introduction to Punjab Ombudsman The office of Punjab Ombudsman came into existence on 30 September 1996, through Punjab Ordinance No. XI of 1996. It became a permanent institution following passage of the Punjab Office of the Ombudsman Act X of 1997. The Punjab Ombudsman added to a number of organizations already dealing with different aspects of grievance redress and accountability: the Chief Minister’s Inspection Team, Punjab Anti‐Corruption Establishment, and Complaint Cells. Confusion over the need for an Ombudsman, given the existence of all these other bodies, was one factor in the late establishment of the institution in Punjab. The Ombudsman was set up on the grounds that the roles of these other agencies are not always well‐defined, they are not all accessible to ordinary citizens and/or they do not deal with the specific issue of public dissatisfaction with the bureaucracy. The Ombudsman is appointed by the Punjab Government, and is a person who is/has/is qualified to be a judge of the High Court. The Ombudsman looks into issues of maladministration, defined to include acts of omission and commission, and has the same powers vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure with respect to summoning and enforcing attendance of any person, compelling the production of documents, and so on. Findings/recommendations issued to an agency by the Ombudsman after investigating a complaint have to be followed. Failure to comply or to give reasons for not doing so can lead to a ‘Defiance of recommendation’ report being submitted by the Ombudsman to the government, and to this being included in the personal file of the officer(s) concerned from the agency. Anyone who obstructs the Ombudsman’s work can be punished for contempt. 4.2 Annual Reports’ Review The Punjab Ombudsman has produced annual reports from 1997 to 2005. A review of these reports reveals the following issues as of particular importance over this period: a) Budget, Staff, Regulations, Office – The first Punjab Ombudsman was

appointed on 20 October 1996: he had no office or staff and so commenced working from his private chambers. As the number of complaints increased, the office shifted to a portion of the Chief Minister’s Inspection Team (CMIT) Building but still lacked proper personnel. On 26 Nov 1996 Rs.7.4 million was

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sanctioned for the establishment of the Ombudsman office, but this was revoked less than two days later. The first Ombudsman was thus forced to rely on a few officials lent by S&GAD; he was killed in a terrorist act shortly after. His successor assumed office on 26 January 1997, and it was only in March that a small budget was sanctioned for the Punjab Ombudsman. In short, the Ombudsman Office came into being in very difficult circumstances. In its initial years staff numbers were far less than required. Despite pledges to increase numbers, this was not done leading to increased pendency. The 1999 report notes that investigating officers have to deal with an average of 30‐40 cases daily. The staffing situation improved with the appointment of a number of Additional District and Session Judges as Investigation Officers, and was reflected in reduced pendency rates. Subsequent reports detail the appointment of additional personnel. The Ombudsman office was set up without defined procedures and regulations. It was not until 2005 that the Ombudsman for the Province of Punjab (Registration, Investigation and Disposal of Complaints) Regulations were promulgated. This and the introduction of standardized notices and formats streamlined procedures as well as increased staff numbers, led to the time taken for investigations being reduced. The 2005 report claims that the target of disposing of a complaint within four months of its registration was, except in some very complicated cases or where agencies delayed submitting reports, being achieved. It anticipates that with increased cooperation from government departments this could be reduced by a further two to three weeks.

Lack of office space is described in the reports as a perennial problem. There are calls in the 1998 report for the establishment of a record room for safe storage of files – one consequence of the initial shortage of staff and space was that records were in very bad condition – and for a library to facilitate Investigation Officers. The 2002 report describes how plans to build additional rooms in the CMIT building, in order to create more room for the Ombudsman sharing it, were shelved because it was anticipated that the establishment of District Ombudsmen (see below) would lead to a reduced workload on the Provincial Ombudsman. But as the latter pointed out in the report, District Ombudsman offices would take time to establish, and in the meantime the Provincial Ombudsman had to deal with complaints from across Punjab.

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The 2003 report lauds the replacement of old with new vehicles, improved office equipment including more computers, and training of staff and predicts that these improvements will enhance the performance of the institution. Further improvements in office facilities and equipment were carried out in 2004‐5, including finally the construction of additional rooms, creating space for a record room and library, and better facilities for complainants such as seating and an information desk. In 2001 a website for the Punjab Ombudsman was set up to facilitate public access to the institution. The 2001 report describes progress in enhancing computer literacy and use in the Ombudsman office. A (new) website was launched in 2005 with support from the Asian Development Bank’s Access to Justice Program. As well as providing information about how to get grievance redress (procedures and so on) it also allows complainants to track the status of their complaint.

b) Institutional Strengthening and Expansion – One factor in the delay in setting

up a Punjab Ombudsman was that the Government was considering merging the Chief Minister’s Inspection Team with the Ombudsman; this idea was later dropped in favour of revamping and strengthening the CMIT. However a cabinet decision in December 2000 shifted the complaint handling cell of the Governor’s Inspection Team to the Office of the Ombudsman, strengthening its role.

The 1998 report calls for the establishment of regional offices similar to those of the Federal and Sindh Ombudsman. The 2002 report states that the establishment of a regional office in Multan was sanctioned, while proposals to set up offices in Sargodha and Rawalpindi were put on hold awaiting establishment of the District Ombudsman offices. Work on the Multan office began in 2003 and the office became functional in June 2004. The Rawalpindi office was set up in 2005, while a proposal for an office in Sargodha was still under consideration.

Unlike in Sindh, the Punjab Ombudsman welcomed the creation of the District Ombudsman under the Local Government Ordinance 2001 noting ‘this will go a long way in the attainment of the objectives of accountability of the Administrative Departments and for provision of relief at the door steps of the citizens’. The 2001 report acknowledges that people in far‐flung areas and the interior are less familiar with the Ombudsman institution and hence submit

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fewer complaints than those in major towns and cities. But it expects the number of complaints ‘shall be adequately enhanced once the District Mohtasibs are in place’. However, as establishment of District Ombudsman offices continued to be delayed, and the Provincial Ombudsman’s expansion remained on hold, the end result was that little progress was made on facilitating rural, far‐flung populations in accessing grievance redress.

c) Implementation and Use of Coercive Powers – The issue of implementation is

implicitly recognized as a problem when the 1998 report calls for the establishment of an Implementation Cell. This is confirmed by the 2001 report which notes that implementation of the Ombudsman’s orders ‘continues to be an area calling for special attention of the Government’. It adds that bureaucratic inertia and ‘the orthodox technical approach to resolve the issues’ hamper implementation. The report stresses that the ‘dilly‐dallying tactics’ of the agencies impede the primary objective of the Ombudsman Office, i.e. speedy redressal of citizens’ grievances. The early reports highlight the fact that very few representations are made to the Governor in response to the Ombudsman’s findings, and virtually all of these are rejected. However the 2000 report also notes that, despite provisions in the Punjab Ombudsman Act that no court has the jurisdiction to question or overturn the orders of the Ombudsman, seven writ petitions were made to the Lahore High Court – six of these were dismissed while the seventh was pending. By 2001 the number of representations being made had increased significantly, with many made well past the expiry of limitation – and particularly when complainants approached the Ombudsman for implementation of his orders. The 2002 report notes delays by provincial departments in implementation of findings, and appeals to them to follow the timelines laid down by the Ombudsman, e.g. four weeks to respond to an initial complaint, and to take care when making representations ‘so that the matter is not prolonged unnecessarily’. The report cites directives issued by the President’s Secretariat and Supreme Court rulings with regard to representations made in response to findings of the Federal Ombudsman, and stresses that ‘these principles….are binding on all concerned including all Ombudsman under the Constitution.’ It also clarifies that the Ombudsman’s rulings can only be overturned if the order is not just, but conversely that if substantial justice has been done by an order ‘it should not be set aside even if it is without jurisdiction’. Subsequent reports,

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however, describe continued non‐responsiveness and delayed responses by provincial agencies: the 2003 report says that in some cases notices to agencies to file their comments/replies had to be repeated 10 times. In order to improve implementation and provide relief to citizens, the 2004 report describes a shift in emphasis to redressal of grievance before closing the case rather than disposal of complaints by way of giving findings/recommendations. In the latter case, when recommendations were not implemented, complainants filed new petitions for implementation leading to proceedings being restarted. Now each case is kept in ‘Peshi’ until the grievance is fully redressed. Given the non‐implementation of many of the Ombudsman’s orders, the 2001 report notes that ‘certain quarters have been suggesting (this) be dealt with harshly as the law provides.’ The report states that the Ombudsman has from its inception chosen ‘to follow the course of cooperation and pursuance’, and notes that non‐compliance could be due to ‘in‐built factors in the system….instead of individual failings’. However, with continued non‐implementation the 2003 report says that before invoking powers provided under the Ombudsman Act, show cause notices were issued to officials from the non‐compliant agencies ‘whereupon the stone was set rolling for redressal of the grievances of the complainants’. In other cases administrative secretaries were summoned, leading to implementation. As non‐compliance continued, however, the Ombudsman was forced to exercise the powers provided under the Ombudsman Act: the 2005 report states that ‘Defiance of Recommendations’ action was taken in two cases. The Ombudsman reports make a number of general recommendations to improve the functioning of various departments, and the 1998 report notes plans for the Ombudsman to hold periodic/regular meetings with the Department Secretaries, Heads of Attached Departments, etc to discuss the recommendations. While the 1999 report gives some details of implementation progress provided by the departments concerned, subsequent reports note their failure to submit implementation reports on the Ombudsman’s recommendations. Early reports say a lenient view will be taken and no action under the law will be initiated, but later reports threaten that continued non‐compliance would necessitate this. The 2004 and 2005 reports call for an institutionalized arrangement within the government under the chairmanship

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of the Additional Chief Secretary to monitor implementation of general recommendations made by the Ombudsman.

d) Relationship with Provincial Agencies – The Punjab Ombudsman adopted a cooperative approach, working with departmental authorities to settle people’s grievances. The 1998 report claims these efforts ‘are gaining ground to create the impression that the office of Ombudsman is not their adversary ….. it gives suggestions for development of institutions and fair administrative accountability.’ However, the 2000 report notes that there are ‘some in the bureaucracy who feel as if the Ombudsman functions as a super Administrator’ – and accounts for this as due to the functions and modus operandi of the Ombudsman being ‘not fully known or is misunderstood’. The 2001 report notes that the Ombudsman received considerable complaints from (retired) government employees about service matters. While agencies sometimes object to the Ombudsman exercising jurisdiction in these matters, the report states that matters of government servants relating to neglect, delay, etc ‘are deemed to have fallen in the wider ambit of maladministration and thus validly cognizable by the Ombudsman’. It also poses the question: ‘How can the objective of good governance be achieved if the public servants themselves remain aggrieved in such a large number at the hands of their own Departments?’ Subsequent reports (2002, 2003) also justify the Ombudsman’s involvement in all cases of maladministration, including those not otherwise in his jurisdiction. The 2001 report stresses the need for capacity‐building of public officials, to ensure familiarity with proper rules and procedures, and enable them to develop ‘the requisite public friendly spirit’. The following year’s report lauds the fact that a number of departments have undertaken capacity‐building exercises for their employees.

e) Public Interest Matters – The 2000 report notes that the Ombudsman does take suo moto action in matters of public interest coming to his notice through the media or otherwise. Examples including ordering the supply of BA/BSc admission forms to a bank in Gujranwala to save students having to travel to Lahore for these, and reducing noise ‘pollution’ from a cinema. Subsequent reports also give details of suo moto action taken by the Ombudsman, but this is usually in a small number of cases – far less than the Sindh Ombudsman.

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The Ombudsman reports give letters of appreciation from members of the public, as well as newspaper articles about the work and decisions of the institution. Various reports express appreciation for the role of the media in supporting the Ombudsman and raising public awareness about the institution.

4.3 Key Points

The Punjab Ombudsman began operating in very challenging circumstances, lacking staff, equipment and office space. While the former two were addressed within a few years, office space remains a serious problem. The Ombudsman still shares a building with the Chief Minister’s Inspection Team.

No regulations were in place when the Ombudsman was set up: these were only promulgated in 2005.

The Punjab Ombudsman supports the establishment of District Ombudsman offices. However, its own expansion has been largely on hold awaiting the District Ombudsman offices – and these have not yet been established. The end result is an ‘in limbo’ situation, with little progress on either front. Only two regional offices have been established.

Implementation has been weak, both of findings in individual complaints and general recommendations for departmental improvement. In the former the Ombudsman avoided coercive action for many years, but eventually resorted to it in a handful of cases. In the latter, the office has pushed for implementation reports and a high‐level governmental committee to monitor implementation – but with little effect.

The Ombudsman has tried to take a cooperative approach to dealings with the provincial departments. But there is some confusion/mistrust on their part about the role of the Ombudsman – with fears he could interfere in their affairs – and resistance to the Ombudsman deciding on service matters within the departments themselves.

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5. BALOCHISTAN OMBUDSMAN 5.1 Introduction to Balochistan Ombudsman The office of Balochistan Ombudsman came into existence through the Establishment of Office of Ombudsman for Province of Balochistan Ordinance 2001. The Ombudsman looks into issues of maladministration, defined to include acts of omission and commission, and has the same powers vested in a civil court under the Code of Civil Procedure with respect to summoning and enforcing attendance of any person, compelling the production of documents, and so on. Findings/recommendations issued to an agency by the Ombudsman after investigating a complaint have to be followed. Failure to comply or to give reasons for not doing so can lead to a ‘Defiance of recommendation’ report being submitted by the Ombudsman to the government, and to this being included in the personal file of the officer(s) concerned from the agency. Anyone who obstructs the Ombudsman’s work can be punished for contempt. 5.2 Annual Reports’ Review a) Office and Staff – The Balochistan Ombudsman was initially allocated four

rooms, and then one floor in the Civil Secretariat. Given the functions of the Ombudsman – to investigate and curb maladministration by provincial departments – it was felt ‘its permanent establishment in the shadow of the Civil Secretariat was adversely affecting its independence’. To address this, a seParate building was allocated to the Ombudsman; it shifted there in January 2003. However, this lacked furniture and equipment and, as staff numbers increased, did not have sufficient space. Later reports call for a new building to be constructed adequate to meet the institution’s needs. In the first two years of operation the Balochistan Ombudsman was hampered by lack of staff. Most had to be borrowed from other departments. In 2003‐4 a number of additional posts were sanctioned, but it proved difficult to find officers willing to take them up/stay in them. The heavy workload and comParative simplicity of the office made people reluctant to serve the Ombudsman: ‘In the eyes of bureaucrats, this office is a thankless one having no facilities of a Secretary or other Department or District Coordination Officer; therefore, it is not suited to their temperament, furthermore, here they are

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concerned only with poor and oppressed persons’. Hence a number of posts were vacant, or officers posted to them did not take them up, or if they did they were actively trying to leave. Service rules for the Provincial Ombudsman office were only drafted in 2005 and, at the time of preParation of the annual report, were in the process of review. Similarly, regulations governing the functioning of the institution (registration, investigation of complaints, and so on) were also only drafted in 2005. The later reports highlight lack of big vehicles as a major impediment to the work of the Ombudsman and investigation officers, and call for these to be provided to enable them to travel to distant parts of the province.

b) Implementation – The Ombudsman took a cooperative approach to dealing

with the provincial departments but from the outset resorted to issuance of show cause notices to administrative heads in cases of non‐compliance. ‘In very many cases, when notice is issued, Heads of the Departments promptly proceed with cases.’ [2002 report] However, the 2005 report complains that government agencies tend to take the Ombudsman’s findings and recommendations as a ‘matter of routine’ and stresses that they ‘must accord priority to this office references’.

c) Public Dealings – The Ombudsman reports indicate a steady rise in the

number of complaints received by the office. However, this still remains far below that of other provinces. One factor in this could be the long distances people have to travel to register complaints with the Ombudsman. To overcome this, the office undertook extensive tours across the province and held ‘open kacheries’. These were publicized beforehand through the DCO and press. Senior district government officials were all present in the kacheries, where members of the public were able to make complaints about maladministration and, in many cases, these were resolved ‘there and then’. By the time the first Ombudsman completed his tenure, such open kacheries had been held in all parts of Balochistan except Makran Division and Kharan District: three days were spent in each district.

As well as touring vehicles, the Ombudsman reports call for the establishment of regional offices to facilitate the public in accessing the Ombudsman.

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The reports also describe suo moto action taken by the Ombudsman, including while touring districts. Examples of cases in which such action was taken are: illegal possession of a public toilet, sale of spurious drugs, supply of dirty water to the inhabitants of a neighbourhood, and plying of tractor trolleys in Quetta city.

d) Improving Departmental Functioning – Shortly after assuming office, the first

Ombudsman prepared a book ‘Zameer Ka Ehtisab’ which was distributed among department heads and senior officials. The book highlighted the basic principles of good governance, and the responsibilities that came with their posts. The reports stress that the Ombudsman constantly advises agencies on good governance and making efforts to curb maladministration. Alongside findings of individual complaints, this is done in general recommendations to agencies for improved functioning, through studies and assessments to ascertain the root causes of corrupt practices and injustice and to recommend appropriate steps for their eradication, and through a seminar conducted in December 2005 on ‘Public Human Rights and Good Governance’. One of the main points made again and again in the reports is the importance of curbing abuse of state property, e.g. cars, telephones, and for department heads to take the lead in setting a good example.

e) Mandate – In 2004 the Police Order was amended and the Provincial Ombudsman was appointed Chairperson of the Selection Panel for independent members of the Provincial Public Safety and Police Complaints Commission.

5.3 Key Points

The main logistical issue hampering the Balochistan Ombudsman has been lack of staff and, more recently, lack of office space. The Ombudsman office does not hold much appeal for government officers.

Implementation of the Ombudsman’s directions is sometimes delayed by provincial agencies: the office has resorted to issuing show cause notices to departmental heads – an approach that usually leads to compliance.

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The Ombudsman makes constant efforts to guide provincial departments on good governance and curbing corruption.

In order to facilitate the public in accessing the Ombudsman, regular tours are conducted to districts outside Quetta. Open kacheries are held in which people even get ‘on the spot’ grievance redress.

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6. FEDERAL PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE (PAC) 6.1 Introduction to Federal PAC The Federal Public Accounts Committee of the National Assembly is responsible for scrutinizing the accounts showing the appropriation of sums granted by the Assembly for expenditure by the Government. Once the Accounts for a given financial year are consolidated, and the Auditor General of Pakistan has finalized reports on these, both accounts and AGP reports are forwarded by the Ministry of Finance to the President, and thereafter laid before the National Assembly through a motion in the name of the MoF. After this motion has been moved and adopted, another motion is moved – again by the MoF – for the accounts and reports to be presented to the Standing Committee on Public Accounts. In the event of the Assembly being dissolved, the MoF refers the accounts and audit reports to an ad hoc Public Accounts Committee, constituted by the MoF with the approval of the President. The National Assembly Public Accounts Committee comprises not more than nineteen members, and is chaired by the Minister of Finance. Its specific functions are to scrutinize the appropriation and other accounts of the Federal Government, as well as state corporations, autonomous and semi‐autonomous bodies, and the reports of the Auditor‐General on these, and satisfy itself that expenditure was in accordance to the service or purpose for which funds were provided, that expenditure conforms to the authority which governs it, and that every re‐appropriation has been made in accordance with the provisions for this. If any money has been spent on any service in excess of the authorized grant or appropriation for that purpose, the Committee is to examine the case and make such recommendations as it may deem fit. 6.2 Annual Reports’ Review The reports of the Public Accounts Committee date back to 1945‐46, i.e. before the creation of Pakistan. They were available up to the year 1987‐88. The reports detail Committee findings on different aspects of the federal government accounts and functioning of various ministries and departments, including the overall expenditure, excess expenditure, quality of accounts, performance assessment (esp. of semi‐government bodies), issues with fiscal discipline, and so on. Specifically with regard to accountability the following issues emerged from a review of the reports:

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a) Types of ‘Irregularities’ – The reports show the types of ‘irregularities’ that merit disciplinary action. These range from straightforward theft of cash/property, fraud and embezzlement, to improper award of contracts, failure to store materials properly or check stores, failure to check quality of supplies provided/work carried out by contractors, improper use of government property such as official cars, poor oversight and supervision of junior staff. The cases detailed show that disciplinary action can be justified even where an officer has not personally gained in any way from committing an irregularity, and where there was no intention to make personal profit, i.e. personnel are accountable simply for failing to carry out their duty properly.

b) Delays in Disciplinary Proceedings – The reports repeatedly show the Public

Accounts Committee criticizing Government ministries and departments for delaying initiation and conduct of investigations and disciplinary proceedings. In many cases these lingered on for several years, by which time the personnel involved had retired/passed away/absconded, and recovery of stolen property was impossible. The 1949‐50 report notes about the Railways Division: ‘There is a tendency to take an inordinately long time over the investigation of cases involving losses, etc. The delay gives rise to unnecessary complications and in certain cases valuable evidence is destroyed. It is not, therefore, possible to settle these cases satisfactorily after lapses of years….in future all such cases should be promptly and vigorously investigated and the defaulter brought to book without loss of time.’ The report for 1954‐1957 notes ‘Another tendency on the part of nearly all the Ministries….was that they proceeded very slowly in investigating cases of misappropriation, losses and financial regularities, etc and unduly long time was taken by them in finalizing them.’

The fact that this is a chronic and persistent problem – despite repeated calls for speedy action by the PAC – is obvious from the following examples. The 1957‐1959 report describes a case, related to the Ministry of Defence, in which shortages were discovered at a store depot in 1951, but an enquiry was not held until 1957. Owing to the long lapse of time it could not determine responsibility for the loss and this was written off. The 1969‐1971 report highlights a case involving the Works Wing in which one 1962 account showed a balance in hand out of material issued for a work, but a later account showed no balance. At the insistence of the Audit Department, an enquiry was finally initiated and held two overseers responsible in 1972, and a formal enquiry was initiated in 1973 – after a lapse of nine years ‐ by which time one of the overseers had already left the service.

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The 1970‐71 report details another case, related to the Defence Division, where the Auditor General pointed out in 1956 that stores valued at Rs.25,801 were issued in excess to requirements. However, a Ministerial inquiry was not initiated for 14 years, by which time those responsible for the irregularity had retired/expired, the relevant records were not traceable and the loss was proposed to be written off. The PAC report for the years 1981‐1985 relating to the Works Division, questions why it took the department six years to file a case against a contractor whose contract was rescinded without recovery of outstanding balance of Rs.240,288 from him? The same years’ report for the Ministry of Water and Power notes that some ‘cases were lingering on since 1979 and action had been much delayed’.

c) Neglect of Recovery – Delays in conducting investigations and disciplinary proceedings is an important contributory factor in the tendency to write off losses due to theft, embezzlement, etc, and not push for recovery of these. The 1954‐1957 report notes ‘that in cases of misappropriations, the losses involved were generally written off with the approval of the Ministries concerned….as far as possible recoveries of the amounts should be effected from the parties held at fault. Losses should be written off only where it is fully established that recovery cannot be made.’ The same report detailed a case, related to the Ministry of Interior, where a number of items of furniture were found short in 1956. The officer responsible was held liable for a loss of Rs.11,110 but since he could not pay this, the amount was written off. He was punished by compulsory retirement. The PAC observed that no efforts had been made for recovery of losses, and that the officer should have been dismissed from government service – compulsory retirement was not sufficient punishment. In a similar case involving a clerk in an office of the Karachi Administration, who had absconded with Rs.4,500 and been convicted and dismissed from service, the PAC also directed that efforts should be made to recover the amount involved.

d) Failure to Assign Responsibility – The reports show that in numerous cases

where misappropriations, fraud and other irregularities were identified, little effort was made to fix responsibility on the particular officers involved. This, in turn, meant no disciplinary action could be taken. The PAC repeatedly calls for assignment of responsibility within departments/ministries for irregularities – to be followed by the necessary disciplinary action. The 1975‐1976 report, for example, calls for those responsible to be identified and action taken against them in the following cases:

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i) loss of Rs77,800 to the CDA due to storage of unutilized cement for 17 years – the CDA was directed to find out who was responsible for keeping the stock unused for so long;

ii) extra expenditure of Rs.180,000 incurred by the Railway Board due to delay in the execution of a work – ‘The Chairman remarked that it had been admitted that there was a loss and that delay occurred in redesigning, but there was no indication as to who was responsible for these in the design office.’

The 1979‐1980 report notes that in some cases coming before the PAC ‘the departments had generally avoided fixing responsibility for lapses, where such action was most apparently called for.’ However, the reports show this practice continued. The 1983‐1984 report, for example, calls for fixing of responsibility for the non‐recovery of risk and purchase costs of Rs.3.8 million from a firm contracted to supply gunny bags by the Ministry of Industries. A related issue that emerges is the tendency for departments/ministries to only assign responsibility to those immediately involved in irregularities or to the most junior officers. Those ‘higher up’ the chain of command are not held accountable for their clear failure to exercise supervision and control. The report for the years 1957‐1959 details a case related to the Ministry of Railways and Communication (Posts and Telegraphs Department) in which a Sub‐Postmaster was found guilty of misappropriation of funds over an extended period. Given that his service had twice been extended beyond the normal tenure by the Minister‐in‐Charge, even though the misappropriation had by then been detected, the PAC observed ‘it appeared to them that the Minister concerned was also responsible for the misappropriation’. In another case involving the Ministry of Commerce, a cashier manipulated figures and misappropriated a huge sum of money. In the report for the years 1959‐1962, the PAC was stated to be ‘not satisfied with the handling of this case in which only the person at the lowest rank was proceeded against’. It directed further investigation be carried out to ‘fix the responsibility of others involved in this instance especially the supervising officers whose duty was to periodically check the cash books, etc’. The fact that this problem persisted is clear from the report for 1979‐1980, in which in their general remarks the PAC note: ‘The Departments, surprisingly, mostly seemed to hold only their junior employees responsible for such crimes (embezzlement, fraud, etc).’

e) Legal Action vs. Disciplinary Proceedings – Often cases detailed in the PAC

reports show disciplinary proceedings/action awaiting the outcome of legal

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proceedings, or not taken because legal action was considered sufficient. The PAC repeatedly stresses the need for disciplinary proceedings to be taken as well as legal action, and for both to be taken promptly. For example, the 1954‐1957 report details a case related to the Ministry of Health, Labour and Social Welfare, in which money was being recovered from a cashier found guilty of not depositing all the money paid by patients in a hospital. The PAC directed that ‘this action was not enough. In addition to this disciplinary action should be taken against the cashier’. The same report details a number of cases related to the Ministry of Rehabilitation and Works in which materials were stolen from depots or rendered unusable because of improper storage. The PAC was told that the matters had been referred to the Special Police and departmental action would be taken after the police or courts had decided the cases. The PAC ‘directed that departmental action should be started side by side and final action should be taken immediately after the findings of the Court of Law were available.’ The same report states clearly (in relation to the Posts and Telegraphs Department) that: ‘even though an officer might be under prosecution in a Court of Law, this should not unduly delay the initiation of the departmental proceedings against the officer himself and against the supervisory staff responsible for dereliction of duty leading to loss of Government money’. A related issue that emerges in the reports is the difficulty in pursuing disciplinary/legal action against and recovery from officers who have gone abroad. For example, the report for the years 1957‐1959 details a case related to the Railways Board of loss of stores worth Rs.29,306. The Chief Inspector involved resigned his post and proceeded abroad, after which a proper audit revealed even greater losses. Since the officer had fled to Canada before an enquiry into the case could be completed, the Ministry of Law was consulted and it ‘did not consider it advisable to enforce his return to Pakistan pending completion of the enquiry.’ The officer was dismissed from service and debarred from future government employment, but no assets could be recovered from him since he had left no property in Pakistan.

f) Failure to Prioritise PAC Proceedings – Various reports highlight the failure

by Ministries/Departments to provide explanations/responses to Audit Report comments to the PAC, or to provide these in time, or to come fully prepared for PAC meetings, or to ensure attendance at the meetings by high‐level staff (the PAC state that the Secretary should attend), or to provide compliance reports on the recommendations made in previous PAC meetings. When taken

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together these build up a picture of the Ministries/Departments not giving significance or priority to the PAC. As the report for 1954‐1957 states: ‘This led us to the conclusion that the Ministries concerned failed to realize the importance of the work assigned to the Public Accounts Committee.’ The reports calls for these issues to be addressed: at least Joint Secretaries, and ideally Secretaries, should attend PAC meetings; action should be taken on PAC recommendations immediately; departmental representatives should come fully prepared for PAC meetings, and so on.

6.3 Key Points

The PAC reports show a range of ‘irregularities’ committed by staff of Ministries/Departments. Some involve personal gain, but others are simply a failure to carry out their duty properly.

Departments tend to take a long time in initiating investigations and disciplinary proceedings – delays often mean action cannot be taken against those responsible or to recover losses.

Departments have a tendency to write off losses rather than pursue recovery of stolen assets.

In many cases where irregularities are identified by a Department, responsibility is not fixed on particular officers/staff. Without this it is impossible to take disciplinary action. Departments also tend to only assign responsibility to those most directly involved in fraud, etc/the most junior personnel. They do not hold those charged with supervision and control of these accountable.

In many cases departmental disciplinary proceedings are delayed/put on hold while legal proceedings are underway: these can take many years. The PAC calls for the former to be started alongside the latter.

It is often difficult to pursue action/recovery from personnel who have fled abroad.

The behaviour of Departments (in terms of preParation for meetings, compliance with recommendations, etc) shows they do not assign great importance to the PAC.

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7. PROVINCIAL PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEES 7.1 Punjab Public Accounts Committee The reports of the Punjab Public Accounts Committee were available from the years 1977‐78 to 1985‐86. The review of these reports revealed the following major issues: a) Stress on Recovery – The early reports of the PAC show an overwhelming

stress on recovery and virtually no efforts made at taking disciplinary action. There are numerous cases where departments are directed to ensure recovery and, once this is effected and confirmed by the Audit Department, the cases can be dropped. The 1977‐78 report cites the case of a headmaster found guilty of embezzlement. The PAC’s directive was that he should be told to deposit the money, ‘failing which a criminal case would be registered against him’. The same report gives many other cases where departments were told that, if guilty officials do not make up losses, they should not be allowed to draw their pensions/gratuity ‘without adjusting the amount of recovery due’. In one case where pension and gratuity were paid to an officer without recovery, the PAC called for action against those who allowed the payment of pension and gratuity – not for action against the officer guilty of causing Government losses (!) In a case related to the Food Department in the 1977‐78 report, the PAC made a rare call for criminal action to be instituted against an officer guilty of misappropriation in addition to recovery – but this only after the officer failed to pay the first recovery installment. Where recoveries cannot be made because the personnel involved have died, absconded or have no traceable assets, the PAC simply directed that the losses be written off. In later reports the emphasis shifts somewhat and there are more cases where disciplinary action was ordered. But the main impression that emerges is still that the PAC’s primary focus is on recovery of losses. In the context of recovery, there is debate in some of the reports about whether this should be made at the original price (for recovery of stolen/lost materials) or at the replacement price.

b) Poor Cooperation by Departments – The Punjab PAC reports highlight a

number of issues in the approach of Departments to the PAC. These include: failure to submit documents on time; failure to submit Working Papers detailing progress on cases and PAC recommendations; non‐attendance by Administrative Secretaries at PAC meetings or their attendance without being

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properly briefed; non‐compliance or delayed compliance with PAC directives. The 1984‐85 report also identifies limited recovery and a tendency to write‐off losses as a problem, as well as lack of action against guilty officers (see c below). The PAC Chairman concludes ‘I feel that the bureaucracy has exhibited a tendency not to take note of the directives of the Public Accounts Committee….This tendency is not only reflective of their respect for public representatives but is also resulting in commission of more irregularities.’

c) Assignment of Responsibility and Disciplinary Action – The later PAC

reports put more stress on assignment of responsibility for irregularities, and for disciplinary action. The former includes calls for all those involved in some irregularity to be held accountable, i.e. officers/personnel who committed fraud/theft and their senior staff who should have supervised them. In a case related to the Agriculture Department where there was misappropriation of stock worth Rs.390 million, the PAC report for 1980‐1983 states: ‘It is also directed that action against the supervisory staff should be taken for non‐observance of the approved procedure of physical checking of stock and for lack of proper checks over the books of accounts kept in the issuing and receiving officers, as a result of which a large quantity of fertilizer/seed was misappropriated’.

There are more calls for disciplinary action, e.g. the 1980‐1983 report details a case where a District Manager of the Punjab Transport Board held responsible for inefficiency and misconduct that led to substantial loss of cash, had been punished by withholding one increment. The PAC directed that stronger action be taken against him as a deterrent measure: ‘In future it will be a warning against other officials of the Department as (it) was in habit of going into loss due to mismanagement of such culprits.’ Despite such calls, the 1984‐85 report states: ‘The Public Accounts Committee was surprised to learn that the government was soft on officers and officials accused of grave financial misconduct. There are instances where officers, against whom audit Paras were not settled and investigation by other agencies was also pending, continued to remain posted on important positions.’

d) Court Case and Other Delays – The PAC reports list numerous cases as sub

judice, but a major issue with many of these is the lengthy time taken by the courts in hearing them and the frequent use of delaying tactics by defendants. The 1977‐78 report notes: ‘In sub judice cases adjournments were sought by the opposite parties on frivolous grounds which delayed the decisions. 67 cases of

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nine Departments were dragging on for years without any progress.’ The 1978‐79 report urges Administrative Departments to direct their Counsel to seek ‘substantial costs’ in cases where delays were being sought by the other party on frivolous grounds. The PAC reports also highlight delays in taking disciplinary action. E.g. the 1983‐1984 report details a case where irregular expenditure by a principal was brought to the notice of the Education Department in 1972, but the principal retired seven years later with no action brought against her. The PAC directed that action should be taken against the officer who failed to take timely action. Delays are often also caused when cases have been referred to the Anti‐Corruption Establishment: the entire record is transferred to the ACE so no departmental action can be taken. The PAC directed that copies should be kept of all records sent to the ACE. A related issue was that, in several cases, records were untraceable and therefore cases had to be dropped and losses written off.

7.2 Sind Public Accounts Committee

The reports of the Sind Public Accounts Committee were available for the years 1963‐64 to 1970‐71 and then from 1976‐77 to 1981‐82, and for 1992‐93. A review of these reports revealed a number of issues in departmental accounting and expenditure, notably a tendency to have excess expenditure with additional funds not obtained in time or through proper means; or to not surrender savings; not keep a proper check on expenditure on contingencies such as telephones and government transport; re‐allocate funds without proper re‐appropriation; present accounts with misclassifications, mispostings and non‐reconciliation of departmental and Audit office figures; and not maintain/submit proforma accounts. The following major issues emerged specifically with regard to accountability of government personnel: a) Delays in Investigations – The reports detailed numerous cases in which there

were lengthy delays in initiating investigations into misappropriations, theft, etc and this in taking disciplinary action against guilty officers/personnel. The report for 1963‐1971 identifies the main kinds of irregularities and malpractices, i.e. misappropriation; non/slow recovery of Government dues; irregular payments; moneys drawn from the Treasury and deposited in private banks; shortage/non‐accountal of stores; and non‐maintenance of proforma accounts. The same report found that:

Action for fixing responsibility was generally not taken on time;

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Proper vigilance was not shown for making recovery from official at fault in cases of losses caused to Government;

Court cases were not pursued with due preParation; Records, on which demands could be established, were in several cases not kept safely;

Attempt was not made to get back from Anti‐Corruption Department the records taken by that Department a long time ago.

The end result of this was delays, often leading to inquiries not being effective – because personnel had retired/passed away, records were untraceable, etc – and thus to losses having to be written off. Examples from the same report include a local government officer who had drawn various amounts from the Treasury and deposited these in a private bank. The withdrawals were noticed by Audit in 1957‐58 but the Committee found that, even after a lapse of 20 years, no action had been taken against the officer and no attempts made to see how the money was spent and whether any could be recovered from him. The report for 1972/73 to 1975/76 details a number of cases of delays in relation to the Department of Irrigation and Works. In one shortage in stores was found in December 1969 but a preliminary enquiry against the officer considered responsible was not started until June 1978 – in the meantime he had passed away (in April 1978). This problem of delayed investigation persisted. The report for 1977/78 to 1978/79 details a case where 54 tons of bitumen were reported short in 1977‐78 but four years later action against the SDO responsible had not been finalized and no recovery had been made.

b) Leniency – Related to the delays in initiating disciplinary action, was the impression that the Sind Departments took a lenient attitude to officers/personnel guilty of serious irregularities. The report for 1963/64 to 1970/71 details a case of misappropriation of funds from a secondary school in Karachi. Of the two staff members involved, the Senior Clerk and the Headmistress, the former was suspended but later reinstated, while the latter was transferred to another school. No departmental enquiry was held. The report for 1981‐82 points out that ‘certain employees of the Departments of Irrigation, Highways and Buildings who had been dismissed from service, were favoured by the same Departments by award of contracts for execution of works in the same Departments from which they had been dismissed.’ The PAC stresses that showing such a lenient attitude will not deter, but rather will encourage others, to carry out similar acts of misappropriation, fraud, etc.

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c) Departmental Approach to PAC Proceedings – The PAC reports highlight a number of issues with regard to the approach of Departments to its proceedings. These include: failure to submit Working Papers (on time); non‐compliance with PAC directives, or initiation of action on these just before the next PAC meeting, submission of different contradictory explanations to the PAC indicating lack of full disclosure, failure to come properly briefed to PAC meetings. The 1992‐93 report also points out serious failings on the part of the Audit Office ‘which is supposed to be the main plank of the Public Accounts Committee’.

7.3 NWFP Public Accounts Committee Intermittent reports of the NWFP PAC were available during the period 1979/80 to 1997/98. The main issues to emerge, specifically with regard to accountability, were as follows: a) Focus on Recovery rather than Disciplinary Action – The early reports of the

NWFP PAC detail very few cases of misappropriation, etc. They are dominated by PAC comments on excess expenditure, unauthorized re‐appropriation, the tendency of departments to draw down funds in June to avoid lapses, etc. Later reports do detail cases of misdeeds committed by government officials. But the impression that emerges from the PAC’s rulings is that it is primarily concerned with recovery: as long as this can be ensured the PAC does not see the need for disciplinary action to be taken. E.g. the report for 1994‐95 details a case related to the Communications and Works Department where over payment of Rs.155,906 was made to a contractor. The PAC directed that recovery should be made from the Divisional Officer concerned within three months ‘failing which disciplinary action may be taken against him’. The subsequent year’s report for 1995‐96 spells out clearly the PAC’s position on recovery and disciplinary action: ‘The Chairman once again clarified that if the recoveries were made voluntarily in time then no departmental/criminal action whatsoever, may be taken and no adverse entry in the ACRs reflected. However…if any officer involved in misdeed, hesitates to make the recovery good, then he may be proceeded under the rules.’ While recovery might help reduce Government losses, it clearly does little to promote accountability or deter others from committing similar misdeeds.

b) Issues with Administrative Departments – The NWFP PAC reports indicate a number of issues faced with the Administrative Departments, and that many of these persisted over years despite repeated calls for improvement by the PAC.

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The key issues are lack of preparedness for PAC meetings, failure by Administrative Secretaries to attend meetings (despite very strong directives from the PAC that they must do so), failure to submit working papers or submission of very poor quality working papers, failure to submit complete documents, non‐compliance with PAC directives, non‐production of records on the pretext that they are with the Anti‐Corruption Establishment. The report for 1989‐90 describes the establishment of a Follow‐up Cell within the Assembly Secretariat specifically to pursue progress on implementation of the PAC directives and brief the PAC on this.

As well as the above issues relating directly to the Departments’ approach to the PAC, the reports also highlight problems with the check and accountability mechanisms within Departments. The report for 1982‐83 points out that if proper internal checks had been in place numerous irregularities such as shortage of stores, purchases in excess to requirements, etc ‘would not have constituted a permanent feature’. The report for 1994‐95 criticizes the practice of appointing junior officers to conduct enquiries, urging instead that these be assigned to senior officers.

c) Issues with the Audit Office – The NWFP PAC reports periodically criticize

the Audit Department. The report for 1982‐83 criticizes the fact that the Audit Office was only conducting ‘test audit’ for two out of twelve months. The report for 1989‐90 describes the quality of audit reports as very poor. The 1995‐96 report highlights the fact that Audit reports do not identify the specific officials responsible for misdeeds, noting that ‘This practice always put the department and the committee in the difficult situation while fixing responsibility’.

7.4 Balochistan Public Accounts Committee Only one report was available for the Balochistan PAC, for the years 1997/98, 1998/99 and 1999/2000. While the report is dominated by cases of misappropriation, embezzlement, etc, in only a few cases does the PAC call for disciplinary action to be taken against those responsible. In several cases, the departmental representatives dispute the audit claims of misappropriation and state they possess documentary proof to back their assertions: the PAC simply rules the matter pending subject to verification by audit. Other cases are sub judice so the PAC cannot rule on them. And in other cases the PAC directs regularization of loss by the Finance Department. In sum, the Balochistan PAC appears to play little role in enforcing accountability

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despite clear evidence of massive misappropriation, embezzlement, fraud, etc in all departments. 7.5 Key Points

Provincial PACs all uniformly face issues in the approach of Administrative Departments to them: often this is characterized by lack of preParation for meetings, attendance by mid‐level officers rather than Secretaries, non/late submission of working papers, poor compliance with PAC directives.

Some provincial PACs, notably NWFP, also face issues because of poor quality work by the Audit Office.

The Punjab and NWFP PACs place strong emphasis on recovery, often seeing this as a substitute for disciplinary action. Later Punjab reports also stress the need for assigning responsibility on particular officers and taking disciplinary action.

The Sind PAC reports show considerable delays in conducting investigations, often leading to enquiries being ineffective as personnel involved have retired/passed away and records are untraceable. Where guilty individuals are identified, departments tend to be very lenient and not take disciplinary action.

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8. FEDERAL PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION 8.1 Introduction to PSC The Public Service Commission was established in British India in 1926. Upon the formation of Pakistan, it was established under the provisions of the Government of India Act 1935. It was originally referred to as the Central Public Safety Commission, and later as the Federal Public Service Commission. It currently functions under Article 242 of the 1973 Constitution. The Commission provides advice on all matters related to recruitment, promotion and discipline of government employees. The Commission comprises a Chairman, appointed by the President, and Members also appointed by the President on the advice of the Prime Minister. The Commission is assisted by a Secretary. 8.2 Annual Reports’ Review With regard to accountability, it is the Commission’s role in disciplinary matters that is of relevance. Its role in ensuring that proper recruitment procedures are followed and people are hired on merit is important, but only of tangential relevance to the issue of public accountability. Hence the review of the Commission’s annual reports from 1949 onwards focused exclusively on its handling of disciplinary cases and the outcome of these. A number of key issues emerged: a) Implementation – The reports show disciplinary cases referred to the PSC and

it offering advice on them to the Ministries concerned. The record appears mixed with regard to acceptance of the PSC’s advice and implementation of this. The general pattern is that of the total cases referred to the Commission in a year, in a few the PSC’s advice is followed, but in a substantial number the PSC is not told of the orders passed on the basis of its advice. E.g. of the 5 cases referred to the PSC in 1964, the Government accepted the Commission’s advice in two while three cases were awaiting outcome at the end of the year. There are also cases where the Commission’s advice is rejected. For example the 1949 report describes cases where forged documents were presented in the Commission’s examinations. Those found guilty were disqualified from the exam and dismissed/disbarred from government service. The PSC recommended they be prosecuted as well, to act as a deterrent to others, but the Government thought the action already taken was sufficient punishment and

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would have a deterrent effect: it rejected the PSC’s advice. The annual reports actually include a section ‘Cases where the Commission’s Advice was not accepted and the reasons why’. The procedure to be followed in cases of disagreement between the PSC and Government ministries/departments was for the matter to be referred to the Prime Minister. He would hear both sides’ arguments and then make the final decision. The 1950‐51 report gives an example of this. The Ministry of Industries charged two officers in 1949 with ‘intending to cheat and cause wrongful gain to the tenderer’, held an enquiry and recommended they be censored. The PSC found the officers had not been given proper opportunity to defend themselves and advised the Ministry to hold a proper enquiry. It refused and decided not to pursue the issue further. The PSC then appealed to the Prime Minister who ruled in its favour and ordered an enquiry. This found the officers not guilty of dishonesty but of carelessness: an entry as such was made in their character roll.

b) Delays – The 1971 report notes that the PSC was supposed to tender its advice on a case within 20 days, but said delays in submission of documents by the Ministries concerned were extending this period. The following year’s report said the situation had improved somewhat, thanks to a directive issued to Ministries by the Establishment Division, but there was still room for further improvement.

The reports also observed that in some cases Ministries took a very long time in disciplinary proceedings. E.g. proceedings were initiated against an officer by the Health Division in May 1971, an enquiry officer appointed in July 1971 and the case was referred to the PSC in Dec 1972 – after one and a half years. Noting that delay causes frustration and complications, the reports say ‘there is a strong need to issue Government directives to the Ministries/Divisions/Departments to finalize disciplinary proceedings as quickly as possible, particularly in cases where officers may have been suspended’.

c) Mandate – The Punjab Government had reached agreement with the PSC

whereby cases relating to senior provincial officers would not be dealt with by the Provincial PSC but the Central PSC. However the 1955 report states that in one such case the latter’s advice was not accepted by the Punjab Government. The Central PSC wanted the stipulated procedure for disagreements to be

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followed, i.e. the matter be referred to the Prime Minister, but the Punjab Government wanted such cases referred to the Punjab Chief Minister. Following this, the Central PSC asked for the arrangement of forwarding cases of senior provincial officers to it to be discontinued. In 1973 disciplinary cases were removed from the PSC’s mandate: ‘The Commission is no longer concerned with cases of … disciplinary action. ….provisions have been made in the Civil Servants Act 1973 for the establishment of Administrative Tribunals to be called Services Tribunals to exercise exclusive jurisdiction in matters relating to the terms and conditions of service of civil servants and for matters connected therewith or ancillary thereto. … the Services Tribunals will hear appeals against an order or decision of a departmental authority imposing a departmental punishment or penalty on a civil servant.’ Thereafter the Commission did not have any involvement in disciplinary proceedings.

8.3 Key Points

The Public Service Commission functions used to include dealing with disciplinary cases involving government employees.

The PSC offered advice on disciplinary cases referred to it, but this was only sometimes followed. In most cases it was not told what action had been taken on its advice. Disagreements between the PSC and Government ministries were referred to the Prime Minister for a final decision.

Incomplete documentation submitted by Government departments led to delays in the PSC deciding cases. Ministries themselves also took a long time with disciplinary proceedings.

The Central PSC used to deal with cases of senior provincial officers, but disagreement with the Punjab Government over some cases and who should adjudicate on these, led to the practice being discontinued.

In 1973, with the establishment of Service Tribunals, disciplinary matters were removed from the mandate of the PSC.

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9. PROVINCIAL PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSIONS Article 242 of the Constitution provides for the establishment of Provincial Public Safety Commissions. These are operating in all four provinces. As with the Federal Public Safety Commission, they have an important role in ensuring proper recruitment based on merit and transparency, but this is only indirectly relevant to the issue of public accountability. Hence the review of the Provincial PSCs reports did not explore this vast issue, but focused on their direct role in ensuring public accountability, i.e. their role in disciplinary matters. 9.1 Sind Public Service Commission The Bombay‐Sind Public Service Commission was established in British India in 1937 to advise the Governments of Bombay and Sind on all matters related to services and posts such as appointments, promotions and transfers. From the perspective of accountability, the main function of the Commission was to advise on ‘all disciplinary matters affecting a person serving His Majesty in a civil capacity in India’. Upon the creation of Pakistan in 1947, it became the Sind Public Service Commission. In 1955 it was renamed the West Pakistan Public Service Commission, and remained so until 1970. From 1970‐73 it was the Sind‐Baluchistan Public Service Commission, and in 1973 became the Sind Public Service Commission – something that continues to this day. Under the current Sind Public Service Commission Ordinance, it is not responsible for disciplinary cases. The annual reports’ review therefore focused on early reports in which disciplinary cases were part of the Commission’s mandate. Even in these the Commission appears to have played a very limited role in matters of discipline. The 1937‐38 report states that the Commission’s advice was sought in three disciplinary cases; the 1942‐43 report lists six cases, of which in five the Commission’s advice was accepted by the Government and in one the Government’s orders were not communicated to the Commission. In later reports, disciplinary cases only relate to the conduct of examinations by the PSC. The 1987 report details a number of such cases. Candidates found to have used unfair means in the examination were usually disqualified from the examination and possibly from one subsequent examination as well. In sum, the Sind PSC had a very limited role in enforcing accountability among government employees.

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9.2 NWFP Public Service Commission The Punjab and NWFP Joint Public Service Commission was established under the Government of India Act 1935. It later went through a number of transformations: the West Pakistan Public Service Commission, and then the (current) NWFP Public Service Commission. Under the Punjab and NWFP Joint Public Service Commission (Limitation of Functions) Regulations the Commission’s functions included matters related to recruitment, appointments and promotions, transfers, terms and conditions and disciplinary matters. These regulations were maintained under the Independence Act 1947, the 1956 and 1962 Constitutions. However, the 1973 Constitution – whilst providing for the establishment of Federal and Provincial Public Service Commissions under Article 242 – did not lay out their functions, stating they would be ‘prescribed by law’. The functions of the NWFP PSC were thus to be decided by the Provincial Assembly. The 1973 NWFP Public Service Commission Act retained the original functions, but was then superseded by the 1974 NPWF Public Service Commission (Functions) Rules which removed a lot of those functions. The PSCs (similar changes happened in other provinces) were effectively ‘reduced to the status of recruiting agencies’. The NWFP PSC ceased to be consulted in relation to the issues listed above, including disciplinary matters. In 1981 a meeting of the Chairmen of the Federal and Provincial PSCs decided that the Commissions should approach their respective Governments for restoration of their original functions. The NWFP PSC 1981 report recommended the restoration of the old functions, but the 1983 report states that ‘no decision has yet been taken by the Government in this regard’ and describes the PSC’s functions as advising ‘the Governor on matters relating to the qualifications for, and methods of recruitment to, the services and posts referred to in clause (a) – (Pay Scale 16 to 20) in particular and on any other matter which the Governor may refer to the Commission.’ The report notes that the NWFP PSC has an even more limited role than the Federal, Sind and Balochistan PSCs. By 1984, however, several of the Commission’s previous functions had been restored ‐ but not those related to disciplinary matters. The NWFP PSC’s reports were available from 1970‐71, 1972, 1978, 1980, 1983‐2004. Given the change in the Commission’s mandate after 1974, only the initial reports detail its involvement in disciplinary matters. The 1972 report says the Commission determined a case of disciplinary action as a result of a departmental enquiry held against a lady doctor and agreed to the proposed punishment of stoppage of two

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increments without cumulative effect. Subsequent reports give no information about disciplinary action, not even in relation to the conduct of examinations. 9.3 Punjab Public Service Commission The Punjab Public Service Commission was originally established in April 1937. Like the other provincial PSCs it has undergone a number of transformations, e.g. the West Pakistan Public Service Commission. The current Commission is provided for in Article 242 of the 1973 Constitution, and operates under the Punjab Public Service Commission Ordinance 1978 and the Punjab Public Service Commission Functions (Rules) 1978. It enjoys the status of a special institution alongside the High Court and Services Tribunal. The main functions of the Commission relate to selection and recruitment of government officers from grades 16‐22, though since a 1993 amendment to the PSC Ordinance it has also been charged with recruitment for some lower scale posts. Disciplinary matters do not fall within the mandate of the current Commission, but when it functioned under the 1956 and 1962 Constitutions these were included. The 1968 report details 22 disciplinary cases in which the Commission’s advice was sought. The punishments recommended for errant officers ranged from censure, to stoppage of pay increments, reduction in pension, recovery of money, reduction in rank, and in the most extreme case, dismissal from service. In the majority of cases listed the Commission’s advice was accepted by the Departments concerned, but in five cases acceptance was awaited. It should be noted that the Commission largely agreed with the punishments proposed by the Departments, only in a few cases recommending more lenient/severe action. Of the 20 disciplinary cases detailed in the 1973 report, a similar picture emerges: in most cases the Commission agreed with the Departments’ proposed punishments, but in some it advised modifications. The 1973 report, however, does not give the outcome of the Commission’s advice – whether this was accepted or not. The 1974 report lays out the change in the Commission’s mandate, including: ‘The disciplinary cases are not to be referred to the Public Service Commission at any stage’. The 1981 report describes the meeting of Chairmen of the Federal and Provincial Public Service Commissions, and notes the decision made in that meeting that the Commission’s ‘position as provided for in the 1962 Constitution be restored’. To date, however, the Commission continues to be primarily responsible for selection and recruitment, and has no role in disciplinary matters.

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9.4 Balochistan Public Service Commission Article 242 of the 1973 Constitution provides for the establishment of the Balochistan Public Service Commission. This is governed by the Balochistan Public Service Commission Act 1989 and the Balochistan Public Service Commission (Functions) Rules 1995. Its main functions are to conduct tests, examinations or interviews for posts in grades 16‐22, and advise the Government on matters relating to qualifications and methods of recruitment to the services. The Commission’s mandate does not include dealing with disciplinary matters, though this was included in its functions prior to the 1973 Constitution. Of the reports available – 1984, 1986, 1992, 1999, 2000 – none detail any disciplinary cases dealt with by the Commission. 9.5 Key Points

Reports prior to 1973 detail disciplinary cases – usually between 5‐20 cases per year – dealt with by the Provincial Public Service Commissions. In most cases the Commission’s advice was accepted or the outcome was awaited.

The 1973 Constitution removed disciplinary matters from the mandate of the Provincial Public Service Commissions.

Since 1973 they have basically operated as recruiting agencies, with their role in discipline limited to conduct of examinations (plus some involvement in ensuring proper recruitment procedures are followed).

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10. MISCELLANEOUS A number of miscellaneous reports from different organizations were available. A review of these yielded the following issues: 10.1 Auditor‐General of Pakistan The Auditor‐General of Pakistan is mandated to ‘certify the accounts, compiled and prepared by the Controller General of Accounts or any other person authorized in that behalf, for each financial year, showing under the respective heads the annual receipts and disbursements for the purpose of the Federation, of each Province and of each district, and shall submit the certified accounts with such notes, comments or recommendations as he may consider necessary to the President or the Governor of a Province or the designated District Authority, as the case may be.’ [Section 7, Auditor General Ordinance 2001] The report Highlights of the Audit of the Auditor‐General of Pakistan 2004‐05 identifies a number of audit themes across the federal government:

Procurement of goods and services in violation of Government rules and/or without regard to transparency and due procedures;

Failure to effect recoveries due to Government; Some violations of Government rules and procedures for recruitment; Unutilized stores indicating over‐purchase of goods by Government departments;

Retention of money outside Government accounts – something strictly forbidden;

Avoidance of approval from higher authorities, e.g. for purchases; Avoidance of government audit.

The report’s focus is on systemic issues in Government expenditure, accounting and audit, rather than on specific issues of malpractice and accountability. But the obvious problems identified in the former can be taken as indicative of what is happening in the latter. Clearly, there is considerable room for improvement in both. 10.2 Anti‐Corruption Establishment Punjab The Punjab Anti‐Corruption Establishment (ACE) started life as the Anti‐Corruption Cell, which in 1956 became the Directorate of Anti‐Corruption, and then in 1961 the Anti‐Corruption Establishment. The current ACE operates under the Punjab ACE Rules 1985. The ACE is an attached department of S&GAD, Government of the

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Punjab, and comprises investigation, technical, legal, prosecution, administration and vigilance wings. The organizational structure comprises a headquarters and seven regional offices. The ACE’s basic mandate is to conduct enquiries, investigation and prosecution of corrupt public servants through the Special Anti‐Corruption Courts. Since 2003 the ACE has been engaged in a process of internal reforms, one outcome of which is the production of its first two year books – for 2004 and 2005. Both year books describe the legal framework, organization, functions and performance of the Punjab ACE. Common challenges that are identified in these include lack of capacity (particularly in investigation and prosecution), lack of permanent office space, and an extensive workload. Both also detail progress being made to overcome challenges and strengthen the ACE, such as computerization and automation of the ACE office, opening of additional regional offices and a new district level set‐up, incentives for ACE staff, repatriation of non‐performing ACE staff to their parent departments, training of investigation officers, and clearance of pendency. A particularly interesting feature of the year books is the details of the kinds of corruption found in different departments. In education, for example, key ‘misdemeanors’ are mis‐utilization of funds, corruption in admission to institutions, corruption in examinations, and ghost schools. In health some common malpractices are issuance of bogus medical certificates, corruption in the purchase of machinery and equipment, and doctors engaged in private practice alongside their government jobs.

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11. CONCLUSION The study of annual reports of public accountability institutions provides at least some of the answers to the question of why these are not effective/as effective as they should be? Many institutions are hampered by capacity constraints: lack of staff, lack of properly trained staff, shortage of office space, equipment, transport, and an overall lack of resources. In many cases the resources available fall far short of those required to address the institutions’ workload. To some extent, these issues are being resolved over time – NAB, for example, has made considerable progress in building its institutional capacity. These are ‘practical’ issues hampering public accountability institutions. More serious, in that they have a more damaging effect and are harder to address, are issues related to their approach and the attitude of others towards them. Taking the latter first, many institutions face resistance from government departments or lack of cooperation. Poor implementation of the directives of public accountability institutions is a major problem virtually across the board. In many cases, public accountability institutions lack the authority and power to enforce implementation, meaning their work is effectively rendered meaningless. While much of the blame for this state of affairs rests with government departments, the public accountability institutions themselves are also guilty in that many display a reluctance to antagonize or confront the former. In their desire to promote harmonious relations they overlook their own mandate. But perhaps the most disturbing issue to emerge from the review of annual reports is that many public accountability institutions are simply not focused on accountability. In the case of the Federal and Provincial Ombudsmen, the focus is very much on providing grievance redress for citizens – a laudable objective – but one that, in the absence of accountability by those in public office, does little to curb maladministration and bring about long‐term improvements. In too many cases the Federal and Public Accounts Committees are happy to settle for recovery of government losses: their attitude that if this is brought about there is no need for disciplinary action again does little to promote accountability or curb embezzlement, theft, fraud, etc. It is too early for this research project to be making recommendations – the findings of all five components need to be collated and qualitative research among stakeholders

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undertaken – but based on the above findings some general points can be stressed. One, while it is important to provide public accountability institutions with the human and material resources needed to be able to carry out their mandate effectively, equally important is the need to enforce implementation of their findings. Two, most crucial is the need for public accountability institutions to focus in their working and operations on the question of accountability: this cannot be a secondary goal – it has to be their number one priority. This is the key to achieving long‐term grievance redress, curbing maladministration, curbing irregularities in public finance, and so on. Accountability has to take centre stage.

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ANNEX IV(B)

FINANCIAL ANALYSIS

OF


Note: The Annexes of the Financial Analysis report are attached separately (Financial Annexes)

Prepared by Masood H. Kizilbash

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CONTENTS

6. Introduction 6 7. Overview of Financial Data of Accountability Institutions at Federal Level 13

8. Overview of Financial Data of Accountability Institutions at Provincial Level 21

9. Analysis of Financial Data 26 10. Proposals/ Recommendations 32 11. Annexures 35 12. Federal Government

a. Annex‐I b. Annex‐II c. Annex‐III d. Annex‐IV e. Annex‐V f. Annex‐VI

13. Provincial Governments 14. Punjab

a. Annexure P‐I b. Annexure P‐II c. Annexure P‐III d. Annexure P‐IV e. Annexure P‐IV f. Annexure P‐V 40

15. Sindh a. Annexure S‐I b. Annexure S‐II c. Annexure S‐III d. Annexure S‐IV e. Annexure S‐V 46

16. NWFP a. Annexure F‐I b. Annex F‐II c. Annex F‐III d. Annex F‐IV e. Annex F‐V 49

17. Baluchistan

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a. Annex B‐I b. Annex B‐II c. Annex B‐III d. Annex B‐IV e. Annex B‐IV 52

18. Appendices Delegation of Financial Powers 54

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Chapter – 1

Introduction 1.1 “Public Accountability” is one of the four key elements in the definition of “Good Governance”. It is defined as accountability of the “actions” of the Executive organ of the State. 1.2 The functions of the Executive organ of the State are performed by Ministries/Divisions, departments, subordinate offices and corporate bodies. For running these institutions, civil servants at various tiers of functional responsibility are hired for performing these functions within the laws, rules and regulations. The civil servants are supposed to discharge their responsibilities in accordance with the given legal framework. If their actions do not conform to it, they become accountable for their actions. 1.3 In order to make the public servants accountable, a State creates the organizations for taking corrective or punitive actions against the erring public servants, working in various Divisions, Departments and bodies under the Executive Organ of the State. The capacity of these organizations for performing their functions is derived from their legal, administrative and financial capacity. The study in the succeeding chapters analyzes the key Accountability Organizations’ financial strength for discharging their duties in terms of adequacy of financial funding, expenditure patterns, surrenders and their break‐up, delegation of financial powers etc. 1.4 The financial strength of the Accountability Organizations in discharging their function is one of the key determinant of the outcome. The litmus test is that how efficiently and effectively these organizations have delivered in unearthing, checking, controlling and helping carry out corrective actions against all cases of irregularities, committed within the given framework of laws, rules and regulations as well as how effectively and quickly the culprits were investigated for the crimes and proceeded against in the courts of law under the punitive laws of the State.

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Chapter – 2 Financial Data of the Key Federal Public Accountability Organizations 2.1 This chapter reviews the financial data, collected and computerized with great difficulty on account of segregated availability of the budget documents and lack of publication of historical budgetary data by either the Organizations themselves or Research Organizations in the public or the private sector. 2.2 In order to evaluate financial capacity of each organization to enable it undertake its functional responsibility, the review takes into account the following components:‐

(a) Budgetary allocation of funds and other services, if any. (b) Growth in the allocation of funds from year to year. (c) Distribution of funds between salary and non‐salary components

and their ratios. (d) Utilization / surrender of funds. (e) Expenditure authority. (f) Financial authority. (g) Internal and external financial controls

I. Federal Investigation Agency Background 2.3 Federal Investigation Agency is a successor to Pakistan Police Establishment, created in 1948 which itself was a successor to first ever anti‐corruption agency established in 1938 by the British Government in India. The Pakistan Special Police Establishment was transformed in 1974 into Federal Investigation Agency through an Act which expanded the scope of its functions and made it an attached department of the Ministry of Interior.

Overview of Financial Allocations and Expenditure Data 2.4 A historical overview of the financial allocations, growth rates year to year, break‐up into salary and non‐salary with their ratios and utilization / surrender of funds is placed at Annexure‐I.

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Analysis of Trends 2.5 A study of the data shows the following trends :‐ a. 100% funding from the budgetary sources. b. Consistent increase in the allocation from year to year.

c. Increase in salary budget component comParatively higher than non‐salary budget.

d. Lower ratios of non‐salary budget in overall allocations. e. Excess utilization and surrenders observed in most years in the

time series. Expenditure Authority 2.6 In terms of Office Memorandum No.F.3(2)Exp.III/2006 dated 13th September, 2006 on the subject of “System of Financial Control and Budgeting” (September, 2006) which amends the powers delegated to the Ministries/Divisions and Head of the Departments under the Financial Rules, Supplementary Rules and General Financial Rules, the Director General FIA as a Head of the Department has been vested with full powers to incur expenditure within the ambit of delegated authority without referring to Financial Advisor / Ministry of Finance. For all other cases, he has to seek approval from FA/MOF. Financial Autonomy 2.7 Financial autonomy in the sense that the Department has powers to determine its own budget, raise revenues from the sources other than the budgetary grant or to incur expenditure in accordance with its own priorities is not enjoyed by the Director General FIA. He is bound to follow General Financial Rules, Fundamental Rules, Supplementary Rules and orders of the Ministry of Finance from time to time. Internal and External Financial Controls

(a) Internal Financial Controls (i) Maintenance of Accounts

The Director General FIA observes Internal Control notified by the Controller General Accounts and as laid down in the Account Code. For the purpose he is assisted by the Accounts Officer who is charged with the responsibility of maintenance of the Accounts

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Books and other ancillary records and exercises internal checks for adherence to the rules as provided in Para 13 of GFR Volume I, namely, application of rules on handling and custody of cash and enforcement of system for security regularity and propriety in various transactions including receipt and issue of stores etc.

(ii) Internal Audit

An Accounts/Audit Officer carries out inspection of Accounts Books, Sanctions, Receipts, Stocks and Stores in order to ensure that the financial transactions have been made in accordance with the financial rules and accounts posted and maintained in accordance with the Account Code. For the purpose, he submits a report to the Head of the Department for taking actions thereon.

(b) External Controls (i) Financial Advisor’s Organization

Ministry of Finance has posted Deputy Financial Advisor / Financial Advisor in the Ministry of Interior for performing expenditure control function of the Ministry of Finance and assisting the Secretary and Head of the Department in the financial management. Specifically speaking, DFA/FA attached to the Ministry of Interior approves expenditure and budget provisions where powers are not delegated to D.G. FIA, namely, reappropriation cases, technical supplementary and supplementary grant in respect of unexpected expenditure, write‐off of losses and creation of posts.

(ii) Audit by the Office of Auditor General of Pakistan The auditors from the office of the Auditor General of Pakistan carry out an annual audit of the organization. The audit includes audit of Account Book, expenditure, sanctions, supplementary schedule of authorized expenditure and audit of stores and stocks. The detailed results of the audit are reported to Drawing and Disbursing Officer of the FIA and controlling authorities. The responsibility for settlement of these objections and for recovery of amount paid in excess of authorization lies on controlling officer/DDO. In case objections are not dropped, these are, then, referred to the Departmental Audit Committee in the Ministry of Interior, headed by the Secretary. If some of the audit objections remain unresolved, these are referred to the office of

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the Auditor General and are incorporated in the Audit Reports on Appropriation Accounts, submitted to the President and the Public Accounts Committee of the National Assembly for appropriate action.

II. Prime Minister’s Inspection Commission Background 2.9 The Prime Minister’s Inspection Commission was established in 1978 as an attached department of the Prime Minister’s Secretariat. The mandate of the Commission is to conduct inquiry in respect of any Ministry, Division, Department or office of the federal or provincial government which is involved in bribery, corruption, favouritism, nepotism, maladministration or misapplication of rules and regulations. 2.10 Following establishment of National Accountability Bureau in November, 1999 and operationalization of its activities, it was wound up as a redundant organization. However, it was revived in 2004. Overview of Financial Allocations and Expenditure Data 2.11 A historical overview of the financial allocations, growth rates from year to year, break‐up into salary and non‐salary with the ratios and utilization / surrender of funds is placed at Annex‐II. Analysis of Trends 2.12 Since its operationalization, an analysis of data indicates the following trends:‐ (a) 100% funding from the budgetary sources. (b) A downward trend in allocations between 1979‐80 to 1986‐87

and an erratic trend between 1987‐88 and 2006‐07. (c) An erratic trend in salary budget component as well as non‐ salary budget.

(d) Lower ratios of non‐salary budget in overall allocation. (e) Excess utilization of funds observed in most years of the Time

Series and surrenders only a few years.

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Expenditure Authority, Financial Autonomy and Internal and External Financial Controls 2.13 The Prime Minister’s Inspection Commission being an attached department of the Prime Minister’s Secretariat enjoys expenditure authority and financial autonomy to the extent described at Paras 2.6 and 2.7. As for internal and external financial controls, the same system is in place as described at Para 2.8. III. National Accountability Bureau 2.14 National Accountability Bureau was established under the National Accountability Ordinance, 1999 as amended from time to time as an autonomous body and became a constitutional body by virtue of its inclusion in the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. 2.15 The functional coverage of the NAB extends throughout Pakistan and to all citizens of Pakistan including those who have been or are in service of Pakistan and are accused of corruption and corrupt practices as delineated in the Ordinance. Unlike Prime Minister’s Inspection Commission, the NAB is an investigating as well as prosecution agency. After merger of Anti‐Corruption and Crimes Wing of the FIA with the NAB in 2002, it has become a most powerful investigating and prosecution agency in the country. Over‐view of Financial Allocations and Expenditure Data 2.16 National Accountability Bureau is the only organization which is authorized to retain a certain percentage from the recovered amount from the accused under Voluntary and Plea Bargain provisions in the law. The amount retained is spent to meet operational expenditure including rewards, incentives and welfare of employees. The data of retained amounts from year to year and the heads on which spent is not released. Apart from this retained amount, the NAB is also allocated funds from the budget. 2.17 The financial allocations, growth rates from year to year, break‐up in salary and non‐salary components with their ratios and utilization / surrender of funds is placed at Annex‐III. Analysis of Trends 2.18 The data analysis indicates the following :‐

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(a) An upward trend in allocations. (b) Non‐salary budget ratio much higher than the salary budget

component. (c) Excess utilization of funds in most years of the Time Series met

from the amount retained under the Voluntary and Plea Bargain provisions and Technical and Supplementary Grants.

(d) Surrender of funds only in a year over the Time Series. Expenditure Authority 2.19 As a Principal Accounts Officer, the Chairman NAB is vested with delegated authority to incur expenditure against the budgetary provisions as provided in the “System of Financial Control and Budgeting September 2006”. For the items not delegated, he has to seek approval from F.A. and the Finance Secretary. Financial Autonomy 2.20 The NAB enjoys a limited financial autonomy. The Chairman is empowered to determine without reference to the Ministry of Finance, the amounts of recovery from the accused under Voluntary Return and Plea Bargain, retain a certain percentage of the corruption money for supplementing the budgetary resources provided in the budget and determines terms and conditions of service to officers and staff including remunerations. Internal and External Financial Controls 2.21 NAB is subject to same internal and external financial controls as described in Para 2.8 of this report. IV. Federal Ombudsman (Wafaqi Mohtasib) Background 2.22 The Ombudsman’s office was established in 1983 through the promulgation of the Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib Order, 1983 (Presidential Order No.1 of 1983) subsequently incorporated in the Constitution, 1973 “to diagnose, investigate, redress and rectify any injustice done to a person (citizen) through maladministration.” Thus, the scope of the functions of the Organization encompasses every conceivable form of administrative neglect, inattention, delay,

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incompetence, inefficiency, ineptitude in the administration or discharge of duties and responsibilities. Like NAB, it is a constitutional and autonomous organization. Overview of Financial Allocations and Expenditure Data 2.23 An overview of the financial allocations, grants, from year to year, break‐up into salary and non‐salary with their ratios and utilization/surrender of funds is placed at Annexure‐IV. Analysis of Trends 2.24 The results of the analysis of the trends are as under :‐ (a) 100% funding from the budgetary sources. (b) An incremental funding pattern observed from year to year. (c) Growth in allocations both for salary and non‐salary

components. (d) Ratios of non‐salary component fairly high in overall

allocations. (e) 100% utilization of allocated funds in most years of the Time‐

Series. Expenditure Authority 2.25 Designated as a Principal Accounts Officer his expenditure authority is limited to the extent as delegated to a Secretary of the Federal Ministry / Division in terms of “System of Financial Control and Budgeting (September 2006)” which amends the powers delegated under the General Financial Rules, Supplementary Rules and the Fundamental Rules. Financial Autonomy 2.26 As described at Para 2.7 of this chapter. Internal and External Financial Controls 2.27 As described at Para 2.8 of this chapter.

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V. Federal Public Service Commission 2.28 In pursuance of Article 242 of the Constitution, Federal Public Service Commission was created through an ordinance for the purposes of making recruitment against the posts in BPS 16 and above belonging to All Pakistan Services and civil posts in connection with the affairs of the Federation and to the posts in basic pay scales 11 to 15 or equivalent in the specified departments. Notwithstanding the decisions made by the Chief Executive in a meeting held in January, 2000, to change the status of the FPSC from that of an attached department of the Establishment Division to an autonomous body, the decisions have not been fully implemented. Overview of Financial Allocations and Expenditure Data 2,29 An overview of the financial allocations, growth from year to year, break‐up into salary and non‐salary with the ratios and utilization and surrenders of funds is placed at Annexure‐V. Analysis of Trends 2.30 A study of data reveals the following ‐

(a) 100% funding from the budgetary source. The service fee such as examination fee etc. forms part of the revenues of the government. (b) A consistent rising trend in the allocations from year to year. (c) Ratios of salary and non‐salary components of the budget in the allocations almost half and half. (d) Utilization is almost 100% in the Time‐Series with surrenders appearing in only a few years.

Expenditure Authority 2.31 Despite the decisions made by the Chief Executive in January, 2000, the Chairman continues to be vested with the expenditure authority as enjoyed by the Head of the Department in terms of the “System of Financial Control and Budgeting (September 2006).”

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Financial Autonomy 2.32 As described in Para 2.7. Internal and External Financial Controls 2.33 As described in Para 2.8. VI. Federal Service Tribunal 2.34 The Federal Service Tribunal is an administrative Tribunal, established under Services Tribunal Act, 1973. It remained a subordinate office under the administrative and financial control of the Establishment Division till 2001 when its administrative e control was transferred to the Ministry of Law, Justice and Human Rights Division. The functional responsibility of the Federal Service Tribunal under the Act is to ensure inexpensive and expeditious justice to civil servants concerning the Terms and Conditions of their service including promotion and punishment, as provided in the Rules. Financial Allocations and Expenditure 2.35 An overview of the financial allocations, growth from year to year, break‐up into salary and non‐salary with the ratios and utilization and surrenders of funds is placed at Annexure‐VI. Analysis of Trends 2.36 An analysis of data denotes the following :‐ (a) 100% funding from the budgetary source. (b) A consistent rising trend in the allocations of both salary and

non‐salary components. (c) Lower ratio of allocation to non‐salary component than the

salary component. (d) Utilization of funds almost 100% with marginal excess utilization

in some years and marginal surrenders in a few years of the Time‐Series.

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Expenditure Authority 2.37 Being a subordinate office, the expenditure authority rests with the Principal Accounting Officer / Secretary of the Division within the powers delegated to him under the “System of Financial Control and Budgeting (September 2006). Financial Autonomy 2.38 As described at Para 2.7. Internal and External Financial Control 2.39 As described at Para 2.8. VII. Auditor General of Pakistan Background 2.40 The office of the Auditor General was for the first time recognized statutorily with the introduction of the Constitutional Reforms of 1919 and in audit matters he was made by statute independent of Government of India. The provisions of Government of India Act 1935 provided for total independence of audit in relation to the Authorities whose transactions were audited. At the same time, in order to keep a watch on financial transactions of the government by an independent agency over the servants of the Government who are entrusted with the realization and utilization of public money and management of assets, the Auditor General was also entrusted with the responsibility of maintaining the accounts of the governments. 2.41 Under Articles 168 and 169 of the Constitution, the Auditor General was assigned two functions, namely, keeping of accounts of financial transactions of federal and provincial governments and to carry out the audit. Following promulgation of two ordinances, namely the Auditor General’s (Functions, Powers and Terms and Conditions of Service) Ordinance, 2001 and Controller General of Accounts (Appointment, Functions and Powers) Ordinance, 2001, the audit and account functions have been seParated with the Controller General Accounts controlling the account function to prepare and maintain the accounts of the federation, provinces and district governments in such forms and in accordance with such methods and principles as the Auditor General may, with the approval of the President, prescribe from time to time. Besides, the Controller General authorizes

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payments and withdrawals from the Consolidated Fund and Public Accounts of the federal and provincial governments against approved budgetary provisions after pre‐audited checks that the Auditor General may from time to time prescribe. The Controller General is lays down principles of internal financial controls for the government departments in consultation with the Ministry of Finance and the provincial Finance Departments. 2.42 The Auditor General is charged with the responsibility of audit of all expenditures from the Consolidated Fund of the federation and of each province, audit all transactions of the federation and the provinces relating to Public Accounts, audit of all trading manufacturing, profit and loss accounts and balance sheets of subsidiary accounts, audit of any authority or body receiving grant or loan from the Consolidated Fund of Federal Government, Province or of any district, audit of receipts of federation, provinces and districts and audit of stores and stocks. 2.43 The Auditor General on the basis of audit carried out by him certify the Reappropriation Accounts and Finance Accounts in respect of the federation, provinces and districts submitted by the CGA with notes, comments and recommendations to the President, the Governor of the province and the designated District Authority. 2.44 Under Article 81 of the Constitution, the remuneration payable to the Auditor General and administrative expenses including remuneration payable to officers and servants of the office of the Auditor General are charged upon the Consolidated Fund and are not subject to approval of the National Assembly. Overview of Financial Allocations and Expenditure Data 2.45 An overview of the financial allocations, growth from year to year, break‐up into salary and non‐salary with the ratios and utilization and surrenders of funds is placed at Annex‐VI. Analysis of Trends 2.46 The analysis of the data indicates the following :‐ (a) 100% funding from the budgetary sources. (b) A consistent rising trend in both salary and non‐salary allocations.

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(c) Ratio of non‐salary component lower than salary component in overall allocations.

(d) Marginal excess utilization of funds and marginal surrenders witnessed over Time‐Series.

Expenditure Authority 2.47 In terms of Section 21 of the Ordinance, the Auditor General is vested with full authority to incur expenditure within the budgetary provisions but within the framework of the System of Financial Control and Budgeting of 13th September, 2006 and other relevant rules. Financial Autonomy 2.48 The financial autonomy in the budget‐making of the organization including creation of posts, technical and supplementary grants are subject to the approval of the Ministry of Finance. Internal and External Financial Controls 2.49 As described in Para 2.8. VIII. National Assembly and Standing Committee on Public Accounts 2.50 The budget of the executive organ is placed before the National Assembly for raising revenues and incurring expenditure. The budget is, then, debated and approved by the National Assembly for federal government and provincial legislature for the provincial governments, with such amendments as may be tabled. 2.51 The legislative organ is ultimately a sanctioning authority of the budget. Therefore, under Article 171 of the Constitution, the President is obligated to submit Finance Accounts and Appropriation Accounts on Finance Accounts before the National Assembly. On receipt of the President’s approval, the Ministry of Finance apprises the National Assembly Secretariat and the Parliamentary Affairs Division in include a motion in the name of the Minister for Finance for laying the reports before the National Assembly. After the motion is adopted, another motion is moved by the

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Minister that the accounts and reports of the Auditor General thereon be referred to the Standing Committee on the Public Accounts. Functions of the Committee 2.52 The functions of the Committee are broadly to satisfy itself with regard to the following :‐

(a) Any notable changes in the arrangements of Grants i.e. increase or decrease in their numbers, their amalgamations and sub‐division.

(b) Completeness and accuracy of accounts including accounts of stocks and stores.

(c) Expenditure not in accordance with the intentions of the legislature or which indicates gravely faulty administration of the Grant or Appropriation.

(d) Expenditure in excess of Grant or Appropriation. (e) Expenditure not in conformity with the authority which governs

it. (f) Cases of losses, write‐offs and irregular and improper

expenditure of public money.

2.53 After examination of accounts and reports of the Auditor General thereon, the Committee prepares a report within one year and presents it to the Assembly. Implementation of the Recommendations/Decisions of the National Assembly or the Standing Committee on Public Accounts 2.54 As per Audit Code, it is the duty of the Finance Division to consider any recommendations of the National Assembly or of the Public Accounts Committee arising out of the Audit Reports. It forwards to the Controller General Accounts as well as the Auditor General of Pakistan the findings of the Public Accounts Committee and the decisions of the National Assembly. It is also the duty of the Finance Division to communicate to the Controller General Accounts and Auditor General of Pakistan all orders passed by the Government on the recommendations of the Public Accounts Committee of the National Assembly in all cases of financial irregularity including misappropriation of funds, embezzlement, fraud, theft of stocks and stores, expenditure in excess over Grants and Appropriations etc. The orders passed by the Government on the reports of the Public Accounts Committee

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constitute case‐law relating to the accounts and are maintained by the Accountant General and Finance Division.

Chapter – 3

3.1 This chapter reviews the computed financial data of the Accountability Organizations in each province on the same basis as outlined at Para 2.2 of the Chapter 2. A. Punjab Province I. Anti‐Corruption Establishment Background and Legal Status 3.2 Anti‐corruption Establishment in Punjab is an attached department of the Services and General Administration Department, created under an Act and is headed by Additional Chief Secretary of the Government of Punjab. It is charged with the responsibility of verification of allegation of corruption against the government officials, inquiry, registration of FIR and prosecution of the accused under the Pakistan Penal Code provisions as per the Punjab Anti‐Corruption Establishment Rules, 1985. Overview of Financial Allocations and Expenditure Data 3.3 A historical overview of the financial allocations growth rates, break‐up into salary and non‐salary components and their ratios and utilization/surrender of funds is placed at Annexure P‐I. Analysis of Trends 3.4 A study on the data reveals the following :‐

(a) 100% funding from the budgetary sources. (b) A consistently rising trend in the allocation. (c) Abysmally low level of ratio of non‐salary component in the

allocation.

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(d) Utilization is much high for both salary and non‐salary components in most years and marginal surrenders observed over the Time‐Series.

Expenditure Authority 3.5 The Secretaries in the Provinces are designated as the Principal Accounting Officers as in the federal Ministries/Divisions. However, they have not been delegated expenditure control function by the Finance Department as is vested in the federal Secretaries. Accordingly, all financial matters such as expenditure sanction, allocation and approval of the appropriations etc. are referred to the Finance Department by the line Department. In line with this system in practice at the provincial level, the Head of the Departments of the attached departments have not been delegated any financial authority for incurring expenditure against the budgetary provision. This also applies to the Head of Anti‐Corruption Establishment. Financial Autonomy 3.6 With financial authority being with the Finance Department as per Rules of Business, the Secretaries of the line departments or Head of the Departments of the attached departments do not enjoy any financial autonomy in all matters concerning financial management. 3.7 Internal and External Financial Controls

(a) Internal Financial Control (i) Maintenance of Accounts

Through an Accounts Officer/Accountant, the Head of the Department maintains “Account Books” and exercises internal checks such as handling and custody of cash, enforcement of system for security, regularity and propriety in various transactions including receipt and issue of stores.

(ii) An Accountant (audit)/Audit Officer carries out inspection of Account Books, Sanctions, Receipts, Stocks and Stores in order to ensure that accounts are maintained as per CGA’s notified rules and submits the Report to the Head of the Department.

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(b) External Financial Controls (i) With financial management and control centralized with the

Finance Department, the Financial Advisor’s Organization as in the case of federal government Ministries/Divisions and Departments does not exist in the line departments for assisting the Principal Accounting Officers or Head of the Department.

(ii) Audit by the Office of Auditor General of Pakistan As discussed in sub‐section (ii) of sub‐Para (b) of Para 2.8.

II. CM’s/Provincial Inspection Team Background and Legal Status 3.8 Following establishment of the Prime Minister’s Inspection Commission, the Government of Punjab also established the Chief Minister’s Inspection Team in 1978 as an attached department of the Chief Minister’s Secretariat. The team is entrusted with the responsibility of inspecting all government departments and autonomous bodies to oversee due observance of their duties and responsibilities and to take cognizance of violations of rules and regulations by the government functionaries and with the approval of the Chief Minister to refer to Anti‐Corruption Establishment, those cases which concern it. Overview of Financial Allocations and Expenditure Data 3.9 An overview of financial data is attached at Annexure P‐II. Analysis of Trends 3.10 An analysis of the data indicates the following trends :‐ (a) 100% funding from the budgetary source.

(b) A consistently rising trend in the allocations. (c) A low rate in the allocation to non‐salary component. (d) Utilization of funds lower than allocation in most years of the

Time‐Frame Series but a higher level of utilization in non‐salary component than budgetary allocations.

(e) Surrenders observed in most years of the Time‐Series

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Expenditure Authority 3.11 As described in Para 3.5. Financial Autonomy 3.12 As described in Para 3.6. Internal and External Financial Controls 3.13 Arrangements as described in Para 3.7. III. Provincial Ombudsman Background and Legal Status 3.14 The Punjab Office of the Ombudsman was established in 1997 under an Act of the Provincial Assembly as an autonomous body for the protection of the citizens against maladministration of any department or statutory corporation or institution under the control of the provincial government. Overview of Financial Allocations and Data 3.15 An overview of financial data is placed at P‐III. Analysis of Trends 3.16 An analysis of financial data denotes the following trends :‐

(a) 100% allocation from the budgetary source. (b) A rising trend in allocations. (c) Ratios of non‐salary budget in the allocations pitched at

comParatively high level in the allocations. (d) Utilization exceeds allocation in most years of the Time‐Series

especially in non‐salary component. Expenditure Authority 3.17 Mohtasib is a Principal Accounting Officer in respect of expenditure incurred against budget grant or grants controlled by the Mohtasib.

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Financial Autonomy 3.18 The financial management being with the Finance Department, the Ombudsman does not enjoy financial autonomy except in case of appointment of advisors, consultants, interns etc. whose remunerations or honorarium is fixed by him in his discretion. Internal and External Financial Controls 3.19 As described at Para 3.7. IV. Public Service Commission 3.20 Punjab Public Service Commission was established in 1978 under an Ordinance for the purposes of recruitment to provincial services against civil posts in BPS‐16 and above and recruitment of all posts falling in the pay scales from BPS‐11 to 15. It is a constitutional and autonomous body but having a financial status of the attached department. Overview of Financial Allocations and Data 3.21 An overview of financial data is placed at Annexure P‐IV. Analysis of Trends 3.22 An analysis of financial data indicates the following trends :‐ (a) 100% allocation from the budgetary sources. (b) A rising trend in the allocations. (c) The ratios of non‐salary budget in the allocations higher than salary budget in most of the years of the Time‐Series.

(d) Utilization of Funds in most years lower than allocations resulting in surrenders except a few years of the Time‐Series.

Expenditure Authority 3.23 Expenditure authority as described at Para 3.5.

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Financial Autonomy 3.24 As described at Para 3.6. Internal and External Financial Controls 3.25 As described at Para 3.7. V. Punjab Service Tribunal Background and Legal Status 3.26 The Punjab Service Tribunal is a quasi body, established under the Punjab Service Tribunal Act 1974 as a subordinate office of S&GAD department in order to provide expeditious justice to civil servants concerning the terms and conditions of their service including promotion and disciplinary matters under the Rules framed under the Act. Financial Allocations and Expenditure 3.27 A historical overview of the data is attached at Annexure P‐V. Analysis of Trends 3.28 An analysis of financial data shows the following trends :‐ (a) 100% funding from the budgetary sources. (b) A consistent rising trend in allocations. (c) Ratio of non‐salary component in allocation lower than salary component.

(d) Utilization higher than allocations especially for non‐salary component.

Expenditure Authority 3.29 Being a subordinate office, the expenditure authority against the budgetary provision rests with the Principal Accounting Officer against the budgetary line items.

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Financial Autonomy 3.30 Financial management being under the control of Finance Department,

the PST does not enjoy financial autonomy. Internal and External Financial Controls 3.31 Internal financial control as described at Para 3.7 is exercised by the Department while external financial control by the Audit Department of the Auditor General of Pakistan. B. Sindh Province I. Anti‐Corruption Establishment Background and Legal Status 3.32 Anti‐Corruption Establishment was established under Sind Inquiries and Anti‐Corruption Act, 1991. It is an attached department of Service and General Administration Department. Overview of Financial Allocations and Expenditure Data 3.33 A historical overview is placed at Annexure S‐I. Analysis of Trends 3.34 A study of financial data reveals the following :‐ (a) 100% allocations made from the budgetary source. (b) A rising trend in the allocations over Time‐Series.

(c) Ratios of non‐salary component lower than salary components. (d) Utilization lower than allocations in most years of the Time‐Series

with a few exceptions. Hence, surrenders in most years. Expenditure Autonomy 3.35 As at Paragraph 3.5.

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Financial Autonomy 3.36 As at Para 3.6. Internal and External Financial Control 3.37 As at Para 3.7. II. CM’s/Provincial Inspection Team Background and Legal Status 3.38 The Chief Minister’s Inspection Team was established in 1978 as an attached department for performing the functions as in Para 3.8. Overview of Financial Allocations and Expenditure Data 3.39 An overview of financial data is attached at Annexure S‐II. Analysis of Trends 3.40 An analysis of the data indicates the following trends :‐ (a) 100% funding from the budgetary sources. (b) A rising trend in allocations over the Time‐Series both in salary and non‐salary components.

(c) Ratio of non‐salary component in the allocation abysmally low. (d) A mixed trend of utilization of allocations with non‐salary

utilization either 100% or more than 100% with surrenders witnessed in most years of the Time‐Series.

Expenditure Authority 3.41 As described in Para 3.5. Financial Autonomy 3.42 As described in Para 3.6.

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Internal and External Financial Controls 3.43 As described in Para 3.7. III. Provincial Ombudsman Background and Legal Status 3.44 The Sind Office of the Ombudsman was established in 1992 under an Act of the Provincial Assembly as an autonomous body with the functions as at Para 3.14. Overview of Financial Allocations and Expenditure Data 3.45 An overview of financial data is attached at Annexure S‐III. Analysis of Trends 3.46 An analysis of data reveals the following trends :‐ (a) 100% funding from the budgetary sources.

(b) A rising trend of allocation in most years both in salary and non‐salary components.

(c) Ratio of non‐salary component lower than salary component. (d) A mixed trend in overall utilization of allocations with non‐salary

utilization exceeding allocation in most years of the Time‐Series. (e) Surrenders observed in some years of under‐utilization of

allocations. Expenditure Authority 3.47 As described in Para 3.5. Financial Autonomy 3.48 As described in Para 3.6. Internal and External Financial Controls 3.49 As described in Para 3.7.

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IV. Sindh Public Service Commission Background and Legal Status 3.50 Sind Public Service Commission was established in 1978 under an Act of legislature with the functions and legal status as described at Para 3.20. Overview of Financial Allocations and Expenditure Data 3.51 An overview of financial data is attached at Annexure S‐IV. Analysis of Trends 3.52 An analysis of data indicates undernoted trends :‐ (a) 100% funding from the budgetary sources.

(b) A rising trend in allocations with non‐salary allocations denoting mixed trend over the Time‐Series.

(c) Ratio of non‐salary component lower than salary component. (d) A mixed trend in utilization of overall allocations with non‐salary

utilization exceeding in all years covered in the Time‐Series. In line with the mixed trend of overall utilization, excess utilization and surrenders observed.

Expenditure Authority 3.53 As described in Para 3.5. Financial Autonomy 3.54 As described in Para 3.6. Internal and External Financial Controls 3.55 As described in Para 3.7.

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V. Services Tribunal 3.56 Sind Services Tribunal was established under an Act of the legislature in 1974 as a subordinate office of S&GA Department with the functions as described in Para 3.26 Overview of Financial Allocations and Expenditure Data 3.57 An overview of financial data is attached at Annexure S‐V. Analysis of Data 3.58 An analysis of data shows the trends as mentioned below :‐ (a) 100% funding from the budgetary sources. (b) A rising trend in overall allocations both for salary and non‐ salary items.

(c) Ratios of non‐salary component in overall allocation pitched at a low level. (d) Utilization in most years of the Time‐Series lower than allocations both for salary and non‐salary components resulting in surrenders and over‐utilization in the remaining years of the Time‐Series.

Expenditure Authority 3.59 As described at Para 3.5. Financial Autonomy 3.60 As described at Para 3.6. Internal and External Financial Controls 3.61 As described at Para 3.7.

C. N.W.F.P. I. Anti‐Corruption Establishment

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Background and Legal Status 3.62 Following break‐up of One Unit in 1969, ACE in the NWFP continued to function under the West Pakistan Anti‐Corruption Rules, 1965 until 1999 when the ACE was brought under the Anti‐Corruption Rules 1999 under the Prevention of Corruption Act 1998. It is an attached department of the Provincial Establishment Department. Financial Allocations and Expenditure Data 3.63 An overview of financial data is attached at Annexure F‐I. Analysis of Data 3.64 An analysis of data shows the following trends:‐ (a) 100% funding from the budgetary source.

(b) A rising trend in the allocations both for salary and non‐salary components.

(c) Ratios of non‐salary component lower than salary component in the allocations.

(d) Utilization of salary component lower than allocations and higher for non‐salary component over the Time‐Series with marginal over‐utilization or surrenders in some years. Expenditure Autonomy 3.65 As described at Para 3.5. Financial Autonomy 3.66 As described at Para 3.6. Internal and External Financial Control 3.67 As described at Para 3.7. II. CM’s/Provincial Inspection Team

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3.68 The Governor’s Inspection Team, later bifurcated as Provincial Inspection Team, in 2003, has been working since 1978 as an attached department with the duties and responsibilities similar to Inspection Teams in Punjab and Sindh. Overview of Financial Allocations and Expenditure Data 3.69 An overview of financial allocations and expenditure data is attached at Annexure F‐II. Analysis of Trends 3.70 An analysis of data indicates the undernoted trends :‐ (a) 100% funding from the budgetary sources. (b) A rising trend in the allocations both for salary and non‐salary

components. (c) Ratio of non‐salary component in the allocations lower than salary component.

(d) Utilization in most years of the Time‐Series was lower than allocations, resulting in surrenders. In other years there was over‐utilization arising out of excess utilization both for salary and non‐salary items.


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III. Public Service Commission Background and Legal Status 3.74 NWFP Public Service Commission was established in 1978 under the NWFP Public Service Commission Ordinance 1978 performs the functions described in Para 3.20. It is an attached department of the Services and General Administration Department. Financial Allocations and Expenditure Data 3.75 An overview of financial allocation and expenditure is attached at Annexure F‐III. Analysis of the Trends 3.76 An analysis of the financial data denotes the following trends :‐ (a) 100% funding from the budgetary sources. (b) A rising trend in the allocations both for salary and non‐ salary components.

(c) Ratio of non‐salary component in overall allocations pretty low. (d) Utilization of funds less than allocation in some years and over‐

utilization in others. However, over‐utilization in non‐salary component witnessed over whole Time‐Series. Surrenders in salary component discernible.


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IV. Service Tribunal Background and Legal Status 3.80 The Service Tribunal was established under an Act of legislature in 1974 as a subordinate office of General Administration Department for performing the functions as described in Para 3.26. Financial Allocation and Expenditure Data 3.81 An overview of financial allocation and expenditure is attached at Annexure F‐IV. Analysis of the Trends 3.82 An analysis of the financial data sets the following trends :‐ (a) 100% funding from the budgetary source. (b) A rising trend in allocations from year to year but at a relatively slow rate.

(c) Ratio of non‐salary component lower than salary component but at a fairly high level.

(d) Overall utilization more than allocations due to a high level of utilization in case of salary component but a low rate of utilization in respect of non‐salary component in most years of the Time‐Series. Accordingly, surrenders not observed.


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D. Baluchistan I. Anti‐Corruption Establishment Background and Legal Status 3.86 Anti‐Corruption Establishment established under West Pakistan Anti‐Corruption Act 1962 is still operated under West Pakistan Anti‐Corruption Rules, 1965. The Anti‐Corruption Establishment is an attached Department of Services and General Administration Department. Financial Allocations and Expenditure Data 3.87 Financial allocations and expenditure data is attached at B‐I. Analysis of the Trends 3.88 An analysis of financial data shows the following trends:‐ (a) 100% funding from the budgetary source.

(b) An inconsistent growth rate in allocations both for salary and non‐salary components over the Time‐Series.

(c) Ratio of non‐salary component much lower than salary component.

(d) Utilization exceeding overall allocations from excess utilization in both salary and non‐salary components except a few years when marginal surrenders made.


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II. CM’s/Provincial Inspection Team 3.92 The Provincial Inspection Team was established in 1978 as an attached department of the Services and General Administration Department with functions as assigned to similar Teams constituted in other provinces. Financial Allocations and Expenditure Data 3.93 Financial allocations and expenditure data is attached at Annexure B‐II. Analysis of the Trends 3.94 An analysis of financial data indicates the following trends :‐ (a) 100% funding from the budgetary source.

(b) An inconsistent growth rate in allocations both for salary and non‐salary components over the Time‐Series.

(c) Ratio of non‐salary component in the allocations lower than salary component but pitched at fairly high level.

(d) Utilization in excess of allocations in most years of the Time‐ Series especially in respect of non‐salary component. Hence, marginal surrenders only in a few years.

Expenditure Authority 3.95 As given in Para 3.5. Financial Autonomy 3.96 As described in Para 3.6. Internal and External Financial Controls 3.97 As described in Para 3.7.

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III. Provincial Ombudsman Background and Legal Status 3.98 The office of the Provincial Ombudsman was established under an Ordinance in 2001 as an autonomous body with the functions as at Para 3.14. Financial Allocations and Expenditure Data 3.99 Financial allocation and expenditure data is attached at Annexure B‐III. Analysis of Data 3.100 An analysis of the financial data denotes the following trends :‐ (a) 100% funding from the budgetary source. (b) An inconsistent increase in overall allocation with salary component recording increases and non‐salary component increases in some years and declines in others in the Time‐ Series.

(c) Ratio of non‐salary component lower than salary component but pitched at fairly high level.

(d) Utilization in excess of allocations in some years while less than allocations in others, involving surrenders.

Expenditure Authority 3.101 As given in Para 3.5. Financial Autonomy 3.102 As described in Para 3.6. Internal and External Financial Controls 3.103 As described in Para 3.7. IV. Public Service Commission Background and Legal Status

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3.104 Baluchistan Public Service Commission was established under an Act in 1989 for discharging its functions described in Para 3.20. It is an attached department of the Services and General Administration Department. Financial Allocations and Expenditure Data 3.105 An overview of financial allocations and expenditure data is attached at Annexure B‐IV. Analysis of the Trends 3.106 An analysis of financial data indicates the following trends :‐ (a) 100% funding from the budgetary sources. (b) An increasing trend in overall allocations in most years but negative growth witnessed in some years with non‐salary component recording consistent increase.

(c) Ratio of non‐salary component lower than salary component. (d) Utilization exceeding allocations in most years barring a few years when surrenders made.

Expenditure Authority 3.107 As given in Para 3.5. Financial Autonomy 3.108 As described in Para 3.6. Internal and External Financial Controls 3.109 As described in Para 3.7.

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V. Service Tribunal Background and Legal Status 3.110 The Service Tribunal was established under the Balochistan Service Tribunal Act 1974 as a subordinate office of the Services and General Administration Department for performing the functions as described in Para 3.26. Financial Allocation and Expenditure Data 3.111 An overview of financial allocations and expenditure data is attached at Annexure B‐V. Analysis of Data 3.112 An analysis of financial data indicates the following trends :‐ (a) 100% funding from the budgetary source. (b) An inconsistent trend in overall allocations and with salary and non‐salary components in the Time‐ Series.

(c) Ratio of non‐salary component lower than salary component. (d) Utilization lower than allocations in most years but utilization of

non‐salary component in excess of allocation. (e) Surrenders from allocations in most years of the Time‐Series.

Expenditure Authority 3.113 As described at Para 3.29. Financial Autonomy 3.114 As described at Para 3.30. Internal and External Financial Controls 3.115 As described at Para 3.31. 3.116

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Chapter 4

Analysis of Financial Capacity of Accountability Organizations 4.1 As discussed in Chapter‐I, the accountability outcomes are a function of legal, administrative and financial capacity of the Accountability Organizations in the country. Based on the financial overview of the Accountability Organizations in Chapter 2 and 3, the financial capacity of these organizations is analyzed both at federal and provincial levels in this chapter from various financial yardsticks. However, such an analysis can be better understood only in the background of a larger frame of financial management system at federal and provincial level. Financial Management System 4.2 The Financial Management System comprising fiscal policy, expenditure control and management was centralized in the Ministry of Finance at the federal level and Finance Departments at the provincial level till early 1960s. With the expansion of the functions of the State and increase in the volume of transactions, administrative inconvenience was faced in obtaining sanction of the Ministry of Finance by the Ministries and their attached departments. Accordingly, the Ministry of Finance placed Financial Advisors/Deputy Financial Advisors in the Ministries for assisting the Administrative Secretaries/Principal Accounting Officers in all financial matters including preParation of budgets, proposals for expenditure sanctions, allocation and approval of appropriations or any other business entrusted to Ministry of Finance as per Rules of Business. The system operationalized under the O.M. No.F.1(U.O) Admn(Rwp) dated 30th June, 1960 has been functioning at the federal level with modifications made from time to time. With pressures mounting from the Ministries/Divisions for vesting the Principal Accounting Officers and Head of the Departments with authority for incurring expenditure against the budgetary provisions, powers continued to be delegated to the Secretaries and Heads of the attached departments over time. 4.3 The current status of the delegated powers as contained in the O.M. No. F.3(2)Exp.III/2006 dated 13th September, 2006 is attached (Appendice). It may be mentioned that while expenditure authority stands delegated to a large extent, the fiscal part of the financial management i.e. budget‐making and approval including setting of rates of service charges etc. has never been delegated in Pakistan at federal level to the Ministries, Divisions and attached departments.

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4.4 As against the federal level where the powers of expenditure control stand delegated to a large extent, to the Administrative Secretaries and Heads of Departments, all powers of financial management ‐ budget‐making of the departments, revenue‐raising and expenditure control ‐ remain centralized in Finance Departments of the provincial governments. As a result, the Principal Accounting Officers and Head of the Departments at the provincial level as controlling officers of the allocated budgets have to observe line to line budgetary provisions for incurring expenditure as provided in Rules 11 to 17 of the General Financial Rules. Classification of the Accountability Organizations in terms of Delegation of Financial Powers 4.5 Financial powers have been delegated at the federal level, based on their classified status. Accordingly, Federal Ombudsman has been vested with the powers delegated to the Secretaries of Ministries/Divisions as Principal Accounting Officer. Chairman, Federal Public Service Commission; Director General, FIA; and Chairman, Prime Minister’s Inspection Commission have delegated power of the Head of the Departments. The Chairman, Federal Service Tribunal being a subordinate office of Law, Justice and Human Rights Division has not been delegated any power and, as such, financial powers are exercised by the Secretary/PAO. As for NAB and the office of the Auditor General, the Chairman NAB and Auditor General of Pakistan enjoy complete expenditure authority and financial autonomy conferred under NAB Ordinance 1999 and AG’s Ordinance, 2001. 4.6 Although the Principal Accounting Officers and Head of the Departments and subordinate offices have not been generally delegated financial powers, the organizations are categorized as at the federal level so as to distinguish one from another. For, the responsibilities in regard to the budgetary control, accounting etc. differ in accordance with the status of the organization in the General Financial Rules, Supplementary Rules, Fundamental Rules etc. Accordingly, Anti‐Corruption Establishments, Provincial Inspection Teams and Public Service Commissions are classified as attached departments, Office of the Provincial Ombudsman a department and Services Tribunal a subordinate office of the Services and General Administration Department.

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Sources of Funding A. Federal Level 4.7 The financial data of the Accountability Organizations from Annexure‐I to Annexure‐VI reveals that all organizations, except NAB, are funded from budgetary sources. The budget of the NAB is, however, funded from the budgetary source as well as a certain amount retained from realized “corruption money”. The service charges realized by the organizations, such as, Federal Public Service Commission accrue to Federal Consolidated Fund of the federal government. The rates of service charges are subject to the approval of the Ministry of Finance. B. Provincial Level 4.8 The financial data of the Accountability Organizations in respect of each province annexed to this Report also shows that all organizations are funded from the budgetary source and service charges accrue to the Provincial Consolidated Fund. Trends in Allocations A. Federal Level 4.9 A study of the growth rates of allocations shows that in case of all six Accountability Organizations at the federal level, barring a few years in the interval, a rising trend in allocations is observed in the Time‐Series. B. Provincial Level 4.10 At the provincial level also, the growth rate of allocations as given in the province‐wise financial data, indicates that barring a few years in the interval a rising trend is observed in the Time‐Series. Methodology of Allocations A. Federal Level 4.11 The observed trends in the allocations indicate that expenditure level of the preceding year is made the basis for the next years allocation. It signifies that the incremental methodology employed does not take into account either the performance or the output of the organizations in relation to their functions or

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efficiency needs in utilization of funds. This methodology implicitly recognizes the existence and the size of the organizations without question. B. Provincial Level 4.12 The methodology as at federal level is applied in the provinces. Trends in Salary and Non‐Salary Allocations A. Federal Level 4.13 The output or performance as well as its quality largely depends on the level of allocation of non‐salary component in the budget of the Accountability Organizations. However, the financial data of these organizations from Annex‐I to Annex‐VI suggests that the share of non‐salary component is much lower and in some cases insignificant except the NAB where the ratio of non‐salary component is much higher and in some years even exceeds the salary component. B. Provincial Level 4.14 The share of non‐salary component in the allocations of the Accountability Organizations in the provinces follows the same pattern as at federal level barring Punjab Public Service Commission. Utilization of Allocations A. Federal Level 4.15 The utilization of funds in the preceding year being the criterion of allocation of funds for next year is, by and large, nearly 100% or more than 100% in case of all six Accountability organizations with marginal surrenders in few years in the Time‐Series of the financial data. This trend resulted from utilization level in both components, namely, salary and non‐salary. However, in some organizations, such as Federal Public service Commission, Federal Service Tribunal and Auditor General’s Office, utilization of non‐salary component remained lower than allocations in most years of the Time‐Series. It is obvious that main thrust of allocation and utilization is on salary component and scant attention is paid to the non‐salary component. B. Provincial level

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Punjab 4.16 In case of the Punjab, over‐utilization is observed in case of Anti–Corruption Establishment, Provincial Ombudsman’s Office and Provincial Service Tribunal both in case of salary and non‐salary components. However, under‐utilization of allocations is witnessed in Provincial Inspection Team’s Office and the Public Service Commission. However, there was a lower utilization in salary component and over‐utilization in non‐salary component. This may be due to “padding” of salary component for utilization in non‐salary component through reapporpriation during the course of the year. Sindh 4.17 In Sind, a low utilization is observed in Anti‐corruption Department and Sind Service Tribunal both in salary and non‐salary components. As regards Provincial Inspection Team, Ombudsman’s office and Sind Public Service Commission, there is under‐utilization in most years with salary component under‐utilized and non‐salary component fully utilized or over‐utilized probably through reappropriation from salary to non‐salary component. N.W.F.P. 4.18 In NWFP, Office of the Provincial Inspection Team and Public Service Commission under‐utilized in most years of the Time‐Series. The under‐utilization in the former case was both in salary and non‐salary components and in the latter in salary component but over‐utilization in non‐salary component, financed through reappropriation. As regards Services Tribunal, there was over‐utilization in salary component met from under‐utilized funds of non‐salary component. Balochistan 4.19 In Balochistan, there was over‐utilization in Anti‐Corruption Establishment, Office of the Provincial Inspection Team, Office of the Provincial Ombudsman, and Public Service Commission, emanating from over‐utilization in both salary and non‐salary components in most years of the Time‐Series. In case of Service Tribunal there was under‐utilization in aggregate terms in most years of the Time‐Series due to low utilization of salary component but over‐utilization was witnessed in non‐salary component, met from reappropriation from salary component.

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4.20 As analyzed from Paras 4.10 to 4.13, an erratic trend in allocations and utilization of funds is witnessed in the Provincial Accountability Organizations. This owes to high level of dependency and uncertainty of transfers from “federal divisible pool“to the provincial governments. Analysis of the Working of Public Account Committees vis‐à‐vis the Audit Reports 4.21 A review of the working of Standing Committee on Public Accounts at the federal and provincial level is contained in Para 2.50 to Para 2.54. The Audit Reports of the Auditor General of Pakistan serve dual‐purpose. Firstly, the reports provided to the government, concern the extent to which the concerned public servants are in compliance with the rules and orders. This serves as a lever to the government for modifying its rules for plugging loopholes and for taking punitive action against the public servants. Secondly, the reports to the legislatures through their Public Accounts Committees establish the extent of compliance by the governments with the purposes for which moneys were placed by the legislatures at their disposal as well as regularity and propriety of the expenditure. The Audit Reports as such make observations on deficiencies of sanctions, non‐compliance with the rules and regulations, financial irregularities, cases of losses, write‐off and nugatory expenditure. 4.22 It is observed that no time limit is laid down neither in the Audit Code nor the Controller General of Accounts Ordinance 2001 nor in the Auditor General of Pakistan Ordinance, 2001 for submission of the Appropriation and Finance Accounts and the Audit Reports thereon after the close of financial year. As a result submission of the Accounts as well as Audit Reports to the President and Governors and to the Public Accounts Committees is invariably delayed. Sometimes the ‘time‐lag’ stretches to a few years. The last report on the audit of accounts of the federal government ranged form the period 2001‐02 to 2003‐04 and was submitted in November, 2005. At the provincial level also, the submission of the reports to Public Accounts Committees indicates a longer time‐lag of 3 to 5 years after the close of financial year. 4.23 The Public Account Committees are required under the law to submit their Report to the legislatures within one year. However, the deliberations of the Public Account Committees are inordinately delayed due either to absence of the Administrative Secretaries for furnishing replies on the unresolved audit Paras or submission of Inquiry Reports by the Administrative Departments or disputes between the Administrative Department and the Accountant General on the

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expenditure printed in Appropriation Accounts. As a result, either the Public Account Committees failed to present their reports on the floor of the legislatures or could do so after a lapse of several years. 4.24 Apart from delays in finalizing the recommendations on the Appropriation Accounts by the Public Account Committees, even the finalized recommendations remain pending such as ex‐post facto regularization of expenditure without sanction by the competent authority, recovery of government dues including rent, income tax, sales tax, recovery of amount of public money from the officials, disciplinary actions against officials for fraud and embezzlement etc. Although the Public Account Committees have follow‐up cells, their institutional and administrative strength is wanting both at federal and provincial levels.

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Chapter 5 Proposals/Recommendations 5.1 Based purely on quantitative financial data and analysis without qualitative research involving feedback from stakeholders including Accountability Organizations, firming up proposals or recommendations may not be conclusive. Nevertheless, a few proposals can be made at this stage for effecting improvements in the financial domain of the Accountability Organizations. 5.2 The organizations are funded through incremental approach of the budgeting, based on the expenditures. The approach is neither performance based nor efficiency‐based. It recognizes the existence and the size of the organization without any investigation into its “need” and “effectiveness” in discharging its functions for curbing corruption among the government functionaries. It is, therefore, suggested that incremental budgeting concept applied to the Accountability Organizations should be substituted with zero‐based budgeting which questions the justification for all expenditure by starting from scratch and developing budget proposals with the alternative levels of spending grouped into “decision packages”. The advantages of this system are that the department/agencies are put to notice that the existence and size cannot be taken for granted. Furthermore, the “budget padding” and excessive spending is avoided. At the same time, by trimming unnecessary items of expenditure from the budget signals the prospect of a close‐down or mergers where more than one organization has been established for performing similar function. This will also help make the Accountability Organizations more efficient and effective. 5.3 It is observed that allocations are heavily tilted in favour of salary component. Accordingly, numerical strength of the organizations bears no relationship with the provisioning of non‐salary components such as equipment like computer, fax machines, vehicles etc. and their maintenance for keeping them operational, traveling and dearness allowance for performing field duty. With these endemic trends, output and quality of the Accountability Organizations suffer. Hence, the need for striking a balance between numerical strength of these organizations and the non‐salary items of expenditure for making them effective and laying off the surplus strength force, if necessary. 5.4 Expenditure authority against the budgetary provisions stands delegated to a fairly large extent to the Principal Accounting Officers and Head of the

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Departments at the federal level and in case of NAB and Auditor General’s Office, complete expenditure authority over their budgets. Yet, their powers for reappropriation of funds from one Head to another, write‐off of losses, hiring of non‐residential building, entertainment, repair of transport, expenditure from lumpsum provision etc. are subject to the approval of Financial Advisor/Ministry of Finance. This also applies to the NAB and the AG’s Office. However, at the provincial level, expenditure authority rests with the Finance Departments with the respective Drawing and Disbursing Officers seeking sanctions with the Finance Departments for incurring expenditure against each line item provided in the budget of the organizations. This underscores the necessity to place the departmental budget at the disposal of the Head of the Accountability Organizations and grant of full powers of expenditure within the overall budgetary grant. This also implies delegation of full expenditure powers for reappropriation from one Head of the Account to another within the budgetary grant or appropriation. 5.5 As regards fiscal and management authority it is centralized in the Ministry of Finance at federal level and in the Finance Departments at provincial level except in case of the NAB which has been delegated some authority for creation of posts and determination of remuneration of officers and staff, fixing the amounts of recovery from the accused under Voluntary Return and Plea Bargain and retention of a fixed percentage of realized corruption money. As any delegation of fiscal and management authority including setting of rates of service delivery is fraught with the risk of hemorrhaging fiscal management, it cannot be recommended. 5.6 The releases to the Accountability Organizations for meeting current expenditure are restricted at the federal level to 40% of the total budget allocations in the financial year. As the releases are on pro‐rata basis for each Head of the Account in the budgetary allocations, high valued machinery and equipments cannot be purchased in time, thereby adversely affecting operational efficiency of the organizations. It is, therefore, suggested that full releases should be made in case of such items at the beginning of the year. 5.7 The pecuniary and non‐pecuniary incentives (e.g. promotion) should be

built in the system for those officials whose performance impacts upon the output of the whole organization.

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ANNEX IV(C)

ADMINISTRATIVE ASPECT

OF


Prepared by Muhammad Nasim Khan Raja

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CONTENTS 7. National Accountability Bureau (NAB)

Anti Corruption Establishment (ACE) ACE, Baluchistan ACE, Punjab ACE, Sindh

Comparison of NAB & ACE Bibliography

8. Chief Ministers Inspection Team (CMIT) CMIT, Baluchistan CMIT, NWFP CMIT, Punjab CMIT, Sindh

9. Public Service Commission (PSC) Federal Public Service Commission Baluchistan Public Service Commission NWFP Public Service Commission Punjab Public Service Commission Sindh Public Service Commission

10. Public Accounts Committee (PAC) 11. Ombudsman

Federal Ombudsman (Wafaqi Mohtasib) Provincial Ombudsman, Baluchistan (POB) Provincial Ombudsman, Punjab (POP) Provincial Ombudsman, Sindh (POS)

12. Service Tribunals Federal Service Tribunals (FST) Baluchistan Service Tribunals (BST) NWFP Service Tribunals (NWFP ST) Punjab Service Tribunals (PST) Sindh Service Tribunals (SST)

13. Departments of Auditor General of Pakistan

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Administrative Aspect Of

National Accountability Bureau (NAB)

& Anti-Corruption Establishments of the

Provinces (ACE)

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NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU (NAB) Historical background of NAB

The NAB was created under the National Accountability Ordinance promulgated on 16th Nov

1999 to eradicate corruption and corrupt practices and hold accountable all those persons

accused of such practices. Briefly, NAB is assigned tasks of eliminating corruption through a

comprehensive approach of Awareness, Prevention and Enforcement. Before October 1999

the Bureau was known as Ehtesab Bureau operating under Ehtesab Act 1997, while in Nov

1996 there was Ehtesab Commission. The NAB Ordinance 1999 has been amended from time

to time by Ordinance XIX of 1999, Ordinance IV of 2000 and Ordinance XXIV of 2000. The

amendments (attributable to the Supreme Court Order) were made by Ordinance XXXV of

2001. Latest amendments were made in the National Accountability Ordinance through

National Accountability amendment Ordinance 2002 on 15th Nov 2002.

The NAO-99 has been included in the 6th schedule of the constitution and given

constitutional safeguard through 17th amendment by the Parliament. As per article 268(2) of

the Constitution, the changes/ amendments in the 6th schedule can not be debated without

the prior consent from the President. No changes/amendments in law can be made without

⅔rd majority vote.

NAB Ordinance extends to the whole of Pakistan and is applicable to all persons in Pakistan,

all citizens of Pakistan and persons who are or have been in the service of Pakistan

wherever they may be including areas which are part of Federally Administered Tribal Areas

(FATA), & Provincially Administrative Tribal Areas (PATA)

Major amendments in the Ordinance

The major amendments pertain, interalia to the security of tenure of top hierarchy of the

organization comprising Chairman, Deputy Chairman and the prosecutor General

Accountability. In the last amendments the tenure, qualifications, method of appointment

of chairman and prosecutor General Accountability have been added. The appointment of

serving district and session judges to the accountability courts facilitating the accused in

making an application for the transfer of his/her case from one accountability court to

another requiring the prosecution to produce the accused in court after every fifteen days

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for extension in remand. The judgment of the Supreme Court also recognized jurisdiction of

superior courts to grant bail in appropriate cases.

Organization structure

NAB is an independent constitutional body. It has an efficient vigilance wing, maintaining

strict watch on officials working within the organization. It is rather more independent of

political pressures as it is answerable to the President of Pakistan which is a non political

institution. Chairman NAB presents Annual Performance Report which is mandatory to be

presented to the President of Pakistan by 30th March every year.

NAB is established under National Accountability Ordinance 1999 at the federal as well as

regional levels as one organization, working according to laid down standard operation

procedures. The Headquarter of the organization is located in Islamabad. Horizontally, the

bureau consists of five regional offices as NAB Punjab, Sindh, NWFP, Baluchistan and

Rawalpindi.

The NAB is headed by a chairman who is assisted by a Deputy Chairman and heads of various

wings and Regional Offices which are normally headed by the Director General, Director

Etc. The bureau is divided into eight wings and five Regional Bureaus.

Bureau comprises at the headquarters into following wings/cells:

1. Headquarter Wing

2. Financial Crimes Investigation Wing

3. Investigation Monitoring Wing

4. Administration Wing

5. Research, Analysis & Training Wing

6. Budget & Accounts Wing

7. Awareness & Prevention Wing

8. Human Resource Wing

9. Intelligence Cell

10. Media Cell

11. Computer Cell

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Each Bureau comprises the following six wings:

1. Investigation Wing

2. FCI Wing

3. Prosecution Wing

4. Vigilance/ Security Wing

5. A & P Wing

6. Administration/ B & A Wing

These regional bureaus were established on 15th May 2000. The existing Organogram of

headquarter and regional offices are available at annex - A & B.

Chairman NAB

Head of the NAB is the Chairman and appointed by the President of Pakistan in consultation

with the leader of the house and the leader of the opposition in the national assembly for a

non-extendable period of four years on such terms and conditions as may be determined by

the president and shall not be removed except on the grounds of removal of the judge of

supreme court of Pakistan

Qualification for appointment of chairman is as under:

i) Retired chief justice or a judge of the supreme court or a chief justice of high court

ii) Retired officer of the armed forces of Pakistan equivalent to the rank of a General

iii) Retired federal government officer in BS 22 or equivalent

Appointment of Deputy Chairman Deputy Chairman is also appointed by the President of Pakistan in consultation with

chairman NAB for a non-extendable tenure of three years.

The qualifications for appointment are:

i) Serving or retired major general or equivalent in the armed forces of Pakistan, or

ii) Serving or retired civil servant of BS 21 or equivalent

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Appointment of Prosecutor General Accountability (PGA)

Any person qualified to be a judge of Supreme Court of Pakistan may be appointed by the

President a prosecutor General accountability on the advice of the Chairman for a non-

extendable period of 3 years.

The PGA is to advice to the chairman NAB on legal matters and perform such other duties of

a legal character as may be referred or assigned to him by the chairman NAB and in the

performance of his duties, he has the right of audience in all courts established under the

ordinance and all other courts including the supreme court and a high court and tribunals.

The PGA has the power to appoint special prosecutors with the approval of the chairman

and the concurrence of M/O Law & Justice for instituting or defending cases, appeals,

petitions, applications and all other matters before all the courts on issues pertaining to

legal proceedings under the ordinance

Appointment of Officers and Staff

The chairman NAB is authorized to appoint officers and staff and the terms and conditions

be determined with approval of the chief executive under section 28 of ordinance with the

provisions of Civil Servants Act, 1973(LXXI of 1973) are not applicable to employees

appointed in NAB. NAB has framed its own service rules and notified under SRO 780 (1)/2002

called as National Accountability Bureau (NAB) employees Terms & Conditions of Services

(TCS) 2002.

TCS is very elaborate and is applicable to all employees of NAB except the following:

a) Chairman, Deputy Chairman and Prosecutor General Accountability; or

b) a person who is serving on deputation from the Federal or the Provincial Government

or from a corporation. Statutory body or Local Fund or an autonomous body etc; or

c) a person who is employed on contract basis or on daily basis or paid from

contingencies or appointed for a specific period; or

d) a person who is a worker or workman as defined in the Factories Act, 1934 (XXV of

1934) or the Workman’s Compensation Act, 1923 (VIII of 1923)

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Competent Authorities to make appointment to various posts as follows:

1. Post in BPS 19 & above or equivalent Chairman

2. Post in BPS 16 to 18 or equivalent Director General(Admin)

(BPS-21) H.Q Office

3. Post in BPS 1 to 15 or equivalent Director(BPS-20) H.Q. Office or

Incharge Regional NAB concerned

Following methods of appointment & qualifications is prescribed in TCS rules:

1. By initial appointment as per part I

2. By promotion as per part III

3. By transfer as per part IV

4. Through deputation as per part V

5. Through Contract as per part VI

10% quota is reserved for Armed forces in each cadre. Other quota as per government rules

are also followed in case of initial appointment.

Selection is made through selection Board and Departmental Selection Committees as per

following procedure:

Table: 1 Sr no. Name of Selection Board / Committee Power of Recruit Composition 1 Selection Board

BPS 19 & above

Chairman, 3

members BS 21 2 Department Selection Committee I

BPS 16 to 18

An officer BS 21 ,

Two officers BS 20 3 Department Selection Committee II

BPS 1 to 15

An officer of BS 20,

Two Officers of BS 19

Methods of appointment & conditions of promotion are specifically given in TCS for all

posts. There is a clear career path available for employees.

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Staffing

At the time of the establishment of NAB, the total manpower strength was 402. In the year

2000-2001 & 2002-2003, the Government approved 800 and 900 posts respectively for

headquarters as well as provincial NAB, the early period of the inception of NAB (1999-2001)

was an extreme shortage of manpower which was filled up by getting personnel from other

departments like FIA, police, banks, income tax etc and from armed forces on

contract/deputation basis. NAB is in the process of gradually establishing its own

investigation cadre and will gradually be replaced by the deputations/others. Presently not

more than 17% of armed forces personnel are working in NAB.

The office wise sanctioned strength is available in the following table:

Table: 2

Office Wise Sanctioned Staff Strength S.No NAB Officer Staff Total

1 Islamabad (Head Quarters) 99 323 422

Punjab, Lahore 105 346 451

2 Rawalpindi 62 165 227

3 NWFP, Peshawar 62 168 230

4 Sindh, Karachi 99 323 422

5 Baluchistan, Quetta 56 146 202 Total 483 1471 1954

The above table indicates that out of 1954 personnel 422 are working in the Headquarter

Office which constitutes 22% of total strength.

Summary of Staff strength of various categories The NAB has 2715 sanctioned posts whereas 2155 are in position and 560 posts are vacant.

The total staff strength of H.Q is 518 including 104 officers of BS-16 & above. The working

strength of 2155 includes 541 officers (equivalent to BS-16 and above) and 1614 staff

members (equivalent to BS-15 and below).

The officers constitute 25% and the staff 75% of the total work force. Summary of staff

strength of various categories are given below:

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Table: 3

The above table indicates that there are 21% officers and 55.3% officials working on regular

basis. The rest falls in other categories. There is a need to build up capacity of their own

staff and induct the employees who fulfill the merit and other requisite qualifications,

experience and their existing performance in NAB

Merger of FIA (Anti-Corruption & Economic Crimes Wing) into NAB Federal Cabinet in its meeting held on 20th Sept 2002 decided to merge Anticorruption Wing

(ACOW) and Economic Crime Wing (ECW) of FIA into NAB to avoid duplication and achieve

uniformity in operations against corruption.

This decision was implemented at the end of 2004 and Ministry of Interior transferred 753

posts and 193 personnel from FIA to NAB.

To provide necessary legal framework, M/O Law, Justice and Human Rights issued a

notification on 20 Nov 2003 whereby relevant sections 168, 169, 201, 218, 219, 468, 471,

472 and 477A have been added to the schedule of NAO-1999. These sections vide a

notification issued on 16th Aug 2004 by the M/O interior to delete from the schedule of FIA

Act 1974.

Mission

Summary of Staff Strength of various Categories BS 16 & above % BS 15 & Below %

1 Regular 113 21% 893 55.32% 2 Deputation 156 28% 185 11.46% 3 Contract 171 31% 28 1.73% 4 Lump sum Contract - - 78 4.83% 5 Attachment 101 20% 246 15.24% 6 Contingent - - 136 8.42% 7 Others - - 48 2.97%

Total 541 1614 Vacant 202 358

Grand Total 743 1972

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Mission of the National Accountability Bureau is to eradicate corruption and corrupt

practices and hold accountable all those persons accused of such practices.

Functions of the NAB The main functions of the Bureau are summarized below:-

1. To take effective measures for the detection, investigation, prosecution and speedy

disposal of cases involving corruption, misuse of power misappropriation of property,

kickbacks, commissions etc.

2. Recovery of state money and other assets from those persons who have

misappropriated or removed such money or assets through corruption, corrupt

practices and misuse of authority.

3. Educate the society about the causes and effects of corruption and corrupt practices

and to implement policies and procedures for the prevention of corruption in the

society.

4. Maintaining liaison with the international agencies in combating corruption and

seeking or giving mutual legal assistance in matters concerning corruption.

Briefly, the bureau has three principal functions:

Awareness

Prevention

Enforcement

Incentives NAB is providing incentives to its employees and also focuses on their welfare and well

being which includes:

i. Utility charges

ii. House rent subsidy

iii. Scholarships

iv. Death and Disability compensation

v. Assistance on marriage of self and children

vi. Lunch subsidy

vii. Performance of Umra and free traveling facilities

NAB has spent following amounts on welfare measures since approval of recovery and

reward rules.

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Year Amount

2002-03 31,987,082

2003-04 27,203,738

2004-05 54,313,279

NAB has framed a reward policy for the informers who provide ethnic information on

corruption and recoveries of looted money/assets. This reward is admissible to the informer

after the recovery of full amount from the accused through plea bargain. A reward

committee recommends to the chairman an amount to be paid to the informer depending

upon the nature and significance of this case. In case of more than one informer the

committee can recommend sharing of the reward among the informers.

Following is the formula for determining the reward money for informers.

NAB’s share of Recovered Amount Informer’s Maximum Reward out of NAB’s share

i. 10 lacs 20%

ii. Upto 50 lacs 10%

iii. Upto 1 Crore 7%

iv. Upto 3 Crore and above 4%

On excellent performance of work, appreciation certificate, advance increment is also given

to the employees.

Training

Regular & comprehensive training is need for the success operation of an organization. NAB

has given due importance to the training of its employees on modern lines. Research

Analysis & Training Wing (RA & T Wing) deals with the training of employees of the NAB.

Beside this, inform general public regarding white collar crime through seminars/workshops

and conferences etc. NAB has also undertaken number of courses/refresher courses so far to

educate at different levels of its employees to enable them to unearth corruption.

The wing is headed by the ADG (BS-20) who is assisted by the Additional Directors (BS-19)

and two Assistant Directors.

The following functions are assigned to this wing:

Training needs assessment and plans for training of NAB officials.

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Drafting annual report.

Planning & conducting research project

Establishment/Maintenance of library & Forensic Science Laboratory

Principles of training in NAB are as under: -

Knowledge of the work

Mastery of Profession

Perseverance and Steadfastness

Commitment & Motivation

Training standards are laid down which are necessary to be met by each category of

profession. The number of persons trained in various courses during the period 2003 and

2005 can be seen at Annex ‘C’ & Annex ‘D’ respectively

Training Policy The salient features of the training policy are as under: -

Carry out inquiries & investigations in anticorruption and systemic corruption cases

with an over riding aim being able to maintain quality & reduce time

Carry out prosecution in a manner that allows judges to take expeditions and

rationalized decisions.

Use of modern techniques in IT for case management

Promotion of seminar, workshops and talks on corruption issues by eminent scholars

for developing better comprehension on corruption issues.

Development of internal capability for conducting forensic auditing and accounting to

detect crimes in the financial institutions

Procedure of Decision Making in NAB

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The Chairman NAB through comprehensive consultations with the investigation team, the

Director General Investigation Monitor and the Prosecutor General Accountability decide on

the following:

Authorization of investigation

Issuance of arrest warrant

Reference filing

Acceptance or rejection of Plea bargain

This process is very useful and helpful in rectifying weaknesses in investigation and

objective detailed analysis of the case and also examining the legal merits on the basis of

available evidence. The accused and his family are provided full opportunity to present

their case.

Chairman’s Power

The chairman has full power to freeze property (NAO-12).

The chairman has power to call for any information relevant to the case (NAO-19).

He has power to seek assistance from anyone (NAO-27).

He has power to make rules (NAO-34).

The other operational powers which are delegated to the DG’s NAB are given in the

attached Annex ‘E’

Delegation of Powers to Directors General Regional NABs For smooth functioning of the regional offices Chairman NAB has delegated sufficient

administrative & operational powers to DG’s of Regional NABs under provision section 34-A

of NAO. The details of which are available at Annex ‘E’

Internal Administrative Controls

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To improve the existing system of functioning following additional efforts have been made

towards this direction: -

i) Direct enrollment of Security Guards and provision of equipment as per requirements.

ii) Introduction of “Access Control System”

iii) Provision of CCTV system to keep check over the movement of individuals/visitors

iv) Installation of “Mail scanners” and walk through gate at the entrance

The NAB has prepared a complete code of conducts and ethics for all employees which

determine the direction of employees for their conducts.

Internal Vigilance System An effective internal vigilance system is in place in NAB. A vigilance cell was created in NAB

and upgraded to Intelligence Wing 2002 to keep a strict watch on its employees and to

provide an environment of check and balances. The cell has very successfully detected few

corruption instances in the organization, where the involved officers have been prosecuted

and their front men were also apprehended. An internal security network has also been

established and is functioning very effectively in the organization

National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS) National Anti-Corruption Strategy (NACS) was prepared through detailed consultations

within the country. In October, 2002 the federal cabinet approved the strategy and in Nov,

2002 implementation committee held its first meeting. This committee met twice during

the year 2005 for its 8th and 9th meeting respectively. The committee achieved a number of

important landmarks during this year. The old Proforma of assets declaration for all

government employees was changed alongwith its monitoring mechanism which could be

fed into a computer database.

NACS is structured around the following eight pillars of National Integrity System.

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1. Legislative & Political System 2. Judiciary 3.Executive 4. Accountability Bodies

5. Anti Corruption Agencies 6. Media 7. Civil Society 8. Private Sector

NACS pointed out weakness in each pillars, devised strategy and implementation plan to

overcome the weakness.

On the NACS recommendations, NAB’s operative law, the NAO, 1999 has been amended to

incorporate awareness and prevention as its core functions in addition to the enforcement

functions.

To raise the capacity building of NAB to handle its new awareness and prevention role Asian

Development Bank (ADB) and Department For International Development (DFID), UK have

extended a technical assistance grant for strengthening and restructuring of NAB.

Issues and Recommendations Tall Tier Structure

Hierarchy of officers in NAB has eight tiers from operating level to head of the organization.

The title of these posts with their pay scales are given below:-

Sr. no. Designation Basic Pay Scale 1. Chairman 22

2. Deputy Chairman 21

3. Director General 21

4. Director 20

5. Add. Director/Secretary 19

6. Deputy Director/Investigation 18

Officers/Section Officer

7. Asstt. Director/Investigation Officer 17

Section Officer

8. Inspector/Senior Investigation Officer 16

There are three levels of investigation officer which may be reduced to 2 starting from

BS-17

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If we have a look at the command structure of the NAB it has an important role to play in its

behavioral pattern. The chairman has absolute power to assert and initiation of inquiries

against the accused. There is a need to delegate powers at the lower level. The existing

hierarchy leads to complete delinking from reality. Hence there is a need to delegate more

operational powers of Chairman NAB to the Regional Directors General.

Role of Regional Bureau

The NAB with head office at Islamabad has five Regional Bureaus. The Regional Bureaus are

generally hub of most of the activities. The NAB is thinking to expand its field offices at

district level. It is more appropriate to first strengthen regional bureau. Headquarters

should limit itself to policy making and all operational activities be assigned to regional

bureau. This is an international management practices and we should follow this for smooth

functioning and proper monitoring of the NAB activities.

Appointments on Merit People suffer when the society is mismanaged by not recognizing merit, NAB is special

organization assigned with a noble cause. All recruitments particularly, at officer cadre

should be filled on merit and there should be no quotas so that efficient people can be

recruited and trained for the job. Non political persons of sound integrity may be appointed

on key positions particularly head of the organization. Training needs assessment

On the basis of past experience NAB should increase the capacity building of the staff in

different fields. In the last few years a number of officers have been trained within and

abroad in different fields. There is still a need to assess training requirements and feed

back from already trained personnel. This should be a regular feature to equip the human

resource with modern tools for investigation /prosecution. Investigation is pre requisite for

such accountability organization. Hence, investigation officers may be provided in depth

training and special courses be designed for the purpose which may be updated from time

to time. Hence the capacity and upgradation capability factor of the employees require

continuous periodic review. There is a need to review periodically the recruitment

procedure quotas for recruitment, cases structures, terms and conditions of services,

incentives etc.

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Limits of Time & Authority There should be a laid down limit of time and authority for finalizing the cases on the basis

of their nature from initiation, investigation till their finalization and submission to

Accountability Court. It is also proposed that the service delivery departments and

regulatory bodies may also have prescribed time limit within which all

applications/disputes/claims etc must be decided. In case of rejection, detailed reasons

may be recorded. Delivery of every application and order is registered and either side signs

for an acknowledgement…………………………………………………………………………………………………………….

Anti-Corruption Establishment Historical Perspective

Criminal Procedure code, 1898 explains the procedures of trial, jurisdiction & powers of the

court for the purpose of trial and also the procedure of investigation of the case and

prosecution. The provisions of this law are applicable where the same are not inconsistent

with ACE laws. However, there was no formal organization to combat the corruption in the

British India. On 14th January 1938, a six member committee under the chairmanship of Mr.

Kunwar Sir Maharaja Singh was appointed with the following terms of reference.

1. To enquire into the extent of corruption in the public services of the United

Provinces including the Local self Government Services and to ascertain its causes,

means and occasions.

2. To suggest suitable and effective remedies and to submit a report to government This committee alongwith other deliberations recommended for Anti-corruption Department

at the H.Q

In 1947, when Pakistan came into being as an independent country Prevention of Corruption

Act 1947 was passed and till 1956, there was a small anti corruption cell at provincial level

headed b y a superintendent of Police under Home Dept. One unit was created in 1956 and

a Directorate of Anti Corruption Establishment West Pakistan was established in June under

the administrative control of chief secretary West Pakistan with three Regional Offices

Lahore, Rawalpindi and Hyderabad. These offices were headed by the Director. The

establishment has taken action against the ex-politicians under the Elective Bodies

(Disqualification) Order 1959.

The Anti Corruption Ordinance (xx) of 1961 was promulgated on 8th September 1961

supplemented by West Pakistan Anti Corruption Establishment Rules, 1965. According to

section 3 of the said ordinance, West Pakistan Anti Corruption Establishment was created.

After dissolution of West Pakistan in 1970 into four Provincial Governments West Pakistan

Anti Corruption Establishment Rules, 1965 were adopted and necessary amendments were

made from time to time according to their requirement.

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Anti-Corruption Establishment, Baluchistan Anti Corruption Establishment (ACE) is a continuation of the sec as existed in West Pakistan

based on Anti Corruption Rules, 1965 and was established after disintegration of one unit.

Organization of ACE is under administrative control of the Chief Secretary.

Organogram of ACE, Baluchistan

The secretary S & GAD functions as Ex-Officio Director and is head of the ACE Baluchistan.

The superintendent of Police is the immediate incharge of ACE. For his assistance there is

one Deputy Director, one DSP, one PSPD, one Special Prosecutor and other staff. The

structure of the organization is weak and not conductive for the assigned task.

Presently six circle officers are functioning at Quetta, Sibi, D.M.Jamali, Khuzdar, Kech and

Loralai respectively. Organogram of ACE Baluchistan is available at Annex ‘F’. The

sanctioned/working, vacant, staff strength in ACE, Baluchistan is available at Annex- ‘G’

Staffing

ACE has 100 sanctioned posts whereas 75 persons are in position and 25 posts are lying

vacant. Details of total staff strength can be seen at Annex-B. Six employees are attached

with NAB since June 2000. Out of the sanctioned posts of 100, there are 15 officers in BS 16

& above. The composition of officers is 15% whereas staff is 85%. The government of

Baluchistan has appointed 4 investigating officers (B-18) and 5 deputy investigation officers

(B-17) in the NAB/ACE on contract basis. They are presently working with NAB Baluchistan

and their salaries are being paid by the ACE. Sanctioned/Working, Vacant staff strength in

ACE, Baluchistan is available at Annex-G.

Shortage of Staff In ACE presently, the post of PDSP - 01, P1- 01, Inspector 03, Sub Inspectors - 03, HCS-07

and Constables - 09 are lying vacant which indicates that 25% posts are vacant. Due to the

shortage of investigating and field staff the ACE is facing problems to finalize the pending

cases/inquiries. Even from the authorized strength six personnel are working in NAB on

attachment basis since June 2000. This state of affairs is hampering on the working of ACE.

Immediate steps be taken to overcome this shortage. Neither the permanent post of

technical officers is available in ACE nor a technical officer made available in time. Most of

the cases/inquiries registered with ACE are of technical nature. Technical inspections of the

sites/ reports of the experts are most essential in completing the investigation and

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examining the witnesses. The examination of technical experts is delayed due to their non-

cooperative attitude. They neither inspect the sites nor submit their reports in time causing

great delays in finalizing the cases/inquiries.

Provincial Councils / Committees The Government of Baluchistan has not made any amendment in Anti Corruption Law and is

still following West Pakistan Anti Corruption Rules 1965. Under these rules government

constituted the provincial Anti Corruption Council, Divisional Anti Corruption Committee

and District Anti Corruption Committee. On implementation of the devolution plan the

divisional anti corruption committees were abolished and the government reconstituted

provincial anti corruption council and district anti corruption committees. Provincial Anti-

Corruption Council deals with the corruption cases of all the provincial officers of BS-16 and

above whereas District Anti Corruption Committee deals with the corruption cases of all

provincial official BS 1 to 15.

Composition of Provincial Councils/Committee

Provincial anti corruption council

1. Chief secretary chairman Chairman

2. Senior member board of revenue Member

3. Secretary law Member

4. Secretary S & GAD Member/Secretary

District Anti Corruption Committee

1. District Coordination Officer Chairman

2. District Officer Member

3. Circle Officer ACE

Functions To conduct Inquires and investigates bribery and corruption cases in provincial departments

including public sector corporations under the administrative control of provincial

government of Baluchistan and prosecutions the offenders in special courts

Incentive for ACE Presently there is no incentive system for the employees of ACE. To encourage honest and

hardworking employees an incentive system for ACE maybe devised. Out of the money

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recovered by ACE, Baluchistan 10% of the recovered amount may be given to the

department.

Training There is no specialized training programme for in the employees of ACE. Most employees

are from Police Establishment and they have their own training courses which are

mandatory for them.

The field staff of ACE is hired on deputation from Baluchistan Police, most of the staff

comprises untrained semi-educated low level officials of the rank upto inspectors. Many of

them are not well versed in English and therefore unable to understand and scrutinize the

official record being of low level they also lack initiative and can not deal with enquiries

and the cases against senior officers of provincial departments.

There is a need for establishing a special investigating and prosecuting cadre with

appropriate training and skills for all the provinces to run the organizations on scientific

basis.

Raiding magistrates are not available whenever required.

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Anti-Corruption Establishment, Punjab Anti Corruption Establishment (ACE), Punjab was established at provincial level after

dissolving of one unit in 1970. West Pakistan Anti Corruption Establishment Rules 1965

remained in force till formulation of Anti Corruption Establishment Rules 1974 was formed.

Under these rules provincial, Divisional and District Committees were made to give sanction

for initiate and decision of inquiries of cases. On 28th March 1985 Punjab ACE Rules 1985

were promulgated and the organization was made officers based for decision making.

Mission of ACE, Punjab is “to eradicate corruption and create deterrence amongst Public

servants and all their accomplices involved in criminal misconduct & corrupt practices.”

Existing Organization of ACE, Punjab ACE, Punjab is an attached department of S & GAD Government of Punjab. The Headquarter

is located at Lahore headed by a Director General (BS-20/21). The Additional Chief

Secretary, Punjab is the administrative secretary of the ACE, Punjab. There are two

Additional Directors (BS-19) at HQ. One is assigned the job of scrutiny of final decision of

enquiries/cases and other issues. The Additional Director technical is responsible for all

technical matters pertaining to ACE, Punjab. To deal with the official affairs of the ACE,

Punjab the following six sections are functioning

Investigation Wing

Technical Wing

Legal Wing

Prosecution Wing

Administration Wing

Vigilance Wing

Director General (Head Quarters) (1)

Asst. Director General (2)

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Decision making is exercised at Officers level through Director General, Additional Directors and

Deputy Directors whereas enquiries & investigations are conducted by Deputy Directors, Assistant

Directors and Circle Officers

The organogram of ACE, Punjab is available at Annex ‘H’. There are regional and district

setup under HQ.

In Punjab, apart from the regular officers of ACE an ACE setup has also been made within all

administrative department of the government with post of ex-officio Additional Directors.

The ex-officio Additional Directors or Ex-Officio Deputy Directors are to deal the cases

assigned to them by government from time to time. Generally, they are empowered to

decide cases of bribery, embezzlement or misappropriation involving petty amounts if any

case is received by the Ex-Officio Additional Director and Ex-Officio Deputy Director which

does not fall under his purview or in notification issued by them. The same shall be referred

to the Director General ACE for appropriate action under the law.

Area of Jurisdiction of DCO The area of jurisdiction of Ex-Officio Deputy Director (DCO of the District Government) is

the District of his posting while that of Ex-Officio Additional Director is over his Department

and attached department in which he is assisted by the Ex-Officio Assistant Directors.

Regional Setup

There are seven regional offices working at Lahore, Gujranwala, Rawalpindi, Faisalabad,

Sargodha, Multan and Bahawalpur. Regional offices are headed by Additional Directors who

are assisted by Deputy Directors (investigation, legal, technical and prosecution). The

organogram for regional setup is available at Annex ‘I’

District setup

After the introduction of new District Government System, the district coordination officer

was not in a position to perform this duty. Deputy Director (investigation) an officer of

BS-18 was made responsible at district level to receive complaints, initiate inquiry against

corrupt public servants upto BS-16. The organogram of district setup is available at

Annex ‘J’.

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Mission “The mission of ACE, Punjab is to eradicate corruption and create deterrence amongst

Public Servants and all those involved in criminal misconduct and corrupt practices”

Staffing The ACE Punjab has 1006 sanctioned posts including 203 posts of BS-16 and above. Detail of

total staff strength is available at Annex ‘K’. The officers constitute 20% and the staff 80%

of the total sanctioned work force.

Procedure for Staff Induction The following procedure is adopted for induction of staff of various categories.

1. Posts of Additional Directors, Deputy Directors and Assistant Directors (Inv) are filled

by the S & GAD by posting officers belonging to DMG, PCS and Police Service.

2. Technical Officers (Additional Director, Deputy Directors, Assistant Directors, Sub-

Engineers & Draftsmen are posted by the S & GAD from the Engineering Departments

like C&W, PHED, and I & P Departments)

3. Law Officers i.e. Deputy Directors and Assistant Directors (Legal) & (Prosecution) are

posted in ACE Punjab by S & GAD, in consultation with the Law Department.

4. Deputy Director (coordination) and Assistant Directors (Coord.) are posted from

different government departments against the prescribed qualifications and

experience for the post.

5. The posts of Circle Officers are filled by posting Police Inspectors on transfer basis

from Police Department.

6. Other Police Officials like Sub-Inspectors, Assistant Sub-Inspectors, Head Constables

& Constables, are also taken from Police Department.

A number of Officers having no good reputation about their conduct & work were

repatriated in recent part. Presently, the ACE is trying to induct good officers from the

other departments i.e. Police/PCS/DMG and Engineering Department to improve the

working and image of ACE.

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Functions

• Unearth cases of corruption pertaining to public servants and their speedy

investigation and disposal.

• Specifically authorized to: -

Conduct verification, preliminary or open enquiry into the allegations.

Register cases on substantiation of alleged corruption.

Prosecution of accused persons.

Service Rules

E & D rules are applicable to civil employees whereas police officials are exempted and

Police rules are applicable to them.

Incentives Available

Previously, there was no incentive system for the employees of ACE Punjab and it was a

long outstanding demand of the ACE staff for certain incentives as available with FIA & NAB

at Federal level and Special Branch at provincial level. The Chief Minister Punjab has

recently approved the following incentive system for the employees of ACE.

1. The existing special allowance has been increased from 20% to 40% on the basic pay

of the officers/officials. It indicates 100% increase in special allowance.

2. The amount of Honorarium/Reward money has been increased from one hundred

thousands to ten hundred thousands. The Director General ACE, Punjab is now

competent to sanction Honorarium/Reward Money to ACE staff upto Rs. 20,000/- in

each case

Internal Administrative Control

ACE Punjab has no basic facility of getting intelligence information whereas in other

agencies such arrangements are available. However, due to financial constraints an internal

adjustment was made to tackle this problem. The Deputy Director (Coord) at Head Quarters

has been made head of the C & V (Coordination & Vigilance) Wing assisted by four Assistant

Directors (Coord) of the Regions with the following main functions.

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Powers of Head of ACE

The DG ACE enjoys all the powers of the head of an attached department:

1. To investigate and bust intricate cases of fraud involving big fish and known

swindlers rather sharks.

2. To carry out physical verification and check of targets on ground.

3. To carry out sting operations against its own delinquent staff.

4. Inspection of the offices of ACE at Regional & District level and monitor the

working of I.Os.

5. To keep a vigilant eye on the behavior, conduct and working of staff and

recommend punitive measures against the defaulters.

6. To encourage people who want to give information against corrupt public

servant and then to initiate enquiry under ACE rules against that public

servant.

Training

There is no specialized training for the employees of the staff. Last year a few officers were

trained with the NAB officers. The course was organized by NAB. Police Officers get

mandatory training as provided in their rules. The number of specialized trained officers is

very low.

Issues/Recommendations

1. The ACE is a specialized agency assigned a specific job. Structural change is

required for efficient working without any executive influence. ACE should be

declared an independent organization on the lines of NAB.

2. Appointment of Head of Department and other officers should be made on

merit rather then political.

3. Most of the staff of ACE is on temporary attachment. There is a dire need of

permanent cadre of dedicated staff who could work without any fear.

4. There is a lack of professional expertise and specialized trained personnel,

particularly at investigation level. Due to this credibility of the organization

become doubtful. It is, therefore suggested that investigating officers should

be provided proper training.

5. Due to institutional weakness of the ACE. They do not have the necessary

capacity for performance of this task at national level.

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6. The departments do not cooperate with the ACE in providing information

about accused which delay the proceedings.

An independent organization can do this job.

7. There is absence of modern accountability mechanism within the

organization. It is therefore suggested that a strategy be developed to link

the jobs to institutional objective. There should be clear description of job

for all employees which will help in curbing the adhocism.

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Anti-Corruption Establishment, NWFP The provincial Anti-Corruption Establishment was established after the break up of one unit

in 1970. The provincial government of NWFP adopted the West Pakistan Anti-Corruption

Rules, 1965. In these rules Anti-Corruption Committees at the level of Province Division and

District level were constituted. Every investigation was subject to the control and direction

of the appropriate committee. The Director ACE had very limited power. The NWFP

government superseded the ACE, Rules 1965 and made the NWFP, Anti-Corruption Rules

1999. Under these rules power of initiation/registration of case upto BPS-18 is with the

Director ACE and BPS-19 and above is with the Chief Secretary.

Organization of ACE NWFP

Directorate of anticorruption in NWFP is an attached department under the Establishment

Department and was established after dissolution of one unit in 1971. The organization is

headed by a Director who is assisted by one Deputy Director (Technical) and 11 Assistant

Directors and other staff. Organogram of ACE NWFP is available at Annex ‘L’

Procedure adopted by ACE, NWFP Preliminary inquiries and investigation against public servants shall be initiated by the

Establishment on complaints from Government, Head of Departments or other reliable

sources. As per procedure whenever a complaint is received, it is sent to the concerned

Circle Officer of the District for verification of facts. After initial verification/inquiry, if

proper inquiry is needed then the Circle Officer send the complaint to the Director with the

request o allow open inquiry. On the conclusion of open inquiry if the misconduct falls

under the preview of criminal misconduct as defined under Prevention of Corruption Act,

then case is registered with the permission of Competent Authority as specified in the

above mentioned rules. Similarly on the conclusion of investigation challan is submitted to

the Court after obtaining approval from the concerned competent authority.

On completion of investigation Competent Authority can pass the orders either: -

1. To send the case to the Court for trial Or

2. Instead of judicial action send the case to department concerned for departmental action Or

3. Drop the case if no prima facie evidence is available on record.

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Functions of the Directorate of Anti-Corruption Establishment

i. To carry out enquiries and investigate the cases of corruption/corrupt practice, mis-

use of authority, mis-appropriation/defalcation of funds and fraud/cheating etc. if

committed by Public Servants of Provincial Government.

ii. To eradicate corruption from the Government Departments

iii. To pin point cases of irregularities and recommend/departmental action against the

defaulters.

iv. To collect evidence regarding the known corrupt officials and trace out their hidden

assets.

v. To prosecute the corrupt officers/officials in the court of Law.

vi. To enhance/strengthen the process of accountability by bringing the corrupt

elements to the book.

Staff Strength The total staff strength of ACE, NWFP is 212 which include 43 officers in BS-16 and

above. The officer’s constitute 35% of the total strength. The constables (BS-5)

constitute 35% of the total strength. Remaining 45% are other staff members.

Designation wise detailed staff strength is available at Annex ‘M’

Incentives

There is no provision for awarding incentives to the employees of ACE. There is a need

to award special incentives to those officials for performing their duties efficiently.

Incentive system in ACE may be established as in the case of NAB.

Training

There is no regular procedure of capacity building of the employees. Most people are

from police department and that training is treated as sufficient for performance of

investigation and prosecution work. On regular basis employees should be provided

relevant training so that they can combat with the corruption.

Anti Corruption Establishments have very limited power and are not free from executive

control. Director ACE has no power to take action against any gazetted officer without

the prior permission of the Chief Secretary

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It is therefore suggested that ACE may be made an independent organization with

sufficient power so that it can take immediate action against corrupt employees without

any pressure from executive control.

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Anti-Corruption Establishment, Sindh Historical Perspective

When Pakistan was established in 1947, there was no particular organization to tackle the

cognizance of offence pertaining to corruption. This task was however used to be performed

by Police Department in general. Prevention of corruption Act 1947 was promulgated which

authorized Police Department specifically to take this job. In 1961 West Pakistan Anti

Corruption Ordinance was formulated and Anti Corruption Department for East & West

Pakistan was created.

Establishment of ACE, Sindh

Enquiries & Anti-Corruption Establishment, Government of Sindh took its beginning in 1977

when an Enquiries cell was created in S & GAD, Government of Sindh. This cell was given

the shape of ACE in 1978. Subsequently the Sindh Enquiries & Anti Corruption Act, 1991 was

promulgated and in exercise of power conferred by Section 9 of the Sindh Inquiries and Anti

Corruption Rules 1993 and again amended on 4th May, 1995.

Organization of ACE, Sindh

Organization of ACE Sindh is an attached department of Services and General

Administration(S & GAD) headed by the chairman and directly under the control of chief

secretary. Director ACE is assisted with DD and 4 AD’s alongwith other staff. The

organogram of ACE is available at Annex ‘N’

Anti Corruption Committee’s

There are three Anti-Corruption Committees under the rules;

Anti-Corruption Committee I at provincial level

Anti-Corruption Committee II at divisional level

& Anti-corruption Committee III at district level

The composition of these committees is as under:

Anti-Corruption Committee I

1. Chief Secretary Chairman

2. Secretary of the concerned department member Member

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3. Chairman, Enquiries & Anti-Corruption Establishment Member/Secretary

4. Director Anti-Corruption Member

Anti-Corruption Committee II

1. Divisional commissioner Chairman

2. Regional Head of the concerned department Member

3. Deputy Director/Superintendent of Police, ACE of the Division

Anti - Corruption Committee III

1. Deputy Commissioner Chairman

2. District representive of the department concerned Member

3. Circle Officers of Anti corruption Establishment in

their respective circle Member/Secretary

After the introduction of dissolution plan the divisional committee becomes ineffective and

powers transfer to DCO at district level.

Staffing

The ACE Sindh has 825 sanctioned posts whereas 685 persons are in positions and 137 posts

are vacant. Details of total staff strength can be seen at annex- J. The working strength of

688 includes 96 Officers in BS-16 & above and 596 equivalents to Bs-15 & below. The

officers constitute 13% and staff 73% of the total work force. Most of the employees belong

to police service. Details of ACE, Sindh are available at Annex ‘O’

Functions of ACE, Sindh The following functions are performed by ACE:

Inquire & Investigate bribery and corruption cases in Sindh Provincial Government,

Departments including Public sector corporations under the administrative control of

Provincial Government.

Prosecutes offenders in the special courts

Anti-Corruption works through notified police stations of ACE

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Jurisdiction The jurisdiction of ACE is as under:

All employees of the provincial government and all employees of the autonomous/semi-

autonomous bodies are under the administrative control of Provincial Government. All

employees of the federal government working in the province or on deputation in the

Provincial Government are excluded. However, prosecution on trap is allowed.

Procedure

The following procedure is adopted to achieve the above objectives:

Verification/discreet enquiry

On receipt of a complaint/application/source information, enquiry officer verifies contents

of complaint/ information, by calling the complainant on through discreet enquiry and

submits such report to his Deputy Director soliciting permission of the competent

authority/ACC concerned for either: -

− Open enquiry

− Registration of case

− Departmental action

− Closure

Open enquiry

• On receipt of order/permission of the competent authority for holding open enquiry,

a complaint number is allotted and a full fledged enquiry is started. Now enquiry

officer is empowered to call & examine relevant record and witnesses. An

opportunity is also provided to the officer complained against to rebut the

allegations.

• In case, allegations are proved and constitute a cognizable offence or otherwise, EO

submits such report to his Deputy Director soliciting permission of the competent

authority/ACC concerned for either: -

− Registration of case


− Closure

− Action against complainant u/s 182 PPC

Registration of cases

• On receipt of permission of competent authority, an FIR is lodged at concerned

police station of ACE

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• A detailed investigation is conducted including examination of record pertaining to

the offence and recording statements of witnesses.

• Accused officer is also provided opportunity to explain his position

• When case is established or otherwise, IO submits such report u/s 173 Cr. PC to his

Deputy Director soliciting permission of the competent authority/ ACC concerned

for:

− Prosecution of accused


− Closure

− Action against complainant u/s 211 PPC

Referral of ACCs

• Deputy Director concerned receives report from EO/IO.

• Report is examined by PI/AD Legal

• Permission accorded either for ACC-II or reference is made to director ACE for ACC-I

• Director ACE Sindh after examination of case by PI or AD Legal accords permission

for either ACC-II or recommends the case to chairman E & ACE for placing it before

ACC-I

• Chairman e & ACE on examination of case may either return it or accord permission

for placing it before ACC-I

• Finally, case is places before ACC-I for final decision.

Training

There is no regular feature of training for employees. Most employees are from Police

Department. They get mandatory training as provided in their cadre.

ACE did not have sufficient manpower to investigate the cases and worked through

borrowed staff from other agencies.

Incentives

No special incentive is provided to the employees. The police employees working in ACE are

low paid particularly of lower ranks like SI, ASI and Constables. The trained and educated

employees with good salaries will certainly reduce corruption.

Comparison of NAB with Anti-Corruption Establishments of Provinces

A comparison of NAB with ACE (Punjab, Baluchistan, NWFP, and Sindh) is shown in the following table

Table: 4

ACE NAB PUNJAB BALUCHISTAN NWFP SINDH

Statuary/Autonomous Attached Department Attached Department

Attached Department

Attached Department

Deals corruption of Federal/Provincial/ Public Representatives /White Collar Crimes

Deals Corruption cases of Provincial Employees within Punjab Province

Deals Corruption cases of Provincial employees within Baluchistan Province

Deals Corruption cases of Provincial employees within NWFP

Deals Corruption cases of Provincial employees within Sindh Province

Enquiry is not pre-requisite for registration of case. Chairman can sent reference to the Court

Enquiry is essential for registration of cases

Enquiry is essential for registration of case



Reference is submitted to Accountability Court

Challan is submitted to Special Judge ACE




Permanent Prosecutors are not attached

Public Prosecutor is attached with Court




NAB ACE

190

PUNJAB BALUCHISTAN NWFP SINDH

Plea Bargain

No Plea Bargain

No Plea Bargain

No Plea Bargain

No Plea Bargain

No trap/ Raid

Provision of trap/ Raid




Chairman has full power to arrest accused

Director General can not order the arrest of the accused of BS-18 & Above

Director can not order the arrest of the accused of BS-16 & Above



Accused can be retained upto 90 days





Maximum Punishment upto 14 years under NAO, 99

Maximum punishment under 3-7 years under PPC and PCA




Inbuilt Accountability Mechanism for Employees

Inbuilt Accountability Mechanism available

No

No

No

Rate of Conviction 80%

118/2286 (2005)

17/113 Last 10 years

32/202 (2005)

1 conviction during last 5 years

ACE NAB

PUNJAB BALUCHISTAN NWFP SINDH

191

Full Power of Registration case to Chairman

Director General BS-18 has Power of Registration of case

Director upto BS 15 has power of registration of case



Full Power of submission of challan to Chairman

Director General BS-19 & above has power of submission of challan

Director upto BS 15 has power of Submission of challan

Director upto BS 17 has power of submission of challan

Director upto BS-16 has power of submission of challan

Total Staff strength 2715

Total staff strength 1006




E & D Rules not applicable on employees of NAB

The Punjab Employees E,D & Accountability Act 2006 applicable on civil employees

E & D Rules applicable to civil employees



Own Terms & Conditions of Service

Police Rules applicable to employees from Police Service




10% quota reserved for Armed forces in each cadre

No reserved quotas

No fixed quota

No fixed quota

No fixed quota

General quota fixed by the Federal Government for initial recruitment is observed

No such quota for region in the province




Conclusion Corruption is a menace which is eating the fabrics of our society. Resultantly, the general

public is suffering enormously and the very progress of the country is affected. The existing

system of curbing the corruption is not in consonance with the incident of corruption. It

requires a massive stream lining to develop an effective accountability mechanism to

achieve optimum results

193

ORGANOGRAM Headquarters NAB

Chairman

HQ Wing IM Wing FCI Wing RA & T A&P Wing

PGA

Administration Wing

B&A Wing

Media Cell

Intelligence Wing

Computer Cell

NAB (Punjab)

NAB (Sindh)

NAB (NWFP)

NAB (Baluchistan)

NAB (Rawalpindi)

Regional Bureau

Deputy Chairman

Chief of Staff

Annex ‘A’

194

ORGANOGRAM Regional Bureaus

Director General (Regional NAB)

Investigation Wing

FCI Wing

Prosecution Wing

Vigilance/ Security Wing

Admin/B&A Wing

A&P Wing

Annex ‘B’

Statement showing number of courses, alongwith participants conducted by (RA&T Wing) of NAB during 2003

S No.

Title of Course Duration Venue

Total No. of Participants

Remarks

1

Orientation Course New Inductees

6th to 8th January PPC, Sihala 34

2

Investigation Officers (IOS) Course – I

6th Jan to 6th Oct -do- 22

3

Stenographer’s Training Course – I

21st Aug to 3rd Sept STI 34

4

Case Officers Training Course – I

8th Dec to 20th Dec RA & T Wing NABIBD Case Officers

5

Investigation Officers (IOS) Course – II

15th Dec to 14th June 2004

NISTE Islamabad 29

Annex ‘C ’

196

Statement showing number of courses, alongwith participants conducted by (RA&T Wing) of NAB during 2005

S no. Name of Course Duration Place of

Course

Total Number of Participant

Remarks

1. Senior Investigation Officers(SIOs) Course-I 10 jan to 10 feb 05 NIBAF

Islamabad 27

2. Senior Investigation Officers(SIOs) Course-II 11 April to 6 May 05 -do- 35 5 from ACE

3. Legal Consultants Orientation Cadre 21-23 June 05 H.Q NAB 13

4. IOs-Refresher Cadre-I 5-8 July 05 NIBAF Islamabad 16

5. IOs-Refresher Cadre-II 19-22 July 05 NAB Sindh 24

6. Directors Refresher Cadre 25-27 Aug 05 NIBAF Islamabad 17

7. Inspectors (Ex-FIA) Basic Induction Cadre 22 Aug to 2 Sep 05 NAB

Punjab 31

8. Banking Case Officers/IOs Course 26 Sept to 7 Oct 05 NIBAF

Islamabad 20

9. Internet Security and Cyber Crime Cadre 14-18 Nov 05 H.Q

Islamabad 17

10. 2nd NAB Administration Cadre 14-18 Nov 05 NIBAF Islamabad 10

11. WCC Investigation Cadre 24-25 Nov 05 -do- 15

12. Forensic Sciences and Scientific Aids Cadre 06-07 Dec 05 PPC

Sihala 25

13. Land/Property Crime Investigation Cadre 15-16 Dec 05 NIBAF

Islamabad 17

14. Asset Investigation Cadre 21-22 Dec 05 -do- 18

Annex ‘D ’

Delegation of Powers by Chairman NAB to DGs Regional NAB Operational Powers

S#

Section of NAO

Details Power vested in

Power Delegated to Under Section 34(A) of NAO 1999

1 6(c) Acting Cn NAB, In case the Dy. Cn NAB is absent or unable to perform the functions of the office(any officer of NAB) duly authorized by the Cn NAB shall act as Cn NAB.

Cn

2 8(c) 8(d)

Appointment of Special Prosecutors and Advocates by the PGA, with approval of Cn NAB, Appointment of Acting PGA in absence of PGA or inability of PGA to perform his functions

Cn

3 9(c) Closure of case/investigation and release of the accused, if in custody.* Inquiries closure included

Cn DGs (R NAB) (Gr-16 & below, Local bodies Politicians except Distt Nazims)

4 12 Power to freeze property and matters incidental thereto

Cn DGs(R NAB)

5 16-A Power to transfer cases to Accountability Courts

Cn

6 18(g) And 24(b)

Power to file a reference before any Accountability Court after having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case.

Cn DGs (R NAB) (Gr-16 & below, Local Bodies Politicians except Distt Nazims)

7 18(c) Power to authorize inquiry or investigation

Cn DGs (R NAB) (Gr-20 & below, Local Bodies Politicians)

8 18(d) Power to require any agency or authority to hold inquiry or investigation

Cn

9 18(e) Power to/of: - Arrest any person for purpose

of an inquiry or investigation. - An officer in-charge of Police

Station - Cause the attendance of any

person - Seek assistance of any agency,

police officer or any other agency

Cn DGs (R NAB) (Gr-16 & below, Local Bodies Politicians except Distt Nazims)

10 18(h) Power to refer the matter to the Accountability Courts if the complaint received was prima facie frivolous.

Cn DGs (R NAB)

11 18(e) Power to/of: - Arrest any person for the

purpose of an inquiry or investigation

- An officer in-charge of Police Station

- Cause the attendance of any

Cn DGs (R NAB) (Gr-16 & below, local bodies, politicians except Distt Nazims)

Annex ‘E’

198

person - Seek assistance of any agency,

police officer or any other agency

12 18(h) Power to refer the matter to the

Accountability Courts if the complaint received was prima-facie frivolous

Cn DGs(R NAB)

13 19 Power to call for information sec-19 read with offence at S.No2, of the schedule – refusal to provide information

Cn DD Coord IW with approval of Dir.

14 19(e) Power to request the High Court for approval surveillance

Cn

15 20 Power to receive reporting of suspicious financial transaction.

Cn

16 21 Power to seek international cooperation – request for mutual legal assistance

Cn -do-

17 22(a) 22(b)

Power to inquire into and investigate any suspected offence Power to conduct any investigation in conjunction with any other agency or person

Cn DGs (R NAB) (Gr-20 & below, Local Bodies Politicians) -do-

18 24(a) 24(f)

Power to arrest the accused Power to notify Police Station or Sub Jail

Cn DGs (R NAB) (Gr-16 & below, Local bodies Politicians except Distt Nazims) -do-

19 25(a)&(b) Power to accept/reject Voluntary Return and Plea Bargain and release the accused if in custody with approval of the court

Cn DGs (R NAB) (Gr-16 & below, Local bodies Politicians except Distt Nazims)

20 25(A) Power to release the accused with approval of the Court if the accused undertakes to repay amount determined by the conciliation committee

Cn

21 25(aa) Power to constitute conciliation committee

Governor SBP

22 26 Power to tender pardon to the approver

Cn DGs(R NAB) (Gr-20 & below, Local bodies Politicians)

23 27 Power to seek assistance and question of secrecy

Cn

24 28 Power to appoint officers and staff in Cn DGs(R NAB) for staff

199

NAB

only (1-15)

25 31 Power to give sanction to proceed against any person who hampers the investigation

Cn, Dy Cn & PGA

26 31(B) Power to withdraw prosecution of the accused with the consent of court

PGA

27 31(E) Power to give protection to the witnesses

Cn DGs(R NAB)

28 32 PGA to file appeal/revision after directions from Cn

Cn DGs (R NAB) (Gr-18 & below, local bodies politicians except Distt Nazims)

29 33(C) Power to constitute a committee for adoption of measures for prevention of corruption and corrupt practices

Cn

30 33(D) Cn to submit Annual Report to the President

Cn

31 34 Power to make rules with the approval of the President

Cn

32 34A Power of Cn to delegate his power Cn

33 37 Power of the Cn with approval of the President to make orders for removal of difficulties.

Cn

200

Organogram of ACE, Baluchistan

Annex ‘F ’

201

Sanctioned/Working, Vacant Staff Strength in ACE, Baluchistan

S.No DESIGNATION Pay Scale Sanctioned Working Vacant 1 SP 18 1 1 0

2 Deputy Director 18 1 1 0

3 DSP (Crime) 17 1 0 1

4 PDSP 17 1 0 1

5 Special Prosecutor (On contract basis, fixed pay @ 15000 per month)

1 1 0

6 P. Is. 16 2 1 1

7 I.Ps. 16 7 5 2

8 S.Is. 14 8 5 3

9 H.Cs. 7 24 17 7

10 Constables 5 35 26 9

Sub total 81 57 24

11 Superintendent 16 1 1 -

12 Stenographer 12 1 1 -

13 Assistant 11 1 1 -

14 Senior Clerk 7 1 1 -

15 Junior Clerk 5 1 1 -

16 Driver 4 3 1 1

17 Naib Qasid 1 2 2 -

18 Chowkidar 1 2 2 -

19 Sweeper 1 4 4 -

20

Part time sweeper (Rs. 300/- per month)

4 4 -

Sub total 19 18 1

Grand Total (I+II) 100 75 25

Annex ‘G’

202

ORGANOGRAM of ACE, Punjab

DD (Coord) – Deputy Director CoordinationSO (D) – Section Officer Documentation AD (C) – Assistant Director Complaints

AD (M) – Assistant Director MonitoringCO – Circle Officer HWE – Hand Writing Expert

A D (C)) BS-17

D.D. (G) BS-18

D.D. (Coord)

SOD BS-17

AO BS-17

ADM BS-17

ADA BS-17

Additional Director (HQ)

Regional Additional Director BS-19

CO (HQ) BS-16

AD (I) BS-17

H.W.EBS-17

AD (T) BS-17 (2 No.)

D.D. (T) BS-18

Sub Engineer

A.D. (Legal) BS-17

(2 N )

D.D. (Legal)

Director General BS-20/21

Additional Director (Tech)

Annex ‘H’

203

REGIONAL SETUP OF ACE, Punjab

Annex ‘I’

204

District Setup of ACE, Punjab

Annex ‘J’

Asst. DIR (INV) BS-17 STENOGRAPHER BS-12

SENIOR CLERK BS-7

DRIVER BS-4

NAIB QASID BS-1

DEPUTY DIRECTOR BS-18

INSPECTOR/CO BS-16

6 CONSTABLES BS-5IN EACH DISTT

HEAD CONSTABLE BS-7

205

Sanctioned Strength of Staff in ACE, Punjab

S.No DESIGNATION Pay Scale Sanctioned Post 1 Director General 20/21 1

2 Additional Director 19 9

3 Deputy Director (Inv. + Tech + Legal + Admin) 18 61

4 Assistant Director (Inv)/I.Os (Inv. +Complaint + Tech + Legal + Pros +

Admin)

17 69

5 Accounts Officer 17 1

6 Admin Officer 17 6

7 Police Inspector/Circle Officer 16 41

8 Superintendent 16 8

9 Personal Assistant 16 1

10 Divisional Accountant 16 6

Sub-Total-I 203

11 Senior Scale Stenographer 15 6

12 Stenographer 12 76

13 Sub-Engineer 11 8

14 Sub-Inspector 14 1

15 Photographer 11 1

16 Draftsman 11 7

17 Assistant 11 13

18 ASI/Reader 9 41

19 Senior Clerk 7 69

20 Head Constable 7 35

21 Junior Clerk 5 52

22 Constable 5 252

23 Dark Room Assistant 5 1

24 Naib Court 5 6

25 Driver 4 70

26 Dispatch Rider 4 4

27 Naib Qasid 1 145

28 Chowkidar 1 8

29 Mali 1 7

30 Sanitary Worker 1 1

Sub-Total-II 803

Grand Total (I+II) 1006

Annex ‘K’

206

ORGANOGRAM of ACE, NWFP

Annex ‘L ’

Technical Wing

Prosecution Wing

AdministrationWing

ExpertsWing

CrimeWing

Director (BPS-18)

Dy: Director (XEN BS-18)

A.D.L- I & II (BPS-17)

Asstt Director(DSP BS-17)

RangeOfficer

A.D.Crimes-7

(DSP BS-17 One in each

Di i i )

Auditor 2

Tehsildar (BS-16)Admin Officer

Office Suptd

Prosecuting Inspectors-6

STAFF

Asstt. Director (SDO BS-17)

Sub-Engineer 2

STAFF STAFF Dy: Director(XEN BS-18)

Circle Officers-7 One in each Distt:

Shangla, Upper Dig,

Batgram

207

Sanctioned Strength of Staff in ACE, NWFP

S.No DESIGNATION

Pay Scale

Sanctioned Post

1 Director 18 1

2 Deputy Director Technical 18 1

3 Assistant Director Crimes 17 8

4 Assistant Director Legal 17 2

5 Assistant Director Technical 17 1

6 Tehsildar 16 1

7 Range Officer 16 1

8 Administration Officer 16 1

9 Office Superintendent 16 1

10 Circle Officers (Inspectors) 16 20

11 Prosecuting Inspectors 16 6


13 Sub-Inspectors 15 12

14 Prosecuting Sub-Inspector 14 1

15 Junior Scale Stenographer 14 3

16 Assistants 12 6

17 Auditors 11 2

18 Sub-Engineer 11 2

19 Assistant Sub-Inspector 11 1

20 Head Constables 09 30

21 Senior Clerks 07 4

22 Junior Clerks 05 11

23 Constables 05 75

24 Drivers 04 10

25 Naib Qasid’s 01 7

26 Mali 01 1

27 Chowkidar 01 2

28 Sweeper 01 1

Total 212

Annex ‘M’

208

ORGANOGRAM of ACE, Sindh

Annex ‘N’

12-Inspectors

DD Karachi DD Hyderabad DD Sukkur DD Larkana NAB

Director ACE

02-AD HQ 02-AD LEGAL

03- OFFICE SUPTD 05- P I LEGAL

03-AD Field 01-AD Legal

01-Office Suptd 01-P I Legal

03-AD Field01-AD Legal




03-AD Field 01-AD Legal




07-Inspectors 03-Inspectors 03-Inspectors

10-Cos/SCOs 06-Cos/SCOs 05-COs/SCOs

DD HQ

209

Sanctioned, Working and Vacant Staff Strength of Staff in ACE Sindh

S.No DESIGNATION Pay Scale Sanctioned Working Vacant 1 Director 19 1 1 0

2 Deputy Director 18 5 5 0

3 Assistant Director (Field) 17 8 8 0

4 Assistant Director (Legal) 17 6 6 0

5 Prosecuting Inspector 16 9 6 3

6 Inspector 16 56 51 5

7 Sub-Inspector 14 53 35 18

8 Assistant Sub-Inspector 9 53 43 10

9 Head Constable 7 83 69 14

10 Constable 5 341 295 46

11 Office Superintendent 16 7 6 1

12 Assistant 11 14 13 1

13 Stenographer 12 18 15 3

14 Senior Clerk 7 23 18 5

15 Junior Clerk 5 52 42 10

16 Driver 4 17 13 4

17 Constable Driver 4 10 8 2

18 Dispatch Rider 4 1 0 1

19 Qasid 2 4 2 2

20 Naib Qasid 1 30 23 7

21 Sanitation Worker 1 5 5 0

22 Chowkidar 1 21 19 2

23 Sweeper 1 1 1 0

Engineering Staff

24 Technical Officer 18 1 1 0

25 Senior Auditor 16 1 1 0

26 Divisional Accountant 11 1 0 1

27 Cameraman 13 3 2 1

28 Technician 13 1 0 1

Grand Total (I+II) 825 688 137 Bibliography

Annex ‘O’

210

Annual Report 2001, National Accountability Bureau

Islamabad, 2002

Annual Report 2002, National Accountability Bureau,

Islamabad, 2003


Islamabad, 2004


Islamabad, 2005


Islamabad, 2006


Islamabad, 2007

Creation of Prevention, Awareness & Training Wing, Intelligence Wing,

& Contract Cell

Report of the Anti Corruption Committee,

Allahabad, Superintendent, Printed & Stationery, United Provinces,

India, 1939

The Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan; as modified upto 31st

July 2004, National Assembly of Pakistan, Islamabad, PCP 2004

The National Accountability Ordinance, 1999

Islamabad, Manager Printing Corporation of Pakistan, 1999

The National Accountability Ordinance (IV of 2000 & XXIV of 2000)

modified upto 2000, Islamabad Manager Printing Corporation of

Pakistan, 2000

The National Accountability Amendment Ordinance 2002, Modified

upto 15th November, 2002, Islamabad, Manager PCP, 2002

The National Accountability Bureau (NAB) Employees Terms and

Conditions of Services (TCS) 2002. The gazette of Pakistan, Islamabad,

2002

211

Raja Muhammad Nasim Khan & Muhammad Feroz Khan creation of

Prevention Awareness & Training Wing, Intelligence Wing & Contracts

cell in the NAB, Management Services Wing, Establishment Division,

Islamabad 2004

Public Accountability System in Pakistan, National Reconstruction

Bureau, Islamabad, 2006.

The Sindh Enquiries and Anti-Corruption Act, 1991, Sindh Act no. IV of

1992, The Sindh Government Gazette, Karachi, 1992, Government of

Sindh

Services & General Administration Department Amendments,

Notification in the Sindh Inquiries and Anti- Corruption Rules, 1993,

Karachi 1995

The West Pakistan Anti- Corruption Ordinance, 1961 (W.P Ord. XX of

1961),The West Pakistan Government, Lahore 1961

The Prevention of Corruption Act, (Act No II of 1947), Karachi

The Punjab Anti Corruption Establishment Ordinance, 1961 (W.P.

Ordinance XX of 1961)

Punjab Anti Corruption Establishment Rules, 1974 (Gazette of Punjab,

1974), Lahore, 1974

Sindh Enquiries & Anti Corruption Rules, 1993 (SoR-IS & GAD) amended

upto 1997, Karachi

Year Book 2004, Anti Corruption Establishment Punjab, 2005, Lahore

Year Book 2005, Anti Corruption Establishment Punjab, 2006, Lahore

Manual of Anti-Corruption Laws, Rules Regulations and Procedure

regulating the working of the Anti Corruption Establishment, West

Pakistan, 1968. West Pakistan Government Press, Peshawar, 1970

NWFP ACE Rules Amended vide Notification No. SOE – III (E & AD) 4-

6/98, Peshawar, 1999

Munir Muhammad, Causes & Effects of Corruption & Remedial Measures

(Research Paper, PASC, 76th NMC, Lahore, 2002)

www.pakistan.gov.pk

212

www.nab.gov.pk

www.nwfp.gov.pk

ww.nyulawglobal.org/global ex/Pakistan

213


Chief Ministers Inspection Team’s (Punjab, Baluchistan, NWFP, Sindh)

214

Chief Minister’s Inspection Team (CMIT) Punjab Historical Background Inspection Team was established for the first time in Punjab, during 1960 under

the orders of then West Pakistan Governor Malik Ameer Muhammad Khan and

was designated as Governor’s Inspection Team, directly responsible to the

Governor.

In 1969, the inspection team was redesignated as Marshal Law Administrators

Inspection Team. In 1973, with the introduction of Parliamentary system of

government it became Chief Minister’s Inspection Team (CMIT) under the Rules

of Business 1974. Since then the nomenclature kept on changing with the

change of government, and the recent change took place on 8th January 2003.

Establishment of CMIT The CMIT is department under the direct control of Chief Ministers of the

Punjab Province to monitor the performance of various administrative units

through a systematic process of inspection, evaluation and analysis. It

identifies and points out the acts of omissions and commission through in-depth

inquiries and recommends remedial measures within the parameters laid down

in the Rules of Business and Government Policy

The organogram of CMIT is available at annex ‘A’

Objectives The CMIT is to ensure administrative overview, policy implementation and to

take cognizance of the issues of public interest and to assist the Chief Minister

of the province in identifying the administrative melodies and to suggest

remedial measures to improve the efficiency of the provincial administration

with the aim of ensuring Good Governance.

215

Functions

1. Inspect sample development projects throughout the province with the

following objectives:

i. That development projects are properly planned and are executed

efficiently, expeditiously and economically with effective quality

controls and to recommend appropriate action against the defaulting

officials/departments;

ii. That directives/ orders of the Government regarding development

projects are being fully implemented; and

iii. That the officials of National Building Departments and Contractors

are carrying out their duties, responsibilities and tasks properly and

efficiently.

2. Undertake special assignments, which may be entrusted to it under

orders of the Chief Minister on any matter not specified in this Charter.

3. Take cognizance of any important matter affecting Government/ public

interest and draw attention of the authorities concerned for appropriate

action and place it before the Government for his consideration/orders.

4. Entertain complaints of serious/urgent nature and pass these on to the

concerned quarters for expeditious disposal or carryout investigation/

probe directly as may be appropriate.

5. Inspect or cause to be inspected all Government departments including

Police, Autonomous/Semi-Autonomous Bodies, Corporations, Institutions

and Local Bodies to see whether or not these Departments/ Agencies

discharge their duties/ functions efficiently and expeditiously and to

bring serious observations to the notice of the Government together with

recommendations for improvement.

6. Other Departments may assign specific important tasks to the Inspection

Team with prior permission of the Chief Minister.

216

7. Service matters except entrusted to Services, General Administration

and Information Department and budgetary matters relating to the

Department.

8. Review of progress on ADP twice a year and submit observations/

recommendations to the Governor.

9. A requisition made or assistance required by the Inspection Team in

these regards shall be compiled with promptly by all concerned.

10. The Chairman, Chief Minister’s Inspection Team shall submit his reports

to the Chief Minister directly. Copies may be endorsed to the concerned

departments/ official except those, which may be of confidential

nature.

11. The Chairman Chief Minister’s Inspection Team shall maintain close

liaison with Anti-Corruption Department and pass on cases, which may

be appropriate to be dealt with by them.

12. Purchase of stores and capital goods for the Department.

Staffing

The total staff strength of CMIT Punjab is 98 including 22 officers in BS-16

and above. The composition of officers and staff is 22% and 78%

respectively. The department is headed by a chairman and assisted by six

members alongwith other staff.

If we have a look at the functions and structure of the organization, the

staff is not in a position to meet the objectives of the organization. The

organization has no regular staff. The details of staff strength of CMIT,

Punjab is available at Annex ‘B’

Internal vigilance system

There is no inbuilt control system for employees. There is no vigilance cell

in the organization. The employees are governed under the Punjab

Employees Efficiency, Discipline and Accountability Act, 2006.

217

Training

No specific training/courses are arranged for employees

Others

The recommendations of CMIT are advisory. However, they are allowed to

pass on appropriate cases to Anti Corruption Establishment for further

necessary action.

218

Chief Minister’s Inspection Team (CMIT) Baluchistan

The Chief Ministers Inspection Team was constituted under Baluchistan

Government Rules of Business 1976 as amended upto date in the year 2004.

CMIT is basically assigned the responsibility of:-

1. Monitoring the pace of implementation of policies and

programs of the government

2. Provide consultancy services to the administrative

departments for streamlining their over all working, service

delivery system and revenue generation capabilities in

various sectors.

3. Improve quality in the implementation of works, projects

sponsored by various agencies.

4. detect deficiencies and loop holes in the implementation of

projects/plans for facilitating timely completion

5. Provide support and guidance to the functionaries of the

departments /agencies for optimal utilization of their skill

and knowledge

Organization of CMIT

The CMIT comprise of a Chairman B-21 and four members B-20 to assist the

Chairman in his work. The team submits inspection reports from schemes

directly to the Chief Executive of the province whereas the inquiry reports are

routed through the chief secretary under the rules of business.

The Chairman CMIT also discharges responsibilities as Chairman, Services

Review Board and Liability Committees, first to screen out dead wood and

second to clear outstanding liabilities owned to contractors by the

administrative departments. The chairman CMIT is also borne as a member of

provincial selection board.

The organogram of CMIT, Baluchistan is available at annex ‘C’

219

Functions

The functions as given in the Rules of Business include:-

1. To undertake extensive tours of the province in order to assess, on the

spot the progress made by various Government Agencies in

implementation of the policies of the Provincial Government

2. To evaluate on specific directions received from the chief executive of

the province, the functioning of any department, authority or office

under the control of the government of Baluchistan, and suggest ways

and means for making the same more efficient and responsive to public

needs.

3. to study the attitude of senior government officials towards their own

work as well as towards the general public, down to the district level

4. To evaluate and investigate the complaints of corruption against senior

government officials.

5. To examine in depth on specific directions received from the chief

executive of the province, the causes and factors responsible for success

or failure, lapses, delays, cost over runts etc; in the implementation of

any development scheme, and suggest immediate remedial measures.

6. May inspect any office or project or work, consult any record and

examine any official in connection with the work. Any requisition made

by the inspection team in this connection will be complied with promptly

by the official concerned.

7. Any other matter, which the chief executive/authority of the province

may assign specifically and in writing.

8. service matters except those entrusted to the services and general

administration department

Staffing

Provincial Inspection Team, Baluchistan is headed by a Chairman (BS-20/21)

appointed by the Chief Executive of the Province. The total staff strength is 42

220

including 8 officers of BS-16 and above. The officers and staff are 24% and 76%

respectively. The chairman is assisted by 4 members and one secretary.

However, at present there are only two members on the working strength.

Generally the staff is deputed from other departments and stay in PIT is for

short period. The details of staff strength is available at Annex ‘D’

Incentive System

There is no incentive system to encourage the staff for the good work. The

general rules are applicable on the employees of PIT.

Internal Vigilance System

There is no inbuilt mechanism of vigilance for the employees. The employees

are governed under E & D rules of government of Baluchistan.

Training

No specific training is provided to employees of PIT

Issues/Recommendations

1. Hardly any tenure policy for the Chairman and other members regarding

posting and transfer of members is followed. They leave PIT without

completing their assignments. This is equally applicable to other

employees for smooth functioning of the organization. It is necessary

that there should be regular employees and members should not be

allowed to leave the organization before completing their assignment.

Tenure policy should be adopted. Posting should not be made on adhoc

basis.

2. There is also shortage of staff and even sanctioned strength is not made

available to the organization. Posts of members are lying vacant. The

vacant positions may be filled with competent people.

221

3. Inspection team submits its reports of development projects and other

issues directly to chief minister’s and follow up action is being taken by

chief minister’s sector or the Services & General Administration

Department. As far as follow up action on reports is concerned that may

be entrusted to PIT. For the purpose, a monitoring/ evaluation cell is

created within existing setup.

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Chief Minister’s Inspection Team (CMIT), NWFP

Introduction The Chief Ministers Inspection Team called Governors Inspection Team in NWFP

was bifurcated from Governor Inspection Team NWFP through notification

number SO (O & M) E&AD/1-3/2002 dated 13.1.2003

Organization of CMIT, NWFP The Provincial Inspection Team is an attached department of Establishment

Department headed by chairman and assisted by two members, one senior

engineer, one assistant engineer, one secretary along with other staff.

The organogram of the provincial inspection team is available at annex ‘E’

Functions

Functions of the team as assigned by the Government of NWFP are

listed below:-

1. To enquire into cases of corruption, malpractices and other malafide

activities pertaining to any sphere of provincial administration including

administration of autonomous bodies setup by provincial government and

to submit its report to government.

2. To inquire into the cases entrusted to the team by government and to

submit its report to government.

3. to inspect in connection with an inquiry any office of the provincial

government or of an autonomous body constituted by it, or any work of

project sponsored by or on behalf of the provincial government or the

autonomous body for the purpose of spot inspection, investigation and

interrogation;

4. to consult or examine any record connected with the inquiry

223

5. to associate any official in connection with its function;

6. to co-opt an adhoc-basis any officer or any non-official for advice on

technical matters when required; and

7. Any requisition made by the inspection tam for consultation or

examination of records or for association of officials shall be complied

properly by the department/ office concerned.

Staffing

To total strength of CMIT NWFP is 37 including 9 officers. The officers

constitute 24% and staff 76% respectively. The organization is functioning on

horizontal basis. The total staff strength is available at Annex ‘F’

Service Rules

There is no separate service rule for the employees of CMIT. The employees are

governed under E&D rules of the provincial government.

Appointment of Chairman/Members

The Chairman /Members are appointed by the Chief Minister.

Training

There is no system of capacity building for employees of CMIT.

Similarly problems are being faces as in the case with CMIT of other provinces.

Incentives

No special incentive is available for the employees of CMIT, NWFP

224

Holders of the post of Chairman, Provincial Inspection Team, NWFP

S.N Name Period Present Position

From To

1. Mr. Badshah Gul Wazir 4-3-2003 30-9-2004 Secretary Home Department

2. Mr. Shala Khan Afridi 3-12-2004 26-7-2006 Member NWFP PSC

3. Mr. Shah Wali Khan 9-9-2006 22-12-2006 Senior Member Board of Revenue

4. Sahibzada Fazal Amin 26-12-2006 Till date ---

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Holders of the post of Chairman, Governor’s Inspection Team, NWFP

S.N Name Period

From To

1. Lt. Col. Malik Atta-ur-Rehman 18-6-1976 31-8-1977

2. Lt. Col.(r) Abdul Hafeez 1-9-1977 8-5-1978

3. Lt. Col.(r) Muhammad Afzal Khan 10-5-1978 9-5-1980

4. Col (r) Muhammad Nisar Khattak 10-5-1980 9-5-1981

5 Col (r) Amir Nawaz Khan 10-5-1981 5-3-1985

6 Brig (r) Mian Hafeez Ahmad 6-3-1985 31-8-1988

7 Ghulam Rasul Khanzada 1-9-1988 31-3-1988

8 Mian Niaz Gul DMG 1-4-1988 17-12-191990

9 Engr. Abdul Majeed Mohmand 18-12-1990 21-5-1992

10 Sameen Jan Babar 22-5-1992 27-8-1993

11 Brig (r) Bashir-ud-Din Khattak 28-8-1993 24-2-1997

12 Col (r) Alamzeb Khan 5-9-1997 12-7-1999

13 Shaukat Zaman Babar 23-5-2000 31-10-2000

14 Ms. Ali Begum 23-1-2001 8-3-2003

15 Ms Ali Begum 15-1-2003 8-3-2004

16 Major Iftikhar Ali Shah 9-3-2004 14-6-2006

17 Major Sahibzada Muhammad Khalid 27-7-2006 Till date

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Chief Minister’s Inspection Team (CMIT), Sindh

Establishment of CMIT, Sindh CMIT is a department under the direct supervision of Chief Minister’s of Sindh.

However for administration purpose it is an attached department of S & GAD

established after the parliamentary system of government and is called Chief

Minister’s Inspection & Evaluation Team Sindh.

Objectives/ Functions The CMIT, Sindh has to monitor the performance of various administrative units

through a systematic procedures adopted for inspection, evaluation and

analysis. It identifies the shortcomings and progress of development projects

being executed in the province. After indepth inquiries of the implementation

of the project necessary recommendations are made for remedial measures.

• Omissions and Commissions are also brought into the notice of Chief

Minister

• Conduct special assignments, which may be entrusted to CMIT under

orders of Chief Minister or any matter not specified.

• On the request of other department carry out any assignment of

important nature with prior permission of Chairman.

Organization of CMIT, Sindh The CMIT, Sindh is headed by a Chairman BS-21. He is assisted by a Director

General (BS-20) and three members. There is also other staff which assists in

the work. The organogram of CMIT, Sindh is available at Annex ‘G’

227

Appointment of Chairman/Members The Chairman/Members are appointed by the Chief Secretary of the Province.

The Chairman has all the power assigned to the head of an attached

department.

Staffing The total staff strength of CMIT, Sindh is 67 including 14 officers of BS-16 and

above. The composition of officers and staff is 21% and 79% respectively. There

is no separate terms and conditions of service for employees. Rules applicable

to other provincial employees of govt. of Sindh are also applicable to the

employees of CMIT, Sindh. The details of staff strength is available at Annex

‘H’

Incentive System The general incentive system applicable to other provincial employees is also

applicable on them.

Internal Vigilance System No inbuilt separate mechanism of vigilance for the employees. The employees

are governed under E & D Rules of the Govt. of Sindh.

Training No separate capacity building programme is available for the employees.

228

Organogram of CMIT, Punjab

Annex ‘A’

Chairman

Member – I BS-20

Member – II BS-20

Member – III BS-20

Member – IV BS-20

Member Engineer BS-20

Secretary BS-18

Deputy Secretary

Programme Officer

Sr. Research Officer

Section Officer

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Sanctioned Staff Strength of Provincial Inspection Team, Punjab

Organogram of CMIT, Baluchistan

S.No DESIGNATION BPS

No. of Posts

1 Chairman 20,21 1

2 Senior Member 20 1

3 Member General-I 20 1

4 Member General-II 20 15 Member General-III 20 16 Member General-IV 20 17 Member Engineer-I 20 18 Secretary 18 19 Deputy Secretary 18 110 Sr. Research Officer 18 111 Jr. Research Officer 17 112 Programme Officer 17 113 Section Officer 18 114 Data Processing 16 115 Superintendent 16 116 Private Secretaries 16 7 17 Personal Assistant 15 5 18 Stenographers 12,15 10 19 Asstt. /Dy. Suptts. 11,15 6 20 Draftsman 11 1 21 Clerks 5,6 15 22 Lab. Assistant 1 1 23 Drivers 4 10 24 Dispatch Rider 4 1 25 Daftri 2 1 26 Naib Qasid 1 17 27 Lab Attendant 1 2 28 Chowkidars 1 2 29 Mali 1 1 30 Faraash 1 1 31 Sanitary Workers 1 3

Total 98

Annex ‘B’

Annex ‘C’

230

Sanctioned Staff Strength of Provincial Inspection Team, Baluchistan Annex ‘D’

Chairman

Member I BS-20

Member II BS-20

Member III BS-20

Member (Tech) BS-20

Superintendent (BS-16) 1 & Staff P Secretary (BS-16) 1 S. S. Stenographer (BS-15) 6 J.S. Stenographer (BS-12) 1 Accountant (BS-11) 1 Assistant (BS-11 2 Senior Clerk (BS-7) 2 Junior Clerk (BS-5) 5 Driver (BS-4) 7 N.Qasid (BS-1) 7

Technical Section Draftsman (BS-16) 1 Cameraman (BS-15) 2

Secretary BS-17

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Organogram of Chief Minister’s Inspection Team, NWFP

S.No DESIGNATION BPS No. of Posts

1 Chairman 20,21 1

2 Members 20 4

3 Secretary 20 1


5 Private Secretary to Chairman 16 1

Sub total I 8 6 Senior Scale Stenographer 15 6

7 Assistant 11 1

8 Accountant 11 1

9 Draftsman 11 1

10 Senior Clerk 7 2

11 Junior Clerk 5 4

12 Drivers 4 7

13 Cameraman 2 2

14 Naib Qasid 1 7

15 Chowkidar 1 2


Sub total II 34

Total 42

Annex ‘E’

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Sanctioned Staff Strength of Provincial Inspection Team, NWFP

Annex ‘F’

Chairman

Member I Member II

Secretary

SeniorEngineer

Asst.Engineer

Asst.Secretary

Asst.Acct. Officer

233

S.No DESIGNATION BPS

No. of Posts

1 Chairman 21 1

2 Members 19, 20 2

3 Senior Engineer 18 1

4 Assistant Engineer 17 1

5 Secretary 17 1

6 Assistant Account Officer 16 1

7 Assistant Secretary 16 1

8 Private Secretary to Chairman 16 1


10 Computer Operator 11 1

11 Assistants 11 3

12 Sub-Engineering 11 1

13 Senior Clerk 7 1

14 Drivers 4 4

15 Cameraman 2 1

16 Photostate Operator 2 1

17 Naib Qasid 1 9

18 Chowkidar 1 2


Total 37

234

Chairman

Member - I

Member - II

Member - III

Secretary

Superintendent Asst. Director

Director General

DirectorDeputy Director

Programmer Asst. Programmer

Chairman

Member - I

Member - II

Member - III

Secretary

Superintendent Asst. Director

Director General

DirectorDeputy Director

Programmer Asst. Programmer

Sanctioned Staff Strength of CMIT, Sindh

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Sanctioned Staff Strength of Provincial Inspection Team, Sindh


1 Chairman 21 1

Director General 20 1

2 Member 19 3

3 Director 19 1

4 Deputy Director 18 1

5 Officer of Special Duty 18 1

6 Secretary 18 1

7 Programmer 17 1

8 Assistant Director 16 1


10 Data Processing Officer 16 1

Sub Total – I 14



13 Assistant 11 6

14 Key Punch Operator 8 1

15 Cameraman 7 1

16 Senior Clerk 7 3

17 Junior Clerk 5 8

18 Daftri 2 1

19 Operator 2 1

20 Driver 4 7

21 Naib Qasid 1 14


23 Chowkidar 1 1

Sub Total - II 53

Grand Total 67

Annex ‘H’

236


Federal and Provincial Public Service Commissions

(FPSC, PPSC, SPSC, BPSC &

NWFP PSC)

237

Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) Establishment of FPSC Pakistan emerged as a sovereign and independent state of 14th August 1947.

The Pakistan government adapted the Government of India Act, 1935. The

institution of Public Service Commission was in place before partition. The first

office of Pakistan Public Service Commission was established in GemKhana,

Karachi in 1947. Thereafter, Constitution of India 1950 and in the Constitution

of Islamic Republic of Pakistan of 1956, 1962 and interim Constitution of 1972

also contained the relevant provisions regarding the existence and role of FPSC

& PPSC’s. The terms of office was also prescribed in the Constitution of 1956

and 1962 as five years and three years respectively. Subsequently, Functions of

Commission including tenure of Chairman/Members were not made part of the

Constitution of Pakistan 1973. This has been granted through an Act issued

under the provision of Article 242 of the Constitution which is reproduced

below: -

1. Parliament in relation to the affairs of the Federation and the Provincial

Assembly of a province in relation to the affairs of the Province, may by

law, provide for the establishment and constitution of a Public Service

Commission

2. A Public Service Commission shall perform such functions as may be

prescribed by law.

In the light of the above provision in the Constitution Federal Public Service

Commission was established under an Act of Parliament viz the Federal Public

Service Commission Act, 1973 (Act no. LXVI of 1973)

In 1977, President of Pakistan issued Ordinance No. XLV of 1977 to modify the

Constitution and functions of the Commission etc. Accordingly, the term of

office of the Chairman and other members is 5 years which may be extended

upto 3 years by the President. The Pakistan Public Service Commission renamed

as Central Public Service Commission in 1961 and again renamed as Federal

Public Service Commission in 1972. In the new Ordinance tenure of Chairman

238

and Members is 3 years. FPSC is one of the most important recruiting agency

performing statutory and non statutory functions.

Organization of FPSC The Commission is headed by Chairman who is assisted by 11 members. 10

members are in position till 31/05/2007 and 1 post is vacant. There are

Executive Director General (BS-21) and a Secretary (BS-21) to assist the

Chairman. EDG is assisted by Director General (Admin) and Director General

(IT) and other officers, Secretary is assisted by Director General (CSS), Direct

or General (Recruitment), Chief Psychologist and other Officers.

At present FPSC has its headquarters in its own building in Islamabad. The

organizational setup at headquarter consists of the following wings:

1. Administration

2. Establishment

3. CSS

4. Recruitment

5. Psychological

6. Final Passing Out

7. Education Consultant

8. Computer

9. Secret

10. Litigation

11. Programme

FPSC has four branch offices located at Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar and Quetta.

FPSC intends to open 8 more offices in the following locations namely

Rawalpindi, Faisalabad, Multan, Sukkur, Khuzdar, D.I. Khan, Gilgit and

Hyderabad on the pattern of PSC’s to perform the following functions:

1. to act as information centers or focal points for various jobs recruited

through FPSC;

2. to facilitate the applicants in filling up the applications forms;

3. to distribute the blank application forms to intending candidates;

239

4. to act as a centre for CSS competitive examination and screening test

for various recruitments;

5. to act as interview centers if sufficient number of candidates are

available;

6. to facilitate the prospective candidates for video interviews when online

recruitment system becomes operational.

The organogram of FPSC is available at Annex-A. Functions of the FPSC The Federal Public Service Commission Ordinance, 1977 and subsequent

amendments envisaged the functions of the Commission as under:-

(a) To conduct tests and examinations for recruitment of persons to :-

i. All Pakistan services, the civil services of the

Federation and civil posts in connection with the

affairs of the Federation in BPS 16 and above or

equivalent.

(b) To advise the President: -

i. On matters relating to qualifications for and

methods of recruitment to services and posts

referred to in clause (a);

ii. On the principles to be followed in making initiate

appointments to the services and posts referred in

clause (a) and in making appointments by promotion

to the posts BS-18 and above and transfer from one

service or occupational group to another;

iii. On any other matter which the President may refer

to the Commission.

(c) To conduct mandatory Promotional Examinations for: Posts in BS-17

reserved for promotion of departmental candidates in all Occupational

240

Groups/Services. Officers in BS-18 in all Occupational Groups/Services

before their promotion to posts in BS-19. NIPA Entrance Examination for

Officers holding BS-19 posts before their nomination for Advance Course

in Public Sector Management NIPA course mandatory for promotion to

posts in BS-20.

The functions enumerated above have been performed by FPSC w.e.f March

2001 to June 2002 and has been suspended w.e.f 06-07-2002 as matter is

subjudice in Supreme Court of Pakistan awaiting final decision.

Staff Strength The total staff strength of FPSC is 575 including Chairman and 11 Members. The

officers constitute 24% of the total strength. The posts of Executive Director

General in BPS 21 and Director General (IT) in BS-20 have been recently

created on the recommendation of Management Services Wing of the

Establishment Division along with some other posts.

The detailed staff strength is available at Annex – B.

Status of the Commission The Commission is a statutory body headed by a Chairman and assisted by 11

members. The officers and staff of the Commission are treated as attached

department under the administrative control of the Establishment Division.

Previously, till 2001 it was an attached department of Establishment division

and the status from the year 2001 to 2006 was undefined.

Appointment of Chairman/Members The Chairman and other members of the Commission are appointed by the

President of Pakistan. Half the Members of the Commission may be persons

having held office in the Service of Pakistan in BPS 21 or above. No serving

government servant will be appointed as a member. There should be atleast

one member each from the following category representing the Commission:

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Retired Judges of the Superior Judiciary

Retired Officers not below the rank of Major General or equivalent of the

armed forces

Women and the private sector possessing such qualifications and experience as

the federal government may prescribe by rules.

Term of Office of Chairman/Members Presently, the tenure of Chairman and Member is 3 years which was previously

for a period of 5 years. The term of office is not extendable.

The Member may resign his office by writing under his hand addressed to the

President.

Oath of Office Before entering upon the office, the Chairman and the Member has to take

oath in the form set out in the schedule to the Ordinance before the President

in case of Chairman and before the Chairman in case of a Member.

Ineligibility for further employment After the expiry of the tenure of a Member of a Commission, he is not eligible

for further employment in the Service of Pakistan.

Removal from Office A member may not be removed from office except in the manner applicable to

a Judge of High Court.

Submission of Report At the time of Pakistan Public Service Commission, Submission of report to the

Governor General/ President was not obligatory. The reports pertaining to the

years 2004, 2005 and 2006 could not be presented to the President in time.

242

Now all the three reports have been approved by the President and are under

print.

In the present Constitution, Submission of Annual report to the President on

the working of the Commission is mandatory. A copy of the report has to be

laid before the National Assembly and the Senate.

Terms and Conditions of Services of Chairman and Members The terms and conditions of services are determined by the President as

provided in the FPSC Ordinance.

However, presently Chairman is getting the pay of Rs.50, 000/- per month

along with entertainment allowance of Rs. 6,000/- and hiring of house upto

Rs.75, 000 per month. Utility bills are fully paid by the government. The

members are paid 45000 per month entertainment allowance of Rs. 6,000/- ,

house rent 50,000 per month and utility bills 1500 per month are paid by the

government.

Recently 30% increase in pay has been made.

FPSC has its own service rules and appointments to various positions made

through:

Initial Recruitment

Promotion

Transfer

Deputation (in rare case only)

Presently, in FPSC there are four cadres namely:

1. General Administration Cadre

2. Computer IT Cadre

3. Psychological Cadre

4. Research & Development Cadre

In case if any vacancy exists in any cadre, the promotion of eligible employee is

made through Departmental Promotion Committee in his own Cadre.

In case any vacancy exists for initial appointment, any person who fulfils the

requisite experience and qualifications can apply for it.

243

For each post requisite experience, length of service and qualification is

prescribed. The existing recruitment rules are being revised.

The employees have career path as per Service Rules, & Regulations.

Incentives There is no separate incentive system for the employees of the Commission.

The general rules are applicable

Training and Capacity building Previously there was no specialized training programme for the officials and

employees of FPSC. They undertake training courses which are conducted by

the institutions in the country and abroad. The method of selection for the

courses is as for the other employees of the government. Recently, two

projects for strengthening and revamping the recruitment system of FPSC have

been launched. Namely,

1. Online recruitment of FPSC by MOIT, GOP

2. Public Sector Capacity Building Project by World Bank

Reference to project no. 1 which includes automation and re-engineering of

competitive examination, general recruitment, examination system and

developing of dynamic websites etc. ,Networking of the FPSC, providing

hardware to FPSC.

Reference to project No. 2 above, Under the Public Sector Capacity Building

Project by World Bank, an amount of $1 million equivalent to Rs. 58 million was

earmarked for capacity building of FPSC and various components, interalia, of

the programme.

244

Baluchistan Public Service Commission (BPSC) Establishment of Provincial Public Service Commission, Baluchistan Under Article 242 of the Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan

provides that Public Service Commission may be established and constituted by

Law. Hence, Baluchistan Public Service Commission Ordinance 1 of 1974 was

promulgated. This Ordinance was presented in the shape of Baluchistan Public

Service Commission Bill on 7th June 1974 and passed by the Provincial

Assembly, Baluchistan. Presently Baluchistan Public Service Commission is

governed by the Baluchistan Public Service Commission Act 1989 and the

Baluchistan Public Service Commission Rules 1995.

Organization of BPSC The BPSC is headed by Chairman. There are five members to assist him. There

is a Secretary, Controller of recruitment, Controller of Examination and other

Officers to assist them.

The BPSC is organized in the following seven sections:

1. Recruitment

2. Examination

3. Research

4. Regulation

5. Administration

6. Accounts

7. Library

Each section is headed by an officer in BS (16/17) under the overall supervision

of the Secretary. The Commission recently shifted to a double story building at

Ramzoy Road, Quetta. The Commission’s own building at Samungli Road is

under construction. The organogram of the BPSC is available at Annex ‘C’.

245

Status of the Commission The Commission is a statutory body. The composition of the Commission

consists of one Chairman and five members.

The Chairman is Chief Executive of the commission and has all the

administrative and financial powers to be delegated to head of department of

an attached department.

The Chairman of the Commission is also an ex-officio Chairman of selection

Committees for selection of candidates for admission to the Engineering,

Medical Colleges and Agriculture Colleges in Quetta respectively.

The staff of the Commission is an attached department and under the

administrative control of S & GAD of Government of Baluchistan.

Submission of Annual Report Submission of annual report on the basis of calendar year is mandatory under

section 9 of the BPSC Act, 1989.

Terms & Conditions of Service Terms & Conditions of service are determined by the government. Functions of the BPSC The functions of the Commission are:

(i) To conduct tests, examinations or interviews for recruitment for initial

appointment to -

(a) The Civil services of the province of Baluchistan;

(b) Such posts connected with the affairs of the province of

Baluchistan as may be prescribed;

(c) Such posts in or under a Corporation or other Autonomous body or

organization set up by Government under any law or otherwise as

may be prescribed;

246

(ii) To advise Government on –

(a) The matters relating to qualification for, and methods

recruitment to, the services and posts referred to in clause (i);

and

(b) Any other matter which Government may refer to the

Commission;

(iii) To hold such department or language examinations as may be

prescribed.

Appointment of Chairman/Members The Chairman and other members of the Commission are appointed by the

Government. The Government will decide their conditions of service including

terms of contract of re-employment etc. and the number of members.

Tenure of Chairman/Members Terms of office of the Chairman and members was 3 years from the date on

which he takes oath for the office. In the Act 1999, the tenure of chairman and

members has been extended from 3 years to 5 years.

Chairman/Member after taking oath in the form set out in schedule with the

Ordinance before the governor can hold office for his respective term from the

date of taking oath. Member may take oath in the presence of Chairman before

entering upon office.

A member may resign from his office by writing under his hand addressed to

the Governor.

Removal from Office The Chairman/Member cannot be removed from his office except in the

manner applicable to a Judge of a High Court and upon a reference made by

the Government.

247

Staff Strength The total sanctioned strength of the BPSC is 78 including 21 Officers whereas

the officers constitute 26% of the total staff strength and the remaining

employees working in BS 15 & below constitute the remaining 74%.

The detailed staff strength of BPSC is available at Annex ‘D’

Incentive System There is no separate incentive system for the employees of the Commission.


Training No separate training programme is organized for the capacity building of the

employees. They are nominated for the training courses as other provincial

employees are nominated.

248

NWFP Public Service Commission Establishment of NWFP PSC The NWFP Public Service Commission was established under NWFP Public

Service Commission Act 1973 (Act 19 of 1973). Now commission is governed by

the NWFP Public Service Commission Ordinance 1978 and the NWFP Service

Commission (Function Rules 1983).

Different amendments were made in the Ordinance in the year 2002 and 2004

in the Ordinance regarding tenure of members etc.

Organization of NWFP PSC NWFP PSC is headed by Chairman (BSP-22). There are five members BPS–21/20)

to assist him in Commission’s work. There is a secretary, Director Recruitment,

Director Examination and Psychologist alongwith other Officers and staff

assisting the Chairman. The Commission is organized in the following

branches/sections:

1. Recruitment

2. Examination

3. Administration

4. Psychological

5. Computer/ Statistics

The organogram of the NWFP PSC is available at Annex ‘E’.

Status of the Commission The Commission is a statutory body comprising of one Chairman and five

members. The other staff has the status of an attached department under the

administrative control of Establishment and Administrative Department

Government of NWFP

249

The Chairman of the Commission is Chief Executive having all the power which

is delegated to a head of Department. The Recruitment, Promotion, Transfer of

the Officers and Staff of the Commission is regulated under the NWFP Public

Service Commission Officers and Servants (Terms and Conditions of Service,

Regulation, 1985).

Functions of the NWFP PSC In accordance with the NWFP Public Service Commission (Amendment)

Ordinance, 2002 read with amended NWFP Public Service (Functions) Rules

2002, the Commission continued to perform the following functions:

(a) Conduct tests and examinations for recruitment of person to-

i) The civil services of the Province and civil posts in connection

with the affairs of the Province in basic pay scale 16 and above or

equivalent; and

ii) Posts in basic pay scales 11 to 15 or equivalent specified in the

following Departments (except the District cadre posts)

1. Civil Secretariat (through Establishment Department)

2. Board of Revenue

3. Police Department

4. Prison Department

5. Services and Works Department

6. Irrigation Department

7. Industries, Labour and Manpower Department

8. Health Department

9. Education Department

10. Local Government and Rural Development Department

11. Excise and Taxation Department

12. Food Department

13. Physical Planning and Environment Department including

Urban Development Departments; and

250

14. Organizations, except autonomous bodies, under the Health

and Education Department

(b) To advise the Governor:

i. On matters relating to qualifications for and methods of

recruitment to service and posts referred to in clause (a);

ii. Appointments by promotion to posts in BPS-17 and above;

and

iii. Transfer from one service to another; and

iv. On any other matter which the Governor may refer to the

Commission.

Appointment of Chairman/Members The Chairman and Members are appointed by the Governor. Tenure of Chairman/Members

According to the Ordinance No. 20/05/27 of 2002, the tenure of

Chairman/Members has been extended from 4 years to 5 years which is not

extendable in any case. On seizing to hold office, a member may not be

eligible to further employment in the service of Pakistan.

Chairman/Member after taking oath in the form set out in schedule with the

Ordinance before the governor can hold office for his respective term from the

date of taking oath. Member may take oath in the presence of Chairman before

entering upon office.


the Governor.

Removal from Office A member shall not be removed from office except in the manner applicable to

a Jude of a High Court and upon a reference made by the Governor.

251

Staff Strength The total sanctioned strength of the Commission is 179 including 32 Officers

whereas 45 posts are lying vacant including 8 posts of officers.

The composition of officers is 18% and 82 % employees are in BS 15 & below.

25% posts are lying vacant.

The detailed staff strength of NWFP PSC is available at Annex ‘F’

Incentives There is no separate incentive system for the employees of the Commission.


Training No separate training programme is organized for the capacity building of the

employees. They are nominated for the training courses as other provincial

employees are nominated.

Submission of Annual Report Submission of Annual Report on the activities during a calendar year is

mandatory to the Governor of NWFP.

252

Punjab Public Service Commission (PPSC) Historical Background Punjab Public Service Commission is one of the oldest Public Service

Commission in the country and was established in April 1937 under the

Government of India Act 1935. After the independence of the country, in 1947

this Act was adopted. The functions of the Commission were defined explicitly

in the 1956 and 1962 constitutions. On the creation of one unit the Commission

was renamed as the West Pakistan Public Service Commission until 1st July 1970

and on bifurcation of one unit into four provinces, it was again named as

Punjab Public Service Commission.

Establishment of Provincial Public Service Commission, Punjab The PPSC was constituted under the provision of the Punjab Public Service

Commission Ordinance 1978 and PPSC Function Rules (1978) which have been

framed as provided under the Article 242 of the constitution of Pakistan.

The Commission is given the responsibility of making direct recruitment for

various posts under the Government of Punjab.

Status of the PPSC It is a statutory body having 1 chairman and 15 members. The PPSC enjoys the

status of a special institution and is under the administrative control of S &

GAD of the Government of Punjab as per Rules of Business of the Punjab

Government.

Functions of the PPSC According to functions laid down in Punjab Public Service Commission

Ordinance No. II of 1978, the Commission is responsible for recruitment to

253

various posts falling in Grade 16 to 22. The recruitment for the post of Grade 1

to 15 is outside the purview of the Commission unless specially authorised by

the Government of Punjab.

The Primary function of the Commission is to ensure that all posts within its

jurisdiction are filled strictly on merit, subject to recruitment policy of the

Government.

Under section 7 of the Ordinance 1978 and Rule 3 of the Functions Rules cover

the functions which the Commission has to perform. Briefly they are:

a. The Provincial Services and Civil posts connected with affairs of the

province falling in BS-16 and above in different departments.

b. Such posts in or under Corporations, Organizations set up by the

Government under any law as may be prescribed.

c. Any other posts which may be referred to the Commission for

recruitment by Governor/Chief Minister.

d. Advise the Government on terms and conditions of various jobs,

qualifications and methods of recruitment.

e. To approve extension in adhoc service of officers and make

recommendations for absorption of surplus officers.

f. Any other functions as may be prescribed.

Selection Procedure

The selection procedure has been evolved based on well stipulated policy

decisions and Commission’s Regulations developed over the years. The main

aspects are:

a. Requisitions on prescribed form are received from the Administrative

Departments for recruitment to various posts.

b. Applications are invited from the candidates against the posts advertised

through the press.

c. All applications are scrutinized in accordance with service rules to

determine the eligibility of candidates. Applications of ineligible

candidates are rejected.

254

d. Executive and judicial posts are filled up through competitive

examinations.

e. For posts other than executive and judicial, a comprehensive method of

initial screening is carried out. This may involve:

I. Written Test only

II. Short listing on the basis of academic record OR

III. Combination of I and II above

f. Qualified candidates are interviewed by the Commission and

recommended on the basis of aggregate merit.

Appointment of Chairman/Members The Chairman and Members are appointed by the Government. Tenure of Chairman/Members According to the Ordinance of 1978, the tenure of Chairman/Members is fixed

for a period of 5 years which was not extendable. A member may resign from

his office by writing under his hand addressed to the Governor.

Organization of PPSC PPSC is headed by a Chairman who is Chief Executive of the Commission and

has the administrative and financial powers of the Head of the attached

department.

The Chairman is assisted by 15 members and other officers and staff. The

Commission is organized in the following wings/branches:

1. Recruitment Wing

2. Examination Wing

3. Information and Receipt Wing

4. Psychological Branch

5. Research Branch

6. Computer Branch

7. Legal Branch

255

8. Administration Branch

9. Security Branch

10. Accounts Branch

There are two regional offices of PPSC located at Multan and Rawalpindi in

rented buildings. The regional offices are assigned the following functions:

1. To provide information about the posts, which are advertised by the

Commission and also supply and receive application forms.

2. To provide information about the final result of interviews/ written

tests/ examinations and of short listed candidates who are being called

for interview.

3. To attend the Lahore High Court, Multan, Bahawalpur and Rawalpindi

Benches, to defend and pursue the cases filed against the Commission by

the candidates.

4. Interviews are also held at Regional Offices whenever needed frequency

of such decentralized interviews is being increased.

5. In future the Commission will also hold written examinations/ written

tests in Rawalpindi and Multan to facilitate the candidates of these

regions and reduce the workload at the Head Office Lahore.

The organogram of PPSC is available at Annex ‘G’.

Submission of Annual Report The PPSC has to submit its Annual Report to the Governor which is required

under section 9 of the PPSC Ordinance, 1978. The report generally reflects the

work done by the commission and also covers its performance during a calendar

year.

Staff Strength The PPSC has a total strength of 335 personnel excluding the Chairman and 15

Members. There are 36 other officers in BS 17 & above and 309 officials. The

officers constitute 12% of the total strength.

The detailed staff strength of PPSC is available at Annex ‘H’

256

Incentive System

There is no independent incentive system for employees of PPSC. The general

provincial rules are applicable.

Training

In service training is available as for other employees of the government

257

Sindh Public Service Commission (SPSC) Historical Background Sindh Public Service Commission is one of the oldest commissions of Pakistan

having been established on 1st April 1937 as Bombay Sindh Public Service

Commission to meet the provisions of Govt. of India Act 1935. This Commission

was performing the duties of Public Service Commission for the two provinces

of Bombay and Sindh.

The Commission was at that time composed of a Chairman and two members,

one taken from each province. Chairman of the commission was appointed by

the Governor of Bombay with the consent of Governor Sindh. One member was

appointed by Governor Sindh and the other by the Governor of Bombay.

The total expenditure on account of the Commission for 11 months during the

year 1937-38 amounted to Rs. 110,525.

In its ten years operation until 1947, the commission was involved in selection

of candidates for various posts, selection of candidates for scholarships abroad,

promotion, confirmation, seniority issues, conduct of departmental and

language examination and officers pensions matter.

Establishment of Provincial Public Service Commission, Sindh On the eve of independence, the commission was re-established as Sindh Public

Service Commission (SPSC) on 1st August 1947 however the functions of the

commission remained unchanged. SPSC seized to exist in 1955 after the

establishment of one unit and was re-established on 1st July 1970 after

dissolution of one unit. It also worked as Joint Commission known as Sindh

Baluchistan Public Service Commission from 1970-1973.

The new structure of the commission continues to perform similar functions as

before until 14th August 1973. SPSC is a statutory body established under SPSC

Act 1973 at Hyderabad.

Under the Constitution of 1973 passed the SPSC Act 1973 on 5th December and

the commission was again restructured to perform the recruitment functions or

258

the government of Sindh only. According to Section 3 of this Act, the Chairman

and 3 members shall be appointed by the government.

Two major developments that took place in its transition were the SPSC Act

1989 which repelled the 1978 Ordinance and SPSC amendment Ordinance 2001

which was necessitated in the light of government policy on good governance

and enunciated in 1999.

Organization of SPSC SPSC is headed by a Chairman and 10 members appointed by the Governor.

They are responsible for conduct of examinations/tests, interviews and

formulate recommendations for the Government. The head office of the

Commission is located in Hyderabad in its own building. The Commission has

two regional offices located at Karachi and Sukkur in the buildings provided by

the Sindh Government.

SPSC Chairman (BS-22) is Chief Executive of the Commission and has all

administrative and financial powers of the head of an attached department.

There are 10 members in (BS-21/20) to assist him in his work. All theses have

constitutional status. There are other 21 officers for performance of the work

assigned to them under Act. The commission at work in headquarter has

distributed the work in the following branches and sections.

1. Administrative Branch

2. Examination Branch

3. Budget & Accounts

4. Recruitment Sections I, II, III

5. Psychologist Cell

6. Research Cell

7. Computer Cell

The Organogram of SPSC is available at Annex ‘I’

259

Functions of the SPSC The major functional task of the Commission was directed towards Scrutiny of

requisition, processing of applications, conduct of examinations tests,

interviews for the advertised posts.

The detailed functions are assigned to the commission under section 7 of the

SPSC Act 1989.

1. Conduct test/ interview for initial recruitment of civil post in BS-11 and

above connected with the affairs of the province.

2. Conduct test/ interview for post in or under a corporation and other

autonomous bodies of Sindh government.

3. Advise government on matters relating qualifications and method of

appointment to the post.

4. Advise the government on absorption of officers in various services and

cadres

5. Hold departmental and language examination.

6. Any other matter with the government may refer to the commission for

its advice/opinion.

The regional offices also perform the above functions Appointment of Chairman/Members The Chairman and Members are appointed by the Governor in consultation with

the Chief Minister.

Tenure of Chairman/Members According to Act 1973, the tenure of Chairman/Members was fixed for a period

of 3 years which was extendable. According to the recent amendment in the

Act, the tenure of Chairman/Members is fixed for a period of five year which is

not extendable.


the Governor.

260

Staff Strength

The total staff strength of the SPSC is 163, out of which 33 are officers of BS-16

and above. The strength of the constituted commission is 11. The composition

of officer is 20% of total strength whereas 80% is staff including both the

regional offices of Karachi & Sukkur. Presently working strength of SPSC is 142.

8 posts of officers and 13 posts of officials are lying vacant. 24% posts of

officers are lying vacant.

The detailed staff strength of SPSC is available at Annex ‘J’

Submission of Report The SPSC has to submit its Annual Report to the Governor which is required

under SPSC Act, 1989. The report generally reflects the work done by the

commission and also covers its performance during a calendar year.

261

Organogram of FPSC Chairman

MemberMemberMemberMemberMemberMemberMemberMemberMember

Secretary Executive Director General

Director(CSS)

DeputyDirector(CSS)

AssistantDirector (CSS)

Assistant Director (CSS)


AssistantDirector (CSS

Director(FPO)

DeputyDirector (FPO)

AssistantDirector

AssistantDirector

AssistantDirector

AssistantDirector

Director General(CSS)

Director General(Recruitment)

Director(P)

DeputyDirector (P) - 3

Director(Rules)

Assistant Director(R - I & R - II)

Assistant Director(Rules)


Director (F)

Deputy Director(F) 2

AssistantDirector – 3 R-III

Chief(Psychologist)

Senior(Psychologist) 2

Psychologist2

AssistantPsychologist – 4

(To be upgraded aspsychologist)

Director(Secret)

Deputy Director(Secret)

Deputy Director (ST)

AssistantDirector (ST)

AssistantDirector (Secret)




Chief ITSection

DeputyChief (IT)

WebsiteManager

Network Administrator

Director(Establishment)

Deputy Director(Establishment)

AssistantDirector - 3

Assistant Director (Cash)

Deputy AssistantDirector (Budget)

Assistant Director(R&I)

Director(Admin)

DeputyDirector (Admin)

AssistantDirector

AssistantDirector

TransportOfficer

DeputyAssistant Director

Director General(Admin, Establishment, Litigation)Chief IT Section

JuniorProgrammer

DeputyDirector (Law)

AssistantDirector (Law)

Director(E/C)

Senior Research Officer

AD Acc. Officer

(PSCBP)

Research Officer (2)

Assistant Librarian

Assistant Director(Programme)

Deputy AssistantDirector

Assistant Director (Quetta)

Assistant Director(Peshawar)

Assistant Director(Lahore)

Assistant Director(Karachi)

Deputy Assistant Director (Sukkar)

Deputy AssistantDirector (Multan)

Deputy AssistantDirector (Gilgit)

Deputy AssistantDirector (D. I. Khan)

Research

Officer

Post BPSExecutive DG 21Secretary 21Director General 20Chief Psychologist 20Chief IT 20Senior Psychologist 19Deputy Director 18Psychologist 18Programmer 18Quality Assurance Officer 18Database Administrator 18Website Manager 17Network Administrator 17Junior Programmer 17Assistant Director 17Research Officer 17Deputy Assistant Director 16






Programmer

QualityAssurance Officer

DatabaseAdministrator

SystemAnalyst

Chairman

MemberMemberMemberMemberMemberMemberMemberMemberMember

Secretary Executive Director General

Director(CSS)

DeputyDirector(CSS)


Assistant Director (CSS)


AssistantDirector (CSS

Director(FPO)

DeputyDirector (FPO)

AssistantDirector

AssistantDirector

AssistantDirector

AssistantDirector

Director General(CSS)

Director General(Recruitment)

Director(P)

DeputyDirector (P) - 3

Director(Rules)




Director (F)

Deputy Director(F) 2

AssistantDirector – 3 R-III

Chief(Psychologist)

Senior(Psychologist) 2

Psychologist2

AssistantPsychologist – 4

(To be upgraded aspsychologist)

Director(Secret)

Deputy Director(Secret)

Deputy Director (ST)

AssistantDirector (ST)





Chief ITSection

DeputyChief (IT)

WebsiteManager

Network Administrator

Director(Establishment)

Deputy Director(Establishment)

AssistantDirector - 3

Assistant Director (Cash)

Deputy AssistantDirector (Budget)

Assistant Director(R&I)

Director(Admin)

DeputyDirector (Admin)

AssistantDirector

AssistantDirector

TransportOfficer

DeputyAssistant Director

Director General(Admin, Establishment, Litigation)Chief IT Section

JuniorProgrammer

DeputyDirector (Law)

AssistantDirector (Law)

Director(E/C)

Senior Research Officer

AD Acc. Officer

(PSCBP)

Research Officer (2)

Assistant Librarian

Assistant Director(Programme)

Deputy AssistantDirector

Assistant Director (Quetta)

Assistant Director(Peshawar)

Assistant Director(Lahore)

Assistant Director(Karachi)

Deputy Assistant Director (Sukkar)

Deputy AssistantDirector (Multan)

Deputy AssistantDirector (Gilgit)

Deputy AssistantDirector (D. I. Khan)

Research

Officer

Post BPSExecutive DG 21Secretary 21Director General 20Chief Psychologist 20Chief IT 20Senior Psychologist 19Deputy Director 18Psychologist 18Programmer 18Quality Assurance Officer 18Database Administrator 18Website Manager 17Network Administrator 17Junior Programmer 17Assistant Director 17Research Officer 17Deputy Assistant Director 16






Programmer

QualityAssurance Officer

DatabaseAdministrator

SystemAnalyst

Annex ‘A’

262

Sanctioned Staff Strength of FPSC


1 Chairman 22 01

2 Members 22 11

3 Secretary 21 01

4 Executive Director General 21 01

5 Director General 20 03

6 Chief Psychologist 20 01

7 Chief I.T 20 01

8 Directors 19 09

9 Senior Psychologist 19 02

10 Educational Consultant 19 01

11 Deputy I.T 19 01

12 Deputy Directors 18 13

13 Psychologists 18 02

14 Senior Research Officers 18 01

15 System Analysts 18 01

16 Programmer 18 01

17 Database Administrator 18 01

18 Quality Assurance Officer 18 01

19 Junior Programmer 17 02

20 Website Manager 17 01

21 Network Administrator 17 01

22 Assistant Psychologist 17 04

23 Data Control Officers 17 03

24 Research Officers 17 03

25 Assistant Directors 17 35

26 Private Secretary 17 12

27 Deputy Assistant Directors 16 11

28 Assistant Librarian 16 01


30 System Operator 16 03

Annex ‘B’

263


32 Transport Officer 16 01

33 Assistant Database Administrator 16 01

34 Hardware Engineer 16 01

35 Assistant Network Administrator 16 05

Total Gazetted Officers 138 1

Stenographer 16 30

2 Assistant Incharge 15 02

3 D.C.A 15 16

4 K.P.S 14 02

5 Steno typist 14 47

6 Staff Assistant 12 06

7 Assistant 11 64

8 Security Supervisor 11 01

9 Library Assistant 11 01

10 Draftsman 11 01

11 KPO 11 15

12 Terminal Operator 10 02

13 UDC 10 35

14 Telephone Operator 07 02

15 L.D.C 07 61

16 Driver 05 31

17 D.R 04 02

18 D.M.O 04 03

19 Electrician 04 01

20 Lift Operator 03 03

21 Book Sorter 02 01

22 Daftri 02 16

23 Qasid 02 14

24 Naib Qasid 01 58

25 Faraash 01 02

26 Chowkidar 01 10

27 Bus Cleaner 01 01

264

28 Khakroob 01 10

Non-gazetted Staff 437 Grand Total 575

265

Organogram of BPSC

Annex ‘C’

Chairman

Member 1 Member 2 Member 3 Member 4 Member 5

Controller RecruitmentBS-17

Asst Accounts OfficerBS-16

Research Officer (2)BS-17

SecretaryBS-18

Asstt ControllerBS-17

Controller of ExaminationBS-17

Assistant SecretaryBS-16

LibrarianBS-16

Admin OfficerBS-16

SuperintendentBS-16

Chairman

Member 1 Member 2 Member 3 Member 4 Member 5

Controller RecruitmentBS-17

Asst Accounts OfficerBS-16

Research Officer (2)BS-17

SecretaryBS-18

Asstt ControllerBS-17

Controller of ExaminationBS-17

Assistant SecretaryBS-16

LibrarianBS-16

Admin OfficerBS-16

SuperintendentBS-16

266

Sanctioned, Staff Strength of BPSC

S.No DESIGNATION Pay Scale Sanctioned

1 Chairman 21/22 1

2 Members 20/21 5

3 Secretary 18 1

4 Assistant Secretary 17 1

5 Controller Recruitment 17 1

6 Assistant Controller 17 1

7 Controller of Examination 17 1

8 Secrecy Officer 17 1

9 Research Officer 17 2

10 Admin Officer 16 1

11 Assistant Accounts Officer 16 1

12 Librarian 16 1

13 Assistant Controller 16 1


15 PS to Chairman 16 1

Sub Total - I 20

16 PS to Members 15 5

17 Investigator 14 2

18 Jr. Scale Steno 12 2

19 Assistant 11 16

20 Sr. Clerk 7 3

21 Jr. Clerk 5 4

22 Driver 4 6

23 Daftri 2 1

24 Chowkidar 2 2

25 Mali 1 1

26 Naib Qasid 1 15

Annex ‘D’

267

Sub Total - II 57

Grand Total 77

268

Organogram of NWFP PSC

ChairmanBS-21/22

Member 1BPS 20

Member 2BPS 20

Member 3BPS 20

Member 4BPS 20

Member 5BPS 20

Member 6BPS 20

Member 7BPS 20

Director (Rect)BS-18

SecretaryBS-18

Director ExamBS-18

PsychologistBS-18

Accounts Officer

SuperintendentAdmin

SuperintendentAccounts

Computer Programmer

Superintendent - I

Superintendent - II

Superintendent - III

Superintendent - I

Superintendent - II


Superintendent

Registrar

Deputy Secretary - I Deputy Secretary - II

Controller Exam

Controller Exam

Superintendent

Assistant Psychologist

Statistical Investigator

ChairmanBS-21/22

Member 1BPS 20

Member 2BPS 20

Member 3BPS 20

Member 4BPS 20

Member 5BPS 20

Member 6BPS 20

Member 7BPS 20

Director (Rect)BS-18

SecretaryBS-18

Director ExamBS-18

PsychologistBS-18

Accounts Officer

SuperintendentAdmin

SuperintendentAccounts

Computer Programmer

Superintendent - I

Superintendent - II


Superintendent - I

Superintendent - II


Superintendent

Registrar

Deputy Secretary - I Deputy Secretary - II

Controller Exam

Controller Exam

Superintendent

Assistant Psychologist

Statistical Investigator

Annex ‘E’

269

Sanctioned, Working and Vacant Staff Strength of NWFP PSC

S.No DESIGNATION Pay Scale Sanctioned Working Vacant 1

Chairman 22 1 1 - 2

Members 21 1 1 - 3

Members 20 2 2 - 4

Secretary 18 1 1 - 5

Director Recruitment 18 5 3 2 6

Director Examination 18 1 - 1 7

Psychologist 18 1 1 - 8

Assistant Psychologist 17 1 1 - 9

Deputy Secretary 17 2 2 - 10

Controller of Examination 17 2 2 -

11 Accounts Officer 17 1 - 1

12 Programmer 17 1 1 -

13 Registrar Examination 16 1 1 -

14 Statistical Investigator 16 1 - 1

15 Superintendent 16 9 7 2

16 Librarian 16 1 1 -

17 Private Secretary to Chairman 16 1 - 1

Sub Total - I 32 24 8

18 Private Secretary 15 1 - 1

19 Sr. Scale Stenographer 15 8 6 2

20 Jr. Scale Stenographer 12 5 3 2

21 Assistants 11 24 20 4

22 Senior Clerks 7 6 5 1

23 Junior Clerks 5 19 12 7

24 Drivers 4 10 8 2

25 Daftri 2 4 4 -

26 Naib Qasid 2 43 36 7

Annex ‘F’

270

27 Behishti 1 1 1 -

28 Mali 1 1 1 -

29 Chowkidar 1 12 3 9

30 Sweeper 1 5 2 3

Sub Total - II 139 102 37

Grand Total (I + II) 171 126 45

271

Organogram of PPSC

Chairman

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

DirectorLegal Secretary Director

Recruitment IIDirector

Recruitment IDirectorExam

DeputyDirector 2

DeputyDirector

DeputyDirector 3

Sr. Psychologist

Jr. Psychologist

DeputyDirector 3

SecurityOfficer

SecurityOfficer

DeputyDirector

AccountOfficer

SystemAnalyst

Programmer II

Programmer I

DeputyDirector 2

ChairmanChairman

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI




DeputyDirector 2

DeputyDirector

DeputyDirector 3

Sr. Psychologist

Jr. Psychologist

DeputyDirector 3

SecurityOfficer

SecurityOfficer

DeputyDirector

AccountOfficer

SystemAnalyst

Programmer II

Programmer I

DeputyDirector 2

ChairmanChairman

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI

MemberI




DeputyDirector 2

DeputyDirector

DeputyDirector 3

Sr. Psychologist

Jr. Psychologist

DeputyDirector 3

SecurityOfficer

SecurityOfficer

DeputyDirector

AccountOfficer

SystemAnalyst

Programmer II

Programmer I

DeputyDirector 2

Chairman

Annex ‘G’

272

Sanctioned Staff Strength of PPSC

S.No DESIGNATION Pay Scale No. of Posts 1 Chairman 01

2 Members 15

3 Secretary 20 01

4 Director Recruitment I 18 01

5 Director Recruitment II 18 01

6 Director Exam I 18 01

7 Director Legal 18 01

8 System Analyst 18 01

9 Sr. Psychologist 18 01

10 Jr. Psychologist 17 02

11 Deputy Director 17 12

12 Deputy Secretary 17 01

13 Programmer 17 02

14 Security Officer 17 01


Sub Total - I 42

Subtotal – II

(Total Staff BS 16 & below) 309 Grand Total 351

Annex ‘H’

ChairmanChairmanChairman

Annex ‘I’

273

Organogram of SPSC

274

Sanctioned, Working Staff Strength of SPSC

S.No DESIGNATION Pay Scale Sanctioned Working 1 Chairman 22 1 1

2 Members 21 & 20 10 10

3 Secretary 18 1 1

4 Controller of Examination 18 1 1

5 System Analyst 18 1 1

6 Deputy Secretary (Regulations) 18 1 1

7 Psychologist 18 1 -

8 Deputy Secretary 17 4 2

9 Assistant Controller of

Examination

17 1 1

10 Statistical Officer 17 1 1

11 Budget & Accounts Officer 16 1 -

12 Superintendent 16 7 5

13 Data Processing Officers 16 2 -

14 PS to Chairman 16 1 1

Sub Total - I 33 25



17 Assistants 23 18

18 Librarian 1 -

19 Data Entry Operators 6 6

20 Junior Clerks 18 11

21 Drivers 16 16

22 Qasids 3 3

23 Naib Qasids 41 41

24 Chowkidar 5 5

25 Sanitary Workers 4 4

Annex ‘J’

275

26 Malis 2 2

Sub Total - II 130 117 Grand Total (I+II) 163 142

276

Administrative Aspect

Of Federal Service Tribunal

& Provincial Service Tribunal’s

(Punjab, Sindh, Baluchistan, NWFP)

277

FEDERAL SERVICE TRIBUNAL (FST) Establishment of FST The Federal Service Tribunal was established on 22/2/1974 under Article 212 of

the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973. Services Tribunal Act,

1973 (Act no. LXX of 1973) was also promulgated which provide for the

establishment of Administrative Tribunals. FST on its establishment was placed

under the administrative control of the Establishment Division vide item No.11

of Schedulet II of Rules of Business, 1973. Subsequently the adminstrative and

financial control of FST was transferred from Establishment Division to Law,

Justice & Human Rigths Division in the year 2001.

Organization of FST The FST is headed by a Chairman with its Headquarters at Islamabad. There are

10 members to assist the Chairman. There are two camp offices located at

Lahore & Karachi. Two members are appointed in each camp office.

The Organogram of FST is available at Annex ‘A’

Purpose/Objective of FST The very purpose of establishment of tribunal was to provide a single forum to

the civil servants for redressal of their grievances in report of their service

matters. Prior to that the Civil Courts in exercise of their planary powers used

to entertain adjudicate and such matters within their territorial jurisdiction

where the Civil Servants concerned was posted as where the cause of action

accrued to him. These matters were being filed in different Civil Courts of

different cities there was a lot of conflicting judgement/Orders on the same

issue as such the necessity was arisen to establish the Service Tribunals for

which a provision under Article 212 was made in the Constitution of Pakistan.

278

Appointment of Chairman/Members The Chairman & Members are appointed by the President of Pakistan. The

qualification for the person appointed as Chairman is the same as prescribed

for a judge of the High Court. The Chairman and members of a Tribunal may

resign their office by writing under their hand addressed to the President.

Power of Appointment The Chairman appoint to posts available in the tribunal by any of the following

methods :

1. by promotion as per general rules 2. by transfer 3. by initial appointment

He can make the appointment upto BS-19 against available vacancy by

adopting the normal procedure.

Jurisdiction The FST having exclusive jurisdiction with regard to terms & conditions of

services of Civil Servants who are or have been in the service of Pakistan.

Initially the jurisdiction of Tribunal was to the extent of Civil Servants

working/employed in the Federal Secretariat Ministries/Divisions/Attached

Departments/Offices etc.

Previously employees of autonomous/semi autonomous bodies of the Federal

Government were included but they were again excluded in the year 2006.

Functions of FST

• Like other High Courts in the country, the FST is responsible to ensure

inexpensive and expeditious justice to all Civil Servants. No fee is

charged from the appellants/Civil Servants for filing appeals or other

documents etc.

279

• The Civil Servant is required to deposit only a nominal amount of

hundred rupees post admission of their cases as cash security and that

amount too is refundable to them after the final disposal of their

appeals.

• Judgements are also provided to the appellants free of cost at their

offical/residential addresess by registered post at government expenses.

• The appellants are entitled to argue their cases themselves without

spending any amount on hiring services of any advocate.

• A copy of the judegement/order passed by the Tribunal is sent to the

parties concerend free of cost by registered post.

Powers of Tribunals Under section 5 of the Service Tribunal Act, 1973 (Act No. LXX of 1973) the

powers of Tribunal may on appeal, confirm, set aside, vary or modify the order

appealed against.

A tribunal shall, for the purpose of deciding any appeal, be deemed to be a

Civil Court and shall have the same powers as are vested in such Court under

the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908) including the powers of :-

• Enforcing the attendance of any person and exam

• Compelling the production of documents

• Issuing commission for the examination of witnesses and documents

Procedure to file appeal before Tribunal In exercise of the powers vested by section 8 fo the Service Tribunals Act,

1973, the Federal Government has formulated the rules namely “The Service

Tribunals”(Procedures) Rules, 1974, In these rules detailed procedure of filing

appeal in the Tribunal is given.

280

Staff Strength The total staff strength of FST is 137 including 37 Officers of BS-16 & above.

The officers constitute 27% of total strength and remaining 73% consists of staff

BS-15 & below. There are 4 posts of BS-22, 3 posts are BS-21 and 4 posts of BS-

20. BPS wise staff strength is available at Annex ‘B’.

Incentives There is no special incentive provided to the employees of the FST. The

honorium is sanctioned to the employees during the last quarter of the

financial year as admissible to the Federal Government employees. The criteria

for sanctioning the honorium to the employees are given in the honorium rules

issued by the Finance Division.

Training No special capacity building programme for the employees.

281

BALUCHISTAN SERVICE TRIBUNAL Establishment of BST The Baluchistan Service Tribunals Bill 1974 was passed by Provincial Assembly

of Baluchistan on 5th June, 1974 and after being assented by Governor of

Baluchistan was called Baluchistan Service Tribunals Act, 1974.

Organization of BST BST is headed by a chairman who is assisted by 2 Members, 1 Registrar and 1

Additional Registrar alongwith other supporting staff. The organogram of BST is

available at Annex ‘C’

Appointment of Chairman/Members The Chairman and members of the tribunal as appointed by the Government

and may resign their office by writing under his hand addressed to the

government.

Qualification for Chairman A Chairman of the tribunal is appointed who has been qualified to be a Judge

of High Court.

Qualification for Member Member of the tribunal is appointed who has not less than ten years Class I

Service under federal or a provincial government.

Jurisdiction of BST BST has exclusive jurisdiction in respect of matters relating to the terms and

conditions of service of Civil Servants including disciplinary matters. Civil

servant, who is a member of a Civil Service of the Province of Baluchistan or

282

who holds a Civil post in connection with the affairs of the province excluding

the following categories of employees.

1. an employee who is on deputation from federation or from other person

or authority; or

2. a person who is employed on contract or on work charged basis or who is

paid from contingencies; or

3. a person who is a worker or workman as defined in the Factories Act,

1923.

Baluchistan Corporation Employees (Extension of jurisdiction of Service

Tribunals) Act 1993 was passed by the Baluchistan Assembly.

After the enactment fo this law which was initiated on the recommendations of

the Pakistan Law Commission, the jurisdiction of Service Tribunal was extended

to all employees of the corporation.

Appeals to Tribunals Any Civil Servant aggrieved by any final order whether original or appellate

made by departmental authority in respect of any of the terms and conditions

of his service may within thirty days of the communication of such order to

him, prefer an appeal to the tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter.

Appeal against Tribunal Appeal against the Service Tribunal lies to the Supreme Court

Power of Tribunal The status of the tribunal is of a Civil Court for the purpose of deciding any

appeal and have the same powers as are vested in the Civil Court under code of

civil procedure, 1908, including the powers of :

1. enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath.

2. compelling the production of documents.

283

3. issuing commission for the examination of witnessed documents.

4. no court fee shall be payable for preferring an appeal to , or filing,

exhibiting or recording any document in, or detaining any document

from tribunal.

Staff strength The total staff strength of BST is 18 including 5 officers BS-16 & above. The

composition of officers is 28% whereas strength of supporting staff is 72%. The

detailed staff strength is available at Annex ‘D’.

Incentives No incentive is provided except the honorium, where general financial rules are

applied.

Training No special training is provided to employees.

284

NWFP SERVICE TRIBUNAL Under historical perspective NWFP Codes Regulations 1931 and the British

Baluchistan, a Provincial Judicial Service Tribunal exists for deciding appeals of

the employees of the respective areas. Under Article 212 of the Constitution of

the Islamic Republic of Pakistan which provides Establishment of Administrative

Tribunals at the Federal and Provincial levels the Provincial Assembly of NWFP

promulgated the NWFP Service Tribunals Act 1974. NWFP Service Tribunal was

established under this Act in 1974. This tribunal is an attached department of

Establishment Department of NWFP Government. Chairman of the tribunal is

head of the department and has all the administrative and financial powers

which are delegated by the Government of NWFP to the head of Department.

Objectives/Purpose of Tribunal The main purpose of establishing the tribunal is to provide remedy in the

service matters to the Civil Servants of NWFP Government.

Appointment of Chairman/Members The Chairman and Members are appointed by the government. The Chairman or

a member of the tribunal may resign the office by writing under his hand

addressed to the Governor NWFP.

Qualification for Chairman The person appointed as Chairman of the tribunal has been or is qualified to be

a Judge of high court.

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Qualification for Members The person appointed as member of the tribunal may not have less that 10

years of Class I service against a post in the Federal government or Provincial

government.

Organization of the tribunal The tribunal is headed by the Chairman (BPS-21) and assisted by 2 members of

(BS-20) and a registrar (BS-17) alongwith other ministerial staff. The

organogram of services tribunal Peshawar is available at Annex ‘E’

Service Tenure for Chairman/Members The Chairman and Members of a tribunal are appointed for a period of 3 years.

The terms can be extended.

Removal of Chairman/Member Chairman or Member of tribunal by reason of physical or mental incapacity is

unable to perform a duty or is guilty of misconduct.

Powers of Tribunal Tribunal has the following powers under the Act:

1. A tribunal may on appeal, confirm, set aside, vary or modify the order

appealed against

2. the tribunal for the purpose of deciding any appeal, be act as civil court

and shall exercise the same powers given to such courts under code of

civil procedure 1908 including the powers of

enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on

oath

compelling the production of documents;

286

issuing commission for the examination of witnesses and

documents

3. No court fee is chargeable for preferring an appeal to tribunal or filing,

exhibiting or recording any documents in/or obtaining any documents

from the tribunal.

Tenure of Officers There is no fixed tenure for Chairman, Members and other staff of the tribunal.

Sometimes a member only stays for a few months in the tribunal and is

transferred to some other place.

Jurisdiction of Tribunal NWFP Service Tribunal has exclusive jurisdiction in respect of matters relating

to the terms and conditions of service of Civil Servants including disciplinary

matters. Civil servant, who is a member of a Civil Service of the Province of

NWFP or who holds a Civil post in connection with the affairs of the province

excluding the following categories of employees.

4. an employee who is on deputation from federation or from other person

or authority; or

5. a person who is employed on contract or on work charged basis or who is

paid from contingencies; or

6. a person who is a worker or workman as defined in the Factories Act,

1923.

NWFP Corporation Employees (Extension of jurisdiction of Service Tribunals)

Act 1993 was passed by the NWFP Assembly.

After the enactment of this law which was initiated on the recommendations of

the Pakistan Law Commission, the jurisdiction of Service Tribunal was extended

to all employees of the corporation under the administrative control of the

government of NWFP.

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Staff Strength The total staff strength of the tribunal as on April 2007 is 32 including 6

officers of BS-16 & above. The officers constitute 23% of the total strength and

77% of ministerial staff. The officers are appointed by the government and

administration department. The detail of staff strength is available at Annex

‘F’.

Incentives No special incentive package is available for the employees. Training There is no specific capacity building programme for the employees of the

Tribunal. In the year 2005, a 2 years project was launched for the

computerization of NWFP Service Tribunal, Peshawar. The completion date of

the project was December 2006 which could not be completed and is hoped

that the project will be completed till June 2007. The following areas are

considered for automation:

Courts cases registration

Online case schedule

Case delaying issues and status

Security/processing fee submission and refund

Judgment and notices development and control

Online reports regarding Court cases

Online Catalog Management for Court Judges, Lawyers, Government

Department Employees, Application users, Groups, Districts etc.

Security System

General Recruitment

The network setup and hardware installation had been completed last year.

The training to the employees of the tribunal has also been completed. The

software training to the employees was completed

288

PUNJAB SERVICE TRIBUNAL Establishment of PST Punjab Service Tribunal established in the year 1974 under the Punjab Service

Tribunals Act, 1974 (P. Act IX of 1974). This Act was passed by the Punjab

Assembly on 5th June, 1974; assented to by Governor of the Punjab on 20th

June, 1974.

Organization of PST PST is headed by a Chairman and assisted by 4 Members, 1 Registrar and 1

Additional Registrar alongwith other minsteral staff. The organogram of PST is

available at Annex ‘G’

Objective/Purpose of Establishment of PST The objective of establishment of this Tribunal to provide relief to the civil

servants of the Punjab Province in respect of their service matters including

disciplinary matters.

Appointment of Chairman/Members The Chairman and members are appointed by the Governor Punjab. The

Chairman and member of Tribunal may resign his office by writing under his

hand addressed to Governor. The Chairman or member is not allowed to hold

any other office of profit in the service of Pakistan if his remuneration is

thereby increased. Maximum age for appointment of a member is 58.

Qualification for Chairman The person appointed as the Chairman of a tribunal has been or is qualified to

be a judge of a High Court

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Qualification for Members The Chairman has the power to constitute a Bench comprising of himself or one

member only or two members without the Chairman or the Chairman and a

member and when so constituted , a bench will be treated as Tribunal.

Jurisdiction of Tribunal PST has full jurisdiction in respect of matters relating to the terms and

conditions of Civil Servants including disciplinary matters who are working in

the Civil Service Punjab Province. The employees of the corporations were not

covered under PST.

In 1993 the jurisdiction of Service Tribunal extended to provide relief in cases

involving the terms and conditions of the employees or corporation under the

administrative control of Punjab Province through Punjab Corporation

Employees (Extension of Jurisdiction of Service Tribunals Act, 1993).

Appeal to Tribunal Any Civil Servant aggrieved by any final order, whether original or appellate, ,

made by departmental authority in respect of any of the terms and conditions

of his service may within thirty days of the communication of such order to him

prefer an appeal to the tribunal having jurisdiction in the matter.

Appeal against Tribunal Appeal against the Service Tribunal lies to the Supreme Court within 60 days of

the date of communication of the said order/judgement.

Powers of Tribunal A tribunal may, on appeal confirm, set aside, vary or modify the order

appealed against.

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A tribunal for the purpose of deciding an appeal of an aggrieved civil servant

will act like a Civil Court under the Civil Procedure Code, 1908 including the

following powers:

i. Enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath.

ii. Compelling the production of documents; and

iii. Issuing commission for the examination of witnesses nd documents.

No court fee is chargeable for filing an appeal, exhibiting or recording any

document in , or obtaining any document from tribunal.

Pay & Allowances Pay & Allowances of Chairman and members are mentioned in Schedule Part I

under Terms of Office of PST. Part II described about the leave and Part III

about Travelling Allowance & Medical Attendance.

Staff Strength The total staff of the PST is including BPS 16 and above. The officers

constitute and whereas . The detail staff strength is available at Annex ‘H’.

Incentives No special incentive package is available for the employees. Training

There is no capacity building plan for the employees of PST

291

SINDH SERVICE TRIBUNAL Establishment of SST Sindh Service Tribunal established in the year 1973 under Article 212 of the

constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan which provides establishment of

administrative tribunal at the federal and provincial level.

The Provincial Assembly of Sindh promulgated the Sindh Service Tribunals Act,

1973 Sindh Act XV of 1973 and established this Tribunal.

Sindh Service Tribunal is an attached department of Services General

Administration & coordination.

Chairman SST is head of the Department.

Organization of SST The Tribunal is headed by a Chairman assisted by 2 members and a Registrar

alongwith other ministerial staff. The structure of the organization is

functional.

The organogram of SST is available at Annex-A.

Objective/Purpose of Establishment of SST The primary purpose of establishment of the Tribunal was to provide a single

forum to the Civil Servants for redressal of their grievances in respect of their

service matters SST

Appointment of Chairman/Members The Chairman and members are appointed by the government. The Chairman

or a member of a Tribunal may resign his office by writing under his hand

addressed to the Governor.

Qualification for Chairman

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A person who has been or is qualified to be , judge of High Court is appointed

as Chairman of the Tribunal.

Qualification for Members

A person who has not less than 17 years service against a post in BS-16 & above

under the federal government or provincial government is appointed as Member

of Tribunal

Service Tenure for Chairman/Members The Chairman and Members of Tribunal are appointed for a period of three

years. The government may extend for another term as it deems fit. The

government may not curtail the term of office of the Chairman nor any

member appointed for a Tribunal. This addition was made 0n 31-12-1977.

Removal of Chairman or Member According to section 3-A of the SST, the Chairman or a member of tribunal by

reason of physical or mental incapacity is unable to perform his duty or is guilty

of misconduct. His casee wil be reffered to a committee consisting of three

persons headed by a person not below the rank of chairman to enquire into the

matter. The committee after conducting the inquiry, submits a report that the

Chairman or member is incapable of performing his duties or in guilty of

misconduct, Government may remove such Chairman or member.

Powers of Tribunal

SST has the following powers under the Act:

A tribunal may on appeal, confirm , setaside, vary or modify the order

appealed against.

The tribunal for the purpose of deciding any appeal, can act as Civil

Court and shall exercise the same powers vested in such court under the

code of civil procedure, 1908 (Act V of 1908), including the powers of :

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Enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath

Compelling the production of documents

Issuing commission for the examination of witnesses and documents

No court fee is admissable for preferring an appeal to tribunal or filing,

exhibiting or recording any document from a tribunal.

Terms & Conditions of Service of Chairman/Members Services & General Administration Department (Regulation Wing) issued SOR-I(S

& GAD) 2/1-85, in exercise of the powers conferred by section 8 of the SST Act,

1973 issued on 18th November 1985. In these rules, conditions of service of

Chairman and Members are prescribed.

Pay & Allowances of Chairman

The Chairman of SST will be entitled to get pay in BPS-21, in case if the

Chairman is a serving Judge of the High Court, he will be entitled to get the

pay, as admissible to a Judge of the High Court.

The Chairmaan is entitled to free unfurnished residential accommodation from

the term of his office and fifteen days after ceasing to hold his office and in

case accommodation is not provided he will be allowed house rent subsidy at

such rate as admissible to a Secretary to Government.

The Chairman is entitled to the travelling allowances as admissible to a

Secretary to Government.

The Chairman is entitled to medical facilities in accordance with the West

Pakistan Government Servants/ Medical Attendance) Rules, 1959 as applicable

in Sindh.

The Chairman is entitled to use of official car.

Pays & Allowances of Member

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A member of the tribunal is entitled to receive paying BPS-20 provided that if

the membre:-

i. Was immediately before his appointment as such in the service of Pakistan

and was drawing higher pay, he shall continue to draw such pay;

ii. Was immediately before his appointment as such holding a post in BPS 19

or below, he shall pay of Rs 440/- per month during tenure of his pay and

special pay does not exceed the maximum of BPS 20.

iii. Is re-employed after retirement from the service of Pakistan, his pay shall

be regulated in accordance with the rules and instructions as if he were

reemployeed in a post under government.

The member is entitled to the use of official car on such conditions as

applicable to the use of official car b y Secretary to Government.

The member is entitled to the travelling allowance as admissible to a Secretary

to Government.

The member is entitled to medical facilities in accordance with the West

Pakistan Government Servants (Medical Attendance) Rules, 1959 as applicable

in Sindh.

Jurisdiction SST has exclusive jurisdiction in respec t of matters relating to the terms and

conditions of service of Civil Servants alongwith disciplinary matters who are in

Civil Service of the Sindh Province.

On the recommendation of the Pakistan Law Commission in its meeting held on

Dec 26-31, 1992 at Lahore regarding the extension of jurisdiction of Service

Tribunals to provide relief to the empoyees of statutory corporations, managed

or controlled by the federal or provincial governments.

In the light of above recommendation Sindh Corporation Employees (Extension

of Jurisdiction of Service Tribunals) Act, 1993 was passed by Sindh Provincial

Assembly. Resultantly, the jurisdiction of Service Tribunal extended to all

employees of the corporations or institutions set up or established by an

Ordinance or Act of Provincial Assembly and managed or controlled by the

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Government of Sindh. The basic objective was to provide relief in cases

involving terms & conditions of service of the employees of corporation.

Staff Strength The total staff strength of SST is 36 including 5 officers of BS-16 & above. The

Officers constitute 12% of the total strength whereas 88% are staff. The

detailed staff strength is available at Annex-B.

Incentives No special incentive package is available for the employees of the SST.

Training There is no capacity building plan for the employees of SST

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Organogram of Federal Service Tribunal

Member

Personal

Member

Member

Member Member Member Member Member Member

CHAIRMAN

Member Personal Personal Personal Personal Personal

Deputy Deputy

Registrar

Deputy

Assistant

Personal

Assistant Assistant

Admin

Superinte Asst.

Annex ‘A’

297

Statement showing the staff strength of Federal Service Tribunal

S.No Basic Pay Scale Sanctioned Post 1 22 4 2 21 3 3 20 4 4 19 1 5 18 1 6 17 14 7 16 10

Sub Total-I 37

8 15 10 9 14 0 10 13 0 11 12 4 12 11 6 13 10 0 14 9 0 15 8 0 16 7 9 17 6 0 18 5 12 19 4 16 20 3 0 21 2 12 22 1 31

Sub Total - 2 100

GRAND TOTAL 137

Annex ‘B’

298

Organogram of Baluchistan Service Tribunal

Chairman

Add. Registrar

Reader

Assistant

Jr. Clerk

Member - I

PA

Member - II

PA

Driver (4)

Naib Qasid (4)

Process Server

Registrar

Annex ‘C’

299

Statement showing the staff strength of Baluchistan Service Tribunal (as on 31/01/2007)

S.No DESIGNATION Pay Scale Sanctioned 1 Chairman 21 1

2 Members 20 2

3 Registrar 1

4 Additional Registrar 1

5 Senior Stenographer 15 2

6 Assistant 11 2

7 Reader 10 1

8 Junior Clerk 5 1

9 Process Server 5 1

10 Driver 4 2

11 Naib Qasid 4 4

Total 18

Annex ‘D’

300

Organogram of Service Tribunal, NWFP

Member

PS

Member PS

Superintendent

Assistant

Registrar

Asstt Registrar

Chairman

Accountant

Officers 6 Ministerial Staff 32

Annex ‘E’

301

Statement showing the staff strength of NWFP Service Tribunal

S.No DESIGNATION Pay Scale Sanctioned 1 Chairman 21 1

2 Members 2 2

3 Registrar 17 1

4 Assistant Registrar 16 1


Sub Total 6

6 Stenographer 15 5

7 Assistant 11 1

8 Accountant 11 1

9 Driver 4 3

10 Clerk 5 6

11 Naib Qasid 1 6


13 Chowkidar 1 2

Sub Total 26

Total 32

Annex ‘F’

302

Organogram of Punjab Service Tribunal

Ministerial Staff

Reader 06

Clerk 08

Naib Qasid 14

Chowkidar 02

Sanitory Work 02

Superintendent 01

Accountant 01

-------------------------------

32

Chairman

Member Member Member Member Member

PS 2 PS 2 PS 2 PS 2 PS 2

Registrar

Asst Registrar

Annex ‘G’

303

Sanctioned Staff Strength of Punjab Service Tribunal

Organogram of Sindh Service Tribunal

S.No DESIGNATION BPS No. of Posts 1 Chairman 21 1

2 Member 20 53 Registrar 18 14 Assistant Registrar 16 15 Superintendent 16 1

6 Accountant 11 1

7 Stenographer, Steno typist 12,15 148 Reader 5 69 Clerk 5 810 Naib Qasid 1 14

11 Chowkidar 1 2


Total 46

Annex ‘H’

Annex ‘I’

304

Statement showing the staff strength of SST

Chairman

Member Member

Registrar

Superintendet

Reader

Assistant Assistant

Sr. Clerk

Annex ‘J’

305

S.No DESIGNATION Pay Scale Sanctioned

1 Chairman 22 1

2 Member 19/20 2

3 Registrar 18 1


Sub Total – I 5

5 Sr. SC. Stenographer 15 4

6 Reader 11 1

7 Assistant 11 2

8 Sr. Clerk 7 1

9 Junior Clerk 5 4

10 Typist 5 2

11 Driver 4 3

12 Qasid/Daftri 2 1

13 Bailiff 2 1

14 Naib Qasid 1 10

15 Chowkidar 1 1


Sub Total - II 31

Grand Total 36

306


Federal Ombudsman &

Provincial Ombudsman (Baluchistan, Punjab, Sindh)

Wafaqi Mohtasib (WM)

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Historical Perspective Originally, modern Ombudsman flourished in China during Qin Dynasty (221 BC) and in

Korea during the Choseon Dynasty. The concept Mohtasib (Ombudsman) is also an

ancient Islamic concept. The second caliph Hazrat Umar established this institution on

regular footing during his caliphate. Many Islamic states have established the office of

Mohtasib to ensure that no wrong or injustice is done to the citizens. It is necessary to

clarify that Ombudsman is not equal to Mohtasib. In Islamic era the institution of

Ombudsman was an organization to invigilate excesses and unlawful activities of

government officers/officials towards the public. This organization was called

“Dewan-ul-Muzalin” whereas the institution of Mohtasib was an organization

responsible to inspect over all values of society such as measurement weight,

purification of utilities, condition of foods, rates of commodities, adulteration, ritual

and public activities of the people. Dr. Victor Pickl of the Austrian Ombudsman Office

remarks as follows:

“Institution to investigate complaints can only be seen in context of public

administration; hence their history is also the history of public administration as a

whole. It goes back to the Holy Quran. In the Koran (Holy Quran) itself the term

‘administration’ is not used, administrative systems are expounded. Justice is one of

the basic principles of Islamic Ideology. Not only the rulers are responsible for it but

the exercise of justice is a task for the whole Muslim community and should be

practiced without regard of social status, race, or religious creed. Among Greeks and

Romans, on the other hand, sharp distinctions were drawn between different persons

and organizations in which rights were vested”

“As shown above the handling of complaint from the public was an essential part of

the Islamic system of justice…

There are good reasons for the assumptions that the Islamic system has influenced the

creating of the first Ombudsman in Sweden”

In the 18th century, when King Charles XII of Sweden was in exile in Istanbul (Turkey)

during Ottoman Empire, he observed the working and efficacy of the institution of

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Ombudsman in the Ottoman Caliphate, King Charles XII, on regaining the power,

established a similar institution in Sweden. It is also used in the other Scandinavian

languages as the Icelandic “Umboosmaour”, the Norwegian “Ombudsman” and the

Danish Ombudsmand.

The modern use of the term as earlier stated began in Sweden, with the Swedish

Parliamentary Ombudsman established in 1809 to safeguard the rights of citizens by

establishing a supervisory agency independent of the executive branch. Gradually,

other developed western countries also adopted this institution.

Presently, this institution is successfully working in Canada, UK, Netherlands, Ireland,

United States, India, Bangladesh, Srilanka, Philippines, Japan, Indonesia and several

other countries with different constitutions. In brief the Office of Ombudsman in its

developed form has so far been established in 114 countries of the world.

The need of setting up the Ombudsman institution in Pakistan was first given place in

the interim constitution of Pakistan 1972. The institution of Ombudsman was included

in the federal legislative list whereas it was also mentioned that the institution can be

set up in he Provinces through Provincial legislatures. However, the institution of

Wafaqi Mohtasib was established in 1983 under President Order of 1983. This process

cannot be completed unless all the provinces have their own Ombudsman. The Sindh

Province is the first who has established the Provincial Ombudsman institution in early

1992 by an Act of 1991. Azad Jammu and Kashmir also set up this institution in 1992.

The Punjab Province established this institution in 1996 and Baluchistan Province has

setup this institution in 2001 whereas Province of NWFP has yet to setup the

Ombudsman Office.

Establishment of Wafaqi Mohtasib in Pakistan In Pakistan, the establishment of the institution of Ombudsman was advocated on

various occasion. A provision of appointment of Wafaqi Mohtasib as well as Provincial

Mohtasib was provided in Article 276 of the interim constitution of 1972.

Subsequently, constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 also includes Wafaqi

Mohtasib at item 13 of the Federal Legislative list in the fourth schedule.

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The institution of Wafaqi Mohtasib was first established in the country under

Presidential Order No. 1 of 1983 known as “Establishment of the Office of Wafaqi

Mohtasib Order, 1983” which has been made a part of the constitution of Pakistan by

virtue of Article 270-A. The first Wafaqi Mohtasib was appointed on 8th August 1983

and thus Wafaqi Mohtasib Office started functioning from this date. The present

incumbent of the office is 9th Wafaqi Mohtasib appointed last year.

Objectives of Wafaqi Mohtasib The basic objective for establishing the office of the Wafaqi Mohtasib was to

institutionalize a system for enforcing and fortifying bureaucratic accountability.

The main objective of Wafaqi Mohtasib is:

“To diagnose, investigate, redress and rectify any injustice done to a person through

mal-administration”. The institution of Wafaqi Mohtasib is unique in its jurisdiction

and the mode of operations from other grievance redress mechanism available in the

country. It is neither parallel to executive nor has it been assigned functions identical

to other agencies. The Mohtasib office has been established to fill the vacuum in the

existing system for safeguarding the individual citizens from injustices and mal-

administration of government functionaries.

The institution provides speedy justice to the people who have suffered through mal-

administration and ask for remedial measures.

Appointment of Wafaqi Mohtasib The Wafaqi Mohtasib is appointed by the President under section 3(1) of the

Ordinance and takes an oath before the President before joining the office. He will

perform his functions and exercise his powers fairly, honestly, diligently and

independently of the executive and all executive authorities throughout country will

act in aid of the Mohtasib.

Status of the Organization

The institution of Wafaqi Mohtasib is independent. It is a statutory body

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Tenure of the Wafaqi Mohtasib

Wafaqi Mohtasib is appointed for a fixed term of four years which is not extendable

under any circumstances. During this period, he is not allowed to hold any other

office of profit in the service of Pakistan or occupy any other position carrying the

right to remuneration for rendering of services.

Removal of Wafaqi Mohtasib Wafaqi Mohtasib can not be removed from his office except on the ground of

misconduct or of having incapable of property performing his office duties due to

physical or mental incapacity. On his request, charges can be determined by the

Supreme Judicial Council. The terms & conditions of Service cannot be varied to his

disadvantage. On the basis of the inquiry conducted by the Supreme Judicial Council

President is empowered to take action of the removal or vice versa.

Jurisdiction of the Wafaqi Mohtasib The services offered by the Wafaqi Mohtasib are free of cost and without observance

of any formality. The Wafaqi Mohtasib may take action on a complaint by any

aggrieved person, on a reference by the President. The Federal Council or National

Assembly as the case may be or on a motion of the Supreme Court or High Court made

during the course of any proceedings before it or of his own motion. He has the

jurisdiction to undertake any investigation into any allegation of maladministration on

the part of any federal agency or any of its officers or employees except in the

following cases:

(1) i. any matter sub-judice before a court of competent jurisdiction or

tribunal or board in Pakistan on the date of the receipt of a complaint,

reference or motion by him; or

ii. relate to the external affairs of Pakistan or the relations or dealing of

Pakistan with any foreign state or government; or

311

iii. relate to, or are connected with the defence of Pakistan or nay part

thereof, the military, naval and air forces of Pakistan, or the matters

covered by the laws relating to those forces.

(2) The Mohtasib shall not accept for investigation any complaint by or on

behalf of a pubic servant or functionary concerning any matters relating

to the Agency in which he is, or has been, working in respect of any

personal grievance relating to his service therein.

(3) For carrying out the objectives of this Order and, in particular for

ascertaining the root causes of corrupt practices and injustice, the

Mohtasib may arrange for studies to be made or research to be

conducted and may recommend appropriate steps for their eradication

(4) The Mohtasib has power to setup regional offices as, when and where

required.

Appointment of Advisors/ Staff & TCS 1. The Mohtasib has power to appoint advisors, consultants, fellows, bailiffs, interns,

commissioners and experts with or without remuneration to assist him in the

discharge of his duties under the Article 20 of this Order.

2. The Mohtasib has the power to appoint staff with consultation of the President. It

is necessary for Mohtasib to consult Federal Public Service Commission for making

appointment of the staff members or on matters relating to qualification for such

appointment and methods of their recruitment.

3. Pay & Allowance applicable to the Federal Civil Servants are adopted by the

Wafaqi Mohtasib for employees.

Powers of Wafaqi Mohtasib

312

Under Article 14of this Order, the Wafaqi Mohtasib has the power of Civil Court under

the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in regard to the following matters:

1.

i. Summarizing & enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on

Oath;

ii. compelling the production of documents;

iii. receiving evidence on documents;

iv. Issuing commission for the examination of witnesses.

2. If Wafaqi Mohtasib finds an element of maladministration in a matter, he can after

investigating the matter ask the concerned Agency to consider the matter further or

cancel its decision to take disciplinary action against any public servant, to dispose of

the cases within specified time or to improve the working of the Agency or to take

any other remedial measure. In case of non implementation of the recommendation

of Mohtasib, is treated as “Defiance of Recommendations” he may in addition to

taking other actions under this order, refer the matter to the President of Pakistan,

who in his discretion may direct the Agency to implement the recommendations. The

Mohtasib is also empowered to award compensation to an aggrieved person for any

loss or damage suffered by that person on account of bad administration. In case of

false complaint or frivolous he can also award compensation to the Agency or the

functionary against whom the complaint was made.

The Wafaqi Mohtasib or any member of the staff under Article 15 is authorized in this

behalf may, for the purpose of making any inspection or investigation enter any

premises where the Mohtasib or as the case may be, such member has reason to

believe that any article, book of accounts or any other documents relating to the

subject matter of inspection or investigation may be found.

The Mohtasib has the same power to punish for contempt, as the Supreme Court has

to punish any person for its contempt.

Administrative/Financial Powers

313

The Wafaqi Mohtasib is the Chief Executive of the office and has been given

administrative and financial autonomy by the federal government. He is Principal

Accounting Officer of the office in respect of the expenditure incurred against budget

grant or grants controlled by him and he is exercising all the financial and

administrative powers delegated to him. This amendment was made in the Ordinance

No. LXXII of 2002

Delegation of Powers The Mohtasib has the power to delegate some of his powers as may be specified in the

Order to any member of his staff or to a standing or advisory committee to be

exercised subject to such conditions as may be specified and every report of such

member or committee is first submitted to the Mohtasib with his or its

recommendations for appropriate action.

Organization of Wafaqi Mohtasib The office of Wafaqi Mohtasib was established on 8th August, 1983 with its

Headquarter at Islamabad. The office of Mohtasib is an independent constitutional

body. Wafaqi Mohtasib is its Chief Executive, who is assisted by one Secretary, 7

advisors, 1 DG (Admin), 1 Consultant (Admin) and 1 Consultant (complaints) alongwith

other ministerial staff at headquarters. The following wings are functioning directly

under secretary:

i. Complaints Wing

ii. Coordination Wing

iii. Administration Wing

iv. MIS wing

v. Public Relations Wing

Investigation Wing and Advisor Appraisal is directly under the Mohtasib. In the

beginning four regional offices were opened at Provincial Capitals i.e. Karachi,

Lahore, Peshawar, and Quetta. It was felt that complaints of remote areas had to

travel quite a distance in order to register and follow up. Four more regional offices

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were established from the period 2001 onwards located at Faisalabad, Multan, Sukkur

and DI Khan.

Each Regional Office is headed by either a Member/Advisor/DG/Consultant/Director

etc (BPS- 19/20) officer. Each regional office has the following six sections to perform

the administrative and operational functions:-

Administration

Coordination

Complaints

Investigations

Public Relations

Organogram of Federal Ombudsman and its Regional setup may be seen at Annex-A &

B.

Staff Strength The office of Wafaqi Mohtasib started with the working strength of 32 officials against

the sanctioned strength of 114 in the year 1983-84. The total number of civil servants

at that time was 121,153.

Presently the total staff strength of Wafaqi Mohtasib is 614 including 92 officers which

constitutes of 15% of total strength whereas officials 85% of total strength. Wafaqi

Mohtasib is in BPS 22 whereas there are 2 officers in BPS-21 and 9 Officers in BPS-20.

The staff is on regular as well as on contract basis. There are some officers on

deputation basis in their own pay scale. However, the staff below BS-17 is on regular

basis.

A handbook was prepared describing procedures functioning of Wafaqi Mohtasib Office

in the year 2004. Later on different handbooks for dealing of complaints pertaining to

specific organizations such as WAPDA, PTCL were prepared Draft Wafaqi Mohtasib

(Ombudsman’s)

Employees, Appointment, Promotion and Transfer Rules 2005 were prepared and have

been submitted to the M/O Law for vetting. These laws are still to enforce.

The detailed staff strength is shown at Annex-C.

Incentives

315

20% special allowance on the running basic pay is paid to the employees. No other

incentive is provided to them.

Training In the beginning there was no capacity building plan for the employees of the WM.

Appraisal Wing was established to review and improve the quality of documentary

findings prepared by Investigating Officer. This wing has to reflect the growing focus

on training. In the year 2004, progress was made for development of training

modules. WM has developed Management Information System (MIS) and installed at

head office as well as regional offices. Training of all Investigation Officers and

officials has been carried out with refresher courses to all concerned employees.

Internal Administrative Control Internally, WM has adopted an open door policy for senior management including the

Wafaqi Mohtasib himself and other members of his team irrespective of their

hierarchical position.

They are encouraged to communicate and provide feedback on their collective or

individual grievances. WM, on regular basis has initiated to conduct series of meetings

with different officials.

To increase operational efficiency Management Information System (MIS) is being

developed which has various components to enable better internal management

including Human Resource, Accounts, Inventory Control and Library Software

applicants. There is also a purpose to build up electronic complaint management

system.

Key performance indicators are being established which will use in performance

assessment focusing on outputs and outcomes rather than the traditional input and

process based modes of assessment.

Provincial Ombudsman Baluchistan (POB)

316

Establishment of Provincial Ombudsman, Baluchistan Governor of Baluchistan on 10th March, 2001 promulgated Baluchistan Ordinance no.

VI of 2001 regarding the establishment of the office of Ombudsman for the Province

of Baluchistan. Hence, the office of POB was established under this Ordinance in year

2001. In Baluchistan this office was established after 18 years of establishment of the

office of Wafaqi Mohtasib. The main reason for late establishment of the office was

due to special environment of supremacy of bureaucracy who continuously resisted

and avoided to follow the path of other provinces to establish Ombudsman office

because they thought that the office of Ombudsman will be checked on their absolute

authority which was not acceptable to them. The purpose to establish this institution

was to diagnose, investigate, redress and rectify any injustice to a person through

mal-administration of government functionaries.

Objective of POB The main objective of the POB is to pave the way for the good governance which

implies besides other factors the preservation of rule of law, adherence to due

process, procedure and expeditious fair and under an effective legal system in order

to curb mal-administration.

The Ombudsman law has a distinguished character of redressal of the grievances of

poor and stressed people through the way of informal justice.

Suo-moto actions are taken by the Ombudsman to redress the grievances of public at

large, even those people are benefited who are not party in complaints before this

office. Best efforts were made to persuade the agencies to act under the system and

rules.

Accountability with honest, sincere intention and without any discrimination is the

only proper mechanism for elimination of corruption or for its minimization because

strike at the root cause of corruption in society is basic need for good governance.

Salient Characteristics of POB

317

• Independent of executive

• Easily accessible

• Free of cost, No fee for filing complaint

• Result oriented

• Its Ordinance to override other laws.

• Delivers speed and free of cost justice

• Suo-moto action

Appointment and Qualification of POB The POB is appointed by the Governor of Baluchistan. Before joining as Ombudsman

he has to take an oath before the Governor as described in the first schedule of the

Ordinance.

The qualification for appointment of Ombudsman is who is or has been a judge of the

High Court or has been District & Session Judge qualified to be judge of the High

Court.

The Ombudsman is supposed to perform his functions and exercise his powers fairly,

honestly, diligently and independent of the executive

Tenure of POB The POB is appointed for a fixed term of four years and is not eligible to extension of

tenure or for reappointment as Ombudsman under any circumstances.

Resignation from Office The Ombudsman may resign from his office by writing under his hand addressed to the

Governor.

Organization of POB The office of POB was established on 22nd March 2001 and initially started in four

rooms allotted by S & GAD in Block #10 of the Civil Secretariat and later on one

complete floor was provided for the office. The existing space is still not meeting the

requirement to accommodate staff. The office is headed by an Ombudsman who is

318

assisted by 1 secretary, 4 Directors, 1 Deputy Director and 1 Registrar alongwith other

staff.

These Directors are assigned the job of investigation of complaints and their

processing. One Director is responsible for dealing with the complaints. The

Organogram of POB is available at Annex – A.

Staff Strength The staff of 20 personnel for the office of Ombudsman was sanctioned at the time of

its establishment. The existing sanctioned strength is 68 including 15 officers of BS-16

and above. The ratio of officers is 22% and rest of the staff is 78% respectively.

There is no regular staff. Most of the employees are transferred by Services & General

Administration department frequently. Service Rules framed are still under process.

The post wise total staff strength is available at Annex – B

Incentive System No incentive system is framed for employees of POB.

Training

There is no capacity building programme for the employees of POB.

Provincial Ombudsman Punjab (POP)

319

Establishment of Provincial Ombudsman Punjab The office of the Punjab Ombudsman was established on 30th September 1996 vide

Punjab Ordinance No. XI of 1996 with the purpose to safe guard the rights of people,

ensuring adherence to the rule of law, diagnosing, rectifying and redressing any

injustice done to them through mal-administration and for suppression of corrupt

practices.

In order to give permanence to this institution the government enacted Act X of 1917

which has been notified on 30th June 1997. When the first Ombudsman was a retired

Judge of Supreme Court, no space for office was allotted. The Ombudsman started his

work in his own chamber. He was shifted to a position of Chief Minister Inspection

Team’s building. Mr. Justice Muhammad Munir A Khan, who had hardly settled down

his office, was assassinated by terrorist and Mr. Justice (R) Manzoor Hussain was

appointed as 2nd Ombudsman of Punjab on 26th January 1997.

During this period there was a development of merger of Chief Minister’s Inspection

Team with Ombudsman Office. The idea was dropped on 26/03/1997 and Chief

Minister decided that both will to continue work as separate entities. After the end of

this uncertainty, the office has got the budget etc.

Appointment of Ombudsman The Ombudsman is appointed by the government and a person who is or has been or is

qualified to be a judge of the High Court and is a person of known integrity. He can

not join the office until he takes an oath before the Governor in the form set out in

first schedule to this Act.

The Ombudsman has to perform his functions in all matters and exercise his powers

fairly, honestly, diligently and independent of the Executive and all executive

authorities throughout the province of Punjab.

Tenure of the Ombudsman

320

The Ombudsman has a fixed term of 3 years and is not eligible for any extension for

tenure of for reappointment as Ombudsman under any circumstances.

Resignation The Ombudsman may resign his office b y writing under his hand addressed to the

Governor.

Organization of Ombudsman The office of POP was established on September 30, 1996 and first Ombudsman of the

office appointed on 20th October, 1996, The Ombudsman is the Chief Executive of the

office and is its Principal Accounts Officer in respect of the expenditure incurred

against budget grant or grants controlled by the Ombudsman. He has all the

administrative and financial powers delegated to Head of an Administrative

Department of the Province. POP is assisted by Secretary (BS-20), 2 Advisors (BS-

20/21) and 10 consultants (BS-19), Advisors and Consultants are investigating officers

and stationed at Lahore. The Secretary (BS-20) is assisted by 1 Additional Secretary

(BS-19) and 2 consultants (BS-19), one is assigned the job of inspection and other is

looking after the affairs of the research. There are 10 other officers and staff to assist

them in their day to day working.

Presently, POP has its headquarter in Lahore and two regional offices located in

Multan and Rawalpindi. Territorial Jurisdiction of head office and regional offices is

determined and all the districts of Punjab are distributed among these regions and

head offices. A new regional office is proposed to set up in Sargodha during the next

financial year. The organogram of POP is available at Annex A

Staff Strength The total staff strength of POP is 175 including 39 officers. The composition of

officers is % whereas staff is %. There is a skeleton staff in the regional offices.

Regional office Multan has an Advisor in BS-20 and 3 consultants BS-19 alongwith staff.

In Regional Office Rawalpindi there is 1 Additional Registrar (BS-17) alongwith other

supporting staff. The detailed staff strength is available at Annex-B

321

Incentives

There is no capacity building programme for the employees of POB.

Training No incentive system is framed for employees of POB.

Provincial Ombudsman Sindh (POS) Establishment of Provincial Ombudsman, Sindh

322

The institution of Wafaqi Mohtasib was established in 1983 under President Order,

1983 which was admired by all segment of society. Half of the public grievances

voiced at Provincial level, the pubic have been demanding for establishing of Mohtasib

Office in the Provinces.

Even WM has also been recommending the establishment of the Office of Mohtasib in

the Provinces to complete the process of administrative accountability.

Sindh Province was the first to set up the office of Ombudsman in early 1992 under

Sindh Act No. I of 1991. The prime objective behind establishing the office of

Ombudsman is to evolve a system for enforcing perpetuating accountability of

government functionaries.

Functions of POS

The main function of the office is to diagnose, investigate, redress and rectify any

injustice done to a person through mal-administration on the part of provincial

government departments/agencies.

Mal-administration includes: 1. A decision, process, recommendation act of omission or commission which :-

• is contrary to law, rules or regulations or is a departure from

established practice or procedure, unless it is bonafide

and for valid reason; or

• is perverse, arbitrary or unreasonable, unjust, biased, oppressive,

or discriminatory; or

• is based on irrelevant grounds; or

• involves the exercise of powers or the failure or refusal to do so,

for corrupt or improper motives, such as

bribery, jobbery, favoritism, nepotism and administrative

excesses; and

2. neglect, inattention, delay, incompetence, inefficiency and ineptitude, in the

administration or discharge of duties and responsibilities.

323

Appointment of Ombudsman The Provincial Ombudsman Sindh is appointed by the Governor of Sindh under section

3 of the Act. The Ombudsman can not join his office without administering the oath of

the office before the Governor in the form set out in the first schedule to this Act.

The Ombudsman is supported to perform his functions and exercise his powers fairly,

honestly, diligently and independently from the influence of the Executive and all

executive authorities throughout the province will assist in performance of his

functions under the Act.

Tenure of POS The Ombudsman is appointed for a fixed terms of four years which is not extendable

for another term under any circumstances. The ombudsman is also not allowed to

hold any other office of profit in service of Pakistan.

Terms of Services of POS The POS is entitled to such salary, allowances and privileges and other terms and

condition of service as the Governor may determine and these terms are not

changeable during the term of office.

Resignation from Office The Ombudsman may resign his office by writing under his hand addressed to the

Governor.

Removal from Office The Ombudsman under section 6 of Act may be removed from office by the Governor

on the ground of misconduct or of being incapable of properly performing the duties

of his office by reason of physical or mental incapacity. The procedure of removal on

the basis of misconduct is mentioned in the Act.

It is pointed out that if an Ombudsman is removed from Office on the ground of

misconduct, he is not eligible to hold any office of profit in the service of Pakistan or

324

for election as a member of National Assembly or a Provincial Assembly or any local

body.

Appointment of an Acting Ombudsman According to section 7 of Act an Acting Ombudsman can be appointed by the Governor

in case of office of Ombudsman is vacant or the Ombudsman is absent or is unable to

perform his functions due to any reason.

Appointment & Terms & Conditions of Service of Staff Provincial Mohtasib has the power to appoint the staff other than specified for

appointment by Governor.

Ombudsman Office is exempted to consult the Provincial Public Service Commission

for recruiting the staff or on matters relating to qualifications for such appointment

and mode of their recruitment.

Basic Pay Scales, Allowances and other terms of services for the staff of the

Ombudsman are same as applicable to the provincial employees. Before joining the

office each employee is supposed to take oath before the ombudsman in form as set

in.

Powers of Provincial Ombudsman, Sindh Provincial Ombudsman Sindh has the following powers:

I. Civil Court powers to summon and enforce attendance of any person and

examine on oath, compel to produce documents, receive evidence on affidavits

and issue commission for the examination of witness.

II. To authorize to enter and search any premises and inspect any article, book of

accounts or other documents.

III. To punish any person for its contempt same powers, mutatis mutandis’, as the

high court.

IV. To require any person to furnish information on such points or matters as, in the

opinion of the ombudsman, may be useful for the investigation.

325

V. To report the cases of “defiance of recommendations” to the governor of Sindh,

which becomes part of the personal file or character roll of the public servant

primarily responsible for the defiance

VI. To constitute an inspection team for the performance of any of the functions

VII. To establish standing or advisory committees at specified places with specified

jurisdiction.

VIII. To appoint advisors, consultants, commissioners and experts.

IX. To award of costs and compensation and refund of amount.

X. To seek the assistance of any person or authority for the performance of his

function.

XI. To take measures to curb maladministration including corrupt practices and

graft.

XII. To informally conciliate, amicably resolve, stipulate, settle or ameliorate any

grievance without written memorandum and without the necessity of docketing

any complaint.

XIII. To take suo-moto action

326

Organogram of Federal Ombudsman

Annex ‘A’

327

Setup of Federal Ombudsman

Annex ‘B’

328

Statement showing the Staff Strength of Wafaqi Mohtasib

S.No Basic Pay Scale

Sanctioned Post

1 22 1

2 21 2

3 20 9

4 19 3

5 18 3

6 17 10

7 16 19

Sub Total-I 47

8 15 62

9 14 3

10 12 19

11 11 35

12 10 1

13 8 1

14 7 88

15 5 10

16 4 49

17 2 20

18 1 126

Sub Total-II 414

TOTAL 461

Annex ‘C’

329

Organogram of Provincial Ombudsman Baluchistan

OMBUDSMAN

Secretary

Director – I Investigation (B-19)

Director – II Investigation (B-19)

Director – III, Complaint

Director – IV Investigation (B-19)

Deputy Director (Admin) (B-18)

Registrar (B-17)

P.R.O (B-17)

S.S.S (B-15) 1 J.C (B-5) 1

Account Officer (B-17)

Computer Operator (B-16)

Superintendent (Admin) (B-16)

• J.S.S (B-12) 1

• S.C/Cashier (B-7)

Superintendent - I (B-16)

Superintendent – II (B-16)

• S.S.S (B-15) 1

• Computer Operator (B-12) 1

• Assistant (B-11) 1

• J.C (B-5) 2

• J.S.S (B-12) 1

• Computer Operator (B-12) 1


• J.C (B-5) 2 • Bailiff (B 5)

P.S (B-16)

Advisor

Consultant

P.S (B-16)

PA


Librarian/Storekeeper • S.C (B-7)

1 • J.C (B-5)

Annex ‘D’

330

Statement showing the Staff Strength of POB


1 Principal Ombudsman 20

01

2 Secretary 19 11

3 Director 18 04

4 Deputy Director (Admin) 17 01

5 Registrar 17 01


7 Public Relations Officer 16 01



Sub total - I 16


11 S.S. Stenographer 19 02

12 J.S. Stenographer 18 04


14 Assistant 18 04

15 Senior Clerk 18 02

16 Junior Clerk 18 08

17 Bailiff 18 02

18 Driver 18 06

19 Naib Qasid 17 16

20 Chowkidar 17 02

21 Mali 17 01

22 Faraash 17 02


Subtotal - II 52

Grand Total 68

Annex ‘E’

331

Organogram of Provincial Ombudsman, Punjab

Regional Office,

Annex ‘F’

Ombudsman Punjab

Secretary BS-20

Investigating Officers

P.S.O BS-18/19

Advisor-I BS-20

Advisor-II BS-21

Consultant-I

BS-19

Consultant-II

BS-19

Consultant-III

BS-19

Consultant-IV

BS-19

Advisor BS-20

Consultant-I BS-19

Consultant-II BS-19

Consultant-III BS-19

Additional Secretary BS-19

Consultant Inspection

BS-19

Consultant Research

BS-19

Receptionist BS-17

Computer Programmer

BS-18

Registrar BS-17/18

A/A Officer BS-17

P.R.O. BS-17/18

Under Secretary (I&C) BS-18

Research Officer BS-17

Research Officer BS-17

Additional Registrar BS-17

Supt. Judicial Branch

BS-16

Suptd. Admin Branch

BS-16

Admin & Accounts Branch

Complaints Handling Branch

Consultant-V

BS-19

Consultant-VI

BS-19

Consultant-VII BS-19

Consultant-VIII BS-19

Consultant-IX

BS-19

Consultant-X

BS-19

Advisor BS-20

Add. Registrar BS-17

Consultant

Complaints Handling Admin & Accounts

Regional Office,

332

Statement showing the Staff Strength of Provincial Ombudsman Punjab


1 Ombudsman 01 2 Advisors 21 01 3 Advisor 20 03 4 Secretary 20 01 5 Consultants 19 16 6 Secretary 19 01 7 PSO 18/19 01 8 Under Secretary 18 01 9 PRO 17/18 01 10 Registrar 18 01 11 Computer Programmer 18 01 12 Research Officer 17 02 13 Accounts Officer 17 01 14 Additional Registrar 17 02 15 Superintendent 16 06

Sub Total – I 39

15 Personal Assistant 15 06

16 Stenographer 15 22

17 Assistant 11/15 24

18 Clerk 5/7 20

19 Assistant Clerk 5 02

20 Drivers 4 08

21 DR 4 06

22 Qasid 2 02

23 Naib Qasid 1 34

24 Daftri 1 01

25 Chowkidar 1 06

26 Mali 1 01


Sub – Total II 136

Grand Total I + II 175

Annex ‘G’

333

Organogram of Provincial Ombudsman Sindh

Ombudsman

Advisor Advisor Advisor Director General

Secretary

Director Sukkur

Director Larkana

Director Hyderabad

Director Mirpur

Director Director Dadu

Director Karachi East

Director Noshera

Director Nawabshah

Director Karachi

Account Officer

Asstt Registrar

Asstt Registrar

Asstt Registrar

Asstt Registrar

Asstt Director

Asstt Director

Asst Director

Registrar

Accountant

Annex ‘H’

334

Statement showing the Staff Strength of POS


1 Ombudsman 01

2 Advisors 20 03

3 Director General 20 01

4 Secretary 20 01

5 Directors/Consultants 19 09



8 Registrar 17 01



11 Accountant 16 01

12 Assistant Registrar 16 4


Sub Total - I 27

14 Stenographer 15

15 Steno typist 07

16 Urdu/Sindhi Steno 02

17 Receptionist 01

18 Assistants 27

19 Sindhi Translation 01

20 Sr. Clerk 07

21 Telephone Operator 02

22 Sr. Clerk 23

23 Machine Operator 03

24 Driver 19

25 Dispatch rider 02

26 Qasids 02

27 Naib Qasid 34

28 Chowkidar 02

Annex ‘I’

335

29 Mali 01

30 Sanitary Worker 04

Sub – Total II 152

Grand Total 176

336


Department of Auditor General of Pakistan (DAGP)

Department of Auditor General of Pakistan (DAGP)

337

Historical perspective Since 1947 the Pakistan’s Audit Department with its present nomenclature as

the Department of the Auditor-General of Pakistan (DAGP) has undergone many

a significant change in its organization, composition, scope, size, functions,

role, importance and constitutional status.

In the constitutional and legal perspective there are three distinct periods:

1947-56 Post-independence scenarios

1956-2001 Working as per Presidential Orders under provisions of the

Constitutions of 1956 and 1973

2001 to date Separation of Audit & Accounts

The terms and conditions of service, the term of office and the powers and

functions of the Auditor General of Pakistan are given in Ordinance no xxiii of

2001

Organization of DAGP The Pakistan Audit Department inherited from the colonial system after

independence in 1947. The Pakistan Audit Department was divided into two

distinct and separate segments w.e.f 3.10.1988 on the basis of functions

performed by that office. The present nomenclature of the Department came

into existence in 2001 after complete separation of audit from accounts and

named as Department of Auditor’s General of Pakistan (DAGP). The Auditor

General of Pakistan is the administrative head of the DAGP and is appointed

under Article 168(1) of the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan 1973.

The Auditor General is assisted by 2 Additional Auditor Generals, 1 Deputy

Auditor General and 4 Directors General. 4 Deputy Auditors General are under

Additional Auditor General (Audit). Each DAG has 2 Directors General for his

assistance.

The Auditor General Office has an elaborative administrative structure which is

available at national, regional, provincial and 110 district levels. The terms and

338

services of the officers are as in the Pakistan Audit Accounts and have separate

cadre of service. DAGP has 11 field offices all over the country.

Organization Chart of Auditor General of Pakistan is available at Annex-A

Vision of DAGP To strengthen the legislative oversight by providing an independent and

objective assessment of the process of governance and financial management

at all tiers of government.

Term of Office The term of the office is for a fixed time of five years from the date on which

he assumes such office or he attains the age of 65 years whichever is earlier.

Protection of Service Sufficient protection has been provided to the Auditor General as he cannot be

removed from office except in the like manner and on the like grounds as a

judge of the Supreme Court

Submission of reports Under article 171, the reports of the Auditor General relating to the accounts

of the federation shall be submitted to the president who shall call them to be

laid before the National Assembly and the reports of the Auditor General

relating to the accounts of a province shall be submitted to the governor of

province who shall pass them to be laid before the provincial assembly.

The reports prepared by the Auditor General of Pakistan are considered in the

Public Accounts Committee of the respective assemblies. The mandate enables

the Auditor General to strengthen the legislative over side by providing an

independent and objective assessment of the process of governance both at the

federal and provincial levels.

339

The Auditor General office has an elaborative administrative structure which is

available at national, regional, provincial and 110 district levels. The terms and

service of the Officers are as in the Pakistan Audit Accounts and have separate

cadre of service.

Powers of Auditor General and its Delegation

The Auditor General’s Functions& Powers, Terms and Conditions of Service

are prescribed in the Ordinance, 2001

1. full power in connection with audit of accounts

2. power to dispense with detailed audit

3. power to amend the schedule

4. power to make rules

5. power to make regulations

6. power to create temporary post

The powers of the Auditor-General of Pakistan emanate from the Pakistan

(Audit and Accounts) Order 1973 read with Articles 169 and 170 of the

Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan. He exercises the powers under

Fundamental and Supplementary Rules and those full powers delegated to a

Ministry or a Division, after declaration of Pakistan Audit Department, a

Division vide Finance Division’s O.M. No.F.5(17) Exp.II/85-423, dated 14-07-

1987.

Financial powers, delegated by the Ministry of Finance under the “Revised

System of Financial Control and Budgeting” vide O.M. No.F.1 (5) R-12/80 dated

11-03-1981, have further been delegated by the Auditor-General to the Deputy

Auditor-General (A&C), Director (Admin) and other officers working in the

office of the Auditor-General. The Accountants/ Directors-General/Directors

etc. shall exercise the powers delegated to them under the “Revised System of

Financial Control and Budgeting” referred to in the preceding paragraph.

Important Functions

340

The DAGP audits the Federal Government Ministries, Divisions and Departments

and prepares reports that are submitted to the President of Pakistan who

causes them to be laid before the National Assembly. The results of audit are

grouped by the Principal Accounting Officers and presented in several volumes

of Audit Reports to facilitate discussions in the Federal Public Accounts

Committee. The other functions include:

Audit all transactions of the Federation, Provinces and Districts relating

to Public Accountability.

Audit all trading, manufacturing, profit and loss accounts and balance

sheets and accounts kept by Order of the President or of the Governor of

the Province in any Federal Department.

Audit, subject to the provisions of this Ordinance, the accounts of any

authority or the Federation or a Province, and in each case to report on

the expenditure, transactions so audited by him.

Staffing Department of the Auditor General of Pakistan has its own service and has 5243

sanctioned posts which include 1939 officers (equivalent to BS 16 & above).

The staff members comprise 3307. There are 924 officers in BS-16 which are

only 18% of the total force. 963 employees are in BS 1 to 3. The officers

constitute 37% and the staff 63% of the total work force. Integrate comparison

of officer’s strength and their ratios are given below:

Comparative number of posts:

B-22 B-21 B-20 B-19 B-18 B-17 B-16

3 7 28 70 134 773 924

Inter-grade ratios

B-22-21 B-21-20 B-20-19 B-19-18 B-18-17 B-17-16

1:2.3 1:4 1:2.5 1:1.9 1:5.8 1:1.2

All the staff is on regular basis. BPS wise number of employees employed in

DAGP may be seen at Annex B

341

Project for Improvement of Financial Reporting & Auditing (PIFRA) PIFRA stands for project for improvement of financial reporting and Auditing

launched with the assistance of the World Bank, the Government of Pakistan is

establishing a nationwide integrated management information system and

online communication spread in the four provinces.

Audit all expenditure from the Consolidated Fund of the Federation and of each

Province whether the money is shown in the accounts as having been disbursed

were legally available to, the service or purpose to which they have been

applied or charged and whether the expenses to the authority which governs it.

Appointments of Officers The probationer officers recruited on the basis of results of the competitive

examination conducted by the Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC) on

yearly basis that after allocation to the Pakistan Audit Service complete an

integrated training at the Civil Service Academy. Undergo departmental

training followed by an examination held by FPSC. Thereafter, they are posted

to a particular Audit Department.

The post of an Audit Officer is a supervisory post and carries the responsibilities

of the section or the Audit/Inspection Party. The work of the section is done by

Audit Officer with the assistance of the staff posted with him.

Promotions to the post of Audit Officer are made from the Accountant cadre on

the basis of seniority cum fitness.

The Departmental Promotion Committee reviews the seniority list.

Promotion/Selection is made through Departmental Committees notified by the

DAGP.

Initial appointments in Basic Pay Scales 5 to 15 are made on the

recommendations of the Departmental Selection Committee after advertising

the vacancies in newspapers. The staff of BPS 5 to 15 in Audit offices generally

342

comprises of senior Auditors, junior Auditors, cashiers, KPOs, Data Coders, Data

Supervisors, Stenographers, Steno typists and Operators etc.

Initial recruitment to a post is made on having educational qualification and

the requisite experience. The suitable candidates are interviewed or tested

through examination. The general quota for initial recruitment is observed in

all the cadres.

All kinds of recruitments including that of auxiliary staff includes Naib Qasid,

Qasids, Sanitary workers, Chowkidars, Machinists, Farashs, Malis, Daftries,

Record Sorters, Binders and Drivers are governed under Civil Servants

(Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules 1973, framed under section 25 of

Civil Servants Act, 1973

Postings/Transfers Postings and Transfers from one office to another of all officers are made by

the Auditor General. Initial postings on completion of training are made as far

as possible on the basis of performance.

The audit officers are liable to be posted within and outside Pakistan against

any post under the Federal Government or any provincial government or local

authority or a corporation or body setup or established by any such government

Audit General on his discretion may order transfers from one department to

another

Quotas The percentage distribution of vacancies in case of recruitment prescribed on

all Pakistan basis will be applicable. The General provincial and regional quota

as provided in the constitution.

50% of the vacancies in BPS 1 & 2 are reserved for discharged, retired or

demobilized armed forces personnel, the remaining 50% vacancies are opened

for all. The vacancies reserved for ex-service men cannot be filled by other

persons unless the employing authority obtains a certificate from the welfare

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and Rehabilitation Director (GHQ) Rawalpindi to the effect that suitable ex-

service men are not available for employment.

Incentives The employees are awarded advance increment in case of obtaining additional

qualification and on passing of professional examination, special qualification

pay is given to encourage employees. On meritorious service special

certificates are awarded to encourage, honest and dedicated officials

Internal Administration Control

In DAGP, there is a Deputy Auditor General who is responsible of inspection,

regulation, vigilance and monitoring of training. Employees are governed under

E & D rules. Special operative manuals are framed wherein there are clear

rules and regulations

Training The officers of the Audit group before induction are given training in the civil

service academy and then specialized training at the Audit & Accounts training

Institute, Lahore. In DAGP, there are different cadres and for each cadre a

comprehensive training programme is chalked out under training policy. Five

Audit & Accounts Training Institutes are stationed at Islamabad, Lahore,

Karachi, Quetta & Peshawar. BSP wise courses are arranged in these institutes

such as:

Course for BPS 19 & 20

Course for BPS 18

Course for BPS 16 & 17

Course for BPS 11 to 15

Course for BPS 5 to 10

Course for DDO

Course for office specific

Proper attention is given for the capacity building of the officers & staff.

Individual officers are also sent abroad for additional qualification & training.

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Audit is a specialized job. Hence, every officer and official upto BS-5 is

provided a chance for training in their requisite area. Refresher courses are

also arranged.

Training under PIFRA Training institute/department of any organization plays a pivotal role in

developing knowledge and information to the employees. They carry out need

assessment and ensure the provision of suitable programme to all its

employees, so that work is carried out on cost effective basis in efficient

manner by the right persons with the requisite knowledge and skills.

PIFRA World Bank project has been working with great enthusiasm in imparting

adequate knowledge and improving the skills of employees under this

programme around 530 officers/officials in SAP R3, HR & FI modules. 3400

DDO’s have been trained in four provinces at the end of December 2006. 28

master trainers in NAM/COA have been trained to further impart training in

Districts of AJK.

The impact of the training is improved Audit System. Training Research and

Publications are the major tools of the training institutes of the country to

keep abreast of the developments in the profession. It has a network of

training institutes all over the country where public servants are provided

training in the field of auditing, accounting and financial management. Its

research operations have produced a Public Audit Manual, an internationally

recognized Performance Audit Methodology with 13 sector specific guidelines

etc.

Performit is a magazine published quarterly. This magazine is devoted to the

advancement of financial and performance audit in public sector.

Performance evaluation, government accounting, public financial management

and other related disciplines.

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346

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Statement showing BPS wise number of employees in DAGP (as on June 2006)

S.No Basic Pay Scale Sanctioned Post 1 22 3 2 21 7 3 20 28 4 19 70 5 18 134 6 17 773 7 16 924

Sub Total-I 1939

8 15 71 9 14 0 10 13 0 11 12 138 12 11 1586 13 10 0 14 9 0 15 8 0 16 7 3 17 6 0 18 5 377 19 4 166 20 3 963 21 2 22 1

Sub Total - 2 3233

GRAND TOTAL

Annex ‘B’

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PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE (PAC)

PAC is one of the most important tools of the legislative accountability. Its

origin can be traced in the British Parliamentary System. The doctrine of

accountability is essentially a British concept that is confined to the

counties of British common wealth. The theory implies 5 things as given

below:

Appointment of Principal Accounting Officer

Submission of Appropriation Account

An independent Audit of the Accounts

Appointment by the legislature

Select Committee and appearance before the PAC of the principal

accounting officer.

The Role of PAC The role and responsibility of PAC has been given in the Rules of Business in

the National Assembly 1992 wherein PAC is authorized to examine the

Appropriation Accounts, finance accounts, Report of the Audit General

thereon. The report of the Committee is required to be presented within a

period of one year to the National Assembly. The role of PAC is

recommendatory. It is upto the executive to take action on the

recommendations of the parliament.

Composition of PAC

The job of PAC starts with the presentation of the reports of the Auditor

General to the legislature through the President. The legislature refers

these reports to the PAC under rules 183, 184 of the rules of procedures and

conduct in the National Assembly 1992. The composition of the PAC is 19

members which are elected by the assembly and the Minister of Finance and

Ex-Officio member.

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Functions

The committee shall examine the accounts showing the appropriation of

sums granted by the assembly for the expenditure of the government. The

annual finance accounts of the government. The report of the Auditor

General of Pakistan and such other matters as minister for finance may

refer to it.

In scrutinizing the appropriation accounts of the government and the

reports of the Auditor General of Pakistan thereon it shall be the duty of

the Committee to satisfy itself;

1) That the money shown in the accounts as having been disbursed was

legally available for and applicable to the service or purpose to which

they have been applied or charged;

2) That the expenditure conforms to the authority which governs it;

3) That every re-appropriation has been made in accordance with the

provisions made in this behalf under rules.

It shall also be the duty of the committee to:

a) Examine the statement of accounts showing the income and

expenditure of state corporations, trading and manufacturing

schemes, concerns and projects together with the balance sheets

and statements of profit and loss accounts which the president

may have required to be prepared or are prepared under the

provisions of the statutory rules regulating the financing of a

particular corporation trading or manufacturing scheme or

concern or project and the report of the Auditor General of

Pakistan thereon;

b) Examine the statement of accounts showing the income and

expenditure of autonomous and semi-autonomous bodies, the

audit of which may be conducted by the Auditor General of

Pakistan either under the directions of the President or under an

Act of Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament); and

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c) To consider the report of the Auditor General of Pakistan in cases

where the President may have required him to conduct the audit

of any receipts or to examine the accounts of stores and stocks

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ANNEX IV (D)

LEGAL FRAMEWORK

OF


Prepared by Ali Raza

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CONTENTS 1. Introduction 6 2. Historical Footsteps 13 3. The Laws 21 4. Summary 24 5. General Accountability 26 6. Institutional & Financial Accountability 32

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Introduction The Report seeks to study the legal framework of the Public Accountability institutions and associated laws and rules enacted to either setup these institutions or indirectly affect the functioning and jurisdictions of these institutions. Public Accountability is an enormous field in view of the additions made in terms of institutions and laws over the last 60 years to what was already provided in the general as well as some special laws available in 1947. To achieve a focused report a system for the ensuing research and analysis was setup up. Initially three basic categories of accountability were defined;

A) General Accountability B) Institutional & Financial Accountability C) Judicial & Special Accountability

In each category the ‘Primary Institutions’ involved in public accountability were selected to form the core focus of the research. The laws directly relating to these institutions were studied at length. When studying an institution its provincial of sub components if any were studied as a unified group to avoid repetition. The Primary Institutions identified for purposes of this Report are; General Accountability

1. National Accountability Bureau 2. Office of the Ombudsman

a. Federal Ombudsman b. Punjab Ombudsman c. Sindh Ombudsman d. Baluchistan Ombudsman e. Ombudsman Azad Kashmir f. Federal Tax Ombudsman g. Banking Ombudsman

3. Federal Investigation Agency Institutional & Financial Accountability

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1. Service Tribunal a. Federal Service Tribunal b. Punjab Service Tribunal c. Sindh Service Tribunal d. NWFP Service Tribunals e. Baluchistan Service Tribunals

2. Auditor General of Pakistan 3. Public Accounts Committee

During the research and analysis of the Primary Institutions a large body of laws and rules were found which directly or indirectly were either linked with the primary institution or in some way had a material jurisdictional or functional affect on the primary institution. These are referred to as ‘Supporting Legislation’ for purposes of this Report

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Public Accountability Accountability is defined as “an explanation or defence of one’s actions or conduct”. Public Accountability seeks an explanation or defence of a person acts, omissions and conduct relating to public authority or matters within the public domain including public property and assets and which may result in the formation of an offence against the person. There are four essential steps to carrying out Public Accountability. Identification Investigation, Prosecution, Penalty The Identification process can be divided into the formal and informal methods. A formal identification method is put in place where a person or a body is setup whose responsibility it is to constantly verify acts which fall within public accountability and identify any such acts which require investigation as prima facie they are not kosher. The informal identification method is where any citizen is permitted to bring to the notice of the authorities an act or omission which would otherwise fall within the realm of public accountability. Once an act or omission has been identified, the investigation must be carried out into the facts to ascertain whether an offence has been committed. Investigation is again carried out through two systems; Judicial and Administrative. A judicial investigation is carried out by an authorized agency or body authorized to do so. A judicial investigation carried evidentiary value in a judicial proceeding and it is also of a higher investigative value as it is based on strict procedures and rules. An administrative inquiry is carried out by the department or authority whose member has allegedly committed the offence and is carried out a person or persons appointed within the same department or authority to investigate the matter. Common method of an Administrative Inquiry is to issue a Show Cause Notice to the person and ask them to explain the facts and their conduct. Both forms of investigation if find that the facts investigated into form a prima facie offence, recommend or themselves prosecute the alleged offender for the offence under the law.

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Prosecution is an essential commodity of Public Accountability as it ensures the fundamental protection guaranteed to every citizen not to be condemned unheard and to seek a defence. Prosecution of public accountability matters can be carried out by the ordinary courts of law or special courts or tribunals formulated specifically by public accountability laws. At present majority of the public accountability matters are referred to special courts or tribunals. The final step of public accountability is the Penalty. An offence found to have been committed without a corresponding comparable penalty would be an exercise in futility. Penalties for public accountability are generally provided under the special accountability laws and are different in nature and severity to penalties provided for under the general law for similar offences committed in the private rather than the public domain. When creating any public accountability institution or promulgating any law relating to public accountability the definition and scheme of public accountability must be foremost and it is this shift of focus from the core objective in the last five decades which seems to be the cause of the creation of the multitude of accountability institutions to respond to urgent and time specific political needs which have now formed a complex web of public accountability laws overlapping and conflicting in authorities and jurisdictions which in turn would and should have an effect on the performance and efficiency of these institutions and an inability to truly achieve the core objective of public accountability.

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Historical Foot Steps Limiting ourselves to immediate history and using 1947 as the primary divider and creating historical phases between 1947 and 2007 based on facts, a brief insight into historical perspective was essential to fully understand some of the later promulgated accountability laws. Prior to 1947 the earliest of laws relating to public servants was the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850. This Act of 1850 provided the Government with the power to appoint a special Commissioner to inquire into and prosecute public servants. Added to this the primary jurisdiction over general and public accountability was formulated under the Penal Code 1860. The Penal Code carried provision of offences specific to accountability of public servants. Amendments and minor additions were promulgated from time to time to provide for emergent and urgent issues as they arose and in due course these amendments and ordinances were merged into the general law prescribed under the Penal Code 1860. Prior to 1947 other than the Special Commissioner appointed under the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 and the general authority of the Crown to appoint an investigator or prosecutor in special and specific matters, the inquiry in terms of public accountability was carried out by the police or in the case of public servants at an inter departmental level and prosecution was carried out under the general law by the ordinary courts which formed a part of the judiciary. In the Penal Code 1860 sections 161, 165, 408, 409, 411, 141, 417 & 420 covered the specific offences relating to public accountability. These included the offense of bribery, cheating and breach of trust. The Penal Code dealt with the criminal offences in terms of accountability whereas misconduct and misuse of authority remained in the jurisdiction of administrative actions and controlled by laws such as the Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850. Under the India Act, 1935 the issue of public accountability was further reinforced yet the prosecution on account of accountability remained with the ordinary scheduled courts.

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In 1944 under on one of the major steps in public accountability the Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944 provided for property to be confiscated which had been procured, created or misappropriated as a consequence of an offence under the Penal Code relating to public accountability. This provided for an exception to the general law where no other law could question the confiscation of such property while the confiscation itself was still subject to a determination and decision of the ordinary courts. After partition in 1947 historically in terms of a study of accountability laws the 60 years can be divided into three distinct phases. In the first phase from 1947 to the adoption of the new Constitution in 1973 the accountability laws saw minimal change other than a focus on handling corruption and regulation of the civil service. The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 was the first step immediately after partition followed up laws such as the Sindh Prevention of Bribery & Corruption Act, 1950, the Public & Representative Offices (Disqualification) Act 1949, the Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment Act 1958, the West Pakistan Departmental Inquiries (Powers) Act, 1958, Elective Bodies (Disqualification) Order 1959, the West Pakistan Anti‐Corruption Establishment Ordinance, 1961 and the Government Servants (Conduct) Rules 1964 and the parallel West Pakistan Government Servants (Conduct) Rules 1966. The focus during this first phase was primarily on corruption in the public sector and the public servants and their internal rules and regulations. In term of institutions during this period the Auditor General was an institution which was prevalent prior to 1947 and was adopted into the system in 1947 and similarly the Public Accounts Committees were a part of the parliamentary format. The second historical phase is from 1973 till 1989. The most important body of law in this period was the Constitution as adopted in 1973 by the legislative assembly. The Constitution of 1973 sets out the most fundamental accountability law including the reconfirmation of the Auditor General’s office and the setup of the Public Accounts Committees. In addition to the Constitution the two most notable accountability laws and institutions introduced during this period were the Service Tribunals setup at the federal and provincial level through the Service Tribunals Act 1973 and corresponding provincial acts in 1974. The other major institutional introduction was the setup of the Ombudsman’s Office through the Establishment of the Office of the Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order 1983 followed by provincial offices being setup later.

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Majority of the accountability related laws promulgated during this period were immediately after the adoption of the Constitution of 1973 and was a direct result of the new supreme law as it took roots into the system. Meanwhile, the first of the formal accountability institutions in the form of the Federal Investigation Agency was formulated under the Federal Investigation Agency Act 1974 during this phase and so began the process of setting up special tribunals and special institutions to deal with accountability taking away the general and fairly efficient jurisdiction of the ordinary scheduled courts. Special focus in this period was on the accountability relating to public servants on an administrative level with the promulgation of the Government Servants (E&D) Rules 1973, Civil Servant (Appeal) Rules 1977, Civil Servant (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Rules 1973, Civil Service of Pakistan (Change in Nomenclature of Services and Abolition of classes) Rules 1973, Railway Servants (E&D) Rules 1975 and Punjab Civil Servants (E&D) Rules, 1975 are only some of the laws promulgated during this period. Why was there a need to setup special courts or a special tribunals or a special institutions to tackle accountability issues when the investigation stage was and could continue to be handled by a single efficient and modern institution such as the FIA and where the FIA could have easily been developed into such a specialized organization and where prosecution of such matters could certainly be handled as efficiently and qualitatively, if not more so, by the ordinary courts which certainly represent the best judicial reasoning available? The answer to this question may be found in the most recent historical phase of the journey of accountability in Pakistan. The third historical phase is in the recent years from 1989 to 2007. After a long hiatus the return of the political parties and parliament saw a multitude of new laws and institutions being formed. Majority of them have the origins in reaction to urgent political needs. The bifurcation of the single Federal Ombudsman’s Office into provincial Ombudsman’s Offices and then further bifurcation into the setup of the Office’s of the Tax Ombudsman and now the Banking Ombudsman has seen new tiers of accountability institutions being setup. New civil service rules in the form of the Removal From Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000 and its sub legislation applicable at the provincial level were also introduced. However, without hesitation the most noted accountability institution to be setup in Pakistan the National Accountability Bureau was setup during this period vide the National

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Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999. NAB is a claimed attempt to amalgamate public accountability under one roof to the extent possible however, an analysis of the NAB Ordinance 1999 and corresponding accountability laws represents a very different situation. The NAB Ordinance 1999 as most other laws introduced during this period actually can be traced to specific political events such as change in government or enforcement of emergency due to dismissal of a government. These laws or institutions were focused on achieving certain political objectives or initiatives. The NAB Ordinance 1999 was a direct result of the primary ground for dismissal of the government in 1999 i.e. rampant corruption which had led to the government being bankrupt. NAB was required to hold the officials and public officers accountable for the corruption and recover the funds. The fall out of this mind set was that further amendments were made to other laws such as the Banking Tribunals Ordinance, 1983 under which the Banking Tribunals had been setup as special courts to manage the voluminous banking matters which required judicial adjudication. Through amendments made after 1999 the Banking Tribunals rather than remaining a fair and impartial judicial tribunal were converted practically into recovery officers acting on behalf of banks. The mind set at this time was that taking a bank loan and not repaying it amount to corruption – a fact which completely negates the definition of commercial activity. A bank is a commercial business just like its clients who are also undertaking business. The bank invests in a business on certain terms and expects the amount it has loaned to be repaid. However, to create a special tribunal for recovery of bank loans and then add powers that allows a company’s shareholders and directors to be personally prosecuted for the debts of a company amounts to a presumption that every bank loan which is not repaid amounts to corruption on the part of the debtor. The differentiation between public and private money has been lost in this period and the sole cause is the recent accountability mind set. What remains lacking still is a macro view of public accountability and a resultant restructuring which will allow the cob webs to be cleared and accountability to maintain an efficient and clean web with its objective singularly to net the flies of accountability.

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The Laws In the course of researching the accountability laws and their legal framework as well as their historical context the following laws in different categories were studied at length and form the primary basis of this Report. Constitutional & Historical Laws These represent the historical context as well as the establishment of certain institutions such as the Auditor General and the Pubic Accounts Committees. Indian Act 1858 Indian Council’s Act 1861 Indian Council’s Act 1892 Indian Council Act 1909 (Minto‐Morley Reforms) The Act of 1919 Government of India Act 1935 The Indian Independence Act, 1947 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1962 Constitution of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 1973 Institutional Laws Certain specific institutions were earmarked for research and study for purposes of this Report and the body of laws relating to these institutions which were studied are as follows categorized by institution. 1. Ombudsman Interestingly the original institution of the Ombudsman was setup in 1983 through a Presidential Order. Thereafter, provincial offices were setup through law except in NWFP where the office has not yet been setup. Recently a Banking Ombudsman has also been setup through an amendment to the primary federal law. Establishment Office of Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order, 1983 Establishment Office of the Ombudsman AJ&K Act, 1991 Establishment Office of the Ombudsman Sindh Act, 1992 Punjab Office of the Ombudsman Act, 1997 Establishment Office of the Ombudsman Baluchistan Ordinance, 2001 Establishment Office of the Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000 Federal Tax Ombudsman I&D Complaints Regulations, 2001

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2. Federal Investigation Agency The FIA prior to the formation of the NAB was the principle investigation agency in terms of Accountability matters. It retained that position for 25 years till NAB was established. It continues to operate however, with a slightly curtailed jurisdiction. Federal Investigation Agency Act, 1974 Federal Investigation Agency Rules, 1975 Federal Investigation Agency (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Rules, 1975 Members of the Federal Investigation Agency (E&D) Rules, 1978 3. Service Tribunals This institution represents the primary accountability forum for purposes of prosecution of accountability relating to public servants. Established in 1973 as a part of the overall scheme of the 1973 Constitution it was further spread into each province to deal with federal and provincial jurisdictions separately. The Service Tribunals Act, 1973 Sindh Service Tribunals Act, 1973 Punjab Service Tribunals Act, 1973 NWFP Service Tribunals Act, 1974 Baluchistan Service Tribunals Act, 1974 The Service Tribunals (Procedure) Rules, 1974 The Provincial Service Tribunals (Extension of Provisions of The Constitution) Act, 1974 The Service Tribunals (Qualification of Members) Rules, 1974 Sindh Service Tribunals (Procedure) Rules, 1974 Punjab Service Tribunals (Procedure) Rules, 1974 NWFP Service Tribunals Rules, 1974 The Service Tribunals (Procedure) Rules, 1977 Federal Service Tribunal Chairman & Members Service Rules, 1983 4. National Accountability Bureau Formed in 1999 as the primary accountability institution it now forms the focus of any accountability study in respect of accountability in Pakistan. NAB as an institution has been created to amalgamate majority of the public accountability which was previously being carried out by different institutions however, as will be discussed in this Report the objective has not been achieved due to probably a lack of a micro level study of the accountability laws and forums when setting up NAB. National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999

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General Laws Numerous general laws had to be research to find the conflicts and jurisdictional issues created as a consequence of the special laws formulating institutions as well as creating special forums. These laws provide a specific insight into the institutions researched for purposes of this Report. Criminal Law Amendment Ordinance, 1944 The Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 Sindh Prevention of Bribery & Corruption Act, 1950 The Pakistan Commissions Of Inquiry Act, 1956 The Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment, 1958 Pakistan Criminal Law Amendment (Punjab) Rules, 1985 Punjab Anti Corruption Establishment Rules, 1985 Judicial Accountability Judicial Accountability was also studied. Primarily judicial accountability is formulated under the Constitution however, Baluchistan also enacted a law specifically relating to Judicial Accountability. Baluchistan Subordinate Judiciary Service Tribunals Act, 1989 Public Servants Accountability Public Servants Accountability in terms of the Civil Services established in Pakistan has been the focus of public accountability since the very start. Numerous laws and rules have been promulgated to deal with situations as they occurred and the Estacode forms the primary manual of such laws for purposes of application. These laws and rules defined and regulate the conduct of civil servants and in turn define the jurisdiction of the institutions such as the Service Tribunals and the Public Service Commission. These laws and rules have been researched as they form the primary context to understand and analyze the institutions dealing with public servants accountability. Service Efficiency & Discipline Rules The Service Efficiency & Discipline Rules were established at different times at the Federal and also Provincial level providing the basic accountability of public servants at a departmental level. These Rules combined with the plethora of

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service laws promulgated regulate the conduct and accountability of public servants. 1. Laws Public Servants (Inquiries) Act, 1850 Pakistan Special Police Establishment Ordinance, 1948 West Pakistan Departmental Inquiries (Powers) Act, 1961 Civil Servants Act, 1973 Sindh Civil Servants Act, 1973 Punjab Civil Servants Act, 1973 NWFP Civil Servants Act, 1973 Baluchistan Civil Servants Act, 1974 Pakistan Railway Police Act, 1977 The Corporation Employees (Special Powers) Ordinance, 1978 Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000 The Punjab Removal from Service (Special Power) Ordinance, 2000 Removal from Service (Special Powers) Sindh Ordinance, 2000 North‐West Frontier Province Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000 Baluchistan Province Removal from Service (Special Powers) Ordinance, 2000 2. Rules Civil Service of Pakistan (Composition & Cadre) Rules, 1954 Police Department Delegation of Powers Rules, 1958 Government Servants (Conduct) Rules, 1964 West Pakistan Government Servants (Conduct) Rules, 1966 Government Servants (E&D) Rules, 1973 Civil Servant (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Rules, 1973 North‐West Frontier Province Government Servants (E&D) Rules, 1973 Punjab Civil Servants (Appointment and Conditions of Service) Rules, 1974 Sindh Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Rules, 1974 Railway Servants (E&D) Rules, 1975 Punjab Civil Servants (E&D) Rules, 1975 Punjab Police (E&D) Rules, 1975 Baluchistan Police Disciplinary Rules, 1975 North‐West Frontier Province Police Rules, 1975 Sindh Civil Servants (Probation, Confirmation and Seniority) Rules, 1975 Civil Servant (Appeal) Rules, 1977 Baluchistan Government Servants (Conduct) Rules, 1979 Baluchistan Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotions & Transfer) Rules, 1979

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Sindh Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1980 Baluchistan Civil Servants (E&D) Rules, 1983 Baluchistan Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1983 North‐West Frontier Province Civil Servants (Appeal) Rules, 1986 North‐West Frontier Province Government Servants (Conduct) Rules, 1987 Sindh Civil Servants (E&D) Rules, 1988 North‐West Frontier Province Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion & Transfer) Rules, 1989 The Punjab Civil Servants (E&D) Rules, 1999 Estacode

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Summary The research and study to analyze the legal framework of the public accountability institutions selected for purposes of this Report has been extensive but by no means exhaustive. The total body of laws and rules promulgated since 1947 and the many more existing prior to 1947 providing a historical understanding of the present law and institutions consists of hundreds of laws and corresponding amendments brought to them from time to time. This Report has attempted to focus on the primary public accountability institutions and their legal framework as well as the legal issues in terms of efficiency and application of these institutions. It provides a macro view of the public accountability and sets out the basis for a micro study into specific institutions for purposes of any direct reforms to such institutions. The specific Legal Framework Reports on each of the selected institutions follow in the next sections culminating in the final recommendations. The Legal Framework Reports cover primarily the following areas in terms of research and reporting. Report is in a general format without going into the micro details of each law and corresponding conflicts. A broad overview and specific analysis is provided to allow for the Report to be a document of reference for further analysis. This however, is based on the detailed research into each of the primary laws and the relevant related laws and rules.

1. Organization & Creation 2. Structure & Authority 3. Objective 4. Jurisdiction 5. Level of Autonomy 6. Systems & Controls 7. Legal Robustness

The above areas provide a template to understand the legal framework of each law and its relationship with other accountability laws.

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GENERAL ACCOUNTABILITY

NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU ORGANIZATION The National Accountability Bureau was established under the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance, 1999. The NAB was established as an investigative and prosecution agency in response to the need for public accountability. OBJECTIVE The objective for the establishment of the NAB was to provide a central organization to carry out the investigation and prosecution of matters involving corruption, misappropriation and fraud relating to both public and private accountability. Prior to the establishment of NAB these functions were entrusted to organizations such as FIA, CIA, Special Courts etc. However, by establishing NAB a single centralized organization to do all the above functions was provided and the intention was to streamline such investigations and efficiently handle corresponding prosecution of accountability matters. NAB was established in response to the need to recover state money misappropriated by officials and private funds obtained by private individuals and companies from Banks. 1. Defined Its objective is defined in the preamble to the Ordinance promulgated by the President of Pakistan under the authority of the Provisional Constitution Order and Order 9 of 1999. NAB in terms of the objectives defined for it has been provided a mandate to operate throughout Pakistan and effectively in reference to any matter it deems fit to take up and investigate. Furthermore, the NAB Ordinance, 1999 overrides all other existing laws therefore, giving NAB the primary jurisdiction over all accountability matters.

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2. Parallel Objectives NAB being established as the central organization responsible for public and private accountability and in the absence of the pre existing organizations such as FIA, CID, Special Courts etc not being suspended or their operational jurisdiction curtailed, NAB actually works to some extent in parallel to such organizations. However, NAB takes precedence over all other accountability and investigative organizations in terms of matters taken up by NAB in investigation. Therefore, while NAB does have parallel objectives with other accountability and prosecution organizations it enjoys a preferential position in terms of matters taken up by it for investigation or prosecution. Such parallel objectives clearly create conflict of operation and jurisdiction and in order to curtail this the Government has taken some initial administrative steps such as transfer the entire commercial investigation cell of FIA to NAB to ensure no conflict occurs in terms of investigation in such matters. 3. Amendments or Curtailment to Objective Four primary set of amendments were made to the NAB Ordinance 1999 through the NAB (Amendment) Ordinance, 1999, NAB (Amendment) Ordinance, 2000, NAB (Amendment) Ordinance, 2001 and NAB (Amendment) Ordinance, 2002. These amendments have infact enhanced and greatly increased the jurisdiction and authority of NAB as an organization including the addition to the objectives. As a consequence of the amendments NAB was given further authority to act as the implementer of policy for educating the public about corruption as well as implement policies and procedures to prevent corruption. Therefore, NAB consequent to the amendment in 2002 became a policy implementing arm of the Government and to some extent usurping the authority and power otherwise provided to the Ministry of Interior and its different divisions and departments including the different police forces at the provincial level. NAB was further given the authority to interact with international organizations for purposes of investigation and search and seizure. Once again such authority directly conflicts with the pre existing authority of the Ministry of Interior in this respect.

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STRUCTURE & AUTHORITY The structure and authority of Bureau has been defined in the Ordinance of 1999. 1. External Authority The Bureau established through an Ordinance promulgated by the President under PCO 1 of 1999 and which in turn is protected by the 17th Amendment to the Constitution viz Article 270AA, is a comprehensive organization with no external authority except that of the President of Pakistan. Under Sections 6, 7 and 8 of the Ordinance, 1999 the President of Pakistan appoints the three primary administrative and operational persons of the Bureau being the Chairman, Deputy Chairman and Prosecutor General. The Chairman NAB reports directly to the President of Pakistan. 2. Internal Authority Internally the Bureau is headed by a Chairman appointed by the President of Pakistan under Section 6(b) of the Ordinance of 1999 in consultation with the Leader of the House and the Leader of the Opposition in the National Assembly. In addition a Deputy Chairman is appointed by the President of Pakistan in consultation with the Chairman NAB under Section 7 and a Prosecutor General is appointed under Section 8 again by the President in consultation with the Chairman NAB. In addition NAB has provincial organizational heads including provincial prosecutors and investigators. Primarily NAB’s operations are divided into the investigation wing and the prosecution wing. 3. Operating Legal Frame Work The Bureau’s principal operating frame work has been defined in the Preamble and then again in Section 4 of the Ordinance of 1999. The Bureau has the legal authority to inquire into any act or suspected offence which is defined under the Ordinance 1999 and on the basis of such investigation it can attempt recovery directly through negotiations with the offender or prosecute the offender. Prosecution under the Ordinance of 1999 is carried out by the NAB’s Prosecutor General before the Special National Accountability Bureau Court which has also been formed under the Ordinance of 1999 and

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Judges appointed or transferred to such special NAB Courts to hear prosecutions initiated by Prosecutor General NAB. NAB’s operational legal framework is wide and fairly independent. NAB operates all over Pakistan and the Ordinance of 1999 overrides all other laws to the extent that event the Cr.P.C which otherwise controls all criminal prosecutions can be overridden and as has been held in 2002 by the Sindh High Court even the immunity provided under the Limitation Act does not extend to criminal prosecution under the NAB Ordinance of 1999. Its legal framework has been designed to give NAB complete independence for the reason that NAB can and does investigate into affairs or persons who are or were holders of the highest political and administrative offices of the Country including the Superior Judiciary. The Bureau has been provided extra ordinary powers to implement its legal framework in terms of powers to seize and freeze assets as well as have transfer of assets undertaken after initiation of an inquiry against a person held illegal. In addition NAB can under Section 34 of the Ordinance of 1999 frame its own Rules and under Section 35 delegate whatever powers that are found to be necessary for delegation. There is no other accountability organization in Pakistan which has the sweeping and independent framework provided to NAB. JURISDICTION 1. Primary Jurisdiction The primary jurisdiction of the Bureau is defined in Section 22 of the Ordinance where under the Chairman NAB may on any matter being brought to his notice initiate an investigation into a suspected offence against any person whatsoever. NAB upon completion of the investigation has two directly resulting jurisdictions; a) initiate direct recovery from the offender through negotiations and plea bargain or b) initiate prosecution against the offender before the Special NAB Court. NAB’s jurisdiction in matters of offences extends to all offences which are defined under the Ordinance, 1999 and this includes almost all offences relating

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to financial fraud and misappropriation or in more general terms public accountability which has been further extended to private accountability by allowing the jurisdiction to be extended to offences in terms of loans obtained by individuals or companies from private banks. 2. Secondary Jurisdiction In support of its primary jurisdiction NAB has been provided a secondary jurisdiction to undertake certain actions which include; a) Freezing of Assets b) Impounding of Assets c) Seeking assistance from Foreign Governments and Agencies d) Keeping a suspected offender in Custody e) Obtaining any information from any government or private entity f) Recover fines etc as arrears of land revenue g) Protection of Witnesses The above powers amount to a secondary jurisdiction. The secondary jurisdiction is consistently exercised by NAB in support and enablement of its primary jurisdiction. 3. Sufficiency of Jurisdiction NAB has one of the widest jurisdictions granted to any accountability or similar institution in Pakistan. Its present jurisdiction infact exceeds the initial objective of the institution. By acquiring the jurisdiction to take cognizance suo moto, investigate, plea bargain, prosecute and in support of the above to detain a person, confiscate property and assets and seek assistance of foreign countries and agencies, NAB has by far the most comprehensive jurisdiction provided to any accountability institution. 4. Conflict of Jurisdiction All the different jurisdictions and powers granted to NAB were previously available to different institutions and most importantly to the police authorities and the public prosecutors office. NAB and NAB Court’s jurisdictions are in clear conflict with the jurisdictions available to institutions such as FIA, Police, Public Prosecutor and the Special Banking Courts as well as the general courts of law. The anomaly created by the NAB Ordinance of 1999 is that while NAB’s jurisdictions are notwithstanding any other law in force in Pakistan, the

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numerous institutions which have similar or parallel jurisdictions continue to function. Therefore, primarily if NAB takes cognizance of a specific offence all other institutions with the jurisdiction to take cognizance of the same offence are precluded from taking cognizance. Any offence which NAB opts not take cognizance off is consequently available to other institutions to take cognizance off. 5. Restraints The only restrain on NAB is its own choice in terms of which offence it intends to take cognizance off. NAB reports to the President of Pakistan and therefore, there is no other authority or institution which places any restraint on NAB’s functioning or jurisdiction. Since even prosecutions initiated by NAB are tried in the NAB Court there is no effective judicial restraint. Actions taken by NAB can be challenged under the constitutional jurisdiction of the High Court however, majority of the actions taken by NAB in terms of investigation and plea bargaining are protected from judicial review under the Ordinance of 1999. LEVEL OF AUTONOMY 1. Functional Powers & Authority Absolute autonomy has been granted to NAB in terms of its exercise of powers and authority. The Chairman NAB is the sole authority responsible for the functioning of NAB and the Chairman in turn reports only to the President of Pakistan. Therefore, effectively NAB’s functional powers and authority can be exercised without any restriction or external supervision. NAB is a completely autonomous institution not answerable to any provincial or federal government or any other institution. Its authority is absolute in terms of its jurisdiction and mandate. 2. Appointment The Chairman, the Deputy Chairman, the Prosecutor General Accountability and the Judge of the NAB Court are all appointed directly by the President of Pakistan. The appointments once made are for a fixed tenure and functions and powers relating to each position are defined. Therefore, the persons appointed to the above noted principal positions of NAB are completely autonomous as they are answerable to no person except the Chairman NAB and in the case of the Chairman the President of Pakistan.

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Appointments to positions in NAB are provided for in Section 28 of the Ordinance of 1999. It provides the Chairman with the power to appoint any person on contract or permanent employment at whatever compensation package which the Chairman finds fit. Other than the principal positions in the NAB hierarchy almost all other positions are filled through contract employment or through transfer of personnel from government departments and institutions. NAB presently has numerous employees of the FIA who have been placed at NAB’s disposal on deputation. Many of the investigating officers of NAB are serving or retired Army Officers while majority of the prosecutors are hired by NAB on contract. Unlike other departments or institutions NAB has formulated its own Rules including Rules of Employment and Service. Under the Rules promotions and appointments follow a more corporate structure than a government department. Having the original power to make its own Rules, NAB has the power to amend and add to its Rules whenever it finds necessary providing an immense amount of flexibility to respond to its changing needs of human resource. In addition NAB has the peculiar situation of having the ability to provide its investigating and prosecuting officers with bonus’s on all recoveries whether made through plea bargaining or prosecution. The objective of this provision was to provide an incentive to the officers to aim at achieving maximum recoveries and success. However, without proper monitoring and external auditing this provision can also act in the negative sense where an officer can accept a plea bargain at a lower value as long as the officer feels sufficiently compensated at a personal level. 3. Delegation The Chairman of the Bureau is the sole authority over the administration and operational functioning of the Bureau. The Chairman in turn can delegate any of his powers to any officers of the Bureau. The Ordinance of 1999 also provides for certain delegation of powers to the Deputy Chairman of the Bureau and the Acting Chairman NAB who is appointed in the absence of the Chairman. These are primarily powers others vested in the Chairman and are delegated by necessity to the Deputy Chairman or Acting Chairman in the absence of the Chairman to ensure smooth functioning of the Bureau.

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4. Financial The Financial authority vests in the Chairman. The financial controls are determined by the Chairman and through the Rules which are framed by NAB itself. NAB has an operational budget which is funded by the Federal Government. In addition NAB also receives a portion of the recoveries it makes and while majority of this is utilized for granting of bonus’s to officers a portion is also available to NAB for its operational expenses. NAB is only responsible to submit its accounts to the President of Pakistan and the sole financial control over NAB is that off the President of Pakistan after the Chairman NAB. 5. Adequacy & Efficiency The autonomy of the Bureau is more than adequate to allow the Bureau to carry out its objectives and exercise its jurisdiction. The combination of investigation and prosecution and no dependence of any external institution or authority in terms of carrying out its investigations or prosecution provides NAB with a sufficiently adequate autonomy. The vast extent of autonomy provided to the Bureau in turn ensures that the Bureau can function efficiently and the extent of efficiency is directly dependent upon the decision making of the Chairman. SYSTEMS & CONTROLS The Bureau having been provided with extensive autonomy there is no corresponding systems and controls placed by the Ordinance of 1999 on its operations or its exercise of authority and powers vested in it. 1. Defined Mechanism There is no defined mechanism of controls on the operations of the Bureau except the overall authority of the Chairman of the Bureau. Internal mechanisms if any are provided for through internal rules and operational controls devised and implemented by the Chairman. No defined mechanism exists in the Ordinance of 1999.

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2. External Mechanism The sole external control is through the President of Pakistan and therefore, at an executive level. The overall systems and controls are very linear in that they flow from the President of Pakistan through the Chairman of the Bureau and further to those powers are delegated to by the Chairman of the Bureau. 3. Rules & Procedures NAB has been provided with the power under the Ordinance of 1999 to make its own Rules & Procedures. These Rules and Procedures are not published for public consumption as neither the functioning of NAB and nor issues relating to service in the NAB is open to judicial review. In the absence of published Rules of NAB the Rules and Procedures are internal and subject to the decision of the Chairman NAB who has the power to amend the Rules or add to them. 4. Effectiveness With the wide range of powers and jurisdictions provided to NAB its effectiveness as an accountability institution is beyond doubt. The sole hurdle in its complete effectiveness is the discretion provided to the Chairman of the Bureau in terms of the offences the Bureau takes cognizance off. The Bureau is not bound to take cognizance of all offences of a specific category. It has been provided with a wide scheme of objectives and within the frame work of its objectives defined in the Ordinance of 1999 it can take cognizance of any offence it deems fit. This discretion in effect leaves the Bureau selecting what offences it will take cognizance off and the legal anomaly occurs where the Bureau takes cognizance of a certain offence and leaves another similar offence to be taken cognizance of some other accountability or judicial institution. In effect two persons committing the same offence are treated differently through different investigative and judicial process’s. Therefore, while NAB has a very wide scope in terms of application and jurisdiction its discretionary exercise of its authority infact creates an inequality in law.

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RELATIONING The NAB Ordinance 1999 provided a very fluid basis for relationships between NAB and other institutions. This has begun to evolve over the last 8 years however; it is still at a very early stage for more specific relations to evolve. 1. Institutional & Legal Defined Relationship The sole defined legal relationship that he Bureau has is with the President of Pakistan. Beyond this NAB has no relationship imposed upon it by law which requires it in any way or form to operate alongside or in conjunction with any other institution. 2. Evolved Relationship The Bureau has been provided under the Ordinance of 1999 and the consequent amendments the power to seek the assistance of other institutions and government departments if it is so required by the Bureau. Therefore, the Bureau can seek at any time the assistance of any institution or government department in Pakistan to assist in any inquiry or prosecution being undertaken by the Bureau. In addition NAB has been given the power under the Ordinance of 1999 to seek assistance from foreign governments and foreign agencies in terms of acquiring information or assistance in securing the physical arrest of an offender. This is an evolving relationship which will develop with time as foreign agencies work with NAB. LEGAL ROBUSTNESS 1. Level of Principal Mandate The principal mandate of NAB is extensive and far reaching in terms of scope and applicability. The Preamble to the NAB Ordinance of 1999 read with Sections 3 and 4 define the mandate. The Bureau’s mandate extends from offences relating to public fraud and misappropriation to private fraud, banking fraud and defaults, examination of conduct of public servants and elected representatives, the conduct of the judiciary etc. Basically, NAB’s principle mandate is accountability and accountability of any nature as may be required or felt desirable. The discretion is immense and the mandate extensive allowing NAB to act as an all encompassing accountability institution.

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In view of the few amendments which have come since its establishment in 1999, the mandate of the Bureau has not yet been altered to any great extent and infact the only possible change has been that the mandate has been extended during these initial years. 2. Derived & Evolved Mandate The Bureau is a young organization and has not had the time to have evolved mandates. In addition its principal mandate is so extensive that there is not much left to be added through evolution and passage of time. The only area of the mandate which has slowly started undergoing evolution is that the focus of the Bureau in terms of the types of offences it concentrates on is being defined in the numbers of similar offences that the Bureau takes up. A case in point is the Bureau having taking cognizance recently of all housing schemes in and around the capital territory and investigating the affairs of these housing schemes/companies and taking action where found necessary. These housing schemes have taken money from the public and therefore, NAB has chosen to step in as a public accountability institution and investigate and ensure if these housing schemes are acting properly or not. What the above example infact shows is the slow evolution of NAB into a regulator as well. The housing schemes in and around the capital territory are regulated by the Capital Development Authority however, with NAB now directly involved it has preferred jurisdiction and in exercise of its jurisdiction it is also overseeing the implementation of the housing schemes to ensure that the sponsors do not defraud the public. This is probably the most defined case of the Bureau evolving into a regulator. 3. Strengths & Weakness’s The Bureau’s strength is in its autonomy and its wide ranging mandate coupled with the absolute discretion to decide which offence to take cognizance off. Its strength lies in its ability to hire its own staff, regulate its own service rules and operate as a completely independent institution without any government or judicial controls. The enacting law has provided the Bureau with the most effective set of tools of any institution in Pakistan to evolve and operate as an institution of accountability.

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However, in its wide ranging mandate and discretion also lies the Bureau’s weakness. The Bureau has no external controls over its operations except that of the President of Pakistan. All controls are internal. This does not provide the management with an external view on the workings of the Bureau and the consequent ability to rectify weakness’s and problems. The Bureau in this respect is inward looking as an organization which effectively curtails growth of an institutional culture in any organization. However, effectively there are no legal weakness’s in the Bureau with the Bureau being able to take cognizance of an offence and then control the entire process right upto prosecution and conviction. 4. Effectiveness The Bureau is very effective in terms of the offences it selects to take cognizance off. However, with the ability to plea bargain with an offender, the Bureau in its own discretion elects whether to prosecute a person or not. Consequently, a person who is found upon investigation to have committed a criminal offence may avoid prosecution and conviction by entering into a plea bargain with NAB and paying a part or the whole of the amount found to have been misappropriated by the said person. Since NAB does not publish or otherwise publicly announce the exact amounts plea bargained as against the amount found to have been misappropriated it is difficult to assess the extent of NAB’s effectiveness in terms of recovery of public or private money. A part of public accountability is that an offender must receive appropriate punishment in terms of return of funds misappropriated as well as a criminal conviction. NAB in its focus on recovery uses the plea bargaining tool and in turn tends to allow an offender to escape conviction. Consequently, while NAB performs one part of the accountability function very effectively or so it seems in view of the presumed figures of recovery, it infact lacks in carrying out total accountability and therefore, effective at one level it ha not yet become a completely effective accountability institution as possibly envisaged in the preamble to the Ordinance of 1999. 5. Achievement of Objective The Bureau is achieving its objectives to an extent in terms of recovering public money where it takes cognizance of offences however, the cognizance is selective therefore, it has not been able to carry out complete accountability as was determined in its objectives.

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The Bureau has not yet defined for itself categories of offences which it will take notice of as a matter of rule and thereby ensuring that certain category of offences such as misappropriation of public money becomes a category which is completely and totally investigated and handled by the Bureau. This will allow for a more homogenous handling of public accountability of different categories rather than the selective handling by the Bureau in exercise of its discretion. As an all encompassing public accountability institution the Bureau should not be exercising its discretion in terms of which offence to take cognizance of and which not. While the law gives the Bureau this discretion and this ability to pick and choose, this in itself is the single most prominent hurdle in the Bureau becoming a truly effective accountability institution.

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Section 6. National Accountability Bureau. (a) There shall be constituted a National Accountability Bureau for the whole of Pakistan. (b). (1) The Chairman shall be appointed by the President in consultation with the leader of the House and the leader of the opposition in the National Assembly for a period of four years on terms and conditions of the President and shall not be removed except on the grounds of removal of judge of Supreme Court of Pakistan. (2) The Chairman NAB may resign his office. (b). (a) A person who is (1) A retired Chief Justice of Supreme Court, judge of Supreme Court, Chief Justice of High Court, (2) A retired officer of Armed Forces equivalent to the rank of retired Lieutenant General. (3). A retired Federal Government officer of BPS 22 or equivalent shall be appointed as Chairman. (c) In Absence of the Chairman NAB, the Deputy Chairman shall perform functions of the office duly authorized by the Chairman NAB. Section 7. Deputy Chairman NAB. (a) Deputy Chairman NAB shall be appointed by the President in consultation with the Chairman NAB. (a. a) A person who is (1) An officer of Armed Forces equivalent to the rank of Major General or (2) Federal Government officer in BPS 21 or equivalent shall be appointed as the Deputy Chairman NAB. (b) Deputy Chairman is to hold the office for three years and shall be removed on the ground of misconduct. Section 8. Prosecutor General Accountability. (a) the President of Pakistan in consultation with the Chairman, may appoint any person who is qualified to be appointed as judge of Supreme Court, as Prosecutor General Accountability. (2) He shall hold an independent office on full time basis. The Prosecutor General shall hold the office for three years. (3) The Prosecutor General shall hold the office for three years. (4) The Prosecutor General shall be removed on the grounds of misconduct. (5) The Prosecutor General Accountability may resign his office. (b) The Prosecutor General Accountability shall give advice to the Chairman NAB upon legal matters and perform such other duties of a legal character as may be referred or assigned to him by the Chairman NAB. (c) The Prosecutor General Accountability may with the approval of Chairman NAB appoint special prosecutors to conduct prosecution of cases. (d) In case of absence of the Prosecutor General, any other Law officer of the NAB shall act as the Prosecutor General Accountability.

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Section 9. Corruption and corrupt practices. (a) A holder of a public office or any other person is said to have committed the offence of corruption and corrupt practice (1) If he accepts or obtains any gratification, directly or indirectly, other than legal remuneration for doing or fore-bearing to do any official act. (2) Accepts and obtains any valuable thing with consideration or inadequate consideration from a person who is concerned in any proceedings or business transacted by him with his official functions. (3) Dishonestly and fraudulently misappropriates or otherwise converts to his own use any property entrusted to him; (4) By dishonest/ illegal means obtains for his spouse, children, dependents etc any property, valuable thing or pecuniary advantage; (5) He or his dependants cannot account for the standard of living beyond known sources of income; (6) Misuses his authority to gain any benefit/ favour for himself or any other person; (7) Has issued any directive, policy or SRO or any order which grants, concession/ benefit in taxation or any other law to himself or relative/ associate; (8) Wilful default or cheating/inducing members of public at large to deliver any property; (9) Commits criminal breach of trust as defined in Section 415 of the Pakistan Penal Code. (10) Commits criminal breach of trust as defined in Section 405 of the Pakistan Penal Code. (11) Commits a criminal breach of trust in capacity as banker, broker, attorney, agent as provided Section 409 of Pakistan Penal Code. (12) Aids, assists, abet attempts, or acts in conspiracy with person or holder of public office (b) All offences under this Ordinance are non-bailable offences. (c) If no prima facie case is made out after the investigation to the satisfaction of the Chairman NAB, the case may be closed by the approval of the Court. Section 10. Punishment for corruption and corrupt practices. (a) A holder of public office who commits the offence of corruption and corrupt practices shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to 14 years with fine and such of the assets found disproportionate to the known sources of his income shall be forfeited. (b) The offences specified in the Schedule to this Ordinance shall be Punishable in the manner specified. (c) The Federal Government may amend the Schedule by notification in the Official Gazette. (d) The convicted person shall not be entitled to any remissions. Section 11. Imposition of fine The amount of fine shall in no case be less than the gain derived by the accused or any relative/associate.

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Section 12. Power to freeze property. (a) The Chairman NAB or the Court trying may order freezing the property of the accused or part of it, whether in his possession or in the possession of any relative/associate or person on his behalf. (b) If the Property ordered to be frozen under Sun section (a) is debt or a movable property, the freezing may be made: (1) By seizure; (2) The appointment of receiver; or (3) By prohibiting the delivery of the Property to the accused or to anyone on his behalf. (4) By all or any other way that the Court or the Chairman NAB may deem fit. (c) In case of immovable property, the land paying revenue, the freezing shall be made through the Collector of the District on which the land is situated. In other cases, (1) By taking the possession; (2) By appointment of the receiver; (3) By prohibiting the payment of rent or delivery of the property to the accused or to any other person on his behalf. (4) By all or any method that the Chairman NAB or the Court may deem fit. Provided that any order of seizure, freezing, attachment etc shall remain in force for a period not exceeding fifteen days unless confirmed by the Court and the order shall be effective from the time of passing or proclamation in the newspaper, dispatched to the accused by registered post or electronic media. (d) If the property to be frozen is of perishable nature, the Court or Chairman NAB may order immediate sale. (e) The powers, duties and liabilities of a receiver appointed under this Ordinance shall be same as those appointed under the Civil Procedure Code. (f) The order of the freezing shall remain operative until the final disposal of the case and in case of acquittal of the accused for a period of ten days after the receipt of the certified copy of the order of the acquittal or release by the NAB. Section 13. Claim or objection against freezing. (a) The Court shall have exclusive jurisdiction to entertain and adjudicate upon all claims and objection against the freezing of property. Such claims shall be made within 14 days from the date of order of freezing the property. (b) The Court may extend the time for filing objections for sufficient cause, not exceeding additional 14 days. (c) The aggrieved party may file an appeal to the High Court with in ten days of the dismissal by the Court. Section 14. Presumption against accused accepting illegal gratification. (a) The accused shall be presumed to have accepted and obtained the gratification, or pecuniary advantage unless the contrary is proved. (b) In any trail of an offence punishable under section 165 of Pakistan Penal Code. any gratification other than legal remuneration or any valuable thing has been given or offered to be given by any accused person unless the contrary is proved that he gave or

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attempted to give that gratification as a motive or reward such as is specified in section 161 to 163 of the said Code. (c) In an offence punishable under section 9 subsection (a) clause (5) of this Ordinance, the fact that the accused or any other person on his behalf is in possession of anything for which the accused cannot satisfactorily account for or pecuniary resources disproportionate to his known sources of income the Court shall presume that the accused is guilty of the offence of corruption and corrupt practices. (d) The accused shall be presumed guilty of misuse of his authority or issuance of directive, or any policy or statutory order or SRO unless the contrary is proved. Section 15. Disqualification to contest elections or hold public office. (a) The person accused is convicted under section 9 shall cease to hold public office. He shall stand disqualified for a period of ten years after serving sentence for seeking or from being elected, chosen, appointed or nominated as member or representative of any public body or authority. (b) Any person convicted of an offence shall not allowed to apply for or be granted or allowed any financial facilities in the form of advance or loan for a period of ten years. Section 16. Trail of offences (a) The accused shall be prosecuted for an offence under this Ordinance in the court and the case shall be heard from day to day and disposed of within thirty days. (b) The Court shall sit at such place or places, as the Federal Government may specify. (c) In case of more than one Court, the Chief Justice of High Court of the Province concerned shall designate a judge to be administrative. (c. c) All orders made or proceedings taken before the assignment shall be deemed to have been made by the Court to which the case was assigned. (d) The Chairman NAB may file reference to a Court established anywhere in Pakistan. Section 16 A Transfer of case. (a) The chairman NAB may apply to any court of law or tribunal that any case pending before such court or tribunal shall be transferred to a Court established under this Ordinance and it shall not be necessary to for the Court to recall any witness or again record any evidence that may have been recorded. (b) the Prosecutor General Accountability or Special Prosecutor may apply for the transfer of case from any Court in one Province to another Court in another Province or from one Court to another within the same Province in the interest of justice, protection of witnesses or having regard to facts and circumstances of the case-- (1) To the Supreme Court of Pakistan if the case is intended to be transferred from one Province to another and (2) To the High Court of the Province in cases the case is intended from one Court to another Court in the same Province. (c) The accused may also make an application to the Supreme Court for the transfer of case from one Province to another and to the High Court for transferring the case from one Court to another within the same Province.

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Section 16 B Contempt of Court. A Court shall have the power to punish for contempt of court with imprisonment for a term which may extend to six months and fine which may extend to one million rupees any person who (a) Abuses, interferes with obstructs the process of the Court, disobeys any order or direction of the Court; (b) scandalizes the Court or otherwise do anything which tends to bring the Court or a person constituting the Court into hatred, ridicule or contempt; (c) Does anything which tends to prejudice the determination of a matter. (d) Does any thing which by any other law constitutes contempt of Court. Section 17. Provisions of the Code to apply (a) The provisions of the Code of Criminal procedure shall apply to the proceedings under this Ordinance. (b) The Provision of sub-section (a), the provisions of Chapter XXIIA of the Code shall apply to the trails under this Ordinance. (c) The Court may for the reason to be recorded, dispense with any provision of the Code and follow such Procedure as it may deem fit according to the circumstances. (d) The person accused of more offences than one of the same kind may be charged with and tried at one trail for any number of such offences. Section 18. Cognizance of offences. (a) The Court shall not take cognizance of any offences except on a reference made by the Chairman NAB. (b) A reference under this Ordinance shall be initiated by the NAB (1) On reference received from the Government, (2) Receipt of complaint or (3) Its own accord. (c) Where the Chairman or an office authorized by NAB is of the opinion that it may be necessary and appropriate to initiate proceedings against any person, he shall refer the matter for investigation. (d) The responsibility of inquiry of an alleged offence shall rest with NAB, unless any other agency or authority is required to do so by the Chairman. (e) The Chairman NAB or such members shall have power to arrest any person for the purposes of inquiry or investigation. (f) Any inquiry shall be completed expeditiously as may be practical and feasible. (g) The Chairman NAB or an authorized officer shall appraise the material before him during the inquiry and investigation, if he decides that it would be proper and just to proceed further, he shall refer the matter to the Court. (h) If the complaint inquired into is concluded as false and frivolous, the Chairman or authorized officer is may refer the matter to the Court and the complainant if found guilty shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to one year and/or fine. Section 19. Power to call for Information. The Chairman NAB may during the Course of an inquiry or investigation

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(a) Call for information from any person for the purpose of satisfying himself; (b) Require any person to produce or deliver any document or thing useful or relevant to inquiry; (c) Examine any person acquainted with facts and circumstances of the case. (d) Require any bank, financial institution to provide information regarding any person. (e) The Chairman may apply to the relevant High Court for the permission of surveillance of any person where there is a reasonable suspicion. Section 20. Reporting of Suspicious Financial Transactions. It shall be the duty of all banks and financial institutions to take prompt and immediate notice of all unusual or large transactions with no apparently genuine or economic or lawful purpose. Failure to supply such information shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to five years. Section 21 International Cooperation- Request for Mutual Assistance. Chairman NAB or any officer of the Government may request a foreign state to do any or all acts necessary in accordance with the law of such state evidence taken, or documents or articles produced; obtain and execute such warrants or other lawful instruments authorizing search and seizure. Freeze assets, confiscate articles and forfeit assets; transfer to Pakistan any such evidence, transfer in custody to Pakistan a person detained in state. Section 22 Jurisdiction Chairman NAB may inquire or investigate any offence which appears to him on reasonable grounds to involve this Ordinance. The Chairman NAB may conduct any such proceedings in conjunction with any agency as he deems fit. Section 23 Transfer of Property Void The property contained by the Accused or any relative or person associated with him shall not be transferred by any means. Any transfer of any right or title or interest or creation of charge on such property shall be void. Section 24 Arrest The Chairman NAB shall have the power at any stage of the inquiry or investigation under this Ordinance to direct that the accused, if not already arrested, to be arrested. Section 25 Voluntary return and Plea Bargaining Where a person prior to the authorization of investigation voluntarily comes forward and offers to return the assets or gains acquired or made by him in the course of or as consequence of any offence under this Ordinance the Chairman NAB may accepts such offer and after the determination of amount, deposits it with NAB, the NAB discharge such person from all its liability.

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Section 26 Tender of Pardon Chairman may with the view to obtaining the evidence tender full or conditional pardon to such a person on condition of his making full and true disclosure of the whole circumstances. Section 27 Power to Seek Assistance The Chairman shall have power to seek full and complete assistance and call for all or any documents and information relevant to or in connection with any matter pending before the NAB. Section 28 Appointment of Officer and Staff of NAB. The chairman NAB or officer appointed by him may appoint such officers and staff as he may consider necessary for efficient performance of the functions. Section 29 Accused to be Competent Witness The accused shall be a competent witness for the defence and may give evidence on oath in disproof of the charges made against him. Section 30 False Evidence etc. The court shall have the Jurisdiction and power to take cognizance of an offence committed in the Course of the investigation or trail of a case by any officer, any witness, including an expert who tendered false evidence to summarily try him and award punishment. Section 31. Prohibition to Hamper Investigations. Any person concerned with the inquiry, investigation and prosecution of the case consciously and deliberately and with malice compromises, hampers, misleads, jeopardizes or defeats an investigation case under process before the NAB shall be guilty of an offence punishable with imprisonment for a term which may extend to ten years. Section 31 A Absconding to Avoid Service of Warrants. Whoever absconds in order to avoid being served with any process issued by ay Court or any other authority or officer under this Ordinance shall be punishable with imprisonment which may extend to three years. Section 31 B Withdrawal from Prosecution The Prosecutor General with consent of the court may withdraw from the prosecution of any accused. Section 31 C Court to Take Cognizance of Offence with Prior Approval of the State Bank. The Court shall not take cognizance of an offence against officer or an employ of a bank without prior consent of the State Bank for writing off, waiving, restructuring or refinancing any financial facility, interest or loan.

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Section 31 D Inquiry, Investigation or Proceedings in Respect of Imprudent Bank Loans. No inquiry, investigation in respect of imprudent, defaulted or rescheduled loan shall be conducted and initiated by NAB. Section 31 E Protection of Witnesses Chairman NAB or the Court may in facts and circumstances of case take such measure as may be considered necessary for the safety, security and protection of witnesses. Section 32 Appeal Any person convicted or the Prosecutor General Accountability may within ten days of final judgement and order of the Court prefer and appeal in the high Court of the Province where the Court is situated. Section 33 Transfer of Pending Proceedings Any and all proceedings pending before a Court shall stand transferred to a court as son as it is constituted under this ordinance with in the same province, and it shall not be necessary to recall and witnesses or again to record any evidence. Section 33A Payment of Bonuses There may be paid bonuses or ex-gratia to the officers and staff of the NAB, other govt. Servants, and public servants for rendering commendable services in detection and investigation of any offence. Section 33 B Reporting of Public Contracts. All ministries, divisions and attached departments of Federal Government and provincial govt shall furnish to NAB a copy of any contract entered into by such ministries etc of minimum monetary value of fifty million. Section 33 C Measures for prevention of Corruption and Corrupt Practices,. The Chairman NAB shall from time to time constitute committees comprising officers of the NAB or other persons to (a) Educate and advise public authorities, holders of public offices on measures to combat corruption and corrupt practices. (b) Develop, arrange, supervise participate in or conduct educational programs and media campaigns and generally to disseminate information on detrimental effects of corrupt practices. (c) Examine laws in force, rules and regulations relating to the practice of ministries, departments of Federal Government or Provincial Government, statutory or other bodies and to recommend amendments in order to eliminate corrupt practices. (d) Instruct, advise and assist any statutory or other public corporation or bodies or organizations in public and private sectors on measures for reduction of corruption and corrupt practices. (e) Monitor the implement, assess and evaluate the success of instructions and advice of reduction and elimination of corruption and corrupt practices.

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Section 33 D NAB to submit an annual report. The chairman NAB shall as soon as possible after the end of every year submit a report to the President of its affairs for that year, Section 33 E Recovery of amount of fines. Any fine or other sum under this ordinance shall be determined by the court. Section 34 Power to make rules. The Chairman NAB by notification in the official Gazette, make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Ordinance. Section 34 A Delegations of Powers. The Chairman by a written order delegate all or any of his functions to an officer to carry out the purposes of this Ordinance. Section 35 Repeal. (a). The Ehtesab Act 1997 shall stand repealed from the date of promulgation of this Ordinance. (b). any case or proceedings pending under the Ehtesab Act 1997 shall be proceeded with and all subsequent proceedings shall be completed under this Ordinance. Section 36 Indemnity No suit or prosecution or any other proceedings shall lie against the Federal Government, provincial Government, Chairman NAB or any other member of the NAB etc for any act done in good faith. Section 37 Removal of Difficulties Order. In order to curtail any difficulty arising in giving effect to any provision of this Ordinance, the Chairman NAB may make such order, not inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance for removal of that difficulty.

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THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN ORGANIZATION The Office of the Wafaqi Mohtasib or the Ombudsman was conceived as early as 1973 with the Federal Ombudsman being an item in the Federal Legislative List of the Constitution of 1973. The Office of Federal Ombudsman was in effect established in 1983 vide the Establishment of the Office of the Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) Order 1983. This was promulgated as a Presidential Order on 24th January 1983 and protected by Article 270A of the Constitution. The establishment of the Federal Ombudsman was followed by the establishment of different Ombudsman offices as follows;

a) Office of the Ombudsman for the Province of Sindh. This was established vide the Establishment of Office of the Ombudsman for the Province of Sindh Act, 1992.

b) The Punjab Office of the Ombudsman. This was established vide the Punjab Office of the Ombudsman Act, 1997.

c) Office of the Ombudsman for Baluchistan. This was established vide the Establishment of Office of the Ombudsman for the Province of Baluchistan Ordinance, 2001.

d) Office of the Federal Tax Ombudsman. This was established vide the Establishment of Office of the Federal Tax Ombudsman Ordinance, 2000.

Through an amendment to the Ombudsman Order of 1983 another Office of the Ombudsman in the form of the Banking Ombudsman has also been created. Therefore, at present in addition to the Federal Ombudsman there are five independent Ombudsman Offices also operational with a variety of jurisdictions. OBJECTIVE The objective for the establishment of the Ombudsman Offices was to provide a forum for a person to register their grievance against mal administration, as defined in Section 2(2) of the Order of 1983, on the part of the bureaucratic administration at different levels.

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1. Defined Its objective is defined in the preamble and Section 9 of the Order of 1983. The Ombudsman’s objective as stated is to provide a forum to redress grievances in respect of mal administration. In the course of its objective the Ombudsman is required to investigate the allegation and pass any orders to redress the grievance. The objective therefore, is to provide for a forum and grievance redressal mechanism which is efficient, speedy and low cost allowing any citizen of Pakistan to invoke its jurisdiction without having to go through a more convoluted and expensive process of seeking assistance from the courts of law under the general law. 2. Parallel Objectives The Office of the Ombudsman has been provided with a very specific and limited scope in terms of objectives and consequent jurisdiction. Its objective are not parallel to any other institution or agency as such. Ofcourse, in the case of majority of the grievances brought before the Ombudsman the complainant has the option of seeking redress before the courts of law under the general law however, no specific institution or agency has been given similar objective to that of the Office of the Ombudsman. Effectively, the Office of the Ombudsman can be considered as an alternative resolution forum where speedy justice can be expected against grievances of mal administration. 3. Amendments or Curtailment to Objective Majority of the amendments made to the Order of 1983 or the other laws promulgating the different Offices of the Ombudsman relate more to operational matters and have not essentially curtailed the objectives of the Office of the Ombudsman. The only amendment which may be seen as a curtailment of the objectives of the Federal Ombudsman is the creation of the Banking Ombudsman however, that is in theory as in practical implementation it has only created another Ombudsman to handle banking matters. The Objectives defined for the Ombudsman are so specific and detailed that there has not been a need for curtailment or amendment to its objectives.

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STRUCTURE & AUTHORITY The structure and authority of the Ombudsman has been clearly defined in the Order of 1983 and the subsequent laws promulgated for bringing into existence the different offices of the Ombudsman. 1. External Authority The Ombudsman is appointed by the President of Pakistan for a fixed term of 4 years and provided with specific authority to act as the Ombudsman. Apart from the appointing authority there is no other specific external authority which acts on the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman may receive on reference matters for investigation from the superior judiciary or other government departments however, these are requests for investigations and not under any direct authority. 2. Internal Authority Internally the Office of the Ombudsman is headed by the Ombudsman and the office itself is managed through a very lean staff who are appointed or sent on deputation to the Office. The Office is primarily managed by the Ombudsman as the final authority in terms of administrative and operational matters. The Ombudsman’s internal authority can be curtailed or enhanced by the appointing authority being the President of Pakistan. 3. Operating Legal Frame Work The Federal Ombudsman’s, and similarly the different Ombudsman’s appointed for specific territorial jurisdictions or categories such as tax and banking, have their operating legal frame work defined under the law. In the case of the Federal Ombudsman the legal frame work is defined under Articles 2(2), 9, 10 and 11. The Ombudsman can inquire into any matter relating to mal administration and for purposes of inquiry carry out evidence and use other means available and upon a finding issue under Article 11 Recommendations for implementation by the relevant government department or agency to redress the grievance brought before the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman as part of its Recommendation can also ask the department or agency to cancel its orders or take disciplinary action against the public servant in question.

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The legal frame work is narrow in its spectrum and applicability and the Ombudsman can recommend action but not take direct action. The Ombudsman has been provided the additional power to send a report to the President of Pakistan if it finds that any of its recommendations are not being implemented without just cause and seek an order from the President against the said department or agency to implement the recommendation of the Ombudsman. JURISDICTION 1. Primary Jurisdiction The primary jurisdiction of the Ombudsman is to inquire into complaints brought before it relating to mal administration of public servants or public departments and agencies and upon investigation recommend different defined actions under Article 11 to the said department or agency for implementation. The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman is limited to providing a speedy, low cost and efficient forum for hearing and investigating into grievances of any person which would otherwise not be viable for perusal by an ordinary court of law or the department or agency itself. The specific jurisdiction in terms of matters which may be complained before the Ombudsman are defined in Article 2(2) and Article 9 of the Order of 1983. This jurisdiction is further limited to exclude matters involving the external affairs of Pakistan or the defence of Pakistan. Similarly, matters sub judice before a court of law cannot be brought before the Ombudsman. The jurisdiction of the Ombudsman is further limited to a complainant being a non public servant under Article 9(2) and therefore, a public servant cannot complain before the Ombudsman in a matter relating to his or her own agency or department as that jurisdiction otherwise lies with the Service Tribunal or internal redressal system within each government department or agency. 2. Secondary Jurisdiction The Ombudsman has a secondary jurisdiction in that it can carry out research and arrange for studies in a given matter relating to corrupt practices which come to its notice so as to be able to make a general recommendation to the relevant department or agency on how to curtail such practices. The Ombudsman also has a secondary jurisdiction in terms of actions it may take in support of its investigation. These are powers provided to the Ombudsman

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under Article 14, 15 and 17 of the Order of 1983. These include the power to search, seizure, summoning witnesses, receiving evidence and appointing inspection teams. In addition the Ombudsman also has the power to hold a person in contempt under Article 16 of the Order of 1983 which is an original proceeding and an additional or secondary jurisdiction. One of the more important secondary jurisdictions provided to the Ombudsman is to upon inquiry and finding determine that a department or agency should pay costs or compensation to the aggrieved party and thereby, a finding in the nature of financial redressal which is an important jurisdiction to empower the Ombudsman to be more than just an inquiry and recommendation forum. 3. Sufficiency of Jurisdiction The Ombudsman in terms of its primary objective does not have sufficient jurisdiction. As a forum for redressal of grievances against mal administration and providing speedy, efficient and low cost justice to the common man the Ombudsman while is able to carry out its initial function of investigation and achieve the recommendation stage efficiently it’s lack of jurisdiction in terms of implementation of its findings makes it a toothless tiger. Any legal order or finding which is not capable of immediate and complete implementation is of no value to the complainant. By restricting the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman to making recommendations and even when faced with a department or agency not acting on such recommendations the only available recourse being a report to the President of Pakistan is not a practical or efficient system of implementation. Keeping in perspective the thousands of complaints which come before the Ombudsman and even if 20% of the consequent recommendations are not implemented and reports forwarded to the President of Pakistan for necessary action, the President of Pakistan would be required to put in hundreds of hours of his precious time in reviewing these reports which is an impractical solution. The Ombudsman needs to be provided with the jurisdiction to enforce and implement its recommendations directly and which should possibly include the power or authority to suspend or terminate a public servant who is responsible for implementing the recommendation but is not doing so.

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4. Conflict of Jurisdiction Essentially the only conflict of jurisdiction that can occur with the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman is that of the ordinary courts under the general law however, such conflicts are satisfactorily taken care of under Article 9(1)(a) restraining the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction in terms of matters sub judice before a court of competent jurisdiction or a judicial tribunal or board. In addition the restriction placed under Article 9(2) disallowing any complaint by a public servant against their department or in terms of their service ensures there is no conflict with the special jurisdiction otherwise granted to the Service Tribunals and the Public Service Commission. 5. Restraints The restrain on the Ombudsman’s jurisdiction is that it can only investigate into matters of mal administration excluding matters relating to matters of foreign affairs or defence of Pakistan. In addition there is a restrain that the Ombudsman must act within the powers and authorities specified in the Order of 1983 in terms of carrying out its investigations even if they are not sufficient in a given matter. LEVEL OF AUTONOMY 1. Functional Powers & Authority The Office of the Ombudsman is a fairly autonomous body being appointed by the President of Pakistan and acting as a quasi judicial forum. The Ombudsman has functional autonomy to act in terms of his objectives and the powers and authority are clearly defined under the Order of 1983. The only area where the powers or authority of the Ombudsman is not completely autonomous are the powers to carry out search and seizure and in certain matters of evidence where the Ombudsman is dependent on assistance from other government agencies. Under Article 24 of the Order of 1983 the Ombudsman is defined as the Chief Executive of the Office and therefore, exercises all powers expected to be with a Chief Executive in terms of administration and management.

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2. Appointment The Ombudsman is appointed by the President of Pakistan on a fixed tenure and the terms of the tenure and service are specifically defined in Articles 4, 5 and 6 of the Order of 1983. The Ombudsman is an impartial office where the Ombudsman is restrained from occupying any other position for profit or remuneration and is further restrained from being involved in any political or semi political organization. The staff of the Ombudsman is appointed under Article 8 by the President in consultation with the Ombudsman. While the staff is entitled to salaries and benefits similar to those available to other public servants in similar posts under Article 8(3) they report to the Ombudsman and are also required to take an oath of office. The staff of the Ombudsman office is fairly lean and a very functional system has been developed to handle complaints for which specific persons are appointed to specialized posts. 3. Delegation The Ombudsman cannot delegate his powers to any other person. Under Article 7 of the Order of 1983 there can be an Acting Ombudsman but that is only in the absence of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman being the person who is to hear and decide matters there is no delegation permissible. The Ombudsman infact acts as a quasi judicial forum and therefore, as an investigator and also as an arbitrator in terms. 4. Financial The financial authority vests in the Ombudsman under Article 24 of the Order of 1983 and the Ombudsman is the Principal Accounts Officer and exercises all powers relating to financial and administrative controls which otherwise would have been delegated to a ministry or division of the Government. The Ombudsman prepares the budget, which is funded through the Federal Consolidated Fund under Article 35 of the Order of 1983 and has the power to fix remunerations and approve all expenses.

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5. Adequacy & Efficiency The autonomy of the Ombudsman is fairly adequate and efficient. The Ombudsman’s Office has become a genuine forum providing assistance to persons with a grievance against bureaucratic high handedness or mal administration. However, the Ombudsman’s Office can improve its functioning and effectiveness with increased autonomy in terms of implementation of its recommendations. SYSTEMS & CONTROLS The systems and controls placed on the Ombudsman’s Office are primarily defined in the Order of 1983 in the form of the powers and authorities of the Ombudsman. 1. Defined Mechanism There is a defined mechanism of systems and controls in terms of defining the operational controls within the Order of 1983 including matters such as financial defined under Article 35 and the requirement to publish an Annual Report declaring detailed performance under Article 28 of the Order of 1983. Additional systems and controls are developed and implemented by the Ombudsman within the framework of the Order of 1983 and the powers granted there under. 2. External Mechanism While the external mechanism of control is through the President of Pakistan as the appointing authority additional external mechanisms also exist which have been introduced indirectly through the Order of 1983. The Ombudsman and the Staff are deemed to be public servants as defined under Section 21 of the Penal Code under Article 27 of the Order of 1983. While this provision primarily relates to the functioning of the Ombudsman and the Staff of the Office in terms of investigative matters and consequent immunity provided under Article 30 of the Order of 1983, it also opens the door for the Ombudsman and his Staff to be considered as public servants in terms of system and controls applicable upon public servants.

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3. Rules & Procedures Under Article 36 of the Order of 1983 the Ombudsman has the power to make Rules with the approval of the President of Pakistan. The Rules can be framed for carrying out the purposes of the Order of 1983. The Rules are primarily internal in nature and setout the functional system of management. Present Rules include how a complaint is to be handled when received at the Office and its pre inquiry stage and selection for inquiry and investigation and the process of investigation itself. Further Rules also deal with how the Ombudsman will call or evidence and how documents and evidence will be treated. The power to make Rules infact enables the Ombudsman to effectively organize management structures and systems. 4. Effectiveness The Ombudsman is infact a fairly effective organization in terms of its limited scope and jurisdiction. It provides a very viable forum for speedy and low cost resolution of grievances in an environment where the bureaucracy has a very strong presence and mal administration is often found. The Ombudsman’s Office can become even more effective with certain additional powers specifically in terms of the power to implement and enforce its findings and recommendations. As an accountability institution it can be considered in the category of a grass root accountability where a person who is aggrieved by an incorrect electricity bill has a forum to complain and seek justice. RELATIONING The Ombudsman’s Office is primarily an autonomous body and its independence is crucial as that provides it with the ability to consistently hear complaints against government departments and agencies. 1. Institutional & Legal Defined Relationship With the promulgation and establishment of the Provincial Ombudsman’s Offices and the specialized Ombudsman for Tax and Banking a defined legal relationship has been created between the different Offices. By creating the

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Provincial Offices the Federal Ombudsman can now refer any complaint relating to a provincial jurisdiction to the Provincial Ombudsman and similarly in matters of taxation and banking. These are institutionalized relationship however, the overall concept remains the same and all the Ombudsman’s Offices primarily function on the same pattern as the Federal Ombudsman. 2. Evolved Relationship Due to the severe independence of the Ombudsman’s Office required by necessity as it is the form for complaints against government departments and agencies, no particular evolved relationships can be found with the Ombudsman’s Office. LEGAL ROBUSTNESS 1. Level of Principal Mandate The principal mandate of the Ombudsman is well defined legally and sufficient powers and authorities have been provided to the Ombudsman to implement its objectives and exercise its jurisdiction. The limiting factor in the mandate is the inability of the Ombudsman to enforce and implement its recommendations directly and it must seek the indulgence of the President of Pakistan to enforce its recommendation if a department or agency refuses to implement the recommendation. This is a practical and legal anomaly which needs to be studied and possibly rectified through a simple amendment allowing the Ombudsman to suspend a public servant who is responsible for implementation of its recommendation until such time as the decision is implemented. 2. Derived & Evolved Mandate The Ombdusman’s mandate is specifically defined in the Order of 1983 and the other laws promulgated to establish the other Ombudsman’s offices. No derived or evolved mandate as such has been found and it is unlikely that the mandate can evolve in its present framework. In view of the specific and limited jurisdiction of the Ombudsman the mandate changing without a direct amendment to the law itself is not possible and specifically in view of the defined limiting jurisdiction of the Ombudsman.

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3. Strengths & Weakness’s The greatest strength of the Ombudsman’s Office is that it provides an independent forum for handling of grievances against bureaucratic departments and agencies which otherwise would not be viable for the common man to approach the ordinary courts of law with. It provides speedy and efficient redress at a low cost. The Ombudsman’s Office provides an external control over the high handedness and mal administration of government departments and agencies and protects the inherent rights of citizens. Its strength lies in its ability to be completely impartial and its impartiality guaranteed by the structure under which it is formulated including the appointment of the Ombudsman and the Staff. The primary weakness in the Ombudsman’s Office is that it cannot implement its own recommendations and findings effectively. It is dependent on the department or organization against which it has given a finding to implement the decision and in the case of failure to implement it has to seek the indulgence of the President of Pakistan. This is the most glaring weakness of the institution. 4. Effectiveness The Ombudsman’s Office has been fairly effective in providing justice to minor grievances of the common man and providing an alternative dispute resolution forum. It has been able to save persons from the bureaucratic red tape and been able to resolve problems which would otherwise have taken years and at a very high cost to the affected person. It is only in terms of matters of serious nature where the Ombudsman might decide against the government department or agency but the relevant department or agency can avoid the decision by not implementing the recommendations and using the fact that the Ombudsman cannot directly enforce the recommendation to their advantage. Legally within the objective defined and the framework developed for the institution the Ombudsman’s Office has operated in a fairly effective manner however, its effectiveness can be made far greater with a clear cut authority to implement its own decisions.

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5. Achievement of Objective The Ombdusman’s Office within the limited scope of its objective has more or less achieved its objective. There is room for improvement in terms of systems of handling evidence and investigation however, keeping in mind that the Ombudsman is also seeking to provide speedy justice there is a limitation on the extent of investigation which would be carried out. Within the parameters defined the institution of the Ombudsman has achieved success and can become the primary accountability institution of mal administration by bureaucracy in relation to the members of the public if its powers and authorities are further revised in view of its own past history and functioning.

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Section 3. Appointment of Mohtasib. 1. The Wafaqi Mohtasib (Ombudsman) shall be appointed by the President. 2. The Mohtasib shall take oath before the President in the form set out in the First

Schedule. 3. The Mohtasib shall perform his functions and exercise his powers fairly, honestly,

diligently and independent of the Executive. All Executive authorities shall act in aid of the Mohtasib.

Section 4. Tenure of the Mohtasib. 1. The Mohtasib shall hold office for a period of four years and shall not be

eligible for extension or re-appointment under any circumstances. 2. The Mohtasib may resign his office.

Section 5. Mohtasib not to hold any other office of profits.

1. The Mohtasib shall not (a) Hold any other office of profits in the service of Pakistan. (b) Occupy any other position carrying the right to remuneration for rendering of services.

2. The Mohtasib shall not hold any office of profit in service of Pakistan before the expiration of two years after he has ceased to hold that office; nor shall be eligible to contest election during the tenure or two after he has ceased to hold the office or to take part in any political activity.

Section 6. Terms and Conditions and remuneration of Mohtasib.

1. The Mohtasib shall be entitled to such salary, privileges and allowances and other terms and conditions of service as the President may determine.

2. The Mohtasib may be removed form the office on the grounds of misconduct or incapability to perform his duties due to any physical or mental incapacity. The Mohtasib may refute any charges and request an open public evidentiary hearing before the Supreme Judicial Council. Failure to conduct hearing within thirty days and conclude within ninety days shall absolve The Mohtasib of any or all charges.

3. The Mohtasib making the request under Sub-section (2) shall not perform his functions until the hearing is concluded.

4. The Mohtasib removed on the charge of misconduct shall not be eligible to hold any office of profits in the service of Pakistan or contest elections..

Section 7. Acting Mohtasib.

In absence of The Mohtasib the President shall appoint an acting Mohtasib. Section 8. Appointment and terms and conditions of service of staff.

1. The member of staff other than those mentioned in Article 20 or those of a class specified by the President by order in writing shall be appointed by the President in consultation with The Mohtasib.

2. It shall not be necessary to consult the Federal Public Service Commission for making appointment of members of the staff or on matters relating to their qualifications and recruitment.

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3. The entitlement of salaries, allowances and other terms and conditions of service may be in corresponding grades in the National Pay Scales of the Federal Government.

4. A member of staff, mentioned in sub-section (1) shall take an oath before The Mohtasib in a manner set out in the Second Schedule.

Section 9. Jurisdiction, Functions and Powers of the Mohtasib

1. The Mohtasib on a complaint by an aggrieved person may undertake any investigation into allegation of maladministration on the part of any Agency or its officers or employees:

The Mohtasib shall have no jurisdiction to investigate any matter which (a) Are sub-judice before a court of competent jurisdiction or judicial tribunal on date of receipt of a complaint. (b) Relate to the external affairs of Pakistan. (c). relate to the defence of Pakistan.

2. The Mohtasib shall not accept for any investigation by or on behalf of a public

servant or functions concerning matters relating to the Agency in respect of any personal grievance relating to his service.

3. The Mohtasib may arrange for studies to be made or research to be conducted for ascertaining and eradication the root causes of corrupt practices and injustices.

4. The Mohtasib may set up regional offices as and when required. Section 10. Procedure and Evidence.

1. A complaint shall be made on oath or solemn affirmation by the aggrieved person or his legal representative.

2. Anonymous or pre-anonymous complaints shall not be entertained. 3. A complaint shall be made within three months from the day on which the

aggrieved person first noticed of the alleged matter, but the Mohtasib may conduct an investigation pursuant to a complaint which not within time if he considers that there existed special circumstances.

4. The Mohtasib shall issue a notice to the principal officer of the Agency to meet the allegation contained in the complaint including the rebuttal, for purpose to conduct an investigation. He may however, proceed with the investigation if he receives no response.

5. Every investigation is to be conducted in private, but The Mohtasib may adopt such procedure as he deems fit.

6. A person shall be entitled to appear in person or be represented before The Mohtasib.

7. The Mohtasib shall pay expenses to any person who attends or furnishes information for the purposes of an investigation.

8. The conduct of investigation shall not affect any action taken by the Agency or duty of that Agency to take further action with respect to the subject matter of the investigation.

9. The Mohtasib may require any officer of Agency concerned to furnish information which is relevant and helpful in conducting investigation. There shall

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be no obligation to maintain secrecy in respect of disclosure of any information for purpose of investigation.

10. In case where the Mohtasib decides not to conduct an investigation he would sent a written statement of his reasons to the complainant.

11. The Mohtasib shall regulate the procedure for the conduct of business or exercise of powers under this Order.

Section 11 Recommendations for Implementation.

1. If the Mohtasib, after considering the matter on his own motion or on a complaint or on reference by the President, Federal Council or National Assembly is of the opinion that that matter amounts to maladministration he shall communicate his findings to the Agency concerned (a) To consider to matter (b) To modify or cancel the decision, process, recommendation, act or omission.; (c) To explain more fully the act or decision in question; (d) To take disciplinary action against the public servant under relevant laws applicable to him; (e) To dispose of the matter within a specified time; (f) To take action on his findings and recommendations to improve working of the Agency; (g) Take other step specified by the Mohtasib.

2. The Agency shall inform the Mohtasib of the actions taken on his

recommendations or reasons for non compliance. 3. The Mohtasib shall forward a copy of the communication received by him from

the Agency to the complainant. 4. The Mohtasib may lay a special report to the President of he thinks that the

person aggrieved in consequence of maladministration and injustice has or will not be remedied.

5. If the agency does not comply with the recommendations of the Mohtasib or does not give a reason for non compliance, it shall be treated as ‘defiance of recommendations’.

Section 12 Defiance of Recommendations.

1. If there is a Defiance of Recommendations by a public servant with regard to the implementation of the recommendation, the Mohtasib may bring the matter to the notice of the President, who may order the Agency to implement the Recommendations accordingly.

2. Every instance of the defiance shall become the part of the Personal file and Character Roll of the office responsible for the defiance.

Section 13 Reference by Mohtasib. The Mohtasib may refer the case to the concerned authority to take corrective and disciplinary measure if he finds, upon investigation, any person guilty of any allegations. The concerned authority is to inform the Mohtasib of the actions taken by it. However,

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upon failure of the authority to take such actions gives Mohtasib discretion to bring it to the notice of the President. Section 14. Powers of the Mohtasib.

1. The Mohtasib has the same powers as are vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, in respect of matters, namely (a) Summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath: (b) Compelling to produce the documents; (c) Receiving the evidence on affidavits and; (d) Issuing, commission for the examination of witnesses.

2. The Mohtasib have the power to require any person to furnish the information on

such points or matters as in his opinion be useful, relevant to the subjection of the investigation.

3. The powers referred to in sub-section (1) may be exercised by any person, authorized by the Mohtasib in his behalf.

4. Where the Mohtasib finds a case to false, frivolous or vexatious he may award reasonable compensation to the Agency, public servant or other functionary against whom the compliant was made.

5. If any Agency, public servant or other functionary fails to comply with the directions, the Mohtasib may refer the matter to the appropriate authorities to take disciplinary action against the person.

6. If the Mohtasib has a reason to believe that any public servant has acted in a manner warranting criminal or disciplinary proceedings against him, he may refer the matter to the relevant authority for necessary actions.

7. The staff and nominees of the office may be commissioned by the Mohtasib to administer oaths for the purposes of this order and to attest affidavits, affirmations or declarations which shall be admitted in evidence in all proceedings.

Section 15. Power to enter and search any premises.

1. the Mohtasib or any person authorized on his behalf, may enter any premises for making any inspection or investigation where , he has a reason to believe that any document relating to the subject matter of the investigation may be, and (a) Search such premises and inspect any article, book of accounts or other document; (b) Take extracts or copies of such books of accounts or documents; (c) Impound or seal articles, books of accounts or documents; (d) Make an inventory of such articles, books of accounts and other documents found in such premises.

2. All searches shall be carried out in accordance with the provision of Criminal Procedure Code.

Section 16. Powers to punish for contempt. 1. The Mohtasib has same powers as the Supreme Court has to punish any person

for its contempt who

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(a) Abuses, interferes with, impedes, imperils or obstructs the process of the Mohtasib in any way or disobeys any order of the Mohtasib. (b) Scandalises the Mohtasib or otherwise does anything which tends to bring the Mohtasib, his staff or nominee or any person authorized by the Mohtasib in relation to his office, into hate or ridicule or contempt: (c) Does anything which tends to prejudice the determination of a matter pending before the Mohtasib or (d) Does anything which, by any other law constitute contempt of Court. Provided the fair comments made in good faith in public interest on working of Mohtasib or any of his staff.

2. Any person sentenced under clause (1) may appeal to the Supreme Court. 3. The President has the power to grant pardon, reprieve or respite and to remit,

suspend on commute any sentence passed by any Court, Tribunal or authority. Section 17 Inspection team

1. The Mohtasib may constitute an inspection team for performance of any functions of the Mohtasib.

2. Inspection Team shall consist of one or more members of the staff and shall be assisted by persons as the Mohtasib may consider necessary.

3. An Inspection Team shall exercise such of the powers of the Mohtasib as he may specify in writing; the reports of the Inspection Team shall first be submitted to the Mohtasib.

Section 18. Standing Committees The Mohtasib may establish standing or advisory committees when necessary with the jurisdiction of performing functions of the Mohtasib as are assigned. The Committees are to report to the Mohtasib first, with its recommendations. Section 19. Delegation of Powers The Mohtasib may by order in writing delegate his powers as may be specified, with such conditions, as may be specified to the any member of his staff, or to the Committees to be exercised and the reports are to be submitted to the Mohtasib first along with recommendations. Section 20. Appointment of Advisers. The Mohtasib may appoint advisers, consultants, fellows, bailiffs, Intern commissioners and experts with or without remunerations to assist him in discharge of his duties under this Order. Section 21. Authorization of Provincial functionaries etc. The Mohtasib may with the consent of Provincial Government authorize any person, Agency, public servant or other functionary to undertake the administrative control of the Provincial Government in respect of matter falling within the jurisdiction of the Mohtasib under section 14 sub-section (1) and (2).

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Section 22. Awards of costs and compensation and refund of the amounts 1. The Mohtasib may call upon any public servant, agency, or functionary to show

cause why compensation has not been awarded to the aggrieved person or loss suffered for by him on account of any maladministration on their part. On hearing the Mohtasib may award reasonable costs or compensation.

2. In case of illegal gratification, misappropriation, criminal breach of trust or cheating by any employee of an agency, an order a credit to the Government may be passed or any other order as he may deem fit,

3. An order made under sun-section two shall not absolve such person of any liability under any other law.

Section 23. Assistance and advice to the Mohtasib

1. The Mohtasib may seek the assistance of any person or authority for the performance of his functions. 2. All officers of the Agency whose assistance has been sought by the Mohtasib shall assist to the extent of their authority.

3. A person shall be prosecuted for giving false evidence. Section 24. Conduct of Business.

1. The Mohtasib shall be the Chief Executive of the office. 2. The Mohtasib shall be the Principal Accounts Officer of the office in respect of

all the expenditure incurred against budget grants controlled by the Mohtasib. Section 25. Requirement of affidavits.

1. The Mohtasib may require the any complainant to submit affidavits attested or notarized before any competent authority.

2. The Mohtasib may take evidence without technicalities and subject a person to take lie detection tests and may draw inferences when a person refuses to take such test as are reasonable in the circumstances.

Section 26. Remuneration of advisers, consultants etc

1. The Mohtasib may fix remuneration of advisers, consultants, experts and interns engaged by him.

2. The Mohtasib may fix an award or remuneration for exceptional services rendered or valuable assistance given to the Mohtasib.

Section 27. Mohtasib and staff to be Public Servants The Mohtasib, officers and other staff shall be deemed to be public servants within the meaning of section 21 of the Pakistan Penal Code. Section 28. Annual and other Reports.

1. The Mohtasib shall submit a report to the President within three months of conclusion of a calendar year.

2. The Mohtasib may from time to time present before the President reports relating to his functions.

3. Such reports shall be made public.

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4. The Mohtasib may also make public, his recommendations, research and conclusions.

5. The Mohtasib shall present the reports before the Federal Council and National Assembly.

Section 29. Bar to Jurisdiction No Court or other Authority shall have jurisdiction

1. To question the validity of any action or anything done under this Order. 2. To grant an injunction or stay in relation to any proceedings or anything to be

done or done under this Order. Section 30. Immunity No suit, prosecution or other legal proceedings shall lie against the Mohtasib or his advisory committee, inspection team staff or any person authorized by the Mohtasib for anything done in good faith. Section 31. Reference by the President.

1. The President may refer any matter, report or complaint for investigation and independent recommendations by the Mohtasib.

2. The Mohtasib shall promptly investigate any such matter. 3. The President may by notification in the official Gazette, exclude specific

matters, public functionaries or Agencies from the operation or purview of any or all of the provisions of this Order.

4. Section 32. Representations to the President. Any person aggrieved by a decision or order of Mohtasib, may a representation to the President, within thirty days. Section 33. Informal resolution of dispute.

1. The Mohtasib or member authorized shall have authority to informally conciliate, amicably resolve any grievance without written memorandum and without issuing an office notice.

2. The Mohtasib may appoint liaison counsellors at local levels on terms and conditions that he deems necessary.

Section 34 . Service of Process.

1. A written process or communication shall be deemed to be duly served upon a respondent, namely:- (a) By service in person through any employee or by any special process-server appointed in the name of Mohtasib. (b) By depositing in any mail box or posting in any post office a copy of the process or by registered post (c) By a police officer pr nay employee or nominee of the office leaving the process or document at the last known address of the respondent. (d) By publishing the process or document through any newspaper and sending a copy thereof to the respondent.

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2. The burden of proof shall lie upon the respondent to demonstrate by assigning sufficient cause that he had no knowledge of the process and that he acted in good faith.

3. The document or process mailed shall bear a clear mark of the Office. Section 35. Expenditure to be charged on Federal Consolidated Fund. The remuneration payable to the Office shall be an expenditure charged upon the Federal Consolidated Fund. Section 36. Rules The Mohtasib may make rules for carrying out the purposes of the Order with the approval of the President. Section 37. Order to override other laws. The provisions of the Order shall have effect notwithstanding anything contained in other laws. Section 38. Removal of Difficulties. The President may make order to remove any difficulty to give effect to any provision of this Order.

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FEDERAL INVESTIGATION AGENCY ORGANIZATION The Federal Investigation Agency was established under the Federal Investigation Agency At of 1974. The FIA was uptil 1999 the primary federal investigation agency and operates as a department of the Ministry of Interior, Government of Pakistan. OBJECTIVE The primary objective for the constitution of the FIA was to provide a central investigating agency to investigate matters directly relating to the Federal Government as well as public sector organizations. The FIA basically replaced the Pakistan Special Police which had been established in 1948 through the Pakistan Special Police Establishment Ordinance and functioned as the primary investigation agency. FIA investigates primarily immigration offences, economic fraud and public corruption. In addition the Federal Government may also direct FIA to investigate any matter relating to public accountability or offences relating to the public sector including commercial and governance related crimes. 1. Defined Its objective is defined by the legislature in the Preamble to the Act of 1974.

“Whereas it is expedient to provide for the Constitution of a Federal Investigation Agency for the investigation of certain offences committed in connection with matters concerning the Federal Government, and for matters connected therewith”

The objective as defined coupled with the jurisdiction extending to the whole of Pakistan provided FIA with a mandate of investigation into almost any matter relating to the Government directly or indirectly. 2. Parallel Objectives Uptil 1999 FIA was the primary organization with the objective of investigating all crimes relating to the State and Public accountability. However, in 1999 with the promulgation of the National Accountability Bureau Ordinance a parallel

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objective was declared and effectively a second institution with a parallel objective to that of FIA was constituted. 3. Amendments or Curtailment to Objective While there has been no direct amendment or curtailment of the Objectives as defined under the Federal Investigation Agency Act of 1974, indirectly through administrative action a curtailment to the defined Objective has taken place. With the transfer of the entire Financial Crimes Wing of the FIA to the National Accountability Bureau on deputation has effectively curtailed the FIA’s ability to investigate financial crimes and consequently an indirect curtailment of its legal and constitutional Objective. STRUCTURE & AUTHORITY The structure and authority of FIA has been defined in the At of 1974 and further specified in the Federal Investigation Agency Rules, 1975. 1. External Authority The Agency itself is constituted by the Federal Government and operates as a department of the Ministry of Interior reporting to the Minister of Interior therefore, the superintendence of the Agency directly vets in the Federal Government. The level of authority of the Agency has been specified by the Federal Government through the Schedule to the Act of 1974. 2. Internal Authority Internally the Agency is headed by a Director General to be appointed under Section 3(2) of the Act. The Director General is responsible for the overall administration of the Agency and has been given under Section 4(2) of the Act the powers of an Inspector General of Police as otherwise defined in the Police Act, 1861 and otherwise prescribed by the relevant Rules. Therefore, structurally the FIA is administered and managed similar to a police organization with a similar hierarchy. Effectively the FIA mirrored in terms of its organizational structure its predecessor the Pakistan Special Police. 3. Operating Legal Frame Work The FIA’s principal operating frame work has been defined in Section 5 of the Act, the Schedule to the Act and the Rules.

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The members of the Agency have been given the power to investigate which include the powers to search, arrest and seizure. These powers mirror the powers of a Provincial Police and has been so stated in Section 5(1) effectively defining FIA as a Federal Police. A member of the Agency above the rank of a sub‐inspector has been given the authority and power to act as the office‐in‐charge of a police station when discharging his duties in a given area. The Act of 1974 created a new institution and gave it all the legal powers and authorities which otherwise vest in the Police Force and specified the offences it can investigate. What the Act of 1974 did not do was create an organizational structure specific to the needs of a federal investigation agency. The legal framework provided to the Agency was further protected through an indemnity provided to the members of the Agency operating in good faith under Section 8 of the Act. JURISDICTION 1. Primary Jurisdiction The primary jurisdiction of the FIA is to investigate into the offences specified in the Schedule to the Act of 1974. The Schedule to the Act of 1974 and consequent amendments to it have resulted in the primary jurisdiction of the FIA extending to almost all the principal offences under the Pakistan Penal Code including offences of theft and murder. In addition numerous offences under special laws have also been added to the jurisdiction of the FIA including special laws relating to; a) Official Secrets b) Foreigners Act c) Foreign Exchange d) Imports & Exports e) Banking f) Arms & Explosives g) Customs h) Immigration i) Treason j) Terrorism k) Drugs l) Telecommunication The FIA’s primary jurisdiction has been extended to cover almost all kinds of offences and consequent investigation as well as corresponding authority to act as a police force.

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While the Objective limited the jurisdiction to be one of investigation and limited to matters of the Federal Government and public sector organizations it has now been extended beyond investigation including prosecution and involving any citizen of Pakistan in respect of almost any act whether committed in connection with the Federal Government or not. 2. Secondary Jurisdiction The extension of the primary jurisdiction of the FIA through an amended to the Schedule to the Act to include offences under the Special laws amounts to the creation of a secondary jurisdiction. With jurisdiction now extending to even offences under the Banking laws whether it be a private or a public bank and extending to offences under the Drugs Act of 1976 and other such laws the secondary jurisdiction created, and almost now merged into the primary jurisdiction translates into an all encompassing jurisdiction in terms of investigations of crimes and their prosecution. A further secondary jurisdiction is one of prosecution. Under section 5‐A of the Act of 1974 added through the Federal Investigation Agency (Amendment) Ordinance, 2002 the Assistant and Deputy Directors Law of FIA are deemed to be Public Prosecutors. Consequently, they can now directly institute proceedings and conduct such proceedings and trials before Special Courts constituted under any law. 3. Sufficiency of Jurisdiction The Primary and Secondary jurisdictions created for FIA are more than sufficient for its effective operation and for fulfillment of its Objectives. Infact in certain situations the jurisdiction created far exceeds the Objectives of the institution as well as the logical boundaries of jurisdiction which would be needed for FIA to operate within its mandate effectively. 4. Conflict of Jurisdiction Certain conflicts of jurisdiction have arisen as a consequence of the enactment of the Act of 1974 and consequent amendments to it. A direct conflict of jurisdiction exists with the Police Force. The FIA primarily acts as a Federal Police Force exercising the same jurisdiction which otherwise is vested in the Provincial Police forces.

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With the promulgation of the National Accountability Bureau a conflict of jurisdiction has arisen in the both the investigation authority and the prosecution powers. The 2002 Amendment Ordinance has created a conflict of jurisdiction in terms of public prosecution. The primary jurisdiction of prosecution vests in the Public Prosecutors Office whereas part of this jurisdiction has been usurped by the 2002 Amendment Ordinance. 5. Shared or Parallel Jurisdiction The area of investigating banking crimes and crimes by public servants is a jurisdiction which the FIA now shares with the National Accountability Bureau. With the transfer of the entire Financial Crimes Wing of the FIA to the National Accountability Bureau infact this has created a shared jurisdiction. 6. Restraints There are effectively no restraints on the jurisdiction of the FIA except those imposed by the Federal Government through amendments to the Schedule to the Act of 1974 and through administrative restraints which indirectly create a restrain in jurisdiction. While the FIA is effectively the only institution other than the National Accountability Bureau which has sweeping powers and authorities in terms of its jurisdiction, some of its powers and authorities are capable of restraint on account of the fact that the FIA has not been given a completely independent structure and it primarily relies on the structure of the provincial police. FIA operates at the discretion of the Federal Government and its jurisdiction can be limited or extended at any time subject to the favour of the Federal Government which can make the entire institution completely ineffective by a simple administrative decision not to appoint a Director General and not delegate any of the powers of the Director General to any other member of the FIA. LEVEL OF AUTONOMY 1. Functional Powers & Authority A high level of autonomy has been provided to the FIA in terms of its investigative functions and connected exercise of powers and authority and

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further secured through a legal indemnity provided to members of the institution in terms of the actions. However, the autonomy of the institution is derived ultimately from its level of independence. The FIA as an institution is completely dependent on the instructions and favour of the Federal Government and therefore, operates as a department of the Federal Government rather than a complete autonomous institution. 2. Appointment The Director General is appointed under Section 3 of the Act directly by the Federal Government and all other members of FIA are appointed or transferred on deputation and are subject to the Rules otherwise applicable to officers of the Police Force therefore, functioning as members of FIA so long as they find favour of the Federal Government. All members of the FIA are considered public servants. The appointments and consequent promotions and transfer of members of FIA are controlled through the Federal Investigation Agency (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1975. These are dependent primarily on the structure defined in the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules, 1973. All posts of Director General and Additional Director General are mde by the Federal Government directly from amongst the All Pakistan Unified Grade or the Civil Service in terms under Section 4 of such Rules of 1974. Appointments to all other posts in the FIA are made either through direct appointment, transfers from other government institutions or promotions. For purposes of such appointments the authorities have been defined on the basis of the Grade of the post. The Prime Minister is the authority of appointment to Grades 17 and above. The Director General is the authority in terms of Grades 11 to 16. In terms of appointment to Grades 3 to 10 the authority is the Director General or Additional Director General not holding less than a Grade 19 post. The structure for purpose of appointments has been defined through internal Groups which are; Investigation, Accounts, Customs, Income Tax, Engineering and Legal. In addition each Group has operational Wings or Divisions.

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For purposes of Promotion there is setup a Departmental Promotion Committee while for appointments and transfers there is setup a Departmental Selection Committee. Most importantly, a maximum limit of 50% has been placed on appointment of posts within the Agency being made through promotion from within. Therefore, atleast 50% of the total strength of the Agency consists of persons who have been either transferred from other institutions or fresh direct appointment. 3. Delegation The Director General has the power to delegate his powers to any member of the Agency as he deems fit under Section 7 of the Act. However, further delegation by such members has not been specified or provided for. The power of Delegation is absolute and is not defined in terms of controls or checks placed thereon. The Director General effectively is the sole administrator of the Agency and all powers vest in him. For administrative management the Director General delegates his powers to respective members of the Agency. 4. Financial The Financial authority primarily vests with the Director General who in turn delegates it to the head of the Accounts Group. The FIA is dependent on the budget allocated to it by the Federal Government for which the Agency makes a budget request through the Ministry of Interior. The Agency follows the same financial controls as applicable on any government department or institution. 5. Adequacy & Efficiency While the adequacy of the autonomy is sufficient in terms of the Agency carrying out its functions in terms of investigation there autonomy level is certainly not adequate in terms of what should be generally required in the case of a public accountability institution. FIA functions primarily as a federal police force under the same hierarchical structure as adopted by the provincial police forces. It has sufficient autonomy to allow it to adequately discharge its prime objective of investigation. However, its efficiency is to some extent hampered by the requirement of atleast 50% of its

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work force being inducted through transfers of new postings limiting the ability of promotions and consequent long term development of internal careers. SYSTEMS & CONTROLS As the FIA has evolved into a federal police force and the Act of 1974 primarily depended on the prevalent laws pertaining to civil service and the police service the systems and controls are also borrowed from these two institutions. 1. Defined Mechanism The only defined mechanism of operational controls in the Act of 1974 is the prime administrative authority being provided to the Director General. Other than that no formalized mechanism for controls or an operational system has been defined within the Act. In terms of systems, the system in terms of human resource functions relating to appointments, transfers and promotions is provided for through the Federal Investigation Agency (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules 1975 which are in fact more detailed and elaborate than the parent Act of 1974 itself or the Rules of 1974. 2. External Mechanism Almost the entire Agency’s operational system and controls are based on the systems and controls borrowed from the police force under the Police Act 1861 and the relevant laws pertaining to Civil Servants. Therefore, the majority of the systems and controls provided are external creating therefore, rather than an autonomous institution a simple government department. 3. Rules & Procedures The primary sets of Rules applicable are the Federal Investigation Agency Rules 1974 and the Federal Investigation Agency (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules 1975. In addition the Civil Servants (Appointment, Promotion and Transfer) Rules 1973 apply to the members of the Agency and the actions and authority level is otherwise controlled and defined through the Police Act 1861.

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The Estacode effectively is the operational manual followed by the members of the Agency. There is no provision for internal accountability or controls to ensure due and proper functioning. 4. Effectiveness Considering the present practical position of the Agency as a department of the Federal Government the systems and controls are effective in terms of satisfying the requirements of a general government department. However, the systems and controls are certainly not sufficient in terms of what is required of an accountability institution and the first of which is an autonomous and independent existence. The Agency has no independent system or a set of controls to deal with the unique situation of public accountability. Members of the Agency involved with investigating and prosecuting public accountability cases have been provided an indemnity under Section 8 of the Act and that more or less curtails any possibility of internal accountability within the institution. RELATIONING As FIA evolved into a functional government department it has created numerous relationships with other institutions as well majority being out of necessity. 1. Institutional & Legal Defined Relationship The legal relationship defined in the Act of 1974 is primarily with the Federal Government which is effectively vested with the powers of superintendence of the Agency. The only institutional relationship defined in the Act of 1974 is the taking over of the personnel and functions by the Agency of the Pakistan Special Police which was disbanded as a consequence of the Pakistan Special Police Establishment Ordinance, 1948 being directly repealed by the Act of 1974. 2. Evolved Relationship The Agency has numerous evolved relationships with other institutions which are a result of its needs based on its own evolution as an institution.

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The latest relationship to be created is one with the National Accountability Bureau after 1999 where the Bureau works parallel to the Agency and in terms of financial crime, the entire personnel of the Agency are not working with the Bureau on deputation. The Agency also has evolved relationships with the Provincial Police forces as it takes on deputation numerous personnel from the polices forces and has certain powers where members of the Agency can act as police officers with designated powers. The Agency after the Amendment Ordinance 2002 has a new relationship with the Public Prosecutors Office in that members of the Agency’s legal department can now operate as Public Prosecutors and require an certain extent of coordination required to fulfill certain basic legal requirements as a part of a criminal trial where the Public Prosecutors Office is required by the Agency even if acting as a Public Prosecutor on its own. LEGAL ROBUSTNESS 1. Level of Principal Mandate The principal mandate of the Agency is to investigate offences relating to the Federal Government and public sector organizations. However, this mandate has been extended through amendments to the Schedule to the Act including in the Schedule almost all of the criminal offences provided for in the Pakistan Penal Code including such offences as murder and kidnapping and theft etc. In addition the principal mandate limited to investigation has also been extended through the Amendment Ordinance 2002 to include the mandate to prosecute. 2. Derived & Evolved Mandate As a result of the amendments to the original Act of 1974 and the formation of internal Rules by the Director Generals of the Agency from time to time and directions of the Federal Government, the mandate of the Agency has evolved to a great extent and the Agency now effectively operates as a Federal Police Force rather than an accountability institution. The Agency has derived further mandates from special laws such as the Passport Act, 1974, Emigration Ordinance, 1979, Customs Act 1969, Foreign Assets (Declaration) Regulation, 1972, Imports & Exports (Control) Act, 1950 and the

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Foreign Exchange Regulation Act 1947. These special laws amongst others have provided the Agency with direct mandate to investigate and prosecute. As a consequence of such derived mandates the overall mandate of the Agency has evolved into a mandate to be a special police force at a macro level and one specializing in immigration and export and import control matters. These are recognized as the Agency’s primary investigative domain. The mandate while constantly evolving has infact moved away from the original objective of having a central federal agency to investigate into affairs relating to public accountability. 3. Strengths & Weakness’s The Agency’s strength lies in its institutional roots in the Police Forces. It has personnel highly trained in general police work and investigative fields. In addition the Agency in view of its vast mandate has the ability to look at matters in far more detail as it has access to one of the largest depositories in terms of criminal archives and experience in handling all kinds of offences which the general police force is not capable of handling due to lack of experience. This strength allows the Agency to act as a foil to the standard police force and investigate in relation to offences which are complicated or specialized in nature specially offences relating to financial crimes and immigration and control laws. At the same time the principal weakness of the Agency is its lack of institutionalism and effectively having become a government department representing a federal police force controlled by the Ministry of Interior. The Agency is not directly focusing on public accountability and infact after the creation of the National Accountability Bureau its mandate in terms of public accountability has become more or less redundant. Another major weakness of the Agency is the complete lack of internal accountability and lack of a constant work force. With atleast 50% of its work force at all times either on temporary deputation or being introduced through direct induction the Agency is not able to hire the best talent at the starting levels and train the personnel into senior officers who understand and belong to the culture of the organization.

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Consequently, the Agency does not have an independent or defined culture as an institution rather it has adopted the culture in vogue in government departments. A major legal weakness in the Agency is that while it has been given powers to investigate and are deemed to act as police officers when investigating or in performance of their duties as investigative officers, the Agency has not been given the inherent Autonomy to allow it to declare findings without the possibility of retribution from its overseeing authority i.e. the Federal Government through the Ministry of Interior. The controls and systems as planted in the Agency provide for ultimate controls by the Federal Government and therefore, the Agency effectively acts as an arm of the Federal Government without the freedom and independence to declare its investigative findings publicly. A further weakness is the inability of the Agency to take suo moto notice of an offence and investigate. It is dependent on a department, organization or government to refer a matter to the Agency for investigation through a complaint. This effectively curtails the ability of an institution to look into any wrong doing which comes to public knowledge. 4. Effectiveness As a result of the Agency’s evolution over a period of time into a Federal Police Force its effectiveness as a public accountability institution has become redundant. It no longer acts as an independent accountability and investigative institution. The prime objective of the Agency is not longer the focus. The Agency is effective as an investigating police force and nothing more and that too in terms of accountability is ineffective due to its relationship with the Government and its operational structure. Its role is now defined by the law to be that of an investigating federal police. 5. Achievement of Objective The Agency has failed to achieve the Objective which was declared in the Act of 1974. It is no longer an investigation agency for investigating crimes relating to the Federal Government and Public Sector Organizations. The objective of the Agency was to provide the investigating support to public accountability however, it has evolved into a police force providing support to different special laws and with the now extended Schedule to the Act it provides investigative

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support in terms of all criminal offences committed. Therefore, it has even become a supporting specialized investigative arm of the Police Forces. The Act of 1974 is a five page documents consisting of 10 sections of which one section repeals the old Special Police Establishment Ordinance. Section 1 & 2 deal with the definitions and title defining to seven terms. Section 3 creates the Agency. Section 4 defines the administrative control of the Agency. Sections 5, 6, 7 and 9 define the powers while Section 8 provides an indemnity to the members of the Agency. Essentially the Act of 1974 shut down the Special Police Force and replaced it with a new organization in the form of the Federal Investigation Agency with a new objective of accountability. However, as complete dependence of the Act of 1974 in terms of functional and operations provisions of the new Agency was on prevalent laws relating to the Police Forces and Government Servants and the context of its predecessor; the Special Police Force, the Act of 1974 left the door open for the Federal Government to allow the Agency to evolve into an accountability institution. The amendments to the Act of 1974 and the Rules framed from time to time as well as the precedents which laid down the overall domain and jurisdiction of the Agency converted it into a government police department.

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Section 3. Constitution of the Agency. (1) Federal Government may constitute an Agency for inquiry into and investigation of the offences. (2) The Agency shall consist of a Director General and other officers as the Federal Government may appoint. Section 4. Superintendence and Administration of the Agency. (1) The superintendence of the Agency vests in the Federal Government. (2) The administration of the Agency vests in the Director General who exercises the powers of an Inspector General of Police under the Police Act, 1861. Section 5. Powers of the members of the Agency. (1) The agency has the power throughout Pakistan for the purposes of inquiry and investigation that it may search, arrest, seize the property and have such duties, privileges and liabilities as the officer of Provincial Police. (2) The officer of the rank of sub-inspector may for inquiry or investigation, exercise his powers as officer-in-charge of the police station where he is carrying out investigation and shall be deemed as officer in-charge of that police station. (3) The officer of the Agency may also arrest without warrant any person who has committed or has reasonable grounds to have committed any offence. (4) The Police station includes any place declared to be the police station by the Federal Government. (5) The officer conducting an investigation may, by a written order, direct the owner or person in possession of a property not to transfer, remove or otherwise dispose of the property, which is the subject matter of the investigation. (6) Any contravention of the order made under sub section (5) is punishable by imprisonment for a term which may extend to five years or fine or both. Section 5-A Certain officers of the Agency to be deemed as Public Prosecutors. The Assistant Director (Legal) and the Deputy Director (Law) shall be deemed to Public Prosecutors and shall be competent to institute and conduct proceedings in the case sent up for trail in Special Courts. Section 6. Power to Amend the Schedule. The Federal Government may amend the Schedule by notification in the official Gazette. Section 7. Delegation of powers. The Director General may by a written order direct all or any of his powers to be exercised by any member of the Agency. Section 8. Indemnity. No suit, prosecution or other legal proceeding shall lie against the Federal Government, any member of the Agency or any person exercising any powers under this Act for anything done or intended to be done in good faith. Section 9. Power to make rules.

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(1). The Federal Government may by notification in the official Gazette, make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act. (2) Such rules provide for the (a) Terms and conditions of service of the Director General and other members of the Agency and qualification for recruitment to various posts; (b) Powers and functions of the members and conduct of inquires and investigation. (c) Nature and extent of assistance that the Agency may provide to Provincial Investigating Agencies; (d) Powers of Inspector General of Police to be exercised by the Director General; (e) Manners of rewards for commendable services. Section 10. Repeal (1) Pakistan Special Police Establishment Ordinance, 1948, Special Police and Provincial Police as the said Ordinance and Order are repealed. (2) Upon the repeal of the said Ordinance

(a) All persons who were members of the Special Police before such repealing shall stand transferred to the Agency and shall be entitled to the same terms and conditions to which they were entitled subject to sub section (5).

(b) Any inquiry/investigation carried out by the Special Police shall continue to be carried out by the Agency.

(3) Subject to sub-section (4), the appointments of the specified persons shall be not be disturbed after commencement of this Act.

(4) The Federal Government may direct the specified persons to express their willingness to serve in or under the Agency on the recommendation of the Director General. (5) The specified persons shall be entitled to the same terms and condition of service as he was entitled to before such repeal.

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INSTITUTIONAL & FINANCIAL ACCOUNTABILITY SERVICE TRIBUNAL ORGANIZATION The Federal Service Tribunal was established through the Service Tribunals Act of 1973. In addition four provincial Service Tribunals were also setup through the following promulgations;

a) Sindh Service Tribunals Act of 1973; b) Punjab Service Tribunals Act of 1974; c) NWFP Service Tribunals Act of 1974; and d) Baluchistan Service Tribunals Act of 1974.

All the Provincial Service Tribunals operate in the same manner and their authority and operation follows the terms of the Service Tribunals Act of 1973 which controls the operation of the Federal Service Tribunal. OBJECTIVE The objective for the establishment of the Service Tribunals was to provide for an administrative tribunal to deal with matters relating to the terms and conditions of service of civil servants. The conduct of the civil servants is primarily regulated by the Efficiency & Discipline Rules and the Civil Servants Acts which effectively setout the terms of service. Under the Efficiency & Discipline Rules the Authority can appoint an Officer to hold an inquiry into the conduct of any civil servant and issue a penalty or finding. This amounts to the primary accountability of a civil servant at the departmental level. A civil servant through the Service Tribunal is provided a forum to challenge such a finding or penalty imposed. 1. Defined The objective of the Service Tribunal is defined in the Preamble and Section 3 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The objective is to provide for an administrative

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tribunal to exercise exclusive jurisdiction in respect of matters relating to the terms and conditions of service of civil servants. The Service Tribunal acts as a court of appeal in most cases and in some specified matters can also act as the court of original jurisdiction. 2. Amendments or Curtailment to Objective All amendments to the parent laws of the Service Tribunals primarily deal with the administrative procedures and addition of Rules. No major curtailment of the objective or mandate of the Service Tribunals has been made since their inception. The procedures added through the amendments infact have improved the ability of the Service Tribunals to adjudicate upon the appeals brought before it. STRUCTURE & AUTHORITY The Service Tribunals are established by the Executive and therefore, in the case of the Federal Service Tribunal the Tribunal operates under the authority of the President of Pakistan. 1. External Authority The primary external authority which operates on the Tribunals is the Executive establishing the Tribunal. The Executive when establishing the Tribunal or thereafter determines the territorial limits of the Tribunal as well as the class or class’s of civil servants in respect of whom the Tribunals have jurisdiction. Therefore, the extent of mandate or jurisdiction is determined solely by the Executive. Also as the sole appointing authority of the Chairman and members of the Tribunals the Executive also determines the number of members of the Tribunal as long as they don’t exceed three in number. 2. Internal Authority Internally the Tribunal is headed by the Chairman of the Tribunal who is appointed by the Executive. The Chairman is responsible for the daily functioning of the Tribunal and its members.

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The Chairman further determines when and where a bench of the Tribunal may be required to sit under Section 3‐A of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973. The Chairman is primarily the administrative authority of the Tribunal. 3. Operating Legal Frame Work The legal framework has been defined under the establishing Acts. Under the Service Tribunals Act of 1973, which is more or less followed in word and spirit in the later promulgated Acts establishing provincial Tribunals, the Tribunal shall be established by the Executive with the objective of providing a judicial forum for all matters relating to the terms of service of civil servants. The Tribunals are specific for the civil servants and their terms of service. The Tribunal sits as a judicial tribunal adjudicating upon appeals and original matters and follows generally the procedure for judicial hearings. The Tribunal at all times consists of the Chairman and atleast one member or at the maximum three members. The Tribunals have the power to declare void or amend or curtail any departmental or government order issued in relation to the terms of service or appointment of a civil servant and consequently is the principal deciding institution in terms of civil servants. JURISDICTION 1. Primary Jurisdiction The primary jurisdiction of the Tribunals is in relation to the class or class’s of civil servants within the territorial area notified by the Executive. The primary jurisdiction includes hearing of all matters relating to a civil servants terms of service including appeals against departmental or administrative orders passed in relation to the civil servants terms of service and conduct. The jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal is defined under Sections 4, 5 and 6 of the Service Tribunals Ac, 1973. The Service Tribunal can adjudicate upon all matters and appeals brought before it and it is deemed under Section 5 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 to be a civil court when adjudicating upon such matters and therefore, applies the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code where found necessary.

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2. Secondary Jurisdiction The jurisdiction of the Service Tribunal is specific and defined and no secondary jurisdiction has been setup or evolved through amendments or precedents. 3. Sufficiency of Jurisdiction To comply with its objectives and mandate the jurisdiction granted to the Service Tribunals is sufficient and adequate. Additionally the Federal Government under Section 8 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 frames Rules for the functioning of the Tribunals. The Tribunals infact have operated efficiently and are the primary forum for adjudication of matters relating to Civil Servants. 4. Conflict of Jurisdiction While there is no direct conflict in jurisdiction, there is available to the civil servants the alternative jurisdiction of the High Court under its constitutional jurisdiction under Article 199 of the Constitution. Under Section 6 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 the jurisdiction in matters relating to civil servants was made the exclusive domain of the Tribunals however, the Act does not and cannot override the jurisdiction granted to a High Court under the Constitution. 5. Restraints The only restrain upon the Tribunal is the territorial jurisdiction or classification in terms of persons who can approach the Tribunal and these are determined by the Executive. No other direct or indirect restraints exist. LEVEL OF AUTONOMY 1. Functional Powers & Authority The Tribunal is autonomous in terms of its powers and authority within the ambit of its defined jurisdiction. The Chairman and Members of the Tribunal have the functional authority to hear matters and adjudicate and pass orders which are binding in law. Other than the Executive who establishes the Tribunals and determines its operational domain the Tribunal is completely autonomous in theory.

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2. Appointment The Chairman and Members of the Tribunals are appointed by the Executive on terms identified. The Chairman is required to be a person who has been or is qualified to be a Judge of the High Court. 3. Delegation As the Service Tribunal operates as a judicial forum there is no provision for delegation of powers in terms of the principal authorities and powers granted to the Tribunal. The Chairman may delegate powers of administration to another Member or Officer of the Tribunal under the Rules, however, this is limited to administrative matters and not judicial. 4. Financial The financial management of the Tribunal is done by the government and the Tribunal or the Chairman have no financial authority under the law. The Tribunal being a federal an/or provincial institution and a judicial institution at that, its financial matters are controlled by the relevant Ministry detailed to manage the financial and administrative affairs of the Tribunals. 5. Adequacy & Efficiency The autonomy of the Tribunals is adequate in terms of the mandate provided to the Tribunal. In theory the Tribunals are completely autonomous as any judicial forum should be. Furthermore, as a judicial tribunal in terms of matters relating to civil servants the autonomy guaranteed to the Tribunal has operated fairly efficiently in practice with the Chairman and the Members being able to respond with independent judgments frequently against the government departments and authorities. SYSTEMS & CONTROLS 1. Defined Mechanism The only defined system and controls on the Tribunals are the authority of the Executive and the defined jurisdictional parameters in the law itself. Additionally the Chairman of the Tribunal as the organizational head of the Tribunal implements the system.

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The Chairman and the Members have been given defined roles to perform as adjudicators and in judicial forums controls are of a different nature to administrative institutions. The aspect of the Tribunals which requires controls is primarily their judicial decision making process and this being appeal able provides an adequate control within the system. 2. External Mechanism The external mechanism in terms of systems is that off the relevant Ministry or Government Department responsible for the financial and administrative affairs of the Tribunal. The budget of the Tribunal is regulated and determined by the controlling Ministry and the staff of the Tribunal is also provided on deputation. No other external mechanism in terms of controls exists except that the Chairman and Members of the Tribunal are liable to be held accountable as any other member of the judiciary or executive appointee. 3. Rules & Procedures Under Section 8 of the Service Tribunals Act, 1973 the Federal Government may enact and frame Rules from time to time. Infact Rules for the Federal and Provincial Tribunals have been framed and deal primarily with procedures relating to hearing of matters and composition of the Bench’s. In terms of its legal adjudication the Tribunal s deemed to be a civil court and therefore, incorporates the Civil Procedure Code in its powers of adjudication which provide sufficient basis for the Tribunal to be able to function as a judicial forum. 4. Effectiveness The Systems and Controls imposed on the Tribunals are in practice sufficient and no major hindrance in the Tribunals ability to function or adjudicate and comply with its objectives and mandate has been seen. The Tribunals acting as a judicial forum have more or less a standard set of systems and controls which have been found to be effective in other judicial forums and institutions. RELATIONING The Tribunal being a judicial forum is an independent and autonomous body under the law being established by the Executive.

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1. Institutional & Legal Defined Relationship The sole defined relationship of the Tribunals is between the Federal and Provincial Tribunals in terms of their territorial jurisdiction and classification of matters within their jurisdiction. As an independent judicial forum there are no other defined institutional or legal relationships of the Tribunal. It remains independent and acts as a judicial institution in terms of matters brought before it for adjudication. 2. Evolved Relationship Over the years an evolved relationship of the Tribunals has been with the Establishment Division of the Government in terms of judgments given by the Tribunals are considered as the road map to amendments and changes brought to the E&D Rules and the Estacode from time to time. This is not a defined relationship however, it is one which exists with the Tribunals being the principle authority in terms of commenting on the legality of the E&D Rules and the commentary by the Tribunals on the terms of service and process of departmental inquiries acting as precedents. LEGAL ROBUSTNESS 1. Level of Principal Mandate The principal mandate of the Tribunals is clearly defined under the law and is specific in terms of applicability. The mandate is exclusive in nature and judicial in operation. The mandate being exclusive is extensive in terms of covering all matters relating to the terms of service of civil servants and therefore, amounts to deciding on accountability of civil servants. While in most case’s the matters before the Tribunals originate from decisions taken in departmental inquiries the Tribunals also have the jurisdiction to hear original matters. In terms of hearing maters against orders of departmental authorities and inquires the Tribunals also act as an accountability forum of such departmental authorities to ensure fair and judicious treatment of civil servants in terms of their service.

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2. Strengths & Weakness’s The strength of the Tribunals is its independence and consequent ability to decide matters against the establishment. Its further strength lies in the defined terms of its Chairman and Members and guarantee of their service. The exclusive nature of its jurisdiction is a further strength of the Tribunal which allows it to operate without any legal or jurisdictional conflict. If there is weakness in the Tribunal it is in the lack of defined jurisdiction in terms of original matters which can be brought before the Tribunal. While this jurisdiction exists by implication as not having been excluded it is not specifically determined as the appellate jurisdiction has been in the law. Therefore, an affected civil servant at times is not aware that it can approach the Tribunal on its original side and does not avail of a judicial redress available to it. 3. Effectiveness The Service Tribunals in terms of their objective have been very effective in providing a judicial and accountability forum for civil servants. Civil Servants are able to seek redress of their grievances against departmental inquiries and decisions before the Tribunals whereas the departments as well have the ability to defend their decisions and have them upheld. The Service Tribunals in terms of their special jurisdiction have further been able to provide a large data base of precedents which have defined the service rules and terms of service of civil servants as well as determine the proper procedures to be followed by departmental inquiries to ensure the fundamental rules of justice is implemented at all levels. The Service Tribunals have also reduced a fairly heavy load of protracted and costly litigation which a civil servant and a government department would have to undertake in a challenge to a department inquiry or decision. The Tribunal is capable of making quick decisions and the ability of the Tribunal to allow the affected civil servant to appear and defend themselves further allows the civil servant to seek redress at a low cost. 4. Achievement of Objective The Service Tribunals have certainly achieved their objective at the macro level providing the most fundamental judicial forum for accountability of civil servants. At the same time the Service Tribunals have through their judgments put on record settled precedents which have in turn come to regulate the

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procedures and rules of departmental conduct as well as conduct of civil servants in terms of their service. Within the narrow framework entrusted to the Service Tribunals they have succeeded in achieving their objective. The Tribunals could be empowered with better Chairman’s and Members who are judiciously experienced however, that is a matter for the Executive to take. Historically the Executive has appointed retired senior civil servants as members of the Tribunal which probably in hindsight is not the best policy however, a more balance formation of the Tribunal with the Chairman having judicial experience and one Member bring further judicial experience while a second Member bringing the experience of working within the civil service would be probably a more balanced approach and would result in fewer challenges to the decisions of the Service Tribunals.

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Section 3. Tribunals: 1. The President may, establish one or more Service tribunals. In establishing one or

more than one Tribunal, the class the civil servants in respect of whom or territorial limits within which the Tribunal shall exercise jurisdiction under this Act.

2. A Tribunal shall have exclusive jurisdiction in matters of terms and conditions of service of civil servants and disciplinary matters.

3. The Tribunal shall consist of (a) A Chairman, being a person who is or has been or is qualified to be Judge

of High Court; and (b) Three members each of whom possesses such qualifications as may be

prescribed by the rules. 4. The Chairman and members of the tribunal shall be appointed by the President on

terms and conditions as he may determine. 5. The Chairman or a member may resign his office by writing under his hand

addressed to the President. 6. The Chairman and members shall not hold any other office of profit in the service

of Pakistan. 7. A Tribunal established to exercise jurisdiction in respect o a specified class of

case may consist of one or more persons in service of Pakistan to be appointed by the President.

3-A. Benches of the Tribunal

1. The powers and functions of a Tribunal may be exercised by Benches consisting of not less than two members, including the Chairman.

2. in case of difference of opinion (a) The point shall be decided according to the opinion of the Majority. (b) If the members are equally divided and the Chairman of the Tribunal is

himself not a member of the Bench, the case shall be refereed to the Chairman for his opinion.

(c) If the members are equally divided and the Chairman of the Tribunal is himself a member of the Bench, the opinion of the Chairman shall prevail.

Section 4. Appeals to the Tribunals:

1. Any civil servant aggrieved by any order whether original or appellate, may within thirty days of communication of the order appeal to the Tribunal.

Provided that (a) where an appeal, review or representation to a departmental authority is

provided under the Civil Servants Act 1973, (b) Where the departmental authority determining the fitness of a person to

be appointed or to hold a particular post or promoted to a higher post or grade.

(c) No appeal to lie against the order passed before 1st July, 1969. 2. Where the appeal is against the order of departmental authority imposing the

departmental punishment, the appeal shall be preferred

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(a) In case of penalty of dismissal from service, compulsory retirement, demotion

(b) In other case referred to in the sub-section (7) of that section. Section 5. Power to Tribunals

1. The tribunal may set aside, confirm, vary or modify the order appealed against. 2. A Tribunal shall be considered a Civil Court and shall have same powers as are

vested in a Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure, including (a) Enforcing the attendance of a person and examining him on oath; (b) Compelling production of documents (c) Issuing commission for the examination of witnesses and documents,

Section 6. Abatement of suits and other Proceedings: All suits, appeals or applications regarding any matter within the jurisdiction of a tribunal pending before any Court shall abate forthwith, provided that any party may within ninety days of establishment of the appropriate Tribunal prefer an appeal to it. Section 7. Limitation The Provisions of section 5 and 12 of Limitation Act, 1908 shall apply to the appeals. Section 8. Rules.

1. The Federal Government may by notification in the official gazette make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Act.

2. such rules ma provide for the all or any of the following matters, namely (a) Requirements as to the number of members of the Tribunal necessary for

the hearings, order or decision by a Tribunal. (b) Filing for specified period any vacancy on the office of the Chairman or

member of the Tribunal caused by the absence on leave or otherwise of the Chairman or member.

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AUDITOR GENERAL OF PAKISTAN ORGANIZATION The primary organization for financial accountability in Pakistan is the Auditor General. Appointed under Article 168 of the Constitution of 1973 by the President of Pakistan, the Auditor General and his Office are responsible for the audit and reporting to the legislature on the usage and handling of public funds by the Government and Government departments and agencies. OBJECTIVE The objective for the establishment of the office of the Auditor General under the Constitution was to provide for a financial control and check through a proper financial audit procedure on the management and utilization of public funds by the government and its departments and agencies. This provides for the most fundamental public financial accountability with the Auditor General reporting to the legislature who in turn are empowered under the Constitution to question and control the Governments spending firstly through the approval of the budget process and thereafter, through the reports of the Auditor General in terms of the utilization of the funds approved in the Budget. 1. Defined The objective is defined in Articles 168 to 171 of the Constitution. The Auditor General has two primary objectives. Firstly it provides guidance to the Federal and Provincial Government in terms of the system under which the government accounts should be maintained. Article 170 of the Constitution states; “The accounts of the Federation and of the Provinces shall be kept in such and in accordance with such principles and methods as the Auditor General may, with the approval of the President prescribe.” Therefore, the Auditor General acts as the principal financial controller of the Government in terms of financial systems to be employed for maintenance of accounts. This ensure that all government accounts are maintained in a uniform manner and follows the updated internationally recognized accounting and financial policies.

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The second defined objective of the Auditor General is to audit the government accounts and prepare and present a report on such utilization of funds. This report is presented to the President who in turn is required to place it before the legislature for their review and consequent check on the government. Article 171 of the Constitution states; “The reports of the Auditor General relating to the accounts of the Federation shall be submitted to the President, who shall cause them to be laid before the National Assembly and the reports of the Auditor General relating to the accounts of a Province shall be submitted to the Governor of the Province, who shall cause them to be laid before the Provincial Assembly.” These are the two primary objective of the Auditor General as defined. 2. Parallel Objectives In so far as the Constitution is concerned there are no parallel objectives determined for the Auditor General. However, through numerous orders and notifications issued by the President of Pakistan and directions issued by the Legislature under the provisions of Article 169 of the Constitution, the objectives of the Auditor General have been somewhat enlarged and bifurcated. Under the Auditor General’s (Functions, Powers and Terms and Conditions of Service) Ordinance 2001 and the Controller General of Accounts (Appointment, Functions and Powers) Ordinance 2001 the accounting and auditing functions of the Auditor General have been separated. These two Ordinances effectively repealed the earlier Pakistan (Audit and Accounts) Order of 1973. Under the bifurcation the Controller General of Accounts is responsible for maintaining the accounts while the Auditor General carries out the audit. 3. Amendments or Curtailment to Objective The above two amendments through the Ordinance’s of 2001 are not directly curtailment to the Objectives of the Auditor General rather they bifurcate the operational working of the Office of the Auditor General. The above Ordinance’s have further provided for in detail the powers and authorities of the Auditor General and the Controller in terms of carrying out their functions. The Auditor General has been provided with all those powers which are necessary for an auditor to audit the accounts under internationally recognized accounting and financial standards.

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STRUCTURE & AUTHORITY The structure and authority of the Auditor General is provided for in the Constitution as well as under the Ordinances of 2001. 1. External Authority The Auditor General operates under two external authorities. The first external authority is that of the President of Pakistan who is the appointing executive under Article 168 of the Constitution. The Auditor General operates as per the authority defined and vested in the Auditor General by the President of Pakistan through the Constitution and notifications and orders issued from time to time. In addition the Auditor General reports to the President of Pakistan and specifically under Article 171 of the Constitution. The Auditor General allows operates under the external authority of the Parliament. Under Article 169 of the Constitution the Auditor General performs such functions and exercises such powers as may be determined by the Act of Parliament from time to time. 2. Internal Authority Internally the Auditor General is the head of the organization. The Auditor General has reporting to him Additional Auditor Generals responsible for Operations and Manpower and Systems Development who in turn have Deputy Auditor General’s heading the different departments such as Federal Audit, Provincial Audit, Corporate Audit and Revenue Receipt Audit etc. In addition the Auditor General also has Director Generals reporting to him looking after International Relations and Inspection & Regulations. With the recent addition of the Controller under the Ordinance of 2001 some of the above functions relating to maintenance of accounts has been transferred to the Controller and consequently departments handling accounting now report directly to the Controller. The functions of the departmental heads including the Additional and Deputy Auditor Generals are derived from the functions of the Office of the Auditor General as structured in the different Presidential Orders and the Ordinances of 2001.

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3. Operating Legal Frame Work The Auditor General is the supreme auditing organization in Pakistan with all the powers and authority that an auditor has in auditing accounts of any organization. The Auditor General is the principal auditor of the Government and all its departments and agencies and allied institutions and corporations. The legal framework within which the Auditor General operates is defined and established vide the Constitution whereas the detailed frame work is contained in the Ordinances of 2001 and the different Presidential Orders and Notifications issued from time to time relating to the functioning of the Auditor General’s Office. The Auditor General has been provided with independence and autonomy under the Constitution to enable the Auditor General to place before the President and the Parliament a verified audit report of the Governments financial dealings. The Auditor General has the authority to inspect any and all accounting and allied record of the Government and related departments and organizations in order to carry out the audit. The specific purpose of the audit is to determine if any misconduct has taken place in terms of managing or disbursement of public funds. The legal framework at a macro level is determined and permanent through the Articles of the Constitution whereas the operating and micro level framework is updated constantly to ensure that the Auditor General’s Office remains an auditing organization in line with the international standard of auditing. JURISDICTION 1. Primary Jurisdiction The primary jurisdiction of the Auditor General is to audit the Government accounts and the accounts of all government departments, organizations and agencies as well as directly or indirectly allied institutions or corporations. The Auditor General also audits grants and funds provided by the Government under special orders or conditions. In the addition the Auditor General, now through the Controller, acts as the accounting controller determining the procedure for maintaining accounts by the

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Government and its departments and all other defined organizations which fall within the jurisdiction of the audit to be carried out by the Auditor General. In pursuance of its primary jurisdiction the Auditor General has been given the power and authority to inspect and investigate all accounts relating to the Government and determine during audit any mal administration, misconduct or misappropriation of public funds. 2. Secondary Jurisdiction The Auditor General has a secondary jurisdiction which while no having been defined under the Constitution has been introduced through the Ordinance of 2001 and prior thereto through notifications issued in this respect. Under this jurisdiction the Auditor General can also audit the accounts of any organization or body corporate at the request of the President of Pakistan or a Governor of a Province. In addition the Auditor General now also has the power to audit stocks and stores of all government departments and therefore, its power and extent of audit has been enhanced to cover all areas of a standard corporate audit. The most important secondary jurisdiction available to the Auditor General is that of reporting and advising improvements and imposition of control systems in the financial and accounting management so to minimize the loss and wastage of public funds. 3. Sufficiency of Jurisdiction The Auditor General specifically after the promulgation of the Ordinances of 2001 has sufficient jurisdiction to carry out the detailed audit of any government accounts. In terms of its jurisdiction the Auditor General’s Office has also been provided with the ability to organize and structure the organization to meet the challenge of auditing a complex and large scale corporation. 4. Conflict of Jurisdiction There is no direct conflict of jurisdiction as the Auditor General is the sole and exclusive authority to carry out the audit of government and related departments and corporations accounts. There are certain parallel jurisdictions in that many public sector corporations or semi government departments obtaining international funding may retain the

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services of other auditors as well. Therefore, their accounts are audited by both a professional auditor as well as the Auditor General. This does not create a conflict unless and until in practical terms the two auditors do not agree on any specific issue and provide conflicting reports. 5. Restraints There are no specific restraints on the powers and authority of the Auditor General. The Auditor General has been provided vast powers to carry out its functions of accounts and audit and penalties have been imposed on any person hindering the Auditor General in terms of his functions and authority. LEVEL OF AUTONOMY 1. Functional Powers & Authority The Auditor General has been granted a level of autonomy in that the Auditor General is to discharge its functions under the law and within the terms of reference sent to the Auditor General by the President of Pakistan or a Governor of a Province. The Auditor General acts independently and is an independent organization under the direct authority of the President and the Parliament. Its powers and functions are autonomous except that it reports directly to the President of Pakistan and through the President to the Parliament. The Auditor General cannot off its own motion audit or interfere in the accounting practices of any organization unless and until that organization is listed as a government department or institution directly or indirectly and the Auditor General is directed to include such organization or institution in its audit. The Auditor General in his capacity as the head of the organization is autonomous in terms of the organizations management and operations within the parameters laid down by the President of Pakistan or an Act of Parliament. 2. Appointment The Auditor General is appointed under Article 168 of the Constitution and as a constitutional appointment takes oath of office. The Auditor General’s terms of service are defined by an Act of Parliament or the Order of the President. Furthermore, the Auditor General cannot be removed except in the same manner and on the same grounds as a judge of the Supreme

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Court, thereby providing severe safeguards to the tenure and term of the Auditor General once appointed. Under the different notifications and the Ordinances of 2001, the President makes further appointments of Additional and Deputy Auditor General as well as Director Generals in the Auditor Generals Office on the recommendations of the Auditor General. Under the Ordinance of 2001 the President of Pakistan is now also required to appoint the Controller General of Accounts. 3. Delegation The Auditor General can delegate powers to the Additional Auditor Generals and Director Generals in terms permissible as per the Act of Parliament or the President of Pakistan. The delegation of powers depends specifically on the operational structure created for the Office of the Auditor General from time to time. 4. Financial The budget of the Auditor General is a charged expenditure and is therefore, not approved by the Parliament as with the annual national or provincial budgets. The Auditor General has the financial authority in terms of defining its budget, with the approval of the President of Pakistan and expending the budget in terms of operations of the Office of the Auditor General. By classifying the Auditor General’s budget as a charged expense the Auditor General infact has been provided with a fair amount of independence in terms of its budget and expenditure. 5. Adequacy & Efficiency The autonomy of the Auditor General is sufficient for carrying out the objectives and mandate of the Auditor General. The Auditor General enjoys the level of autonomy which any professional auditor would under the internationally recognized standards of accounting and auditing. The Auditor General’s autonomy is however, subject to the approval and sanction of the President of Pakistan or an Act of Parliament as per the Constitution. The process of such approvals and sanctions however have been

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inefficient as can be seen that the first step taken to seriously modernize and update the organization itself were taken as recently as 2001 whereas the international standard of accounting had progressed drastically over the last few decades. Possibly a level of autonomy in terms of professional matters and management should be provided without the approval process allowing the Auditor General to take necessary steps to constantly upgrade and update the organization as the premier auditing organization. SYSTEMS & CONTROLS The Constitution places the primary controls over the Auditor General’s office in terms of its functions and authority being determined by the President or an Act of Parliament. The systems deployed are also with the approval of the President of Pakistan. 1. Defined Mechanism There is a defined mechanism of controls and systems in terms of the operations and working of the Office of the Auditor General. The controls have been imposed by the different orders of the President of Pakistan and Act’s of Parliament as well as the fundamental control placed by the Constitution defining the operation and responsibility of the Auditor General. The systems are also defined and are constantly updated by the Auditor General and the Additional Auditor General (Manpower & Systems Development). The systems defined are put in the form of policies and rules which are implemented by the Auditor General. All systems and controls defined and developed by the Auditor General are approved by the President of Pakistan. 2. External Mechanism There is no external controls placed over the Auditor General Office except those of the President of Pakistan and the Parliament which are constitutional controls. Beyond the terms defined and stipulated by the President or the Parliament the Auditor General has a high level of autonomy to implement the objectives and mandate of the Office of the Auditor General. 3. Rules & Procedures The Auditor General cannot frame Rules however, procedures which specifically include auditing and accounting systems are constantly developed and enforced.

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For this purpose there is an entire department in the Auditor General’s Office called the Manpower & Systems Development department headed by an Additional Auditor General. The department carries out research on new accounting policies and systems an also analyses systems and procedures already in place in the Auditor General’s Office recommending changes and updates. Since the Auditor General’s Office is primarily an auditing and accounting organization it has to constantly update its procedures and systems to ensure it remains upto date with the international accounting standards. 4. Effectiveness The systems and controls while extensive and upto date in terms of accounting standards and being effective in terms of carrying out the voluminous accounting and auditing functions that the Auditor General is required to carry out, they are not effective in terms of accountability. The Auditor General has been provided with the legal ability and authority to develop its systems and controls in such a manner to make them effective. There is no hindrance in the legal ability to make the systems effective. The issue has been off practical effectiveness. As an accountability organization the Auditor General’s Office while auditing the government accounts is required to locate, inquire and report on cases of misappropriation, misconduct and misuse of public funds and authority. However, this is rarely the case with the Auditor General’s audit reports normally giving comments on how to improve the procedure or highlighting minor areas of accounting discrepancies. The practical focus has become rubber stamping the accounts to ensure that overall they must look kosher while moving away from the focal mandate of being an accountability institution. RELATIONING The Auditor General is an independent organization and as it is the principle auditor of the Government and its departments and agencies there can be no direct defined relationing as that would amount to a conflict of interest. 1. Institutional & Legal Defined Relationship Except for the defined relationship the Auditor General’s Office has with the Parliament and the President of Pakistan as the overseeing and directing

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authorities, there is no defined legal or institutional relationship the Auditor General has and legally cannot have as it would amount to a professional conflict of interest. LEGAL ROBUSTNESS 1. Level of Principal Mandate The mandate of the Auditor General is clear and defined. It provides an independent platform as would be essential for an auditor. Furthermore, the mandate is added or defined at a micro level by the highest executive of the country and the legislature and the Auditor General reports solely to the executive and the legislature. The mandate of the Auditor General has been given constitutional authority and protection. Being a constitutional mandate it cannot be restricted or restrained in any manner by the operation of any law. It is a primary mandate and it remains protected until such time as an amendment to the Constitution itself is mae. 2. Derived & Evolved Mandate The primary mandate of the Auditor General is very wide and general in terms as defined by Articles 168 to 171 of the Constitution. The mandate by necessity had to be further defined by the President and the Parliament as provided for in the Constitution. Therefore, the mandate of the Auditor General has evolved considerably through executive orders and Acts of Parliament however, the fundamental constitutional mandate remains intact. The evolved mandate flows from the primary constitutional mandate and responds to the needs and requirements of a given time period. Since the primary mandate is defined and the Constitution further defines the procedure for evolution of the mandate there can be no derived mandate. 3. Strengths & Weakness’s The Auditor General’s strength is its Constitutional mandate and resulting independence. The Auditor General is appointed under the Constitution and cannot be removed except through the arduous process available to remove a judge of the Supreme Court. This protection provides the Auditor General with the ability to operate independently and without concern as to his service or its terms.

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The Constitution has provided the safeguards to ensure that the Auditor General acts independently and as with any auditor his defined client is the Executive and the Legislature from whom it takes instructions as to the terms of reference of the auditing to be carried out however, the audit itself is independent and is to report on the financial and accounting status of the government and is departments, agencies and directly and indirectly controlled organizations and companies. The Auditor General as part of its mandate is the primary public financial accountability organization. The Auditor General is required to point out and report on all matters of misappropriation, misuse and wastage of public funds and also advise on improvement of accounting system. There is no apparent weakness in the legal framework and mandate of the Auditor General. The Auditor General has been provided with the legal protection and authority to carry out the function of public accountability at the highest level directly through the Constitution. 4. Effectiveness The effectiveness of the Auditor General’s Office has been limited to accounting matters and auditing to the extent of ensuring that in general the public accounts are kosher to a large extent and/or appear kosher carrying the stamp of an audit. However, as an accountability organization the Auditor General has been ineffective. There are no major precedents of the Auditor General’s office reporting and investigating serious misappropriation of public funds. This ineffectiveness is further highlighted by the fact that while the Auditor General has infact audited and stamped certain public accounts, NAB and FIA in respect of the same accounts have prosecuted government officials for misappropriation and misuse of public funds. Under the larger scheme of things the Auditor General is the first accountability organization which is required to report on offences of financial improprietary so that they can be further investigated and prosecuted. A study of prosecutions relating to public accountability show that the Auditor General has not been identifying these offences and therefore, has not been effective in terms of its role as an organization of public financial accountability.

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5. Achievement of Objective The primary achievement of the Auditor General has been implementing accounting standards in government accounting to meet the international accounting standards Beyond accounting the Auditor General has not been a proactive accountability organization and infact its audits have been found lacking in terms that they have failed to point out accounting and financial discrepancies which is one of its primary objectives.

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Section 3. Salary, Pension etc. The salary, pension and other terms and conditions of service of the Auditor General shall be provided in the Schedule to his Ordinance. Section 4. Term of Service The Auditor General shall hold the office for a fixed term of five years or until he attains the age of sixty five years. Section 5. Resignation The Auditor General may at any time resign his office, by writing under his hand addressed to the President Section 6. Leave.

1. The President may grant leave to the Auditor General on such terms and conditions as he may specify.

2. The power to grant or refuse the leave vests with the President. Section 7, Auditor General to certify accounts. The Auditor General may certify accounts complied by Controller-General Accounts or any other person authorized if he considers appropriate and necessary, for each financial year and shall submit such certified accounts to the President with comments and recommendations as he may consider necessary. Section 8. Provisions related to Audit. The Auditor General shall

1. Audit all expenditure from the Consolidated Funds of the Federation and Provinces to ascertain whether the money shown in accounts has been disbursed legally and where applicable and to what purpose.

2. Audit all transactions of the Federation and of the Provinces relating to the Public Accounts.

3. Audit all trading, manufacturing, profit and loss accounts and balance sheets and subsidiary accounts kept by the Order of the President and Governors.

4. Audit the accounts of any authority established by the Federation or the Province. Section 9. Audit of receipts and expenditure of holders of the authorities substantially financed by loans and grants. The Auditor General shall audit the accounts of any body or authority which has been substantially financed by loans and grants from the Consolidated Funds, subject to the provisions of laws applicable. Section 10. Auditor General to give information and undertake studies. The Auditor General may give the Federal Government and Provincial Governments information and undertake studies that they may require. Section 11. Functions of Auditor General in the case of grants or loans given to other authorities or bodies.

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1. The Auditor General may scrutinize the accounts of the any authority or body where a grant or loan is given for any specific purpose, from the Consolidated Funds, as to the fulfilment of conditions subject to which the grant and loans were given. For this purpose the Auditor General has the right to access to the books and accounts of that authority.

2. The Auditor General shall not have access to the books and accounts if the law provides for the audit of a specific authority to be conducted by any other agency other than the Auditor General.

Section 12. Audit of receipts of Federation or of Provinces or of districts. The Auditor General shall audit all receipts which are payable into the Consolidated Fund and to satisfy himself that all receipts have been deposited and rules relating to receipts are being fully observed and are in place to ensure proper assessment. Section 13. Audit on Account of stores and stock The Auditor General has the full authority to audit and report on the accounts of stores and stocks kept in any office or department of Federation or Province. Section 14. Power of Auditor General in connection with audit of the accounts.

1. the Auditor General has authority (a) To inspect any office of accounts, and offices responsible to keep the initial or subsidiary accounts. (b) To require any accounts, books papers and other documents which deal with or form the basis of otherwise relevant to the transactions to which his duties in respect of audit extend. (c) To inquire and to call for information as may be required.

2. The officer-in-charge of nay office or department shall afford all facilities and provide record for audit inspection and with the request for information.

3. Any hindrance in the auditorial functions of the Auditor General results in disciplinary action.

Section 15. Audit of companies and corporations established in public sector.

1. The Auditor General shall perform functions and exercise powers in relation to the audit including supplementary audit of the accounts of the public sector companies.

2. The duties and powers of the Auditor General in regard to the audit of the accounts of corporations shall be performed and exercised by him in accordance to the relevant laws.

3. On receiving the request of the Governor or the district authority to audit accounts of corporations established under the provincial laws, the Auditor General shall audit the accounts, having the right of access to the books and accounts of such corporations.

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Section 16. Audit of accounts of certain authorities or bodies. The Auditor General may on the request of the President or Governor of the Province undertake the audit of the accounts of authorities or bodies the audit of which has been entrusted to him. Section 17. Power to dispense with detailed audit. The Auditor General may dispense with any part of the detailed audit and apply limited check in relation to accounts and transaction as he may determine. Section 18. Delegation of Powers. Any powers exercised by the Auditor General may be exercised by such officer of his department as may be authorized by him. Section 19. Budgetary provisions. The Auditor General shall have the full powers to incur expenditures within the budgetary provisions. Section 20. Power to amend the Schedule. The Federal Government by notification in official gazette amend the Schedule. Section 21. Power to make rules The President may by notification in official gazette make rules for carrying out the purposes of this Ordinance. Section 22. Power to make regulations. The Auditor General may make regulations not inconsistent with the provisions of this Ordinance and rules for carrying out the purposes of this Ordinance. Section 23. Repeal The Pakistan (Audit and Accounts) Order 1973 is hereby repealed.

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PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMMITTEE ORGANIZATION The Public Accounts Committee is formed under Rule 168 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the National Assembly at the request of the Ministry of Finance to consider the accounts and audit report submitted by the Auditor General. If the National Assembly is existing under the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business a Standing Committee on Public Accounts is formed whereas if the National Assembly does not exist having been dissolved the Ministry of Finance with the approval of the President of Pakistan constitutes an ad hoc Public Accounts Committee for the said purpose. OBJECTIVE The objective for the establishment of the Public Accounts Committee is to review the Accounts and Audit Report submitted by the Auditor General and required to be laid before the National Assembly under Article 171 of the Constitution. The Public Accounts Committee under the Rules of Procedure and Conduct on Business in the National Assembly undertakes a detailed scrutiny of the Accounts on behalf of the National Assembly which was the authorizing body in terms of the national budget and expenditure sought by the Government. The Public Account Committee is the scrutinizing arm of the public financial accountability and is required to make any recommendations it may find necessary after reviewing the accounts. 1. Defined Its objective is defined under Rule 168 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business in the National Assembly. The objectives include the review and scrutinizing of the accounts prepared by the Auditor General in terms of verifying that the expenditure made by the Government has been made in accordance with the sanction of the National Assembly and in accordance with the relevant procedures and condition on such expenditure.

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The objective includes a review of the reports of the Auditor General in terms of any and all institutions, organizations and agencies which are directly or indirectly linked to the Government or have been instructed for audit by the President of Pakistan. 2. Parallel Objectives The Ministry of Finance and the Auditor General to some extent carry out the same objectives as that of the Public Accounts Committee and the Public Accounts Committee is primarily a review committee off the report of the Auditor General. 3. Amendments or Curtailment to Objective The objectives of the Public Accounts Committee can at all times be altered depending on the amendment to the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business or by the order of the President of Pakistan approving the establishment of the Committee. The amendments upto now have not made any significant curtailment to the objectives of the Public Accounts Committee which continues to act as the primary review committee of the public accounts submitted. STRUCTURE & AUTHORITY The Public Accounts Committee consists of upto nineteen members elected by the National Assembly and the Minister of Finance it its ex officio member. The Chairman is elected by the Committee from amongst its own members. The decisions of the Committee are undertaken by a vote and each member has a vote with the Chairman having a casting vote. The Committee operates under the authority declared in the terms of reference of the Committee and in matters submitted before the Committee by the Ministry of Finance or referred to it by the National Assembly. 1. External Authority The sole external authority on the Committee is the National Assembly itself which elects the Committee and the Rules of Procedure are implemented with the external authority of the Speaker of the National Assembly.

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The Public Accounts Committee is a standing committee under the Rules of the National Assembly and enjoys the rights and authorities granted to all standing committees of the National Assembly. 2. Internal Authority The internal authority in terms of functioning is with the Chairman of the Committee however, as in the case of all standing committees of the National Assembly each member has a right to a single vote and therefore, the members of the Committee as a majority infact determine the modus operandi of the Committee. With the Rules clearly laid down in terms of functioning of the Standing Committees there authorities are clearly defined. 3. Operating Legal Frame Work The primary operating legal frame work of the Public Accounts Committee are the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the National Assembly. The relevant Rules applicable in addition to Rule 168 are Rules 179 to 225. The framework is clearly defined in terms of the Rules and is further defined by the terms on which matters are referred to the Public Accounts Committee by the President of Pakistan, the Ministry of Finance or the National Assembly itself. JURISDICTION 1. Primary Jurisdiction The primary jurisdiction of the Public Accounts Committee is to review and scrutinize the Accounts and Audit Reports submitted by the Auditor General. In exercise of this jurisdiction the Public Accounts Committee also has the jurisdiction under the Rules of Procedure to appoint sub committees, power to take evidence including summoning of documents under Rules 208, 209 and 210 and maintaining its proceedings in camera or restraining publication of its meetings minutes. 2. Secondary Jurisdiction The Committee also has jurisdiction to take up any matter relating to public accounts referred to it by the National Assembly or the President of Pakistan or under the Rules an issue which it might take notice off as a standing committee.

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Its secondary jurisdiction flows from the primary jurisdiction of being a review and scrutinizing body of public accounts. 3. Sufficiency of Jurisdiction For the role defined for the Public Accounts Committee it has sufficient jurisdiction in terms of carrying out the review and scrutiny of accounts. The Committee is not limited to the contents of the accounts and audit report presented to it and it can summon and hear evidence in terms of detailed scrutiny including summoning of the relevant record from the concerned departments or organizations. 4. Restraints There are no restraints on the functioning of the Committee beyond what is provided for in the Rules of Procedure and the terms of reference if any as issued by National Assembly or the President of Pakistan. The Committee has a defined mandate and objective and its functioning is defined specifically as in the case of any standing committee of the National Assembly. LEVEL OF AUTONOMY 1. Functional Powers & Authority The Committee has autonomy to the extent permissible by the Rules of Procedures or the Executive Order establishing the Committee. The Committee works as an arm of the National Assembly to carry out the function of the review and scrutiny of the Public Accounts. It has the freedom to call for any evidence and record which it deems necessary to carry out its functions and has the authority to record evidence and consequently record its report and finding which can be made public by it. 2. Appointment The Committee is an elected Standing Committee of the National Assembly with its members being elected by the National Assembly and the Committee itself electing its own Chairman from amongst its members.

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In the event that the National Assembly is not available and has been dissolved the Committee is formed on the recommendation of the Ministry of Finance with the approval of the President of Pakistan. The Committee members have equal voting rights on the Committee and are required to represent the public interest in terms of public accounts and expenditure undertaken by the Government. 3. Delegation There is no delegation of powers in terms of the Committee’s function. The only indirect provision for delegation is that if the Chairman is not available the Committee can elect any of its members as the Chairman for the time the original Chairman is unavailable. 4. Financial The Committee has no financial authority as none is required with the Committee acting as a Standing Committee of the National Assembly. Any expenses of the Committee are handled as per the standard Rules of the National Assembly in terms of expenses incurred by the National Assembly and its Committees. 5. Adequacy & Efficiency The autonomy of the Committee is sufficient in terms of its limited scope of review and scrutiny. In addition the members of the Committee being elected representatives of the National Assembly carry a level of autonomy as elected representatives under the Constitution which they bring to the Committee as its members. The one area where the Committee as a part of the public financial accountability frame work may have done with further autonomy was to have the power to summon any person in respect of any matter of accountability that it might find needs to be reviewed as it could relate to a matter of public financial accountability. Without this power the Committee is more or less limited to review and scrutiny and corresponding report and recommendations on matters brought before it in addition to the Constitutional requirement of laying the Accounts and Audit Reports of the Auditor General before it.

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SYSTEMS & CONTROLS The Committee operates under the systems and controls defined under the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the National Assembly. It can implement systems that it finds necessary for its effective functioning. 1. Defined Mechanism The defined mechanism in terms of controls and systems are present in the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business relating to Standing Committees of the National Assembly as enumerated under Rules 179 to 225. 2. Rules & Procedures The Rules and procedures of the Public Accounts Committee are contained in Rule 168 and Rules 179 to 225 of the Rules of Procedure and Conduct of Business of the National Assembly and any other Rules which may be implemented or instructed by the National Assembly or the President of Pakistan as the case maybe. The Rules and Procedures of the Public Accounts Committee are well defined and the Committee may seek additional authorities and powers if it may find it necessary in the process of its review and scrutiny. 3. Effectiveness The systems and controls are sufficient for the purposes of the Committee’s primary mandate of review and scrutiny. However, in view of the Public Accounts Committee’s failure to report and ear mark matters of public accountability in its reports which is highlighted by the fact that Accounts and Audits which have been reviewed by the Committee without comments have later been found to include serious cases of misappropriation of public funds when the matters were investigated by organizations such as NAB or FIA indicate that the systems and controls are more bureaucratic in nature rather than being practically effective to deliver the actual objective of the Committee catching any matters of misuse of public funds which might have escaped the review of the Auditor General. RELATIONING The Public Accounts Committee has a clearly defined relationship in terms of it being a Standing Committee of the National Assembly and reporting to the

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National Assembly as its electing authority or the President of Pakistan as its approving authority in the event that the National Assembly stands dissolved. 1. Institutional & Legal Defined Relationship The legally defined relationship the Public Accounts Committee has is with the National Assembly or the President of Pakistan being its appointers. There is no other relationship it has or can have as a public accountability body representing the elected representatives of the elected parliament. LEGAL ROBUSTNESS 1. Level of Principal Mandate The principal mandate is more bureaucratic in terms of carrying out a review and scrutiny of Accounts and Audit Reports prepared and submitted by the Auditor General. While the Committee has the powers to call for evidence and inquire into any matter contained in the Accounts and Reports it does so more on the basis of political interests rather than a detailed review of the entire reports and set of accounts. The Committee’s mandate is clearly defined however, it is a mandate which the Committee cannot be expected to fulfill in earnest as a very complex and specialized matter relating to accounts is to be reviewed by elected representatives. The members of the Committee cannot be expected and in practice they do not go beyond matters which are pointed out to them and majority of such matters relate primarily to political interest. This fact is apparent from the previous proceedings of the Committee which has consistently failed to take notice of serious financial frauds and misappropriations of public funds which have come to light later under investigation by specialized accountability organizations such as the FIA and NAB. 2. Strengths & Weakness’s The strength of the Committee is that it consists of elected independent public representatives and therefore, have the ability to act freely and in the best interest of the public.

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However, the Committee being formulated to carry out a specialized review and scrutiny of accounts is unable to carry out a professional review and rather a bureaucratic review is undertaken with political interests as the primary motivation. 3. Effectiveness The legal frame work of the Committee is defined to primarily provide for a stamp of approval on the public accounts prepared and submitted by the Auditor General’s Office thereby verifying that the authority of expenditure provided to the Government by the National Assembly was correctly exercised. Its effectiveness as an arm of the public financial accountability structure is ineffective as it does not have the requisite investigative tools or authorities beyond calling and review evidence and documents. Public fraud requires specialized expertise and extensive investigation into numerous threads and transactions which the Public Accounts Committee is not capable of undertaking. Ultimately the Public Accounts Committee serves a political and bureaucratic purpose and its frame work in combination with its mandate is structured to be limited for such purpose. 4. Achievement of Objective The Public Accounts Committee has not achieved its objective of being the independent accountability arm reviewing government expenditure to secure and safeguard the public interest in terms of usage of public funds. It primary objective is that of a watch dog representing the National Assembly and the public in terms of Government expenditures as well as the functioning and reporting of the Auditor General. It has not so far achieved this objective in terms of the history of the Public Accounts Committee and the corresponding fact that numerous matters of serious public misappropriation have been identified and prosecuted arising out of accounts and matters which were placed before the Public Accounts Committee and reviewed by them and found to be in order.

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Article 179. Committees of the National Assembly

1. There shall be a Standing Committee of the Assembly for each Ministry of the Government.

2. Each Committee shall deal with the subjects assigned, under the rules for the allocation and transaction of business of the Government, to the concerned Ministry or matter referred to in the Assembly:

3. The Speaker shall issue directions in regard to the re-allocation of the existing Standing Committees when there is any change in the composition of the Ministries or their nomenclature.

Article 180. Reference to the Standing Committee The Speaker may remit any subject to the Standing Committee with the view of suggesting legislation or making recommendations to the Assembly. Article 181. Composition

1. Each Committee shall be comprised of ten members o be elected by the Assembly.

2. The Minister concerned shall be ex-officio member of the Committee. 3. The Member-in-charge other than a Minister or member on whose motion the

subject was referred to the Standing Committee may attend the meeting but cannot vote unless he is a member of the Committee.

4. An officer not less than the rank of Joint Secretary designated in this behalf and the Secretary, law and justice division may attend the meeting of the Committee.

Article 182. Functions

1. A committee shall examine a Bill and present its report to the Speaker with recommendations, suggestions for legislation and check whether it is in anyway in violation of the Constitution.

2. The Committee may also propose amendments. 3. If the Committee fails to submit its report in the prescribed time, the Bill may be

considered by the Assembly upon the motion of a member of the Minister concerned.

4. A Committee may examine the expenditures, administration, public policies, petitions and delegated legislation of the concerned Ministry and its associated Public bodies and forward its report of findings.

Article 191. Composition The Committee shall not consist of more than ten members to be elected by the Assembly, and Minister for Parliamentary Affairs. Article 192. Functions The function of Committee shall be to take note of and scrutinize assurances, promises, commitments and undertakings of the Government.

(a) The extent to which the assurances have been implemented.

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(b) Where implemented and whether implemented in time. Article 195. Restriction on membership A member shall be a member of one Standing Committee at time. Article 197. Chairman of a Committee.

1. The Chairman of the each Committee shall be elected by the Committee from amongst its members.

2. The Committee shall chose an acting chairman in absence of the Chairman Article 203. Voting in committees. All questions at the meeting shall be determined by voting. Article 204. Casting vote of chairman The Chairman of the Committee shall have the casting vote in case of equality of the meeting. Article 205. power to appoint sub-committees.

1. A Committee may appoint sub-committees to examine matter referred to them. 2. The order of reference shall be clearly stated and the report of the sub-Committee

shall be deemed to be part of that Committee. Article 207. Meetings in camera. The meetings of the Committee may be held in camera if decided by the Committee. Article 208. Power to take evidence or call for papers, records or documents.

1. A Committee shall have the power to require attendance of persons, papers or record as necessary for the discharge of their duty. Provided the Government may decline any document disclosure of which would be prejudicial to the security.

2. A witness may be summoned and produce such documents as may be necessary. 3. The Committee may invite or summon any person who has a special interest in

any matter in relation to the matter under consideration. 4. A Committee shall have vested powers of civil court under the Code of Civil

Procedure for enforcing the attendance of any person. Article 209. Evidence on oath.

1. A Committee may administer oath to a witness examined before it. 2. The form of oath or affirmation is specified.

Articles 210. Examination of witnesses. The examination of witnesses before a committee shall be conducted as follows.

(a) The Committee shall decide the mode of procedure. And nature of questions to be asked of a witness.

(b) The Chairman of the Committee may ask witness questions as he may consider necessary with reference to the subject matter as specified in clause (a).

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(c) The Chairman may call other member of the Committee to ask any other questions.

(d) A witness may be asked to put other relevant points that have not been covered. (e) A verbatim record of proceedings of Committee shall be kept. (f) The evidence given before the Committee may be available to all members of the

Committee. Article 211. Evidence or information to kept confidential or secret. Any evidence shall be treated a confidential or secret unless the Committee decides otherwise. Article 212. Request for views of Ministries or Division on Private Members’ Bills. The Secretary General shall transmit a copy to the concerned Ministry for the Private Members’ Bill and request to furnish the views on the Bill for consideration by the Committee. Article 213. Record of Proceedings of the Committee. A summary of the record of the proceedings shall be maintained by the Secretary General. Article 214. Restriction on publications etc. of proceedings.

1. A Committee may direct that the whole or any part of its proceedings or summary thereof may be laid on the Table.

2. The report of a Committee which has not been presented to the Committee shall be treated as confidential.

3. The Speaker may direct that any part of the proceedings may be communicated to the members confidentially.

4. A Committee may make its report or part thereof before presentation to the Assembly; such part shall be treated confidential by the Government.

Article 215. Special Reports. A Committee may make a special report to the Speaker, of matter that comes into light in the course of its work Articles 216. Report of Committees.

1. The Committee shall submit its report within thirty days from the date on which the reference was made, where the Assembly has not fixed a date for presentation of the report.

2. The reports may be either preliminary or final. 3. the report shall

(a) Incorporate the views of the Minister concerned. (b) Set forth the recommendations and minutes of dissent; (c) Be signed by the Chairman.

4. The Secretary General shall make the copy of the report available for every member of the Assembly and publish it in the Official gazette.

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Article 217. Presentation of the Report. 1. The report shall be presented by the Chairman or in his absence any member

authorized by the Chairman of the Committee. 2. The Chairman or member shall confine himself to the brief statement of facts

while presenting the report. Article 219. Printing, publication or circulation of report before its presentation. The Speaker may on a request made to him order printing, publication or circulation of report before its presentation of the report, when the Assembly is not in session. Article 224. Business before Committees not to lapse on prorogation. Any business pending before the Committee shall not lapse for the reason of lapse of prorogation of the Assembly. Article 225 (A) Select Committees on Bills.

1. the Minister-in-charge of the Ministry to which a Bill relates, the Chairman of a Standing Committee concerned with the Bill, the member-in-charge, the Ministers of Law, justice and Parliamentary Affairs shall be included in every Select Committee and it shall not necessary to include their names in any motion for election of such Committee.

2. The other members shall be elected by the Assembly when a motion of that Bill be referred to the Select Committee is adopted.

3. At the time of election of the members of Select Committee the number of members whose presence shall be necessary to constitute a sitting of Committee shall be fixed by the Assembly.

4. The Minister-in-charge of the Ministry to which the Bill relates shall be the Chairman of the Select Committee.

5. In absence of chairman the Committee shall chose one member as to act as chairman for that sitting.

(B) Special Committee The Assembly may appoint a special Committee on a motion which shall have its function specified in that motion.

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ANNEX IV(E)

PERFORMANCE

OF


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Prepared by Dr. A.R.Kemal CONTENTS 1. Introduction 6

2. Corruption and Misuse of discretionary powers 13

3. Pakistan’s Governance Strategy and Corruption 21

4. Development of Performance criteria for corruption

5. And misuse of discretionary powers 26

6. Analysis of the organizations and their performance 32

7. Conclusions 35

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I. INTRODUCTION

Institutions, rules and political structures impact rather significantly outcome of various government policies and the poor economic, political and civil institutions resulting in the misuse of discretionary powers has led to widespread corruption and ineffective outcome of various social sector policies despite an increase in the resource allocation. In terms of corruption Pakistan has been ranked Pakistan 142nd amongst 163 countries with a score of just 2.2 in the scale of 1 to 10 by Transparency International2. Except for Bangladesh whose ranking is 156 with score of 2.0, all the other South Asian countries have been ranked ahead of Pakistan. India is ranked 30 with score of 4.6, Sri Lanka is ranked 84 with score of 3.1 and Nepal is ranked of 121 with score of 2.5. The report also shows that 96 percent of respondents who had contact with the lower courts had encountered corrupt practices mainly by court officials in Pakistan. This is rather disturbing despite the efforts made by respective governments to curb corruption.

The issue of poor governance and corruption is not new to Pakistan and governments in the past established a number of organizations to contain the level of corruption and misuse of discretionary power. These organizations among others include National Accountability Bureau (NAB), Federal Investigation Agency (FIA), Auditor General’s Office, Public Accounts Committee, Prime Minister’s Inspection Commission, Federal and Provincial Ombudsmen, Federal and Provincial Public Service Commissions and Federal Service Tribunals. Why presence of so many organizations have failed to check the corruption and misuse of power as is evident from the score in Transparency International raises various questions in the mind of the people. These issues include among others:

• Is there any duplication of efforts by various organizations and are they working at the cross purposes?

• Are the rules of business in accordance with the objectives for which the organization has been set up? Obviously if they are not then it is hardly expected that it will be able to fulfill the mandate for which it was created

• Does the Act or Ordinance under which an organization has been created delineate the functions of the organization properly and clearly?

2 Finland with an index of 9.6 is the least corrupt country of the world.

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• Has the funding been adequate for the organization to work effectively?

• Is the methodology proper for checking the corruption or the methodology would result in an even more corruption?

• Does the Act clearly spell out performance criteria clearly or it is vague or it simply is not stated?

With a view to finding out answers to these questions, it is imperative that performance of various organizations is properly on the basis of a well defined criterion of evaluation. In the present study performance of the following eight organizations will be evaluated in the light of the provisions in the Constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan and various laws on prevention of corruption.

1. National Accountability Bureau & Anti‐Corruption 2. Public Accounts Committee 3. Auditors General Office 4. Federal Investigation Agency 5. Prime Minister’s Inspection Commission 6. Federal Service Tribunal 7. Federal and Provisional Ombudsman 8. Federal and Provisional Public Service Commission

Analysis of these organizations would be evaluated at three different levels: (i) Descriptive analysis: This part of exercise looks at the various case

referred, the nature of these cases, the disposal rate and the backlog. Which department has been the major cause of disruption on the basis of complaints received;

(ii) Statistical Analysis: Besides using the simple statistical tests like averages and dispersions non‐Parametric tests will be used to determine comParative performance of various organizations

(iii)Econometric analysis: Depending on the availability of the data, determinants of corruption will be explored through econometric methods. In particular it would be examined to what extent regulations, budget, and administrative structure impact performance of an organization

The analysis will be carried out on the basis of the secondary data but such data are inadequate to examine the performance. For example secondary data may suggest that the relief has been provided as that organization may have recommended relief but the respondent may have not received any relief if its decision is not implemented as the organization may just be a recommendatory

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body3. Therefore unless primary data are available we may not be able to determine the outcome and therefore in the second stage of the study the primary data will be collected.

The study would examine the trends so far in meeting the objectives for which the organization was established, the lessons that can be learnt from the experience and the policy implications. Plan of the study is as follows. After this introductory section an analysis of misuse of discretionary powers and definition of corruption is examined in section II. The governance strategy of Pakistan and its implementation is reviewed in section III. The efforts to check corruption through various measures are reviewed in section IV. Major conclusions of the study and the future strategy are discussed in concluding section of the study.

3 Public Accounts committee may have asked for the recovery but if the recovery has not been made then the performance leaves much to be desired.

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2. CORRUPTION AND MISUSE OF DISCRETIONARY POWERS

While poor outcome of the deployment of public resources may also be due to deterioration in the competency of the bureaucracy and the policy makers and the policy advice of the multilateral institutions, it is the widespread corruption resulting in misuse of public money which is the major cause4. Because of corruption intended objectives of the public sector expenditures are not realized and more efforts need to be mounted5.

Corruption may be defined as the extortion of resources from the public for a work that should have been done under normal circumstances or as a result of connivance between the government officials and the private sector government is deprived of its revenues or there has been leakage of public expenditure. No doubt discretionary powers need to be delegated to government officials to avoid rigidity and delays, but the discretionary powers more often than not have been misused resulting in corruption in Pakistan. The government of Pakistan has been that the poor governance leads to corruption Pakistan governance strategy report presented to Pakistan Economic Forum of 1998 called for reforms in the financial governance; civil service; legal and judicial system; police system; accountability and integrity in the public sector; decentralization and devolution; human rights; gender balance; better environment; the involvement of NGOs; and public‐private partnership.

Corruption is largely affected by perceptions and belief, institutional failure, organizational failure and the implementation of policies. How economic policies induce more corruption and the avenues through which the corruption is effected and consequently their impact on the well being of the people needs to be examined. The seven major governance problems that result in corruption identified by World Bank in 1995 include:

4 It is generally believed that influential elite of society has usurped the resources well reflected in the continued high degree of corruption [see Hussain (1999) and World Bank (2001]. 5 For details see Kemal (2003).

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Abuse of discretionary powers in the civil service leading to rent seeking behaviour;

Politicization of public sector decisions resulting in the sub‐optimal use of public resources;

Lack of transparency in the decision making leading to tax concessions, undue favours in public expenditures and waste of money;

Breakdown in law and order leading to various problems including non‐recovery of credits and loans;

Cumbersome legal and judicial procedures resulting in non‐compliance of rules and regulations;

Poor procurement practices and barriers to entry resulting in higher procurement costs; and

Ethnic strife and violence leading towards insecure property rights.

Economic Policies and Corruption

Absence of well‐functioning institutions has been the major cause of the

failure of governance in Pakistan. The Constitution of Pakistan lays a framework for people’s representatives, bureaucracy, technocrats and advisors to act together and formulate and implement the policies. The public representatives and the civil and military bureaucracy, however, accuse each others of misusing their powers and corruption while the general public believe that both the policy makers and bureaucracy are corrupt and have neither the will nor the competency to resolve problems faced by them. The media and civil society have also failed to provide the necessary feedback and input and the quality of the advice from bilateral donors and multilateral institutions have also been far from optimal.

We may distinguish two types of public institutions that affect the economic policies, viz. forum that provide guidelines for Public Sector Development Program (PSDP) and are responsible for approval and funding of public sector programs and projects and the forum that formulate the policies and ground rules that influence the behaviour of the private sector. While the Parliament and on its behalf cabinet are responsible for all the economic policies there are various committees and sub‐committees which take decisions on their behalf. The issuance of SROs and various economic policies including trade, investment, industrial, and agricultural policies are never presented in the parliament; they are approved by the cabinet. Moreover, the ECC headed by the Finance Minister, and comprising ministries of various economic ministries

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modify the decisions taken by the Parliament and Cabinet in such a way that the basic objective may be neutralised6. Frequent amendments subsequent to approval of the Finance Bill by National Assembly indicate that the decisions taken by the Parliament are compromised. As a matter of fact actual policy prescription in most of the cases is not the one approved by parliament but that decided by ECC. Since there is no public debate, nor any transparency in arriving at the decision, ECC can become a forum of political patronage.

Various ministries and departments are responsible for implementing policies formulated by these fora. The interpretation of rules and their application that forms the realm of governance are basic to policy implementation. Since interpretation may be influenced by the desires of ministers and political bosses and that the bureaucrats use their discretion powers for their personal interests, implementation of policies become a major source of corruption. The preceding discussion makes it quite clear that while technically policy formulation is in the hands of the parliament, cabinet and its various sub‐committees, in line with the constitution and the prevalent practice all over the world, where it differs from other countries is the lack of transparency, parliamentary debates and general public discussion on the pros and cons prior to the announcements of a policy. In this regard, media and civil society has much larger role to play but unfortunately their capacity to analyze major economic decision is limited; they at best react to the policies rather than being pro‐active. The politicians and bureaucrats influence the public sector development expenditure through misallocation of resources to various projects and programmes and implementation of the programs. Implementation of a major chunk of the PSDP without proper analysis results in poor development efforts. Equally responsible are the bureaucrats who join the policy makers and consequently the common man suffers.

The major policy conclusion emerging from the preceding analysis is that donor‐bureaucratic‐politician nexus has been responsible for corrupt practices in Pakistan. The non‐transparency of decisions taken by the cabinet or its sub‐committees has been the major problem. Accordingly, there is a need to ensure that the parliament rather than the cabinet takes major policy decisions and these must not be allowed to change easily.

6 For example, the duty structure proposed in the Finance Bill can be modified through ECC. It may exempt or provide concessions to a product from duty, or enhance the duties through issuance of SROs with a view to increasing protection to an activity. It may change the excise and sales tax rates and the procedures to collect them.

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3. PAKISTAN’S GOVERNANCE STRATEGY AND CORRUPTION

Transparent, participatory and efficient governance structure ensures right priorities, appropriate policies and their effective and efficient implementation for welfare of the people. The institutional decay in Pakistan has led to poor governance resulting in ad‐hoc policy‐making resulting in economic instability and unpredictability of economic policies. The poor governance is manifested in corruption, inefficiency, ineffectiveness, inaccessibility, intractability, and lack of motivation and incentives. It has retarded the growth prospects and resulted in sharp increase in poverty.

The slow pace of institutional reform, the presence of vested political interests, political interference in the location of projects, excessive centralization in the management of services has precluded community and beneficiary involvement and weak implementation capacity. Public utilities have been the target for political patronage resulting in massive over employment, widespread corruption and poor management. Because institutions in Pakistan have not been able to adapt to rapidly changing needs of the country governance has assumed center stage in Pakistan.

The good governance reform package of the government aims at changing the system of institutions and incentives that affect the behavior of public officials, business entrepreneurs, and citizens. The first step in this direction has been the creation of basic awareness of key issues among the stakeholders and development of common language of discourse among them. Government has held various seminars, workshops and conferences of the stakeholders which have helped in the contextualization of the governance issues to Pakistan.

Financial Governance: The major problems identified in this area include politicization and corruption weakening the civil service and diverting expenditures to lower priority activities; inability of the institutions to adapt to rapidly changing needs of the country; ad‐hoc policy‐making leading to economic instability and unpredictability, and encouraging lobbying, corruption,

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and misuse of power resulting in frustration and generalized and dysfunctional behavior; policy ineffectiveness and erosion of confidence in the government, and because of the discretionary power unfair considerations, motivated by illegitimate financial transactions or political and personal favors creep in.

Accountability and Integrity in the Public Sector: The anti‐corruption

strategy to combat the menace of corruption comprise punishing some major offenders, involving the people in diagnosing corrupt systems, linking incentives to output, revamping training, auditing services, and CBR, promoting the Media’s “watch‐dog” function, and measures enhancing deregulation and privatization.

Decentralization and Devolution: Government has gone for devolution to solve governance problems in Pakistan because it is at the local level that people contact government departments to meeting their daily needs. This is probably the most significant policy from the present government. The devolution represents an opportunity to bring local accountability to government and achieve efficiencies in the way services are delivered to the poor.

Judicial Reforms: Because of failure of the institutions, the poor resort to informal justice and that adversely impact the poor. The informal legal system is particularly deleterious to the poor who possess neither the economic nor the social capital to receive adequate justice. Beside there exist strong informational constraints relating to moral hazard and adverse selection; both limit efficiency. There are four dimensions of vulnerability and justice. First, vulnerability is exacerbated by the everyday harassment, under‐performance, exclusion and denial of basic rights by public officials of people who are disadvantaged by virtue of gender, ethnicity, economic or political power. Second, vulnerability is much increased by local officials responsible to license and regulate economic activities who typically extract rent from informal sector workers, by imposing or manipulating regulatory controls over their livelihood activities. Third, corruption of local cadre/officials hampers access to public goods and services including health, education and land management. Fourth, failure of state institutions to provide law and order and security is a function of the existent police, legal, and judicial structures and these are affected by the performance of the four domains of justice including administrative, political, judicial and policing. The system of justice administration has to be such that it inspires confidence in the ability of courts to administer justice fairly and impartially. There is a need to resolve the problems in organization, administration, procedures, policies, human resources and financing of judiciaries. The court congestion and long delays in justice can only be avoided through more courts equipped with qualified judges.

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Police Reforms: Placing the police under safety commissions that act as buffers against political interference while holding the police accountable against annual policing plans and performance indicators, and introducing independent complaints authorities will increase police accountability and engender greater public confidence in the police. Introduction of independent prosecution agencies that vet police investigations prior to filing of criminal cases in courts should also promote police compliance with the law.

Civil Service Reforms: Civil service reform should be such to shift the role of government from control to public service; government should be leaner, and more efficient and effective.

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4. DEVELOPMENT OF PERFORMANCE CRITERIA FOR CORRUPTION AND MISUSE OF DISCRETIONARY POWER Transparency International provides an assessment of relative levels of corruption around the world. In addition to its quantitative assessments of worldwide corruption, the country wide studies provide empirical detail about a country’s corruption and integrity, and complements tools and instruments where the focus is more comParative in nature. Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI): It examines levels of perceived corruption and highlights the role of facilitators – the legal and financial professionals who facilitate corruption by, wittingly or not, allowing the proceeds of corruption to be moved, laundered, stored and invested. The CPI scored countries on a scale from zero to 10, with zero indicating high levels of perceived corruption and 10 indicating low‐levels. Pakistan score is only 2.3 and is placed at 142 out of 167 countries. Bribe Payers Index (BPI): It highlights supply side of the corruption. The companies from the wealthiest countries generally ranked in the top half of the index, but still routinely pay bribes, particularly in developing countries. In addition, companies from emerging export powers such as China, India and Russia ranked among the worst in bribing abroad. The 2006 BPI reflected the responses of more than 8,000 business people in 125 countries polled in the World Economic Forum’s Executive Opinion Survey 2006. Pakistan ranks 77 in business cost of corruption with score of 4.0, ranks 105 with a score of 3.6 in bribes for influencing laws and regulations, 94 with a score of 3.6 for irregular payments for judicial decisions, and 98 with a score of 3.3 for irregular payments in public contracts. Global Corruption Barometer: It explores how corruption affects ordinary citizens. It asks people which sectors of society were most corrupt and which areas of their lives were most affected by corruption. In addition, respondents are asked to evaluate their government’s efforts to fight corruption. Those

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surveyed by Transparency International perceived that political parties and parliaments are the most corrupt institutions, followed closely by business and the police.

While these criteria can be quite in collection of primary data they are of

not much use when only limited secondary data are available. For this study criteria will have to be developed that helps in the evaluation of the performance of different organizations. It needs to be underscored that a criterion for one organization may not be valid for the other organization. For example organizations responsible for checking the misuse of discretion power like ombudsmen the criterion may be different than those set up for anti‐corruption like NAB.

A common criterion used for the efficiency of an institution is the number of applications it receive which show the confidence of the people in that organizations and the cases which it disposes off and the relief provided to the complainant. It can also be argued that an increase in the number of cases may well reflect the increase in corruption. The reasons for changes over time in the behavior may also throw some light.

In the present study trends have been ascertained in terms of the cases received, cases disposed off and relief provided. An attempt is also made to discern the trend and reasons for the changing trends ascertained.

The secondary data used in the study relate to: • Number of fresh complaint received, disposal of complaints and the

pending • Breakup of complaints according to departments and agencies • City/district wise breakup • Overall progress of inquiries & investigations • Overall progress of the court cases • Number of cases, inquires, and their recoveries • The performance of anti‐corruption court • Department‐wise enquiries/cases of anti corruption dept and their

performance

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5. ANALYSIS OF THE ORGANIZATIONS AND THEIR PERFORMANCE

Induction of public employees, promotion and redressal of grievances are the first element of good governance. Pakistan has set up Federal and Provincial Public Service Commissions to induct new staff at various levels. To what extent the commissions have been able to recommend the officers on merit and to what extent the government would let the commissions work independently determine the meritocracy in the system. The promotions are governed by the establishment division though for sometimes, the FPSC was asked to carry out the tests for qualifications of the officers to be sent for further training. For redressal of the grievances, various courts may be approached in case of raw inductees and for grievances relating to promotions of the civil servants, there are federal and provincial tribunals. Employees of the autonomous organizations do not come under the purview of FPS on establishment division. They are inducted and promoted by their selection committees and approved by their Boards. For redressal of grievances, except for short period when they could go to the tribunals, the only option they have is to move the various courts. We shall examine performance of these organizations in terms of their recruitments on merit and working of the redressal mechanism. The government employees sometimes use their discretionary powers and deny the rights to the people. The federal and provincial ombudsmen have been appointed for redressal of grievances. Aggrieved party can file an application to the ombudsmen and after hearing it may recommend to the relevant department for remedial actions. To what extent the federal and provincial ombudsmen have been able to redress the grievances shall be analysed by looking into the cases referred, cases disposed and the relief provided by both the Federal and Provincial Ombudsmen. Both the current and development budget expenditure is at the disposal of Principal Drawing and Disbursing Officer or with those who have been delegated the powers to use it. The funds have to be used in accordance with the provisions laid down by the government. Whereas AGPR and internal auditors, and financial advisors are supposed to check if the expenditure is in accordance with the rules, the post audit is done by the Auditor General Office. Audit of each department in the government sector, autonomous organization and to some extent the military audit is carried out by the audit department. Any irregularities found in the accounts are first reported to the ministry or the department, if the respondents fail to satisfy the auditors then these observations also known as audit Para(s) are referred to Federal and Provincial Public

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Accounts Committees of the assemblies through the President of Pakistan. These public account committees at federal and provincial level examine the audit Paras report and discuss with concerned department and order to take remedial actions. Performance of these organizations will be examined with a view to determining their efficacy. Despite the pre and post audit, the pilferage of public money is quite rampant. Government has instituted various mechanism including Federal Investigation Agency, anti‐Corruption Departments, and the National Accountability Bureau. As argued earlier, Pakistan score on corruption is a cause for concern and we shall examine performance of these organizations as well.

Federal Public Service Commission (FPSC)

Chairman and members of the Federal Service Commission are appointed by the President for a fixed time period. However, the tenure of the posts has been changing over time between 3 to 5 years and at present the tenure is 3 years. These constitutional posts of chairman and members imply that once appointed they cannot be removed form the office without the consent of the parliament. However, change in tenure of the chairman and members as has been done in recent years suggest that the Chairman and members can be shown the door before the tenure elapses.

The Federal Public Service Commission has been established to conduct tests and examinations for recruitment for the federal government some of which may be posted in provinces. FPSC carries out recruitment of all the government civil services of officers of BPS 16 and above or equivalent. The commission also advises President on matters relating to qualifications for and methods of recruitment to services and posts; on the principles to be followed in making initial appointments to the services and posts and in making appointments by promotion to the posts BS‐18 and above; transfer from one service or occupational group to another; and on any other matter which the President may refer to the Commission. The commission is also responsible for conducting mandatory promotional examinations7 for the posts in BS‐17 reserved for promotion of departmental candidates in all Occupational Groups/Services.

While the Commission carries out the tests and interviews and select the candidates it has been observed that sometimes the ministries refused to accept the nominations of the Commission. Instead they carry out with the ad hoc 7The functions enumerated above have been performed by FPSC w.e.f March 2001 to June 2002 and has been suspended w.e.f 06-07-2002 as matter is subjudice in Supreme Court of Pakistan awaiting final decision.

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appointments. Moreover, departments sometimes change the method of recruitment and may not consult the FPS. While the departments and ministries can appoint themselves a person on contract for two years they have to go to FPSs for extension of any contract beyond two years but they seldom go. FPSC is encountering various problems including:

• Withdrawal of requisitions by the departments/ministries after they are advertised;

• Spasmodic and incomplete requisitions; • Delay in fulfilling the requirements stated by the Commission; • Non‐compliance of the Commission’s advice • Lack of any systematic attempt by the Divisions and Departments

to make forecasts of their requirements of personnel resulting in the absence of any real and scientific planning, or of timely submission of cases for recruitment of suitable personnel, for existing and future vacancies

• The job description and job classification of various posts are either conspicuous by its absence or too sketchy and flawed to be of much use

• Increasing number of contract appointments are being made in various Divisions and Departments against the regular cadre posts

• Whereas posts of President’s Secretariat (Personal or Public) only were excluded from the purview of the FPSC, Directorate General of Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) got approval of the Prime Minister to recruit against their posts in BS‐16 and above at their own

• Some of the Ministries/Divisions/Departments get approval of the Prime Minister, in extension in contract appointments, bypassing the Federal Public Service Commission

• While framing Recruitment Rules, some Ministries/Divisions/Departments either do not seek advice of the Commission or change the rules without approval of the Commission.

Since members of the FPSC are generally the retired secretaries or army men who are generalist, while the FPSC needs a larger presence of academics, private sector and corporate leaders who could determine the suitability of the candidate there is a need for diversified institutional base with professional qualifications.

It is generally believed that the process of FPSC is quite transparent in the sense that the posts are advertised and the tests and interviews are carried out by a panel which also includes the relevant professionals. While there is always a possibility that the deserving candidates might have been left out, major problem

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faced by the FPSC is that various ministries and departments bypass the FPSC and refuse to accept the candidate recommended by FPSC and instead will continue with the ad‐hoc appointments or contract appointments where they do not have to approach FPSC. Whereas FPSC is an autonomous organization actions taken by the government in recent years has led to believe that autonomy may have been compromised. The practice of contract employment and that too at salaries widely different form the normal public sector salaries any bypassing the FPSC has opened the way of corruption and poor practices. Punjab Public Service Commission (PPSC) The Commission was established in 1937 and the present commission owes its existence to PPSC Ordinance of 1978. Besides chairman there are 15 members and are appointed by the Governor. Its broad functions include recruitment for the provincial services and civil posts of the province for Grade 16 and above, posts under corporation or any other body or organizations set up by the government and any other post referred to by the government. It may also be associated in the framing of rules for different types of posts. It has also an advisory role but that has diminished significantly. The Commission is a constitutional body and is supposed to be autonomous but as pointed out by the chairman of PPCS in practice it is far from autonomous; Commission reverts to the provincial government even for relatively minor approvals. Moreover, as in the federal government contractual appointments which have numerous inherent weaknesses are on the increase. Such appointments have created widespread uncertainty and could lay the seeds of a spoils system which could seriously erode foundations of a merit based selection process. Unlike the FPSC the Punjab Commission also has to recruit staff for the corporations but in recent years especially for the newly established corporations staff has been recruited without referring to the PPSC. Like the FPSC members of the commission have broad generalist background, while the Commission today needs a larger presence of academics, private sector and corporate leaders so that there is an institutional base with a more diversified background. Sindh Public Service Commission (SPSC)

Sindh Public Service Commission is one of the oldest commissions of Pakistan and was established in 1937. On the eve of independence, the commission was re‐established as Sindh Public Service Commission. It was restructured to perform the recruitment functions for the government of Sindh in

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1973. It is a statutory body and is headed by a Chairman and 9 Members. Chairman and members are appointed by the Governor.

It is expected to perform various functions which include recruitment of civil post in BS‐11 and above connected with the affairs of the province, for post in or under a corporation and other autonomous bodies of Sindh government, advise government on matters relating qualifications and method of appointment and the absorption of officers in various services and cadres. The Sind Public Service Commission feel that its role and scope is limited compared to FPS and other provinces. They feel that administrative autonomy needs to be granted and that will enhance its independence, administrative and functions effe3ciences, its image and general working. The contract appointments are creating problems. The Commission has faced difficulties in selected areas and some government departments have chosen to either by‐pass the Commission, or ignore its recommendations. There has been a reluctance to comply with the provision of existing government Rules and Regulations vis‐à‐vis the statutory consultation role of the Commission. Like the FPSC and other provincial public service commissions, members of the Sindh Public Service Commission have broad generalist background, while the Commission today needs a larger presence of academics, private sector and corporate leaders so that there is an institutional base with a more diversified background. NWFP Public Service Commission NWFP Public Service Commission was set up in 1978. The Chairman and

7 members are appointed for five years by the Governor. Basic functions include recruitment, promotion and transfers of BP16 and above and for certain department even in BPS 11 to 15 or equivalent. The Commission is to advise the governor on matters relating to qualification for and methods of recruitment and any other matter.

Like the FPSC and provincial commissions of other provinces most of the contract appointees not selected through the Commission and that can create problems for selection on merit. The Commission feels that contract appointees of Departmental Selection Committees can make out their way for regularization through questionable means eve for such posts which need to be filled through the NPSC. Like other provinces and the federal Public Service Commission the members and chairman are drawn from generalist background and the selection process suffers.

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Balochistan Public Service Commission It was established in 1989 and besides Chairman there are 3 members who

are appointed by the Governor. Its function includes recruitment for initial appointments in BPS 16 and above or any other post referred to the Commission for government and autonomous organization. It may also advise the government on matters relating to qualifications and rules. The preceding analysis of Federal and Provincial Public Service Commissions suggest that with the passage of time the departments have been reluctant to accept the recommendations of FPSC or its provincial counterparts for recruitment. These governments suggest that the commission takes rather long in recruiting the candidates and delays can be quite costly. While this is true to some extent and there is a need for the Commissions to expedite and they should be strengthened. However, the fact remains that the FPSC or its provincial components are much more transparent and can ensure meritocracy to a large extent than the individual departments. The ad‐hoc appointments and the contractual appointments open the ways for nepotism and corruption and this must be curtailed. Moreover, the government should make it incumbent on the departments and ministries to accept the candidate selected by FPSC. FEDERAL SERVICE TRIBUNAL (FST)

Federal Service Tribunal has been set up to redress grievances of the employees of the federal government and has all the necessay power to review the cases refered to it by the affected government employees. Chairman & Members of the FST are appointed by the President of Pakistan. Federal Service Tribunal was earlier placed under the administrative control of the Establishment Division but in 2001 it was shifted to Law, Justice & Human Rigths Division. The move seems to be in the right direction because most of the grievances are cuased by the decisions of the Establishment Division.

Basic objective of the setting up of tribunal is to provide a forum to the civil servants for redressal of their grievances in the service matters8. Jurisdiction of Federal Tribunal extends to civil servants working or employed in the Federal Secretariat Ministries/Divisions/Attached Departments/Offices9. Tribunal has the

8 Prior to the formation of Tribunals, civil courts used to entertain adjudicate such matters and there have been conflicting judgement/Orders. 9Previously employees of autonomous/semi autonomous bodies of the Federal Government were included but they were excluded in the year 2006.

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power equivalent to civil courts and on appeal, confirm, set aside, vary or modify the order appealed against. It can call any person document and appoint commission for the examination of witnesses and documents. FST is to ensure inexpensive and expeditious justice to all Civil Servants10.

Performance of FST has been evaluated on the basis of the cases insituted and disposed by the FST. Table 1 shows interesting trends:

• Over the 1974‐96 period, number of cases institued has been less than 2000 and in most of the years it has been around 1000, but the number of cases increased sharply after 1997, because FST could hear the case of autonomous organizations

• The sharp increase in the cases refered to FST by the employees of the autonomous organizations may suggest that the deprtmental committes for induction and promotion may be less trasmparent than the Public Service Commissions and Estabslihment division

• Disposal of cases show wide variations. For example, in certain years the disposal was more than the new cases instituted and thus reducing the pending cases and in other years there disposal of cases was rather small thus adding significantly to the pending cases

• From 1997 onwards there has been sharp increase in the disposals as well. It could be due to increased work force available with the FST and availability of the resources to FST. {This will be analysed when the data on finances are made available from the subcomponent of the project on finances}.

• In each period number of diposals has been different and it seems that the quality of appointed members and chairman may have been a major factor in the perofrmance

• Since the number of compliansts from the autonomous organizations have been high and that has been taken out of the purview of the FST, it may become difficult for them to get the justice if they have been wronged. It seems it would have been much beteer to better orgnaise FST through increase in the resources for rather than taking them out of the purview of the FST.

• Despite an increase in disposal even today around 20,000 case are pending. This is very sad state of affairs and a number of

10 A civil servant is required to deposit only a nominal amount of 10 rupees post admission of their cases as cash security and that amount too is refundable to them after the final disposal of their appeals. The appellants are entitled to argue their cases themselves and may not hire services of any advocate. A copy of the judegement/order passed by the Tribunal is sent to the parties concerend free of cost.

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employees and departments have to painstakingly wait for the decision.

Table:1 Institutions, Disposal and Pending cases in Federal Services Tribunal Year Case Pending Institution Total Disposal Balance 1974 849 849 163 6861975 686 318 1004 317 6871976 687 365 1052 402 6501977 650 266 916 428 4881978 488 1994 2482 354 21281979 2128 515 2643 362 22811980 2281 555 2836 2078 7581981 758 474 1232 378 8541982 854 1114 1968 918 10501983 1050 827 1877 586 12911984 1291 992 2283 931 13521985 1352 923 2275 735 15401986 1540 1122 2662 804 18581987 1858 1010 2868 536 23321988 2332 921 3253 1267 19861989 1986 1172 3158 1564 15941990 1594 994 2588 1197 13911991 1391 934 2325 1021 13041992 1304 1051 2355 1343 10121993 1012 1073 2085 1875 2101994 210 1227 1437 1151 2861995 286 1226 1512 1229 2831996 283 1398 1681 1245 4361997 436 5510 5946 4588 13581998 1358 7909 9267 2797 64701999 6470 5832 12302 3091 92112000 9211 5788 14999 6101 88982001 8898 7523 16421 5663 107582002 10758 6411 17169 3377 137922003 13792 6349 20141 6963 131782004 13178 5695 18873 4775 140982005 14098 7141 21239 1878 19361

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PUNJAB SERVICE TRIBUNAL

Punjab Service Tribunal, established in the year 1974, is headed by a Chairman11 with four Members appointed by the Governor, Punjab. The law does not provide for fixed tenure of the office of chairman and members and they can be removed or transferred at any moment and thus seriously impairing capacity of these tribunals to dispense justice fearlessly and therefore credibility of its decision is badly affected. A non‐extendable tenure would make proceedings of PST much more credible for the stakeholders.

Objective of establishment of the PST is to provide relief to civil servants of the Punjab Province in respect of their service matters including disciplinary matters. Employees of the corporations were not under the purview of PST until 1993 when jurisdiction was extended to employees of corporation under the administrative control of Punjab as well. The tribunal may, on appeal confirm, set aside, vary or modify the order appealed against12. It has similar powers like that of FST, viz. enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath, compelling the production of documents; and issuing commission for the examination of witnesses nd documents.

Table 2 shows the data on instituion of appeals over time in PST. These data show interesting pattern. In the first three years of its estbslihment, less than one thousnad applications with a declining trend were filed. However, in 1993 the number of cases received doubled and in the following year it doubled further. However, sicne then it has showns somewhat declining trend. Why there has been a declining trend is difficult to ascertain? Is it becaseut the decisions by the estabslihments have improved or that the public employees do not have much confidence in PST cannot be asertained on the basis of data. Though the report of the chairman to the governor does suggest that there is lack of crditibility about the PST proceedings. The primary data collection in the secod part of the project would hopefully help us iond etermining the reaosn for low levels of filing of compliants.

11 The Chairman has the power to constitute a Bench comprising of himself or one member only or two members without the Chairman or the Chairman and a member and when so constituted , a bench will be treated as Tribunal. 12 Appeal against the Service Tribunal decision can be made to the Supreme Court within 60 days of the date of communication of the said order/judgement.

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Table 2. PUNJAB PUBLIC SERVICE TRIBUNAL

Year Total appeals filed during the period. 1990 8391991 6661992 6671993 12741994 17411995 10731996 22561997 40241998 23491999 36012000 37112001 28402002 32112003 2943

Table 3 shows appeals filed and decided by PST over the last three years.

It shows that the disposal of cases exceeded the appeals filed. This does indicate that tribunal is quite efficient in deciding the appeals in time. However, two points need to be noted. Firstly, the data on the pending cases are not available and therefore we do not know if the cases may have been lingering on for a long period of time and thus discouraging the employees to file an application in PST. Second, even if the cases are decided expeditioulsy, because of the lack of credibility the employess may have been discouraged.

Table 3. PUNJAB PUBLIC SERVICE TRIBUNAL APPEAL FILED AND DECIDED Year Appeals filed Appeals decided.

2004 3064 34002005 3189 38202006 3452 3453

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SINDH SERVICE TRIBUNAL (SST)

Sindh Service Tribunal was established in the year 1973 as an attached department of Services General Administration & Coordination. Besides the Chairman there are two members of SST and are appointed by the government for a period of three years and the term can be extended if necessar but government is not to curtail the term of office of the Chairman or a Member. Basic objective of establishing the tribunal is to provide a forum to the civil servants for redressal of their grievances in respect of their service matters. SST may on appeal, confirm , set aside, vary or modify the order appealed against. The tribunal can enforce attendance of any person and examine on oath, compelling the production of documents and issuing commission for the examination of witnesses and documents

SST has exclusive jurisdiction in respect of matters relating to the terms and conditions of service of Civil Servants alongwith disciplinary matters and is extended to all employees of the corporations or institutions set up or established by an Ordinance or Act of Provincial Assembly and managed or controlled by the Government of Sindh.

NWFP SERVICE TRIBUNAL (NST)

NWFP Service Tribunal was established in 1974 as an attached department of Establishment Department of NWFP government. The Chairman and Members are appointed by the government for a period of 3 years. The main purpose of establishing the tribunal is to provide a redressal measure in the service matters to the civil servants of NWFP government. Tribunal on appeal may confirm, set aside, vary or modify the order appealed against the tribunal. It has the power of enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath compelling the production of documents; and issuing commission for the examination of witnesses and documents

NST has exclusive jurisdiction in respect of matters relating to the terms and conditions of service of civil servants including disciplinary matters. Civil servant, who is a member of a civil service of the Province of NWFP or who holds a civil post in connection with the affairs of the province. Its jurisdiction has been extended to employees of the corporations under the administrative control of the government of NWFP.

The perfromace of the NST is shown in Table 4. The number of cases filed in NST has been increasing over time since 1990 and in 1997 there was a big jump as the employees of the corporations start filing the appeals to NST. However, dsiposal of cases have been rather slow in the initial years but ove the last 5

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years, it has gathered momentum. Despite an increase in the new filing the total pending cases have come down drastically from 6880 in 2000 to just 994 in 2006. Table 4. Institutions, Disposal and Pending cases of NWFP Service Tribunal S. No. Year Case Pending Institution Total Disposal Balance

1 1990 196 259 455 217 238 2 1991 238 254 492 287 205 3 1992 205 30 235 29 206 4 1993 206 390 596 225 371 5 1994 371 491 862 649 213 6 1995 213 821 1034 575 459 7 1996 459 790 1249 692 557 8 1997 557 2765 3322 544 2778 9 1998 2778 1314 4092 497 3595 10 1999 3595 2477 6072 1585 4487 11 2000 4487 2936 7423 543 6880 12 2001 6880 1224 8104 1800 6304 13 2002 6304 1238 7542 1134 6408 14 2003 6408 1391 7799 3099 4700 15 2004 4700 1044 5744 3235 2509 16 2005 2509 1008 3517 2193 1324 17 2006* 1324 710 2034 1040 994

(*Till Sep 2006) The sharp increase in disposal of the cases in the last five years proabaly is

due to sharp increase in the resources provided to the tribunal. See tbale 5. Whereas budget for NST had increased at an annual rate of just 10.2 percent over the 1990‐99 period, it has increased at an annual rate of 17.2 percent since then. While the econometric work would shed better light on the determinants but the simple observation in this case does suggest that higher funding and performance of an organization are strongly corrleated.

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Table 5. Yearwise Budget/Expenditure of NWFP Services Tribunal Since 1990 S.No. year Total Budget (Rs)

1 1990‐91 10382382 1991‐92 12212023 1992‐93 13316534 1993‐94 14060535 1994‐95 19533286 1995‐96 21033757 1996‐97 21144868 1997‐98 27723749 1998‐99 225605910 1999‐2000 265277811 2000‐01 241743012 2001‐02 336081313 2002‐03 412695614 2003‐04 530680415 2004‐05 598062016 2005‐06 6879620

BALUCHISTAN SERVICE TRIBUNAL

The Baluchistan Service Tribunal (BST) was established in 1974 and besides chairman there are two members. The Chairman and members of the tribunal are appointed by the Government for a period of 3 years. BST has exclusive jurisdiction in respect of matters relating to the terms and conditions of service of civil servants including disciplinary matters. Civil servant, who is a member of a civil service of the province of Baluchistan or who holds a civil post in connection with the affairs of the province. The tribunal has the power to enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath, compelling the production of documents and issuing commission for the examination of witnessed documents. WAFAQI MOHTASIB (WM)

Wafaqi Mohtasib office started working in 1983 as an independent statutory body. The Wafaqi Mohtasib is appointed by the President for a fixed time period of four years which is not extendable under any circumstances and

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cannot be removed from his office except on the ground of misconduct or of having incapable of property performing his office duties due to physical or mental incapacity.13 The terms & conditions of Service cannot be varied to his disadvantage. President administers an oath before Wafaqi Mohtasib assumes the office.

Basic objective for establishing the office of the Wafaqi Mohtasib is to institutionalize a system for enforcing and fortifying bureaucratic accountability. The main objective of Wafaqi Mohtasib is “To diagnose, investigate, redress and rectify any injustice done to a person through mal‐administration”. The institution of Wafaqi Mohtasib is unique in its jurisdiction and the mode of operations from other grievance redressal mechanism available in the country. It has been established to fill vacuum in the existing system for safeguarding the individual citizens from injustices and mal‐administration of government functionaries. The institution provides speedy justice to the people who have suffered through mal‐administration and ask for remedial measures.

The Wafaqi Mohtasib may take action on a complaint by any aggrieved person, on a reference by the President. The WM has the jurisdiction to undertake any investigation into any allegation of maladministration on the part of any federal agency or any of its officers or employees except for cases that are sub‐judice cases, relate to external affairs of Pakistan or the defense and defense services of Pakistan. The complaint of a public service relating to its own office does not fall in its jurisdiction.

For carrying out the objectives particularly for ascertaining the root causes of corrupt practices and injustice, the Mohtasib may arrange for carrying out research studies to ascertain the factors and recommend appropriate steps for their eradication on scientific basis.

Wafaqi Mohtasib has the power of Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure 1908 in regard to the following matters: The Mohtasib is also empowered to award compensation to an aggrieved person for any loss or damage suffered by any person on account of bad administration. In case of false or frivolous complaint, WM can award compensation to the complainant and the agency or the functionary against whom the complaint was made would pay for that. The Mohtasib has the same power to punish for contempt, as the Supreme Court has. Services offered by the Wafaqi Mohtasib are free of cost and without observance of any formality.

In the beginning four regional offices were opened at provincial capitals in Karachi, Lahore, Peshawar, and Quetta. It was felt that complaints of remote

13 During this period, he is not allowed to hold any other office of profit in the service of Pakistan or occupy any other position carrying the right to remuneration for rendering of services

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areas had to travel quite a distance in order to register and follow up, four more regional offices were established from the period 2001 onwards located at Faisalabad, Multan, Sukkur and DI Khan. Each regional office has six sections including administration, coordination, complaints, investigations and public relations similar to that in the head office.

Though the job of Mohtasib Office is technical in nature, initially there was no capacity building plan for the employees. However, on recommendations of the Appraisal Wing, training of staff has started and training modules have been developed. Training of all investigation officers and officials has been carried out with refresher courses to all concerned employees. Similarly WM has developed Management Information System (MIS) and installed at head office as well as regional offices with various components to enable better internal management including human resource, accounts, and inventory control and library software applicants.

Most of the cases filed in Federal Ombudsman has been against the federal agencies. The ratio of cases filed against federal and provincial agencies is 90:10 and probably this is because the complaints against provincial departments may have been lodged in the provincial ombudsman. Performance of the Federal Ombudsman Office in terms of applications filed and the applications disposed off along with relief provided and rejected over the 2000‐05 period is shown in Table 6. The trends are quite interesting:

• The applications received have been continuously declining over time from 41,080 in 2000 to just 15,136. Does it imply that the common man has fewer complaints than before or that they are frustrated that going to ombudsman does not help them is a question which cannot be answered with the data we have from the secondary sources. However the primary data would help us understanding the phenomenon;

• Almost one third to one half of the applications filed were not permissible due to various reasons and we shall discuss later the reasons for their non‐admissibility, but for better use of the Ombudsman Office it will be necessary that the people are educated about the applications which can be entertained by the Office;

• The total applications pending with the Ombudsman has been increasing up to 2002 and then has been declining both because of the fewer new applications and better disposal rate. The disposal rate that had declined from 59 percent in 2000 to 45 percent in 2002 has increased to 73 percent;

• The disposal include both that has provided relief as well as those whose application has been rejected. Those who got relief have been roughly 80 percent of the total cases decided. However, since

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Ombudsman Office is to just recommend, it does not necessarily imply that the relief was actually does imply that they have also been benefited as well. This can be ascertained only with the help of primary data.

Table 6: Institution and Disposal of Complaints, in Federal Ombudsman

Disposal Carry Total Disposal after Detailed Investigation

Year Received Prior to admission Admitted Over

Workload (d+e) Relief Rejected

Total (g+h) % i/f

a B C d E f G h i j 2000 41,080 14,138 26,942 11,793 38,735 18,749 3,994 22,743 59 2001 33,385 10,534 22,851 15,992 38,843 15,641 3,916 19,557 50 2002 31,613 10,636 20,977 19,286 40,263 13,567 4,477 18,044 45 2003 25,761 10,346 15,415 22,219 37,634 16,921 5,096 22,017 59 2004 25,327 10,581 14,746 15,617 30,363 18,433 3,597 22,030 73 2005 15,136 8,867 6,269 8,333 14,602 8,934 1,779 10,713 73

How much time does it take to dispose‐off a petition is also important? Table 7 shows that only 4 percent of the cases are decided in six months and 32 percent in six months and in 2004 the ratio was even lower. The fact that 42 percent in 2004 and 31 percent 2005 took more than a year for the decision is rather disappointing and may have been one of the cause that the total cases received has fallen over time. Same pattern is observed across all the regions except Quetta where the total number of cases disposed have been rather small.

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Table7: Time Profile of Disposal of Complaints During the Year 2004 and 2005

S. No.

Name of the Office

Within 3 months

Within 3 months

Within 6 months

Within 6 months

Within 1 year

Within 1 year

More than year

More than year

Total Disposal

Total Disposal

1 Head Office, Islamabad 98 166 823 747 1266 745 1117 545 3304

2,203

2 Regional Office, Lahore 54 88 1455 736 2539 866 798 392 4846

2,082

3

Regional Office, Karachi 55 82 279 297 410 334 1297 695 2041

1,408

4

Regional Office, Peshawar 91 54 1450 782 2775 1,240 2292 621 6608

2,697

5 Regional Office, Quetta 9 26 93 71 53 34 8 13 163

144

6 Regional Office, Sukkar 16 31 95 149 291 223 2066 471 2468

874

7 Regional Office, Multan 3 7 154 56 423 221 1059 214 1639

498

8

Regional Office, Faisalabad 9 32 121 131 281 223 515 272 926

658

9

Regional Office, D. I. Khan 1 2 23 6 11 48 0 93 35

149

Total 336 491 4493 2,981 8049 3,935 9152 3,316 22030 10,713 2% 4% 20% 28% 37% 37% 42% 31%

Note: Shaded color data represents 2005, whereas unshaded data represents 2004

The maximum complaints have been lodged against WAPDA. See Table 8. It accounted for more than 60 percent of total complaints in 2004. Followed by PTCL though with the passage of time is has declined probably due to various alternatives available to the consumers. Another interesting aspect is that the complaints against banks have gone down and that also may be a reflection of the privatization and competition of the banks. Probably one can deduce that competitive framework would help in reducing the discretionary powers. Table 8: Volume of Complaints against the Major Agencies Agency 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004WAPDA 15034 13642 13167 9545 9253PTCL 4291 2772 1957 1331 1227

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SNGPL‐SSGPL 1358 1181 1394 1005 832AIOU 593 588 415 324 342SLIC 576 525 401 284 216Estate Offices 633 215 185 172 195Banks 1080 984 714 991 142 The Federal Ombudsman has been quite cost effective and the total expenditure per complaint is less than Rs 4000. Even in nominal terms there has been ad decline in the cost per complaint up to 1991‐94. See Table 9. Though there seems to be an increase in the cost per compliant in later years but in real terms the cost seems to have declined.

Table 9: Cost‐Effectiveness of Disposal of Cases Year Expenditure Complaints Cost Per Complaint (Rs.) (Rs.) Received Disposed of Received Disposed of

83‐86

67,177,705

123,523 24,779

544 2,711

87‐90

93,932,750

132,453 45,532

709 2,063

91‐94

134,592,946

190,165 85,887

708 1,567

95‐98

166,215,895

171,352 93,895

970 1,770

99‐02

201,009,341

149,911 99,423

1,341 2,022

2003

65,102,000

25,761 22,030

2,527 2,959

2004

84,709,509

25,327 22,030

3,344 3,845 The trends observed in case of applications received and disposed indicate that with the passage of time the common man has somewhat lost interest in going to Ombudsman though the proportion of the cases disposed off has increased over time and in 4‐5th of the cases the relief has been provided. It seems that either the time taken by the Ombudsman office to dispose off or that after the relief is recommended the agencies have been using delaying tactics not to implement the decisions of the Ombudsman. In any case there is a reason to believe that the Office needs to be made more effective.

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Punjab Ombudsman

Punjab Ombudsman office was established in 1995 and the Ombudsman is appointed by governor who also takes oath from the Ombudsman. There is a fixed term and like the Federal Ombudsman, the provincial Ombudsman cannot be removed from the office. The Punjab Ombudsman Office has been created for redressal of the complaints of the common man against various departments of the Punjab government. Performance of the Punjab Ombudsman is similar to that of the Federal Ombudsman. The number of complaints received has been consistently declining and the reasons could be similar to that have been discussed above. See Table 10. Both due to a smaller number of new petitions as well as better disposal total pending cases have dropped significantly from more than 10 thousand to just 2,440.

Table 10 : Ombudsman Punjab Receipt and Disposal of complaints 1996‐97 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 Brought Forward ‐ 10,049 6,018 4,001 5,465 5,651 3,800 3,683 4,733 Receipt 17,801 11,501 11,696 8,909 8,385 8,586 9,392 8,434 8,503 Total Processed 17,801 21,550 17,714 12,910 13,850 14,237 13,192 12,117 13,236 Disposal 7,752 15,532 13,713 7,445 8,199 10,437 9,509 7,384 10,796 Carried Forward 10,049 6,018 4,001 5,465 5,651 3,800 3,683 4,733 2,440

The Punjab Ombudsman receives complaints some of which are non‐maintainable as has been the case in Federal Ombudsman. As many as 3,422 complaints in 2005 were non‐maintainable and the main reasons have been incomplete papers, the complaints related to service matters or private matters or they were concerned with federal agencies. See Table11. Since this is the waste of resources and time of the private citizens and the officers of the Ombudsman, there is a need to create awareness amongst the masses as to what types of cases may be sent to the Ombudsman Office.

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Table 11 : Punjab Ombudsman – Non‐Maintainable

complaints. CATEGORY COMPLAINTS %AGE Incomplete 1,339 39 Service matters 659 19 Concerning Federal Agencies 583 17 Private matters 432 13 Subjudice 197 6 Anonymous 130 4 Press clippings 50 1.46 Time barred 28 0.82 Concerning Other Provinces 4 0.12 TOTAL 3,422 .100

Unlike the Federal Ombudsman, only in 40 percent of the cases grievance was redressed in case of Punjab Ombudsman. In 53 percent of the cases, views of the agencies were upheld and in 7 percent of the cases the redressal of grievance was recommended but the recommendations have not been so far implemented. Table 12 shows the agency wise breakdown of the complaints and one can observe very interesting patterns:

• Maximum complaints have been against police department which is hardly surprising in view of the perception about the police high handedness in Pakistan. Similarly the revenue and irrigation departments have been amongst the top six departments against which the complaints have been lodged. This is not surprising either;

• However it is quite surprising and unfortunate that 15.8 percent complaints have been lodged against education and 6 percent against health departments. These rank 2nd and 5th in terms of complaints.

• The local and district governments also are high in the list of complaints and this needs to be rectified as the basis objective of devolution has been to ensure the accountability at the local level.

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Table 12 : Punjab Ombudsman – Department/agency wise breakup of complaints

received in 2005 SR.NO DEPARTMENT / AGENCY

COMPLAINTS

%AGE

1 Police 1261 17.16 2 Education 1160 15.79 3 Revenue Administration 837 11.39 4 Local Govt. & Rural Development 579 7.88 5 Health 443 6.03 6 Irrigation & Power 430 5.85 7 District Governments 226 3.08 8 Benevolent Fund Boards 213 2.90 9 Boards of Intermediate & Secondary Education 197 2.68 10 Water & Sanitation Agencies 186 2.53 11 Accountant General Punjab 174 2.37 12 Universities 134 1.82 13 Excise & Taxation 133 1.81 14 Agriculture 129 1.76 15 Communication & Works 125 1.70 16 Zakat & Ushr 125 1.70 17 Forestry, Wildlife & Fisheries 116 1.58 18 Bait‐ul‐Maal 109 1.48 19 Development Authorities 87 1.18

20 Housing, Urban Development & Public Health Engineering 79 1.08

21 Home/Jails 66 0.90 22 TEVTA 56 0.76 23 Anti Corruption Establishment 55 0.75 24 Cooperatives 52 0.71 25 Food 49 0.67 26 Labour & Human Resource 47 0.64 27 Auqaf, Religious and Minority Affairs 38 0.52 28 Population Welfare 28 0.38 29 Transport 28 0.38 30 Livestock & Dairy Development 27 0.37 31 Industries 26 0.35 32 PESSI 23 0.31 33 Services & General Administration 16 0.22 34 Punjab Public Service Commission 15 0.20 35 Mines & Minerals 12 0.16 36 Bank of Punjab 12 0.16

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37 Social Welfare & Women Development 12 0.12 38 Finance 9 0.12 39 Information, Culture & Youth Affairs 7 0.10 40 Environment Protection 6 0.08 41 Law & Parliamentary Affairs 5 0.07 42 Board of Technical Education 4 0.05 43 Planning & Development 3 0.04 44 Printing Press 3 0.04 45 Information Technology 2 0.03 46 Punjab Small Industries Corporation 2 0.03 47 Punjab Text Book Board 1 0.01 TOTAL 7,347 100

The Provincial bureau has received complaints from across all the districts of Pakistan. Whereas Lahore and Faisalabad were expected to have the maximum number of complaints because of the larger population, in terms of per capita complaints many smaller towns have proportionately had much higher complaints. See Table 13. For example Rahim Yar Khan has a population of less than 20 percent of Failsalabad but the number of complaints have been only slightly less. Bahawalnagar a town near Multan much smaller in size than Multan has filed more complaints. There are many such cases. It seems that the governance is even poorer in smaller towns than the big cities.

Table 13: Punjab Ombudsman District wise break up of complaints received in 2005

SR.NO DISTRICT COMPLAINTS %AGE 1 Lahore 1007 12.03 2 Faisalabad 502 6.00 3 RahimYar Khan 428 5.11 4 Bahawalnagar 394 4.71 5 Multan 384 4.59 6 Sargodha 343 4.10 7 Bahawalpur 331 3.95 8 Jhang 325 3.88 9 Sheikhupura 305 3.64 10 Gujranwala 292 3.49 11 Khanewal 280 3.34 12 Kasur 249 2.97 13 Okara 236 2.82 14 Toba Tek Singh 221 2.64

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15 Sahiwal 214 2.56 16 Muzaffargarh 213 2.54 17 Vehari 213 2.54 18 Mianwali 210 2.51 19 Sialkot 207 2.47 20 Khushab 204 2.44 21 Dera Ghazi Khan 200 2.39 22 Pakpattan 192 2.29 23 Rawalpindi 173 2.07 24 Bhakkar 164 1.96 25 Mandi Baha‐ud‐Din 140 1.67 26 Gujrat 140 1.67 27 Rajanpur 131 1.56 28 Narowal 116 1.39 29 Hafizabad 111 1.33 30 Layyah 91 1.09 31 Jhelum 74 0.88 32 Chakwal 72 0.86 33 Attock 67 0.80 34 Lodhran 53 0.63 35 Nankana Sahib 43 0.51

36 From Other Provinces 40 0.48

37 From Abroad 8 0.10 TOTAL 8,373 100

The maximum complaints have been against the administrative excesses, discrimination, favoritism, arbitrary, unjust and biased decisions. They accounted for 43 percent of the complaints filed in 2005. Inattention, delay, neglect, inefficiency and ineptitude accounted for 37 percent and the remaining 20 percent has been against corrupt practices. As regards maladministration in service matters the maximum complaints have been against the pension and retirements benefits followed by the Benevolent Fund. This is unfortunate that those who need the help most by the government have to face the maximum difficulties. The complaints against other departments are shown in Table 14.

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Table 14: MALADMINISTRATION IN SERVICE MATTERS

COMPLAINTS PERTAINING TO2005 SR. NO. DESCRIPTION COMPLAINTS 1 Pensionary and Other Retirement Benefits 247 2 Benevolent Fund 230 3 Release/Fixation of Pay 171 4 Appointment Under Rule 17(A) 129 5 Selection Grade/Promotion/Move Over 125 6 Misconduct 114 7 G. P. Fund 99 8 Reimbursment of Medical Charges 90 9 Family Pension 84 10 Finalization of Pending Chronic Enquiries 82 11 Grant of Increments 71 12 Completion of Service Book/Service Record 42 13 Reinstatement in Service 36

14

Appointment Against Quota for the Children of Non‐gazetted Employees (BS‐1 to 5) 32

15 Payment of Travelling Allowance 27

16 Appointment Against Quota for the Disabled 23

17 Payment of Grant on Marriage or Death 17 18 Issuance of LPC 7 19 Cancellation of Transfer Orders 5 20 Transfer of PPO 4 21 Seniority Disputes 3 22 Annual Confidential Reports 2 TOTAL 1,640 PROVINCIAL OMBUDSMAN SINDH (POS)

POS Secretariat was established in early 1992 at Karachi. The Ombudsman is appointed for a fixed term of four years which is not extendable under any circumstances. There are regional offices and one sub office working under the Ombudsman Secretariat. There is also a provision of the District Ombudsman office at district level, but Sindh Mohtasib is not in favor of District Ombudsman

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Office. The Provincial Ombudsman Sindh is appointed by the Governor of Sindh and Governor administers the oath of the office.

The prime objective behind establishing the office of Ombudsman is to evolve a system for enforcing perpetuating accountability of government functionaries. The main function of the office is to diagnose, investigate, redress and rectify any injustice done to a person through mal‐administration on the part of provincial government departments/agencies. The mal‐administration includes a decision, process, recommendation act of omission or commission which is contrary to law, rules or regulations or is a departure from established practice or procedure, unless it is bonafide and for valid reason; or is perverse, arbitrary or unreasonable, unjust, biased, oppressive, or discriminatory is based on irrelevant grounds involves the exercise of powers or the failure or refusal to do so, for corrupt or improper motives, such as bribery, jobbery, favoritism, nepotism and administrative excesses; and neglect, inattention, delay, incompetence, inefficiency and ineptitude, in the administration or discharge of duties and responsibilities. He receives complaints of any aggrieved person, or on a reference by the Governor or the Provincial Assembly by any aggrieved person or on a motion of Supreme Court or High Court made during the course of any proceedings before it or of his own motion, undertake any investigation into any allegation of maladministration on the part of any agency or ay of its officers or employees unless it is sub‐judice relate to the external affairs of Pakistan or defense or defense forces of Pakistan. It is not accept for investigation any complaint by or on behalf of a pubic servant or functionary concerning any matters relating to the Agency in which he is, or has been, working in respect of any personal grievance relating to his service therein. Mohtasib may arrange for studies to be made or research to be conducted and may recommend appropriate steps for their eradication.

Unlike Federal and Punjab Ombudsman the complaints received by the Sindh Ombudsman has been consistently rising over time, from 5558 complaints in 1998 they have increase to 8846 by 2005. However, most of the complaints could not be admitted. For example in 1998 only 11 percent of the complaints could be admitted. However, the proportion has increased significantly improved over time and in 2005 though still low it had increased to 30.9 percent. Therefore the cases admitted have increased much more sharply from just 644 in 1998 to 2733 in 2005. See Table 15. The disposals of cases have varied over time and it has been around one thousand and resultantly the pending cases have swelled from just 940 in 1998 to 3657 in 2005. It indicates that the performance of the Sindh Ombudsman needs to be signifincalty improved.

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Table 15 : Ombudsman Sindh ‐ complaints Recieved and Processed Year Complaints Recieved Complaints Admitted Decided Balance/CarryOver 1998 5556 644 1017 940 (1313‐374) 1999 5582 860 876 924 (940‐16) 2000 6551 1850 869 1905 (924+ 981) 2001 6637 178 1812 1875 (1905‐30) 2002 7297 1594 1418 2051 (1875+176) 2003 7382 1359 1177 2233 (2051+182) 2004 7813 1534 944 2823 (2233+590) 2005 8846 2733 1899 3657 (2823+834)

The rejection rate has been quite high in Sindh and the main reasons have been noted in Table 16. It seems that the common man is unaware of as to what sort of complaints are not under the purview of the Provincial Ombudsman. A campaign to create awareness amongst the masses would be quite helpful in this regard.

Table 16 : Ombudsman Sind ‐ Reasons for Rejection of Complains after

Initial Scrutiny

Year

Service Matter

Non

Admin

Private Matter

Subjudice

Ano‐Pseudo

nymous

No Personal

Grievance

Time Barred

Closed on A/c

of No

Response/

Def.

2005 385 784 83 94 359 6 79 16 2004 373 273 70 51 387 9 105 77 2003 353 355 91 74 405 11 140 70 2002 397 539 91 30 391 17 97 101 2001 384 376 31 29 447 28 80 238 2000 359 464 71 42 356 39 20 468 1999 348 316 75 56 306 25 24 379 1998 333 280 42 14 287 23 64 321 1997 310 287 56 62 358 82 74 759 1996 465 303 112 97 328 65 87 795 1995 515 294 96 115 342 81 30 181 1994 718 336 199 161 420 119 51 144 1993 789 308 292 191 642 125 26 123 1992 851 310 425 221 532 124 21 199 1991 191 89 84 53 43 36 1 266

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The complaints have been lodged against both the federal and provincial departments though the number of complaints against federal agencies is only 10 percent as such complaints need to be referred to the Federal ombudsman. Like Punjab the maximum complaints have been lodged against police, local government, I&P, education department, revenue department and the development agencies such as KMC and KDA. Details are given in Table 16.

Table 17 : Ombudsman Sind ‐ Institution and Disposal of Complaints Agency‐Wise Distribution of

Cases/Complaints Agency Admitted

2004 2005Home/Police 277 541Local Govt. 232 201I & P 188 258Education 174 225Revenue 166 277K.M.C 149 240H.T.P 86 195K.D.A/K.B.C.A 66 169Health 33 82S&GAD (SPSC) 24 17Zakat & Ushr 20 98Agriculture 20 23C & W 18 55Information ‐ 1Labor & Transport 18 29Excise & Taxation 13 13Food & Coop. 11 7Finance 10 16Ind. & Min. 9 8Forest Wildlife & fish 7 11Popu. & Welfare 5 14Culture and Tourism 3 4A. G. Sindh\Social Welfare 3 17Social Welfare 2 10Agency not given ‐ ‐ PVT Matter ‐ ‐ F.G.A ‐ ‐ Law Dept. ‐ 1

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PROVINCIAL OMBUDSMAN BALUCHISTAN (POB)

Office of Ombudsman for the Province of Baluchistan was set up in 2001 after 18 years of establishment of the office of Wafaqi Mohtasib. The main reason for late establishment of the office was due to special environment of supremacy of bureaucracy who continuously resisted and avoided to follow the path of other provinces to establish Ombudsman office. The purpose to establish this institution is to diagnose, investigate, redress and rectify any injustice to a person through mal‐administration of government functionaries.

The POB is appointed by the Governor of Baluchistan, and takes an oath before the Governor. The POB is appointed for a fixed term of four years and is not eligible to extension of tenure or for reappointment as Ombudsman under any circumstances. The main objective of the POB is to pave the way for the good governance which implies besides other factors the preservation of rule of law, adherence to due process, procedure and expeditious fair and under an effective legal system in order to curb mal‐administration. The Ombudsman law has a distinguished character of redressal of the grievances of poor and stressed people through the way of informal justice. Suo‐moto actions can be taken by the Ombudsman to redress the grievances of public at large, even those people are benefited who are not party in complaints before this office. Best efforts were made to persuade the agencies to act under the system and rules.

DEPARTMENT OF AUDITOR GENERAL OF PAKISTAN (DAGP)

The Pakistan Audit Department inherited from the colonial system after

independence in 1947. The Pakistan Audit Department was divided into two distinct and seParate segments on 3.10.1988 on the basis of functions performed by that office and after 2001 there has been complete seParation of audit from accounts and named as Department of Auditor’s General of Pakistan (DAGP). The Auditor General of Pakistan is the administrative head of the DAGP and is assisted by 2 Additional Auditor Generals and other staff. The Auditor General Office has an elaborative administrative structure which is available at national, regional, provincial and 110 district levels.

The department of the Auditor‐General of Pakistan (DAGP) has undergone significant changes in its organization, composition, scope, size, functions, role, importance and constitutional status over time. The term of the office is for a fixed time of five years from the date on which he assumes such office or he attains the age of 65 years whichever is earlier. Auditor General cannot be removed from office except in the like manner and on the like grounds as a judge of the Supreme Court

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To strengthen the legislative oversight by providing an independent and objective assessment of the process of governance and financial management at all tiers of government, reports of the Auditor General relating to the accounts of the federation are considered in the Public Accounts Committee of the respective assemblies. The Auditor General provides an independent and objective assessment of the process of governance both at the federal and provincial levels.

The Auditor General has the power of auditing accounts, to dispense with detailed audit, to amend the schedule, to make rules and regulations. The DAGP audits the Federal Government Ministries, Divisions and Departments and prepares reports for consideration of PACs. Auditor General’s Office:

Audit all transactions of the Federation, Provinces and Districts relating to Public Accountability;

Audit all trading, manufacturing, profit and loss accounts and balance sheets and accounts kept by Order of the President or of the Governor of the Province in any Federal Department and

Audit, subject to the provisions of this Ordinance, the accounts of any authority or the Federation or a Province, and in each case to report on the expenditure, transactions so audited by him;

Training of any organization plays a pivotal role in developing knowledge

and information to the employees. They carry out need assessment and ensure the provision of suitable programme to all its employees, so that work is carried out on cost effective basis in efficient manner by the right persons with the requisite knowledge and skills. The impact of the training is improved Audit System. Training Research and Publications are the major tools of the training institutes of the country to keep abreast of the developments in the profession. It has a network of training institutes all over the country where public servants are provided training in the field of auditing, accounting and financial management. Its research operations have produced a Public Audit Manual, an internationally recognized Performance Audit Methodology with 13 sector specific guidelines etc. Under PIFRA World Bank project skills of the employees have been improved rather significantly.

The issuance of ordinance that defines the functions, powers and terms and conditions of service of the Auditor General and the ordinance that establishes the Controller General of Accounts as independent and seParate organizations have gone a long way in improving the audit. Similarly the new system of accounts, which is being established, will make the accounts transparent. These measures no doubt will provide the necessary information to check corrupt practices but by itself cannot check or even contain corruption. As long as there is legal basis for auditing and the Public Accounts Committees examine the

505

accounts with a lag of five year or so such improvements in reporting would not have much impact. The Public Accounts Committee must examine the accounts almost immediately so that the corrupt are taken to task. It has been observed that the Public Account Committee examine the accounts pertaining to a year for which responsible officers have long retired or some are even dead. Moreover, there is no mention of performance auditing which is absolutely necessary if the public resources are to be used optimally. Whereas seParation of auditing from accounting department is important, there has been corruption in the audit departments as well especially at the lower levels. How that should be checked needs urgent attention.

PUBLIC ACCOUNTS COMITTEE The parliament approves the expenditure and it must oversee if the expenditures have been properly used in accordance with the objectives for which they have been approved. The Parliament has the Public Accounts Committee and during the years when there is not parliament ad‐hoc committees are set up comprising the notable person of the society.

Functions of Public Accounts committee is governed by Rules of Procedures and conduct of business in national Assembly, 1992 and provides public representatives the opportunities to keep a check on expenditure. The Committee has been assigned the following functions comprise examination of the accounts showing the appropriation of sums granted for the expenditure of Government; the Annual Finance Accounts of the Government; the Reports of the Auditor General, examine the statement of accounts showing the income and expenditure of the state corporations and the autonomous and semi autonomous bodies; and consider Audit Reports.

The main problems with the Public Accounts Committees at the federal and provincial levels have been the delays in examination of the accounts. Sometimes the delays had been so much that the actions against whom were to be taken had been dead. Therefore a strategy has been designed to expedite the disposal of audit Paras. Following were salient points of this strategy:‐

i) The concerned officers of the ministry should first discuss the audit Paras at the base – the first auditing level – for resolution of issues.

ii) Reactivation of The Departmental Accounts Committees (DACs) and encouraging departmental authorities to arrive at an agreed position.

iii) Members to remain focused on important cases for decision making. The Audit Reports brought before the APAC cases involving gross financial irregularities, culpable negligence and misuse of power. A sum of Rs.70,644 million has been ordered to be recovered from the concerned

506

persons/departments/organizations was ordered by the Ad‐Hoc committee. However, to what extent the orders are implemented by the relevant departments would determine the effectiveness of the PAC. It is in this regard the PAC has suggested that deliberations and recommendations of PAC are not likely to yield any fruitful results unless some mechanism is evolved to ensure follow up of the decisions made by the Committee. The National Assembly Secretariat has, for this purpose, set‐up an Implementation Section temporarily to monitor the implementation of APAC directives. This Section requires permanent status by incorporating necessary provisions in the relevant rules.

The role of Departmental Accounts Committees (DACs), as defined by Ministry of Finance, is to watch the processing of relevant Audit Inspection Reports and decide upon appropriate measures to accelerate their finalization. The DAC comprises the Principal Accounting Officer/secretary of the Ministry/Division as Chairman and representatives of Ministry of Finance and the Auditor General as members. They should make sure that only substantive issues are referred to PAC. The PAC by itself should be more selective in the choice of Para’s to be taken up for deliberation. Since transparency plays a key role in the process of eliminating corruption,

the PAC should continue keeping its proceedings open to the press and electronic media. The presence of the press exposes the cases of mismanagement and corruption to public.

Since excess expenditure by a Ministry, over and above the original budgetary allocation met through Supplementary Grant, also disturbs the budgetary discipline and results in higher deficit financing. It is bad budgeting in any case. The absence of correct budgeting, proper monitoring and reconciliation at the right time can result in over‐payments with the result that irregularities mostly remain un‐detected Pac has also noted that pressure of expenditure increases during the months of May and June and directed the respective PAO should take appropriate measures for monitoring the flow of expenditure so that expenditure is evenly spread over the year according to needs. This would reduce cases of financial mismanagement due to unnecessary haste in utilization of funds.

The PAC has recommended that in order to enhance the value of reports, Audit should evolve indicators in consultation wit the Ministries concerned and apply these indicators to measure performance of the auditee unit. The auditors also have an obligation to constantly update and improve their skills in discharging their professional responsibilities. They must know and apply auditing, accounting and financial management standards, procedures and practices. They may possess a good understanding of the constitutional, legal and institutional principles and standards governing the operations of the

507

audited entity. Thus, the general public and the audited entities would be assured of the fairness, impartiality and competence of the Auditors.

The PAC also noted that Members finance/Finance Director had either become a party to financial misdeeds or was over‐awed by the Chairman/Chief Executive. The selection of person for such posts in autonomous Corporations/Bodies must be made carefully so that he plays a pivotal role in the financial management of the unit. He should enjoy a certain freedom in tendering financial advice and greater protection by the Government/Ministry of Finance. Similarly, it was found that in a number of cases in the cantonment areas, residential plots were converted into commercial plots without sanction of the competent authorities and without recovery of the requisite fees resulting in huge loss of revenues. The APAC has advised recovery as well as disciplinary actions against defaulters and that the relevant rules of allocation/conversion of plots must be amended quickly in the interest of the State.

The Public Accounts Committee can be a potent source to check the corruption but its effectiveness depends on a number of factors. Firstly, the audit reports have to be proper and after the departmental committee only substantial issues come to the Committee. Second, the legalistic auditing should give way to the performance auditing which at present is only limited to a few organizations. Third, the PAC should be properly staffed and they may not just rely on the Auditor General’s Office. Fourth, there should be a follow up mechanism as the PAC recommendations will be of no use if the departments fail to recover the amount of money. For Example the APAC had ordered recovery of about Rs 67 billion and such recovery would help in improving the government fiscal problems as well as in checking the corruption. Anti‐Corruption Establishment

In 1947 prevention of Corruption Act 1947 was passed and till 1956, there

was a small anti corruption cell at provincial level headed b y a superintendent of Police under Home Dept. One unit was created in 1956 and a Directorate of Anti Corruption Establishment West Pakistan was established under the administrative control of chief secretary West Pakistan with three Regional Offices Lahore, Rawalpindi and Hyderabad. These offices were headed by the Director. The Anti Corruption Ordinance (xx) of 1961 was promulgated on 8th September 1961 supplemented by West Pakistan Anti Corruption Establishment Rules, 1965. According to section 3 of the said ordinance, West Pakistan Anti Corruption Establishment was created. After dissolution of West Pakistan in 1970 into four Provincial Governments West Pakistan Anti Corruption

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Establishment Rules, 1965 were adopted and necessary amendments were made from time to time according to their requirement.

Anti‐Corruption Establishment, Punjab Anti Corruption Establishment (ACE), Punjab was established at provincial level after dissolving of one unit in 1970. West Pakistan Anti Corruption Establishment Rules 1965 remained in force till formulation of Anti Corruption Establishment Rules 1974 was formed. Under these rules provincial, Divisional and District Committees were made to give sanction for initiate and decision of inquiries of cases. On 28th March 1985 Punjab ACE Rules 1985 were promulgated and the organization was made officers based for decision making. Mission of ACE, Punjab is “to eradicate corruption and create deterrence amongst Public servants and all their accomplices involved in criminal misconduct & corrupt practices.”

ACE, Punjab is an attached department of S & GAD Government of Punjab. The Headquarter is located at Lahore headed by a Director General (BS‐20/21). The Additional Chief Secretary, Punjab is the administrative secretary of the ACE, Punjab14. The DG ACE is :

7. To investigate and bust intricate cases of fraud involving big fish and known swindlers rather sharks.

8. To carry out physical verification and check of targets on ground. 9. To carry out sting operations against its own delinquent staff. 10. Inspection of the offices of ACE at Regional & District level and

monitor the working of I.Os. 11. To keep a vigilant eye on the behavior, conduct and working of

staff and recommend punitive measures against the defaulters. 12. To encourage people who want to give information against corrupt

public servant and then to initiate enquiry under ACE rules against that public servant.

There is no specialized training for the employees of the staff. Last year a few officers were trained with the NAB officers. The course was organized by NAB. Police Officers get mandatory training as provided in their rules. The number of specialized trained officers is very low.

Since ACE is a specialized agency assigned a specific job. Structural change is required for efficient working without any executive influence. ACE

14 Apart from the regular officers of ACE an ACE setup has also been made within all administrative department of the government with post of ex-officio Additional Directors.

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should be declared an independent organization on the lines of NAB. Appointment of Head of Department and other officers must be on strict merit if the benefits of ACE are to be reaped. There should be permanent staff which is properly trained. There is a lack of professional expertise and specialized trained personnel, particularly at investigation level. Due to this credibility of the organization is badly affected. Punjab ACE suggest that in public sector the corruption has been to the extent of about 25 percent and most of these is in the tax evasion where it has been as high as 50 percent. For details see Table 18. Table 18: EXTENT OF CORRUPTION IN PUBLIC SECTOR No. FORMS

TRANSACTIONS (RS. In billion)

CORRUPTION (Rs. In billion)

1 Bank Loans 470 47 2 Tax Evasions 436 218

3 Public Sector Dev. Project 116 29

4 POL Imports 67 4 5 Current Exp. 94 9 6 Public Utilities 175 26

Total 1358 333 The main factors behind the corruption are the lack of accountability as has been identified in Transparency International and has been reproduced in Table 19 below. And we have see in the preceding discussion that despite various institutions like Auditor General and Public Accounts committee there has been little accountability. Table 19: The Transparency International Pakistan has identified following factors of corruption

1 Lack of accountability 31.68%

2 Low salaries 16.54%

3 Monopoly of power 16.43%

4 Discretionary powers 12.61%

5 Lack of transparency 9.97% 6 Power of influential people 4.59%

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7 Red tapism 4.28% 8 Shortages of demand and supply 2.26% 9 Others 2.64% The ACE Punjab has received so far 19511 complaints and most of these are disposed off during the year as is shown in Table 20 but some linger on even for years. Table 20: Enquiries ‐‐‐‐‐Year Wise Break Up of Pendency on 31.12.05 S. no.

ACE Office

up to 2001 2002 2003

2004 2005 Total

1 HQ 0 0 1 6 31 38 2 LHR 0 0 1 24 535 560 3 GWA 0 0 0 4 323 327 4 RWP 1 0 1 13 125 140 5 FSD 0 1 4 18 128 150 6 SGA 0 0 1 26 252 279 7 MTN 0 1 9 62 320 392 8 BWP 0 0 3 5 110 118 Total 1 2 20 158 1824 2005

One of the indicators of effectiveness is the amount of recovery made by these anti‐corruption agencies. The recoveries reported in Table 21 compared to the estimates presented in the ACE book reported above it are rather small and shows very poor performance and effectiveness. Table 21: Recovery 2004 2005

S. no. ACE Office

Recovery(Rs. in Lac)

Net cash (Cases)

In‐Direct recovery

Compromised Amount

Total Rs. in Lacs

1 HQ 91.887 240.00 00 2.63 242.63 2 LHR 845.410 41.52 16967.83 936.68 17946.03 3 GWA 36.366 61.79 335.18 515.23 867.20 4 RWP 957.810 108.75 5.04 376.54 490.33 5 FSD 881.000 27.91 23.25 94.30 145.46 6 SGA 790.380 195.98 00 16.40 212.38 7 MTN 863.130 96.51 652.62 182.77 931.90 8 BWP 153.265 142.57 00 281.95 424.52

Total 4619.25 870.03 17983.92 2406.50 21260.45

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The Table 21 shows the cases and enquiries and it turns out that Revenue and the police department comes out to be on top. These were the departments where the corruption was reported to be the maximum. They are on top in both the years and their percentage has increased further.

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Table 22: DEPARTMENT‐WISE ENQUIRIES/CASES AS ON 31.12.2005 No. Departments

Total Cases

%age Cases

Total Enquiries

% ageEnquiries

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 REVENUE (BOR + Settlement + Consolidation& Relief Department) 178 32.4 582 29.0 2 POLICE 168 30.5 638 31.8 3 LG & RD (DG–RD + LCS Board + KatchiAbbadies + District Govt.) 60 10.9 174 8.7

4 EDUCATION (Colleges + Schools + Libraries + Sports+ Phy. Edu. + Sec.Boards & Universities) 33 6.0 84 4.2

5 HEALTH 18 3.3 62 3.1 6 HUD & PHED (Dev. Authorities like LDA, FDA MDA, GDA, RDA, etc 15 2.7 38 1.9 7 FOREST 13 2.4 67 3.3 8 IRRIGATION & POWER 10 1.8 88 4.4 9 EXCISE & TAXATION 9 1.6 17 0.8 10 USHER & ZAKAT 8 1.5 27 1.3 11 C & W (Buildings + Highways + Architect) 7 1.3 52 2.6 12 FOOD 7 1.3 24 1.2 13 AGRICULTURE 3 0.5 14 0.7 14 COOPERATIAVE 0 0 17 0.8 15 AUQAF 0 0 13 0.6 SUB TOTAL 529 96.2 1897 94.6 16 OTHER DEPTTS. 21 3.8 108 5.4 GRAND TOTAL 550 100 2005 100

DEPARTMENT‐WISE ENQUIRIES/CASES AS ON 31.12.2004 No. Departments

Total Cases

%age Cases

Total Enquiries

% ageEnquiries

1 2 3 4 5 6 1 POLICE 243 29.71 634 29.40 2 REVENUE (BOR + Settlement + Consolidation& Relief Department) 225 27.51 585 27.11

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3 LG & RD (DG–RD + LCS Board + KatchiAbbadies + District Govt.) 59 7.21 154 7.14 4 HUD & PHED (Dev. Authorities like LDA, FDA MDA, GDA, RDA, etc 52 6.36 93 4.31

5 EDUCATION (Colleges + Schools + Libraries + Sports+ Phy. Edu. + Sec.Boards & Universities) 47 5.75 124 5.75

6 IRRIGATION & POWER 43 5.72 125 5.79 7 EXCISE & TAXATION 22 2.69 31 1.44 8 HEALTH 17 2.18 88 4.08 9 FOREST 16 1.96 34 1.58 10 C & W (Buildings + Highways + Architect) 11 1.34 46 2.13 11 FOOD 6 0.73 19 0.88 12 USHER & ZAKAT 5 0.61 51 2.36 13 COOPERATIAVE 5 0.61 13 0.60 14 AUQAF ‐ 0 13 0.60 15 AGRICULTURE ‐ 0 11 0.51 SUB TOTAL 751 91.8 2021 93.65 16 OTHER DEPTTS. 67 8.19 137 6.35 GRAND TOTAL 818 100 2158 100

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Anti‐Corruption Establishment, Sindh After disintegration of West Pakistan into four provinces, Sindh Government promulgated Sindh inquiries & anti‐corruption act, 1991. Under section 9 of this act, Sindh inquiries and Anti‐Corruption Rules 1993 framed and again amended on 4th May, 1995. The West Pakistan Anti‐Corruption Rules, 1965 were repeated after these rules. Organization of ACE Sindh is an attached department of Services and General Administration(S & GAD) headed by the chairman and directly under the control of chief secretary. Basic functions include unearth cases of corruption pertaining to public servants and their speedy investigation and disposal and is specifically authorized to: ‐

Conduct verification, preliminary or open enquiry into the allegations. Register cases on substantiation of alleged corruption. Prosecution of accused persons.

On receipt of a complaint/application/source information, enquiry officer verifies contents of complaint/ information, by calling the complainant on through discreet enquiry and submits such report to his Deputy Director soliciting permission of the competent authority/ACC concerned for either an open enquiry, registration of case, departmental action or closure of case. There is no regular feature of training for employees. Most employees are from Police Department. They get mandatory training as provided in their cadre. ACE did not have sufficient manpower to investigate the cases and worked through borrowed staff from other agencies.

Table 22 shows that the number of cases registered have been in the range of about 100. While the cases in the 1980s increased they have fallen in recent years. Is it due to the NAB or the cases are not being referred by the government departments or that the agencies have relaxed. One reason could be very slow disposal of the cases. These are to be examined in greater detail when more data becomes available. Same is true of all the other areas of Sindh.

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Table 22: CASES REGISTERED AND DISPOSED OFF YEARS WISE ACE KARACHI

S.No. YEARS No. of cses received / registered

No. of cases disposed off/decided

1 1970 39 39 2 1971 78 78 3 1972 89 89 4 1973 60 60 5 1974 93 93 6 1975 94 94 7 1976 112 112 8 1977 66 66 9 1978 61 61 10 1979 52 52 11 1980 64 44 12 1981 97 22 13 1982 150 131 14 1983 122 107 15 1984 154 92 16 1985 149 63 17 1986 153 101 18 1987 190 212 19 1988 195 141 20 1989 109 164 21 1990 66 130 22 1991 93 148 23 1992 164 76 24 1993 109 46 25 1994 100 132 26 1995 69 55 27 1996 77 85 28 1997 71 61 29 1998 89 138 30 1999 85 112 31 2000 51 76 32 2001 61 69 33 2002 51 42 34 2003 40 26 35 2004 30 13 36 2005 66 50 37 2006 91 43

Table 23: CASES REGISTERED AND DISPOSED OFF YEARS WISE ACE LARKANA

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1 1970 45 45 2 1971 32 32 3 1972 35 35 4 1973 44 44 5 1974 35 35 6 1975 39 39 7 1976 59 59 8 1977 54 54 9 1978 26 26 10 1979 29 20 11 1980 39 39 12 1981 53 53 13 1982 39 39 14 1983 75 73 15 1984 82 82 16 1985 74 74 17 1986 90 90 18 1987 229 229 19 1988 214 211 20 1989 149 148 21 1990 89 88 22 1991 87 86 23 1992 62 62 24 1993 66 66 25 1994 114 113 26 1995 148 148 27 1996 75 75 28 1997 64 63 29 1998 78 76 30 1999 129 116 31 2000 144 124 32 2001 72 55 33 2002 32 15 34 2003 49 22 35 2004 17 6 36 2005 45 11 37 2006 70 06

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CASES REGISTERED AND DISPOSED OFF YEARS WISE ACE SUKKUR



1 1970 45 45 2 1971 55 55 3 1972 70 70 4 1973 50 50 5 1974 52 52 6 1975 55 55 7 1976 59 59 8 1977 47 47 9 1978 48 48 10 1979 63 63 11 1980 54 54 12 1981 60 60 13 1982 84 84 14 1983 76 76 15 1984 86 86 16 1985 88 88 17 1986 111 111 18 1987 191 191 19 1988 217 217 20 1989 216 216 21 1990 159 158 22 1991 166 163 23 1992 131 129 24 1993 156 156 25 1994 114 114 26 1995 122 120 27 1996 174 172 28 1997 164 157 29 1998 173 169 30 1999 259 247 31 2000 230 206 32 2001 122 105 33 2002 81 68 34 2003 110 81 35 2004 67 49 36 2005 111 66 37 2006 77 19

Anti‐Corruption Establishment, NWFP

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The NWFP Anti‐Corruption Establishment was established after the breakup of one unit in 1970. The provincial government of NWFP adopted the West Pakistan Anti‐Corruption Rules, 1965. In these rules Anti‐Corruption Committees at the level of Province Division and District level were constituted. Every investigation was subject to the control and direction of the appropriate committee. The Director ACE had very limited power. The NWFP government superseded the ACE, Rules 1965 and made the NWFP, Anti‐Corruption Rules 1999. Under these rules power of initiation/registration of case upto BPS‐18 is with the Director ACE and BPS‐19 and above is with the Chief Secretary.

Directorate of anticorruption in NWFP is an attached department under the Establishment Department and was established after dissolution of one unit in 1971. The organization is headed by a Director. Preliminary inquiries and investigation against public servants shall be initiated by the Establishment on complaints from Government, Head of Departments or other reliable sources. As per procedure whenever a complaint is received, it is sent to the concerned Circle Officer of the District for verification of facts. After initial verification/inquiry, if proper inquiry is needed then the Circle Officer send the complaint to the Director with the request o allow open inquiry. On the conclusion of open inquiry if the misconduct falls under the preview of criminal misconduct as defined under Prevention of Corruption Act, then case is registered with the permission of Competent Authority as specified in the above mentioned rules. Similarly on the conclusion of investigation challan is submitted to the Court after obtaining approval from the concerned competent authority.

On completion of investigation Competent Authority can pass the orders either to send the case to the Court for trial, or for judicial action send the case to department concerned for departmental action or drop the case if no prima facie evidence is available on record. Anti corruption agency is to vii. To carry out enquiries and investigate the cases of corruption/corrupt practice, mis‐use

of authority, mis‐appropriation/defalcation of funds and fraud/cheating etc. if committed by Public Servants of Provincial Government.

viii. To eradicate corruption from the Government Departments ix. To pin point cases of irregularities and recommend/departmental action against the

defaulters. x. To collect evidence regarding the known corrupt officials and trace out their hidden

assets. xi. To prosecute the corrupt officers/officials in the court of Law. xii. To enhance/strengthen the process of accountability by bringing the corrupt elements to

the book. There is no regular procedure of capacity building of the employees. Most people are from

police department and that training is treated as sufficient for performance of investigation and prosecution work. On regular basis employees should be provided relevant training so that they can combat with the corruption. Moreover, Anti Corruption Establishments have

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very limited power and are not free from executive control. Director ACE has no power to take action against any gazetted officer without the prior permission of the Chief Secretary. Unless ACE is an independent organization with sufficient power so that it can take immediate action against corrupt employees without any pressure from executive control.

The ACE NWFP shows that the enquiries have increased in 1990s and there has been sharp disposal in the last few years. Probably that may have led to higher enquiries and it might help in explaining the decline in enquiries in Sindh. See Table 23.

Table 23: Performance of Anti‐Corruption Establishment, NWFP

From 1971 to 20/9/2006 Years Previous Added Total Disposal Total Balance Balance Judicial Departmental Dropped Disposal

1971 34 48 82 10 6 5 21 611972 61 84 145 75 10 6 91 541973 54 110 164 45 22 5 72 921974 92 89 181 88 42 5 135 461975 46 80 126 52 14 5 71 551976 55 71 126 45 12 4 61 651977 65 84 149 75 26 6 107 421978 42 72 114 15 8 3 26 881979 88 74 162 75 10 4 89 731980 73 89 162 45 20 5 70 921981 92 85 177 66 30 6 102 751982 75 112 187 75 40 7 122 651983 65 84 149 88 15 4 107 421984 42 65 107 42 8 2 52 551985 55 72 127 68 10 4 82 451986 45 75 120 42 18 6 66 541987 54 84 138 65 8 4 77 611988 61 80 141 82 9 5 96 451989 45 74 119 66 10 4 80 391990 39 48 87 32 6 3 41 461991 46 71 117 42 15 5 62 551992 55 134 189 75 18 4 97 921993 92 128 220 52 18 7 77 1431994 143 185 328 83 21 8 112 2161995 216 165 381 98 32 11 141 2401996 240 144 384 90 16 10 116 2681997 268 108 376 182 45 30 257 1191998 119 114 233 42 41 19 102 1311999 131 131 262 66 18 22 106 156

520

2000 156 131 287 95 29 15 139 1482001 148 186 334 233 42 10 285 492002 49 164 213 134 24 4 162 512003 51 144 195 78 35 19 132 632004 63 123 186 48 33 16 97 892005 89 113 202 32 35 16 83 119

30/9/06 119 86 205 45 33 28 106 99

Anti‐Corruption Establishment, Baluchistan Anti Corruption Establishment (ACE) is a continuation of the cell that existed in West

Pakistan based on Anti Corruption Rules, 1965 and was established after disintegration of one unit. Organization of ACE is under administrative control of the Chief Secretary. The Government of Baluchistan has not made any amendment in Anti Corruption Law and is still following West Pakistan Anti Corruption Rules 1965. Under these rules government constituted the provincial Anti Corruption Council, Divisional Anti Corruption Committee and District Anti Corruption Committee. On implementation of the devolution plan the divisional anti corruption committees were abolished and the government reconstituted provincial anti corruption council and district anti corruption committees. Provincial Anti‐Corruption Council deals with the corruption cases of all the provincial officers of BS‐16 and above whereas District Anti Corruption Committee deals with the corruption cases of all provincial official BS 1 to 15. Inquires and investigates bribery and corruption cases in provincial departments including public sector cooperation’s under the administrative control of provincial government of Baluchistan and prosecutes the offenders in special courts

The secretary S & GAD functions as Ex‐Officio Director and is head of the ACE Baluchistan. The superintendent of Police is the immediate incharge of ACE. Presently six circle officers are functioning at Quetta, Sibi, D.M.Jamali, Khuzdar, Kech and Loralai respectively. There is no specialized training programme for in the employees of ACE. Most employees are from Police Establishment and they have their own training courses which are mandatory for them. There have been very few cases registered in ACE Quetta but it shows quite a substantial variation over time and there has been only 17 convictions over the lat 10 years. Table 24. CASES REGISTERED DISPOSED‐OFF BY ANTI CORRUPTION ESTABLISHMENT BALOCHISTAN, QUETTA, FOR THE LAST 10 YEARS 1995‐2004.

Decided S. No.

Years Registered Challaned Convicted Acquitted

Pending in the court

Dropped by

PACC

Transferred to

NAB/FIA

Pending Investigation with ACE

1 1995 6 2 ‐ 2 ‐ 4 ‐ ‐ 2 1996 8 7 1 4 2 1 ‐ ‐

3 1997 32 15 8 4 3 7 7 3 4 1998 10 3 ‐ 3 ‐ 4 2 1 5 1999 13 7 1 4 2 4 1 1 6 2000 23 17 3 8 6 1 5 ‐ 7 2001 10 6 3 1 2 ‐ 3 ‐ 8 2002 5 1 1 ‐ ‐ 2 1 1 9 2003 2 1 ‐ 1 ‐ ‐ 1 ‐ 10 2004 4 2 ‐ 1 1 1 ‐ 1

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NATIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY BUREAU (NAB)

The NAB15 was created under the National Accountability Ordinance promulgated on 16th Nov 1999 to eradicate corruption and corrupt practices and hold accountable all those persons accused of such practices. NAB is assigned tasks of eliminating corruption through a comprehensive approach of awareness, prevention and enforcement. NAB Ordinance extends to the whole of Pakistan and is applicable to all persons in Pakistan, all citizens of Pakistan and persons who are or have been in the service of Pakistan wherever they may be including areas which are part of Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), & Provincially Administrative Tribal Areas (PATA)

Chairman, Deputy Chairman and the prosecutor General Accountability have the specified tenure and its qualifications, method of appointment of chairman and prosecutor General Accountability are specified. NAB is an independent constitutional body. It has a vigilance wing and is suppose to maintain strict watch on officials working within the organization. Chairman is answerable to the President of Pakistan and the chairman presents Annual Performance Report to the President of Pakistan by 30th March every year. Mission of the National Accountability Bureau is to eradicate corruption and corrupt practices and hold accountable all those persons accused of such practices. The main functions of the Bureau are summarized below:‐

5. To take effective measures for the detection, investigation, prosecution and speedy disposal of cases involving corruption, misuse of power misappropriation of property, kickbacks, commissions etc.

6. Recovery of state money and other assets from those persons who have misappropriated or removed such money or assets through corruption, corrupt practices and misuse of authority.

7. Educate the society about the causes and effects of corruption and corrupt practices and to implement policies and procedures for the prevention of corruption in the society.

8. Maintaining liaison with the international agencies in combating corruption and seeking or giving mutual legal assistance in matters concerning corruption.

Most of the staff of NAB is on deputation from the other departments, but 21% officers and 55.3% officials working on regular basis. There is a need to build up capacity of their own staff and induct the employees who fulfill the merit and other requisite qualifications, experience

15 Before October 1999 the Bureau was known as Ehtesab Bureau operating under Ehtesab Act 1997, prior to this there was Ehtesab Commission in Nov, 1996. The NAB Ordinance 1999 has been amended from time to time by Ordinance XIX of 1999, Ordinance IV of 2000 and Ordinance XXIV of 2000. The amendments (attributable to the Supreme Court Order) were made by Ordinance XXXV of 2001. Latest amendments were made in the National Accountability Ordinance through National Accountability amendment Ordinance 2002 on 15th Nov 2002.

Total 113 61 17 28 16 24 20 7

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and their existing performance in NAB and it is providing incentives to its employees and also focuses on their welfare16. NAB has framed a reward policy for the informers who provide ethnic information on corruption and recoveries of looted money/assets. This reward is admissible to the informer after the recovery of full amount from the accused through plea bargain. A reward committee recommends to the chairman an amount to be paid to the informer depending upon the nature and significance of this case. In case of more than one informer the committee can recommend sharing of the reward among the informers. Following is the formula for determining the reward money for informers. NAB’s share of Recovered Amount Informer’s Maximum Reward out of NAB’s share

v. 10 Lacs 20% vi. Upto 50 Lacs 10% vii. Upto 1 Crore 7% viii. Upto 3 Crore and above 4% Regular & comprehensive training is need for the success operation of an organization. Research Analysis & Training Wing (RA & T Wing) deals with the training of employees of the NAB. Beside this, inform general public regarding white collar crime through seminars/workshops and conferences etc. NAB has also undertaken number of courses/refresher courses so far to educate at different levels of its employees to enable them to unearth corruption. The salient features of the training policy are as under: ‐

• Carry out inquiries & investigations in anticorruption and systemic corruption cases with an over riding aim being able to maintain quality & reduce time

• Carry out prosecution in a manner that allows judges to take expeditions and rationalized decisions.

• Use of modern techniques in IT for case management • Promotion of seminar, workshops and talks on corruption issues by eminent scholars

for developing better comprehension on corruption issues. • Development of internal capability for conducting forensic auditing and accounting to

detect crimes in the financial institutions

The Chairman NAB through comprehensive consultations with the investigation team, the Director General Investigation Monitor and the Prosecutor General Accountability decide on the following:

• Authorization of investigation • Issuance of arrest warrant • Reference filing

16 As much as Rs 54 million was spent on the welfare in 2005.

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• Acceptance or rejection of Plea bargain This process is very useful and helpful in rectifying weaknesses in investigation and objective detailed analysis of the case and also examining the legal merits on the basis of available evidence. The accused and his family are provided full opportunity to present their case.

National Anti‐Corruption Strategy (NACS) was prepared through detailed consultations within the country. In October, 2002 the federal cabinet approved the strategy and in Nov, 2002 implementation committee held its first meeting. This committee met twice during the year 2005 for its 8th and 9th meeting respectively. The committee achieved a number of important landmarks during this year. The old Performa of assets declaration for all government employees was changed alongwith its monitoring mechanism which could be fed into a computer database. NACS is structured around the following eight pillars of National Integrity System.

• Legislative & Political System • Judiciary • Executive • Accountability Bodies • Anti Corruption Agencies • Media • Civil Society • Private Sector

NACS pointed out weakness in each pillars, devised strategy and implementation plan to overcome the weakness. On the NACS recommendations, NAB’s operative law, the NAO, 1999 has been amended to incorporate awareness and prevention as its core functions in addition to the enforcement functions. To raise the capacity building of NAB to handle its new awareness and prevention role Asian Development Bank (ADB) and Department For International Development (DFID), UK have extended a technical assistance grant for strengthening and restructuring of NAB.

Whereas NAB has been established to check corruption but it has suffered from various problems. On the basis and past experience NAB should increase the capacity building of the staff of different cadres. In last few years a number of officers have been trained within and abroad in various courses. There is still a need to assess training requirements and feed back from already trained personnel. This should be a regular feature to equip the human resource with modern tools for investigation /prosecution. Investigation is pre requisite for such accountability organization. Hence, investigation officers may be provided in depth training and special courses be designed for the purpose which may be updated from time to time. Hence the capacity and upgradation capability factor of the employees require continuous periodic review. There is a need to review periodically the recruitment procedure quotas for recruitment, cases structures, terms conditions of services, incentives.

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Table 25 shows the cases for prosecution. Whereas there were already 275 cases by the end of 2004, 144 more were added during 2005. While the disposal is less than the new cases, and as such pending case are increasing , out of the 81 cases disposed off during the year only 39 were convicted; 24 were acquitted and 18 were withdrawn. This is not a very happy state of affairs for such a high powered agency. Table 25

PROSECUTION CASES – 2005

NAB In Progress as on Filed in ACs

Convicted

Acquitted

With‐ drawn

Cases Disposed‐off

In Progress as on

31‐12‐04 31‐12‐05

Punjab 95 35 09 06 11 26 104

Sindh 74 41 06 10 03 19 96

NWFP 33 43 08 05 ‐ 13 63

Balochistan 18 10 12 02 ‐ 14 14

Rawalpindi 55 15 04 01 04 09 61

Total 275 144 39 24 18 81 338

Table 25 shows that almost all the cases were taken to the special courts. Such courts do not augur well for the governance structure. The NAB should see if such cases would be acceptable in the normal court proceedings Table 25

OVERALL PROGRESS OF THE COURT CASES EX‐FIA TAKEN‐OVER BY NAB

Region

Total No. of Court Cases

Taken Over in Special Courts

Decided in Special Courts

Transferred to ACs

Decided in ACs

Under Progress

Punjab 929 929 Nil 10 Nil 929 Sindh 1026 1026 Nil 4 Nil 1026 NWFP 17 17 7 Nil Nil 10 Balochistan 24 24 Nil 4 Nil 24 Rawalpindi 160 160 2 2 Nil 158 Total 2156 2156 9 20 Nil 2147 Table 26 OVERALL PROGRESS OF INQUIRIES & INVESTIGATIONS EX‐FIA TAKEN OVER BY NAB

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Progress Punjab Sindh Balochistan

Rawalpindi NWFP

Total

Transferred 924 421 31 532 177 2085 Authorized under NAO 18 297 31 239 134 719 Voluntary Return Nil 2 Nil 6 2 10 Closed 2 98 10 68 41 219 Transferred 499 128 40 148 98 913 Authorized under NAO 2 112 40 5 77 236 Plea Bargain Nil 4 4 Closed Nil Nil 2 Nil 6 8 Chief Minister’s Inspection Team (CMIT) Punjab Inspection Team was established for the first time in Punjab in 1960 and was directly responsible to the Governor. The department is under the direct control of Chief Ministers of the Punjab Province to monitor the performance of various administrative units through a systematic process of inspection, evaluation and analysis. It identifies and points out the acts of omissions and commission through in‐depth inquiries and recommends remedial measures within the Parameters laid down in the Rules of Business and Government Policy The CMIT is to ensure administrative overview, policy implementation and to take cognizance of the issues of public interest and to assist the Chief Minister of the province in identifying the administrative melodies and to suggest remedial measures to improve the efficiency of the provincial administration with the aim of ensuring Good Governance. Its functions include

2. Inspect sample development projects throughout the province with the following objectives:

iv. That development projects are properly planned and are executed efficiently, expeditiously and economically with effective quality controls and to recommend appropriated action against the defaulting officials/departments;

v. That directives/ orders of the Government regarding development projects are being fully implemented; and

vi. That the officials of National Building Departments and Contractors are carrying out their duties, responsibilities and tasks properly and efficiently.

13. Undertake special assignments, which may be entrusted to it under orders of the Chief Minister on any matter not specified in this Charter.

14. Take cognizance of any important matter affecting Government/ public interest and draw attention of the authorities concerned for appropriate action and place it before the Government for his consideration/orders.

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15. Entertain complaints of serious/urgent nature and pass these on to the concerned quarters for expeditious disposal or carryout investigation/ probe directly as may be appropriate.

16. Inspect or cause to be inspected all Government departments including Police, Autonomous/Semi‐Autonomous Bodies, Corporations, Institutions and Local Bodies to see whether or not these Departments/ Agencies discharge their duties/ functions efficiently and expeditiously and to bring serious observations to the notice of the Government together with recommendations for improvement.

17. Other Departments may assign specific important tasks to the Inspection Team with prior permission of the Chief Minister.

18. Service matters except entrusted to Services, General Administration and Information Department and budgetary matters relating to the Department.

19. Review of progress on ADP twice a year and submit observations/ recommendations to the Governor.

20. A requisition made or assistance required by the Inspection Team in these regards shall be compiled with promptly by all concerned.

21. The Chairman, Chief Minister’s Inspection Team shall submit his reports to the Chief Minister directly. Copies may be endorsed to the concerned departments/ official except those, which may be of confidential nature.

22. The Chairman Chief Minister’s Inspection Team shall maintain close liaison with Anti‐Corruption Department and pass on cases, which may be appropriate to be dealt with by them.

23. Purchase of stores and capital goods for the Department.

The recommendations of CMIT are advisory. However, they are allowed to pass on appropriate cases to Anti Corruption Establishment for further necessary action. Chief Minister’s Inspection Team (CMIT) Baluchistan

The Chief Ministers Inspection Team was constituted under Baluchistan Government Rules of Business 1976 as amended upto date in the year 2004. The CMIT comprise of a Chairman B‐21 and four members B‐20 to assist the Chairman in his work. The team submits inspection reports from schemes directly to the Chief Executive of the province whereas the inquiry reports are routed through the chief secretary under the rules of business. The Chairman CMIT also discharges responsibilities as Chairman, Services Review Board and Liability Committees, first to screen out dead wood and second to clear outstanding liabilities owned to contractors by the administrative departments. The chairman CMIT is also borne as a member of provincial selection board.

CMIT is basically assigned the responsibility of:‐

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1. Monitoring the pace of implementation of policies and programs of the government

2. Provide consultancy services to the administrative departments for streamlining their over all working, service delivery system and revenue generation capabilities in various sectors.

3. Improve quality in the implementation of works, projects sponsored by various agencies.

4. detect deficiencies and loop holes in the implementation of projects/plans for facilitating timely completion

5. Provide support and guidance to the functionaries of the departments /agencies for optimal utilization of their skill and knowledge

The functions as given in the Rules of Business include:‐

9. To undertake extensive tours of the province in order to assess, on the spot the progress made by various Government Agencies in implementation of the policies of the Provincial Government

10. To evaluate on specific directions received from the chief executive of the province, the functioning of any department, authority or office under the control of the government of Baluchistan, and suggest ways and means for making the same more efficient and responsive to public needs.

11. to study the attitude of senior government officials towards their own work as well as towards the general public, down to the district level

12. To evaluate and investigate the complaints of corruption against senior government officials.

13. To examine in depth on specific directions received from the chief executive of the province, the causes and factors responsible for success or failure, lapses, delays, cost over runts etc; in the implementation of any development scheme, and suggest immediate remedial measures.

14. May inspect any office or project or work, consult any record and examine any official in connection with the work. Any requisition made by the inspection team in this connection will be complied with promptly by the official concerned.

15. Any other matter, which the chief executive/authority of the province may assign specifically and in writing.

16. service matters except those entrusted to the services and general administration department

Chief Minister’s Inspection Team (CMIT), NWFP The Chief Ministers Inspection Team called Governors Inspection Team in NWFP was bifurcated from Governor Inspection Team NWFP through notification number SO (O & M) E&AD/1‐3/2002 dated 13.1.2003 The Provincial Inspection Team is an attached department of

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Establishment Department headed by chairman and assisted by two members, one senior engineer, one assistant engineer, one secretary along with other staff. The Chairman /Members are appointed by the Chief Minister. Functions of the team as assigned by the Government of NWFP are listed below:‐

8. To enquire into cases of corruption, malpractices and other malafide activities pertaining to any sphere of provincial administration including administration of autonomous bodies setup by provincial government and to submit its report to government.

9. To inquire into the cases entrusted to the team by government and to submit its report to government.

10. to inspect in connection with an inquiry any office of the provincial government or of an autonomous body constituted by it, or any work of project sponsored by or on behalf of the provincial government or the autonomous body for the purpose of spot inspection, investigation and interrogation;

11. to consult or examine any record connected with the inquiry 12. to associate any official in connection with its function; 13. to co‐opt an adhoc‐basis any officer or any non‐official for advice on technical matters

when required; and 14. Any requisition made by the inspection tam for consultation or examination of records

or for association of officials shall be complied properly by the department/ office concerned.

To total strength of CMIT NWFP is 37 including 7 officers. The officers constitute 19% and staff 81% respectively. The organization is functioning on horizontal basis. There is no seParate service rule for the employees of CMIT. The employees are governed under E&D rules of the provincial government.

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7. CONCLUSIONS The foregoing analysis allows us to draw the following conclusions:

1. The Federal and Public Service Commissions need to be strengthened and the practice of ad‐hoc appointments and contractual appointments should be minimised and the rules should be properly followed and the contract employee should not be regularized or given extension beyond the two years without the permission of FPSC or its counterparts;

2. The practice of appointing the retired secretaries, generals and judges as chairman and members and these bodies should be reviewed and the professionals who can judge the worth of the candidates for the jobs be inducted

3. Government should honor the autonomy of the FPSC and its provincial counterparts and make these agencies credible because the recruitment and promotion is basic to improved governance

4. The Autonomous organization employees should also be allowed to go to the Federal or Provincial Tribunals as the redressal is less costly and for that these tribunals should be reorganized;

5. The Auditor General Office should introduce performance auditing and it needs to be ensured that the auditors do not fall in line with the departments

6. Since the PACs do not have that much time only the major cases where the department and the Auditors do not agree that should be referred to the PAC

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7. The PAC should be provided with the adequate staff so that it can independently evaluate the reports of Audit

8. A mechanism has to be found to ensure that the decisions of the PAC are implemented

9. The anti‐corruption agencies including NAB have failed to perform the duties as the total amount recovered is peanuts compared to the total leakages from the government exchequer

10. The Plea‐bargaining system should be abandoned as it is a convenient and easy way to recover money but would result in an even higher corruption.

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Annex V (a) Abdul Razzaq Kemal Name : Abdul Razzaq Kemal Date of Birth : April 14, 1946 Nationality : Pakistani Marital Status : Married Home/Office Address : House # 106, Street 66, Sector F‐11/4, Islamabad Phone: 92‐51‐9266108; E‐mail: [email protected]

PASSPORT DETAILS Name DR. ABDUL RAZZAQ KEMAL Father’s Name Mr. Abdul Ghani Date of Birth 14‐04‐1946 Place of Birth Amritsar (India) Passport No. LA078928 Date of Issue 02‐10‐2002 Place of Issue Islamabad Date of Expiry 01‐10‐2007 National Identity Card # 61101‐1955657‐7; Date of Issue: 02/02/2002, Valid upto 31/12/2006 ACADEMIC EXPERIENCE Degree/Certificate/Program Year University Subjects

Ph.D. 1978 Manchester Economics

Master of Arts 1972 Stanford Economics

Annual Program of Studies 1970 Economic Institute, Colorado

Economics

Master of Arts 1968 Punjab Economics

Bachelor of Arts 1966 Punjab Economics, Political Science, English and Arabic

PRESENT POSITION

Consultant on Research to the Governor, State Bank of Pakistan Concurrently the Director General International Islamic Economic University

PROFESSIONAL AFFILIATIONS

Consultant to Federation of Chamber of Commerce and Industries Special Advisor to Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission: 2004‐06. President, Pakistan Society of Development Economists: 2000‐2006

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Secretary, Pakistan Society of Development Economists:1988‐91 Member, Board of Directors Pakistan Steels Mills: 1996‐98 Member, Board of Overseas Pakistani Foundations, 2000‐03 Member, Society for International Development. Member, Pakistan Futuristic Foundation and Institute Member, Advisory Board of Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre Member, Academic Council of Quaid‐i‐Azam University Member of the Council of Islamic University, Islamabad Member, Board of Management of the Mehran University Institute of Science & Technology Development.

Member, Permanent Technical Committee for Centre for Research on Poverty Reduction and Income Distribution (CRPRID), Government of Pakistan, Islamabad.

Member of PPAF General Body Member, Board of Directors of PPAF Member Advisory Committee, global Change Impact Studies Centre

PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

Director, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, December 15, 1999 to April 13, 2006

Chief Economist, Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan, April 5, 1997 to December 14, 1999

Member, Planning Commission, Government of Pakistan, July 2, 1995 to April 4, 1997 and Chief Economist (Additional Charge) November 5, 1995.

Joint Director, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, March 22, 1990 to December 14, 1999.

Joint Economic Adviser, Ministry of Finance (on deputation from PIDE), January 12, 1984 to April 20, 1988.

Chief of Research, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, March 3, 1980 to March 21, 1990.

Senior Research Economist, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, November 19, 1978 to March 2, 1980.

Research Economist, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, September 28, 1972 to November 18, 1978.

Staff Economist, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, April 11, 1969 to September 27, 1972.

Editor, Pakistan Development Review, December 15, 1999 to‐date

Co‐Editor, Pakistan Development Review, 1979 to 1983 and 1988 to 1995.

Referee: ‐ Journal of Applied Economics and Journal of Developing Areas

Secretary, Advisory Council, Ministry of Finance, 1984 to 1987.

Secretary, Pakistan Society of Development Economists, 1989 to 1991.

Secretary, Committee on Economic and Social Well‐being, Eighth Five Year Plan.

Chairman, Sub‐committee on Sources of Growth, Eighth Five Year Plan.

Member, Task Force on Economic Policy Formulation.

Member, Working Group on Labour, Seventh Five Year Plan.

Member, Working Group on Manpower, Eighth Five Year Plan.

Member, Working Group on Statistics, Seventh & Eighth Five Year Plans.

Member, National Accounts Committee, 1974 ‐ 2006.

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Member, Central Investment Promotion Committee, 1986‐88.

Member, Task Force on Poverty Alleviation and Self Reliance.

Member, Task Force on Agriculture.

Chairman, Sub‐Committee on Non‐agricultural and Non‐industrial Income Accounts.

Chairman, Committee on National Accounts.

Chairman, Committee on Poverty Reduction Strategy, P&D Division (1999‐2000)

Chairman, Committee on Industries for the MTDF

Member, committee on Macro economic Planning

Member, Editorial Advisory Board, Pakistan Bankers.

Member, Editorial Advisory Board, Pakistan Economic and Social Review.

Member, Editorial Advisory Board, Kashmir Economic Review.

Member, Editorial Board, Pakistan Manpower Review.

Member, Editorial Board, Journal of the Institute of Bankers in Pakistan

Member, Board of Referees of the Journal of Business Studies and Social Studies, Commecs Institute of Business Education, Karachi.

Member, Editorial Advisory Board of the Lahore Journal of Economics, Lahore School of Economics, Lahore.

Member, Advisory Committee for preparation of Annual Report on Observance and Implementation of the Principles of Policy in Relation to the Affairs of the Federation (2004).

TEACHING EXPERIENCE Courses Taught at Lahore University of Management Sciences, Quaid‐i‐Azam University, International Islamic University, PIDE and Fatima Jinnah Women University at Bachelors, Msc. M. Phil. And Ph.D. levels:

(i) Mathematics for Economists (ii) Quantitative Methods in Economics (iii) Introduction to Econometrics (iv) Econometric Methods (v) Advanced Econometrics (vi) Applied Econometrics (vii) Introduction to Macro‐economics (viii) Advanced Macro Economics (ix) General Equilibrium Economics (x) Applied Economics (xi) Topics in Micro‐economics (xii) International Economics (xiii) International Finance (xiv) Public Economics (xv) Development Economics

Training Experience at various institutions Pakistan Institute of Development Economics

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National Institute of Business and Finance Administrative Staff College NIPAs National Defense College Pakistan Manpower Institute Postal Staff College SAARC Human Resource Development Centre ILO ADB Rural Development Centre Consultants to: United Nations Development Program (UNDP) United Nations Industrial Development Program (UNIDO) International Labour Organization World Bank Asian Development Bank DFID ESCAP Kuwait Research Institute

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PUBLICATIONS

a) Books

1. (With Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi and Rashid Aziz). An Econometric Model of Pakistanʹs Economy. Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad, 1982.

2. (With Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi, Alan Heston, Norma Tan and Associates), Structure of Protection in

Pakistan (Two volumes), Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad, 1983.

3. (Co‐edited with V‐Kanesalingam), Trade Expansion in South Asia: Liberalization and Mechanisms, Macmillan India Limited, New Delhi, 1990.

4. (With Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi) Protectionism and Allocative Efficiency in Manufacturing in Pakistan,

International Centre for Economic Growth, San Francisco, 1991.

5. (with Zafar Mahmood). Labour Absorption in the Informal Sector and Economic Growth in Pakistan, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Islamabad, 1993.

6. (with Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi and Mian M. Nazir) PIDEʹs Research Programme for 1993‐1996,

Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad, 1994.

7. (with Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi). The Burden of Protection: A Case Study of Pakistanʹs Manufacturing (to be published by International Centre for Economic Growth, San Francisco), 1997.

8. (With Faiz Bilquees, Shahnaz Rauf, Rehana Siddiqui, Fazal Hussain and Z.M.Nasir) Macroeconomics of

Pakistan’s Economy, PIDE, Islamabad. October 2000. 9. A Primer on Economics for Trade Unions, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Islamabad, 2002. 10. Iqtesaadiati Kitabcha bara‐e‐Trade Unions (Urdu), Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Islamabad, 2002.

11. (with M. Irfan and Naushin Mahmood), Population of Pakistan: An Analysis of 1998 Population and

Housing Census, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad, 2003. 12. (with Atta‐ur‐Rahman, Rehana Siddiqui, Muslehuddin, Zafar Mueen Nasir, Munir Ahmad, Ejaz

Ghani, Muhammad Iqbal, Syeda Tanveer Naim, Aamir Matin and Shaukat Hameed Khan), Technology‐Based Industrial Vision and Strategy for Pakistan’s Socio‐Economic Development, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics and Higher Education Commission/COMSTECH, Islamabad.

(b) Articles

1 “Contribution of Large Scale Manufacturing Industries Towards Gross National Product at World Prices in Pakistan”, Pakistan Development Review, Spring 1974.

2 (With M. G. Chaudhry) “Wheat Production Under Alternative Production Functions”, Pakistan Development Review, Summer 1974.

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3 (With T. Alauddin) “Capacity Utilization in Manufacturing Industries of Pakistan”, Pakistan Development Review, Autumn 1974.

4 (With S. Guisinger), “The Social Value of Savings in Developing Countries and Optimal Second Best Tariffs” Discussion paper No.1, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad, 1974 (Mimeographed).

5 (With Z. Alvi) “Effects of 1972 Devaluation on Balance of Trade”, Pakistan Development Review, Spring 1975.

6 “The Effect of Tax Holiday on Investment Decisions: Some Comments”, Pakistan Development Review, Summer 1975.

7 “Eliminating Dependence on Foreign Aid: Some Policy Implications”, Pakistan Development Review, Winter 1975.

8 “Consistent Time Series Data Relating to Pakistanʹs Large Scale Manufacturing Industries”, Pakistan Development Review, Spring 1976.

9 “Sectoral Growth Rates and Efficiency of Factor Use in Large Scale Manufacturing Industries of West Pakistan”, Pakistan Development Review, Winter 1976.

10 “On the Concept of Foreign Exchange Multiplier: A Correction”, Pakistan Development Review, Autumn 1976.

11 “Are Consistent Time Series Data Relating to Pakistanʹs Large Scale Manufacturing Industries Inconsistent”? Pakistan Development Review, Spring 1978.

12 An Analysis of Industrial Efficiency in Pakistan: 1959‐60 to 1969‐70 Ph.D. Thesis submitted to the University of Manchester, 1978.

13 “Infant Industry Argument, Protection and Manufacturing Industries of Pakistan”, Pakistan Development Review, Spring 1979.

14 “Planning Models in Pakistan” Paper presented at the Seminar on Models for Alternative Development Strategies, The Hague, Netherlands, 13‐24 October 1980.

15 (With F. Bilquees and Ashfaque Khan). “Estimates of Money Supply for West Pakistan”, Statistical Paper Series No.1 Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 1980.

16 “Income Distribution in Pakistan” Research Report Series No.123, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, April 1981.

17 (With Richard Porter) “Learning by Doing While Remembering Forgetting with Reminders from the Pakistan Manufacturing Data” Discussion Paper 92, Center for Research on Economic Development. The University of Michigan, May 1981.

18 “Substitution Elasticities in Large Scale Manufacturing Industries of Pakistan”, Pakistan Development Review, Spring 1981.

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19 (With Nadeem A. Burney and Shahid Hameed) “Quota Restrictions, Tariffs and the Scarcity Premium on License”; Statistical Paper Series No.2, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, June 1981.

20 (With Paul Popiel) Effective Exchange Rates for Exported or Exportable Products of Pakistan. A Study prepared Jointly for the Pakistan Institute of Development Economics and the World Bank, Islamabad, December 1980.

21 “Import‐Export Structure of Pakistan and Trade Expansion in South Asia”, Paper Presented to Committee on South Asian Studies in Kathmandu, Nepal in 1981 and Lahore in 1982.

22 “Impact of Labour Policy on Economic Development: Major Research Issues”, in (eds) June Whitaker and Monolo Abella, Labour Administration: A Role for Universities and Research Institutions, Report of the Regional Seminar, Bangkok ILO, 1982.

23 Decentralized Planning, Income Distribution, Employment and Rural Development, Study prepared for ILO, Geneva, July, 1982.

24 (With Muhammad Saleem and Tallat Mahmood), “An Input‐Output Table for Pakistanʹs Economy 1975‐76”. Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad, 1982.

25 “Substitution Elasticities in the Large Scale Manufacturing Industries of Pakistan ‐ A Rejoinder”, Pakistan Development Review, Summer 1982.

26 (With M. Irfan) “Employment and Manpower Projections for the Sixth Plan Period”; Paper presented at Pakistan Institute of Development Economics/ARTEP Seminar held in Islamabad 1983.

27 “Estimates of Investment Resource Pool for Pakistan”. PEPAC, Islamabad 1983.

28 “Risk‐bearing and Profit Sharing in An Islamic Framework: Some Allocational Considerations: Comments” in eds Z. Ahmad, M. Iqbal and M.F. Khan, Fiscal Policy and Resource Allocation in Islam: Institute of Policies Studies 1983.

29 “The Manufacturing Industries of Pakistan: An Analysis of Efficiency” in C. Kirkpatrick and F. Nixson, The Industrialization of Less Developed Countries, University of Manchester Press, Manchester, 1984.

30 “Synthesis Study on Import‐Export Structure and Trade Expansion in South Asia”, Presented to Committee on South Asian Studies, Delhi, 1984.

31 “Incentive Structure for Manufacturing Industries of Pakistan” A paper circulated at the First Annual General Meeting of Pakistan Society of the Development Economists held at Islamabad, 1984.

32 “Comments on Changes in Poverty and Income Inequality in Pakistan During the 1970s” Pakistan Development Review, Winter, 1985.

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33 “Administrative Machinery and Data Relating to Labour Markets in Pakistan”, Paper presented to ILO/ARTEP Workshop on Mid‐Term Review of Sixth Plan, Islamabad, 1985.

34 “Comments on Economic Development Through Regional Co‐operation: A Custom Drawback Union of Islamic Countries” Presented at the Seminar on Fiscal Policy and Development Planning in an Islamic State, July 6‐10, 1986, Islamabad.

35 “Comments on Analysis of Inter‐Industry Relations in Pakistan: Some Further Experiments With 1975‐76 Data”. Pakistan Development Review, Winter, 1986

36 “Economic Indicators as a Requirement for Security” in (eds) S.F. Hasnat and A. Pelinka, Security for The Weak Nations: A Multiple Perspective, Lahore: Izhar Sons, 1986.

37 “Pakistanʹs Manpower Planning Experience”, in (ed.) Rashid Amjad, Human Resource Planning, ILO/ARTEP, Delhi, 1987.

38 “Effective Protection Rates: A Guide to Tariff Making” Pakistan Development Review, Winter 1987.

39 “Sources of Income Inequalities: Some Comments” Pakistan Development Review, Winter 1987.

40 Fiscal System of Pakistan, Study Prepared for World Bank, 1987.

41 Trends in Balance of Payments and Trade Policies, Study Prepared for World Bank, 1987.

42 “Pakistanʹs Experience with Manufacturing Consumer Durables”, Pakistan Development Review, Winter 1988.

43 “Rural Development in Pakistan”, South Asia Journal, Volume 1, No. 4, 1988.

44 Indigenisation Policy in Pakistan, Study Prepared for World Bank, 1988.

45 Operational Lending Strategy for Pakistan. Asian Development Bank. Manila 1988 (Mimeographed).

46 Commercial Policy, International Trade and Structure of Protection in Pakistan, Study Prepared for International Food Policy Research Institute, 1988.

47 “An Appraisal of Credit Facilities for Self Employment in Rural Areas and Suggested Improvement” in Report of Seminar on Promotion of Self Employment in Rural Areas, Ministry of Labour and Manpower, Islamabad, 1988.

48 “Human Resource Development Labour Surplus Economies ‐ An Integrated Approach” in (ed.). S. N. Hyder, Human Resource Development and Utilization: Issues and Policies, Pakistan Manpower Institute, 1988.

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49 “Fiscal Imbalances as an Obstacle to Privatization Effort” in Pakistan Development Review, Winter, 1989.

50 “South Asia and European Integration: Some Comments”, Pakistan Development Review, Winter 1989.

51 “Manpower Planning and Monitoring”, HRD Working Paper, UNDP/ILO ARTEP, New Delhi, 1989.

52 “Protection Structure in Pakistan”, National Seminar on Privatization and Investment, UNDP Seminar Document.

53 “Protection, Industrial Development and Employment Generation in Pakistan”, HRD Working Paper, UNDP/ILO ARTEP, New Delhi, 1990.

54 “Balance of Supply and Demand for Manpower”, GOP/UNDP/ILO ARTEP, Islamabad, 1990.

55 (with Faiz Bilquees and Zafar Mahmood). “Sustainable Development in Pakistan with a Focus on Environmental Issues”, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 1990.

56 “Economic Co‐operation Among SAARC Countries”, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 1990.

57 (with Mete Durdag). “Budgetary Deficit and Performance of Pakistanʹs Economy”, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics and the World Bank, 1990.

58 “Partners in Progress: Economic Co‐operation Between Pakistan and United States, 1947‐88” in (ed.) Rais Ahmad Khan, Forty Years of Pakistan‐United States Relations, Royal Book Co. Karachi, 1990.

59 “Manpower Statistics of the Informal Sector: Present Status and Future Requirements in Pakistan”, in Proceedings of Regional Seminar on Labour Information System of Labour Administration, Data Base Project, M/O Manpower and Overseas, Islamabad, 1990.

60 “Industrial Policy and Technological Development”, in Human Resource Development in the Context of Industrialization, UNDP Regional Bureau for Asia and the Pacific Division for Regional Programme, New York, 1990

61 “Industrial Sector Review Study”, A paper prepared for Asian Development Bank, 1990.

62 “The Future Prospects of Pakistanʹs Economy”, Periodic Paper 1, Pakistan Futuristic Foundation and Institute, Islamabad, 1991.

63 “Prospects of Trade Expansion in South Asia: Overview” in V. Kanesalingam and A.R. Kemal Trade Expansion in South Asia: Liberalization & Mechanisms, Macmillan India, 1991.

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64 (With Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi) “The Privatization of Public Enterprises in Pakistan”, Pakistan Development Review, Summer, 1991.

65 “National Perspectives Towards the Year 2000: National Approach Paper ‐ Pakistan” in the Proceedings of Workshop on The Future of Pacific Economies (FAPE) IV. Kuala Lumpur. Asian Pacific Development Center. 1991.

66 “Privatization: The Experience of Pakistan” in (ed.) V. Kanesalingam, Privatization: Trends and Experience in South Asia. New Delhi. Macmillan India Ltd. 1991.

67 “Monitoring of Labour Markets in Pakistan” a paper presented to Regional Workshop on Labour Market Analysis as a Tool for HRD Planning, 29‐31 July 1991, Beijing, China by ILO/ARTEP.

68 “Performance of Pakistanʹs Economy”. UNICEF, 1991.

69 “Options for Financing the Budgetary Deficit, Money Supply, and Growth of Banking Sector”, Pakistan Development Review, Winter, 1991.

70 “Human Resource Development Strategy for the Eight Five Year Plan”. ILO/ARTEP, New Delhi, India. 1991.

71 “Privatization in Pakistan”, paper presented in the IPS Working Group on The State of the Economy, 1990‐91, Institute of Policy Studies, Islamabad. 1991.

72 “Privatization and Free Market Economy: Comparative South Asian Experience”, paper presented at the Conference Organized by Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry. 1991.

73 “Self‐reliance and the Implications for Growth and Resource Mobilization”, Pakistan Development Review, Winter, 1992.

74 “Fiscal and Monetary Policies and Employment in Pakistan” Journal of the Institute of Bankers in Pakistan, December 1992.

75 “Pakistanʹs Financial Markets and New Industrial Policyʹ Pakistan Bankers, January‐June, 1992.

76 “Two Gap Theory and next Budget”, Paper presented at Pre‐Budget Seminar organized by Lahore Chamber of Commerce, 1992.

77 “Identification of Potential Sectors and Areas for Gainful Absorption of Return Migrants”, in (eds) Nazir Hussain, Izzatullah Khan, and Khalid Hayat, Return Migrants and Their Re‐Integration in the Economy, Islamabad, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Pakistan Manpower Institute, 1992.

78 “Taxation of Agricultural Incomes in Pakistan” Paper presented to Commission on Agricultural Taxation, 1992.

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79 “Why Do Small Firms Fail to Graduate to Medium and Large Firms in Pakistan”. Pakistan Development Review, Winter 1993.

80 Intra‐OIC Member Countries Migration, Returning Migrants and Remittances, A Study Prepared for Islamic Development Bank, Jeddah, 1993.

81 Innovative Policy Approaches to Entrepreneurial Skills and Micro‐Enterprises Development: Pakistan Study, A Study Prepared for UNDP, Islamabad, 1993.

82 “Retrenchment Policies and Labour Shedding in Pakistan”, Occasional Paper Interdepartmental Project on Structural Adjustment, ILO, Geneva, 1993.

83 Privatization and Retrenchment of Labour, ILO/ARTEP, New Delhi, 1993.

84 Industrial Sector Review in Pakistan. Asian Development Bank, Manila. 1993.

85 “Modalities of on‐Going Privatization Process and Its Possible Impact on Employment in Productivity” in (ed.) S. N. Hyder, Privatization, Employment and Productivity, Islamabad. Freidrich Ebert Stiftung and Pakistan Manpower Institute, 1993.

86 Child Labour in Pakistan. Freidrich Ebert Stiftung. Islamabad, 1993.

87 “Pakistan’s Economic Battle: Can 1993‐94 Budget Win It?” Pakistan Banker, Vol.3, No.2, 1993.

88 “Interest Free International Capital Transaction”, Paper prepared for Islamic Economic Commission, Pakistan, 1993.

89 (with Zafar Mahmood and Athar Maqsood Ahmad). “Structure of Protection, Efficiency, and Profitability. Islamabad”, Study prepared for the Resource Mobilization and Tax Reforms Commission, Karachi. 1994.

90 “Structural Adjustment, Employment, Income Distribution and Poverty”, Pakistan Development Review, winter 1994.

91 “Informal Sector in Rural Pakistan” UNIDO. Islamabad. 1994.

92 “Pakistan: A Profile of the Tax System” in Issues and Experiences in Tax System Reforms in Selected Countries of the ESCAP Region, ESCAP, United Nations, New York, 1995.

93 “Infrastructure and Private Sector Development in Pakistan” in (ed.) Sadiq Ahmed and Rohil Hafeez, Private Sector Development in Pakistan, World Bank, Islamabad. 1994

94 (with Faiz Bilquees) “Determination of the Basic Minimum Wages Through Calorie Intake Approach”, Study prepared for Pay and Pension Committee, Government of Pakistan. Islamabad. 1994.

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95 “Constraints, Policy Approaches and Programs for the Development of Micro Enterprises in Pakistan”, UNDP. Islamabad. 1994.

96 “Reforms and Performance of Manufacturing Industries in Pakistan” Study prepared for the Asian Development Bank. 1994.

97 “International Trade Distortions and Their Impact on Growth and Balance of Payments”, 20th SEANZA Central Banking Course, State Bank of Pakistan, Karachi, 1994.

98 “Poverty and Growing Unemployment in Pakistan ‐ Where and Why Pakistan Failed”, Paper read at a Workshop Organized by FES and Administrative Staff College, Lahore. 1994.

99 “Availability and Quality of Data on Pakistanʹs Economy”. Journal of Pakistan Bankers, Lahore. 1994.

100 (with Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi). “Implication of Privatization on Employment and Social Protection in Pakistan”, in (ed.) R.Islam Social Dimensions of Economic Reforms in Asia, ILO (SAAT), New Delhi, India, 1994.

101 “Principles of Taxation and Taxation System”, Paper read at the conference organized by National Institute of Public Administration, Lahore, 1994.

102 (With Faiz Bilquees and Zafar Mahmood) “National Income Accounting and Environment: A Case Study of Waterlogging and Salinity in Pakistan”, Pakistan Development Review, Winter 1995.

103 “Pakistanʹs Macro Economic Policies and the Small‐scale Enterprises”. Paper presented in the PIDE/Donors Group Policy Workshop on the Promotion of Small‐scale Enterprises in Pakistan, January 29 ‐ February 1, 1995. Islamabad.

104 (With Faiz Bilquees and Zafar Mahmood) “Case Study on the Economic Valuation of the Salinisation and Waterlogging as a Result of Inappropriate Irrigation in Pakistan”, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics. A study prepared for ESCAP, 1995.

105 “Development of Private Sector of Pakistan”, World Bank. 1995.

106 “Macro‐economic Policies in Relation to Employment Promotion” Paper presented at conference organized by Pakistan Manpower Institute, Islamabad, 1995.

107 “Significance of SAARC and ECO for Pakistan” Paper read at conference organized by Institute of Regional Studies, Islamabad, 1995.

108 “Drug Abuse and the Economy of Pakistan”, Presented at Conference on Drug Abuse held by ILO/winterʹs Education, Lahore, 1996.

109 “Socio Economic Impact of Globalization and Regionalization”, Paper presented at a conference organized by Pakistan Chartered Accountants at Bhurban, 1996.

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110 “Introduction to Poverty in Pakistan”. (with Sameena Kamal) in Poverty Seminar Report, UNDP, 1996.

111 “Defining Poverty”, In Poverty Seminar Report, UNDP, 1996.

112 “Globalization and its Impact on World of Workers: A case of Success and Failure in Selected Countries of Asia”, Paper presented at conference jointly organized by ILO and Pakistan Manpower Institute, 1997.

113 “Poverty Alleviation in Pakistan ‐ An Evaluation of Public Strategies and Policies Adopted for Poverty Alleviation” ‐ in (ed.) Mahbubul Haq Sahibzada, Poverty Alleviation in Pakistan; Present Scenario and Future Strategy, Institute of Policy Studies and FES, December 1997.

114 “Why Regulate a Privatized Firm?” Pakistan Development Review, 25:4 Part II (Winter 1996) pp. 649‐656.

115 “Pakistan’s Industrial Experience and Future Directions”, Pakistan Development Review, Winter 1997.

116 (with Rashid Amjad), “Macroeconomic Policies and their Impact on Poverty Alleviation in Pakistan”, Pakistan Development Review, Spring 1997.

117 (with Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi). “The Structure of Protection and Industrial Efficiency in Pakistan”. Journal of Economic Cooperation, Istanbul, Turkey, 1997.

118 “Employment in the Manufacturing Sector”, ILO/SAAT, Delhi, 1997.

119 “Tariff Rationalization, Growth and Inflation ‐‐ The Case of Pakistan”, EDIPAʹs Course on Reconciling Policies for Economic Growth and Development with Moderating Inflation, organized by PIDE, 1997.

120 “Globalization with Equity: Policies and Growth”, ILO, Bangkok, 1997.

121 “Pakistan’s Foreign Debt: Perception and Reality” Pakistan Bankers, Vol. VII, No.2, 1997 (pp.58‐65).

122 “Patterns and Growth of Pakistanʹs Industrial Sector” in (ed.) S.R. Khan, Fifty Years of Pakistanʹs Economic Development, Oxford University Press, Islamabad, 1997.

123 (with Tariq Banuri). “Economic Trends” in (ed.) T. Banuri, S.R. Khan, Moazam Mahmood, Just Development, Oxford University Press, Islamabad, 1997.

124 (with Tariq Banuri and Khawar Mumtaz). “Human Resource Development” in (ed.) T. Banuri, S.R. Khan, Moazam Mahmood, Just Development, Oxford University Press, Islamabad, 1997.

125 (with Moazam Mahmood).”Poverty and Policy in Pakistan” in (ed.) T. Banuri, S.R. Khan, Moazam Mahmood Just Development, Oxford University Press, Islamabad. 1997

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126 (with Tariq Banuri and Moazam Mahmood). “The Policy Framework and Structural Adjustments” in (ed.) T. Banuri, S.R. Khan, Moazam Mahmood Just Development, Oxford University Press, Islamabad, 1997.

127 “Electronic Commerce and International Trade of Pakistan”, Pakistan Development Review, winter, 1998.

128 (with Syed Nawab Haider Naqvi). “Privatization, Efficiency and Employment in Pakistan” in (ed) Tony Bennet, Privatization ‐ How it Works. 1998.

129 “Manufacturing Skills Training in Pakistan”. Study prepared for ILO, SAAT, New Delhi, 1998.

130 “Characteristics of the Workers in the Urban Informal Sector of Pakistan”, Research Report No. 160, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 1998.

131 “The Urban Informal Sector of Pakistan: Some Stylized Facts”, Research Report No. 161, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 1998.

132 “Financing the Small and Medium Business and Industry in Pakistan”, Journal of the Institute of Bankers, Vol. 66(2), 2000.

133 (with G. M. Arif) “International Migration of Men and Women Workers: Nature, Extent, Direction and Working Conditions”, paper presented at International Confederation of Free Trade Unions, Singapore, 2000.

134 “Economic Relationship between Pakistan and Korea”, Paper presented in the Seminar on Building Partnership Towards the 21st Century for South‐West Asian Countries, Korea International Cooperation Agency (KOICA), Seoul, Korea, March 2000.

135 “Manufacturing Industries of Pakistan: Past, Present and Future”, DAWN, 2000

136 “Role of Banks in the Micro‐Credit”, Journal of the Institute of Bankers, 66:1, 2000.

137 “External Resource Mobilisation in an Islamic Framework”, PIDE, Islamabad, May 2000.

138 “Financing Economic Development”, Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 39, 2000.

139 Financing Investments in the Asia and Pacific Region: Trends, Issues and Methods”, Paper prepared for ESCAP, Bangkok, Thailand, October 2000.

140 (with G. M. Arif) “Poverty Assessment Study: Pakistan” Prepared for Global Link Management, Inc. Tokyo, Japan. October 2000

141 “Debt Trap: The Real Culprit”, Economic Insight, 2:2, Summer/Autumn 2001, pp. 5‐14.

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142 “Privatization in Pakistan: Minimizing Negative Social Effects through Restructuring” in Privatization in South Asia Gopal Joshi (ed.), SAAT, ILO, New Delhi. 2000.

143 “Construction Industries of Muslim Countries and WTO”, paper presented at the Symposium of the Federation of Contractors from Islamic Countries (FOCIC), Beirut, Lebanon, November 2000.

144 “Evolution of the Manufacturing Industries of Pakistan”, Daily Business Recorder, August 2000.

145 “Globalization and Pakistan’s Economy”, PIDE FOCUS, 2001.

146 “Globalization and South Asia”, Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Review, Vol.I, No.1, June 2001.

147 “Structural Adjustment, Employment and Poverty in Pakistan” in Mahmood (ed). Adjustment and Beyond: the Reform Experience in South Asia, Palgrave, 2001.

148 “Tariff Reduction and Income Distribution: A CGE‐based Analysis for Urban and Rural Households in Pakistan, PIDE Research Report No. 181, 2001.

149 “Who Makes Economic Policies: The Players Behind the Scene”, LEAD‐Pakistan Occasional Paper Series No. 13 (Governance Series), 2001.

150 “Debt Accumulation and its Implications for Growth and Poverty”, Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 40, 2001.

151 (With M. Irfan and G. M. Arif). “MIMAP SYNTHESIS Report: Major Conclusions and Policy Implications”, MIMAP Technical Paper Series No.3, PIDE, Islamabad, 2001.

152 (with Musleh‐ud Din, Kalbe Abbas and Usman Qadir) “A Plan to Strengthen Regional Trade Cooperation in South Asia” in T. N. Srinivasan (ed.) Trade Finance and Investment in South Asia, Social Science Press, New Delhi, 2002

153 “Macro‐economic Policy and Poverty in Pakistan”, Pakistan Human Condition Report 2002, Centre for Research on Poverty Reduction and Income Distribution, Islamabad.

154 “Optimal Levels of Reserves in Developing Economies, with special Reference to Pakistan”, Public Policy Papers No.1., Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad, 2002.

155 Productivity Growth during the 1990s in Pakistan”, Asian Productivity Organization, Japan. 2002.

156 (with Muslehuddin and Usman Qadir) Exports and Economic Growth in South Asia in Mohsin Khan (ed.) Economic Development in south Asia. New Delhi: Tata McGraw‐Hill Publishing Company Ltd. 2005.

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157 (with G.M. Arif, M. Iqbal, M. Habibullah, M. Ayub, Riffat Ayesha and M. Ali Kemal)“Investment Plan for Micronutrients in Pakistan”, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad. 2002.

158 “Major Issues and Challenges of the New WTO Work Program for IDB Member Countries”, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad, 2002.

159 (With Ather Maqsood Ahmed, Z.M. Nasir and G. Y. Soomro), “National Nutrition Survey 2001‐02”, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 2002.

160 “Structural Adjustment, Macroeconomic Policies and Poverty Trends in Pakistan” in Christopher M. Edmonds (ed.) Reducing Poverty in Asia: Emerging Issues in Growth, Targeting and Measurement Asian Development Bank, U.K: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2002

161 Regulatory Framework in Pakistan, Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 41, 2002.

162 “Poverty Generation Processes in Pakistan – A Community Level Analysis”, National Human Development Report 2003, UNDP, Islamabad.

163 (with Z. M. Nasir and Ghulam Yasin Soomroo),Correlates of childhood morbidity in Pakistan, AGM of PSDE, 2003

164 “Public Private Partnership in Pakistan” NGORC Journal, Issue 3, Vol.2. July 2003.

165 “Use of Population Data in Economic Planning” in A.R. Kemal, M. Irfan and Naushin Mahmood (eds).) Population of Pakistan: An Analysis of 1998 Population and Housing Census, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad. 2003.

166 “An Evaluation of the Social Impact of TEPI, Report Submitted to the Asian Development Bank. 2003.

167 (With Rehana Siddiqui, V. Robichaud, Rizwana Siddiqui and M. Ali Kemal, “Tariff Reduction, Fiscal Adjustment and Poverty: A CGE Based Analysis” –– Research paper prepared for MIMAP.

168 “Policy Initiatives for Employment and Poverty in Pakistan” – in Report of Seminar on Active Labour Market Policies for Employment Generation and Poverty Alleviation in Pakistan Ministry of Labour, Manpower & Overseas Pakistanis and ILO, 2003.

169 Workers and Employers Bilateral Council (WEBCOP) in Pakistan – Paper submitted to the Sub‐Regional Meeting on Showcasing Best Practices of Social Dialogue, Puri (Orissa), India, September 2003.

170 (with Ejaz Ghani and Munir Ahmad) Agricultural Marketing and International Trade –Background paper for Human Development in South Asia 2002, Mahbub ul Haq Human Development Centre, 2003.

171 “Agricultural Growth and Rural Poverty in Pakistan: A Regional Analysis”, –Background paper prepared for Rural Factor Market Studies, World Bank, 2003.

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172 “Reduction in Tariffs, Income Distribution and Poverty in Pakistan” in PCSTD Trade Winds, 1:1, 2003.

173 “Income Distribution Studies in Pakistan and an Agenda for Future Direction of Research” Pakistan Human Condition Report 2003, Centre for Research on Poverty Reduction and Income Distribution (CRPRID), Government of Pakistan, Islamabad, 2003.

174 (with Rehana Siddiqui, Rizwana Siddiqui and M. Ali Kemal) “An Assessment of the Impact of Trade Liberalisation on Welfare in Pakistan: A General Equilibrium Analysis”, MIMAP Technical Paper Series No. 16, 2003.

175 “Structural Adjustment and Poverty in Pakistan”, MIMAP Technical Paper Series No. 14, 2003.

176 “Poverty in Pakistan: Trends and Causes” in Pro‐Poor Growth Policies, UNDP/PIDE, Islamabad, 2003.

177 “Economic Growth and Changes in Productivity Levels in Pakistan” Asian Productivity Organization, Japan. 2003.

178. Institutional Change, Growth, and Poverty Levels in Pakistan, Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 42, No. 4, 2003.

179 An Employment Based Poverty Reduction Strategy for Pakistan, GOP/ILO Workshop, 2004.

180 Pakistan: Performance and Prospects, South Asia Journal, No.4, April‐June 2004.

181 Trade‐offs in Economic Policy Making, Pakistan Observer, August 28, 2004

182 Quarterisation of Annual GDP of Pakistan, Statistical Paper Series No.5, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, Islamabad, December 2004.

183 SAFTA and Economic Cooperation, South Asia Journal, No.6, October‐December 2004.

184 Exploring Pakistan’s Regional Economic Cooperation Potential, Pakistan Development Review, Vol. 43, No. 4, 2004.

185 (with Rehana Siddiqui} National Policy Study: Child Labour and Development in Pakistan . ILO 2004.

186 (with Muslehuddin and Ejaz Ghani) Industrial Vision and Industrial parameter policy, for Ministry of Industries, 2004

187 Pakistan’s economy: Performance and future prospects. South Asian Journal, 2004

188 The Prospects of Economic cooperation in the perspective of South Asian Free Trade Area, South Asian Journal, 2004

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189 (with Lama, Muslehuddin and Rehana siddqui) Energy/Power Sector reform in Pakistan and India , SANEI, 2004.

190 Exploring Pakistan’s Regional Economic Cooperation Potential, Pakistan Development Review, winter 2004

191 The Challenge of Water Shortage in Pakistan, Margalla Papers 2005, National Defence College, Islamabad.

192 Macroeconomic Management: Breaking out of the Debt Trap, The Lahore Journal of Economics, Special Edition, 2005.

193 Medium Term Development Framework: 2005‐10, Pakistan Pictorial, Pakistan Publications, Islamabad, May‐June 2005.

194 The Auto Industry in Pakistan: Trade policies and performance, Study for the World Bank. 2005

195 Analysis of Productivity Indicators: Pakistan, APO 2005

196 Economic cooperation in the perspective of Islamabad Declaration, South Asian Journal, 2005

197 Budget 2005‐06 and Pakistan’s economy, Blue Chip, 2005

198 An analysis of Trade Policy, Blue chip, 2005

199 Skill Development in Pakistan, Pakistan Development Review Winter, 2005

200 (with Muslehuddin and Ejaz Ghani) Non‐Agricultural Market Access (NAMA) Pakistan country paper for CUTS, 2005

201 Manuals for Gender Mainstreaming, UNDP/Government of Pakistan, 2006

202 Income Inequalities in Pakistan and a Strategy to Reduce Income Inequalities , An input into PRSP‐II, the UNDP/Ministry of Finance, 2006

203 (with Z. M. Nasir and M. Ali Kemal) Macroeconomic Policies and Poverty in Pakistan, UNOPS 2006

204 Key Issues in Industrial Growth of Pakistan, The Lahore Journal of Economics, September, 2006

205 Macro economic Policies in south Asia‐ A Synthesis Report, Presented in the SAPANA conference in Islamabad. 2006

206 Skill Development for International Competitiveness, FDI, Exports and Overseas Migration, paper read at conference organized by ILO/Ministry of Labour, Islamabad, 2006

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207 An analysis of Sialkot Leather Goods Cluster with special reference to Poverty Alleviation, UNOPS, 2006

208 An Analysis of Federal Budget: 2006‐07, Blue Chip, 2006

209 Pitfalls and Economic Prospects of Pakistan. Criterion volume1, No.1, 2006

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(c) Collective Research

1. State of Pakistanʹs Economy, 1970‐71 to 1978‐79, Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, 1980. 2. Pakistan Economic Survey, 1983‐84, 1984‐85, 1985‐86 & 1986‐87. 3. Pakistan Basic Facts 1983‐84, 1984‐85, 1985‐86 & 1986‐87. 4. Pakistan Budgets 1984‐85, 1985‐86 & 1986‐87. 5. Evaluation of the 8th Plan 6. 9th Five Year Plan 7. Annual Plans for 1996‐97, 1997‐98, 1998‐99, and 1999‐2000 8. Survey on Barriers to Trade in Pakistan

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Annex V (b) Ali Raza

Legal Experience

Partner Awan Raza, Registered Law Firm (July 2006 to date) - Senior Partner handling corporate and commercial matters including

international arbitrations and commercial litigations. - Providing legal services to primarily multinationals and international clients

as well as representing Pakistani clients in foreign jurisdictions. - Experience includes managing clients specifically in the following sectors;

* Cement * Textile * Power * Tractor Manufacturing * Paper Manufacturing * Banking * Water Treatment * Telecom * Construction * IT * Oil & Gas

- Legal consultancy to National Reconstruction Bureau on local government laws and issues.

- Legal consultancy to GINI (Governance Institutions Network International) - Experience includes; drafting and negotiating of corporate documentation,

litigation, arbitration, commercial negotiations and advisory on legal and commercial matters.

Partner RK Law Associates (June 1989 to November 2004)

- Litigated corporate, civil and company matters relating to commercial disputes.

- Advised and consulted on litigation strategy and legal effect on projects. - Acted as counsel for the Liquidators of BCCI from 1992 till 2001. - Acted as principal consultant to the industry in drafting and finalization for

purposes of enactment of the Protection of Breast Feeding Act. - Consulted and advised different industries including textile and power on

aspects of different laws before their enactment in terms of their practical implementation and effects.

- Advised foreign clients on application and effects of different laws in Pakistan.

Consultancy Experience Managing Director Ispirato Consulting Inc (July 2006 to date) - Providing an array of consulting services including;

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o corporate consulting o marketing strategy and media management consultancy o information technology development and consultancy o human resource development advisory o business development advisory.

- In addition to providing consultancy and advisory services the firm also acts as overall manager and overseer of projects bringing together the best resources available under one umbrella.

- Research and Reporting on specific terms including; o Report on Criminal Justice Coordination Committees for NRB

undertaken in December, 2006.

Chief Operating Office Qmart Corporation (Pvt) Limited (November 2004 to June 2006)

- Setting up the first retail chain network in Pakistan of supermarkets and associated products.

- Start up of the company and the business including designing of the business model, business systems and development of human resource.

- Development the Information & Management System including a central retail system, central warehouse management system, financial management system, communication system linking with a customized wireless system to bring online all retail outlets. Systems utilized for development of the integrated management process were Oracle Financials, Oracle Collaboration Suite, Navision and Fujitsu Retail Management.

Marketing & Media Consultant 9th SAF Games, Islamabad (January 2004 to October 2004)

- Coordinated marketing plan as well as raising of funds through sponsorships and coordinating

- Overseeing and managing live production of the entire event and sale and management of broadcast rights to international television broadcasting companies.

- Management of advertising and promotion of the event through media and outdoor activities.

- Advised in development and evaluated overall IT system including comprehensive communication system for all international participating teams as well as media.

Consultancy & Reports for

National Reconstruction Bureau (May 2003 to December 2003) - Report on Criminal Justice Coordination Committees

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- Report on Union Council System as an integral part of the Local Governance system.

Education Punjab University, Lahore Pakistan L.L.B Bachelor of Law

Linfield College, Oregon USA Bachelor of Liberal Arts majoring in Political Science and Computer Sciences and minoring in Communication and Mathematics

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Annex V (c) Masood H. Kizilbash

PART‐I : PERSONAL

i) Name : MASOOD H. KIZILBASH ii) Date of Birth : 17‐08‐1940 iii) Marital Status : Married iv) No. of Children : Three v) Telephone # : 92‐51‐2294758 (Res) Cell : 0300‐9501455 vi) Postal Address: : House # 392‐A, Ibn‐e‐Seena Road,

Sector‐ G‐10/2, Islamabad vi) E‐Mail address : [email protected]

PART‐II : ACADEMIC QUALIFICATION i) Master in Economics from University of Karachi ii) Master in Strategic Studies from Quaid‐e‐Azam University, Islamabad

PART‐III : PROFESSIONAL EXPERIENCE

A. CONSULTANCY EXPERIENCE • Consultant to Ministry of Housing and Works November, 2003 to date: Out Puts:

i. A Report titled “Redevelopment/Disposal of Government Owned Overaged Houses/Quarters in Islamabad, Peshawar, Lahore, Quetta and Karachi.

ii. A Report titled “Fact Finding Report on the Issues Relating to Co‐operative Housing Societies”.

iii. A Study titled “Issues Relating to Unauthorized Sale of Plots, Acquisition of Land by Housing Companies/Co‐operative Housing Societies and Low Standards of Town Planning ”.

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iv. A Study titled “Monetization of Housing Facility of Federal Government Employees”.

• UNDP and IDA Consultant to: National Reconstruction Bureau (November 2001 to June 2005*) Outputs: i. A Concept Paper titled “ Planning Structures and Systems in Pakistan”. ii. A Study Paper titled “Inter‐Governmental Fiscal Relations”. iii. A Concept Paper titled “Concept paper on NEC, ECNEC, Planning Commission and Planning and Development Division”. iv. A Manual titled “ Manual on Development Planning and Budgeting”. v. A Proposal titled “ A Proposal for Next National Finance Commission Award”. vi. A Study Paper titled “ Inter‐Governmental Fiscal Framework under Devolution Plan, Issues and Design Options of Provincial Fiscal Award”. vii. A Report titled “ A Report on Pay and Pension Committee”. * Full time and later on assignment basis. B. EXPERIENCE IN SOCIAL SECTORS. • Federal SAP Coordinator (1996 ‐ 2000)

Observing my keen commitment to the development of social sectors, the Government of Pakistan appointed me as Project Director, Federal Social Action Program / Coordinator. In this capacity, I remained associated with conceptualisation, planning and designing of Social Action Programme Project‐II – a US $ 10 billion programme for 5 years beginning 1997‐98. The project addressed four key sectors, namely, Elementary Education, Basic Health, Water Supply and Sanitation in rural areas and urban slums and Population Welfare. The project aimed to reach out to poor and marginalised segments of the society, particularly women and children by expanding access to and improving quality of social services in a cost effective and efficient manner. The Project was singularly based on a participatory approach to development, built within the framework of social and political complexities. It helped to empower communities in identification of schemes, decision sharing and management of services in a tripartite partnership

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combining government, primary stakeholders and private sector including secondary stakeholders. The project designing involved dialogue at grass root level with the primary stakeholders, provincial governments, concerned federal Ministries in social sectors, NGOs, academic institutions and visiting multi‐donors Missions consisting of World Bank, Asian Development Bank, DFID of United Kingdom, the Netherlands, European Commission, CIDA of Canada, UNDP, etc. It also involved undertaking a number of studies for finalising the design of the project. As leader of the technical committee of the Government, I successfully negotiated the Development Credit and Project Agreements in January 1998 with the multi‐donors under the lead of the World Bank.

• Project Director of ADB financed project titled “Strengthening of Federal SAP Secretariat and SAP Cells”.

• Project Director of IDA and other donors financed project titled “Participatory

Development Programme Project”. • Project Director of IDA, ADB, DFID and other donors financed project titled

“Strengthening of SAP Monitoring and Evaluation Systems”. • Led the Pakistan delegation in 1997 at the 35th Session of the Commission for Social

Development at the United Nations, New York and circulated a Report on the implementation status in Pakistan of the Copenhagen Declaration and Action Plan adopted in March 1995. The Commission adjudged the Report as one of the best five Reports submitted at the Session and its format was suggested to other member countries for adoption.

• Served as an honorary Joint Secretary of Greenwood Education Society between 1966

and 1986. The Society runs three Schools in Karachi. C. EXPERIENCE IN DEVELOPMENT BUDGETING AND FINANCE • Adviser to State Bank of Pakistan (1994‐95)

The responsibilities included study of issues relating to Fiscal Policy and formulation of reform agenda and re‐evaluation of public sector projects being undertaken to the extent of their foreign exchange liability. Also conducted special studies on (a) two tiered banking system in Pakistan and need for reform and (b)

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role of leasing companies and Modarbas in Pakistan and their future as an instruments for financing and growth.

• Chief Programming Section (1990‐94)

The duties involved formulation of public sector development programme within the resource availability and in conformity with the priorities of the Plan, monitoring of utilisation of resources allocable to project and, if necessary, carrying out of adjustments through reappropriation and supplementary grants.

• Finance Director, Pakistan Security Printing Corporation (1988‐90)

The duties involved overall financial control of the Organisation including preparation of the budget, balance sheet, profit and loss account, costing of products, management of investment portfolio and internal auditing.

D. EXPERIENCE IN POLICY PLANNING

• Chief Policy Planning (1986‐88)

The responsibilities included analytical studies on economic issues requiring policy decisions by the Government. The issues, interalia, involved restructuring of Industrial Policy, induction of private sector in the development of infrastructures and energy, commercialization of various State Enterprises, Rationalization of Tariff Policy, etc.

E. EXPERIENCE IN COMMERCE • General Manager, Trading Corporation of Pakistan (1968‐86)

The assignments covered market research, forecasting market behaviour on the basis of historical trends of production, consumption and prices, preparation of commodity budgets including determination of the size of future demand, quarterly requirements of inventory and timing of purchases, formulation of marketing plans and working our import and export economics of the goods under commodity exchange and Barter Agreements between the Government of Pakistan and the Governments of other countries.

F. EXPERIENCE IN ECONOMIC RESEARCH • Research Officer, State Bank of Pakistan & Industrial Development Bank of Pakistan

(1962‐68)

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The responsibilities covered (a) formulation of monetary measures for correcting imbalances in the capital market industry, price level of commodities (b) conducting of analytical studies on economic issues referred to the Bank for its advice by the Government to help in decision making and future planning, and (c) preparation of economic feasibility reports on the project proposals submitted to the Bank for approval of loans.

PART‐IV : PUBLICATIONS

a) BOOK TITLE PUBLISHER FOREWORD YEAR OF PUBLICATION Planning and Royal Book Late. Mr. Mumtaz 1968 Economic Control Company, Hasan, Former Secretary in Pakistan Karachi Finance, Government of Pakistan. b) Articles/Reports/Research Papers

Apart from the research papers and the reports included in Part III above , I am a regular, contributor of articles in “Dawn” a daily national newspaper on contemporary economic issues. These include: i) Polemic of Macro –Economic Stability. ii) Social Development or Economic Growth. iii) The Washington Consensus and After. iv) Will 50:50 Formula Deliver Autonomy? v) Why Mortgage the Future?

PART‐V : HONOURS AND ACTIVITIES Organisation/Committee/Group Position Year a) The Committees appointed by the GovernmentSecretary 1986‐88 of Pakistan under Mr. A.G.N. Kazi, Ex‐Deputy Chairman, Planning Commission as hereunder:‐

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vi) Transport Policy for Karachi vii) Commercialization of Ordinance Factories, Wah viii) Task Force for Cotton Export Corporation of Pakistan ix) Disinvestment of Shares of PIA x) Private Sector induction into Power Generation xi) Outstanding dues of KESC and Future status of KESC xii) Setting up of Locomotive Factory Risalpur xiii) Tariff Committee xiv) A number of other Committees

b) Sindh Small Scale Industries Corporation Director 1982‐85 c) Study group appointed by the Government Secretary 1982 of Pakistan to carry out a study on “TRANSITION FROM AN IMPORT TO EXPORT REGIME OF WHEAT” d) Greenwood Education Society Joint Secretary 1966‐86 e) World Photographic Exhibition Director 1962

PART‐VI : INTERNATIONAL EXPERIENCE YEAR COUNTRY PURPOSE 2006 CANADA Participant: World Urban Forum ‐3 Conference on “our Future

Sustainable Cities‐Turning Ideas into Actions”, organized by the U.N. Habitat and Government of Canada between 19th and 23rd June, 2006.

1998 USA Participant: International Conference on “Up‐scaling and

Mainstreaming participation of Primary Stakeholders: Lessons Learned and Ways Forward” held at World Bank, Washington on 19th & 20th November, 1998.

1998 Thailand Participant: Workshop on Priorities on Basic Social Services 31st July and 1st August, 1998, organized by UNDP/UNICEF at Bangkok. 1998 UK Participant: Workshop on Monitoring Indicators for the Social

Action Programme Project‐II, organized by DFID in March, 1998

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at London. 1997 USA Leader: Pakistan delegation at 35th Session of the Commission for Social Development at the United Nations Organization, New York. 1992 Thailand, Member: Study tour for submission of research papers on the socio‐ economic aspects of the countries visited.

Hong Kong, South Korea, Indonesia & Australia 1985 Iraq & Kuwait Member: Trade delegation 1984 UK Leader: Commercial delegation 1983 Kuwait, Dubai Leader: Trade delegation Bahrain 1982 Iran Member: The delegation for Finance and Commerce, headed by the Minister for Finance, Commerce and Coordination. 1980 Iran & UAE Member: Trade delegation. 1980 Sri Lanka Member: Trade delegation. 1980 Singapore Member: Commerce delegation. 1979 Sri Lanka Member: Trade team . 1976 Sri Lanka Member: Trade team. 1975 German Leader: Delegation for organising Pakistan’s participation in the Democratic International Trade Fair at Leip‐zig. Republic 1972 Abu Dhabi, Member: Team of the Government of Pakistan for undertaking Dubai, Jeddahmarket survey of the new emerging markets following the oil boom. 1971 Yugoslavia Leader: Delegation for organising Pakistan’s participation in the International Trade Fair at Zagreb.

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1969 Iran Leader: Delegation of the Government of Pakistan for negotiating and signing of the Commodity Exchange Agreement (Barter) between Pakistan and Iran for the exchange of goods.

PART‐VII : REFERENCES

1. Mr. Saeed A. Qureshi. 2. Mr. Mueen Afzal Forner Dy Chairman Chairman, Planning Commission, Pay and Pension Committee, # 36, Street No. 4, F/6/3, Ministry of Finance, Islamabad. Government of Pakistan, Islamabad. 3. Dr. Hafiz A. Pasha, 4. Mr. John Wall

Assistant Secretary General Country Director for Asia Pacific Region Pakistan &Afghanistan, United Nations Development Program World Bank Resident Mission, New York, 10017, USA G/5, Islamabad.

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Annex V (d) Dr. Iffat Idris PERSONAL DETAILS

Full Name: Iffat Idris (nee Malik) Address: House no. 1‐A, Street no. 45, Sector F‐8/1, Islamabad, Pakistan. Tel: 0092‐51‐2856492; Mobile: 0300‐5308652. E‐mail: [email protected] Date of Birth: 18 September 1969 Marital Status: Married Nationality: British and Pakistani EDUCATION

1995‐99 PhD Politics

University of Hull, England

Thesis on ethnic conflict in Kashmir [Published as a book by Oxford University Press: Kashmir: Ethnic Conflict, International Dispute]

1993‐94 MA Politics (with special reference to Non‐Western Societies) University of Hull, England

Major Courses: Politics of South Asia and European Integration 1991‐92 BA English Literature and Sociology: 1st

University of Punjab, Pakistan

1988‐90 Part 1a of Medical Sciences Tripos

Newnham College, University of Cambridge, England

1981‐88 A‐levels: Biology (grade A), Chemistry (A), Maths (A),

Religious Studies (A), Physics (B). O‐levels: 12 grade A, I grade B

Kendrick Grammar School, Reading, England

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WORK EXPERIENCE

March ’06‐ Freelance Development Consultant

Assignments undertaken for various organizations: research studies on governance and development issues, policy briefs, preparation of communications material, reports, technical editing, and so on. Key assignments undertaken are as follows:

May 2007 on‐going, GINI (Daniyal Aziz)– Member of team carrying out research study on public accountability institutions in Pakistan; responsible for component analyzing annual reports of Ombudsman institutions, Public Service Commissions, Accounts Committees and other public accountability bodies.

April 2007, CIDA – Technical support to Economic Affairs Division for 2007 Pakistan Development Forum, including preparation of Background Briefs for individual sessions, supporting materials and final Conference Report.

March 2007, Abacus/OPM – Local communications consultant on project to implement

Medium‐Term Budget Framework across the federal government: preparation of draft communication strategy and communication products.

Feb 2007, UNICEF ‐ Preparation of UNICEF Pakistan Mid‐Term Review Report, detailing

progress to date in 2004‐8 Country Plan, challenges and opportunities, and making recommendations for changes for the remaining period of the CP.

Jan 2007, DTCE ‐ Technical editing and design of Devolution Trust for Community Empowerment (DTCE) Annual Progress Report 2006

Dec 2006‐Jan 2007, IDS – Preparation of report on ‘Missing Facilities in Rural Districts’, based on

field research undertaken in three districts by Innovative Development Strategies (IDS), for submission to ADB

July 2006‐Jan 2007, NCHD – on retainer as Communications Specialist for the National

Commission for Human Development (NCHD). Preparation of two newsletters; speeches for NCHD Chairman, President Musharraf, PM Aziz and other VIPs; NCHD promotional brochures.

Sep 2006, UNDP ‐ Preparation (writing and design/lay‐out) of report ‘UNDP & The 2005 Pakistan Earthquake: One Year On’, printed October 2006.

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April‐May 2006, CIDA ‐ Research/technical support to Economic Affairs Division for the 2006 Pakistan Development Forum; preparation of Background Briefs, text for PDF website, supporting materials and final PDF Report.

March 2006‐ ongoing, LEAD Pakistan ‐ Research and communications activities for LEAD

Pakistan: preparation of three Occasional Papers – ‘Issues in Resource Distribution in Pakistan’, ‘Informal Justice Sector in Pakistan: A Preliminary Assessment’ and ‘Education Sector Reform in Pakistan’; technical editing of case studies, LEAD Updates and Occasional Papers; preparation of LEAD Annual Report 2005.

March‐June 2006, International Islamic University (IIU) ‐ Co‐taught a course on ‘State and

Society in South Asia’ to MA students at IIU, Islamabad. Feb ‘05‐Feb’06 Research and Communications Coordinator, Governance Unit (GU), Pakistan

Resident Mission, Asian Development Bank

The GU of ADB is providing support to diverse reform initiatives in Pakistan, notably devolution, access to justice and gender reforms.

My duties included:

Conducting and supervising research on governance (esp. devolution, justice sector, gender) issues in Pakistan;

Preparing briefing papers, reports and communications booklets on governance issues in Pakistan and the work of ADB;

Coordinating Governance Unit gender activities; Supporting implementation of various Technical Assistance programs, esp research/policy

dialogue components; Interacting with donors, NGOs, government and other stakeholders; Supervising junior staff.

Feb ‘03‐Jan ‘05 Research and Communications Coordinator, Decentralization Support Program,

Asian Development Bank

DSP is a $300 million program to support the local government reforms in Pakistan through capacity building, research, systems development and funding.

My duties included:

Assisting in program implementation (outreach to stakeholders, proposal preparation, TORs preparation, M&E);

Research on local government issues and performance (research papers, policy dialogues);

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Planning and implementing a communication strategy for decentralization reforms and DSP (preparation of briefs and brochures on local government issues, DSP brochures and newsletters);

Supervising junior staff.

April ‘02‐Jan ’03 Public Relations Officer/Acting Manager, UNDP PARAGON, Pakistan

PARAGON was a UNDP regional program to promote good governance in Asia. My duties included:

Managing PARAGON projects; Publicizing PARAGON’s work e.g. through newsletters and the PARAGON website; Research on governance issues; Resource mobilization, administration and supervision of junior staff; Liaising with partner organizations and consultants.

July ‘01‐April ’02 Political Research Officer, Australian High Commission, Islamabad My duties included:

Briefing and preparing reports for High Commission staff on domestic politics, the economy, foreign policy of Pakistan;

Preparing a daily summary of key developments in Pakistan from English and Urdu newspapers;

Maintaining a ‘reference library’ on politicians, institutions, etc in Pakistan; Interacting with politicians, journalists, academics and others to promote understanding of

issues related to Pakistan. Oct ‘99‐July ’01 Senior Research Fellow, Institute of Strategic Studies, Islamabad. My duties included:

Writing research papers, briefing papers and reports: areas of specialization – Kashmir, Middle East

Editing the Instituteʹs journal; Organizing conferences and seminars; Supervising junior research staff.

Aug‐Dec ‘99 Assistant Professor, Fatima Jinnah Womenʹs University, Rawalpindi, Pakistan.

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Taught courses on Political Islam and South Asian politics.

OTHER DETAILS Guest Lecturer – regularly deliver lectures at the National Defence College (Islamabad), Inter‐

Services Academy and other institutions. Radio/TV – regularly appear as guest on TV current affairs programs; interviewer [December

2001‐ April 2002] for the News and Current Affairs Channel of Radio Pakistan; also anchored live programs.

Skills ‐ Computer literate, very good organizational and inter‐personal skills, clean driving licence. Languages ‐ fluent spoken & written Urdu; functional Punjabi; functional French. Hobbies ‐ horse‐riding, interior design. PUBLICATIONS/PRESENTATIONS Books/Booklets ‘Settling the Kashmir Conflict: The Internal Dimension’ in Sidhu, Asif and Samii eds. Kashmir: New Voices, New Approaches. Boulder Colorado, Lynne Rienner, 2006

Kashmir: Ethnic Conflict, International Dispute. Karachi, Oxford University Press, 2002 ‘Why Decentralization? Objectives of Local Government Reform in Pakistan’ and ‘Fiscal Decentralization in Pakistan’. Decentralization Support Program, to be published shortly.

Papers ‘Education Sector Reform in Pakistan.’ LEAD Occasional Papers Series, Islamabad (to be published

shortly). ‘Informal Justice Sector in Pakistan: A Preliminary Assessment.’ LEAD Occasional Papers Series,

Islamabad (to be published shortly). ‘The Iraq Crisis.’ National Development and Security, Rawalpindi, Vol.XI, No.3 (Spring 2003) ‘Promoting Civilisational Harmony.’ National Development and Security, Rawalpindi, Vol.X; No.4

(Summer 2002) ‘Analysis of the Oslo Accords.’ Strategic Studies, Islamabad, Vol.XXI; No.2 (Summer 2001) ‘Jihad in the Modern Era: Image and Reality.’ Islamabad Papers, Institute of Strategic Studies, 2001 ‘Role of Islam in Post‐Revolution Iranian Foreign Policy.’ Strategic Studies, Islamabad, Vol.XX:No.4

(Autumn 2000) ‘Small Arms Proliferation in Pakistan.’ Published in South Asia at Gun Point, Regional Centre for

Strategic Studies, Colombo, Autumn 2000 Unpublished Conference Presentations

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‘Finding Balance between Governance Theory and Practice: The Pakistan Experience’. Presented at International Islamic University Conference, Islamabad, 10 February 2006.

‘Role of the Christian Right in American Politics.’ Presented at 9th American Studies Conference, Quaid‐e‐Azam University, April 2005.

‘Pakistan’s Regional Security Situation.’ Presented at Ford Foundation Conference on Regional Security, Peshawar, July 2001

‘Non‐Traditional Sources of Threat to the Muslim World.’ Presented at Conference on Security in the Muslim World, Cairo University, January 2001

‘Iran‐Pakistan Relations in the Regional Context’. Presented at ISS‐IPIS Round Table, Islamabad, August 2000

‘Islam and the West: Explored in the context of US‐Iran Relations’. Presented at 11th IPIS Seminar, Tehran, January 2000

Newspaper Articles Weekly opinion piece on international/domestic politics for Dawn (Karachi) from December 2001‐

December 2004; now occasional contributor Correspondent for Al‐Ahram Weekly (Cairo) covering developments in Pakistan, Kashmir and

Afghanistan from November 2001‐December 2004 Regular contributor to News on Sunday (Lahore) since December 2002 (on‐going); fortnightly series

on justice sector reforms [February‐June 2006] Weekly opinion piece for News (Rawalpindi) from March 2000‐December 2001 References will be provided on request.

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Annex V (e) Chaudhry Muhammad Anwar

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Documents

Second Technical Progress Report - giniweb.netginiweb.net/public_accountability/Second Technical Progress Report.… · The first technical progress report was submitted in Nov, 2006