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SEC304 Building Security from Scratch - AWS re: Invent 2012

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Page 1: SEC304 Building Security from Scratch - AWS re: Invent 2012
Page 2: SEC304 Building Security from Scratch - AWS re: Invent 2012
Page 3: SEC304 Building Security from Scratch - AWS re: Invent 2012

[email protected]

.secure

and we are building it on AWS

Page 4: SEC304 Building Security from Scratch - AWS re: Invent 2012

Who shapes it?

Page 5: SEC304 Building Security from Scratch - AWS re: Invent 2012

Who is that?

Cloud Providers Security Vendors Old Guard

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Where is it?

Page 7: SEC304 Building Security from Scratch - AWS re: Invent 2012

What is it?

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What is it?

Very slow moving

Created by non-technologists

Defined in the age of

traditional infrastructures

REALITY!

Page 9: SEC304 Building Security from Scratch - AWS re: Invent 2012

Where does it go wrong?

Web VLAN

Load Balancers

Web Servers

App Server VLANApp Servers

DB VLAN

Corporate Network

Support VLAN

Backup SNMP

Logging Bastion

Internet

LBs

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Bugs we’ve seen

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Bugs we haven’t seen

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Controls that match real risks

• Limited accounts via IAM

• Keep powerful creds off of instances

• Use key managers to distribute creds, not on AMIs

• Use limited accounts from Day 1

• MFA on top-level accounts

• Limit direct access, use management platforms when possible

• Use multiple top-level accounts with shared billing

• No developers on production

• Require all access via bastion host

• Log every keystroke, all syslog to separate top-level account

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Controls that match real risks

• Continuous external and semi-external scanning

• Auto-discover all instances via API

• Use highly limited AMIs, install or chroot major services

• Build control plane and asymmetric trust into AMI

• Avoid SSH keys in AMI

• SSH key per admin, revocable

• Deploy corporate controls: • Proxy or DPI firewall

• NFR

• Use VPCs to strongly isolate critical services

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Controls that match real risks

• Security is a targeted feature

• Create security engineering group early

• Build small set of trusted, core components • Input validation

• Escaping on compositing

• Session management

• Crypto

• Build a separate, protected authentication cluster

• Use self-proving requests internally, do not trust caller blindly

• Provision internal certs to all instances, use when possible

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“What do we have on the spacecraft that’s good?”

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Sic Parvis Magna

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C=E(P,Ks)

C + {Ks}User1 + {Ks}GroupA+ {Ks}Service1 + {Ks}Master

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1. Do not trust the conventional wisdom

2. Consider realistic threats for your org, adversaries

1. Build controls based upon AWS’s strengths

2. Build a paranoid application on any platform

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We are sincerely eager to

hear your FEEDBACK on this

presentation and on re:Invent.

Please fill out an evaluation

form when you have a

chance.

[email protected]