SEBOK Reading the Legal Process

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Reading "The Legal Process"The Legal Process: Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law by Henry M. Hart,;Albert M. Sacks; William N. Eskridge,; Philip P. FrickeyReview by: Anthony J. SebokMichigan Law Review, Vol. 94, No. 6, 1996 Survey of Books Relating to the Law (May, 1996),pp. 1571-1595Published by: The Michigan Law Review AssociationStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1289962.

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READING THE LEGAL PROCESSAnthonyJ. Sebok*

THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING ANDAPPLICATION FLAW.By Henry M. Hart, Jr. and Albert M. Sacks.Edited by WilliamN. Eskridge,Jr. and Philip P. Frickey. NewYork: FoundationPress. 1994. Pp. cxxxix,1387. $49.95.I. DEFINING THE LEGAL PROCESS

I sawmy firstcopy of TheLegalProcessduring aw school whena professorlent me his dogearedphotocopy of Henry Hart1andAlbert Sacks's2manuscript.Even though I knew that the manu-script had been copied freely for many years, and that hundreds,maybethousands,of versions sat in offices and librariesaround theworld, I still experienceda slight thrill as I held a copy of the fa-mous book that never became a book - as if I had in my handsasamizdator an artifact. Now thatFoundationPresshas officiallypublishedThe Legal Process thirty-sixyears after Hart and Sackslast edited it, it is worth asking whether the act of publicationchangesthe meaningof TheLegal Processin any way.There is great irony in thinking of The Legal Process as asamizdat. TheLegalProcess was neversuppressed,and as WilliamN. Eskridge,Jr. and PhilipP. Frickey suggest in their elegant andthoughtfulintroduction, he reasons for the failure to publisharemost likelyprosaic.3Furthermore,whilesamizdatsmaybecomein-fluentialthroughsubversion,TheLegal Process exercised its influ-* AssociateProfessor,BrooklynLawSchool. B.A. 1984,Cornell;M.Phil.1986,Oxford;J.D. 1991,Yale;Ph.D. 1993,Princeton. Ed. I am grateful o the Seton Hall UniversitySchoolof Lawlegal theory workshop or the opportunityo presentsome of the ideascon-tained n thisessay. I would ike to thankJillFisch,JohnGoldberg,BillReynolds,Ed Rubin,andSpencerWeberWaller ortheircommentsandsuggestions.ThomasUhl, BrooklynLawSchool Class of 1996,provided nvaluableassistance n researchandediting.1. Late Dane Professorof Law,HarvardUniversity.2. Late Dean and Dane Professorof Law,HarvardUniversity.3. Eskridgeand Frickeysuggestthat Hart and Sacks never delivereda manuscript oFoundationPress,despitea contract orpublication igned n 1956,becauseof delayscausedbyill health,Hart'sperfectionism, ndthen,afterHart'sdeath n 1969,Sacks'sdecanaldutiesat Harvard.An additional easonsuggestedby EskridgeandFrickey,and one thatI believecarriesgreat significance,s thatby 1958the WarrenCourthadbegunto push public awin adirection hatsimplydid not fiteasily ntothe argument f TheLegalProcess.Pp.xcvii-xcix.See also infranote 67.

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Michigan Law Reviewence as a pillar, f not thepillar,of the established egal communitythroughout he late 1950s and 1960s.4The extraordinarynfluenceof The Legal Process in both practiceand the academy probablyresulted from the fact that Hart and Sacks addressedthemselvesdirectlyto students,and not to a moreself-selectingaudience n thelaw reviews. TheLegalProcessformedthe foundation of a coursetaught at Harvardfor thirty years, as well as at many other lawschools that Hart and Sacks'sfriends, admirers, ormercolleagues,and studentspopulated(pp. ci-civ). It is importantto realize thatHart and Sackscould reach studentswho would not only becomethe legal scholars of the future, but also partnersin law firms,elected and unelectedmembersof government,andjudges.5 Onemighteven thinkthat,unlikethe authorsof samizdats,who cannotpublish because of censorshipand other threats,Hart and Sacksnever publishedTheLegal Processbecause,given its success,theydid not reallyneed to.There is a bit more truthin comparingTheLegalProcessto anartifact. Like a reconstructedobject from an archaeologicaldig,one mightwonderwhatthe 1958editionof TheLegalProcesslacks,andwhat additionswould be necessary o completeit. Despite Es-kridge and Frickey'scarefulexplanationof the evolution of TheLegal Process - tracing its descent from Lloyd Garrison and Wil-lardHurst'smaterials or theircourse LawandSociety n the late1930s, to Hart, Abe Feller, and WalterGellhorn'smaterialsfor acourseon legislation n the early1940s,to Hart'spostwarmaterialsfor his legislationcourse,to the fourversionsof the book producedby Hart and Sacks between 1955 and 1958- there is no way toknow how the book would have ultimately ooked had it been al-lowed to continueto evolve. On the one hand,then,to askwhetherthe book was ever finishedis a trivialquestion;the authorsthem-selves in word and deed declaredit to be unfinished.6They never

4. TheLegalProcess providedhe name,the agenda,and muchof the analytical truc-turefor a generationof legalthought the 'legalprocess chool.' P. lii. SeeGUIDoCALA-BRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 249 n.20 (1982); NEIL DUXBURY,PATTERNS OF AMERICAN JURISPRUDENCE,ch. 4 (1995); MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANS-FORMATIONOFAMERICAN AW,1870-1960, 253-58 (1992); ROBERT TEVENS, AWSCHOOL:LEGALEDUCATIONNAMERICA ROMTHE1850s TOTHE1980s, 270-71 (1983); G. EDWARDWHITE, PATTERNS FAMERICANEGALTHOUGHT,44-63 (1978); Clark Byse, Fifty YearsofLegal Education, 71 IOWAL. REV. 1063, 1076-77 (1986); Jan Vetter, Postwar Legal Scholar-ship on Judicial Decision Making, 33 J. LEGALEDUC.412, 415-17 (1983); William N. Es-kridge, Jr., Metaprocedure,8 YALEL.J. 945, 962 (1989) (book review);J.D. Hyman,Constitutional Jurisprudenceand the Teachingof Constitutional Law, 28 STAN.L. REV. 1271,1286n.70 (1976) (book review).5. For example,as Eskridgeand Frickeynote, five membersof the currentSupremeCourt JusticesScalia,Kennedy,Souter,Ginsburg, ndBreyer hadused TheLegalPro-cess at Harvard Law School. See p. cxxv.

6. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, The Making of The Legal Process, 107HARV.L. REV.2031, 2031 (1994).

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The Legal Processsent the book to its publisher,andtheycalledit - and,presumably,thoughtit important hat othersdo so too - a tentativeedition.In setting out to themselves their own map of the book, they re-peatedlyincluded n the table of contentschapters hat had not yetbeen written.7On the other hand,as with othertexts, other factorsmay over-whelm the intentions of the originalauthors,even on matters ascriticalas contentandclosure. Thus,on a verynontrivial evel TheLegal Processis a completedtext. Thisis not because FoundationPressput it between hardcovers,but because over the past thirty-six years the 1958 tentativeedition has acquireda canonical statusin the relevant interpretivecommunities. By the 1970s lawyerswere treating The Legal Process as not only an influentialset ofteachingmaterials,but as the foundational ext of the legal theoryknown as legalprocess. Regardlessof whether Hart and Sacksintended it to serve as an expositionand defense of a legal theory,that is preciselyhow The Legal Process is now viewed, and, in avery real sense, that is preciselywhat The Legal Process now is.The Legal Process, in its artifactualform, now states Hart andSacks'slegal theory,fromwhich scholarshave drawnthree themesin legal process.The first theme emphasizesthat legal process theory grappleswith institutionalcompetence.8Thisperspectivestressesthat Hartand Sacks believed that it was possible to distinguish egitimateand illegitimate exercises of official power while simultaneouslytranscending the centuries-old debate between ... the 'is' and the'ought'. 9 The Legal Process demonstratedthat lawyers did nothave to engage in substantivemoral or political reasoning,since

7. See p. lxxxix (Table 2).8. See, e.g., MORTON HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATIONOFAMERICAN LAW 1870-1960,254 (1992); LAURA KALMAN, LEGAL REALISM AT YALE: 1927-1960, 222 (1986); GARYMINDA, POSTMODERN LEGAL MOVEMENTS: LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE AT CENTURY'S END33-36 (1995); Barbara J. Flagg, Enduring Principle: On Race, Process, and ConstitutionalLaw, 82 CAL. L. REV. 935, 943-44 (1994); James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Constraints inTort 67 CORNELL . REV. 901 (1982); James A. Henderson, Jr., Process Norms in ProductsLitigation: Liability for Allergic Reactions, 51 U. PITr.L. REV.761,767-69 (1990); Harold A.McDougall, Social Movements, Law, and Implementation: A Clinical Dimension for the NewLegal Process, 75 CORNELL . REV.83, 90-91 (1989); Gary Peller, Criminal Law, Race, andthe Ideology of Bias: Transcendingthe Critical Tools of the Sixties, 67 TUL.L. REV.2231, 2240(1993); Gary Peller, Neutral Principles in the 1950's, 21 U. MICH.J.L. REF. 561 (1988) [here-inafter Peller, Neutral Principles]; Mark Tushnet & Timothy Lynch, The Project of theHarvard Forewords: A Social and Intellectual Inquiry, 11 CONST.COMMENT.63, 479-80(1994-95); Robert Weisberg, The Calabresian Judicial Artist: Statutesand the New Legal Pro-cess, 35 STAN.L. REV.213, 217 (1983); Vincent A. Wellman, Dworkin and the Legal ProcessTradition: The Legacy of Hart & Sacks, 29 ARIZ.L. REV.413,429-38 (1987); Akhil R. Amar,Law Story, 102 HARV.L. REV. 688, 691-92 (1989) (book review); Joseph W. Singer, LegalRealism Now, 76 CAL. L. REV. 465, 505-07 (1988) (book review).9. Peller, Neutral Principles, supra note 8, at 569; see also Gary Peller, The Metaphysics ofAmerican Law, 73 CAL. L. REV. 1151, 1183-85 (1985) [hereinafter Peller, Metaphysics].

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Michigan Law Reviewthere could be a kind of natural, functional correlation betweendifferent kinds of disputes and different kinds of institutions, so thatthe categories of dispute could be matched up with the kinds ofinstitutional procedures corresponding to them. 10 Thus, by adopt-ing the value pluralism of pragmatists like John Dewey, legal pro-cess was able to argue - contra the realists - that the analysis oflegal validity is not reducible to political ideology.1lThe second theme emphasizes the connection between legalprocess and the problem of statutory interpretation.'2 This per-spective stresses Hart and Sacks's interest in proving that statutesexemplified reasonable persons pursuing reasonable purposes rea-sonably. 13 In a manner similar to the substance/procedure distinc-tion implicit in the idea of institutional competence, Hart andSacks's theory of statutory interpretation rests on the convictionthat competing political interest groups could, if governed by theright sort of procedure, produce rational public policy.14 This viewof statutes depended critically on the presumption that proceduresexisted that could identify the purposes selected by the legislaturewithout actually substantively evaluating those purposes.1510. Peller, Neutral Principles, supra note 8, at 594; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr. &Gary Peller, The New Public Law Movement: Moderation As A Postmodern Cultural Form,89 MICH.L. REV.707,719-20 (1991); Mark Kelman, Emerging CentristLiberalism, 43 FLA.L.REV. 417, 420-21 (1991).11. See Peller, Neutral Principles at 583-84 (citing JOHNDEWEY,FREEDOMAND CUL-TURE(1939)); see also EDWARDA. PURCELL,R., THE CRISISOF DEMOCRATICHEORY:SCIENTIFICATURALISM THEPROBLEM FVALUE206 (1973); Minda, supra note 8, at 34-35.12. See WILLIAMN. ESKRIDGE, R., DYNAMICSTATUTORYNTERPRETATION43-44(1994); William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Legislation Scholarship and Pedagogy inthe Post-Legal Process Era, 48 U. PIT-. L. REV.691, 694-700 (1987) [hereinafter Eskridge &

Frickey, Legislation Scholarship]; Eskridge & Peller, supra note 10, at 718-19; William N.Eskridge, Jr., Politics Without Romance: Implications of Public Choice Theory for StatutoryInterpretation,74 VA. L. REV.275, 281-83 (1988) [hereinafter Eskridge, Politics Without Ro-mance]; William N. Eskridge, Jr., Public Values in StatutoryInterpretation,137 U. PA. L. REV.1007, 1012-13 (1989) [hereinafter Eskridge, Public Values]; Michael A. Fitts, The Vices ofVirtue: A Political PartyPerspectiveon Civic VirtueReforms of the Legislative Process, 136 U.PA. L. REV. 1567, 1571 (1988); Philip P. Frickey, From the Big Sleep to the Big Heat: TheRevival of Theory in Statutory Interpretation,77 MINN. L. REV. 241, 249-50 (1992); Jane S.Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structureof Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation,108 HARV.L. REV.593, 600-01 (1995); Cass R. Sunstein, InterpretingStatutes in the Regula-tory State, 103 HARV.L. REV.405,434-36 (1989); Wellman, supra note 8, at 450-51; Daniel B.Rodriguez, The Substance of the New Legal Process, 77 CAL. L. REV. 919, 941-42 (1989)(book review).13. P. 1378; see Rodriguez, supra note 12, at 942.14. Eskridge and Frickey call this optimistic pluralism. See Eskridge & Frickey, Legis-lation Scholarship, supra note 12, at 695-96; Eskridge, Public Values, supra note 12, at 1014.15. See Eskridge & Peller, supra note 10, at 721-22. To the extent that Hart and Sacksactually believed that such procedures existed, critics from the left exposed their view asnaive with the emergence of Critical Legal Studies, and the right with the emergence ofpublic choice scholarship. See, e.g., Neil Duxbury, Faith in Reason: The Process Tradition inAmerican Jurisprudence, 15 CARDOZOL. REV. 601, 666-67 (1993) [hereinafter Duxbury,Faith in Reason]; Eskridge, Politics WithoutRomance, supra note 12, at 296-97; Peller, Meta-

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The Legal ProcessThe third theme emphasizesthe primacyof reasonin legal pro-cess.16This perspectivestresses that legal processwas premised,in every instance,on the belief that those who respectand exercisethe facultyof reasonwill be rewardedwith the discoveryof a prioricriteriathat gives sense and legitimacyto their legal activities. 17Like many in their generation,Hart and Sacks believed that thestandardof rationality, ndependentfrom any given context or re-sult, could be used to judge the soundness of a process.18Thus,The Legal Process representsa significantepisode in the postwarliberalprojectassociated with Robert Dahl and John Rawls.19Thisessayendorses the idea thatreadingTheLegalProcess is areconstructiveproject in which one must treat the book as a fin-ished whole. In that spirit,I will suggest that a fourth and some-what differenttheme lies at the heart of the book. I will arguethatthe structureof TheLegalProcessreveals an extraordinaryoncernwith the problemof adjudicationand that the book adoptsand de-fendsLonFuller'sconceptionof adjudication.My interpretationofHart and Sacks'sargument s inconsistent, n varyingdegrees,withthe three themesidentifiedabove,andI hope my analysiswill raisesome questionsabout our contemporaryview of Hart and Sacks'sunderstandingof their own project.

II. THE STRUCTURE OF THE LEGAL PROCESS AND ITSLEGAL THEORY

A. The Two Faces of The Legal Process1. The Subject of The Legal ProcessTheLegal Processoperateson two levels: pedagogicaland ju-risprudential.Most immediately t seeks to serve as a casebookfora course that had none. To serve this end, it adopts a casebook'sstructure,withappellatedecisions,commentary,and illustrative e-physics,supranote 9, at 1183-87;RichardA. Posner,LegalFormalism,LegalRealism,andthe Interpretationf Statutesand the Constitution, 7 CASEW. RES.L. REV.179, 192-94(1986-87).16. See RICHARDPOSNER,OVERCOMINGAW76-77 (1995); Duxbury, Faith in Reason,supranote 15, at 602; WHTE, upranote 4, at 144;WilliamN. Eskridge,Jr. & PhilipP.Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV.L. REV.27, 34 (1994); Leslie PickeringFrancis,LawandPhilosophy:FromSkepticismo ValueTheory, 7 LOY.L.A. L. REV.65,75(1993);CassR. Sunstein, ncompletelyTheorizedAgreements,08 HARV. .REV.1733,1769-70 (1995).17. Duxbury,Faith n Reason,supranote 15, at 605.18. DuncanKennedy,LegalFormality, J. LEGAL TUD. 51,352 (1973).19. See,e.g., Duxbury,Faith n Reason,supranote 15,at 648-53(discussingROBERT .DAHL, A PREFACETO DEMOCRATICHEORY 1956); John Rawls, Outline of a DecisionProcedureor Ethics,60 PHIL.REV.177(1951)). As Duxburynotes,the identification f thistheme reconciles, to some degree, the seemingly contradictory claim that The Legal ProcesspresagedbothJohnHartEly's Democracy ndDistrust ndRonaldDworkin'sTakingRightsSeriously.Duxbury,Faith n Reason,supranote 15, at 695-701.

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Michigan Law Reviewlections fromlaw reviewsand other secondarysources. TheLegalProcess qua casebook possesses a slightlyexperimental ormat,inthat its seven chapters revolve around fifty-fiveproblems. Theproblemsask the studentto take the role of a legal actor in a widerange of roles - draftinga lease, givingadviceto a legislator,or,most often, decidinga case. FrequentlyHart and Sacks follow aproblemwith an extensive discussionof how real lawyers,legisla-tors,orjudgesapproach he problem,andthenask a seriesof open-ended questionsabout the conventionalsolutions to the problem.The subject of The Legal Process is the subset of valid institu-tionaldecisionsthat involvethe makingor applyingof law.20Hartand Sacks understandthat a large share of society's institutionaldecisions do not involve the creation or applicationof law; theysimplyhave little or nothingto say aboutnonlegalinstitutionalde-cisions.21Accordingto Hartand Sacks,the differencebetween in-stitutionaldecisions that focus, in some way, on law, and otherinstitutionaldecisions,is that institutionaldecisions about law aregeneral,directive,and authoritative p. 114). So the decisionstaken by Citizen Smith to renther house at pricex and by Gover-nor Jones to appointa politicalally to job y may be directive-SmithandJonesspeak fromone pointof time to another p. 113)- and may be authoritative - Smith and Jones claim that theirdecisions be entitled to observanceandacceptanceby all membersof the society (p. 114)- but they are not general. Such specificinstitutionaldecisions derivefrom law but they are not law: Indi-vidualizedarrangementsof this kindare almost invariablyderiva-tive. They dependfor theirauthorityupon the fact that they havebeen made in compliancewith some muchbroader,underlyingar-rangement p. 114). Conversely,as long as an institutionaldeci-sion is general,directive,andauthoritative, t mustinvolve either

20. An institutional ecision s a decisionwarranted ythe principle f institutionalet-tlement. P. 4. The principleof institutional ettlement expresseshe judgment hat deci-sions whichare the dulyarrivedat resultof dulyestablishedprocedures f this kindoughttobe acceptedas bindinguponthewholesocietyunlessand untiltheyaredulychanged. P.4.Although t reflectsa very particular iew of political heory,Hart andSacksprovidea scantfew pagesof argument or the principleof institutionalettlementand then assumethat itsvalidity s obvious o the reader. Theprinciple f institutional ettlementclearly prings romHobbes: Thealternative o disintegratingesort o violence s the establishment f regular-ized andpeaceablemethodsof decision. P. 4. In Hart'snotes to his Legislation ourse,whichEskridgeand Frickeycharacterize s the foundationof the materials or the courseThe Legal Process pp. lxxxv-lxxxvii),Hart'sdebt to Hobbes becomes even more pro-nounced: 'Whenquestionsarisewhich nsomewayor other have to be settled,peoplefinda means forsettlingthem. The alternativeo war is peace;the alternative o force is law.'P. lxxxiv. See, e.g., THOMASHOBBES,LEVIATHAN23 (C.B. MacPherson ed., 1968).

21. In the first substantive ection of TheLegalProcess,Hartand Sacksspendthe firstfivepagesexplaining hejustification f the principle f institutional ettlementwithoutmen-tioning law or the courts exceptas a subcategory f the social order. See p. 4.

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May 1996] The Legal Process 1577the creation or applicationof law, whether issued by a court, anadministrator, r even a privatecitizen.22TheLegalProcess,therefore,studies general,directive,andau-thoritative decisionmakingat all levels : private, udicial,legis-lative,administrative, ndconstitutional. 23Hart and Sacks offer avisual metaphor - The Great Pyramid of Legal Order - to de-scribe an orderly,almostgeometric,relationshipamong these dif-ferent techniquesof legal decisionmaking.24Thus, the techniquethat appropriatelydeterminesthe legal relationshipbetween pri-vate citizens - such as a contract - will be different from the tech-nique appropriate o determining he legal relationshipat issue inan arbitration,an administrativeprocedure,or an appellatecourtargument.A recurrent heme in TheLegalProcess is the idea thata good lawyer should develop the judgmentneeded to pick thetechnique appropriate or the type of problemat hand. The book,thus, frequentlyasks the studentto weigh the comparativeadvan-

22. Thisnoteworthydefinitionof law transcends ertaintraditions hatwere familiar oreaders n the 1950's. Forexample, he idea that a law must be directive,authoritative, ndgeneral eavesout any requirementhat a lawserve the sovereign.Hartand Sackscarefullydefine authoritative s claimingo be entitledto observanceandacceptanceby all mem-bers of society, andbecause theirdefinitiondoes not relyon the identification f a sover-eign, it representsa breakwith Austinian egal positivism. P. 114 (emphasisadded). SeeJOHNAUSTIN,THE PROVINCEOF JURISPRUDENCEETERMINED20-22 (spec. ed. 1984)(1832); see also H.L.A. HART,THE CONCEPT FLAW 9-91 (2d ed. 1994); Anthony J. Sebok,Misunderstandingositivism, 3 MICH.L. REV.2054,2108-09(1995) (notingsimilaritybe-tweenH.L.A. Hart and SacksandHart). Also, theirdefinitionof lawdoes not equatelawtopredictions f what courtsdo in fact. SeeO.W.Holmes,The Pathof the Law,10HARV.L.REV. 57,461(1897). It thusrepresents breakwithproto-realismndrealism.SeeHolmes,supra; JEROME RANK,LAWAND THEMODERNMIND(1930). Finally, their definition doesnot require hat law conform o moral ruth. It thusrepresents breakwiththeNeo-Scholas-tic traditionof natural aw. See, e.g., FrancisE. Lucey,NaturalLaw and AmericanLegalRealism: TheirRespectiveContributiono a Theoryof Law ina Democratic ociety,30 GEO.L.J.493(1942). Infact,what s refreshing boutHartand Sacks'sdefinitionof lawis thatit isnot court-centered.Theirdefinition uggests hatanymemberof societycanmakeor applylaw as long as they conformto the three criteria dentifiedwith the practiceof generaldirectivearrangements.23. P. 107;see also p. 112( The urther xamination f thenatureof the processof insti-tutionaldecision,and of the problems nvolvedin makingand appraising he decisions neachof the major ypesof institutional rocesses, s the concernof thesematerials rom thisbeginning o the end. ).24. See pp.286-87. The base of the pyramid onsistsof billionsuponbillionsof eventsand non-events n whichmembersof societymake lawsthroughprivateorderings,applythose lawsby complyingwithcontracts, eases,etc., and applythe public aws made by thestate by complyingwith the criminal aws, the tax laws, etc. At the next level are thosesituationsn whichestablished eneralarrangementsre claimed o have beenviolated butno actionis takenby the unhappyparty.The third evel representshosecasesin whichtheparties o a disputesettle theirlegaldisagreement rivately,hrough agreement ndformalrelease; arbitration; nd the decisionby privateassociations. The fourth level capturesthose cases that are institutedn courtsor other tribunals ndowedwithpowersof formaladjudication ut that are settled. The fifth level concernsthose cases that are ultimatelynever contested n court but are disposedof througha final udgment, uchas a defaultor... consentjudgment, or a dismissalor plea of guilty. The sixth level consistsof litigatedcasesin courts. Finally, he seventh evel includes ll the cases whichgo to some reviewingtribunal.



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Michigan Law Reviewtages of legal decisionmakinghroughprivateagreement,majorityvoting, administrativedictate,arbitration,or adjudication.25

2. The Argument of The Legal ProcessA quick look at the table of contents suggests that Hart andSacksdesignedthe book as a pedagogicalexercise in legalmethods.After the introductory haptersets out Hartand Sacks's definitionof law, the book proceedsin an orderly ashionthroughthe typicallawmakingandlaw-applying ategoriesfamiliar o the social scien-tist: private agreements (ChapterTwo), the common law courts

(ChapterThree), referendumsand the electoral system (ChapterFour), the legislativeprocess(ChapterFive), the executivebranchand its administrativeagencies (ChapterSix), and the interpreta-tion of statutesby the courts(ChapterSeven).26Althoughthe vastmajorityof the problemsscatteredthroughoutthe seven chaptersinvolve judicial decisionmaking,one cannot conclude that TheLegal Process only grappleswith institutionaldecisions made bycourts. If this were so, then Hart and Sacks would have called itThe JudicialProcess.27 It is one of their great achievementsthattheywere able to take BenjaminCardozo'snsightsaboutadjudica-tion and applythem to law outside the courtroom. Thus,while allof the fifty-fiveproblems n TheLegalProcessconcern nstitutionaldecisions that involveeither the creationor applicationof law, notall involve institutionaldecisionsmade by courts.If TheLegal Process did no more than define and taxonomizethe varieties of legal activityin society, it would still be significantas an early exampleof the influenceof the Lawand Societymove-ment on mainstream egal education.28Hidden behind Hart and

25. This list illustrates, but does not exhaust, what Hart and Sacks mean when they referto the choice among several [institutional] procedures that society must make in order totake advantage of the principle of institutional settlement. P. 112.26. Eskridge and Frickey note that the original design of The Legal Process called fornine chapters. Chapter 8 would have covered The Making and Amending of Constitutionswhich was originally chapter 2 in the 1955 draft, and chapter 9 would have engaged PrivateRemedies for Unlawful Official Action. Neither was written. See p. lxxxix. In some re-spects, Dean Harry Wellington offered a glimpse of what chapter 8 might have looked like inCommon Law Rules and Constitutional Double Standards: Some Notes on Adjudication, 83YALEL.J. 221 (1973).27. See, e.g., BENJAMIN . CARDOZO, HE NATUREOFTHEJUDICIAL ROCESS3 (1921)(introducing the study of judge-made law ).28. As a survey course in the making and application of law by various public and privateactors, The Legal Process would have closely resembled LLOYDK. GARRISON& WILLARDHURST,LAW N SOCIETY:A COURSEDESIGNED ORUNDERGRADUATESND BEGINNINGLAWSTUDENTSrev. ed. 1940) (3 volumes), materials designed for the course taught by Gar-rison and Hurst at the University of Wisconsin. As Eskridge and Frickey note, Garrison andHurst's entire project was one of institutional structure, procedure, relationship, and, mostof all, institutional competence (a term the authors did not use). P. lxxii. For more aboutHurst and the Law and Society movement, see Aviam Soifer, Willard Hurst, ConsensusHistory, and The Growth of American Law, 20 REVIEWSN AM. HIST.124 (1992).

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The Legal ProcessSacks'sbroadview of the relationshipof law and society,however,is a subtle twist that makes it muchmore normativethan it wouldfirst appear. At firstglance, the organizationof the table of con-tents suggeststhatHartand Sacks intended to use the book's fifty-fiveproblemsto illustrate he advantagesanddisadvantages f vari-ous techniquesof lawmakingandlaw-applying,eavingit to the stu-dent to decide, for example,whether a labordisputeis best settledby a privateagreement,arbitration,or adjudication.But Hart andSacksdispensewithany pretenseof neutrality n their discussionofthe solution to the problem,and throughtheir pointed questionsthey conveyto the studentexactlywhattheythink of the likelycon-sequencesof each choice.29Similarly,Hart and Sacks make no ef-fort to hide their opinionstowardstheir theory of lawmakingandlaw-applyingat any point in the book. Although Hart and Sacksare explicitlynot court-centered,heirbook is implicitlybut aggres-sively adjudication-centered. 30n other words, the progressionfromthe judicial o the legal processcomeswith a catch. Theyargue throughout The Legal Process that although legal deci-sionmakersdo not have to be judges,they shouldadopt the formsof adjudication n their decisionmakingprocesses. As I hope todemonstratebelow, Hart and Sacks build this argumentinto theveryfabricof theirtextbook,so that at strategicpointsin the book'sstructure,n selectionof cases andcommentary, hey directthe stu-dent towards he advantagesof theirpreferred heoryandhighlightthe weaknessesof its rivals.

B. The Valorization of Common Law Adjudication1. Fuller's Theory of AdjudicationIt is important o stop for a momentto considermore carefullywhat Hart and Sacks meanby adjudication. Theynote thatmost,but not all, of the applicationof law occursin courts,and that forthis reasonlawyersfocus on adjudicationp. 178). The first sectionof the chapteron common awprovidessomeimportantcluesaboutHart and Sacks'sviews on adjudication.In ProblemNo. 10,31Hartand Sacks teach the student about the deceptivelysimple distinc-

29. See pp. 275-77. In anotherexample,afterpresentingRoscoe Pound'sargumentatsome length,Hart and Sacks ask tartly, Does Dean Pound'sanalysishold water? P. 89.Hart and Sacks often use such open-ended questionsrhetorically hroughout he book,althoughperhapsnone so sarcasticas the following: Whatdo you thinkthe [plaintiffrail-roadworkers] houghtof the intelligenceof JudgeSanbornand JudgeLochren? Is this ahealthyattitude orpeoplein a freesocietyto have toward heircourts? P. 1142(discussingJohnsonv. SouthernPacificCo., 117F. 462 (8th Cir.1902)).30. Advancing theoryof adjudications a centralaim of TheLegalProcess. Well-man,supranote 8, at 417.31. See p. 345 (ProblemNo. 10: Law, Fact,and Discretion n the Applicationof Law)(reviewingHolmes'sdecisions n Commonwealth . Wright,137 Mass.250 (1884),and Com-monwealthv. Sullivan,15 N.E. 491 (Mass. 1888)).

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Michigan Law Reviewtion between questionsof law and questionsof fact in trial. Theyclearly reject the view, whichthey attributeto JeromeFrank,thatone cannot distinguishbetween issues of fact and law.32Further-more, they seem to believe thatjudges,who find andapplythe law,shouldminimizethe discretionof juries,who find the facts.33Onemight imaginethat Hart and Sacksadvocate the reduction of thejury'srole becauselaypeople simplyare not as competentat judg-ment-makingas the educated,elite judiciary.But subsequentcom-mentsby Hartand Sackssuggestthattheywouldalsodisapproveofa judge actinglike a jury. For example,in a case in which a judgesitswithout a jury, theyconsider t an abdicationof the judicialrolefor the judge to state only his naked conclusion: [for example]that 'the defendant is guiltyof drivingan automobile so as unrea-sonablyto endanger ife.' 34 Hartand Sacks thinkthat the judicialrole demandsmore, for unless the judge providesreasons for theconclusionhe reaches:

[t]he partieswill have no idea of the basis of his decision;and thelosing party,beingleft in the dark,maybe harder o convincethatthedecision s just. And an appellatecourtwillhavetrouble n reviewingthe decision to decide whetheror not it involves error,unless it re-traces the whole processof decisionde novo. Compare he difficultyof reviewingan arbitrator's wardor an administrative rderwhich isunexplainedby anyarticulate indingsor reasons. Perhapseven moreimportant,other privatepersonswill have no aid in planning utureconduct. [p. 357]This statementleads into a section entitled The Reason-For-Being of JudiciallyDeclared Law, which uses two problemsandfinally Lon Fuller's The Forms and Limits of Adjudication to set outthe essentialfeatures of adjudication.35Althoughthe Fullerarticle32. See p. 344 (citing Jerome Frank, A Plea for Lawyer-Schools, 56 YALE L.J. 1303(1947)); JEROME RANK,COURTSONTRIAL 1949); see also p. 349.33. Problem No. 10 concerns jury instructions in which the defendant was accused ofpromoting a lottery. The defendant admitted that he had promoted the game described bythe prosecution, but denied that what he had done was a lottery. Hart and Sacks ask thestudent to pick between the following jury instructions:(a) A request by defendant's counsel for an instruction that if the jury believed beyonda reasonable doubt that the defendant had set up and promoted a lottery for money,they should find him guilty; otherwise, not guilty;(b) A request by the prosecuting attorney for an instruction that if the jury believedbeyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had conducted a game having the follow-

ing described characteristics (specifically enumerating all of the characteristics of thegame which the defendant had admittedly conducted) then they should find him guilty;otherwise not guilty.P. 345. Hart and Sacks express their dislike of (a) pretty clearly at p. 353.34. P. 356. Note that this option resembles jury instruction (a) discussed supra note 33.35. The first problem is based on Norway Plains Co. v. Boston & Me. R.R., 1 Gray 263(1854). Duncan Kennedy has called Chief Judge Shaw's decision in that case to limit theextent of a railroad's duty as a common carrier a classic expression of the rationality of com-mon law adjudication. See Kennedy, supra note 18, at 361. Shaw's decision - which dis-solved the sharp opposition of legislature and judicial functions - was successful because

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May 1996] TheLegal Process 1581appearsas just anotherselection for the student to read, Fuller isnot merelyjustanotherauthorwhose viewsHartandSacksthoughtthey shouldpresentin the text for the studentto consider.36Theycite to Fuller so frequently,and use his terminologyso naturally,that there is good reason to believe that Hart and Sacks self-con-sciously adoptedhis view of adjudication.37Fullerbegan his argu-ment by noting, like Hart and Sacks, that laws must rest uponsome rule, principle,or standard, 38nd, like Hart and Sacks,heconnectedthe rationalityof law to its being purposive. 39 uller,however, was far more systematic n organizinga conceptual pic-ture of adjudication.40Fuller triedto identifythe conditions underwhich adjudicationmight occurin its ideal form, so that he couldthen determine at what point legal processceased to be adjudica-tive and became either a Mixed,Parasitic, or] PervertedForm[]of Adjudication. 41He thoughtthat for a decisionmakingprocessto be adjudicativen the ideal sense, it hadto possessthe followingfeatures: (1) the processmustbe adversarial [t]heargumentsofcounsel hold the case, as it were,in suspensionbetween two oppos-he conformed o the specialform or rationality f adjudication.See id. Althoughusedprimarilyo demonstrate he desirability f common aw courts o makelaw, t also servesasanexampleof adjudicationhatwassuccessful,moreor less,because he decisionmaker avethe reasonsfor his decision.The next problem, TheNeed for the ReasonedElaboration f Precedent:The Caseofthe FaithlessFiduciary, waschosen,I suspect,because t rests on a decisionthat lackstheimaginationandcreativityof NorwayPlains. See p. 397 (reviewingBerensonv. Nirenstein,326 Mass. 285 (1950)). In addition o demonstrating ow common awcourtsmake law bychoosingbetweencompeting ines of precedent, hisproblemalsoprovidesan exampleof acourtthat failedto give adequatereasons or its adjudicative ct.36. As EskridgeandFrickeynote, Hart andSacksreproducean excerptfrom [a]nun-publishedpaper presentedby ProfessorLon L. Fuller to a groupof HarvardUniversityfacultymemberson November19, 1957. P. 397,n.* (citingthe 1958 versionof TheLegalProcess)[hereinafterFuller,Manuscript].Thispaper- much ike TheLegalProcess tself- was famousandoften citedduringFuller's ifetime,but remainedunpublishedor manyyears. See ROBERTS. SUMMERS, ON L. FULLER 0 (1984). A later, substantially revisedversionof the essaywaspublishedposthumously.See LonL. Fuller,TheFormsand Limitsof Adjudication, 2 HARV.L. REV.353 (1978)[hereinafterFuller,Forms].37. See Duxbury,Faith n Reason,supranote 15, at 633. The pictureof adjudicationattributed o Fuller n the followingpagesof this reviewbearsa strongresemblanceo thefive featuresof adjudicationhat AbramChayesattributed o the received radition ivillitigation n the 1950s and '60s. See AbramChayes,TheRole of theJudge n Public LawLitigation,89 HARV.L. REV.1281,1282-83 1976).38. P. 398 (quotingFuller,Manuscript,upranote 36). In theirintroductoryection ongeneraldirectivearrangements, artandSacksorganizeawsaccordingo the degree theypossessedthe featuresof eithera rule or a standard,and promoteeither a principleor apolicy. See pp. 113,138-43.39. See p. 400 (quotingFuller,Manuscript,upranote 36). Hart and Sacksattempttoestablish,at the very beginningof chapter1, that law s concernedessentiallywith the pur-suit of purposes. Pp. 108-09.40. Foran excellentanalysisof Fuller'spictureof adjudication,ee SUMMERS,upranote36, at 90-100.41. Fuller,Forms, upranote 36, at 381.



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1582 Michigan Law Review [Vol.94:1571ing interpretations f it 42; (2) theadjudicative rocessshould nor-mally not be initiated by the tribunal itself 43; (3) the tribunalshould aspire to base its decisions, as much as possible, on theproofs and argumentspresented by the parties44;4) the tribunalmust be impartial45;5) the tribunal'sdecisionmust be retroactive- it may have prospectiveeffects,but it must also have a retroac-tive effect46; and (6) the tribunal must . . . at some appropriatepoint . . . give reasons for the result reached. 47Hart and Sacksrecognizethat given the complexityof the defi-nition of adjudication hey adopt, adjudication s appropriate oronly a fraction of institutionaldecisions. Theyfollow Fullerby de-claringthat adjudicationmost effectivelyresolvesconflictsthat re-sult from humanorganizationby commonends or sharedpurpose,

42. Id. at 383;see also SUMMERS,upranote 36, at 91. Hart and Sackssay somethingsimilarat 633. See also id. at643( Adjudicationmplies .. [a]tribunalmposinga solutionupon the partiesto a disputein the respects n whichthey have failed to agree .... Theprocess is not one of mediation .. . ).43. Fuller, Forms, upranote 36, at 385.44. Id. at 388-91. Fuller well understood hat this conditionwas more often breachedthanhonored,buthe wasemphaticaboutpointing o its breachas one of the early warningsignsof a procedure rossing he invisible ine betweena mixedform of adjudication nd aperverted orm. See id. at 388( Weneedto remindourselves hatif... the grounds or thedecisionfall completelyoutside the framework f the argument,makingall that was dis-cussedor provedat the hearing rrelevant then the adjudicative rocesshas become asham ... ). Summers dentifiesanotherreasonas well: As [Fuller] awit, 'the essence'of[adjudication]s to give eachside a chanceto know whatthe otheris sayingandto affordeach an opportunityo refutethe other. SUMMERS,upranote 36, at 92.45. See Fuller,Forms, upranote 36, at 391. Hartand Sackssaysomethingsimilarandadda criterion: [A]djudicationmplies hat the decidingofficersarenot politicallyaccount-able to anyonefor any particulardecision. They [are] subject . . only to their own con-sciences. P. 642.46. It s not the functionof courts o createnew aimsforsocietyor to imposeon societynew basic directives. Fuller,Forms, upranote 36,at 392;seealsoSUMMERS,upranote 36,at 92. Hart and Sacksseem to be less hostileto prospectivedecisionmakinghanFuller. Seepp.600-15;but seepp.630-40(ProblemNo. 23. AdvisoryOpinions:The Case of Mr.Jeffer-son's IncompletedForwardPass).47. SUMMERS,upranote 36, at 92. This is one of Fuller'smost difficult laimsto inter-pret,and while I tend to agreewith Summers' tatement,Fuller's inalversion of Forms sslightlyweakerthanthe positionattributedo Fullerby Summers.SeeFuller,Forms, upranote 36,at 387. On the otherhand,Fulleralsosaysthat itseemsclearthat the fairnessandeffectivenessof adjudicationrepromotedbyreasonedopinions inwhich he tribunal tatesits reasons]. Id. at 388.WhatFullerultimatelybelievedis not so importantbecause Hartand Sacksappeartoagreewith the positionSummersattributeso Fuller.They saythat itis an integralpartofthe conceptof adjudication s exemplifiedn the conventional ormsof the judicialprocessthat decision s to be arrivedat by referenceo impersonal riteriaof decisionapplicable nthe same fashion n anysimilar ase. P. 643(emphasis dded). If byreference meansthatthe tribunalmust publiclystate its reasons,then Hart and Sacksadopt an even strongerpositionthanFuller on the connectionbetweenthe givingof reasonsandthe havingof rea-sons in adjudication. t is interestinghatin the versionof Forms hatHart andSacksquotein TheLegalProcess,Fullerseems to assume hat the tribunalwill state to the losingpartythe reason or its decision. See p. 644. Seealso White,supranote 4, at 144-45;Sebok,supranote 22, at 2102(on Hart andthe need for the SupremeCourtto explain ts reasons).



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May 1996] The Legal Process 1583as opposed to organizationby reciprocity.48Problemsof reciproc-ity, unlike problemsof sharedends, have no rationalsolution andtherefore should not be solved by adjudicationbut throughotherforms of institutionaldecisionmaking, uch as negotiation (privatelawmaking)or voting (legislation).49There is something almostperverseabout Hart and SacksembracingFuller's orm of adjudica-tion and then refusingto apply it to the vast majorityof conflictsthat arisefrom private orderings afterall, contractand tort dis-putes are matters of privatelaw. Fulleranticipatedand addressedthis problem. He arguedthat althoughcreatingand enforcingtherules of the marketis a sharedpurposeand therefore an appropri-ate subject of adjudication, he outcome of the market is not asharedpurposeandthereforean inappropriateubjectof adjudica-tion.50 For similarreasons,Hart and Sacksfollow Fullerin conclud-ing that if a problem involves the applicationof many rules andprinciplesthen it is polycentric nd require[s]handling by themethod either of ad hoc discretion[managerialdictate]or of nego-tiation or of legislation. 51

48. See pp. 646-47. Fullerofferedthe following llustrations:Order or organization) hrough ommonends can be illustratedby the followingsitua-tion: A commonroadgivesaccess to twoneighboringarms.A boulderrolls across hisroad,blocking t .... Joining ogether[thetwo farmers] re able to removethe obstruc-tion. Here an associationof two men makesboth of them richer.... Organizationby reciprocity, n the other hand, requires hat the participantsdiffer n their values, hatis, thatthey evaluatedifferentlyhe sameobjects ... By atrade of [the objects],both farmers an becomericher.P. 402 (quotingFuller,Manuscript,upranote 36). It is important o note that Fuller ac-ceptedthatproblems temming romnon-convergingalues organization y reciprocity-are technically usceptible o regulationby either he marketor politicalcontrol.49. See p. 645;see also Fuller,Forms, upranote 36, at 363-64.50. A market is a regimeof reciprocity;t presupposesand requiresa divergenceofindividualobjectives. Establishinghe rulesnecessary or the functioning f such a mecha-nism is a meaningful ask for adjudication; erforminghe tasksof the mechanism tself isnot. P. 402 (quotingFuller,Manuscript,upranote 36). It is for this reasonthat Hart andSacksconclude hat [q]uestions risingwithin he regimeof reciprocitywithrespect o whatconstitutesa satisfactory xchangearenot ordinarily ppropriateor adjudication. P. 646.This distinctionbetween the rationality f social rules and rationality f their outcomes isbased, n part,on Hartand Sacks'sadoptionof the Fullerian dea of the fallacy f the staticpie. Pp. 102-03. Hart and Sacksseem to be assuming, ontrary o Rawls,that althoughinstitutionalarrangements oncerning he markethave a rational tructure,he distributionof goodsin a society governedby a rational nstitutionaltructure s not, in itself,subject orational analysis. See JOHNRAWLS,A THEORYOFJUSTICE 3-90 (1971); Duxbury, Faith inReason,supranote 15,at 653;see also Fuller,Forms, upranote 36, at 404 ( Thecourtgetsinto difficulty, ot when it laysdown rules aboutcontracting, ut when it attempts o writecontracts. ).51. P. 647;see also p. 647 ( Adjudicationf disputesaboutmanagerialdecisions nvolv-ingthe selectionof a courseof action orthe future romamongmanypossiblecourses s notordinarily atisfactory,f it is feasible at all, becauseof the numerousvariables o be takeninto account ... ). Fuller, upranote 36,at 394-404;Chayes, upranote 37,at 1289-92(onthe [d]emise f the [b]ipolar s]tructure nmoder litigation);MelvinAronEisenberg,Par-ticipation,Responsiveness,nd theConsultative rocess:An Essay or Lon Fuller,92 HARV.L. REV.410,424-25(1978)(arguing hatFuller'spolycentricmodel is partially resultof thepartiesto the disputenot beingevaluatedby the samecriteria).



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Michigan Law ReviewFullerdid not arguein TheFormsand Limits of Adjudicationthat adjudicationbests other institutionaldecisionmakingproce-dures from the perspectiveof either moralityor philosophy.52Infact,as Hart and Sackssuggest,Fuller understood hatadjudicationcansometimesbe less effectivethan othertechniquesat settlingdis-putes.53Fuller didsuggest,however,that becauseadjudication on-cerns itself solely with rationallyresolvable disputes, it is thetendencyof the adjudicative rocessto inducevoluntaryacceptanceof its results. 54HartandSacks'schapteron the commonlaw, likeFuller'sessay, explicitlydefines adjudicationand then determineswhetherit should be chosen over some other method.55Hart and

Sacksagreewith Fuller thatknowingthe limitsof adjudications asimportantas knowingits form.562. The Lure of False AdjudicationAt the end of ChapterThree Hart and Sacksattemptto identifythe kindsof disputeswhich lend themselvesto reasoneddecision(p. 646). They include disputes in which the claimantasserts aright to a remedywithin the power of the tribunalto grant, and

disputesin whichthe availableremedydoes not requiretoo muchdiscretionon the partof the adjudicator p. 646). Hart and Sacksexclude, for example, an antitrustdispute that would require ajudgeto reorganiz[e]he ... industry, questionsarisingwiththeregimeof reciprocitywithrespectto what constitutesa satisfactoryexchange, and disputesaboutmanagerialdecisionsinvolvingtheselectionof a courseof actionfor the futurefromamongmanypos-sible courses (pp. 646-47). In general,the resultinglist shows anextraordinarybias towardsdisputes that arise in common law.5752. Fuller made these arguments in LON L. FULLER,THE MORALITYOF LAW(2d ed.1969).53. See p. 645. To the extent that the resolution of the dispute depends essentially uponwhat Professor Fuller calls the principle of order by reciprocity, as distinguished from theprinciple of order through common ends (including the maintenance of a regime of reciproc-ity), the method of adjudication operates to eliminate the best judges of a satisfactory ex-change - namely, the parties to the exchange themselves .... P. 645 (emphasis added).54. P. 400 (quoting Fuller, Manuscript, supra note 36).55. Hart and Sacks reject the idea that there are no disputes of any kind which cannotbe effectually settled by establishing an impartial and sufficiently prestigeful tribunal to hearthem, giving both sides or all sides of the dispute an opportunity to present their evidence

and argument, and then having the tribunal make its decision. P. 644.56. This is true for two reasons. First, [w]here adjudication is used to settle disputes notsubject to rational decision, the moral force of the institution suffers. P. 401 (quoting Fuller,Manuscript, supra note 36) (emphasis added). Second, if a dispute is not susceptible to areasoned solution, then the attempt to force it into the mold of adjudication will renderunavailable the very means which are rationally best calculated in most situations to producea satisfactory settlement. P. 645.57. See also Duxbury, Faith in Reason, supra note 15, at 661 ( Hart and Sacks purport tofavor neither common law nor legislation, yet they seem to display a peculiar preference forthe judicial decision. ) (footnote excluded).

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The Legal ProcessHart and Sacksarguethat there is a connectionbetween the formof adjudicationand common law. Becausethe remediesavailablein the armoryof the common law courts [are] few and relativelywell defined, an adjudicator will always be able to determinewhethera claimantdoes or does not possess a right (pp. 646-47).As long as law stayswithinthe boundaries ixedby adjudication,twill be providedwith a comprehensive,underlyingbody of lawadequatefor the resolutionof all the disputesthatmayarisewithinthe social order. 58But the valorizationof common lawin ChapterThree is not simplyan act of exclusion;rather t suggeststhat,to theextent that other legal techniquesare susceptibleto rationalanaly-sis, they ought to adopt the form of adjudication.Fullerrecognizedthe concept of adjudicationas an ideal type,and that it could manifest itself in the world in greaterand lesserdegrees. It was with this skepticalattitude that he turned to newermixed orms of adjudication uch as arbitrationor administrativelaw. Fuller noted that tripartite arbitration,which during the1940sand1950sbecamea widelyuseddecisionmaking rocedure nthe emerging field of labor law,59 tends to deteriorate . . into akind of continuationof bargainingbehind closed doors,or ... intoan emptyform. 60Fullerwas equally skepticalabout the capacityof administrativeagenciesto operateeffectivelywhile adheringtothe adjudicativemode of decisionmaking.61 ullerthoughtthat,at

58. P. 647. Hart and Sacks'sdescriptionof the completeness f the commonlaw issharedby bothChristopherLangdellandRonaldDworkin. SeeThomasC. Grey,Langdell'sOrthodoxy, 5 U. PIrr. L.REV.1,7 (1983). It is worthnotingthat the exampleFulleruses todemonstratehistheoryof the inherentrationality f the common aw is the problemof whatrule to apply whenthe acceptanceand revocationof an offer crossin the mails. P. 401(quotingFuller,Manuscript, upranote 36). Fullernotes thatalthoughhonest mindsmightdisagreeover the proper olution, he choicebetween hemodemrule- acceptances effec-tive upondispatch andits alternatives not purely rbitrary ut maybe derivedration-ally from the purposes shared by a commercialcommunity. P. 401 (quoting Fuller,Manuscript, upranote 36). It is unclearwhetherFuller,like Langdell, nvokes higherlevel legalprinciples, r solvesthis legalproblemby invokingpolicy. See C.C.LANGDELL,A SUMMARYOF THELAWOF CONTRACTS0-21 (2d ed. 1880); Grey, supra, at 27; JamesBoyle, LegalRealismandthe Social Contract:Fuller'sPublicJurisprudencef Form,PrivateJurisprudencef Substance, 8 CORNELL. REV. 71,372-73 1993)(on the tensionbetweenFuller's nstrumentalistendencies n his contracts cholarship nd the formalism hat per-vades his jurisprudential ritings).59. Seep.330(citingEdgarL.Warren& IrvingBernstein,A Profileof LaborArbitration,4 IND. & LAB. REL.200, 217 (1951)).

60. Fuller,Forms,supranote 36, at 397. Hartand Sacksequallycriticizearbitrationnnonlaborcases. At the end of ProblemNo. 8 ( PrivateArbitration:The Case of the Litig-iousInvestor )heyexaminewithskepticismhe argumentsn favorof voluntary rbitration.See,e.g.,pp.314-21(questioning he allegedadvantages temming romprivatearbitration'sspeed, lack of rancor, echnicalexpertise,privacy, reedom fromprecedent,and finality).61. Fullersuggested hatpolycentricproblemswere often givento administrativegen-cies because [t]he nstinct or givingthe affectedcitizenhis 'dayin court'pullspowerfullytowardcastingexercisesof governmental owerin the moldof adjudication, owever nap-propriate hat mold mayturnout to be. Fuller, Forms, upranote 36, at 400. He arguedthatcertainadministrativegencies,suchas the WarManpowerCommission,he Office of

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1586 Michigan Law Review [Vol.94:1571a certainpoint,a law-likeprocessthattries to solve a problem notsusceptibleof a reasonedsolution 62 ecame a perverseformof ad-judicationthat survivesonly by drawing ts moralstrength rominstitutionsof real adjudication.63Hart and Sacks conclude ChapterThree by focusing on theproblemof parasitic adjudication.They refer to the manywell-intentioned bandits[who]engagein attemptedraidsupon [adjudi-cation's]prestige .. theywant the benefitsof judge-made aw with-out havingto acceptthe conditionsof decisionwhicharenecessaryto secure the benefits. 64As thislanguagesuggests,Hart andSackssee a double threat from public decisionmaking hat falsely helpsitself to the prestigeandauthorityof trueadjudication.They arguethat not only can parasitic ormsof adjudicationdeny disputantsaprocessbetter suited to solve their problem(p. 645), but notwith-standing he successof anyindividualepisodeof parasiticadjudica-tion,the practicehas a corrosiveeffecton the overall egal system.65In order to help the student identify parasitic adjudication,Hartand Sacks even offer an exercisein whichthey ask the student todecidewhetheradjudication ouldsuccessfully olve anyone of thefictionaldisputesthey set out in a list. The list constitutes a spec-trum thatrangesfrom a mere awardof a license to an internationalcrisis.66Hartand Sacksstress thatthe question s not whetherthesedisputesshouldbe solvedin court,but instead whetherthey shouldbe solvedby anyof the tribunalswhich clothe theirproceedings nPriceAdministration, nd the WarProductionBoard,could perform heir functionseffec-tivelyandpreciselybecause hey did not attempt o actadjudicatively, hilethe FCC,forinstance,suffered rom its attempt o providean adjudicative roceduren the awardingoftelevision and radiolicenses,a task that Fullerthoughtwas ultimatelynot susceptibletoreasonedsolution. See id. at 400-03.

62. The phrase s Hart and Sacks's.Seep. 645.63. Fuller,Forms, upranote 36, at 406.64. P. 642(discussingwhetheraninstitutional rocedure orobtainingadvisoryopinionswouldqualifyas adjudication).65.If society is to achieveany degreeof effectiveorder,we must leave it to the highestpoliticalpowerto make those decisions hat can claim no greaterrationalityhan thatthey respond o a felt need for somedecision,rightor wrong.... [But]the judgemustfindsome betterjustificationor his decision hanthat they decide.P. 644(quotingFuller,Manuscript,upranote 36). Inthe finalversionof Forms,Fuller akesa slightly ess hostileviewof parasiticormsof adjudication: In abeling aformof decision-making] parasitic,' intendno more condemnationhanwhen a botanistcallsa certain un-gus 'parasitic.'Justas, fromthe standpoint f human nterest, herearegoodand badfungi,so parasitic ormsof ordermaybe good or bad. Fuller,Forms, upranote 36, at 406.66. The examplesare: choosinga recipientof a broadcast icenseamonga set of appli-cants,the solutionof a labordispute, he finalformulation f a zoningplan,the resolutionofa regulationsdisputebetween the UnitedStatesTreasuryDepartmentand the FederalRe-serve Board,the resolutionof a deadlockbetweenthe two Houses of Congressover theamendingof the LaborManagementRelationsAct of 1947,and a disputebetween wo coun-triesover the allegedattemptsby one country o change heform of governmentn the othercountry. See p. 641.



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The Legal Processsome or all of the conventional rappingsof adjudication p. 641).The distinct mpressionone has at the end of ChapterThree is thatHart and Sacksbelieve that none of the disputesin that list shouldbe solved throughadjudication,and that for that reason, they arehostile to an activistuse of law for progressiveends.67That view ispartiallyright;however,I think it is more accurate o say that Hartand Sackswere less concerned aboutrestricting he subjectmatterand political direction of the legal process than they were aboutinsuring hat important ocialproblemswere not mishandledeitherby being forced into an adjudicativeprocesswhen they were notsusceptibleto rationalanalysis,or by beingsubjected o a legal pro-cess that was insufficientlyadjudicative.68C. The Covert Argument for Adjudication in The Legal ProcessThe Legal Process purportsto survey all the techniquescon-tainedin the GreatPyramidof LegalOrder, but the book's ownstructureundermines hat claim. To be sure,Hart and Sacks do notmake the mistakeof assuming hat onlyjudgescan adjudicate,andone of the wonderful eatures of the book is that they exploreways

in whichlegal actors other thanjudgescanbringthe values of adju-dication nto theirlegal activity. Even so, it is interesting o look atwhere Hart and Sacks ultimately dedicate the book's energies.They spend42%of the book on justtwo topics: the enforcementofthe commonlaw by judges (ChapterThree) and the interpretationof statutesby judges (ChapterSeven). No otherchapterexceptforthe chapteron the creation of legislation (ChapterFive) receivessimilar attention.69Obviously,one shouldconcludeonlyso much from the lengthof

chapters. Yet, even this crude measure suggests that Hart andSacks seem more interestedin the work of judges than in work ofother actors in the legal system. In fact, a careful review of thecontent of the seven chapters especiallythe chapterson the com-67. It is hardnot to imagine hat Hart and Sacksareaddressinghe specterof Brownv.Boardof Educationwhenthey state that [t]hepresentquestion s whether he enthusiastsfor adjudication s a methodof settlingeverykindof socialproblemmaynot be opento thechargeof trying o make a similarlyparasiticuse of the prestigeof the method. P. 642. SeeNorman Dorsen, In Memoriam: Albert M. Sacks, 105 HARV.L. REV.1, 12 (1991) (contestingthe criticismmade by progressiveawyers hat legal processwallowed n conservative nd

procedural etishism );ee also p. cxix;Vetter,supranote 4 at 417.68. Of course, t is very possiblethat Hart andSacks'sdeepcommitmento maintainingthe prestige nd integrity f the legal process by testingits range againstthe ideal ofadjudications inextricablyinkedto a politicallyconservativeagenda. Thisessay will nottake up thatquestion. ComparePeller,NeutralPrinciples,upranote 8, at 608 (arguing heconnectionwasinevitable)withDuxbury,Faith n Reason, upranote 15,at 667(the connec-tion is exaggerated ).69. For examplechapter4 (on referendums nd the electionof lawmakers) s only 42pageslong andchapter6 (on the executivebranchandadministrativegencies) s 100pageslong.

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Michigan Law Reviewmon law, legislation,and statutory interpretation reveals thatHart and Sacks do not examinejudges so much as the work ofjudges. That is, Hart and Sacks have a deep commitmentto theidea of adjudication,an activitythat, as noted above, occursmostfrequentlybut not exclusivelyin the courtroom. Hart and Sackscriticize udgeswho, in theiropinion,evade or pervertadjudication,and they cautiously supportnonjudicialactorswho, where appro-priate,faithfullyadopt the forms of adjudication.Forexample,Hartand Sacksspendan extraordinary mountofspacecriticizingJusticeBlack's abdication f judicialresponsibil-ity in ProblemNo. 18.70 In HalcyonLinesv. HaennShip Ceiling&Refitting Corp,71 a worker, covered by the Longshoremen's andHarborWorker'sCompensationAct (LHWA),sued and receivedjudgmentagainstHalcyon,the owner of the ship upon which theworkerwas injured. In the sameaction,the juryreturneda specialverdict finding Halcyon 25% responsible and the worker's em-ployer,Haenn,75% responsible or the injury. Halcyonthen suedHaenn for contribution.The Court heard argumentson whetheradmiraltyallows contributionas between joint tortfeasorson ac-countof claimsby thirdpersons,andif it does, whetherthe LHWAlimited Haenn'scontributiono the compensationowed the workerunderthe federalstatute. JusticeBlack,writing or the Court,heldthat it would be unwiseto fashionnew judicialrules of contribu-tion and that the solution of this problemshould await congres-sional action. 72Hart and Sacks mercilesslycritiquethe Court'sargumentthat admiralty aw had not yet developed either prece-dent or principleuponwhichto extendthe doctrineof contributionfrom collision cases to noncollisioncases.73They arguethat Hal-cyon was not drivenby its doctrinalreasoning- whichHart and

70. Seep. 496. Theproblem s titled TheParadoxof MakingLawby Refusing o MakeLaw: The HalcyonCase.71. 342 U.S. 282 (1952).72. P. 498 (quoting Halcyon,342 U.S. at 285). The Court reservedthe question ofwhether, f Congresschose to extendthe rightto contributionamongjoint tortfeasors oadmiralty ases,the contributionhouldbe limitedby the LHWA. See p. 499 n.12.73. Theyconclude hat:At one strokethe Court(1) reachedan unsoundconclusion n the case before it, (2)destroyed he harmonyof the underlyingmaritime awin thisgeneralarea,and(3) es-tablisheda precedentwhichputsintoquestion hecontinued italityn thefederalcourtsof the wholeAnglo-Americanradition f growthof decisional aw.P. 515 (emphasisadded).Furthermore,Hart and Sacksarguethatby denying he common aw rightto contribu-tion, the Courtturned ortfeasorsike Halcyon nto absolute ndemnitors f joint tortfeasoremployers,becausethe LHWA,a form of workman's ompensation, aturallyallowedtheemployerto recover its payments romthe employeeif the employeesuccessfully ued athirdparty ike Halcyon.Seepp.508-09. It is worthnotingthatHartandSacksunfavorablycompareBlack'srefusalto use the Court'searliercollisioncases to solve this noncollisioncase with Shaw'sapplicationof case law to commoncarriers o the railroads n NorwayPlains. See p. 501.

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The Legal ProcessSacks call so much eyewash (p. 516) - but by JusticeBlack'smisunderstanding f the Court'srole. Black'sopinion tried to de-termine whether Halcyon had a right to contributionby askingwhetherin this matter the method of legislativegrowthof the lawis to be preferred o the methodof judicialgrowth. In so conclud-ing, Black pretendedthat, by deferringto Congress,the Court infact was not makinglaw.74Hart and Sackssuggest that a lack ofrespectfor adjudicativevalues animatedBlack's profoundlyanti-constitutional and indeed unconstitutional reasoning (p. 517).Black supportedhis decision by assertingthat Congresshad en-tered the sphere of maritimepersonalinjury,which demonstratedthat:manygroupsof personswithvaryingnterests revitallyconcernedwith heproperunctioningndadministrationf [maritimeorts] ..[w]e think that legislative onsideration nd actioncan best bringabouta fair accommodationf the diversebutrelated nterestsofthesegroups.75On the other hand,noted Black, in the case before the Court theonly party in favor of allowingcontributionwas Halcyon.76Hartand Sacks accuse Black of trivializing he interests of the partiesand considering the wishes of economicinterestgroupsnot evenbefore the Court.77In fact, Hart and SacksaccuseBlack of strip-ping awayfrom the case manyof the elementsthatthey deem cen-tral to adjudication:by ignoringthe partiesin interest,the Courtdid not stand suspended between two advocates; he Courtmadeandinterpreted aw but gaveno reasons;andfinally, nstead of lim-itingitself to the remediesavailableto it, the Courtenthusiasticallyembraced a polycentrictask.78This,according o Hart and Sacks,

74. Seep. 517;see also p. 515( There an be no doubt,canthere,that the Courtactually'fashionednew judicialrules'while asserting hat it was 'unwise'and 'inappropriate'o doso ... ? ).75. P. 498 (quotingHalcyon,342 U.S. at 286).76. P. 498 (quotingHalcyon,342 U.S. at 286).77. See p. 517 ( [C]ouldunconcern or the interestsof the partiesbefore the Court bemade moreexplicit? ).OnemightthinkthatHalcyonanticipatedhe modemtrendtowardsexpanding he set of partiesof interest n public awlitigation.SeeChayes, upranote 37, at1291;RichardStewart,TheReformation f AmericanAdministrative aw,88 HARV.L. REV.1667,1723-47 1975). However,Hart and Sacks'scriticismof Black'sdecisionwentbeyondaccusinghim of misunderstandingdjudication.They suggest,ultimately, hatBlack'sdeci-sion sought to insure that the worker'semployer n Halcyonwould have an incentive toadvance he workermoneywhile he sued the employer's o-tortfeasor.Thus,Halcyon itslanguageabout deference o Congressnotwithstanding was reallyaboutsecuringa tacti-cal advantage.. whichwillpredisposea negligentemployer o finance he employeein theemployee'sown lawsuitso as to passthe whole buck of the loss in a polite wayto the em-ployer'sco-tortfeasor. P.521. HartandSacksopinethat this resultwouldhaveappealed oBlackbecause t wouldmake it easierfor workers o suenegligent hirdparties ike Halcyon.Thisappealproves n the mindsof Hartand Sacks he trulyunprinciplednd realistroots ofthe decision. See p. 521.78. Despite the fact that the resultof the Court'sprocesswas to defer to a legislativebody,the question hat Black asked- whoshoulddecide whether here is a right o contri-

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Michigan Law Reviewwas not a case of a nonjudicialbody adoptinga pervertedform ofadjudicationbut of a courtadoptinga perverted ormof legislation.Althoughthey do not say so explicitly,Hart and Sacks most ap-prove of agencieswhen they incorporateadjudicativevalues. Forexample,in ProblemNo. 43, aptlynamed Draftingan Administra-tive Opinion: The Oil PumpFiasco, hey comparean actual Fed-eral TradeCommissiondecision with an alternativemodel decisionwritten for their book.79 Whereasthe Commission ssued a deci-sion thatconsisted of nothingbutfindingsof fact,a conclusion,andan order,Hart and Sacks'smodel decision looks like a judicialopin-ion, with sections entitled, analysisof issues, findingsof adjudi-cative fact, and conclusionsof law (pp. 1084-92). Hart andSacks make no attemptto hide theirpreference or theirmodel de-cision.80Hartand Sacksbelieve that the only reasonable nterpre-tation of Section 5 of the Federal Trade CommissionAct is that itrequired he FTCto buildup a bodyof administrativeawthroughthe articulationof groundsof decisionintelligibleenoughand wellenoughreasonedto have an impactat the stage of primaryprivateactivity (p. 1103). In other words,the Commission, ike a court,was responsible in the determination[s]of matters of law (p.1107),and,like a court,the more its proceduresreflectedadjudica-tive values, the better it would do its job.81 Hart and Sacks'sas-sumptionaboutthe centralityof adjudicationn the legalprocessofbution n this case- was not susceptible f reasonedelaboration nd... oughtto be madeby a politicalarm of the government, nd hadbeenalreadyansweredby Congress.P. 516.Hart and Sacks hereforeunderstoodBlack'sact of judicialpassivismwithregard o statutesas an actof judicialactivismwithregard o the Constitution.See,e.g.,Peller,NeutralPrinci-ples, supranote 8, at 600 (stating hat Hart and Sackswere staunchly pposed o judicialactivismonly at the level of constitutionalaw).

79. See p. 1083. The decisionuponwhichHart and Sacksbase this example,Matter fStandardOil Co.of NewJersey,DocketNo. 337,2 F.T.C357(1920), nvolvedStandardOil'spracticeof leasing gasolinepumpsat belowcost to retailgasolinedealerson the conditionthatthe pumpsbe usedonlyto pumpStandardOil'sgasoline. The Commissionoundthatthe leasingarrangementiolatedSection5 of the FederalTradeCommissionAct of 1914andSection3 of the ClaytonAct of 1914. The Commission'sindingswere laterinvalidated nFederalTradeCommission . StandardOil Co. (NewJersey),261 U.S. 463 (1923).80. The only secondary source they include, GERARD HENDERSON,THE FEDERALTRADECOMMISSION1924), clearly inspired their model decision:It seems to me that themostimportant inglestepwhich he Commission ould take ...wouldbe to abandon he formalandlegalistic findings o which t is nowaddicted,andto adoptinstead .. signedopinionsof the kindemployed .. in the courtsof Englandand of the UnitedStates.P. 1105 (quoting HENDERSON,upra, at 334).81. Hartand Sackssaythat the FTC'sstandardpractice ailedto satisfya numberof theconditions for adjudication:(1) the process was not truly adversarial, ince the deci-sionmakerdid not technically hoosebetweentwo competing egal arguments;2) the tribu-nal did not, in its decision,base its decisionon the proofsandargumentspresentedby theparties; 3) the decisionwrittenby the tribunaldidnot deal impartiallywith the argumentspresented by both sides. See p. 1106 (quoting HENDERSON,upra note 80, at 334-37).NeitherHendersonnor Hartand Sacksdiscusshow an administrativegencycouldsatisfythe adjudicativedeal that the decisionmaker e impartial.

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The Legal Processagencies is evident also in their theoretical discussion of the inter-pretationof statutesby agenciesin ChapterSeven. Hart and Sacksapproveof JusticeRobert Jackson'sview that whenCongresswritesa law like the Federal Trade CommissionAct of 1914,whichfor-bade unfairmethods of competition, he relevantagencymust,ininterpreting he inchoate aw, make law.82 But in doing so, theagencyfinds itself in the same position as a court interpretinganavowedly indeterminate direction[ ]. 83 Since Hart and Sacks min-imize the difference betweenthe judicial nterpretationof a statuteand legislation,84t should not be surprising hat they see little dif-ference between adjudicationby a court and by an agency: anagency can formulate law in the same form and manner as acourt. 85So far, we have seen that Hart and Sacksprivilegecourtroomadjudication ndhypothesize hatgreaterallegianceto adjudicationcouldimprovethe work of administrative gencies. A finalpiece ofevidence of TheLegalProcess'scommitment o the primacyof ad-judicationis Hart and Sacks's treatment of legislationin ChapterFive. When they findstatutory nterpretationwanting- and theyoften do - it is because it lacks one or more of the essentialquali-ties found in adjudication.For example,Hart and Sacksspend anunusual amount of space discussingthe origins of the AmericanLaw Institute and codificationmovements in general- a peculiardecision given that ChapterFive purportsto discuss legislation.The lesson they draw from the historyof the Restatements is thatthe ALI incorrectly houghtthat it couldusefully organizethe com-mon lawinto a set of rules,not principles,based on authorityratherthan reason (pp. 740-41). The Restatementprojecttook a turn forthe better in 1953 when the ALI approved[]a substantialchangein policy... [and allowed]an 'enlargedstatementof reasons' n thecomments and other steps designedto show that 'the law doesgrow by court decisions.' 86 This early section in the chapterin-

82. Pp. 1309-10 (quoting Federal Trade Commission v. Ruberoid Co., 343 U.S. 470 (1952)(Jackson, J., dissenting)).83. P. 150( [The]broadstandard established y the FederalTradeCommissionAct of1914]wasbackedup and informedby principles ndpolicies mplicit n the historyandgen-eral scheme of the statute. ).84. See,e.g.,p. 126( Enactedawmaydisplacedecisional awas a meansof initial ormu-lationof legalarrangements,utnot as a means of elaboration[,]orenactmentsneed to beinterpreted ... ).85. Pp. 1311-12. HartandSacksarguefor the distinctiveness etweenagenciesandju-ries,and endupshowing hat udgesandagencies haremanyadjudicativeeatures:(1) bothare capable f formulatingegalstandards nd rules o guidefutureconduct i.e., explainthe reasoning;2) bothmust be as even-handed.. as possible ; nd(3) bothmust formu-late the governing ulesandstandardsn the case beforethem- i.e., restrict hemselves othe arguments f the partiesbeforethem. Pp. 1311-12.86. Pp.746-47(quotingA.L.I.Proceedingsrom 1953& 1954). Hart and Sacksare simi-larly skepticalaboutEuropeancode systems. They argue, n effect, that in order to avoid

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Michigan Law Reviewtends to makeclear,fromthe beginning, hatthe realmistakemadeby those who distinguishcommon law and legislationis not thatthey focus on the fact that the former is announcedby judges andthe latter createdby politicians,but thatthey thinkthat the formerresidesin principlesandthatthe latter in a set of rules.87HartandSackschallengethis idea, as evidencedby the followingrhetoricalquestions: Cannotthere also be postulates of reasoning,whichlimitandcontrol,behindthe words of statutoryprovisions.... Can-not a legislatureeffectuallystate its postulatesand tell the courtsthat they are to treat themas liftingandcontrolling n theirreason-ing? 88The rest of the chapterseeks to show that statutes shouldreflect,as much as possible,the sort of principles ound in commonlaw.In Problem No. 29 ( Revisionof JudicialInterpretationof anExisting Statute ),Hart and Sacks use a lengthy excerpt from acongressionalhearingto illustratethe dangersof encouraging heidea that a statute is all rule and no principle. The purposeof thehearingwas to passa relativelysimple piece of legislation o reversea Supreme Court decision that had held that the Federal Food,Drug, and CosmeticAct did not requirea manufacturero permitentry by a federalinspector.89 n Cardiff, he Courtrefused to givethe Act what clearlywas its only reasonablereading,because -accordingto Hart and Sacks- the Court felt that since Congresshad created a mess by writinga vagueor self-defeatingrule,Con-gress should see its purposesfrustratedand then amend the lawthroughsubsequent egislation.90Hartand Sacksclearlythink thathad the Court treated the Act like a principle, t could have ren-

overly rigidandoutdatedcodes,FrenchandGerman awyers,whennecessary,reasonfromtheircodes in the samewaythatan Englishor American awyerreasons romprinciplesnthe common aw. Seepp.764-66(discussinghe Recourse o Generality n theFrenchCivilCode);see also pp. 771-72(quotingJUSTUsW. HEDEMANN,IEFLUCHTNDIEGENERAL-KLAUSELN(1933)).87. Hartand Sacksclearlydisagreewith the sentiment hat a codemustbe dogmatic ..a statute must never be either a reasoning or a dissertation. P. 781 (quoting ERNSTFREUND,LEGISLATIVEEGULATION1932)).88. P. 783. Hart and Sacksillustrate heirpointwith an examplebasedon Robersonv.RochesterFoldingBox Co., 171N.Y. 538,64 N.E. 442 (1902),in whichthey proposethreealternativehypothetical cts of legislation hatwould enforce the common aw rightto pri-vacythatthe New YorkCourtof Appealshad deniederroneously,n Hartand Sacks'sopin-ion, as well as those of other courts and the New Yorklegislature.The alternative heyprefer avoids he difficulties . . [of] fragmentaryodificationby a level of generality hatleaves all of [the difficulties n elaborating he principle] o be resolvedby futurejudicialaction. P. 783. See also Kennedy, upranote 18, at 396;KathleenM. Sullivan,Foreword:TheJusticesof Rules and Standards, 06HARV.L. REV.22, 79 n.395(1992).89. See pp. 810-33(discussingUnited States v. Cardiff,344 U.S. 174(1952)).90. See pp. 817-18. Hart and Sacksmockinglyreferto this responseto poorlyframedlegislationas the flagellantheoryof statutorynterpretation. P. 91. It is quitesimilar othe positiontaken by Fuller'smythicalJusticeKeen. See Lon L. Fuller,The Caseof theSpeluncean Explorers, 62 HARV. L. REV.616, 636-37 (1949).

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The Legal Processdered it coherent through adjudication and they use the example ofthe hearing to show the unintended and unfortunate consequencesof the Court's approach. In the relatively insignificant episode theydocument, an industry lobbyist tried to get a congressional commit-tee to state in the legislative records that the clarification of theFDA's right to entry, which confirmed a previous FDA construc-tion, should not be seen by the courts as a confirmation of otherprevious administration constructions of the same act (pp. 814-15).As Hart and Sacks observe, the congressmen had backed them-selves into a corner. By allowing the courts to treat its statute like alimited rule, Congress had no alternative but to tell the courts thattheir approval of a subsequent reasonable interpretation of its actby the FDA did not indicate an approval of other FDA interpreta-tions of the same statute based on the same reasoning.91 This case,like others in the chapter, is used by Hart and Sacks to illustrate theperils of viewing legislative intent as no more than a statute's au-thor's specific intentions.92 The only cure to this problem, Hart andSacks seem to say, is for courts to treat legislation like commonlaw.93

91. From he questionsHart and Sacksask the student, t is clearthat,giventhepremisesupon which the statutehad been drafted, he committeehad failed to meet the objectionsraisedby the lobbyistat the hearings.See p. 833.92. Thefirstrule of statutorynterpretationHart and Sacksoffer at the end of chapter7says, a court... is to decidewhatmeaningoughtto be givento the directionsof the statutein the respectsrelevant o the case before t. [This]doesnot saythat the court's unction s toascertain he intentionof the legislaturewithrespect o the matterat issue. P. 1374. Hartand Sacks illchapter5 withexamplesof statutes hat fail to serve thepublic nterestbecausethey soughtto addressspecific,often private,needs,rather han to create generaldirectivearrangements. orexample,ProblemNo. 35( Provision f GovernmentServicesand Pecu-niaryInducements:TheUses of Insurance,EspeciallyAgainstFloods )and ProblemNo. 36( A SpecialLawDealingWith a MunicipalDisaster )are textbookexamplesof what wouldlater be understoodas rent-seeking egislation.See Eskridge,PoliticsWithoutRomance,supra note 12, at 288; see also JAMESM. BUCHANAN& GORDONTULLOCK, HECALCULUSOFCONSENT33-48(1962)(on rent-seekingn publicchoice). EskridgeandFrickey uggestthat Hart and Sacksmay not have realizedthe pessimistic mplicationsof their pictureoflegislative ailure. See pp. cxxi-cxxii;ee also WilliamN. Eskridge,Jr. & PhilipP. Frickey,Legislation cholarship ndPedagogyn thePost-LegalProcessEra,48 U. PITr.L. REV.691,705-07(1987)(RichardPosner's legisprudence orrectedHart and Sacks'snaiveviews oflegislation).93. Hartand Sacks mplicitly riticize he apparentdistinctionbetween the adjudicationof common awandstatutes n chapter1 whenthey discuss heirgeneralprincipleof law-the reasonedelaborationof generaldirectivearrangements withoutdistinguishing e-tween statutesand common aw. See pp. 147-48. Theirsense that statutory nterpretationshouldmainlyfocus on the searchfor principleexplains, or example,theirrejectionof theliteralapproach, ndtheirskepticismof the utilityof legislativehistory. See pp. 1116-48,1212-54.Hart andSacksclearlyreflectthe influenceof EdwardLevi in this view. Levi wasas skepticalaboutthe apparentdistinctionbetweenstatutorynterpretation nd common awinterpretation as Hart and Sacks. See, e.g., EDWARDH. LEVI,AN INTRoDucnTON TO LEGALREASONING9-30(1949). Levi,however,urgeda theoryof statutorynterpretationhat wasmore deferential o earlyjudicial nterpretationsf legislative ntent than the view adoptedby TheLegalProcess.CompareLEVI,upra,at31-32 in trying o constructegislative ntent,a courthas morediscretion hanit has withcase law, and for that reason must be moredeferential o precedent)withp. 1343(commenting n Levi'stheory).

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Michigan Law ReviewCONCLUSION

The idea that TheLegalProcess s an argument or the superior-ity of Fuller'sconceptionof adjudicationhelps to explain the de-cline of legal processduringthe 1960s and 1970s.94Paradoxically,Hart and Sacks'swillingness o locate legal decisionmakingbeyondthe courtroomwas accompaniedby an extraordinarily emandingset of criteria for the form of legal decisionmaking.By allowingthat not all legal actors had to be judge

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SEBOK Reading the Legal Process