SCIR Spring 2016 Final

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S CI R

Volume 6, Number 1 • Spring 2016


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Te Southern California International Review (SCIR) is a bi-annual interdis-ciplinary print and online journal o scholarship in the field o international

studies generously unded by the School o International Relations at theUniversity o Southern Caliornia (USC). In particular, SCIR would liketo thank the Robert L. Friedheim Fund and the USC SIR Alumni Fund.

Founded in 2011, the journal seeks to oster and enhance discussion between

theoretical and policy-oriented research regarding significant global issues.SCIR is managed completely by students and also provides undergraduates

valuable experience in the fields o editing and graphic design.

Copyright © 2016 Southern California International Review.

All rights reserved. No part o this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any orm without the express written consent o the Southern California International

Review.

Views expressed in this journal are solely those o the authors themselves and do not necessarilyrepresent those o the editorial board, aculty advisors or the University o Southern Caliornia.

S C I Rscir.org

Staff

Editor-in-Chief:Reid Tom

Editors:

Aaron Rifind

SarahBelle Selig

Patrick Vossler

Katie McDowell

Anna Merzi

Samuel Miller

ISSN: 1545-2611


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We dedicate this journal to those effected by terrorist violence around theworld and to the cause of finding a peaceful solution to

violence in the Middle East.


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Contents

1. Asylum Trough Executive Action

Bypassing Flawed Law to Protect Persecuted ChildrenJonathan Yost

10

2. Eyes in the Sky An Examination of the Determinants of U.S. and Israeli Unmanned AerialVehicle (UAV) Proliferation

Eric Lenier Ives

26

3. Germany’s Safe Country of Origin SchemeTe Long Legacy of Anti-Gypsyism

Gabriele Anton

62

4. Minimizing Historical Memory and Spillover in rade RelationsSwini ummala

78

5. State-Centrism and the Conceptualization of War

How Mainstream IR Fails to Account for New Actors in Contemporary Conflict Nicholas Babey

88


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S C I R - Vol. 6 No. 1

Asylum Trough Executive Action

and political opinion. Te category most appropriate or children applying or protection ispersecution on account o “membership in a particular social group,” which legally requires

members share “immutable characteristics” and their group possess “social distinction.”Failure to convince judges o these requirements is the ault o vague legal definitions. Tispaper argues that attributes leading to a reugees’ persecution, including age, gender, socio-economic status, region, exercise o a undamental right, shared past experience and politi-cal opposition to a de acto state, are immutable and possess social distinction. Tereore,this paper proposes President Barack Obama issue an Executive Order granting asylum to17,532 members o this persecuted social group over a our-year period.

Tis paper first describes the violence orcing children to flee. Second, it identifies theproblem with current US asylum law. Tird, it proposes a solution, including its implemen-tation and cost. Finally, it analyzes the proposal’s easibility.

Background

Te exceptional brutality o the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs has turned the Northernriangle into the most dangerous area not classified as a war-zone in the world.6 Tis brutal-ity is evident in the initiation process, during which male recruits are assaulted and orced tocommit murder and emale recruits are excessively beaten and raped.7 According to a reportby the US Conerence o Catholic Bishops, children are attempting to escape “join or die”recruiting tactics, in which resistance can result in the murder o the recruit and their amilymembers.8 Te homicide rates in this region are extremely high relative to those o the US,indicating an extraordinary level o violence within these communities. For example, ac-

cording to a 2014 Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA) report, Northern rianglemales between the ages o 15 and 30 have a 1 in 300 chance o being murdered, while a 17year old in the US has only a 0.039 in 300 chance.9 Te constant threat o death leaves manyrecruits with no choice but to flee.

State solutions to violence against gang-resisters have been ineffective and have exacer-bated the situation. Northern riangle governments responded with “zero tolerance” poli-cies based almost exclusively on heavy-handed enorcement, including joint police-militarygang raids. Zero tolerance approaches, or mano dura, undermine human rights, due pro-cess and increase murder rates. In El Salvador or example, 2003 homicide rates increasedrom 33 per 100,000 persons to 56 per 100,000 persons by 2006. Mano dura policies have

6 Cynthia Arnson and Eric Olsen, “Organized Crime In Central America: Te Northern riangle,” Woodrow Wilson Interna-tional Center or Scholars, November 2011, accessed November 22, 2015.

7 Bruneau, Maras: Gang Violence, 1, 3.

8 Carlson, Elizabeth, and Anne Marie Gallagher. “Humanitarian Protection or Children Fleeing Gang-Based Violence in theAmericas.” Journal on Migration and Human Security 3, no. 2 (2015): 129-58. Accessed November 21, 2015.

9 Washington Office on Latin America, “Central American Gang-Related Asylum,” WOLA, May 2008, accessed November 23,2015.


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also resulted in more organized and clandestine gang activity, making it more difficult orauthorities to control.10 In addition to incompetence, there is a strong correlation between

government corruption and unwillingness to protect targets o violence.11

Problem

Currently, adjudication or reugee and asylee protection in the US is determined byimmigration judges, circuit courts and the Bureau or Immigration Appeals (BIA).12 Teybase their rulings on the Reugee Act o 1980 (P.L. 96-212), an act closely ollowing the 1951Convention Relating to the Status o Reugees and 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status oReugees, which define a reugee as:

“any person who is outside any country o such person’s nationality or, in the case o a

person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last habitu-ally resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling toavail himsel or hersel o the protection o, that country because o persecution or awell-ounded ear o persecution on account o race, religion, nationality, membershipin a particular social group, or political opinion.”13

Based on the P.L. 96-212 definition, gang-related asylum claims are regularly denied byUS courts. In most cases, gang-related asylees are viewed as lacking the required connec-tion to any o the five grounds or persecution.14 Te category most appropriate or theseindividuals is “membership in a particular social group.” o be eligible or protection as a

member o a particular social group, they must share “immutable characteristics” and theirgroup must possess “social distinction.” According to the BIA, immutable characteristicsare those “beyond the power o an individual to change or is so undamental to individualidentity or conscience that it ought not be required to be changed.” Regarding social distinc-tion, the BIA declared: “to be socially distinct, a group need not be seen by society; it mustinstead be “perceived” as a group by society. Members o the group may be visibly recogniz-able, but society can also consider persons to be a group without being able to identiy themembers by sight.”15

10 Washington Office on Latin America, “Central American Gang-Related Asylum,” 4.

11 Ibid.

12 Reugee and asylee are used interchangeably or the purposes o this paper.

13 Article 1 (A)(2) o the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status o Reugees.

14 Kate Manuel, “Asylum and Gang Violence: Legal Overview,” Congressional Research Service, September 5, 2014, accessedNovember 20, 2015.

15 Ibid., 13-14.


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Te denial o gang-related asylum cases ofen results not rom a ailure to meet require-ments, but rather rom the vague language used to define “membership in a particular social

group.” Lack o clarity has allowed or excessive subjectivity during adjudications, resultingin rulings based more on opinion than precise legal guidelines.

Solution

o remedy this legal flaw and its tremendous human cost, this paper proposes that thePresident issue Executive Order 1371316, declaring gang-related asylum-seekers shall be o-ered reuge i they meet a more precise definition o a reugee:

1) Any person who is outside any country o such person’s nationality or, in the caseo a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such person last ha-

bitually resided,

2) who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himsel orhersel o the protection o that country,

2) because o persecution or a well-ounded ear o persecution,

3) and are persecuted on grounds o membership in a particular social group consistingo age, gender, socioeconomic status, region, exercise o a undamental right, sharedpast experience, and political opposition to a de acto state.

According to numerous case rulings as well as intergovernmental, think tank and schol-arly arguments, gang-related asylees do indeed meet all o the above criteria:

1) According to Customs and Border Patrol, 122,724 Guatemalan, Honduran and ElSalvadorian children have been apprehended at the southwestern US border during FY2009-2015, placing them outside the Northern riangle.17

2) WOLA reported that government authorities in the Northern riangle ail to re-spond effectively to gangs and are currently unable to protect youths targeted by gang

members. Also, there is evidence o government collaboration with gangs. Tereore,the governments o Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador have proven they are both

16 According to the National Archives and Records Administration, last Executive Action, as o 12/5/15, was EO 13712.

17 US Customs and Border Control, “Southwest Border.”


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unable and unwilling to protect targets.18 In addition, internal relocation is virtuallyimpossible. Due to the extensive reach o the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs, there is no

realistic internal flight alternative to seeking asylum in the US. According to WOLA,“even i one were able to move to another city, the gang presence is pervasive and relo-cation would not provide saety rom persecution by gangs.”19

3) Resistance to orced recruitment by gangs leads to various orms o violence in-cluding, but not limited to, murder, assault, rape, robbery, thef, arson and associatedthreats. In the August 2009 7th Circuit Court o Appeals case Francis Gatimi, et al v. EricH. Holder , the appellate judge affirmed that violence committed by gangs amounts topersecution. He considered the previous judge’s ruling o violence suffered by the claim-ant as mere “mistreatment” to be “absurd” (No. 08-31974). Additional support includes

the March 1999 9th Circuit US Court o Appeals case o Dinora Del Carmen Molinav. INS, which ruled that orced recruitment into a Guatemalan guerrilla group mayamount to persecution. Furthermore, Sandra --, US Department of Justice, ExecutiveOffice for Immigration Review (Dec. 2008) declared that “being relentlessly stalked,threatened, and physically and sexually assaulted by members o a violent gang whomthe Guatemalan government has heretoore been unable to control would qualiy as‘infliction o suffering’ and thus be considered past persecution.”20

4) Gang-related asylees are persecuted on account o being 12-17 year olds, male, livingbelow the international poverty line o $1.90/day, residing in the Central American

cities o San Pedro Sula, San Salvador, Guatemala city and egucigalpa, exercising theundamental right to not associate with the MS-13 and 18th Street gangs, sharing pastexperience o resisting recruitment by said gangs and politically opposing gangs actingas de acto states.21,22

Concerning the validity o said characteristics, the United Nations High Commissioneror Reugees (UNHCR) determined that “gender and age cannot by denied or a particu-lar social group or reugee status.”23 In addition to gender and age, Canada’s Immigrationand Reugee Board recognized that low socioeconomic standing constitutes an immutable


19 Ibid.

20 United Nations High Commissioner or Reugees. “Guidance Not on Reugee Claims Relating to Victims o OrganizedGangs,” UNHCR, March 2010, accessed November 22, 2015. 8, 17.

21 2015 World Bank global poverty line estimate.

22 See Appendix 1.2 or Northern riangle regions with highest levels o child flight.

23 Erika Feller, Volker ürk, and Frances Nicholson, Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations onInternational Protection, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2003. 70, 71.


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characteristic.24 Te September 2014 case o D.V., (unpublished case) IJ Castro and USAID’sCentral American and Mexico Gang Assessment Report reached the same conclusion, adding

that a claimant’s region is also an immutable characteristic.25,26

Regarding the undamental right not to associate with gangs, supporting evidence in-cludes the UNHCR’s determination that “evading recruitment and opposing gang practicesis a characteristic undamental to one’s conscience and exercise o human rights,” unda-mental enough that one should not be orced to renounce it.27 Te right protecting againstassociation with groups is reinorced by multiple court rulings, including VM (FGM - Risks- Mungiki - Kikuyu/Gikuyu) Kenya v. Secretary of State for the Home Department (2008),Canadian Supreme Court ruling Lavigne v. Ontario public service employees union, R v.

Advanced Cutting and Coring Ltd., EU Court o Human Rights ruling Sigurjonsson v. Icelandand Sorensen and Rasmussen v. Denmark.28,29

Te shared past experience o resisting recruitment is also an immutable characteris-tic. Te BIA ruled that minors who have been orcibly recruited by and have resisted gangsmay have a shared past experience, which, by definition, cannot be changed and is thereoreimmutable.30,31

Lastly, due to gangs’ state-like control over public and private spheres in the Northernriangle, asylee resistance is associated with political opposition. According to the UNHCR,MS-13 and 18th Street gangs do indeed behave as a de acto state and thereore politi-cal opposition should be recognized a valid immutable characteristic o their social group.Furthermore, the case o Emilia Del Socorro Gutierrez Gomez v. Te Secretary of State forthe Home Department determined that “the risk o extortion threats rom a criminal gang

will not normally be on account o political opinion, but in some societies where criminaland political activities heavily overlap, the picture may be different.” In Vassilev v. Canada(Minister of Citizenship and Immigration), a Canadian ederal court ruled that “in this casecriminal activity permeates state action. Opposition to criminal acts becomes oppositionto state authorities. On these acts it is clear that there is no distinction between the anti-criminal and ideological/political aspects o the claimant’s ear o persecution. One wouldnever deny that reusing to vote because an election is rigged is a political opinion.” 32

24 UNHCR, “Guidance,” 15.


26 Inormation accessed at usaid.gov.


28 Ibid., 13.

29 Jonathan Orpin, “VSM: does reedom o association include the right not to associate?,” oday’s Dissent, Febuary 24, 2010,accessed November 22, 2015.

30 Matter o S-E-G (2008).


32 Ibid.


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Concerning the “social distinction” component o “particular social groups,” severalcourt decisions state several o the aorementioned immutable characteristics— gender, so-

cioeconomic status, region and shared past experience — also constitute a group with socialdistinction. In X v. Canada, MA6-03043, Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada (29 February 2009), the court ruled that “poor Haitian women with HIV/AIDS” do pos-sess social distinction, and thereore granted “X” asylum in Canada.33 In addition, the BIArecently recognized “young tribal women who are opposed to emale genital mutilation,”“homosexuals in Cuba,” and “ormer national police members” as having social distinc-tion.34 Tese determinations strongly support the argument that characteristics possessedby gang-related asylees ulfill the distinction requirement.

Te validity o persecution on account o membership in a particular social group hasseveral components. Te first is comprised o seven immutable characteristics: age, gender,

socioeconomic status, region, exercise o undamental right to not associate, shared pastexperience and political opposition. Te second includes our socially recognized char-acteristics: gender, socioeconomic status, region and shared past experience. Tis systemis supported by eight court rulings, as well as UNHCR, USAID, WOLA, proessional andscholarly arguments.

Implementation and Cost

Te Executive Order itsel is only the first step in protecting these persecuted children.Implementation o the order is critical. Consequently, this article borrows rom Carlson andGallagher’s suggestions to ensure its execution. Tese suggestions include protecting due

process rights with adequate access to immigration attorneys and additional immigration judges to adjudicate asylum claims, as well as replacement o CBP screeners with USCISasylum officers.35 In addition, Carlson and Gallagher suggest an increase in asylum reerralstaff at US embassies and UNHCR offices in the Northern riangle.36

Te total cost o EO 13713, including processing, admitting and resettling all 17,532asylees, amounts to $264,750,000. Te exact number o asylees is determined by the aver-age level o Central American children encountered at the US’s southwest border during FY2009-2015.37 Te unding required was calculated by the US State Department’s $1.059 bil-lion estimation o costs to process, admit and resettle 70,000 reugees during FY 2015.38 Teproposed quantity o reugees is 25 percent o the State Department’s proposal, and thereore

33 Canada: Immigration and Reugee Board, “X v. Canada.” February 29, 2009, accessed November 20, 2015. 6.

34 Manuel, “Asylum and Gang Violence,” 17.

35 Carlson and Gallagher, “Humanitarian Protection,” 151, 152.

36 US Citizenship and Immigration Services, “Questions & Answers: Reugees," accessed November 21, 2015.

37 US Customs and Border Patrol, “Southwest Border.”

38 Inormation accessed at state.gov.


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25 percent o the costs. In order to minimize burdens on US immigration inrastructure,propose embracing 17,532 children over a our-year period, at 4,383 per year, with an annual

cost o $66,187,500.

Feasibility

Given the current political climate, the viability o this proposal is strong. Tis conclu-sion is based on 1) President Obama’s status as a “lame duck” president, 2) vocal support orsuch a proposal by influential members o Congress, 3) avorable public opinion polls and4) an effective and politically diverse pro-reugee lobby.

Given that midterm elections have passed, and the President is in his final term, heis considered a “lame duck” president. Historically, political costs or Executive Actionsduring the final term period are reduced afer midterm elections. As a result, presidents have

issued Executive Actions considered risky prior to this period. On January 19th, 1981, thelast day o his only presidential term, President Jimmy Carter ordered the release o rozenIranian assets and the establishment o an arbitration process to settle private claims againstIran in exchange or the release o American hostages.39 Furthermore, prior to his lameduck status, Obama proved he is willing to issue controversial Executive Orders. Examplesinclude orders to prohibit discrimination against LGBs, protect undocumented immi-grants rom deportation, boost environmental protections, reorm No Child Lef Behindand raise minimum wages or ederally contracted workers, among others.40 Obama’s lameduck status and record o politically risky Executive Actions increases the likelihood o hiswillingness to issue the proposed order.

In addition to the President’s willingness, influential members o Congress have vocallyexpressed their support or Executive Action to protect Central American children. Amongthese proponents is ormer presidential candidate and long-time Arizona Senator JohnMcCain. During an interview with Reuters, he argued that emergency reugee status orthese minors is “key” to addressing the humanitarian crisis at the border. Further supportwas expressed by 23-year Illinois representative Luis Gutierrez, as well as 20-year Caliorniarepresentative Zoe Logren, who added that her position was endorsed by a Republicanmember o the House Judiciary Committee.41 Beyond those in the interview, support oprotection or Northern riangle asylees would likely be ound among opposition o Housebill H.R. 3009 and its Senate twin S. 2146 — bills demonizing those emigrating rom Central

America.

39 Kenneth Mayer, “Executive Orders and Presidential Power,” Te Journal of Politics 61, no. 2 (May 2009): 445-466, accessedNovember 20, 2015. 451.

40 Inormation accessed at whitehouse.gov.

41 Richard Cowan, “Calls in US Congress or Reugee Status or Central American Kids,” Reuters, June 27, 2014, accessedNovember 20, 2015.


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Te House and Senate versions of the bill were primarily supported by Republicans,including S. 2146 co-sponsors and Presidential candidates ed Cruz and Marco Rubio.42

Te bills received more support than opposition in both chambers, but the deficit in pro-immigrant votes is unlikely to threaten this proposal. If the level of the bills’ support werean indication of opposition to EO 13713, Republicans would still fall short of the total votesneeded for obstruction.

Moreover, public opinion is strongly in favor of an order protecting asylee children.According to a July 2014 poll from the Public Religion Research Institute, 70 percent ofAmericans agreed that these minors are refugees, not illegal immigrants.43 In addition, thePew Research Center found in August 2014 that 56 percent of Americans were in favor ofallowing these children to attend public school and 69 percent were in favor of them join-ing existing family while waiting for asylum adjudications.44 Furthermore, a July 2014 ABC

News/Washington Post poll found that 53 percent of Americans are in favor of a proposed$3.7 billion bill to provide care for Central American children while their cases are evalu-ated.45 Fiscally, the $264 million price tag of this proposal is 99.3 percent less, and includesprocessing, admittance and resettlement costs. While the latter two opinion polls do notdirectly support Executive Order 13713, they express empathy towards asylees and thereforeapply little pressure on lawmakers to obstruct the order.

Finally, the strength and political stance of pro-refugee interest groups bolsters the fea-sibility of this order. According to a June 2013 report by the Council of Foreign Relations,refugee advocates are influential and effective when lobbying Congress.46 Powerful advo-cates include the large, predominately secular coalition RefugeeCouncilUSA. Of the 20 or-

ganizations, influential members include Asylum Access, International Rescue Committee,RefugePoint, Center for Victims of orture, Human Rights First and HIAS, among others. 47 In addition to the secular lobby, a powerful Christian coalition has taken up the mantel ofrefugee protection. Te faith-based lobby consists of World Relief, US Council of CatholicBishops, Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service, Church World Service and manyEvangelical organizations.48 Te latter of the two coalitions may be more effective againstobstruction, as they are part of the Republican’s core constituency.

42 Information accessed at house.gov and congress.gov.

43 See appendix 1.2 for polling graph.

44 Pew Research Center, “Pew Research Center Poll August 20-24, 2014,” polling report, accessed November 20, 2015.

45 ABC News/Washington Post, “ABC News/Washington Post Poll July 9-13, 2014,” polling report, accessed November 21,2015.

46 Council on Foreign Relations, “Te Global Human Rights Regime,” CFR, June 19, 2013, accessed November 21, 2015.

47 Refugee Council USA, “Members,” RCUSA, accessed November 23, 2015.

48 Nahal oosi, “Christian groups break with GOP over Syrian refugees,” Politico, November 17, 2015, accessed November 20,2015.


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Congress does have the power to pass a bill blocking the implementation of EO 13713.However, this bill could then be vetoed by the President, and only a two-thirds vote in both

chambers could overrule his veto.49

Vocal support from influential members of Congress,favorable public opinion polls and an effective and politically diverse pro-refugee lobbyreduce the likelihood that opponents could achieve an obstructive vote.

Conclusion

Extreme gang violence in the Northern has increased youths’ forced migration north-ward. Te vague legal language used to define “membership in a particular social group”with “immutable characteristics” and “social distinction” has failed to offer the refuge thesechildren deserve. Characteristics that lead to their persecution - including age, gender, so-cioeconomic status, region, exercise of a fundamental right, shared past experience, and

political opposition to a de facto state - are immutable and constitute social distinction.Terefore, President Barack Obama should issue Executive Order 13713, which grantsasylum to 17,532 members of this particular social group over a four-year period. Whilethe implementation of this order would require replacement of CBP screeners with USICSasylum officers and an increase in asylum referral staff at US embassies and UNHCR of-fices in the Northern riangle, costs of processing, admitting and integrating the asyleesare very reasonable when compared to less ambitious, more expensive proposals. Given thePresident’s lame duck status and support from Congress, the public and interest groups, thefeasibility of the proposed Executive Action is strong. Offering asylum to persecuted chil-dren is not only a legal obligation, but also a moral responsibility.

49 John Malsberger, From Obstruction to Moderation: Te ransformation of Senate Conservatism, 1838-1952, London, UK:Associated University Presses, 2000.


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Appendix 1

1.1 Northern Triangle Map


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1.3 Polling Graph


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Works Cited

ABC News/Washington Post. “ABC News/Washington Post Poll July 9-13, 2014.” Polling

Report. Accessed November 21, 2015.Arnson, Cynthia and Eric Olsen. “Organized Crime In Central America: Te Northern ri-

angle.” Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. November 2011. AccessedNovember 22, 2015.

Bruneau, Tomas C., Lucía Dammert, and Elizabeth Skinner. Maras: Gang Violence andSecurity in Central America. Austin, X: University of exas Press, 2011.

Canada: Immigration and Refugee Board. “X v. Canada.” February 29, 2009. AccessedNovember 20, 2015.

Carlson, Elizabeth, and Anne Marie Gallagher. “Humanitarian Protection for Children

Fleeing Gang-Based Violence in the Americas.” Journal on Migration and Human Se-curity 3, no. 2 (2015): 129-58. Accessed November 21, 2015.

Council on Foreign Relations. “Te Global Human Rights Regime.” CFR. June 19, 2013.Accessed November 21, 2015.

Cowan, Richard. “Calls in US Congress for Refugee Status for Central American Kids.”Reuters. June 27, 2014. Accessed November 20, 2015.

“Executive Orders.” Te White House. Accessed December 1, 2015.

Feller, Erika, Volker ürk, and Frances Nicholson. Refugee Protection in International Law:UNHCR’s Global Consultations on International Protection. Cambridge, UK: Cam-

bridge University Press, 2003.“Final Vote Results for Roll Call 466.” US House of Representatives. July 23, 2015.

Accessed November 22, 2015.

International Human Rights Council. “No Place to Hide: Gang, State, and Clandestine Vio-lence in El Salvador.” Human Rights Program of Harvard Law School. February 2007.Accessed November 24, 2015.

Malsberger, John. From Obstruction to Moderation: Te ransformation of SenateConservatism, 1838-1952. London, UK: Associated University Presses, 2000.

Manuel, Kate. “Asylum and Gang Violence: Legal Overview.” Congressional Research Ser-

vice. September 5, 2014. Accessed November 20, 2015.Mayer, Kenneth. “Executive Orders and Presidential Power.” Te Journal of Politics 61, no.

2 (May 2009): 445-466. Accessed November 20, 2015.

Obama, Barack. “Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2015.” President of the Unit-ed States. Accessed November 23, 2015.


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Orpin, Jonathan. “VSM: does freedom of association include the right not to associate?”Today’s Dissent. Febuary 24, 2010. Accessed November 22, 2015.

Pew Research Center. “Pew Research Center Poll August 20-24, 2014.” Polling Report.Accessed November 20, 2015.

Public Religion Research Institute. “Survey: Nearly 7-in-10 Americans See UnaccompaniedChildren at Border as Refugees, Not Illegal Immigrants.” PRRI. July 7, 2014.Accessed November 22, 2015.

Refugee Council USA. “Members.” RCUSA. Accessed November 23, 2015.

“S.2146 - Stop Sanctuary Policies and Protect Americans Act.” Library of Congress.October 20, 2015. Accessed November 20, 2015.

Snyder, Howard N. Juvenile Arrests 1999. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Dept of Justice, Office of

Justice Programs, Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention, 2000.Toosi, Nahal. “Christian groups break with GOP over Syrian refugees.” Politico.

November 17, 2015. Accessed November 20, 2015.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees. “Guidance Not on Refugee Claims Re-lating to Victims of Organized Gangs.” UNHCR. March 2010. Accessed November 22,2015.

US Citizenship and Immigration Services. “Questions & Answers: Refugees.” AccessedNovember 21, 2015.

US Customs and Border Patrol. “Southwest Border Unaccompanied Alien Children Statis-

tics FY 2016.” CBP. Accessed November 21, 2015.Washington Office on Latin America. “Central American Gang-Related Asylum.” WOLA.

May 2008. Accessed November 23, 2015.

World Bank. “FAQs: Global Poverty Line Update.” September 30, 2015. AccessedNovember 22, 2015.


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Eyes in the Sky An Examination o the Determinants o U.S. and Israeli

Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV) ProlierationEric Lenier Ives

Since the inception o the Missile reaty Control Regime in 1987, Israel and the United Stateshave accounted or over three-quarters o the world’s unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) exports.Departing rom previous discourse about UAVs that examines the topic rom a legal and ethi-cal standpoint, this paper uses multivariate regression to analyze UAV transer data rom theStockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) along with data on UN voting a-

finity, military capability, polity, domestic stability and the number o soldier and terrorismcasualties. Te results suggest that smaller nations are more likely to import UAVs rom the

U.S. and Israel and that more ideological similarity between nations leads to a decreased likeli-hood o UAV trade. In addition, nations with a large but contracting military are more likelyto import UAVs rom the U.S., while nations with a small but expanding military are morelikely to import UAVs rom Israel. Rising state ragility increases the likelihood o UAV imports

rom both the U.S. and Israel, but the U.S. is more likely to trade with ragile nations. Lastly,the results do not suggest that higher UAV imports correlate with lower soldier casualties. Tis

paper examines which actors influence the export and import o Israeli and U.S. UAVs.

E L I graduated rom New York University in 2015 with a degreein International Relations and German Literature. Afer teaching English in

Germany on a Fulbright Grant, he will attend law school to ocus on nationalsecurity and international law.

Introduction

UAVs, known more commonly as drones, have exploded in popularity in the last 14years. According to a 2012 report by the U.S. Government Accountability Office (GAO),the number of tactical UAV-capable countries grew from 41 in 2005 to 76 in 2011.1 Te ealGroup, a private defense systems analysis firm, estimates that “UAV spending will nearlydouble over the next decade,” from $6.5 billion in 2014 to $11.5 billion in 2024, meaningthat the popularity growth of UAVs shows no signs of stopping.2 Te current analysis offersonly estimates of UAV arsenals with the 2012 GAO report indicating 76 UAV-capable na-tions and the International Institute for Strategic Studies indicating only 56 UAV nations inits 2012 report.

UAVs have been at the forefront of legal and ethical discussions of the War on error,

extrajudicial killings, and excessive domestic surveillance yet little research has been done

1 Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Agencies Could Improve Information Sharing and End-Use Monitoring onUnmanned Aerial Vehicle Exports,” July 30, 2012, publicly released September 12, 2012.

2 eal Group, “eal Group Predicts Worldwide UAV Market Will otal $91 Billion in Its 2014 UAV Market Profile and Fore-cast,” July 14, 2014.


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Eyes in the Sky

on international UAV proliferation as a topic in itself. In other words, most literature focuseson the theory of UAVs rather than their actual sale. Tis paper takes a statistical approach

to the topic of UAV proliferation to explore the macroscopic trends of the two largest UAVexporters in the world – the U.S. and Israel – in order to determine the characteristics of thecountries that import UAVs.

UAVs are governed internationally by the Missile echnology Control Regime (MCR),which aims to control the proliferation of WMD-delivery systems, ballistic and cruise mis-siles, as well as UAVs.3 Tirty-four countries are currently partners to the MCR. In 2015,the U.S. reaffirmed its commitment to the MCR while simultaneously relaxing exportregulations on UAVs sold by U.S. firms.4 Tough Israel has yet to sign the MCR, Appendix3 in the GAO report outlines that Israel imposes regulations on UAV exports based on theguidelines of the MCR. Currently, only the United States, the United Kingdom and Israel

operate militarized drones equipped with surface-to-ground missiles, with the U.S. andIsrael driving international exports. Since the inception of the MCR in 1987, the combinedUAV exports of the U.S. and Israel comprise over 75 percent of the global total. Because ofthe limited adoption of the MCR and the discrete nature of arms deals, getting an exactnumber of international UAV transactions remains difficult.

Te proliferation of UAVs is a central concern of U.S. foreign policy as advanced sys-tems have lethal payloads and incredibly accurate surveillance systems. Current holders ofmilitary drones are mostly democratic countries. However, as data from the InternationalInstitute for Strategic Studies (IISS) shows, Iran, Russia, urkey, and China all continue topursue domestic military UAV programs.5 SIPRI (Stockholm International Peace Research

Institute) arms trade data also shows that many importing countries, such as urkey,Georgia, Colombia, and Ivory Coast, are autocratic.

Tough the Israeli UAV sector is regulated, it thrives on an international market of auto-cratic countries. A marketing official for Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), the state-ownedIsraeli UAV producer, has bluntly stated their industry exists “because of the internationalmarket … We’re too big for Israel, to our delight.”6 IAI exports to 49 nations and “80 percentof its UAV products are designed for foreign markets.”7 IAI produces the high enduranceHeron P and Heron-1 models, which both have sophisticated sensor systems for surveil-lance in inhospitable weather. Te recently-launched Heron P was widely discussed for itsendurance capabilities, notably its ability to fly to Iran from Israel.

3 Te MCR defines and is most concerned with Category I or II equipment. Category I UAVs have complete rocket systems,exceed a 300 km range and a 500 kg payload. Category II also include complete rocket systems but have a range less than 300 km.

4 Missile echnology Control reaty (MCR).

5 Simon Rogers, “Drones by Country: who has all the UAVs?,” Te Guardian, August 3, 2012.

6 ia Goldberg, “Israel leads global drone exports as demand grows,” Te imes o Israel, June 6, 2013.

7 Ibid.


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In the past, U.S. competitors, such as General Atomics and Northrop Grumman, acedmore stringent export restrictions. In February 2015, the U.S. Department o State issued a

new policy regarding commercial UAV exporters to help them compete in the global mar-ket.8 Te new policy distinguishes between military UAVs and commercial UAVs, and itallows commercial UAVs to be governed by Export Administration Regulations (EAR) asopposed to the Conventional Arms ranser (CA) Policy.9,10 Tis shif maintains licens-ing requirements or “non-military” UAVs, but relaxes the requirements o CA Policy,which require proposed transers to consider, among other actors,“U.S. regional stabil-ity interests,” “human rights, democratization, counterterrorism” and “the likelihood therecipient would use the arms to commit human rights abuses or serious violations o in-ternational humanitarian law.”11 Commentators believe this policy shif is a direct result oincreased Israeli and Chinese competition in the global market. While the U.S. maintains a

strong global presence in armed UAVs with the iconic Predator “Hunter-Killer” UAV andthe newer MQ-9 Reaper model, less expensive UAVs equipped with advanced sensory sys-tems rather than surace-to-ground missiles have become the more popular export product.

Tough both the U.S. and Israel embrace the increased competition, each country hastaken a different approach to export regulation. In 2006, Israel’s Ministry o Deense estab-lished the Deense Export Control Agency (DECA) that reviews applications or deenseexports. Under DECA, an MCR Committee specifically handles exports regulated by theMCR. Tus, Israel adheres to the policies o the MCR even though it is not a signatory tothe regime. DECA maintains responsibility or exports and imposes licensing restrictionspreventing the resale o exports.12 Under this system, Category I UAVs, such as the Heron

P, are controlled under a “presumption o denial” standard akin to the United States. Onthe other hand, Category II UAVs, lighter models ofen used in surveillance, are reviewed byDECA and may be approved with a declaration that the buyer adheres to MCR controls.13

My results suggest that both the U.S. and Israel export to smaller, more autocratic na-tions. Israel exports UAVs to nations expanding their militaries while the U.S. exports to na-tions with large but declining militaries. While Israel and the U.S. both export UAVs to moreunstable nations with civil unrest, the U.S. is more likely to export to unstable nations. Teresults suggest that deeper trade ties— in the orm o more UAVs—occur in stable nations

8 U.S. Department o State, February 17, 2015.

9 Export Administration Regulations, (UAVs to be ound in Category 9 – Aerospace and Propulsion Section 9A012).

10 Conventional Arms ranser Policy.

11 Ibid.

12 Government Accountability Office (GAO), “Agencies Could Improve Inormation Sharing and End-Use Monitoring onUnmanned Aerial Vehicle Exports,” July 30, 2012, 48, publicly released September 12, 2012.

13 Ibid.


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with less civil unrest. Te relationship between terrorism and soldier casualties remainselusive , with only Israel exporting to nations with a lower incidence o soldier casualties.

Figure 1 UAVs exported each year by the U.S. and Israel

Literature Review

In the last decade, there has been an explosion o interest in the application and pro-curement o unmanned aerial vehicle systems. Cultural, normative and practical militaryarguments have all been put orth to explain the rapid spread o UAV technology.


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In “Te global diffusion o unmanned aerial vehicles” (2014), Ulrike E. Franke arguesthat UAVs are symbols o a modern army, desired more because they are ‘must-haves’ more

so than a practical military technology. Countries, thereore, desire an unmanned capabil-ity to ‘seem advanced.’ Franke offers contemporary examples in which a country’s leaderproudly presents the new technology rather than keeping the development clandestine.Iran’s Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and Venezuela’s Hugo Chavez both publicly announcedthe acquisition o new drone technologies, shortly ollowed by Vladmir Putin’s public an-nouncement that Russia would invest $12 billion to grow its unmanned capabilities beorethe year 2020.

In “Limiting the Unintended Consequences o UAV Prolieration” (2013), Dennis M.Gormley argues that despite governance by the Missile echnology Control Regime (MCR)and “common goals about the non-prolieration o missile systems capable o WMD deliv-

ery,” the MCR has been unsuccessul in controlling the spread o UAVs due to “unevenimplementation” and “virtually non-existent norms governing UAV prolieration.”14

In “Te Costs and Consequences o Drone Warare” (2013) Michael J. Boyle offers a vision o normative drif in regulating UAV sales and development. He states that, “a final,and crucial, step towards mitigating the strategic consequences o drones would be to de-

velop internationally recognized standards and norms or their use and sale.” Accordingto Boyle, “the genie is out o the bottle: drones will be a act o lie or years to come. Whatremains to be done is to ensure that their use and sale are transparent, regulated and con-sistent with internationally recognized human rights standards.” Boyle oresees a world inwhich drones will be held by more unscrupulous hands, that drones will be misused by

governments and non-state actors unless there a set o internationally recognized standardsgoverning their sale and use. Boyle concedes that “enorcement o these guidelines and ad-herence to rules on their use will be imperect and marked by derogations, exceptions and

violations,” however, the existence o international standards will encourage more restraintthan might otherwise been seen.

Derek Gregory in “Te Everywhere War” (2011), notes that “the advanced technologythat makes the UAV campaign possible – the combination o sensor and shooter in a singleplatorm – does not dispel the og o war.” Countries can still make mistakes based on pooror misinterpreted inormation. He writes that UAV technology exploits a legal grey areathat makes the battlespace even less transparent. Drones increase the ability o a country to

project power via both technological advancement and legal ambiguity. Tey are capableo operating in previously inaccessible theatres, such as treacherous mountain ranges andurban environments in which insurgents might hide.

14 Dennis Gormley, “Limiting the Unintended Consequences o Unmanned Air System Prolieration,” Whitehead Journal oDiplomacy & International Relations, Winter/Spring 2013, Vol. 14, Issue 1, pp. 67.


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Tough UAVs are a modern technology, they could be reasonably compared to thedevelopment o the German Dreadnought battleship at the turn o the 20th century. In

“German Dreadnoughts and the Saudi Bomb: Why We Should Be Wary o Saudi Arabia,”Tomas Grant outlines the social and political advantages o replacing soldiers with theDreadnought battleship, which he characterizes as “the most awesome and technologicallyadvanced weapon o the turn o the century.” He suggests, “or a country that desired to mul-tiply its military orce—but, or social, political, and demographic reasons, also to conservethe number o men at arms—a fleet [o dreadnoughts] offered the ideal security solution.”15

“echnological orce multipliers,” as Grant calls the Dreadnought, embody the modern useo UAVs in military contexts.

Figure 2 UAV Imports by Country 1987-2013

Teoretical Framework As a highly practical and desirable product, UAVs have become a powerul source

o revenue or exporters. For importing countries, UAVs are long-term investments thatpromise extended surveillance capabilities, orce projection and, in some instances, strikecapability. Tey also promise the social and political benefit o military personnel reduc-

15 Tomas Grant, “German Dreadnoughts and the Saudi Bomb: Why We Should Be Wary o Saudi Arabia,” International Rela-tions 1993 11:405.


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tion. For exporting countries, domestic industry reaps financial rewards as well as increasedmarket share with every international order.

UAVs bring several practical advantages: they are inexpensive compared to conven-

tional aircraf, replace military personnel, remove the risk o hostage scenarios and canoperate covertly within and across borders. UAVs all in a space o legal ambiguity becausemany nations do not have robust aviation regulations regarding their domestic and inter-national use.

Tis paper hypothesizes that nations will benefit rom UAVs i they value soldier’s liveshighly and are willing to invest in technology to protect them. Tis idea is most consistentwith democratic nations in which soldiers can vote leaders out o office i they do not eel

valued. Nations seeking to cut military spending might turn to UAVs to replace both conventional aircraf and paid military personnel. Nations operating across borders or com-batting terrorism might also turn to UAVs because o their ability to operate clandestine

missions and operate in terrain that might be unamiliar or harsh or manned operations.However, UAVs are not desirable or every nation. Tey have a high start-up cost: in-

rastructure or launch and technological operation systems must be either developed orimported. Although UAVs are meant to replace ground troops, additional military per-sonnel must be trained to operate UAVs. Te disadvantages o UAVs are more likely tooutweigh the benefits in smaller nations that do not already have a significant military in-rastructure to operate UAVs. Nations that do not ace domestic pressure to protect theirsoldiers are likely more autocratic. Because soldiers in autocracies do not vote, their leadersare not as concerned about replacing military personnel.

Nations seeking to expand or establish their unmanned capabilities have two options:develop a domestic program or import oreign systems. Domestic UAV development is along and costly catch-up process: firms must both design technologically advanced UAVsystems and build manuacturing inrastructure. Importing oreign UAVs, while more cost-effective in most cases, means that a nation must meet the standards, norms, and regula-tions o the exporting nation.

Te number o firms exporting attractive UAV systems remains relatively small withU.S. producers accounting or 45 percent o the global market share in 2013 and with Is-rael ollowing closely in second place.16 Tis means that importing nations must adhere toWestern export regulations that ofen all in line with the MCR. Te U.S. is a signatory o

the MCR and even though Israel is not, they still adhere to most o the MCR regulations.Te first point o concern or exporting nations is their own security. Exporting nationsdo not want to sell UAVs to nations that will turn around and use the technology againstthe exporter. Exporters seek to sell UAVs to nations with a high level o bilateral affinity andhigh levels o domestic stability. In many cases, exporting to ideologically aligned nations

16 Aerospace America, “UAV Roundup 2013,” Aerospace America, August 2013.


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also provides the advantage o increasing the military capabilities o the exporting country’sallies

Second to security is the profit motivation behind UAV exportation. Exporting nationsalready have established a domestic UAV industry; there is significant utility in maintain-ing these firms’ research and development capabilities. Nations can support their domestic

UAV industries by either purchasing the UAVs themselves or by allowing these firms toexport their products. Te chie tension in exporting nations is balancing security-drivenexport regulations with the financial incentive to allow exports as a means o supportingdomestic UAV producers.

Despite this common ramework, different market conditions in Israel and the U.S.might lead to a different export profile. In Israel, the UAV market was destined or export as


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domestic production vastly outpaced government purchases, while in the U.S. the Depart-ment of Defense went through a long period of ‘procurement’ following September 11th.During this time, government contracts subsidized the development of UAVs and therefore

allowed tighter export regulations.Based on these theoretical arguments, this article puts forward the following theoreti-

cal models.

I. Political Affinity Returning to Franke’s argument that countries want to appear advanced , government

type may not matter as the U.S. and Israel export to maintain market presence rather thanensure advanced weapon systems are only in democratic nations’ possession. She uses theexamples of Russia and Iran to emphasize that autocratic countries have a significant inter-est in not only growing their military capabilities, rather in seeming to grow their military

capability. Te most significant UAV users—the United States, the United Kingdom andIsrael—are, however, strongly democratic and presumably have an interest in increasingthe capability of their allies, while withholding technology from non-aligned nations. Bal-ancing the high demand from autocratic nations and the competitive democratic suppliermarket, how does government type and affinity between importer and exporter affect UAVtrade?

II. Replacement Technology

a. Soldier Casualties

UAVs replace soldiers and provide additional safety to soldiers already on the ground.For instance, the ability to send an unmanned drone on surveillance and strike missionsprovides an alternative for manned reconnaissance and attack missions. Te value of a sol-dier depends on the type of government. An autocracy would, in most cases, not value asoldier as highly as a democracy would because soldiers can vote on elected officials whocould lose their office by not valuing soldiers enough.

b. Small, but increasing military sizeUAVs have the capability to act as “technological force multipliers” and offer significant

capability returns on lower levels of manpower. Nations with small army sizes, as measuredby the number of soldiers, have an interest in the force multiplying power of UAVs. Tere-fore, nations with a small, but growing army size have an interest in importing UAVs.

c. Large, but decreasing military sizeSimilarly, nations seeking to reduce the size of their armies while maintaining their

military capabilities would have an interest in a UAV’s ability to multiply force while de-creasing the amount of ground troops needed.


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III. Advanced Capabilities in Combating Civil Unrest and TerrorismAs Derek Gregory argues in “Te Everywhere War”, UAVs increase the ability of na-

tions to operate in unfavorable terrain and strike in previously inaccessible areas. UAVs alsotake advantage of the legal ambiguity between civilians and insurgents and open up the pos-sibility of operating missions against a country’s own citizens in order to combat civil unrestand terrorism. UAVs, then, are valuable technology in countries with civil unrest and a highincidence of terrorist attacks. Officials in both autocratic and democratic governments facereprisals from civil unrest and terrorism.

Yet this theory must be qualified precisely because UAV trade is regulated on a bilaterallevel. Nations with a high degree of civil unrest and deaths resulting from terrorism presenta liability to exporting nations. Despite market pressures to export competitively, exportingto unstable nations is unlikely to occur. An importing nation must have a stable enoughgovernment to carry out international arms deals.

HypothesesTe literature establishes cultural, technological, and pragmatic arguments for UAV

proliferation. Te following hypotheses will test these arguments for UAV trade and willalso examine a political theory approach to the use of UAVs as replacement technology indemocratic nations with compulsory military service:

• H1: Countries with higher ideological similarity to the exporting nation are more

likely to import UAVs.

• H2: Democratic countries with high incidence of soldier casualties are more


• H3: Countries with smaller armies that seek to increase military size are more


• H4: Countries with large military spending that seek to reduce military expendi-

ture are more likely to import UAVs.

• H5: Countries with domestic unrest or conflict, terrorism are more likely to

import UAVs.

• H6

: Countries with stable governments but which experience domestic unrest,

terrorist attack, or conflict are more likely to import UAVs.

Empirical Design:o determine the relationship between UAVs and factors that may contribute to UAV

exporting and importing, this paper uses dyadic zero-inflated negative binomial regression


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models. Te unit of analysis is the number of military UAVs traded between a dyadic coun-try pair in a year beginning 1987—the year the MCR was first signed—and ending 2013,the most current year of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute’s (SIRPI)

Arms ransfer Database. Te series covers dyadic trade between the U.S. and Israel and 185other countries. Te definition of “military UAV” in this paper refers to a UAV that meetseither the MCR classification of Category I or II, or is a surveillance drone used in militaryoperations and counted in the SIPRI Arms ransfer Database. 17

Te author used a zero-inflated negative binomial regression because of the large num-ber of missing values present in the data. Tough Poisson and zero-inflated Poisson regres-sions were considered, Poisson regressions assume a uniform mean and variance in thedata, which is not the case with UAVs. Because zero-inflated negative binomial regressionsdo not allow for clustering, the Vuong test is used in each regression to determine the sig-nificance of a zero-inflated model over a non-inflated negative binomial model. In each

model, the Vuong test affirms the appropriateness of a zero-inflated model. It is importantto note that zero-inflated negative binomial models create two models—the negative bino-mial model that determines the count of UAVs in a country and an inflated model detailingthe logit likelihood of a country receiving one UAV and, then, being a UAV nation. Teresults, then, handle both the count of UAVs traded and the logit likelihood of UAV tradeoccurring at all.

Independent Variables:

17 Te MCR defines and is most concerned with Category I or II equipment. Category I UAVs have complete rocket systems,exceed a 300 km range and a 500 kilogram payload. Category II also include complete rocket systems but have a range less than300km.


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Dependent Variables:

Where B indicates the marginal effect of the independent variable on the likelihood of

the outcome, ndrone, the model for this equation appears generally as:

Controls

Tese models control for population size of each country because a single UAV im-ported to a state with 50,000 people will likely have a larger marginal effect than a UAV im-ported to a nation with 50,000,000. Te model also adjusts for the gross domestic productof the country.

Results

Ideological Similarity In order to determine the relationship between ideological similarity and UAV trade,

Polity IV and UN Voting Affinity were tested individually and then together. Polity 2 dataon both Israel and the U.S. remains robust over the entire time series at 9 or 10. 18 Tere-fore, a higher Polity 2 score in importing nations indicates similarity in regime type toeither the U.S. or Israel.

U.S.Nations with lower UN affinity scores with the U.S. are more likely to import at least

one UAV . In the zero-inflated logit model UN Affinity is significant at the 1 percent level inthe separate model and at the 5 percent in the aggregated model. Tis suggests that nationswith low UN Affinity scores with the U.S. increases the likelihood of a UAV being imported.Population, too, plays a key role in UAV import. Using a log transformation of population ,a smaller population size increases the likelihood of UAV import suggesting that larger na-tions are less likely to import UAVs. Nations with a low level of UN affinity scores with theU.S. and small populations are more likely to import UAVs from the United States. Nations

18 Polity scores measure the regime type of a country on a 21-point scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to +10(consolidated democracy).


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with high UN affinity to the U.S. are 6.6 times less likely to import UAVs. Large nationsthat are ideologically similar to the U.S. can likely afford domestic UAV production, whilesmaller autocratic nations must seek advanced technology abroad.

Te Polity 2 variable is not significant on its own or in the aggregated model, yet itscoefficient indicates that a lower Polity 2 score leads to a higher likelihood o importing U.S.UAVs. In the count model, the Polity 2 variable is similarly not significant, but a higher Pol-ity 2 score leads to ewer UAV imports. Because low ideological similarity leads to a higherlikelihood o UAV import, this result does not support H

1, that countries with ideological

similarity to the exporting nation are more likely to import UAVs. (See Appendix B, able1 U.S. UAV Exports and Ideological Similarity)

Israel

UN voting affinity does not appear to be a determining actor in Israeli UAV exports,

while a lower Polity 2 score leads to more UAV imports rom Israel. A 1 percent decrease inPolity 2 score leads to a 1.16 percent increased likelihood o Israeli UAV trade. Populationremains positive and significant, suggesting that larger nations are more likely to importUAVs rom Israel.

In the negative binomial model or Israel, UN affinity is significant at the 5 percent levelwith a strong positive relationship to UAV trade and remains significant in the aggregatedmodel at the 1 percent level when coupled with Polity 2, which has a slight negative coe-ficient and is significant at the 0.1 percent level. Tis indicates that a lower Polity 2 scoreleads to a higher likelihood o importing at least one UAV rom Israel, while a higher levelo UN affinity and a lower Polity 2 score leads to more UAVs being imported. Te results

suggest that larger autocratic nations with strong UN voting affinity with Israel should bemore likely to import UAVs. (See Appendix B, able 2 Israeli UAV Exports and IdeologicalSimilarity)

Replacement Technology for Soldiers

a. Soldier Casualties

o determine the role o UAVs as both replacement technology and orce multipliers,several models were constructed including the number o soldier battle deaths and Polity 2score o importing nations.

U.S.Battle deaths do not appear to be significant, while population and Polity 2 score remain

significant actors in determining UAV trade. A lower Polity 2 score leads to a greater like-lihood o at least one UAV being imported rom the United States, while a higher Polity 2score leads to more than one UAVs being imported rom the U.S. Te aggregated modelsuggests that smaller, more democratic nations with higher battle casualties are more likely


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to import at least one UAV rom the U.S., while smaller, more democratic countries are thenmore likely to import more UAVs rom the United States. Te U.S. might trade with smaller

more democratic nations with ewer battle casualties to support ideological partners duringtimes o war, while these small democracies seek to increase their military capability whileprotecting soldiers’ lives, but battle casualties remain insignificant in both the logit likeli-hood model and negative binomial model, suggesting that they may not play a large role indetermining UAV trade. (See Appendix B, able 3 U.S. UAV Exports, Battle Casualties andGovernment ype)

In the count and logit likelihood models o U.S. exports, battle casualties are positivelycorrelated with UAV imports, but are not significant. Polity 2 is significant at the 5% level,p


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largest UAV exporters.

U.S. and Israel

Te negative binomial model shows that the US primarily exports to nations with largebut declining army sizes while Israel exports to nations with small but increasing army siz-es. Te relationship between army size and its expansion or contraction remains significantacross all three negative binomial models, but the source of the UAV indicates an inverserelationship. In the aggregated model, the scope of Israeli exports outweighs U.S. exports,and nations with smaller but expanding military size are more likely to import UAVs. (See

Appendix B, able 5 U.S. and Israeli Exports to Nations and their Military Size)Moreover, the logit likelihood aggregate model shows with significance at the 1% level

that nations with smaller but growing armies are still more likely to import UAVs in gen-eral, despite relatively stringent export regulations in both the U.S. and Israel. Tis could in-

dicate that larger countries with higher military capabilities are less likely to import UAVs,perhaps in favor of domestic production.

In the U.S. model, population is significant in both negative binomial and logit likeli-hood models (p


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does not support H 5. (See Appendix B, able 6 U.S. UAV Exports, Civil Unrest and error-

ism Casualties)

Israel Civil unrest and terrorist casualties appear to have some impact on Israeli UAV export.

Nations with higher civil unrest and terrorist attack casualties are more likely to importmore UAVs from Israel. In the negative binomial model, higher levels of civil unrest andhigher terrorist casualties are significant at the five percent level and positively correlatedwith Israeli UAV exports, but lose their significance in the aggregated model. A 10 percentincrease in civil unrest will lead to a 2.28 percent increase in UAV exports, while a 10 per-cent increase in terrorism casualties will lead to a 3.24 percent increase in exports.

In the logit likelihood model, neither is significant. However population remainsnegatively correlated and highly significant at the 0.1 percent level, indicating that smaller

nations with low levels of civil unrest and terrorist attack casualties are more likely to beimport at least one UAV from Israel. (See Appendix B, able 7 Israeli UAV Exports, Civil

Unrest and errorism Casualties)Based on these results, H

5, which claims that countries with civil unrest and terrorism

are more likely to import more UAVs, is supported, though not robustly. Civil unrest andterrorist attack casualties appear to have some effect on UAV imports from Israel, though

further research is required.

Government Stability & Civil Unrest and Terrorism

Because exporting nations have a significant interest in trading with nations that arestable, that will not use the UAVs against the exporter, the State Fragility Index (sfi2) isincluded to determine the role of government stability in nations with civil unrest and ter-rorist attacks. A higher Fragility score means that a nation is more fragile and therefore lessstable.

U.S.

State fragility appears to affect U.S. UAV exports, but there also appears to be signifi-cant interaction effects between the three variables. Without factoring in civil unrest andterror attack casualties, an increase in state fragility increases the likelihood of at least one

UAV import—the odds ratio of SFI is 1.28, indicating a strong association between higherfragility and UAV imports.19 In the count model, we see that an increase in civil unrestand a decrease of terrorist attack casualties and state fragility increases the total number ofUAVs imported. In other words, more stable nations with fewer terrorist attack casualtiesand higher civil unrest are more likely to import U.S. UAVs. (See Appendix B, able 8 U.S.

19 Odds ratio (U.S. UAV [SFI] ) = e^0.243 = 1.275069


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UAV Exports, Civil Unrest, errorism Casualties and State Fragility).

In the U.S. negative binomial model, civil unrest, terror, and state fragility are notsignificant, yet in the aggregate model all three become significant, suggesting stronginteraction between variables. Civil unrest has a positive relationship to UAV importswhile terror and state fragility have a negative relationship. In the logit likelihood model,State Fragility is significant at the 0.1 percent level with a positive coefficient of 0.243. Tisindicates that nations facing increases in state fragility are more likely to import at leastone UAV from the U.S. while, as civil unrest rises, nations are likely to import more UAVsfrom the United States. Population continues to be significant in all four models as smallernations are more likely to belong to import UAVs from the United States.

Interestingly, State Fragility is positively correlated with U.S. UAV trade—the morefragile a nation is, the more likely they are to import U.S. UAVs. Tis is directly contrary to

theoretical thinking and does not support H6 of this paper that more stable nations withterrorist attack casualties and civil unrest are more likely to import UAVs.

Israel

In the negative binomial model for Israeli exports, civil unrest and terror are significanton their own, but when aggregated together with state fragility, they lose significance. Noother values in this model are significant. (See Appendix B, able 9 Israeli UAV Exports,Civil Unrest, errorism and State Fragility)

In the logit likelihood model, however, state fragility is significant at the one percentlevel on its own and at the 0.1 percent level in aggregate. Tis indicates that as state fragility

rises, the likelihood of buying a UAV from Israel increases. Civil unrest also becomes sig-nificant on the 0.1 percent level in aggregate suggesting interaction between the variables.Population remains negatively correlated with UAV trade and is significant at the 0.1 per-cent level providing further evidence that smaller nations are more likely to import UAVs.

It is important to note the reduction in observations in the aggregated model. Teaggregated models use only 2479 of 5008 possible observations due to gaps in the StateFragility Index.

Because of a significant number of missing values in the State Fragility Index in theIsraeli model and the strong likelihood of interaction between variables in the U.S. model,it is also difficult to accept H

6 , which factors government stability into the model. H

6 is, then,

inconclusive based on this data.

Civil War and Violence & Ethnic War and Violence

Because of strong interaction effects between variables in the previous model, thismodel breaks down the Civil Unrest variable into its constituent parts to determine the

varying degrees of civil unrest and state fragility. Te aggregated variable for civil unrest is


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broken down into civil violence and war and ethnic violence and war. wo new variablesare then generated using civil and ethnic violence and civil and ethnic war. Te underlyinglogic is that while civil and ethnic violence is more indicative of civil unrest, while civil andethnic war is indicative of deeper-seeded state instability that might lead to a nation beingprecluded from UAV trade.

U.S.

Civil unrest and war were run in separate models and then run together in an aggre-gated model. Only in the aggregated negative binomial model is civil unrest significant atthe 5 percent level; it is positively correlated with UAV trade (0.41) suggesting that as civilunrest rises, UAV trade also increases. Civil war, however, remains negatively correlatedwith UAV trade, but remains insignificant. Tis finding makes it more credible to say thatmore moderate civil unrest leads to UAV trade, even though civil war is insignificant. (SeeAppendix B, able 10 U.S. UAV Exports, Civil Unrest versus Civil War)

GDP is negatively correlated with UAVs in the civil unrest and aggregated models, sug-gesting that if the U.S. is going to trade UAVs to nations with civil unrest, these nations aremore likely to have a smaller GDP. Population is significant in the individual models, but isnot significant in the aggregated model; in all three models it is negatively correlated withUAV trade, indicating that smaller nations are more likely to import UAVs.

In the logit likelihood model, however, we see again that population is the strongestindicator of UAV trade likelihood. Population remains significant in all three “certain-zero”models at least at the 1 percent level. Furthermore, smaller nations are more likely to importUAVs from the United States.

Also interesting in both models is Polity 2. As Polity 2 score decreases and a nation be-comes more autocratic, it is more likely to import at least one UAV but as Polity 2 increases,a nation will import more UAVs from the United States.

Israel

While neither civil unrest nor war is significant in any model, smaller, more autocraticcountries are more likely to import at least one Israeli UAV. In the logit likelihood modelPolity 2 and population are significant across models at the 0.1 percent level. As Polity 2and population decrease, the likelihood of a nation importing a UAV increases, indicatingthat larger democracies are less likely to import UAVs from Israel, controlling for civil un-

rest and even war. Even with this additional attempt to determine the magnitude of unrestin a country, H 6 remains inconclusive. (See Appendix B, able 11 Israeli UAV Exports, Civil

Unrest versus Civil War).


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Discussion

Despite alling costs and more accessible export regulations rom countries such as

Israel, the U.S. and China, UAVs are military technology and export regulations remainrelatively stringent. Across nearly all models and theories, small population is consistentlyan indicator o UAV trade rom either the U.S. or Israel, suggesting that smaller nationspreer importing UAV technology to domestic production. Ideological similarity seems toplay a role as nations with low UN Affinity with the U.S. or Israel are more likely to importUAVs rom either nation, but even this result is complicated by incomplete UN Affinitydata or Israel. Soldier casualties remain insignificant in the U.S. models yet significant orIsraeli exports, as Israel is more likely to trade with smaller autocratic nations with ewerbattle deaths.

While both the U.S. and Israel are more likely to trade with smaller, more ragile na-

tions, each has a different tolerance or instability and military capability in the importingnation. Te U.S. is more likely to export to a ragile nation than Israel.20 Te U.S. exports tonations with a large but declining military size while Israel exports to nations trying to growtheir military. It is interesting to note here that despite these distinctions in military expan-sion and contraction—both the U.S. and Israel export to smaller nations. Tis suggests thatregardless o whether or not a nation is seeking to grow its military or scale it down, nationsseek the “orce multiplier” effect highlighted in the Dreadnought case. U.S. UAV importersseek to scale down military size without hindering capability and Israeli UAV importers seekto scale up military size more efficiently.

ConclusionTese results have compelling implications or the uture o UAV prolieration. Te

United States and Israel have remained undisputed leaders o the international UAV mar-ket, yet the two have approached global sales very differently. Israeli UAVs were, as an IsraeliUAV marketer stated, always meant or international sale as the domestic market simplycould not absorb the production o large Israeli deense firms. Conversely, rom 1987 to2013, the U.S. could afford to be more parsimonious about its exports because o substantialDepartment o Deense (DoD) contracts and research investments. Yet in 2015, the Depart-ment o Deense reduced its UAV expenditure rom $3.9 billion to $2.4 billion and statedquietly that, in the coming years, “the DoD will not be the bulk user within that market.” 21

Te period o DoD “procurement” is over, and a new period o so-called ‘sustainment’ hasbegun. Despite past U.S. export trends, the uture o U.S. UAV exports may ollow the Israelimodel and look to the international market to support industry growth and maintain mar-

20 Odds Ratio (U.S. UAV [SFI])= 1.275069 || Odds Ratio (Israeli UAV [SFI])=1.082461

21 Abigail Adams, “Te UAV Industry’s Winners and Losers in the 2015 Deense Department Budget,” Te Motley Fool , May18, 2014.


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ket share. However, this shif may also entail exporting UAVs to nations with higher levelso civil unrest and lower levels o ideological similarity.

Despite the MCR, the UAV game remains largely bilateral. Exporting nations create

their own policy balancing security and market interests; importing nations seek UAVs ortheir use in growing a military more efficiently or reducing military size without compro-mising national security. Both Israel and the U.S. are more likely to trade with ideologicallydissimilar nations, and Israel’s UAV production is still dependent on sales to the interna-tional market. Israel exports broadly and trades with nations with more battle deaths, whilethe U.S. exports to nations with higher instability.

As domestic contracts dry up, private UAV producers must work to secure export ap-proval rom domestic governments in order to survive. Boyle’s ears o unmonitored proli-eration and Gregory’s anxieties about extended theatres o war thereore become especiallysalient as security concerns give way to market necessity, with international UAV competi-tion ueling a global race to the bottom.


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APPENDIX A

Empirical Models

Ideological Similarity

UAV USA-country b t = β0 + β1(Polity 2)it + β2(UN Affinity)it + β3(log(Population))it + β4(log(GDP))it +εUAV Israel-country b t = β0 + β1(Polity 2)it + β2(UN Affinity)it + β3(log(Population))it + β4(log(GDP))it + ε

Replacement Technology

Battle DeathsUAV USA-country b t = β0 + β1(log(Battle Deaths))it + β2(Polity 2)it +

β3(log(Population))it + β4(log(GDP))it + εUAV Israel-country b t = β0 + β1(log(Battle Deaths))it + β2(Polity 2)it +β3(log(Population))it + β4(log(GDP))it + ε

Shifing Army SizeUAV USA-country b t = β0 + β1(log(ArmySize))it + β2(Δlog(ArmySize)it +β3(log(Population))it + β4(log(GDP))it + εUAV Israel-country b t = β0 + β1(log(ArmySize))it + β2(Δlog(ArmySize)it +β3(log(Population))it + β4(log(GDP))it + εUAV Israel & USA-country b t = β0 + β1(log(ArmySize))it + β2(Δlog(ArmySize)it +

β3(log(Population))it + β4(log(GDP))it + ε

Civil Unrest and Terrorism

Civil Unrest and TerrorismUAV USA-country b t = β0 + β1(Civil Unrest))it + β2(log(error Deaths))it +β3(log(Population)it+ β4(log(GDP)it + εUAV Israel-country b t = β0 + β1(Civil Unrest))it + β2(log(Terror Deaths))it +

β3(log(Population)it+ β4(log(GDP)it + ε

State Fragility, Civil Unrest and Terrorism

UAV USA-country b t = β0 + β1(Civil Unrest))it + β2(log(error Deaths))it + β3(StateFragility Index)it+ β4(log(Population)it + β5(log(GDP)it + εUAV Israel-country b t = β0 + β1(Civil Unrest))it + β2(log(Terror Deaths))it + β3(StateFragility Index)it+ β4(log(Population)it + β5(log(GDP)it + ε


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Civil Unrest versus Civil War UAV USA-country b t = β0 + β1(Civil Violence))it + β2(Civil War))it + β4(log(Population)it +

β5(log(GDP)it + εUAV Israel-country b t = β0 + β1(Civil Violence))it + β2(Civil War))it + β4(log(Population)it + β5(log(GDP)it + ε

APPENDIX B

Datasets Te data in this paper comes from a variety of sources: data on UAV transfers from

the Arms ransfer Database from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute(SIPRI); United Nations General Assembly Voting Data from Anton Strezhnev and ErikVoeten; Major Episodes of Political Violence (MEPV), the State Fragility Index, High

Casualty errorist Bombings (HCB), and Polity IV from the Center for Systemic Peace;the Armed Conflict Dataset from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program; and finally, WorldDevelopment Indicators on population, gross domestic product, military size and expendi-ture from the World Bank.


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Table 1 U.S. Ideological Similarity


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Table 2 Israel Ideological Similarity


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Table 3 U.S. Exports to Nations with Battle Deaths


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Table 4 Israeli Exports to Nations with Battle Deaths


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Table 5 U.S. and Israeli Exports to Nations and their Military Size


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Table 6 U.S. UAV Exports, Civil Unrest and Terrorism Casualties


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Table 7 Israeli Exports, Civil Unrest and Terrorism Casualties


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Table 8 U.S. UAV Exports, Civil Unrest, Terrorism Casualties and State Fragility


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Table 9 Israeli UAV Exports, Civil Unrest, Terrorism Casualties and State Fragility


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Table 10 U.S. UAV Exports, Civil Unrest and Civil War


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Table 11 Israeli UAV Exports, Civil Unrest and Civil War


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