International Studies in the Philosophy of ScienceVol. 24, No. 4, December 2010, pp. 437451

ISSN 02698595 (print)/ISSN 14699281 (online)DOI: 10.1080/02698595.2010.543353

Book Reviews

Taylor and FrancisCISP_A_543353.sgm10.1080/02698595.2010.543353International Studies in the Philosophy of Science0269-8595 (print)/1469-9281 (online)Book Reviews2010Taylor & Francis2440000002010TarjaKnuuttilatarja.knuuttila@helsinki.fiScientific Models in Philosophy of ScienceDANIELA M. BAILER-JONESPittsburgh, PA, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2009xii + 235 pp., ISBN 9780822943761, US$45.00 (hardcover)

Daniela M. Bailer-Jones (19692006) has written a fine book on models, a book that inher own words she always wanted to have when [she] first set out to work on models(205). And it is indeed a book that all of us who have been working and teaching onmodels also always wanted to have. It is a long-awaited historical and systematic studyon scientific models in philosophy of sciencea fascinating and topical field, whosegenesis has not really been studied and which remained for long in the margins ofmainstream philosophy of science only to explode into numerous studies in recentyears. Yet, Scientific Models in Philosophy of Science is also a highly personal treatise onscientific models testifying to Bailer-Joness longstanding interest in cognitive scienceand scientific practice.

The topics covered by the book are the relationship of theories, mechanisms, analo-gies and metaphors to models, the semantic view and the practice-oriented approachto models, and the recent discussions on phenomena and representation. As regardsthe relationship of models to theories, the basic question Bailer-Jones sets out toanswer concerns why, despite their practical importance, models rarely received anypositive attention before the second half of the twentieth century. No one answeremerges from her story, but her historical treatment of how models have beenconceived of by scientists and philosophers ranges from Maxwell and Hertz via Duhemand Carnap to the emergence of models as a worthy philosophical topic in the writingsof Richard Braithwaite, Ernest Hutten, and Mary Hesse.

The historical approach of Scientific Models in Philosophy of Science is also instruc-tive in that it shows how the notion of a model has changed through the times.Whereas the recent discussion on models focuses on mathematical models, in thenineteenth century they were not considered as models but rather as mathematicalanalogies. Bailer-Jones also argues that although the semantic view brought models tothe fore, its models are not the kind of models that are used in scientific practicewhich gives her the motivation to review the practice-oriented approaches to models.In this context she also discusses case-study methodology, a topic that would indeedmerit more attention from philosophers of science. Scientific Models in Philosophy ofScience also contains interesting interview material on scientists views on models andrepresentation.

438 Book Reviews

What I found most exciting about this book were the chapters on mechanisms, anal-ogies, and metaphors. With a rich array of examples Bailer-Jones discusses the twoways in which models can be mechanical: either they make use of the principles ofclassical mechanics, or they are understood as mechanical physical things. She alsofinds interesting parallels between the views of the old and the new mechanists.In comparing the mechanistic approach of Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden, and CarlF. Craver (2000) to that of Maxwell she notes: What were bodies for Maxwell becomeentities, and what were forces become activities . Activities of entities are productiveof change, which may be like Maxwells motion (40). This sensitivity of Bailer-Jones toparallels, which is evident also elsewhere in her book, seems to be due to her interest inanalogies and metaphors. She discusses the different ways analogies and metaphors areused in science, as well as their relationship to modelling. Apart from philosopherssuch as Hesse and Max Black, she also draws material from cognitive studies on thesetopics.

Bailer-Joness own view on models is not really systematically developed in ScientificModels in Philosophy of Science, which I find a pity. Although when discussing varioustopics she spells out her own take on these issues, summarizing her views in the lastchapter. According to Bailer-Jones, theories are abstract in the sense of being strippedof specific properties of concrete phenomena, whereas models are about concretephenomena (or their prototypes, which nevertheless have all the properties real thingshave). She defines models as interpretative descriptions of phenomena that facilitateaccess to phenomena. There are some rather controversial aspects of this characteriza-tion, concerning her views on the ontology of models and the nature of their targets.Most philosophers of science would be rather reluctant to reduce models to descrip-tions, by which Bailer-Jones refers to external representations, both propositional andnon-propositional (e.g. texts, diagrams, plots of empirical data, and mathematicalequations). While some philosophers tend to think that models are abstract objectsthat can be described in different ways (e.g. Giere 1999, and more generally the propo-nents of the semantic approach), other writers ontology of models is more liberalincluding also model descriptions (e.g. Frigg 2010). However, since Bailer-Jones is talk-ing about interpretative descriptions it is possible to read her as claiming that the ontol-ogy of models contains also scientists interpretations of them.

Writing about phenomena, Bailer-Jones comes close to being a constructivist, whichis what she herself also notes. She claims that a phenomenon usually has a theoreticalcomponent and because of this she resists the idea that phenomena are natural kinds.In her view [w]hat we take a phenomenon to be and how we model it develop togetherover the time (174). However, not wanting to indulge too deeply in constructivism,Bailer-Jones claims rather modestly that a phenomenon becomes refined and some-what reconstructed in the process of modelling (169, 174). These constructivist over-tones disappear in the next chapter, on representation, which I find rather traditional.There representation is delegated the task of connecting models to reality. Bailer-Jonesobserves that models contain false elements due to their inaccuracy, inconsistency, andincompleteness. These features of models are shortcomings from Bailer-Jonessdescriptive perspective but they are tolerated because of the selectivity and diverse

International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 439

functions of models: a model need not be complete or truthful in all respects (188193). In my books the idea of the co-construction of models and phenomena and therepresentationalist talk about the truth and accuracy of models do not sit comfortablytogether, but then such tensions are often productive of new ideas. It would have beeninteresting to see in which direction Bailer-Joness thoughts on models would havedeveloped.

Apart from the fact that Scientific Models in Philosophy of Science does not discusssimulations at all, the only real gap in the book concerns the discussion of models andfiction. Bailer-Jones asserts that the general framework in which Mauricio Surezanalyzes representation is similar to hers, but I doubt that this is eventually the case. Tobe sure, according to her a full-fledged analysis of representation is not possible instraightforward terms (202), which comes close to Surezs deflationary approach torepresentation (Surez 2004). However, whereas Surez and many other philosophershave recently considered the ways in which models either function like fictions orresemble them, Bailer-Jones wants to steer clear of fictionalism insisting that modelsdenote something in the real worlda phenomenon. I assume that had Bailer-Joneslived longer, she would have taken more seriously the fictionalist stance to models,and the idea that the relationship of models to real target systems is often indirect(Weisberg 2007). Most of this discussion was published after her death.

I would have also been interested in Bailer Joness treatment of more recent work onmodelling, now the focus is largely historical. Of contemporary philosophers writingabout models Nancy Cartwright gets most attention, presumably because her viewscome closest to Bailer-Joness. Since Cartwright has had in turn an important impacton the work of Margaret Morrison and Mary Morgan (1999), I find it somewhat oddthat Bailer-Jones considers their work on models rather briefly and even disapprov-ingly. She argues that the idea of models as autonomous agents is misleading, sincetheory and data always constrain to some extent model building. However, Morrisonand Morgan only claim that models are partially autonomous from theory and dataand thus it seems to me that there is no real disagreement between them and Bailer-Jones on this matter. Also the idea of the agency of models bothers Bailer-Jones, butMorrison and Morgan rather highlight the agency of model users in stressing that welearn from models by building and manipulating them.

Of course, one book can only do so much, and there is always room for interpreta-tion in philosophical discussion. Overall, Bailer-Jones gives a balanced treatment of themany topics covered and the philosophers whose work she is discussing, which makesthis book an excellent textbook. Bailer-Jones has also the ability to write in a clear andaccessible way, and the book is exemplary in its didactic approach. At the beginning ofeach chapter Bailer-Jones explains how the chapter links to the previous ones, closingthe chapter with a summary of its most important points. Having said that, I wish oncemore to emphasize that Scientific Models in Philosophy of Science is above all an originalcontribution to the philosophical discussion on modelling. Sadly, Bailer-Jones passedaway all too young, without seeing this book in print. I am convinced, however, that itwill inspire many scholars and students in the years to come and Daniela Bailer-Jonesslifes work on models will thus be carried further. University of Pittsburgh Press has

440 Book Reviews

done a great service to the philosophical community in agreeing to publish this bookposthumously.

References

Frigg, R. 2010. Models and fiction. Synthese 172: 251268.Giere, R. N. 1999. Science without laws. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.Machamer, P., L. Darden, and C. F. Craver. 2000. Thinking about mechanisms. Philosophy of Science

67: 125.Morrison, M., and M. S. Morgan. 1999. Models as mediating instruments. In Models as mediators:

Perspectives on natural and social science, edited by M. S. Morgan and M. Morrison.Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 1037.

Surez, M. 2004. An inferential conception of scientific representation. Philosophy of Science 71:767779.

Weisberg, M. 2007. Who is a modeler? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58: 207233.

TARJA KNUUTTILADepartment of Philosophy, History, Culture and Art Studies

University of Helsinki 2010, Tarja Knuuttila

Constituting Objectivity: Transcendental Perspectives on Modern PhysicsMICHEL BITBOL, PIERRE KERSZBERG, AND JEAN PETITOT (Eds)Berlin, Springer, 2009viii + 544 pp., ISBN 9781402095092, 169.95 (hardback)

This collection of articles investigates important epistemological and ontological ques-tions regarding the way in which objectivity is constituted, rather than merely given.Traditional philosophical questions are examined through the lens of transcendental-ism, with specific reference to modern physics. This approach has its origins in thework of Immanuel Kant. In his Critique of Pure Reason, Kant propounded a system oftranscendental philosophy which was designed to block both scepticism and dogmaticmetaphysics. Critical metaphysics and the transcendental method were intended to beradical alternatives to traditional ontology and epistemology. Constituting Objectivityemphasizes that transcendental accountsin the spirit of Kantnot only maintaincurrency in the context of modern physics, but that they can be (and are) fruitfulperspectives on reality.

Michel Bitbol, Pierre Kerszberg, and Jean Petitot do well in their introduction toelucidate immediately a well-known difficulty in understanding Kants transcendentalphilosophythe distinction between transcendent and transcendental. The two termssomehow point in opposite directions (1). In Bitbol et al.s terms, A transcendentobject exceeds experience insofar as it allegedly exists beyond experience whereas atranscendental structure exceeds experience because it is a background precondition ofexperience (1). The fundamental idea is that, while experience cannot be transcended,we can grasp the form of our experiences from our experiences. Transcendentalism

Copyright of International Studies in the Philosophy of Science is the property of Routledge and its content maynot be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express writtenpermission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.