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8/12/2019 Schleiermacher's Hermeneutics http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/schleiermachers-hermeneutics 1/18  egeler Institute SCHLEIERMACHER'S HERMENEUTICS Author(s): Paul Ricoeur Source: The Monist, Vol. 60, No. 2, Philosophy and Religion in the 19th Century (APRIL 1977), pp. 181-197 Published by: Hegeler Institute Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27902471 . Accessed: 22/03/2014 22:13 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp  . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].  .  Hegeler Institute is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Monist. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 181.118.153.57 on Sat, 22 Mar 2014 22:13:02 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

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SCHLEIERMACHER'S HERMENEUTICSAuthor(s): Paul RicoeurSource: The Monist, Vol. 60, No. 2, Philosophy and Religion in the 19th Century (APRIL 1977),pp. 181-197Published by: Hegeler InstituteStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/27902471 .

Accessed: 22/03/2014 22:13

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

 .JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of 

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

 .

 Hegeler Institute is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Monist.

http://www.jstor.org

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SCHLEIERMACHER'S HERMENEUTICS

Why does one say today that the hermeneutic problem begins with

Schleiermacher? Is there not a Christian hermeneutic which from the time of

the early church has sought to place the figures of theNew Testament in an

interpretative relation with the figures of the Old Testament? Is

heremeneutical reflection also not in evidence in the Church Fathers

(Origen's Peri Archbn, Augustine's Doctrina Christiana) What of the theoryof the "Four Senses of Scripture" from themedieval period, as has been so

magnificently reconstructed byHenri de Lubac? And was there not an ongo

ing hermeneutical debate at the time of the Reformation, the Protestant

Reformation linking together the theological axiom "sola fide" and thehermeneutical axiom "sola scriptural the Counter-Reformation opposingthiswith the correlating of exegesis, tradition, and themagisteriuml

All this is perfectly true, and it would be ridiculous to say that

hermeneutics1 begins with Schleiermacher. But with him a specific problemdoes arise: that of understanding as such. This problem had been only hinted

at before Schleiermacher by theReformation, theEnlightenment, Kantian

philosophy, and philosophical Romanticism.

From theEnlightenment modern hermeneutics does retain the extension

of the laws of interpretation fromprofane to sacred texts, ormore precisely,

philology's conquest of exegesis. By thismove a split is created between theheremeneutic and the dogmatic: truth is the object of science, whereas fables

must be interpreted. In Spinoza, for example, theSensus orationum is dis

tinguished fromVeritas. Applied toScripture, this axiom implies the loss of a

dogmatic core and the dismantlement of the Canon into a collection of dis

parate writings.Also retained from theperiod of theEnlightenment, which witnessed the

birth of cultural anthropology, is the rounding out of the grammatical con

ception of interpretation with an historical approach to the places and cir

cumstances in which textswere written. In thisway, the dissociation of the

theory of signs from the theory of things,which Augustine still saw as closelyconnected, is implied. (It should be noted, however, that Luther continued to

hold that "he who does not understand the things does not understand their

signs.") Hence the development of philology is an important step in this

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182 PAUL RICOEUR

process of dissociation, but what ismore significant here is that the lack of a

general theory of understanding begins to become quite apparent sincemean

ing is constituted and thematized apart from the truth of things.It is with Kantian philosophy, however, that the philosophical horizon

most resembling that of modern hermeneutical reflection is formed. The

general tenor of Kant's firstCritique, it iswell known, is the inversion of the

relation between a theory of knowledge and a theory of being: our capacityforknowing must be measured before the nature of being can be confronted.

From such a perspective it is understandable that the theory of signs should

precede the theoryof things. So Kant makes possible what seemed impossibletoAugustine: a theory of understanding is set free from any theory of the

contents of knowledge.2 More precisely, Kant's philosophy invites us to

move back from the objects of experience to their conditions in themind. Yet

Kantian philosophy does not go beyond the search for the conditions of

physical experience. For this reason themind itbrings to lightremains an im

personal one which carries with it just the conditions fornatural knowledge,

just the categories of empirical knowledge.

Something more is added inRomantic philosophy in that, there, the

mind is considered as the creative unconscious at work inpersons of genius.This philosophical mutation, in turn, is related to an important change of

perspective. Whereas Kant studied natural knowledge, philology poses the

problem of understanding literaryworks, i.e., human creations. To cite onlyone instance,Winkelmann's formidable work of interpretation applied to ar

tistic masterpieces requires a broader philosophy of understanding. And

Herder opens theway with his efforts toground theunderstanding of cultural

works in the soul of epochs and of peoples.3In this essay we will consider Schleiermacher's efforts to continue this

development in terms of the following three topics: (1) the specific character

of hishermeneutics;2)

its nternalrganization

ndcomplexity;

nd(3)

itscontributions and unresolved problems.

/. The Specific Character ofHermeneutics

Schleiermacher was a New Testament professor inHalle in 1804 when

he began to jot notes for a work he would never write on hermeneutics. He

had been educated in theGerman school of philology, fromwhich he had

taken the central problem of coordinating philology and exegesis.4 It is not

without importance to know that he worked on an edition of Plato forwhich

he wrote a long preface and that he envisaged the vast project of translating,

along with F. Schlegel, Plato's entire corpus. All these problems arise,

therefore, out of his reflection on his own work as exegete and philologist:

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SCHLEIERMACHER'S HERMENEUTICS 183

(1) He saw two weaknesses in the philosophy of his day:5 first of all,

philology possessed only individual rules, recipes, which were not all con

nected to a single operation. Out of this arose the problem of understanding:how can exegesis be raised to the rank of a Kunstlehre, that is, of a

"technology," which would not be merely a loose collection of operations?

(2) Hermeneutics was still splintered into a number of specialized dis

ciplines, classical philology and biblical exegesis in particular; a generalhermeneutics requires, therefore, transcending particular applications and

discerning the object common to the two great branches of hermeneutics.

(3) Schleiermacher decries not only the distinction made between

particular hermeneutics but also the splintering of thisdiscipline into various

tasks. For this reason, beginning in the 1805Aphorisms, he criticizes thedis

tinctionErnesti makes between subtilitas intelligent and subtilitas explicandi. For either thisdistinction isonly the external surface of understanding or it

is just an art of exposition and has no place inhermeneutics, becoming in its

turnan object of hermeneutics.6 In the same way, in theAcademic Discourses

he refuses to accept Ast's distinction regarding a hermeneutics of letters,one

of sense, and another ofmind. The first stops before the threshold; the third

extends beyond the domain. Only thehermeneutics of sense is hermeneutics.

Schleiermacher's later distinctions are thus to be understood as lyingwithin

this sphere of hermeneutical unity, whether it is a question of "aspects,""sides" (grammatical and technical or psychological) or "methods"

(divinatory and comparative).

(4) Finally,the rejudice hichheldthat xegesis ndphilology ppliedonly to ancient texts, especially those written in foreign languages, had to be

overcome as well. Historically, it is true that the problems of exegesis arose

out of difficulties pojed by Hebrew, Greek, Aramaic and other languages,but historical distance is only one instance of the true distance out of which

theproblem

ofunderstanding

arises. Thisdifficulty

is tied to the central act,"Die Rede," discourse.7 For Schleiermacher, discourse is any thoughtwhich

is expressed in signs, whether these signs are spoken or written. In other

words, writing has no special status. Even conversation8 implieshermeneutical operations to the extent that the relationship between speakingand thinking is specific: indeed, on the one hand, there isno thoughtwithout

speech thinkings completely iedupwith speaking), nd yet there s a

specific distance between speaking and thinking, since we can translate one

language into another and so express the same thinking in differentmanners

of speaking. There is a relation of presence and distance, of adherence and in

ad?quation, which makes the problem of understanding unavoidable. Ifthoughtwere entirely independent of speech, one would pass from thought to

thought and there would be no interpretation; if speech were completely

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184 PAUL RICOEUR

separate from thinking, there would again be no interpretation because there

would be nothing to look for in speech.It is this tension between the intention of saying something and the ver

bal vehicle which gives rise to the hermeneutical problem. We can see inwhat

sense the problem of interpretation goes beyond that of foreign languages; it

is not the language as ancient, but the speaking as foreign to the one who

perceives it that poses a hermeneutical problem. Foreign languages or ancient

authors are only a particular and an extreme case. A theme of later

hermeneutics is therefore already at issue here: a hermeneutical problem ex

ists whenever there is a cultural distance, whether we are removed by

geography, time, or culture. In every instance, what is distant is to be made

close to us. This struggle against the foreign, against strangeness, continues

up toGadamer, forwhom hermeneutics consists inmaking "my own" what

was "foreign." There is thus a relation of the same to the otherwhich is ab

solutely fundamental. Technically, moreover, Schleiemacher likes to say that

hermeneutics exists because there is first "misunderstanding:"9 the critical

problem of hermeneutics is always that of correcting a "misunderstanding."This is in some sense a result of the foreign character belonging to discourse

itself.There is no hermeneutical problem in a straightforward conversation

where understanding takes place by the direct rectification involved in the

play of question and answer.

The aim of this hermeneutics is to understand an author as well as, andeven better than, he understood himself. A number of ironic comments havebeen made about this slogan, which, anyway, is not originally Schleiermacher's since Kant knew it and used it in the Critique of Pure Reason in

reference to Plato.10 An author does not reflect upon his relationship to hisown discourse, on the relationship between his thinking and his speaking, oron the possible misunderstandings that pertain to this relation. It is alwayssomeone else who thematizes this relation inwhich the other is

engaged.Consequently, the slogan signifies: bringing to clear consciousness the in

strumentality of saying which was as if invested by thinking in speech. It is in

this sense that Schleiermacher declares: The problem ofunderstanding, of in

terpretation is "bringing to consciousness the thoughtwhich lies at the base

(Grund) of discourse."11

2. The Internal Organization ofHermeneutics

The problem that occupied Schleiermacher inhis early courses was that

of the relationship between two forms of interpretation: "grammatical"n

interpretation and "technical^ interpretation; this remains a constant

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SCHLEIERMACHER'S HERMENEUTICS 185

distinction throughout his work but one whose emphasis shifts over the

course of the years. Before the 1959 Kimmerle edition, the notes of 1804 and

the following years were unknown. This iswhy Schleiermacher was credited

with a "psychological" interpretationwhich only littleby littlemoved awayfrom "technical" interpretation, itself at first on an equal footing with

"grammatical" interpretation.A sort of dialectic is established between these two forms of inter

pretation. Yet on what grounds are they to be distinguished? The early texts

introduce their distinction with a preliminary consideration concerning dis

course, which is at once something common and something singular1 A(thistheme is found in all Romantic thinkers: how can man be both universal and

unique?). Discourse is common to all because it employs a language, words,and concepts which are not created by the individual; but at the same time it

delivers a thoughtwhich displays features of singularity. So it is indiscourse

that the dialectic of the common and the singular isfirst to be found. Similar

remarks can be found today in Benveniste (in the "instance of discourse"

each speaker takes possession of language as a whole). If these two inter

pretations carry equal weight, they cannot, however, be undertaken together.

(Saussure says something to this effect: one cannot be engaged in both the

theory of language and the theory of speech.) Schleiermacher states this in

greater detail: to consider the language which is common to thewriter and to

his reader is to neglect thewriter, and to understand the singular character of

the author is to neglect his language, which ismerely skimmed over. We

therefore perceive eitherwhat is common or what is unique. This then is the

object ofgrammatical interpretation: themedium of communication inwhich

discourse circulates between the author and his original reader, between the

author and ourselves. This interpretation is termed "objective" since it con

cerns linguistic frameworks distinct from the author, but it is also "negative"since itmerely indicates the boundaries of understanding: its critical value

concerns only errors involved in themeaning of words.

The pages dealing with grammatical interpretation are no less teemingwith interesting remarks; here Schleiermacher was, along perhaps with

Herder, one of the first to raise the problem of polysemy, that fact that a

word has several meanings. Schleiermacher distinguishes between Sinn, the

unity of sense belonging to a word, and Bedeutung, themultiple realizations

of a word in different contexts. The same word has one Sinn and several

Bedeutungen.15 It isworth noting that Schleiermacher placed thisproblem in

grammatical hermeneutics and not in technical or psychological

hermeneutics. This represents, precisely,an

indeterminacyin

languageand

one which is part of the common legacy; it is indeed language itselfwhich

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186 PAUL RICOEUR

displays thisplural unity. There would be no understanding ifwe were unable

to recognize the unity of sense; yet, at the same time, understanding consists

in knowing how this sense is realized in a given context by taking on a particularmeaning. The unity of sense is even called the "schema," a termwhich

is found again today in theDanish linguistHjelmslev.16 These remarks on the

plurality of significations joined to the same sense can also be seen as a

forerunner ofwhat Jakobson says today about the difference between natural

and artificial languages (a natural language is formed of polys?mie linguisticentities which are context-dependent and which ensure both lexical economy

and great flexibility in application). Schleiermacher is thus the forebearer ofan important development in contemporary semantics, namely, that ordinary

language functions in the interplay between identityof sense and mobility of

signification. In this Schleiermacher also foresaw the difficulty inherent in

the relation between word and concept: words represent a certain intuitive

sphere of sense which isdetermined discursively, producing several concepts;at the same time this intuitive grasp contributes to the personal individualitywhich determines intuitions in thismanner.

The second interpretation is said to be "technical."17 Why? Because, it

seems tome, of the very project of a Kunstlehre, of a "technology." The pro

ject of a hermeneutics as such is completed in this second interpretation. It in

volves reaching the subjectivity of the speaker, where language is forgotten.Here language becomes an instrument in the service of the individual. This in

terpretation is termed "positive" because it reaches the act of thinking that

produces discourse.

The relation between these two hermeneutics varies over the course of

the texts. In the early texts, until about 1819, Schleiermacher stresses the

equal weight of the two hermeneutics.18 He even thinks that theyeach requiredifferent talents. Practicing one means excluding the other, and each

demands a distinct talent.They

possess not

only specific qualitiesbut each

has its own excess: too much of the first is pedantic, too much of the se

cond is nebulous. The notions of alternation and of complementarity were

Schleiermacher's initial intuitions and reveal how little he stressed the

divinatory aspect of hermeneutics. Moreover, technical hermeneutics is not

the same thing as what will later be called "psychological interpretation";19it is not just an affinitywith the author but implies critical themes in the ac

tivity of comparing: an individuality can only be grasped through com

parisons and contrasts. For this reason, the second hermeneutics too in

cludes both technical and discursive elements. We can never grasp an in

dividuality directly, we can only catch hold of its difference in regard toanother and to ourselves.

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SCHLEIERMACHER'S HERMENEUTICS 187

3. Difficulties inSchleiermachers Hermeneutics

Here it is not really a matter of objections coming from outside but in

ternal problems which probably explain why thework was never completed.The first problem concerns the relationship between the two

hermeneutics. After 1819, the second hermeneutics takes the lead and is ex

tended in the direction of "psychological" interpretation. At the same time,the boundaries between the two disciplines are continually readjusted. As the

texts proceed, it becomes more and more difficult to draw the line between

their respective roles. Certain tasks belong at times to one, at times to theother. Under the second interpretation are placed the conditions of publication, the nature of the genre, the originality of composition, themes, and

style; under grammatical interpretation are classed the sense ofwords, syn

onyms, literal and figurative expressions, material and formal aspects. But

where is the structural and thematic unity characteristic of a work to be

placed, what is the sort of internal unity which governs composition? It is

in part technical, as individual, and in part grammatical, as language con

sidered in itsconnective capacity. So, everything that has to do with the in

dividual structure of discourse floats between the two.We find the same

thing in the connective relation between main and secondary ideas; thelinking of ideas has grammatical features but italso refers to an individual

man, depending on whether one stresses the originality or the unity of

composition. Sometimes, then, the linking of ideas, composition, pointstowards the grammatical to the extent that it is a linking together;

sometimes, to the extent that it is the expression of a unique and original

personality, it points towards the psychological.

Perhaps what is characteristic of discourse is this ability to lend itself to

two interpretations for the same function. Is itnot within language that the

individual is to be discovered? But is itnot in the individual that language is

realized?The textswhich most strongly affirm the priority of language in regard

to the individual are to be found in the 1820 manuscript (Preliminary

Sketch): "All that is to be presupposed and all that is to be found is

language." On the other hand, the decisive texts concerning the priority of

psychological interpretation are to be found in theAcademic Discourses and

subsequent notes; these later texts tend towards Dilthey's "psychological re

production." But the other point of view is never repudiated.The difficulty of deciding between the two hermeneutics is furthercom

plicated by the superposition of two pairs of opposites: on the one hand, the

grammatical and the technical and on the other, divination and comparison.20The firstAcademic Discourse contends that both methods are to intervene in

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188 PAUL RICOEUR

each of the two aspects of hermeneutics: even ingrammatical interpretationonemust begin with a global insight,with an intuition of thewhole and an in

itial feeling for it.The individuality of a discourse, however, does not requiredivination alone; it also involves comparison.21 The most we can say is that

the emphasis on comparison is strongest in grammatical interpretation and

the emphasis on divination prevails inpsychological interpretation, althoughit is still true that in grammatical interpretation the problem is posed bydivination and that in psychological interpretation the individual can be

reached only by comparison.22

The fundamental difficulty encountered by Schleiermacher was that histrue project was situated between the two. Technical interpretation itself is

not reallywhat he terms "psychological interpretation" in the later texts. For

the singularity of a work can be understood in two differentmanners. One

can say that what is singular is the idea which governs thework, what he

more elaborately terms "the internal form of thework" (an expression which

is found with various but related meanings in Goethe, Humboldt, and

Schelling). Individuality can therefore be considered as a systematic linkinginwhich the parts are subordinated to the whole: this is the organism or the

work of art inKant's Third Critique, the individuality of its structure.23But

we can also say that the individuality of a work comes from thepsychological

complex fromwhich this idea emanates. And Schleiermacher nevermanagedto distinguish clearly between these two possible orientations of technical in

terpretation: towards the idea which governs thework or towards the author

considered as a psychological being. Between these two directions?pointingto the text and pointing to the author?hermeneutics hesitates. And yet,Schleiermacher did, in the idea of style, glimpse their profound unity.24He

was one of the first to perceive that style is not amatter of ornamentation; it

marks the union of thought and language, the union of the common and the

singular in an author's

project.

The style displays a

singularity

inside the

common resources of language, and, above all, in the style the formal aspectof thework's structure is joined to the psychological aspect of the author's

intention.25This notion of style in Schleiermacher can thus be compared to

the notion of style inG.G. Granger.26 I would venture to think that this is

Schleiermacher's most important idea, more noteworthy than that of psy

chological interpretation itself. Schleiermacher saw a level of articulation

which provided for the continuity of the two hermeneutics.

The second Discourse (pp. 147ff) expressly ties the question of the

work's singularity to the hermeneutical problem discussed above concerning

themutual relation between singular detail and wholeness. A work is in factby turns singular and whole and entire. It is the totality of its parts but it

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SCHLEIERMACHER'S HERMENEUTICS 189

appears in turnas a singularity, and this is so for two different reasons: due to

its relation to similar literaryworks and due to its relation to other productions and, more generally, to other actions which make up a lifeas a whole.

The first inclusiveness belongs more to grammatical interpretation to the ex

tent that it is the common nature of language and lifewhich furnishes the

rules for comparison within the same literaryfield. The second inclusiveness

belongs instead to technical or psychological interpretation?with an ad

ditional accent on the divinatory aspect?to the extent that it is an under

standing of thewriter's global mode of being which leads to a livingvision of

the work's production. This double extension of the investigation is

noteworthy because at each of these levels the individual-totality relation

repeats its demands and itsaporias. This is especially evident in regard to the

tie between a work and the totality of a life.What can assure us, inparticular,that a given work does indeed belong to the fullcourse of the spiritual activityof its author? The relation of a work to the rest of the literaryfield aboundsno less in difficulties despite the prevalence of the comparative process: the

similarity of several works can only be guessed at, as can the singular place ofa given work in the whole constellation.

Nevertheless,this intuition

concerningthe two

waysof

totalizingand of

singularizing at a level above that of individual works reveals thegreat range

opened to hermeneutics by considerations of style. The totality of literature

or the totality of a lifepoint to the same sort of spiritual unity as thatwhich

theEthics posits as the practical ideal.

Schleiermacher's hermeneutics could thus be reorganized around this

central theme. In this way, the hermeneutical problem of the reciprocitybetween understanding singular detail and understanding thewhole is placed

by the second Academic Discourse on the new ground of the duality of

"aspects" and theduality of "methods." On thegrammatical level, in order

to determine which value of a word's semantic field is realized in agiven

passage, theword must be replaced in its immediate context and this context

compared with other parallel contexts; understanding twice compares the

parts to the whole. It is true that Schleiermacher grants that it ismore dif

ficult to practice this principle than tomerely state it:what are we to do, for

example, with sentences that have no context, like proverbs and instances

of irony where initial indications are lacking? Is there an ultimate whole

which would eliminate the provisional character of any delineation of con

text?We are thus sent back to the anticipation of thewhole or to expedients

belonging to written texts (unknown to the Ancients and not found in

poetic works, such as prefaces, summary, table of contents, to say nothingof the general but nebulous idea one has of a book by simply flipping

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190 PAUL RICOEUR

through its pages and skimming its contents). The necessity of the

divinatory process thus becomes evident in every instance. In addition to

the difficulties involved in the idea of the work in general, there are also

problems concerning the difference between various literary genres: all

works in this regard are not totalities in the same sense. Within a singlegenre differences are also numerous: in certain works the articulation is so

hard to perceive that only the internal elements can reveal it.Moreover, in

every work we find the accessory, themarginal, which are not governed bythe rule of reciprocity between the part and the whole. Finally, itmust be

admitted that works of genius "at once display infinite points of articulation and inexhaustible details" (p. 146). The provisional character of un

derstanding obtained according to this principle cannot, therefore, be too

heavily stressed.

I would like to conclude this study by citing the final sentence of the

Academic Discourses, which sums up all Schleiermacher's as yet unrealized

hopes. Evoking attempts made by his predecessors to distinguish several

kinds of hermeneutics, he declares: "As these innovations have their cause in

the still chaotic state of thisdiscipline, theywill not be certain to disappear as

long

as hermeneutics has not arrived at itsproper form as technology and as

long as, startingwith the simple facts of understanding and basing itselfuponthe nature of language and upon the fundamental conditions of the relationbetween speaker and listener, hermeneutics has not developed a coherent and

complete set of rules."

Paul Ricoeur

Universit? de Parisand

The University of Chicago

NOTES

1. The title ermeneutik does not refer o awork bySchleiermacher prepared for

publication but to a series ofwritings, for themost part never published by their

author,which have been theobject of twomajor criticaleditions.The first s theworkof FriedrichL?cke, Schleiermacher's student nd friend, nd is found in thefirst ec

tion, vol. VII, division III of theSamtliche Werke (Berlin, 1838) under the titleHermeneutik und Kritikmit besondrerBeziehung aufdas Neue Testament. It is thisedition thatwas known toDilthey when hewrote his famousLife ofSchleiermacher

(today, after Redecker's publication of the second part of Dilthey's great work,Schleiermachers System als Philosophie undTheologie (Berlin, 1966), it ppears thathe also consulted the

Aphorisms).The second critical edition is thework ofHeinz

Kimmerle, appearing under the titleHermeneutik nach den Handschriftenneuherausgegeben und eingeleitet (Heidelberg,Carl Winter: 1959, published by the

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Heidelberg Science Academy at theurgingofH.-G. Gadamer). It contains the 1805and the 1809Aphorisms, the 1809-10 PreliminarySketch, the 1819Abridged Presentation, the 1826-27 Separate Presentation of Part Two, the 1829 AcademicDiscourses and the 1832-33Marginal Notes. The present studydraws heavily uponKimmerle's observations and especially upon the introduction nd notesmade byMarianna Simon in her (unpublished) French translation of Schleiermacher'sHermeneutics. All quotes referto thepagination of theKimmerle edition.

2. The Aphorisms contain the textwith which H.-G. Gadamer introduces theThird Part ofWahrheit undMethode: "All that is presupposed inhermeneutics is

language and language alone and all that is tobe found?and towhich belong all theother objective and subjectivepresuppositions?must be drawn from language"

(p.38). (The objective and subjectivepresuppositions are thosewhich will appear underthe categories of grammatical hermeneuticsand technical hermeneutics.)

3. The well-known axiom: "All understandingof individualdetails isconditioned

by an understanding of the whole" (Aphorisms, p. 46) certainly belongs tohermeneutics afterSchleiermacher. In the second part of theLife ofSchleiermacher(ed. Redecker, pp. 659, 671?73), Dilthey evokes both Fichte's thesis that everythoughtof a systemhas to be connected to the unity of an active subject and

Schelling's idea thateveryhuman productionmust be consideredan organizedwhole.But it isSchleiermacher who lentmethodological significanceto thisunderstandingofworks on thebasis of the intuition f thewhole. The second Academic Discourse,whichwe will discuss later,will consider thedifficulties ncountered inapplying this

principle.4. As earlyas theAphorisms (p. 33), Schleiermacherdeplores the"narrowing" hefinds in thehermeneuticsof a Joh.Aug. Ernesti, author of the nstitutioInterpretisNovi Testamenti (1761) and proponent of a strictlyphilological exegesis. TheAcademic Discourses of 1829were composed almost entirely nreference o Fr. Ast,author ofGrundlinien derGrammatik,Hermeneutik undKritik (1808), and toFr.A.

Wolf, author ofDarstellung der Altertumwissenschaftnach Begriff, Umfang undZweck, in the journal Museum der Alterthumswissenschaft (1807). The first, more

speculative,represents chelling's influence nphilology,applyinghisprinciples to the

spiritof antiquity,considered the ideal of humanitywhich the author attempts toreachbymeans of theunityof the external form nd the interior ife nd bymeans ofthekinshipwhich unites all that is spiritual.His influence as not as great, however,

as thatof themore scholarlyWolf, who is the truefounderof thephilological schoolof hermeneutics.He defined hermeneutics both in termsof the rules bywhich the

meaning of signs is to be recognized and in termsof the attempt to "grasp the

thoughtsof another as he would want them to be grasped."5. The Abridged Presentation of 1819deplores this: As the rtofunderstanding,

hermeneutics does not yet exist in a general form, instead there are only several

separate hermeneutics" (p. 79). The Academic Discourses mention thepreeminentposition that is held by thephilologyof classical antiquitydue to theesteemofancientworks, considered the"masterpieces of human discourse" (p. 126),but they lso attach equal importance to biblical exegesis, despite thedearth of material for the

philologist inScripture (ibid.). Schleiermacher is seton positing the theoreticalfoundation of procedures common to theseparticularhermeneutics. It can be noted that

juridical hermeneutics isnotplaced on thesame footingbySchleiermacher: "Most ofthe time it deals only with determining the extent of the law, that is,with the

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relationshipbetweengeneral principlesandwhat has notyetbeen clearlyconceived inthem" (ibid.). Schleiermacher is not thefirst to raise the problem of the unityofhermeneutics.For Ast, thework of hermeneutics is to reproduce theunityof Greekand Christian life on the basis of the initial unity of direction. But forAst thishermeneuticsdoes not repose on theunityof a technologybut on thatof thespiritualactivityitself.Wolf, it is true,comes closer to theproject ofa general hermeneuticsasseems indicated in his definitionof hermeneutics, recalled here by Schleiermacher:"The art ofdiscoveringwith a necessary evidence the thoughtsof an author fromhisaccount" (p. 128).Hermeneutics thusconcerns everyauthor.But thisunifying ntentioncan onlymake use of investigations f terms,thesense of sentences,the internalconnections of discourse. In

addition,it is restrictedto

literary roductions. Finally,Schleiermacher never tiresof stressingthata "necessary evidence" isusually out ofreach (pp. 131?32).

6. "Only what Ernesti calls subtilitas intelligendi Prolegomena, par. IV) actuallybelongs to hermeneutics.For as soon as it ismore than theoutward surface of un

derstanding, the subtilitas explicandi becomes in its turnan object forhermeneuticsand belongs to the art of exposition.This iswhy instructions s to thegood use ofcommentaries ispart ofhermeneutics to theextentthat they re a particular applicationofgeneral rules; this isnot thecase forthe instructions orwritingcommentaries"

(Aphorisms, p. 31). The second Academic Discourse returns to this problem:"Development is here nothing other than thepresentation of thegenesis of under

standing, communicating theway inwhich someone arrived at his understanding.

Interpretation is entirelydistinct fromunderstandingonly as speaking out loud isfrom speaking to oneself, and if, inorder to communicate, somethingelse were in

volved, thiscould onlybe theapplication of the rules of eloquence, buthere nothing isadded to the contents,nothing is changed" (p. 154).

7. The Aphorisms state theproblem in the form f a paradox: "One must alreadyunderstand theman tounderstandhis discourse and yet it ison the basis of discoursealone that one must learn to understand him" (p. 44). The PreliminarySketch of1809?10 says: "Praise of discourse, as it is the formingspiritof language" (einesbildenden Sprachgeistes) (p. 56). The Abridged Presentation of 1819 notes:"Discourse ismediation with a view to thecommunityof thought, nd thisexplainsthe correlation between rhetoric and hermeneutics and theircommon relation todialectics" (p. 80). If indeed rhetoricmoves fromthoughttodiscourse,understanding

is "the inverseof an act of discourse" (ibid.).8. Before conversation, the language learningof children implies a prodigious

mastery of theprocess ofunderstanding:"Each child," theAphorisms state,"arrivesat themeaning of words throughhermeneutics alone" (p. 40). The AcademicDiscourses take up thisaphorism and develop itfurther: hehermeneuticaloperationin itsmost complete formrefers o itsbeginnings,where "children starttounderstandwhat is said" (p. 139). Schleiermacher explains this in termsof the lead takenby the

divinatoryprocess over thecomparative process,whichwill be discussed later."Thisthenisprimitive nd thesoul asserts itselfagain here totally nd authentically s a be

ingof presentiment" (p. 140). Schleiermacher lackswords to expresshis admirationfor these"gigantic beginnings" ofunderstandingand for the prodigious?almost in

finite?unfolding of energy" (ibid.)which is involvedhere.Has not thechild to"grasphold of theactivityof thoughtinorder to reproduce itor to reproduce it inorder tograsp it"? (ibid.) Now, we find ourselves in this same situationwhen we encounter

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something foreigntous. Like children,"we are neverable tobeginwithout the same

divinatoryboldness" (p. 140). From thisnotion of a hermeneutics of childhood it is

easy to move to that of a hermeneutics of conversation, which Schleiermacher men

tions on several differentoccasions in the Discourses in an effortto counter the

narrowingof hermeneuticsto thefield of literary roductions.Writing is thusnomorea distinguishing criterion than is the condition that a language be foreign.Ahermeneuticalproblem exists "whereverwe have to perceive thoughtsor a series of

thoughts ymeans ofwords" (p. 130). Indeed, "there exists for each ofus a good dealthat is foreign n another's thoughts nd expressions,whether theutterance isoral orwritten" (p. 130). It iseven, infact, in living onversation that the idea thatdiscourseis itselfthe living expression of a spiritualbeing finds support.

9. In the Preliminary Sketch, we read: "Twofold maxim of understanding.Everything is understood where no misunderstanding is noticed. Nothing is understood that isnot constructed ..." And further: The aim of each of thetwo inter

pretations therefore onsists inavoiding qualitative and quantitativemisunderstand

ing" (p.57). The Abridged Presentation of 1819 specifies: "Rigorous practice beginswith the realization thatmisunderstanding fosters itself nd thaton everypoint un

derstandingmust be deliberate and sought fter" (p. 86). This isa constant theme; it sreaffirmed n theMarginal Notes of 1832-33: "A proposition can be poorly understood quantitatively,when thewhole isnot grasped precisely,qualitatively,whenwhat is ironic is taken as straightforwardnd vice versa" (p. 160).

10. The Preliminary Sketch of 1809-10: "One must understand as well as andbetter than the writer"

(p. 56).1819 variant:

"Understandingthe discourse firstas

well as and thenbetter than its author" (p. 87). The adage must be an old one, sinceKant cites itat themoment of reinterpretinghePlatonic concept of Idea: "I notice

only that there snothingextraordinary n the factthat,whether inordinaryconversationor inbooks,we understandan authormuch betterthanhe understood himselfbyjoining together he thoughtshe expresses regardinghis object, and this is so becausehe had not sufficiently etermined his conception and because he thus sometimes

spoke and even thought nopposition tohis own views" (Critique ofPure Reason, A

314). But it is Fichte who made theRomantic interpretationf thisadage possible bysituatingtheoriginof thoughts n thecreativeunconscious, beyond thinking nd will

ing.11.Abridged Presentation of 1819, p.76.

12. Grammatical interpretation s introduced in the 1809?10 PreliminarySketchin these terms: It is theart offindingtheprecise sense of a givendiscourse startingfromand with thehelp of language" (p. 57). The importanceofgrammatical inter

pretetion results from the preeminence of language itself in interpretation:"Everythingmust be grammatically interpreted ecause finally everythingthat is

presupposed and everthing hat is tobe found is language" (p. 56). Two canons followfromthisgrammatical interpretation. irst canon: "One must constructon the basisof thewhole initialvalue of the language, thevaluewhich iscommon to thewriter andto the reader, and seek only in it thepossibility of interpreting" p. 57). The 1819

Abridged Presentation specifies: "All in a given discourse that still requiresmore

precise determination is to be defined only in termsof the domain of language(Sprachgebiet) common to the author and his public" (p. 90). The initial canon

therefore oes not determine theparticular usage of a termbut only traces out thelimitswithinwhich thecontextwill thengive a positivedetermination.This is the sub

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ject of the second canon, "namely, that the limitation is conditioned by the context"

(p. 64); or, as we read in thePreliminarySketch: "The sense of each word ina givenplace must be determined in accordance with theotherwords accompanying it" (p.95). The notions of semantic field and ofdeterminationthrough ontextual interactionare thus clearlymastered by Schleiermacher.

13. The Aphorisms of 1805and 1809?10 introducethedistinction in thefollowingmanner: "Grammatical interpretation s,of course, strictly peaking objective inter

pretationand technical interpretation s subjective interpretation.o, from thepointof view of construction,the former s only negative interpretation,ndicating limits;the latter ispositive interpretation. hey can never coincide for thatwould suppose a

perfectknowledge and a perfectly orrectuse of

language.

The art consists solely in

knowing in which case which of the two is to be sacrificed" (p. 31?32).14. The Preliminary Sketch states: "There are two completelydifferentstarting

points: understanding in language and understanding inhewho is speaking" (p. 56)."Neglecting thewriter ingrammatical interpretationnd language intechnical inter

pretation.To the extreme" (ibid.). "Explanation involvingtheirrelation. There is aminimum of grammatical explanation and a minimum of technical interpretation,each alongside amaximum of itsopposite.Variable oscillation from ne to the other.The more objective theaccount, themore grammatical the interpretation; hemore

subjective the account, themore technical the interpretation" p. 56).15. On sense (Sinn) andmeaning (Bedeutung), theAphorisms say: "According to

thedistinctionmade byErnesti, sense can onlybe themore specificdetermination of

meaning,the

particulardrawn

from thegeneral sphere" (p. 32).And this importantstatement:"The principle of theunityof sense is the law ofgrammatical interpretationand at thesame time theprincipleof theexactness of sense;but it isonly thecon

sequence of theoriginal unityofmeaning. The failure of thecontraryassertion con

cerninga pluralityof sense is only the resultof confusingthe task of technical inter

pretationwith that of grammatical interpretation" (p. 40). In thisway themore

precisedetermination of sense stilldepends on grammatical interpretationnd on thebasic unityofmeaning. "Sense," then, isdisseminated only in relation to differentauthors and to their individual intentions.

16. "On language usage incontrast to the law of language. Suitable limit:respectof usage." "The unity ofwords is a schema, a mobile intuition" (p. 47).

17. Technical interpretation is first defined in relation to grammatical inter

pretation:"The beginningcommon to thisone (technical interpretation)nd togrammatical interpretations thegeneral insightwhich grasps theunityof thework and themain features of its composition. But theunityof thework and its themeare considered here to be theprinciple thatmoves thewriter, and themain features of its

composition to be its own individual nature as manifested in thismovement"

(Preliminary ketch of 1819,p. 107). For grammatical interpretation,heunityof thework is taken to be constructedwithin language and made up of the connectiveresources of language. For technical interpretation, heunity of thework is a new

production in language, "for every connection of a subject to a predicatewhich hasnot beenmade before is somethingnew" (p. 107). "The two are thus the same thingbut seen fromdifferent ides" (ibid.).Coming back to theproblem intheSeparate Account of Part Two, dating from 1826-27, Schleiermacher observes that both

hermeneuticsare facedwith the same dichotomy of unity andmultiplicity,whetherthis is unity "based onman" (p. 113) or unitybased on the textureof the work.

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18.On the equal importance of the two hermeneutics: "There is full equalitybetween thetwomoments and people arewrong tocall grammatical interpretationnferior nd psychological interpretation uperior" (p. 81). The second is superioronly if

language is treated as a means of communication for the individual. The first is

superior ifthe individualisconsidered theplace for languageand hisdiscourse as thatinwhich language ismanifested.Even the aim of "rivaling the author" (gleichstellen)is not to be credited topsychological hermeneuticsalone: onemust rival theauthor

"objectively and subjectively" (ibid.)?objectively, through knowledge of the

language, subjectively, throughknowledge of his innerand outer life.19. The Aphorisms suggest an internaldivision in technicalhermeneuticswhich

impliesa certain

overlappingwith

grammatical interpretation:The twomain

partsof technical hermeneutics also alternate. The more important it is to grasp the

thought fully,themore the immediatehelp forgrammatical interpretationrecedesto thebackground and vice versa" (p. 48). The Preliminary[Sketch of 1809? lOandthe 1819Abridged Presentation distinguish the two tasks of technicalhermeneutics

more clearly on the basis ofwhether the interpretation s related to thegeneratingprinciple of thework or to theauthor's individuality. he famous axiom placed bytheAcademic Discourses under theaegis of psychological interpretation eferses

pecially to the second point of view: "Understanding the author better than hehimself can account for himself" (p. 138). It is in theAcademic Discourses thattechnical interpretation ecomes a psychological interpretation.While grammaticalinterpretation"aims at understanding discourse on the basis of the whole of

language," psychological interpretation aims at understanding this discourse asthe act of the continuous production of ideas" (p. 137). But the notion remains ofthe alternation and complementarityof these two "sides" (p. 137). The equal im

portance of the two sides of hermeneutics isaffirmed new in the 1832?33MarginalNotes :"Each going so far thatat the end the result of the other is attained at thesame time.Neither of them is superior nor inferior:each reposes on the gift of

language and on theknowledge ofmen" (p. 159).A bit further chleiermacher evenwrites: "if, once the problem is grasped and the initial conditions fulfilled,un

derstanding is to get underway, there is reason todeterminea prioritybetween thetwo. It is given to the grammatical phase, partly because it is themore fullydeveloped, partly because here one can more easily count on earlier practice" (p.160?61). It even seems that after theAcademic Discourses, Schleiermacher changed

his mind about including technical interpretationwithin psychological interpretation.A remark in the 1832?33Marginal Notes suggests this: "Recapitulation of therelative opposition between psychological interpretation nd technical interpretation.The first: rather thegenesis of thoughts fromthemoment of life s a whole.The other, rather reduction to a determined thought or the intended expositionfromwhich a series isdeveloped" (p. 163).One may wonder if thisdistinction,ac

tually somewhat obscure, could not be clarifiedby another distinction, thatof thetwo aspects of style: subjective unity fromtheperspective of theauthor's production, objective unity at the level of composition. Indeed, psychologicalhermeneutics is placed in a perspective of sudden inspirations (Einf?lle), whiletechnical hermeneutics is related to what Schleiermacher calls "mediation" and

"composition," that is, the capacity of a basic thought to generate a series, to

"decide" a succession. "Discovering the decision, that is the orientation and theauthentic unityof thework (psychological), thenunderstanding thecomposition as

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genetic realization (technical difficulties).Then related thoughts as permanent actions of life in its entirety" (p. 164).

20. The pair divination and comparison appears in the 1819Abridged Presentation:"In everyenterprisethere re fromtheoutset twomethods, thedivinatoryandthecomparative,which referto one another and thereforemust not be kept separatefromone another" (p. 109). This duality is found throughoutthe twohermeneutics,depending onwhether one aims directlyat the individualorwhether one gets at him

through omparisonsmade between individualswithin a general sphere:"The twoarenot to be separated. For divination obtains itscertainty only by virtue of the com

parisonwhich confirms it;without this,divination could always in factbe fanatical.But the

comparativemethod does not

impose unity:the

generaland the

particularmust be copervasive and this takes place only throughdivination" (p. 109). TheDiscourses confirmtheprioritygranted todivination: "Where thenwould thestartingpoint provided by theprocess of comparison come from,if it isnot given in thepersonal attempts [oftheauthor]"? (p. 136).But thisprioritydoes not exclude theconstant shiftingfromone method to the other (ibid.). Even the saying evoked above:

"understanding an author better thanhe himself can account for himself (p. 138)does not evade thenecessityofunderstanding individuality ymeans of comparison.

21. If in theAcademic Discourses divination comes before comparison, this isbecause of thecritique that Schleiermacher feelshemust address toWolf concerningthe claim that theauthor's ideas are discovered "in such a way that itbe recognizedwith necessary evidence" (p. 131). Invokingdivination is,above all, to reveal the im

possibilityof trying o impose on theaccount the formof a demonstration. It is fromthispolemical perspective that theveryearly recourse in the iscourses?in referenceto Ion, the "Platonic rhapsody"-is made to this "critical certainty, or rather

divinatory certainty,which for the interpreteronsists inplacing himselfas faras is

possible in thewriter's total state ofmind" (p. 132).The aim ofgraspinghold of theinnerprocess at themoment of sketching-out nd composition does not eliminate,even in theDiscourses, theneed forgrammatical understanding.The same page in theDiscourses confirmsthe thesis thathermeneuticsreliesupon thetwofamilies of inter

pretations defined in the earlier writings.As for divination itself,it refers to the

stylistic imensionwhose dual aspect, objective and subjective,will be shown later.22. The Academic Discourses tryto put some order in the conflict of these two

divisions, that into (grammatical and psychological) "aspects" or "sides" and that

into (divinatory nd comparative) "methods," and theysuggest that each aspect canbe divided intothe twomethods. Grammatical hermeneuticsaims at determiningthe

particularusage of the sense ofwords and sentences; itcan do so onlyby comparingcontextual uses. In the same way, psychological hermeneutics reaches the inner

process ofa particularwriteronlybymeans ofcomparison.On theotherhand, it isbydivination thatwe apprehend,on thegrammatical level,theoriginality nd noveltyofa turn f speechby reproducingthe creative act.The twodistinctions?that of thetwo"sides" and thatof the two "methods"?therefore continually intersect p. 138?39).In thefinal analysis, it is theunityof thought nd ofwords whichmakes these shiftsand exchanges possible.

23. The 1832?33Marginal Notes underscore a remarkable aspect of thisrelation,namely thenecessityof

temporally recapitulating

theearlierparts of a discourse in its

conclusion.This ruleeven becomes a distinctcanon: "Canon: confirmationof theunderstandingwhich is produced at thebeginning is to be expected inwhat follows. It

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follows that at the end one should stillpossess the beginningand thismeans that

speech can become writing forany complexwhich exceeds theordinarycapacity of

memory.The canon then takes this form:tounderstandexactlywhat comes first, nemust have already grasped thewhole" (p. 160).This temporalaspect of the relationbetween speechandwritinghad been remarked inthefirst iscourse, at the timeof a

reflection, tselfoccasioned by Plato, on the relationbetweenwritingandmemory:"As Plato has himself stated: the usefulnessofwritingconsists only incoming to theaid ofmemory's failures, nd this isequivocal, for ifwriting is foundedon the lossof

memory, it in turnabets this loss" (p. 146).24. The notionof style ppears first n the 1805Aphorisms', "unity can be reduced

tostyle,

inthe elevated sense of theword"(p. 48).

The same theme is takenup againin theAbridged Presentation of 1819; speakingof the ffort o reach"the whole of the

actwhich produced theunityof thework in itsparts," Schleiermacher notes, "In its

totalitythe aimmust be said to be theperfectunderstandingof the style" (p. 108).Style is truly heunityof thought nd discourse in singularwork. The notion of styleis impliedinthis 1827?28 notation: "The powerof combination and ofexpression,notas a general concept?logical laws?nor as empirical aggregate, but as individualnature" (p. 114).As such, style can be reachedonlyby approximation" (p. 115).Butit concerns the "internal unity or the theme of a work" (p. 117) as well as the

"originalityof thecomposition" (p. 119).Style thereforeoncerns thecorrespondencebetween theobjective unityof thework and the subjective originalityof the author.

25. The Academic Discourses introduce most interesting istinctionbetween the

twoperiods ofa style pp. 135ff), hat inwhich thestyle sconstituted nd thatduringwhich itreigns. In thefirstperiod, thestyle isunderstoodon the basis of the author'sown activity,of the intensity f theproductive force, nd of the verbal power. In thesecond period, however, it is thealready established stylewhich allows us tounderstand theactivity.The style thenmarks the limitimposed by an existing form: "He

who, in theundertakingof interpretation,oes not apprehendexactlyhow theriver f

thoughtand poetry in a sense runs against its banks and then flows back again,thereby directed in a sense other than itwould have naturally followed, that person is

not able tounderstandwell even themovement of thecomposition and even less ableto attributeto thewriter himselfhis trueplace inrelationto languageand itsforms"

(p. 136).26. See G.G. Granger,Essai d'une philosophie du Style (Paris:A. Colin, 1968).