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Scheduling Manufacturing Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach Negotiation Approach By Astrid Babayan Department of Mathematics and Engineering Harold Washington College January 2005

Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

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Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach. By Astrid Babayan Department of Mathematics and Engineering Harold Washington College January 2005. What is IE?. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation

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Page 1: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Scheduling Manufacturing Systems Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation ApproachNegotiation Approach

By

Astrid Babayan

Department of Mathematics and EngineeringHarold Washington College

January 2005

Page 2: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 2

What is IE?What is IE?

• Industrial Engineering started early in the twentieth century with the applications of the scientific methods in factories. Because of its initial factory orientation, this engineering discipline became known as industrial production or management engineering. Industrial Engineering is frequently defined as the integration of systems of machines, people, materials, money, and methods. While these key components still play an extremely important role in I.E., the meanings of these terms have became far more general in scope. A common misconception is that all I.E.'s work in factories. Information, energy and computers have become equally important components, causing the applications of I.E. to expand beyond factories to hospitals and other health-care operations, transportation, consulting companies, food processing companies, computer/computer software companies, organizations, media operations, service companies, such as banking and utilities, and divisions of local, regional, and national governments. I.E.'s are often suited to hold positions traditionally held by Business Administration and Mechanical Engineering majors.

Page 3: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 3

Research ObjectivesResearch Objectives

• Develop multi-agent based large scale scheduling problem solving framework with incorporated cooperation mechanism ruled by the game theoretic regulations.

• Develop objective measures of effectiveness for evaluating the developed model.

• Verified and validated the effectiveness of the developed methodology by comparing the results with those provided by other researchers.

Page 4: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 4

Scheduling ProblemScheduling Problem

Given:• a set of activities that must be executed;• a set of resources with which to perform the activities;• a set of constraints which must be satisfied; and• a set of objectives with which to judge a schedule’s

performance.Find:• The best way to assign the resources to the activities at

specific times such that all of the constraints are satisfied and the best objective measures are produced.

Page 5: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 5

Scaling Issues - The Size of the ProblemScaling Issues - The Size of the Problem

Using the nomenclature of Van Dyke Parunak, scheduling problems consist of asking what must be done where and when.

• Tasks (what) to complete.• Resources (where) operate on.• Specific periods of time (when).

Page 6: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 6

Assembly Subdivision Representation of a Assembly Subdivision Representation of a ProductProduct

Par

ts p

rod

uct

ion

Sub-assembly

Pro

du

ct

Production progress in assembly

Pro

du

ct c

omp

lexi

ty

Sub-assembly

Sub-assembly

Sub-assembly

Sub-assembly

Sub-assembly

Page 7: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 7

Classification of Scheduling ProblemsClassification of Scheduling Problems

Simple Digraph (Gs):one assembly operation at each assembly level

P 3

P 2

P 1

P

1

P

2

P

3

A

1

A

2

Page 8: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 8

Classification of Scheduling ProblemsClassification of Scheduling Problems

Complex Digraph (Gc):more than one assembly operation at least in one assembly level

P 1

P 2

P 3

P 4

P 5

P

1

P

2

P 5

A

1

A

3

P

3

P

4

A

2

Page 9: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 9

Classification of Scheduling ProblemsClassification of Scheduling Problems

N-product scheduling problem: N multiple products are produced in the system. In solving the N-product scheduling problem, the assembly sequence of a product could be either a simple digraph or a complex digraph.

Product 1 Product N. . .

Page 10: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 10

NN-Product Scheduling -Product Scheduling GcGc Scheduling Scheduling

Construct a complex digraph by connecting the assembly nodes of N products to a dummy final assembly node, Ad. Let t(Ad)=0.

Product 1

.

.

.

Product N

t(Ad)=0

.

.

. Ad

Page 11: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 11

General Structure of {General Structure of {mm, , qq} Manufacturing } Manufacturing SystemSystem

Page 12: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 12

ConstraintsConstraints

Precedence relations among the activities represented by the digraph should not be violated.

Page 13: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 13

Scheduling Problem FormulationScheduling Problem Formulation

Given the manufacturing system structure and product

assembly structure representation by a digraph assign

parts and subassemblies/assemblies to the machines at

the machining and assembly stages and determine the

processing sequences on the machines so that the

makespan), i.e., the maximum completion time Cmax, is

minimized.

Page 14: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 14

Solution Approaches Developed for Solution Approaches Developed for Solving the Scheduling ProblemsSolving the Scheduling Problems

Exact Solution Methods• Mathematical Programming

• Linear Programming• Integer Programming• Dynamic Programming • Bounded Enumeration

(modifications of BB)

Heuristic Solution Methods• Dispatching Rules• Artificial Intelligence

Techniques• Simulated Annealing• Neural Networks• Genetic Algorithm • Fuzzy Logic

• Hybrid Methods

Page 15: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 15

Problem Instances SolvedProblem Instances Solved

• Machining-Driven Product Differentiation Strategy

• Assembly-Driven Product Differentiation Strategy

Assembly Machine

Raw material Parts Finished products

Machine 1

Machine 2

Machine m

.

.

.

Machining

Assembly

Page 16: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 16

NP-Completeness ResultsNP-Completeness Results

• System structure {m=2, q=1}• Jobs:

Lee et al. (1993) showed that 3MAF scheduling with makespan minimization is NP-complete by reducing it to 3-PARTITION problem.

Our problem was reduced to 3MAF by constructing an instance for any {m, q} system where either m > 1 or q > 1. Hence our problem is NP-complete too.

Page 17: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 17

Why Agent-Based Approach?Why Agent-Based Approach?

• can simplify problem solving by splitting the problem into simple tasks;

• can tolerate uncertain data and knowledge; • offer conceptual clarity and simplicity of design; • allow incremental modification of the system boundary;

and • suit well to distributed problems.

Page 18: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 18

Designing Agent-Based SystemsDesigning Agent-Based Systems

Basic strategy: Decompose & Distribute Reduces complexity of a task less capable agents, and fewer resources needed.

Decomposition can be done: •Physically: based on the layout of the info sources or decision points. •Functionally: according to the expertise of available agents.

Distribution can be done according to:•Avoid overloading critical resources.•Assign tasks to agents with matching capabilities.•Assign resources to agents with matching capabilities.

Page 19: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 20

Properties of Agents Used in the System Properties of Agents Used in the System

• autonomy: agents operate without the direct intervention of human operators, and have high degree of computational capabilities;

• sociability: agents interact with other agents via some kind of agent communication language;

• reactivity: agents perceive their acting environment, and respond to the changes that occur there;

• pro-activity: agents do not simply act in response to the environment, they are able to exhibit goal oriented behavior by taking initiatives;

• veracity: agent will not knowingly communicate false information;• benevolence: agents do not have conflicting goals, and every agent will

therefore try to do what is asked of it; and• rationality: agent will act in order to achieve its goals, and will not in

such a way as to prevent its goals being achieved.

Page 20: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 21

Agent-Based Scheduling FrameworkAgent-Based Scheduling Framework

Digraph representation of product assembly

structure

Manufacturing system structure

Final schedule Game theory based agent cooperation

Scheduling subproblems of individual agents

Product assembly structure decomposition and agent

identification

Page 21: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 22

Digraph Decomposition Digraph Decomposition

Page 22: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 23

Scheduling Problem DecompositionScheduling Problem Decomposition

SAJ0={J3, J4, J5}.

NSJ0={J1, J2}

SJ0={}

P3

P4

P5

P6

P7

A3

A4

A2

A5

P1

P2

A1

Agent 4Job 4

Agent 2Job 2

Agent 3Job 3

Agent 5Job 5

Agent 1Job 1

Page 23: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 24

Definitions and NotationsDefinitions and Notations

Define:J = (J1, J2, J3, …, Jn) the set of the jobs to be scheduled;SAJ = set of schedulable jobs. NSJ = set of non-schedulable jobs. SJ = set of scheduled jobs.

Let stage be a step in the scheduling process, when a change in the set of schedulable/scheduled jobs occurs.

The sets SAJ, NSJ, SJ will be defined for stage t as: SAJt, NSJt, SJt

Page 24: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 25

Definitions and Notations (cont.)Definitions and Notations (cont.)

At any point of a time the followings hold:

JSJNSJSAJ ttt

tt NSJSAJ

tt SJSAJ

tt NSJSJ

Page 25: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 26

Agents Interaction in the Scheduling Agents Interaction in the Scheduling ProcessProcess

Outer game Inner game

Set of

candidate feasible jobs

Set of

infeasible jobs

Set of scheduled jobs

Schedule Manager

mig

rati

on

relevant info sharing

migration

relevant info sharing

Page 26: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 27

What Is a Game?What Is a Game?

“A game is a description of strategic interaction that includes the constraints on the actions that the players can take and the players’ interests, but does not specify the actions that the players do take.”

- Osborne and Rubenstein

Page 27: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 28

What Is Game Theory?What Is Game Theory?

“Game theory is a bag of analytical tools designed to help us understand the phenomena that we observe when decision-makers interact.”

– Osborne and Rubenstein

Page 28: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 29

Elements of Game TheoryElements of Game Theory

• Players with similar or different interests.• Actions available to each player.• Consequences related to players’ choices.

Examples:• Chess, go, tic-tac-toe, poker, spades.• Presidential elections, wars, political negotiations• Airline fare setting, business decisions• Channel allocation, bandwidth allocation, other engineering

problems

Page 29: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 30

Two Major Branches of Game TheoryTwo Major Branches of Game Theory

• Non-cooperative game theory includes a detailed study of the strategies available to the players.

• Cooperative game theory is concerned with those situations in which players can negotiate about what to do in the game.

Page 30: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 31

Cooperative Game TheoryCooperative Game Theory

• Players are going to play a game (in the future).

• Before the game, the players are able to negotiate and sign a binding contract regarding which strategies they will play.

• The result of their negotiations is the subject of cooperative game theory.

Page 31: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 32

Two Classes of Cooperative GamesTwo Classes of Cooperative Games

• N person transferable utility games: N-TU• N person non-transferable utility games: N-NTU

Depending weather or not players have comparable units of utility.

applied to problem

Page 32: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 33

How a N-TU Game is Defined? How a N-TU Game is Defined?

• Set of Players/Agents:

N={1, 2, …n}

• Characteristic Function:

Payoff v(S) for each coalition S N of the players’ set N

Page 33: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 34

Solution Concepts in Cooperative Game Solution Concepts in Cooperative Game TheoryTheory

• Core

• Shapley Value

Efficiency:

Symmetry:

Dummy:

Additivity:

}NS ,)( and )(:),...,,({ 21 Si

iNi

in SvxNvxxxxxC

)()(!

!||!1||)( iSvSv

n

SnSv

SiNS

i

Ni

i Nvv )()(

}){(}){(, and , if )()( jSviSvSjiNSvv ji

0)( then , )(}){( if vSiNSSviSv i)()()( vuvu

Page 34: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 35

Solution Concepts in Cooperative Game Solution Concepts in Cooperative Game Theory (cont.)Theory (cont.)

• Banzhaf-Coleman Power Index

Average of player i’s marginal contribution

SiNS

n

i iSvSvv })]{()([2

1)(

1

• Nucleolus

sallocationefficient ofset )}(:{1

NvxxXn

ii

)()(, if nucleolus is xOvOXxXv L

NSxSvxSeSi

i

where)(),(

Page 35: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 36

Shapley ValueShapley Value

General formula for calculating Shapley value:

For our problem reduces to:

Percentage contribution:

)()(!

!||!1||)( iSvSv

n

SnSv

SiNS

i

})({)(}){(2

1)( ivSviSvvi

)(}){()( viSvv iS

}){(

)(

)()(

)(

iSv

v

vv

v i

is

i

Page 36: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 37

Defining Outer GameDefining Outer Game

Initializationt=0

SAJt, NSJt, and SJt.

Agent in SAJ make their

individual schedules: Cmax,i

k=index(max i SAJ

{Cmax,i})

agent k enters

inner game

t=t+1

SAJt, NSJt, and SJt.

SAJ= End of outer game

k=index(max i SAJ ShVi/Cmax)

yes

no

Page 37: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 38

Defining Inner gameDefining Inner game

Coalition: SN

Payoff: v(S)

i S

Calculate v((S-{i} )i*)

i* is a new strategy by i

k=index(max i S ShVi/Cmax)

Agent k reschedules job k

Terminate rescheduli

ng

Inner game is stabilized

yes

no

Page 38: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 39

Lower Bound on MakespanLower Bound on Makespan

LB = solution obtained from MIP relaxation of the original problem

Since the optimization is MIN problem, the following holds:

maxCCLB

Page 39: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 40

Agent-Based Scheduling - CodingAgent-Based Scheduling - Coding

Agent Class properties:• Knowledge of the system structure• Knowledge of his/her own job/task structure• Knowledge of system state

• Completion time on each assembly/fabrication machine

• Knowledge of the state of sets SAJ, NSJ, SJ• Knowledge of his/her preceding agents completion time• Knowledge of formulating and solving MIP formulations

• Solver DLL by Frontline Systems

Page 40: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 41

Example : Agent-Based Scheduling Example : Agent-Based Scheduling

Assembly structure and machining and assembly times of a product.

Agent 1 Job 1

A2

P3

A4

P1

P2

A1

P4

P5

P6

A3Agent 2Job 2

Agent 3Job 3

Part # P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6

Machining Time 6 4 6 1 6 9

Assembly # A1 A2 A3 A4 - -

Assembly Time 3 1 3 5 - -

Set of jobs is defined: J = {J1, J2, J3}

Page 41: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 42

Example : Agent-Based Scheduling (Cont.) Example : Agent-Based Scheduling (Cont.)

t=0

SAJ0={J2, J3}

NSJ0={J1=J2&J3}

SJ0={}

a3 is the winner t=1

SAJ1={J3}

NSJ1={J1=J2&J3}

SJ1={J2}

v(3)=12, v(S)=11, v(S+3)=19ShV(3)=(v(S+3)-v(S)+v(3)) /2=10Percentage contribution=10/19=0.555

Page 42: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 43

Test Problem Generation – {1, 1} SystemTest Problem Generation – {1, 1} System

(i) MT ~ U(7, 25) ; AT ~ U(10, 30) (ii) MT ~ U(6, 14) ; AT ~ U(6, 19) (iii) MT ~ U(3, 12) ; AT ~ U(4, 12). (iv) MT ~ U(5, 16) ; AT ~ U(6, 20)

The average size of the problems corresponds to 37 part nodes, 26 assembly nodes, and 7 assembly levels.

The data was generated based on the real assembly application information from industrial assembly handbooks (e.g., Nof et al., 1996; Boothroyd, 1992; Lotter, 1989).

Page 43: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 44

Analysis of Results – {1, 1}Analysis of Results – {1, 1}

Average over 10 instances of each problem type.

Page 44: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 45

Test Problem Generation – {Test Problem Generation – {mm, , qq} System} System

(i) MT ~ U(3, 12) ; AT ~ U(4, 5)(ii) MT ~ U(4, 9) ; AT ~ U(6, 11) (iii) MT ~ U(2, 14) ; AT ~ U(7, 18)

The average size of the problems corresponds to 45 part nodes, 30 assembly nodes, and 5 assembly levels.

{m, q}={3, 3}; {7, 7}; {20, 20}.

Page 45: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 46

Analysis of Results – {Analysis of Results – {mm, , qq}}

Average over 10 instances of each problem type.

{3,3} {7,7} {20,20} Problem CAB/CLB CAB/CLB CAB/CLB Type 1 1.152 1.394 1.651 Type 2 1.408 1.676 1.317 Type 3 1.395 1.520 1.232

Page 46: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 47

N-Job 3-Machine Flexible Flowshop N-Job 3-Machine Flexible Flowshop SchedulingScheduling

• System Structure

jobs jobs finished jobs

Machine 11

Machine 21

Machine m11

Machine 12

Machine 22

Machine m23

Machine 13

Machine 23

Machine m33

Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3

jobs

Page 47: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 48

NN-Job 3-Machine Flexible Flowshop -Job 3-Machine Flexible Flowshop SchedulingScheduling

• Task Structure

Page 48: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 49

Test Problem Generation - ComparisonTest Problem Generation - Comparison

(i) balanced load:

Pj,1, Pj,2, Pj,3 ~ U(1, 100)

(ii) light load on stage 1:

Pj,1~U(1, 20), Pj,2, Pj,3 ~ U(1, 100)

(iii) light load on stage 2:

Pj,1, Pj,3 ~ U(1, 100), Pj,2~U(1, 20)

Page 49: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 50

Comparison of ResultsComparison of ResultsEqual load Light load at stage 1 Light load at stage 2

n m1, m2, m3 CAB/CLB SEmin CAB/CLB SEmax CAB/CLB SEmin 2,2,2 1.15 1.20 1.08 1.16 1.07 1.13 2,2,3 1.10 1.16 1.04 1.17 1.03 1.09 2,3,2 1.13 1.14 1.11 1.15 1.07 1.12 2,3,3 1.05 1.10 1.12 1.25 1.03 1.08 3,2,2 1.18 1.16 1.08 1.10 1.10 1.10 3,2,3 1.13 1.17 1.04 1.13 1.11 1.17 3,3,2 1.16 1.10 1.11 1.11 1.10 1.09

30

3,3,3 1.21 1.27 1.11 1.18 1.10 1.20 2,2,2 1.12 1.22 1.04 1.18 1.04 1.10 2,2,3 1.08 1.16 1.02 1.20 1.02 1.05 2,3,2 1.08 1.13 1.07 1.17 1.04 1.13 2,3,3 1.03 1.06 1.07 1.28 1.01 1.05 3,2,2 1.13 1.15 1.05 1.12 1.07 1.07 3,2,3 1.08 1.17 1.02 1.13 1.07 1.15 3,3,2 1.12 1.05 1.07 1.10 1.07 1.06

50

3,3,3 1.16 1.27 1.06 1.19 1.18 1.16

Page 50: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 52

Definitions and NotationsDefinitions and Notations

Page 51: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 53

Definitions and Notations (cont.)Definitions and Notations (cont.)

Page 52: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 54

Mixed-Integer Programming FormulationMixed-Integer Programming Formulation

Min CT(An) (1) Subject to:

m

lkj

N

kjj

jklii PtPtqAtACT1 1

)()()()( for iki APPAPA , (2)

1)(1

jik

m

kijk qq for i=1,…, N, j=1,…, N, ji (3)

)()()( iji AtACTACT for i=1,…, n, )( ij AIPA (4)

11

q

jijx i=1,…, n (5)

Page 53: Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach

Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 55

Mixed-Integer Programming Formulation Mixed-Integer Programming Formulation (cont.)(cont.)

)()(1

i

q

jij ACTACT

i = 1 , … , n - 1 ( 6 )

)1( ijiji xM)(ACT)CT(A f o r i = 1 , … , n - 1 , j = 1 , … , q ( 7 )

ikjkkjkjij My)A(tx)A(CT)A(CT ( 8 )

)y(M)A(CT)A(tx)A(CT ikjijiijkj 1 ( 9 )

f o r i = 1 , … , n - 1 , j = 1 , … , q , )A(NAA ik

1or 0 and , , ikjijkij yqx ( 1 0 )

a l l o t h e r v a r i a b l e s a r e n o n n e g a t i v e . ( 1 1 )