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Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation Approach. By Astrid Babayan Department of Mathematics and Engineering Harold Washington College January 2005. What is IE?. - PowerPoint PPT Presentation
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Scheduling Manufacturing Systems Scheduling Manufacturing Systems with Agents: A Game Theory Based with Agents: A Game Theory Based Negotiation ApproachNegotiation Approach
By
Astrid Babayan
Department of Mathematics and EngineeringHarold Washington College
January 2005
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 2
What is IE?What is IE?
• Industrial Engineering started early in the twentieth century with the applications of the scientific methods in factories. Because of its initial factory orientation, this engineering discipline became known as industrial production or management engineering. Industrial Engineering is frequently defined as the integration of systems of machines, people, materials, money, and methods. While these key components still play an extremely important role in I.E., the meanings of these terms have became far more general in scope. A common misconception is that all I.E.'s work in factories. Information, energy and computers have become equally important components, causing the applications of I.E. to expand beyond factories to hospitals and other health-care operations, transportation, consulting companies, food processing companies, computer/computer software companies, organizations, media operations, service companies, such as banking and utilities, and divisions of local, regional, and national governments. I.E.'s are often suited to hold positions traditionally held by Business Administration and Mechanical Engineering majors.
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 3
Research ObjectivesResearch Objectives
• Develop multi-agent based large scale scheduling problem solving framework with incorporated cooperation mechanism ruled by the game theoretic regulations.
• Develop objective measures of effectiveness for evaluating the developed model.
• Verified and validated the effectiveness of the developed methodology by comparing the results with those provided by other researchers.
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 4
Scheduling ProblemScheduling Problem
Given:• a set of activities that must be executed;• a set of resources with which to perform the activities;• a set of constraints which must be satisfied; and• a set of objectives with which to judge a schedule’s
performance.Find:• The best way to assign the resources to the activities at
specific times such that all of the constraints are satisfied and the best objective measures are produced.
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 5
Scaling Issues - The Size of the ProblemScaling Issues - The Size of the Problem
Using the nomenclature of Van Dyke Parunak, scheduling problems consist of asking what must be done where and when.
• Tasks (what) to complete.• Resources (where) operate on.• Specific periods of time (when).
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 6
Assembly Subdivision Representation of a Assembly Subdivision Representation of a ProductProduct
Par
ts p
rod
uct
ion
Sub-assembly
Pro
du
ct
Production progress in assembly
Pro
du
ct c
omp
lexi
ty
Sub-assembly
Sub-assembly
Sub-assembly
Sub-assembly
Sub-assembly
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 7
Classification of Scheduling ProblemsClassification of Scheduling Problems
Simple Digraph (Gs):one assembly operation at each assembly level
P 3
P 2
P 1
P
1
P
2
P
3
A
1
A
2
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 8
Classification of Scheduling ProblemsClassification of Scheduling Problems
Complex Digraph (Gc):more than one assembly operation at least in one assembly level
P 1
P 2
P 3
P 4
P 5
P
1
P
2
P 5
A
1
A
3
P
3
P
4
A
2
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 9
Classification of Scheduling ProblemsClassification of Scheduling Problems
N-product scheduling problem: N multiple products are produced in the system. In solving the N-product scheduling problem, the assembly sequence of a product could be either a simple digraph or a complex digraph.
Product 1 Product N. . .
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 10
NN-Product Scheduling -Product Scheduling GcGc Scheduling Scheduling
Construct a complex digraph by connecting the assembly nodes of N products to a dummy final assembly node, Ad. Let t(Ad)=0.
Product 1
.
.
.
Product N
t(Ad)=0
.
.
. Ad
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 11
General Structure of {General Structure of {mm, , qq} Manufacturing } Manufacturing SystemSystem
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 12
ConstraintsConstraints
Precedence relations among the activities represented by the digraph should not be violated.
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 13
Scheduling Problem FormulationScheduling Problem Formulation
Given the manufacturing system structure and product
assembly structure representation by a digraph assign
parts and subassemblies/assemblies to the machines at
the machining and assembly stages and determine the
processing sequences on the machines so that the
makespan), i.e., the maximum completion time Cmax, is
minimized.
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 14
Solution Approaches Developed for Solution Approaches Developed for Solving the Scheduling ProblemsSolving the Scheduling Problems
Exact Solution Methods• Mathematical Programming
• Linear Programming• Integer Programming• Dynamic Programming • Bounded Enumeration
(modifications of BB)
Heuristic Solution Methods• Dispatching Rules• Artificial Intelligence
Techniques• Simulated Annealing• Neural Networks• Genetic Algorithm • Fuzzy Logic
• Hybrid Methods
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 15
Problem Instances SolvedProblem Instances Solved
• Machining-Driven Product Differentiation Strategy
• Assembly-Driven Product Differentiation Strategy
Assembly Machine
Raw material Parts Finished products
Machine 1
Machine 2
Machine m
.
.
.
Machining
Assembly
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 16
NP-Completeness ResultsNP-Completeness Results
• System structure {m=2, q=1}• Jobs:
Lee et al. (1993) showed that 3MAF scheduling with makespan minimization is NP-complete by reducing it to 3-PARTITION problem.
Our problem was reduced to 3MAF by constructing an instance for any {m, q} system where either m > 1 or q > 1. Hence our problem is NP-complete too.
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 17
Why Agent-Based Approach?Why Agent-Based Approach?
• can simplify problem solving by splitting the problem into simple tasks;
• can tolerate uncertain data and knowledge; • offer conceptual clarity and simplicity of design; • allow incremental modification of the system boundary;
and • suit well to distributed problems.
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 18
Designing Agent-Based SystemsDesigning Agent-Based Systems
Basic strategy: Decompose & Distribute Reduces complexity of a task less capable agents, and fewer resources needed.
Decomposition can be done: •Physically: based on the layout of the info sources or decision points. •Functionally: according to the expertise of available agents.
Distribution can be done according to:•Avoid overloading critical resources.•Assign tasks to agents with matching capabilities.•Assign resources to agents with matching capabilities.
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 20
Properties of Agents Used in the System Properties of Agents Used in the System
• autonomy: agents operate without the direct intervention of human operators, and have high degree of computational capabilities;
• sociability: agents interact with other agents via some kind of agent communication language;
• reactivity: agents perceive their acting environment, and respond to the changes that occur there;
• pro-activity: agents do not simply act in response to the environment, they are able to exhibit goal oriented behavior by taking initiatives;
• veracity: agent will not knowingly communicate false information;• benevolence: agents do not have conflicting goals, and every agent will
therefore try to do what is asked of it; and• rationality: agent will act in order to achieve its goals, and will not in
such a way as to prevent its goals being achieved.
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 21
Agent-Based Scheduling FrameworkAgent-Based Scheduling Framework
Digraph representation of product assembly
structure
Manufacturing system structure
Final schedule Game theory based agent cooperation
Scheduling subproblems of individual agents
Product assembly structure decomposition and agent
identification
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 22
Digraph Decomposition Digraph Decomposition
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 23
Scheduling Problem DecompositionScheduling Problem Decomposition
SAJ0={J3, J4, J5}.
NSJ0={J1, J2}
SJ0={}
P3
P4
P5
P6
P7
A3
A4
A2
A5
P1
P2
A1
Agent 4Job 4
Agent 2Job 2
Agent 3Job 3
Agent 5Job 5
Agent 1Job 1
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 24
Definitions and NotationsDefinitions and Notations
Define:J = (J1, J2, J3, …, Jn) the set of the jobs to be scheduled;SAJ = set of schedulable jobs. NSJ = set of non-schedulable jobs. SJ = set of scheduled jobs.
Let stage be a step in the scheduling process, when a change in the set of schedulable/scheduled jobs occurs.
The sets SAJ, NSJ, SJ will be defined for stage t as: SAJt, NSJt, SJt
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 25
Definitions and Notations (cont.)Definitions and Notations (cont.)
At any point of a time the followings hold:
JSJNSJSAJ ttt
tt NSJSAJ
tt SJSAJ
tt NSJSJ
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 26
Agents Interaction in the Scheduling Agents Interaction in the Scheduling ProcessProcess
Outer game Inner game
Set of
candidate feasible jobs
Set of
infeasible jobs
Set of scheduled jobs
Schedule Manager
mig
rati
on
relevant info sharing
migration
relevant info sharing
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 27
What Is a Game?What Is a Game?
“A game is a description of strategic interaction that includes the constraints on the actions that the players can take and the players’ interests, but does not specify the actions that the players do take.”
- Osborne and Rubenstein
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 28
What Is Game Theory?What Is Game Theory?
“Game theory is a bag of analytical tools designed to help us understand the phenomena that we observe when decision-makers interact.”
– Osborne and Rubenstein
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 29
Elements of Game TheoryElements of Game Theory
• Players with similar or different interests.• Actions available to each player.• Consequences related to players’ choices.
Examples:• Chess, go, tic-tac-toe, poker, spades.• Presidential elections, wars, political negotiations• Airline fare setting, business decisions• Channel allocation, bandwidth allocation, other engineering
problems
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 30
Two Major Branches of Game TheoryTwo Major Branches of Game Theory
• Non-cooperative game theory includes a detailed study of the strategies available to the players.
• Cooperative game theory is concerned with those situations in which players can negotiate about what to do in the game.
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 31
Cooperative Game TheoryCooperative Game Theory
• Players are going to play a game (in the future).
• Before the game, the players are able to negotiate and sign a binding contract regarding which strategies they will play.
• The result of their negotiations is the subject of cooperative game theory.
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 32
Two Classes of Cooperative GamesTwo Classes of Cooperative Games
• N person transferable utility games: N-TU• N person non-transferable utility games: N-NTU
Depending weather or not players have comparable units of utility.
applied to problem
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 33
How a N-TU Game is Defined? How a N-TU Game is Defined?
• Set of Players/Agents:
N={1, 2, …n}
• Characteristic Function:
Payoff v(S) for each coalition S N of the players’ set N
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 34
Solution Concepts in Cooperative Game Solution Concepts in Cooperative Game TheoryTheory
• Core
• Shapley Value
Efficiency:
Symmetry:
Dummy:
Additivity:
}NS ,)( and )(:),...,,({ 21 Si
iNi
in SvxNvxxxxxC
)()(!
!||!1||)( iSvSv
n
SnSv
SiNS
i
Ni
i Nvv )()(
}){(}){(, and , if )()( jSviSvSjiNSvv ji
0)( then , )(}){( if vSiNSSviSv i)()()( vuvu
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 35
Solution Concepts in Cooperative Game Solution Concepts in Cooperative Game Theory (cont.)Theory (cont.)
• Banzhaf-Coleman Power Index
Average of player i’s marginal contribution
SiNS
n
i iSvSvv })]{()([2
1)(
1
• Nucleolus
sallocationefficient ofset )}(:{1
NvxxXn
ii
)()(, if nucleolus is xOvOXxXv L
NSxSvxSeSi
i
where)(),(
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 36
Shapley ValueShapley Value
General formula for calculating Shapley value:
For our problem reduces to:
Percentage contribution:
)()(!
!||!1||)( iSvSv
n
SnSv
SiNS
i
})({)(}){(2
1)( ivSviSvvi
)(}){()( viSvv iS
}){(
)(
)()(
)(
iSv
v
vv
v i
is
i
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 37
Defining Outer GameDefining Outer Game
Initializationt=0
SAJt, NSJt, and SJt.
Agent in SAJ make their
individual schedules: Cmax,i
k=index(max i SAJ
{Cmax,i})
agent k enters
inner game
t=t+1
SAJt, NSJt, and SJt.
SAJ= End of outer game
k=index(max i SAJ ShVi/Cmax)
yes
no
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 38
Defining Inner gameDefining Inner game
Coalition: SN
Payoff: v(S)
i S
Calculate v((S-{i} )i*)
i* is a new strategy by i
k=index(max i S ShVi/Cmax)
Agent k reschedules job k
Terminate rescheduli
ng
Inner game is stabilized
yes
no
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 39
Lower Bound on MakespanLower Bound on Makespan
LB = solution obtained from MIP relaxation of the original problem
Since the optimization is MIN problem, the following holds:
maxCCLB
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 40
Agent-Based Scheduling - CodingAgent-Based Scheduling - Coding
Agent Class properties:• Knowledge of the system structure• Knowledge of his/her own job/task structure• Knowledge of system state
• Completion time on each assembly/fabrication machine
• Knowledge of the state of sets SAJ, NSJ, SJ• Knowledge of his/her preceding agents completion time• Knowledge of formulating and solving MIP formulations
• Solver DLL by Frontline Systems
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 41
Example : Agent-Based Scheduling Example : Agent-Based Scheduling
Assembly structure and machining and assembly times of a product.
Agent 1 Job 1
A2
P3
A4
P1
P2
A1
P4
P5
P6
A3Agent 2Job 2
Agent 3Job 3
Part # P1 P2 P3 P4 P5 P6
Machining Time 6 4 6 1 6 9
Assembly # A1 A2 A3 A4 - -
Assembly Time 3 1 3 5 - -
Set of jobs is defined: J = {J1, J2, J3}
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 42
Example : Agent-Based Scheduling (Cont.) Example : Agent-Based Scheduling (Cont.)
t=0
SAJ0={J2, J3}
NSJ0={J1=J2&J3}
SJ0={}
a3 is the winner t=1
SAJ1={J3}
NSJ1={J1=J2&J3}
SJ1={J2}
v(3)=12, v(S)=11, v(S+3)=19ShV(3)=(v(S+3)-v(S)+v(3)) /2=10Percentage contribution=10/19=0.555
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 43
Test Problem Generation – {1, 1} SystemTest Problem Generation – {1, 1} System
(i) MT ~ U(7, 25) ; AT ~ U(10, 30) (ii) MT ~ U(6, 14) ; AT ~ U(6, 19) (iii) MT ~ U(3, 12) ; AT ~ U(4, 12). (iv) MT ~ U(5, 16) ; AT ~ U(6, 20)
The average size of the problems corresponds to 37 part nodes, 26 assembly nodes, and 7 assembly levels.
The data was generated based on the real assembly application information from industrial assembly handbooks (e.g., Nof et al., 1996; Boothroyd, 1992; Lotter, 1989).
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 44
Analysis of Results – {1, 1}Analysis of Results – {1, 1}
Average over 10 instances of each problem type.
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 45
Test Problem Generation – {Test Problem Generation – {mm, , qq} System} System
(i) MT ~ U(3, 12) ; AT ~ U(4, 5)(ii) MT ~ U(4, 9) ; AT ~ U(6, 11) (iii) MT ~ U(2, 14) ; AT ~ U(7, 18)
The average size of the problems corresponds to 45 part nodes, 30 assembly nodes, and 5 assembly levels.
{m, q}={3, 3}; {7, 7}; {20, 20}.
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 46
Analysis of Results – {Analysis of Results – {mm, , qq}}
Average over 10 instances of each problem type.
{3,3} {7,7} {20,20} Problem CAB/CLB CAB/CLB CAB/CLB Type 1 1.152 1.394 1.651 Type 2 1.408 1.676 1.317 Type 3 1.395 1.520 1.232
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 47
N-Job 3-Machine Flexible Flowshop N-Job 3-Machine Flexible Flowshop SchedulingScheduling
• System Structure
jobs jobs finished jobs
Machine 11
Machine 21
Machine m11
Machine 12
Machine 22
Machine m23
Machine 13
Machine 23
Machine m33
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
jobs
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 48
NN-Job 3-Machine Flexible Flowshop -Job 3-Machine Flexible Flowshop SchedulingScheduling
• Task Structure
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 49
Test Problem Generation - ComparisonTest Problem Generation - Comparison
(i) balanced load:
Pj,1, Pj,2, Pj,3 ~ U(1, 100)
(ii) light load on stage 1:
Pj,1~U(1, 20), Pj,2, Pj,3 ~ U(1, 100)
(iii) light load on stage 2:
Pj,1, Pj,3 ~ U(1, 100), Pj,2~U(1, 20)
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 50
Comparison of ResultsComparison of ResultsEqual load Light load at stage 1 Light load at stage 2
n m1, m2, m3 CAB/CLB SEmin CAB/CLB SEmax CAB/CLB SEmin 2,2,2 1.15 1.20 1.08 1.16 1.07 1.13 2,2,3 1.10 1.16 1.04 1.17 1.03 1.09 2,3,2 1.13 1.14 1.11 1.15 1.07 1.12 2,3,3 1.05 1.10 1.12 1.25 1.03 1.08 3,2,2 1.18 1.16 1.08 1.10 1.10 1.10 3,2,3 1.13 1.17 1.04 1.13 1.11 1.17 3,3,2 1.16 1.10 1.11 1.11 1.10 1.09
30
3,3,3 1.21 1.27 1.11 1.18 1.10 1.20 2,2,2 1.12 1.22 1.04 1.18 1.04 1.10 2,2,3 1.08 1.16 1.02 1.20 1.02 1.05 2,3,2 1.08 1.13 1.07 1.17 1.04 1.13 2,3,3 1.03 1.06 1.07 1.28 1.01 1.05 3,2,2 1.13 1.15 1.05 1.12 1.07 1.07 3,2,3 1.08 1.17 1.02 1.13 1.07 1.15 3,3,2 1.12 1.05 1.07 1.10 1.07 1.06
50
3,3,3 1.16 1.27 1.06 1.19 1.18 1.16
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 52
Definitions and NotationsDefinitions and Notations
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 53
Definitions and Notations (cont.)Definitions and Notations (cont.)
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 54
Mixed-Integer Programming FormulationMixed-Integer Programming Formulation
Min CT(An) (1) Subject to:
m
lkj
N
kjj
jklii PtPtqAtACT1 1
)()()()( for iki APPAPA , (2)
1)(1
jik
m
kijk qq for i=1,…, N, j=1,…, N, ji (3)
)()()( iji AtACTACT for i=1,…, n, )( ij AIPA (4)
11
q
jijx i=1,…, n (5)
Harold Washington College - Math Colloquium 2005 55
Mixed-Integer Programming Formulation Mixed-Integer Programming Formulation (cont.)(cont.)
)()(1
i
q
jij ACTACT
i = 1 , … , n - 1 ( 6 )
)1( ijiji xM)(ACT)CT(A f o r i = 1 , … , n - 1 , j = 1 , … , q ( 7 )
ikjkkjkjij My)A(tx)A(CT)A(CT ( 8 )
)y(M)A(CT)A(tx)A(CT ikjijiijkj 1 ( 9 )
f o r i = 1 , … , n - 1 , j = 1 , … , q , )A(NAA ik
1or 0 and , , ikjijkij yqx ( 1 0 )
a l l o t h e r v a r i a b l e s a r e n o n n e g a t i v e . ( 1 1 )