THEMANONHORSEBACKTheRoleoftheMilitaryinPolitics

S.E.FINER

PALLMALLPRESS

-iii-

PublishedbythePallMallPressLimited5CromwellPlace,LondonSW7

(c)S.E.Finer,1962

Firstpublished1962

Secondprinting1967

Thirdprinting1969

SBN269160957

PrintedbyoffsetinGreatBritainbyAlden&MowbrayLtdattheAldenPress,Oxford

-iv-

Inrecognition,gratitudeandlovetomygreatteacherandconstantguidemybrotherHERMAN

-v-

[Thispageintentionallyleftblank.]-vi-

ContentsAcknowledgements ix

1TheMilitaryinthePoliticsofToday 1

2ThePoliticalStrengthsoftheMilitary 6

3ThePoliticalWeaknessesoftheMilitary 14

4TheDispositiontoIntervene(1)Motive 23

5TheDispositiontoIntervene(2)Mood 61

6TheOpportunitytoIntervene 72

7TheLevelsofIntervention(1)Countriesofdevelopedpoliticalculture 86

8TheLevelsofIntervention(2)Countriesoflowpoliticalculture 110

9TheLevelsofIntervention(3)Countriesofminimalpoliticalculture 129

10TheModesofIntervention 140

11TheResultsofIntervention-TheMilitaryRégimes 164

12ThePastandtheFutureofMilitaryInterven-tion 205

Bibliography 245

Indexofpersons 259

Indexofcountries 262

Indexofsubjects 266

-vii-

[Thispageintentionallyleftblank.]-viii-

AcknowledgementsThisessaygrewoutofashortpaperIpresentedtotheBritishPoliticalStudiesAssociation.ThemoreIthoughtaboutthesubject,themoreimportantitseemedtome.Sincenobodyelseseemedtohaveexaminedit--atleast,inthewayIthoughtitoughttobeexamined--Ifeltcompelledtodosomyself.IhopeIhavedonesocompetentlyenoughnottohavespoiledthefieldforothersbetterqualified.Ibynomeansofferthebookasthelastword---forthiswillnotbewrittenforalongtimetocome--butasafirstone.Ishallbedisappointedifitdoesnotleadtofurtherresearchinthisfield,howevercriticalofmyownstandpointitmayprovetobe.

Ihavewrittenitforthegeneralreaderratherthanformyprofessionalcolleagues,thoughItrustthescholarshipwillnotproveanytheworseforthat;butthisexplainswhyIhavecutdowntheusualapparatusofcitationsandreferences,andlimitedthebibliography.

Colleagueshavegivenmegreathelpandencouragement.IwouldparticularlythankMr.F.G.CarnelloftheInstituteofCommonwealthStudies,Oxford;ProfessorGeorgeFischerofCornellUniversity;ProfessorJohnLewis,alsoofCornellUniversity;myfriend,ProfessorW.J.M.MacKenzieofManchesterUniversity;myoldcolleague,Mr.A.P.V.Rolo,SeniorLecturerinHistoryattheUniversityofKeele;and,finally,mycronyofundergraduatedaysatTrinityCollege,Oxford,BrigadierPeterYoung,D.S.O.,M.C.,M.A.,oftheRoyalMilitaryAcademy,Sandhurst,whousedtobeatmeinafascinatingkriegspielwhichweinventedtogether.Allthesecolleaguesreadmytypescriptandofferedvaluablecommentsandcorrectionswhichhavemuchimprovedthebook.

ImustalsothankMr.S.O.Stewart,theLibrarianoftheUniversityofKeele,andhisstaff,forthehelptheyhavegivenmeinobtainingtheverywiderangeofbooksandothermaterialsthatwasnecessarytocarryoutmyresearch.

-ix-

[Thispageintentionallyleftblank.]-x-

-xi-

[Thispageintentionallyleftblank.]-xii-

CHAPTERONETheMilitaryinthePoliticsofTodayTHEyear1962openedwithbriskoutburstsofmilitaryrevolt.Fourrisings--thoseintheLebanon,Portugal,TurkeyandVenezuela--wereunsuccessful,butthemonthofMarchwitnessedthreevictoriousrevoltsinquicksuccession.InBurma,GeneralNeWindeposedthegovernmentandestablisheddirectmilitaryrule.InArgentinathearmedforcesremovedPresidentFrondiziandsetupaProvisionalPresidentinhisplace.InSyria,exactlysixmonthsafterthe1961coup,militaryfactionsfirstsweptawaythecivilianrégimeandthen,quarrellingamongthemselves,restoredit.

ThedateoftheunsuccessfulLebanonrising,betweenthelastdayoftheoldyearandthefirstdayofthenew,wassymbolical:inallthismilitaryactivity,1962wasbutcontinuingwhere1961hadleftoff.For1961wasalsoabusyoneforthearmedforces.TheyoverthrewtheprovisionalgovernmentinElSalvadorinJanuary.InAprilthe'FourGenerals'stagedtheirunsuccessfulcoupinAlgeria.InMayitwastheturnoftheSouthKoreanarmy;itoverthrewitsgovernmentandestablishedathorough-goingmilitarydictatorship.InAugust,theBrazilianarmedforcesstrovetopreventVice-PresidentSenhorGoulart'saccessiontothePresidency(whichhadbeenvacatedbytheresignationofPresidentQuadros).InSeptemberthearmyoftheSyrianprovinceoftheU.A.R.revolted,drovetheEgyptianofficialsout,andestablishedagovernmentforanindependentSyria.InNovemberEcuador'sarmyandairforcesclashedastowhowastosucceedthePresident--whohadhimselfresignedastheresultofamilitaryrevolt.

Norwas1961verydifferentfrom1960.ThatyearhadseentheTurkisharmyrevoltofMay,andtheestablishmentofGeneral

-1-

Gürsel'sdictatorship;themutinyoftheCongoleseForcePubliqueinJulyandthesubsequentrapineandcarnagethroughoutthenewbornRepublic;theLaotiancoupofCaptainKongLeeinAugust-themovethatsparkedoffthecivilwar;thebloodlesscoupbywhichColonelOsoriooustedPresidentLemusofElSalvadorinOctober;andfinally,therevoltofthePalaceGuardagainsttheEmperorofEthiopiainDecember.

Ineverycasethearmedforceshaddefiedorindeedusedviolenceagainstthegovernmentofthestate.InMay1960ontheoccasionofGeneralGürsel'srevolt,TheTimescommented:'IthasbeenagoodyearforGenerals';butthiswasnotonlybelatedbutquitemisleading.For1959hadwitnessedanunsuccessfulrisinginIraq,anunsuccessfulmilitaryplotinCambodiaandasuccessfulcoupintheSudan,while1958was--forthemilitary--anannusmirabilis.ThatwastheyearwhenMarshalSaritabrogatedtheconstitutionofThailandandmadehimselfdictator;inwhichGeneralsAyubKhan,KassimandAbboudseizedpowerinPakistan,IraqandtheSudanrespectively;inwhich,also,GeneralNeWinwasraisedtopowerinBurmaandGeneraldeGaulleinFrance.

Yetperhapsthisperiod1958-61isexceptional?Hardlyso.Considerthesovereignstatesthatareatleastsevenyearsold,i.e.thosecreatedinorbefore1955.LeavingasidesmallstatesofnominalsovereignstatussuchasLiechtenstein,SanMarinoortheTrucialStates,791sovereignstatesexistedinorbefore1955:15cameintobeingbetween1945and1955,andofthese9havesufferedfrommilitarycoups(includingtheLebanon).Another13statescameintobeingbetween1918and1944(includingthe3BalticStates,nowabsorbedintotheSovietUnion).Ofthese6experiencedmilitarycoups,andoneofthem(Jordan)mayfairlybesaidtobearoyalmilitarydictatorship.Thethreestatescreatedbetween1900and1917,i.e.Albania,CubaandPanama,haveallwitnessedmilitaryrevoltanddictatorshipsince1918;andsolikewisehavethetwo--BulgariaandSerbia--whichbecamefullyindependentbetween1861and1899.46stateshavebeenindependentformorethanacentury.Since1918nolessthan26ofthesehavesufferedfromsomeformorotherofmilitaryinterventionintheirpolitics,usuallyofaviolentkind.2

____________________

1 Properly,76.Thefigureof79includesEsthonia,LithuaniaandLatvia,nowabsorbedintotheU.S.S.R.,butindependentfrom1918to1940.

2 Chinafallsoutsidethisclassification.Itwasapreytoincessantcivilwarandmilitaryturbulenceuntil1949.

-2-

Thusthemilitarycoupsof1958-61werecertainlynotexceptional.Ofthe51statesexistinginorbefore1917,allbut19haveexperiencedsuchcoupssince1917;whileofthe28createdbetween1917and1955,allbut15havedoneso.Independentpoliticalactivitybythearmedforcesisthereforefrequent,widespread,andoflongstanding.

Norareitseffectstransitory.Onthecontrary.Atthemomentofwritingsome11statesaremilitarydictatorships:Thailand,Pakistan,Egypt,theSudan,Iraq,Spain,Portugal,SouthKorea,ElSalvador,ParaguayandNicaragua.Inaddition,inalargenumberofcountriesthearmyaloneguaranteestherégime:e.g.inJordan,theCongo,Persia,Honduras.Inmanyothercountries,e.g.Indonesia,Argentina,Brazil,Venezuela,Peru,EcuadorandGuatemala,therégimesmustneedscourtthearmedforces'goodwill--afavourwhichmaybesuddenlywithdrawn,asinthepast.

Finally,thispoliticalactivityofthemilitaryispersistent.IncertainareasofSouthAmerica,earthquakesaresofrequentthatthepeopledategreateventsfromtheyearswhenbyrarechancenoearthquakehasoccurred.Likewisewiththepoliticalactivityofthemilitary;thereareareaswhereitcanfairlybedescribed--byvirtueofitsrecurrentanditswidespreadnature--asendemic.SuchanareaisLatinAmerica,wherethephenomenonhaspersistedforacenturyandahalf;theMiddleEast;andlikewiseSouthEastAsia.AfourthsucharealayinEurope(uptothecommunizationofmostofitscountries)inthestripconnectingtheBaltic,theBalkansandTurkey.3

Fromwhathasbeensaidsofarwemaydrawtwoconclusions.Inthefirstplacethereisadistinctclassofcountrieswheregovernmentshavebeenrepeatedlysubjectedtotheinterferenceoftheirarmedforces.TheyarecertainlynotliberaldemocraciesoftheBritishorAmericankindwhereinthemilitaryarestrictlysubordinatedtothecivilians.Noraretheydespotismsorautocraciesofatotalitariantype,where,wemustemphasize,themilitaryaresubordinatedtotheciviliansasmuchasorevenmorethanintheliberal-democraticrégimes.Theserégimesofmilitaryprovenanceormilitaryrulearesuigeneris.Theyconstitutealargeproportionofthosesovereignstateswhichareneithercommunistnorliberal-democratic,andwillsooncomprisemostofthem;forthetwoothermaintypesofgovernmentintheworld,thecolonialoligarchies(likeAngolaorKenya)aredisappearing,andsolikewisearetheproto-dynasticrégimeslike

____________________3 ForthesignificanceofthisgeographicalspreadseeChapterTwelve.

-3-

thoseofNepalorArabiaortheYemen.Therégimeswherethemilitaryarethedecisivepoliticalfactorformadistinctclasswhichwemaycalltheempiricalautocraciesandoligarchies.'Empirical'distinguishesthemfromtheideologicalautocraciesandoligarchiesoftheSoviettype;'autocraciesandoligarchies'distinguishesthemfromthedemocracies.

Secondly,themilitaryasanindependentpoliticalforce,constitutesadistinctandpeculiarpoliticalphenomenon.Considerthatthearmedforceshaveintervenedinthepoliticsofmanyandwidelydiversecountries;thattheyhavedonesocontinuallyinthepast,andaredoingsotoday;thattheirinterventionisusuallypoliticallydecisive;andthat,aboveall,theytendtointervenepersistently,overandoveragain,inthesamecountries.Noneofthissuggeststhatweareobservingameresetofephemeral,exceptionalandisolatedadventures.Onthecontrary,itdoesemphaticallysuggestthatweareinthepresenceofapeculiarpoliticalphenomenon:onethatisabiding,deepseated,anddistinctive.

Therégimeofmilitaryprovenanceordirectmilitaryruleis,inshort,adistinctivekindofrégime;andthemilitaryasanindependentpoliticalforceisadistinctivepoliticalphenomenon.

Littleattentionhasbeengiventoeither.Foronething,fewhavetriedtodistinguishbetweentheformsthatmilitaryinterventiontakes;orthedepthtowhichitispressed.Atfirstglancethecharacteristicmodeofmilitaryinterventionistheviolentoverturnofagovernmentandthecharacteristic'level'istheestablishmentofovertmilitaryrule.Yetthemilitaryoftenworkongovernmentsfrombehindthescenes;andevenwhentheydoestablishamilitarydictatorshiptheyusuallyfabricatesomequasi-civilianfaçadeofgovernmentbehindwhichtheyretireasfastaspossible.Overtmilitaryruleisthereforecomparativelyrare,and,apparently,shortlived.Itisthisthatgivestheappearanceoftransiencetomilitaryrégimes.Butthemodesofmilitaryinterventionareasoftenlatentorindirectastheyareovertordirect.Likewisethe'level'towhichthemilitarypresstheirinterventionvaries;theydonotalwayssupplantthecivilianrégime.Oftentheymerelysubstituteonecabinetforanother,oragainsimplysubjectacabinettoblackmail.Whenallthesevariedmodesofmilitaryinterventioninpoliticsareexaminedandthe'levels'towhichthemilitarypresssuchinterventionarerecognized,thephenomenonappearsinitstruelightdistinctive,persistentandwidespread.

-4-

Secondly,thereisacommonassumption,anunreflectingbelief,thatitissomehow'natural'forthearmedforcestoobeythecivilpower.Thereforeinstanceswhichshowciviliancontroltohavebrokendownareregarded,ifatall,asisolateddisturbances,afterwhichmatterswillagainreturnto'normal'.Butnoreasonisadducedforshowingthatciviliancontrolofthearmedforcesis,infact,'natural'.Isit?Insteadofaskingwhythemilitaryengageinpolitics,weoughtsurelyaskwhytheyeverdootherwise.Foratfirstsightthepoliticaladvantagesofthemilitaryvis-à-visotherandciviliangroupingsareoverwhelming.Themilitarypossessvastlysuperiororganization.Andtheypossessarms.

-5-

CHAPTERTWOTHEarmedforceshavethreemassivepoliticaladvantagesovercivilianorganizations:amarkedsuperiorityinorganization,ahighlyemotionalizedsymbolicstatus,andamonopolyofarms.TheyformaprestigiouscorporationorOrder,enjoyingoverwhelmingsuperiorityinthemeansofapplyingforce.Thewonder,therefore,isnotwhythisrebelsagainstitscivilianmasters,butwhyiteverobeysthem.

TheModernArmy1

Inpracticallyeverycountryoftheworldtoday,exceptpossiblyinoneortwooftheproto-dynasticsurvivalssuchastheYemen,thearmyismarkedbythesuperiorqualityofitsorganization.Eventhemostpoorlyorganizedormaintainedofsucharmiesisfarmorehighlyandtightlystructuredthananyciviliangroup.

Thefactthatnotallarmieswerehighlyorganizedinthepast,orthattheyneednotnecessarilybeso,isirrelevanthere.Modernarmiesarecohesiveandhierarchical.Somearmiesofthepasthavenotbeencohesivebuthaveconsistedofameremultitudeofmenindependentofoneanotherandmaintaininglittlecontactbetweenthemselves.Othershavenotbeenhierarchical,butalmostrepublicanintheirrelationstotheirchiefs.TheSpartanhostandtheCossacksettlementswerecohesiveenough,butrepublicanastocommand.ThevoortrekkersandtheAmericanfrontiersmenwereneithercohesivenorhierarchicalformations.Intheearlystagesoftheirdevelopment,somerevolutionaryarmies(e.g.FidelCastro's,orPanchoVilla's

____________________

1 Whatissaidofthearmyhereistobetakenalsotoapply,mutatismutandis,totheairforceandthenavy.

-6-

orZapata's)resembletheseprimitiveprototypesofthemodernarmies,andtothatextentwestillhavesomeoccasiontodealwiththeminthisbook;butforthemostpart,andcertainlyforthetimebeing,weareconcernedonlywiththemoderntypeofarmy,characterizedbyitsuniquelyhighleveloforganization.

Organizationandcoherence'Nonestpotestassuperterramquaecomparetur'runsthequotationonthetitlepageofHobbesLeviathan.Maywenotthinklikewiseofthemodernarmy?

Thearmyisapurposiveinstrument.Itisnotacresciveinstitutionlikethechurch;itcomesintobeingbyfiat.Itisrationallyconceivedtofulfilcertainobjects.Onemaybetoassistthecivilpower,buttheprincipalobjectistofightandwinwars.Thehighlypeculiarfeaturesofitsorganizationflowfromthiscentralpurpose,notfromthesecondaryone,andfindinittheirsupremejustification.Thesefeaturesare(1)centralizedcommand,(2)hierarchy,(3)discipline,(4)intercommunication,(5)espritdecorpsandacorrespondingisolationandself-sufficiency.

Militarycommandiscentralized.Inpractice,muchisdelegatedtounitsinthefield,butalwayswithinthesupremecommand'sgeneraldirectivesandalwayssubjecttoberesumedbyitshouldoccasionarise.AcontinuouschainofcommandlinkstheverylowestechelonswiththesupremeH.Q.Thiscentralizationofauthorityderivesfromthebasicobjectofthearmy--inmilitaryparlanceitexists'tobefought'byitscommandersandforthisitmustrespondtotheircommandsasasingleunit.

Thearmyisarrangedinapyramidofauthority,ahierarchy,eachechelonowingexplicitandperemptoryobediencetotheordersofitssuperior.Thearmyisthereforeveryhighlystratified.Furthertothis,eachecheloninthehierarchyisimmediatelyandobjectivelyidentifiablebynamedrankanddistinctiveinsignia.Authorityisdepersonalized;itisowedtotherank,nottotheman,anditexactlycorrespondstotherank,andtheranktotheinsignia.Theimportanceofsubordinationandsuperordinationisfurtherenhancedbysocialpracticesprescribingasocialdistancebetweenthesuperiorandtheinferiorranks.Thehierarchicalstructure,likecentralization,derivesfromthearmy'sbasicimperative--tofightasaunit;itmusthaveasupremedirectingcommand--hencecentralization;thecommandmusttransmititsordersfromhighesttolowest--hencehierarchy.

-7-

Fromhightolow,eachmemberissubjecttodiscipline.Thearmyisdifficulttoleave--desertionispunishedheavily,anddesertiononactiveservicemightevenincurthedeathpenalty.Thechainofcommandissacrosanct;everythingissupposedto'gothroughthechannels'.Inpractice,thisoftenisoffsetbythe'OldBoyNet',wherebyonecanspeedupthe'usualchannels'.Thisistrueofmostlarge-scaleorganizations.Itonlythrives,however,wheretheorganizationhasdevelopedanespritdecorps(forwhichseebelow).Eachechelonissubjecttotheordersofitssuperiors;failuretoobeycarriespenalties,someexceedinglyheavy.Thisobligationtounquestioningandpromptobedienceisenhancedbythedepersonalizationofthesoldier.Thearmyistoobigamachinetoreckofindividuals,andthesoldierbecomesanumber.Extraneousconsiderationsaretherebythrustaside,andobediencetosuperiors,recognizedbytheirrankandinsignia,becomesthedominantorsolecriterionofaction.Thisruleofobediencealsospringsfromthearmy'sprimarypurpose,i.e.successfulcombat.Unlessitexisted,thebehaviouroftheunitsthatarebeing'fought'wouldnotbecalculable.Itmustbecalculableandpredictableifthebattleplanistobeexecuted.

Centralizationofcommand,thehierarchicalarrangementofauthorityandtheruleofobedience--allarenecessarytomakethearmyrespondasaunitytothewordofcommand;buttheyinturndemandanervoussystem,anetworkofcommunication.Armieshavedevelopedelaboratesignalsystemsindependentofthecivilauthorities.Themostmodernmethodsoftelephone,wirelessandteleprinteraresupplementedbytheoldersystemsofphysicalcommunication--thedespatchrider,andthisinturnbytheprimitivemethodsofsemaphoreandtherunner.Forsoimportantarecommunicationsthattheremustalwaysbemethodsavailable,eventhemostclumsy.Bythesemeansthenervousarticulationofeveryunitinthecountryandthecombinationofallarmsandservicesisrenderedphysicallypossible.Bythesametoken,theterritorialdispersionofunits,theirgeographicalseparationoffersnoimpedimenttotheirunityofdecisionandofaction.

Butanyarmywhichpossessedonlythesecharacteristicsandnoneotherwouldhardlywinabattle.Itsunitywouldbeentirelymechanical,whollycompulsive,singularlylifeless,andnotverybellicose.Anarmymustinadditionbeanimatedbyconsciousnessofitsmartialpurposeandinspiredbyacorporatespiritofunityandsolidarity.

-8-

WhatDurkheimcalledorganicsolidarity,namelya'systemofdifferentandspecialfunctionsunitedbydefiniterelationships',hastobesupplementedbyhis(strangelynamed)mechanicalsolidarity,i.e.'amoreorlessorganizedensembleofthebeliefsandthesentimentscommontoallthemembersofthegroup'.Thiscanonlybe,asDurkheimsays,'inproportionastheideasandinclinationscommontoallthemembers...exceedinnumberandintensitythosepersonaltoeachofthem....'2

This'moreorlessorganizedensembleofthebeliefsandsentimentscommontoallmembersofthegroup'isdeliberatelyinculcatedinarmiesandconstitutestheirvitalspark--theirespritdecorps.Itisgroundedonservicetoacause--aswithCromwell'sIronsidesorTrotsky'sRedArmy--but,muchmorecommonly,onservicetothenation.Theinculcationofanextremenationalism,oftenofthemostrabidoritmaybevulgarsort,isuniversalinthetrainingofallbuttheveryfewideologicalorreligiousarmies.Thisisaccompaniedbythesystematicdisparagementoftheforeigner,andthechannellingofallaggressivetendenciesintohatredoftheenemy.

Suchindoctrinationissupplementedbymeasurestoinculcateasenseofsolidarity.Thenewcomerisinstructedinthehistoryandtraditionsofhisregiment.Heistaughttorespectitsinsigniaanditscolours.Andallthisisenhancedbysomeofthephysicalarrangementsofthemilitarylife.Thearmydiffersinfunctionfromthesocietythatsurroundsitandthisfunctionrequiresthatitbeseparateandsegregated.Itrequiresacommonuniform,andthisimmediatelydistinguishesitfromthecivilianmasses.Itrequiresseparatehousing,inpurelymilitaryquarters,thebarracks.Itdemandsasystematizednomadismmovingfromonegarrisontowntoanother.Itdemandsaseparatecodeofmoralsandmannersfromthatofthecivilianpopulation,sothatthenormalfreedomoflife--totakeleave,tochangeone'semployment,insomecaseseventomarry--areexercisedonlyundersurveillanceandtutelage,andbypermission.Allthistendstoenhancemilitarysolidaritybymakingthemilitarylifeself-centred.Itiseasy,even,toinspirecontemptforone'sownnationals--the'civvies','lespékins','lesbourgeois'--andsoforth.Thebarracksbecomestheworld.3

____________________2 E.Durkheim,LaDivisionduTravail.Social(Paris,1960),p.99.

3 Forproof,ifitbeneeded,witnesstheplotsandescapadesthatmakeupthetaleofsuchtelevisionprogrammesasSergeantBilko.

-9-

Thusbecauseoftheircentralization,hierarchy,discipline,intercommunicationandespritdecorps,armiesaremuchmorehighlyorganizedthananycivilianbodies.Fewoftheseattaintothedegreeoforganizationobtainedbyeventhemostprimitiveofmodernarmies.TheRomanCatholicChurchcertainlydisplaysthesefivefeatures;butitisavoluntaryorganizationwhichthemembermayenterorleaveashethinksfit;forthoseoftepidfaiththepenaltiesfordisobediencearefeeble;itssegregationfromthelaityismuchlessextremethanthatofofficer-corpsfromcivilians.Firmsandbureaucraciesmaypossessthesefivecharacteristicstoo,but,onceagain,theyarevoluntarybodies,thesanctionsforindisciplinearefeebleandthereisnosegregation,noveryspecialcodeofmannersorrulesthathavetobeobeyed,andnotutelage.Ofpoliticalpartiesonlythecommunistpartiesofthe'populardemocracies'resemblethearmedforces.Notfornothinghavetheybeendescribedas'layarmies'.Theirhighdegreeoforganizationandtheirformidablyenergeticespritdecorpsare,asweshallsee,ofthehighestimportancetothequestionofciviliancontrolofthearmedforces;4yethereagain,theyareneitherashierarchical,asseverelydisciplined,asphysicallyinterconnected,asarmies,noraretheyphysicallyandpsychologicallyseparatedfromtherestofthepopulation.

Modernarmies,then,areusuallyfarmorehighlyorganizedthananyotherassociationwithinastate.Thisisnottheonlypoliticaladvantagetheypossess.Themilitaryprofessionoften--thoughnotalways--carrieswithitcertainemotionalassociations.Insofarasthisisso,thearmymayenjoyapoliticallyimportantmoralprestige.

Themilitaryvirtues'Theirsons',wroteHerodotusofthePersians,'arecarefullyinstructedfromtheirfifthtotheirtwentiethyearinthreethingsalone--toride,todrawthebowandtospeakthetruth.'5Hereinweseetheprototypeofthefamedmilitaryvirtues.Thesevirtues--bravery,discipline,obedience,self-abnegation,poverty,patriotism,andthelike--areassociated,bylongstanding,withthesoldier'schoiceofcareer.Theyarevalueswhichallesteem.Wheretheyareidentifiedwiththemilitary,theseacquireamoralhalowhichispoliticallyofprofoundimportance.

Yetwemustbecautious.Themilitaryarenotuniversallywell

____________________4 Seep.99etseq.5 Herodotus,History.Everymaned.,Vol.1,p.72.

-10-

regarded.InGermanyorJapan,upto1945,theirprestigewaspreternaturallyhigh.InEgypt,duringthesameperiodandupto1952,theprofessionofarmswasdespised;likewise,theChinesesoldierwasdespiseduntil1949.Autrespays,autresmoeurs.Furthermore,inanyonecountry,publicopinionmaybequitedifferentatoneperiodfromwhatitisatanother.Thishasbeenelegantlydemonstrated,fortheFrencharmybyGirardet.6After1815therewasareactionagainstallthingsmilitary.Thesoldierwasregardedasvulgar,uncouth,brutal.'Thesesoldiers',writesGirardet(echoingthesentimentsofthattime),'whotakeupthemiddleofthepavement,noisyandarrogant;whooftenbehaveasinaconqueredtown,pursuingthewomenwiththeirgrossassiduities....'Yetfiftyyearslatergeneralsentimentfavouredthesoldier.Thesocialprestigeoftheofficerwasveryhighandtomarryadaughtertoonebecameanobjectofmiddle-classambition.Insteadofstressingtheirstupidityortheirunproductiveness,societysentimentalizedoverthe'lifeoforder,hierarchy,obedienceandpoverty'.7Notverymuchlater,afterSedan,thearmybecame'l'archesainte',itshierarchicalnaturerenderingitthedarlingoftheRight,anditsdemocraticmassbasisthefavouriteoftheLeft.

Yet,atmosttimesandinmostcountries,traitslikecourageanddisciplineandself-sacrificeandpatriotism,traitswhichseemalmostcharacteristicallytoinherein'thesoldier',areesteemedandcherished.Fromthistherearises,atthelowest,asympathyforthearmedforces;atitshighestaveritablemystique.

'...Thatitmaybecomeasitoughttobe,thecareerofarmsrequiresfromthosewhoseekorarecalledontopursueit,certainspecificqualitieswhichwecallthemilitaryvirtues:valour,fidelity,patriotism.Theexerciseofthesevirtuestoaveryhighdegreeissoessentialtothecareerofarmsthattheyconstituteitscharacteristicfeature,defineitsownpeculiarspirit.Theyarethenecessaryconditionsoftheexistenceofthecareer,andiftheydisappeareditwoulddisappearalso.Howcanoneconceiveofacowardlysoldier,anunfaithfulcomrade,awarriorwhobetrayshiscountry?No!Totheextentthatcowardice,disloyaltyandtreasonarise,thereisnoforce,therearenotroops,thereisnoarmy.Thereisonlyamultitudein

____________________6 R.Girardet.LaSocietéMilitairedanslaFranceConternporaine.7 Ibid.,Chapter1.

-11-

arms--andforthatveryreasonmoredangerousthananyother....

Ininternalstructure,thearmyisnotsimplyacollectionofmen:itisanorganismtowhichunion,collaborationandsolidarityareindispensable.Fidelityinthearmyisnecessarytomakesurethatatalltimesallorganswillcarryouttheirduty.Forthisreasontheremustbenoplots,nodisunity,nomutualdistrust;watchfulofitselfthearmymustexpelfromitsmidst,likedeadbodies,thoseelementswhichdonotbelongtoitinspirit,andwhoseheartsdonotbeatinunisonwithitsown....

Forthesoldier...thereexistsneitherthehamlet,nottheregion,northeprovince,northecolony:thereisforhimnothingbutthenationalterritory.Hehasnofamilynorelatives,nofriends,noneighbours:onlythepeoplewholiveandworkinthenationalterritory.Hehasonly--inaword--thefatherland;thefatherlandinallitsmaterialexpressions,inthetotalityofitssentimentsandtraditions,inallthebeautyofitshistoricalevolutionanditsfutureideal.Toithemustsurrenderall;safety,peace,familyandlifeitself.'8

Sentimentssuchasthesewouldbere-echoedtodayinCairo,Bagdad,Khartum;inMadridorinKarachi;andwherevertheyareharbouredtheyhelpliftthemilitarytopower.ButeveninLondon,orWashington,orStockholm,anatmosphereofcandour,selfsacrificeandvigourclingstothearmedforces,andofallamongthe'powersthatbe'thereisatendencytoesteemthemasthemostnoble.Whereandinsofarasthishappens,itconstitutesasecondpoliticalstrengthofthemilitary.

Thearmedforcesthenarenotonlythemosthighlyorganizedassociationinthestate.Theyareacontinuingcorporationwithanintensesentimentofsolidarity,enjoying,inmanycases,considerablefavour.Thisformidablecorporatebodyismorelethallyandheavilyarmedthananyotherorganizationinthestate,andindeedenjoysanear-monopolyofalleffectiveweapons.

Sincethisisso,whyismilitaryinterventioninpolitics,ormilitarygovernment,theexceptionratherthantherule?Whyandhowdocivilianformsofrulepersist?

____________________

8 OliveiraSalazar,ElPensamientodelaRevolucionNacional(BuenosAires,1938),ChapterV,pp.118-22,"'ElogiodelasVirtudesMilitares'".

-12-

Therestofthisbooksetsoutsomeofthefactorswhicharerelevanttoansweringthesequestions.Twoofthese,however,aresufficientlygeneral--andindeedfundamentaltoallthatfollows--tobenoticedimmediately.Theyconstitutethebasicweaknessesinthepoliticalpositionofthemilitary.

-13-

CHAPTERTHREEThePoliticalWeaknessesoftheMilitaryPOLITICALLYthearmedforcessufferfromtwocripplingweaknesses.Theseprecludethem,saveinexceptionalcasesandforbriefperiodsoftime,fromrulingwithoutciviliancollaborationandopenlyintheirownname.Soldiersmusteitherrulethroughciviliancabinetsorelsepretendtobesomethingotherthantheyare.

Oneweaknessisthearmedforces'technicalinabilitytoadministeranybutthemostprimitivecommunity.Thesecondistheirlackoflegitimacy:thatistosay,theirlackofamoraltitletorule.

ThetechnicalinadequacyofthearmedforcesEveninthosestatescommonlydescribedas'militarydictatorships',therulingbody,juntaorcabinet,willbefoundnottoconsistexclusivelyofmilitarymen.InIraq,forinstance(inMarch1961),only7outofthe16cabinetmembersweresoldiers;inPakistan,only3outof14;inSpain,only6outof18.Therehavebeenfewexceptionstothisrule,andthosehavebeenshortlived.PrimodeRivera'sfirstgovernment,1923,wascalleda'MilitaryDirectorate'andconsistedentirelyofmilitary,butin1925hechangedtoalargelyciviliancabinet.InthefirstphaseoftheArgentinemilitaryrégimein1943,nearlyallthecabinetpostsandtopadministrativepositionsatfederalandprovinciallevelweremannedbysoldiers,butafter1944civiliansreplacedthem.InPeru,in1948,GeneralOdriaformedanall-militarycabinetinwhichcolonelsheadedtheministriesofpublichealth,education,labour,theinterior,thetreasuryandjustice,whilearear-admiralconductedforeignrelations;butthisstagelastedonlyuntil1950,afterwhichthecabinetwascomposedofsixofficersandsixcivilians.

-14-

Themoreprimitivetheeconomy,theeasieritisforthearmedforcestoadministeritbypurelymilitarymenandmeasures.Modernarmiesareamicrocosmofthestate;theypossesstheirownseparateandself-containedsystemsofprovisioning,supply,engineering,communications,evenofeducation.Inprimitiveeconomiestheymaythereforebeevenbettertechnicallyequippedthanthecivilsector,anditisnotsurprisingthatevenincomparativelyadvancedsocietieslikeBrazilorArgentinathearmedforcesareusedforpromotingeconomicdevelopments.InBrazil,forinstance,thearmyhasexploredtheinterior,setuptelegraphandwirelessstations,developedagriculturalcoloniesandhelpededucatetheIndians.ThearmydidlikewiseinPeruinthe1940sandinBoliviainthe1950s.InArgentinaithasopenednewroads,constructedschoolsandhospitals1andcarriessomeresponsibilityforthedevelopmentofthedomesticoilindustry.

Associetiesbecomemorecomplicated,however,sothetechnicalskillsofthearmedforceslagfurtherandfurtherbehindthem.Laos,forinstance,isaprimitivestateof1½millioninhabitants,onethirdofwhom--theautochthonousKhatribesmen--areprimitiveintheextreme.TheadministrativecapitalofVientianeisatinytownofbrickandwood.ApartfromthetinminesofPhônTiu,theeconomyisalmostentirelysubsistenceagriculture,employingarchaictechniques.OtherthantheMekongriver,therearefewcommunications.Argentina,onehundredyearsago,wasnotmuchmoredeveloped.ThemostadvancedareawasthetownofBuenosAires,andbefore1870thishadnoartificialdrainage,butdependedonscouringbytheheavyrains;itswatersupplywascartedinfromtheriver;anditspopulationwastiny.Asfortherestofthecountry(theCampo),exceptforafewminesinthenorth-westitwaspastoral.Therewasnoindustry,andonly800milesofrailroad.

Armiescould--ordo--easilydominatesuchprimitivesocieties.Alltheyhavetoprovideislawandorder,andcommunications.Eventheeducational,socialandeconomicdevelopmentofsuchcountrieswouldbewellwithintheircapabilities,iftheychosetoundertakeit;though,sincethearmiesofthesecountriesarenotusuallymuchmoreenlightenedthanthesocietiestheyserve,theydonotinfactusuallytrytodoso.

Comparethetaskofadministeringsuchsocietieswiththatofruling,say,GreatBritainortheUnitedStates,or,forthatmatter,

____________________1 R.Lieuwen,ArmsandPoliticsinLatinAmerica,pp.137etseq.

-15-

evenDetroitorChicagoorLondon!HowveryverymuchmoreisrequiredcanbeseenfromAlliedexperiencesinmilitarygovernmentinItalyandGermanyafter1945.Itmustberememberedthatinbothcasestheoccupyingpowersweredealingwithcompliantandcooperativepopulations,anxioustoingratiatethemselveswiththevictorsandeagertorestoretheirshatteredeconomies;whereasinmost(oratleastmany)militarydictatorshipsthearmedforceshavetofaceamutinouslysullenoropenlyhostilepeople.Yettheoccupyingpowerswereonlyabletocarryouttheirtaskbyheavilyreinforcingtheirmilitarypersonnelwithspeciallytrainedcivilianadministrators.IntheU.S.ControlCouncilforGermany'arosterofthenamesandbusinessassociationsoftheeconomicadvisorsanddivisionheads'reads,wearetold,'likeaWho'sWhoofAmericanindustryandfinance'.2TheUnitedStatesarmyalsohadtorecruitciviliantechnicianstosupplementitsverylimitedsupplyofspecialistsinthefieldsof'administration,law,finance,economics,publicworks,publichealth,publicrelations,publicsafety,publicwelfare,transportation,communications.'3

Secondly,theadministrationwassuccessfulonlyinrepairingmaterialbreakdowns.'Later',runstheaccount,'asproblemsofsecurity,sanitationandrestorationofpublicutilitiesfadedintothebackground,theirinadequacyinsuchfieldsasdenazification,politicalrevivalandre-educationbecameapparent.Itwasfarmoresimpleforthemtoreplaceabrokenwatermain,sincebothrulerandruledcouldappreciatetheserviceofagoodone,thanitwastoselectasuitableburgomasteronthedefinitionofwhichtheymightdiffer.'4

Thirdly,themilitaryprovedincapable,bytheirtraining,ofrulinginanysensewiderthanputtingtheeconomyofthecountryona'careandmaintenance'basis.Theirs,saysacritic,'wasanarrowemphasisonthemaintenanceoflawandorder...extremereluctancetodisturbexistinginstitutions,suspicionofpoliticsandpoliticiansanddistrustoftradeunionists....'5

Inshort,inGermany,theprofessionalmilitarymenconceivedtheirtaskasputtingthecountryon'afodderbasis'--andlittlemore;andevenforthistheirforces'ownresourcesoftechniciansandadministratorswasentirelyinadequate.Indeed,themilitaryhadtolay

____________________

2 "'MilitaryGovernment'"(AnnalsoftheAmericanAcademyofPoliticalandSocialScience,Vol.267(1950),pp.78-80).

3 Ibid.4 Ibid.5 Ibid.

-16-

downtheirpreviousjobsandbecomepolicymakers,andturnoverthedoingofthingstotheirowncivilianstaffsandtotheciviliansofthesubjectpopulation.

Thusasaneconomyadvances,asthedivisionoflabourbecomesmoreandmoreextensive,asthesecondaryandthenthetertiaryservicesexpand,andasthesocietyrequirestheexistenceofatrainedprofessionalbureaucracy,oftechnicians,labourorganizations,andthelike--sothearmyceasestobeabletorulebyitsownresourcesalone.Itsaimmustbetocajoleortocoercetheciviliansandtheirorganizationsintocollaboration.Andtotheextentthatithastodependonthem,sotothatextentisitweakened.6

TherighttogovernNowinanadvancedsociety,i.e.justwherethemilitary'stechnicalinabilitytoruleisatitsgreatest,itsmoralinadequacyhampersitstillfurther,bydenyingittheciviliancollaborationitmustsecure.Forthesecondandcardinalweaknessofthemilitaryasapoliticalforceisitslackoftitletogovern.

Rulebyforcealone,orthethreatofsuchforce,isinadequate;inaddition,governmentmustpossessauthority.Itmustbewidelyrecognizednotonlyasthegovernmentbutasthelawful,therightfulgovernment.Agovernmentthatbaseditsruleonthefactthatitwasmateriallystrongerthananyotherforceorforcesinsocietywouldprovebothshortlivedandineffective.

Thisisnot'moralizing'.Itisageneralizationbasedonexperience,andiscapableofsimpleexplanation.Firstofall,suchgovernmentwouldbeimpermanent.Thereasonissimplythattheclaimtorulebyvirtueofsuperiorforceinviteschallenge;indeeditisitselfatacitchallenge,toanycontenderwhothinksheisstrongenoughtochancehisarm.

ThesameArtsthatdidgainApow'r,mustitmaintain

wroteMarvell.'Ifforcecreatesright,'wroteRousseau,'theeffectchangeswiththecause.Everyforcethatisgreaterthanthefirstsucceedstoitsright.Assoonasitispossibletodisobeywithimpunitydisobedienceislegitimate;andthestrongestbeingalwaysintheright,theonlythingthatmattersistoactsoastobecomethe

____________________6 Seebelow,thecasesofJapan,Germany,France,ChapterSeven.

-17-

strongest.'7Itisindeed!Andthissuccinctlyexplainsoneofthemostusualconsequencesofamilitarycoup,namelyasuccessionoffurthercoupsbywhichnewcontendersaimtodisplacethefirstcomers.'Quitatetu,paraponermeyo,'runstheappropriatelySpanishproverb.Weshallmeetmanyexampleslater;hereletonesuffice-Iraq,wheresixsuccessivecoupswerecarriedoutbetween1936and1941.8

Forceshouldberight;orrather,rightandwrong,Betweenwhoseendlessjarsjusticeresides,Shouldlosetheirnamesandsoshouldjustice,too.Theneverythingincludesitselfinpower,Powerintowill,willintoappetite;Andappetite,anuniversalwolf,SodoublysecondedwithwillandpowerMustmakeperforceanuniversalprey,Andlasteatuphimself.9

Thusgovernmentsthathaveachievedpowerbyforcehavetodefenditagainstonechallengeafteranother.Suchgovernments,therefore,eitherfalltofurthercoupsorhastentoconvertthemselvesintosomethingelse:thatistosay,togroundtheirclaimtogovernonsomethingotherthantheirsuccessfulseizureofpower.Theyseek,inshort,toexercisearighttogovern;or,astheexpressiongoes,tolegitimizethemselves.Somedothis(e.g.GeneralGürselinTurkey)byclaimingtobeona'caretaker'basispreparingthewayforalegalgovernment,perhapsonthebasisofelections.Otherstaketheplungebyorganizingaplebiscite(likeColonelNasserorPrimodeRiveraorGeneralFranco)tovotethemintothepowertheyseizedbyforceofarms.

Treasondothneverprosper:what'sthereason?Forifitprosper,nonedarecallittreason.

Amilitaryjuntalegitimizesitselfinordertoslamthedoorofmoralityinitschallengers'face.Untilithasdoneso,itbearsthemarkofCain.Itisoutlaw.Letitoncebelegitimized,anditisentitledtohuntdownthenewcontendersforpowerasrebelsormutineers.AsVictorHugoputit,afterLouis-Napoleonhadlegitimizedhimselfbytheplebisciteof1852:

____________________7 J.J.Rousseau,TheSocialContract,BookI,Chapter3.8 Seepp.133-4.9 TroilusandCressida,Act1,SceneIII.

-18-

'Mr.Bonaparte'scrimeisnotacrime,itiscalledanecessity;Mr.Bonaparte'sambuscadeisnotanambuscade,itiscalleddefenceoforder;Mr.Bonaparte'srobberiesarenotrobberies,theyarecalledmeasuresofstate;Mr.Bonaparte'smurdersarenotmurders,theyarecalledpublicsafety;Mr.Bonaparte'saccomplicesarenotcalledmalefactors,theyarecalledmagistrates,senators,andcouncillorsofstate;Mr.Bonaparte'sadversariesarenotthesoldiersofthelawandright,theyareJackCades,demogogues,communists....'10

Thereis,however,asecondreasonwhichdrivesgovernmentstoseekauthorityratherthantorelyontheprowessoftheirarmsalone;namelythatthethreatofphysicalcompulsionisnotanefficient,i.e.aneconomical,wayofsecuringobedience.Suppose,forinstance,avillageschoolmaster.Supposethathisonlymeansforgettinghischargestoschool,keepingthemthere,makingthemregularattendersand--presumably--tryingtoteachthemsomething,werebyphysicalforcealone.Imaginehimmotoringtothehousesofthechildren;draggingthemprotestingandarguingfromtheirhouses;beatingoneortwotomaketheothersmorecompliant;forcingthemtosit,toexercise,tolearn--allbythreatandphysicalviolence.Wemustsuppose,too,forthesakeoftheexample,thatthechildrenaredetermined,aseverexpediencyallows,todefyhim,disobeyhimandifpossiblegetridofhim.Inthesecircumstances,calculatehowmuchmoreoftheschoolmaster'stimewouldbespentinroundingthemup,punishingthemanddevisingschemestobeatdowntheiroppositionthanwouldbespentinteachingthem.

Contrastthiswiththeothermorecommonpossibility,thathisauthorityas'theschoolmaster'isrecognized.Bythiswemeansimplythatheclaimstherighttothechildren'sattendanceandattentionatschool;andtheyfortheirpartrecognizeitastheirdutytogettoschool,attendregularlyandbehavethemselvesinclass.Inthesecircumstances,hecanspendalmostthewholeofhistimeonhisprimaryfunction--teaching.Physicalcompulsionwillemergeonlyasasanctioninmarginalcases.

Itisrecognitionofhisauthoritythatworksthemiraculousdifference.Thissimplepsychologicalbondbetweenrulerandruleddoesalltheworkofsecuringschoolattendanceanddisciplineforhim.Inthissense,then,authorityisthemotherofpower.Authority

____________________10 VictorHugo,NapoleontheLittle(London,1852),pp.21-2.

-19-

comprisesadouble-relationship.Ontheonesidegoessociety'srecognitionthatincertainmattersapersonorbodyofpersonshasthemoralrighttodemandobedienceandontheothergoessociety'srecognitionthatinthesemattersithasthemoraldutytoobeysuchpersons.ItisforthisreasonthatRousseau'swordsaresosignificantforarmiesthatdesiretorule:'Thestrongestisneverstrongenoughtobealwaysthemasterunlesshetransformsmightintorightandobedienceintoduty.'11

ThemoralinadequacyofmilitaryinterventionThus,whenthemilitarybreachestheexistingpoliticalorder,itwillbeforcedtoclaimamoralauthorityforitsactions.Nowincertainsocietiesthepublicaremostunlikelytorecognizeanysuchclaim;andwillindeedresistit.

Whetherandhowfarapeoplewillrecognizeorresistit,dependsonthepoliticalformulacurrentamongthem.Thispoliticalformulaisthatwidespreadsentimentorbeliefonwhichthetitletogovernisgrounded.Suchare,orhavebeen,the'willofthepeople','thedivinerightofthemonarch',theconsciousnessofformingadistinctnation,fidelitytoadynastyandsoforth.ThusintheMiddleAges,whereitwaswidelytaughtandbelievedthatkingsruledbydivineappointment,thecontenderforpowerhadtodemonstratethathehimselfwasreallythe'king'andthatthereigningkingwasnot;andthiswasdonebyelaborateargumentaboutandamonggenealogies.(ThatinterminableandboringspeechbytheArchbishopofCanterbury,inActI,SceneII,ofHenryVexactlyillustratesthispoint.KingHenryfinallyasks:'MayIwithrightandconsciencemakethisclaim?'andisanswered:'Thesinuponmyheaddreadsovereign.')Oncehehadprovedhewastheking,i.e.therealking,hewasentitledtocommandhissubjectsandtheyinturndulyboundtoobeyhim.

Theseformulaechangewithtime.Thenthetitlebyvirtueofwhichtherulinggroupclaimtogovernbecomesobsolete.ItwasnouseLouisXVIclaimingtherighttorulebydivineappointmentwhenhissubjectsnolongerbelievedawordofthisrigmarole.Aslongastherulersbasetheirclaimonaformulawhichisunacceptabletotheirsubjects,thesewillregardthemasillegitimate,asusurpers.Thatbeingso,therulerswillbeabletomaintainthemselvesonlybyincreasingrelianceoncoercion.

Theformthatmilitaryinterventiontakes(e.g.violentornon-

____________________11 Rousseau,op.cit.,BookI,Chapter3.

-20-

violent)andwhetherornotthemilitaryentertainthewishtointerveneatall,bothvaryfromsocietytosocietyaccordingtothepoliticalformulaecurrentthereinandtheircompatibilitywithsuchmilitaryintervention.

Wherepublicattachmenttocivilianinstitutionsisstrong,militaryinterventioninpoliticswillbeweak.Itwilltaketheform,ifitoccursatall,ofworkinguponorfrombehindtheseinstitutions--betheythroneorparliament--accordingtothepoliticalformulacurrent.Bythesametoken,wherepublicattachmenttocivilianinstitutionsisweakornon-existent,militaryinterventioninpoliticswillfindwidescope--bothinmannerandinsubstance.

These'civilinstitutions'areacomplexofproceduresandorgans,recognizedasduty-worthybyawideconsensusinthesociety.12Wherecivilianassociationsandpartiesarestrongandnumerous,wheretheproceduresforthetransferofpowerareorderly,andwherethelocationofsupremeauthorityisnotseriouslychallenged:thepoliticalambitofthemilitarywillbecircumscribed.Wherethepartiesortradeunionsarefeebleandfew,wheretheprocedureforthetransferofpowerisirregularorevennon-existent,wherethelocationofsupremeauthorityisamatterofacutedisagreementorelseofunconcernandindifference:therethemilitary'spoliticalscopewillbeverywide.

Wecanthereforethinkofsocietiesasbeingatdifferentlevelsofpoliticalcultureaccordingtotheirobserveddegreeofattachmenttocivilinstitutions.AtthehighestpoliticalculturelevelswillbecountrieslikeBritainortheUnitedStates,whereattachmenttocivilianinstitutionsisverystrong.Atthelowestlevelwillbethosecountrieslike,perhaps,HaitiortheCongotoday,orArgentina,MexicoandVenezuelaahundredyearsago,whereaconsciousattachmenttocivilianinstitutionsdoesnotexistatall.Nowitisastrikingfactthatpeoplemayhaveahighlevelofartisticormaterialculturebutaverylowlevelofpoliticalculture.'Manypeoplehavehadperiodsofmaterialandintellectualsplendourandyet,asitwerebyasortoffatalcurse,haveneverbeenabletoridthemselvesofcertaintypesofpoliticalorganizationthatseemtobeutterlyunsuitedtoensuringanyrealprogressinthemoralityoftheirgoverningclasses.'13

____________________

12 ThiscrucialtopicisfurthertreatedandexplainedinChapterSevenwheretheconceptof'civilinstitutions'and'politicalculture'isdefined.

13 G.Mosca(ed.A.Livingston),TheRulingClass,p.133.

-21-

Inlandsofalowpoliticalculturetheneedforlegitimacywillnot,andindeedhasnotprovedaserioushandicaptothemilitary.Butincountriesofmatureoradvancedpoliticalcultureitwillprovecrippling.Insuchcountries,countrieswhereattachmenttocivilianinstitutionsisstrongandpervasive,theattemptsofthemilitarytocoercethelawfulgovernment,letalonesupplantit,wouldbeuniversallyregardedasusurpation.This,themoralbarrier,iswhathaspreventedthemilitary,forallitsorganization,prestigeandpower,fromestablishingitsrulethroughouttheglobe.

-22-

CHAPTERFOURTheDispositiontoIntervene(1)MotiveWEHAVEbeenusingtheexpression'militaryinterventioninpolitics'.Bythiswemean:Thearmedforces'constrainedsubstitutionoftheirownpoliciesand/ortheirpersons,forthoseoftherecognizedcivilianauthorities.

Themilitarymaypursuesuchinterventionbyactsofcommissionbutalsobyactsofomission.Itmayactagainstthewishesofitsgovernment;oritmayrefusetoactwhencalledonbyitsgovernment.Ineithercaseitbringsconstrainttobear.

Nowtointervenethemilitarymusthavebothoccasionanddisposition.Bya'disposition'wemeanacombinationofconsciousmotiveandofawillordesiretoact.Itisthisdispositionthatformsthesubjectofthischapter.

However,justastherearefactorsdisposingthemilitarytointervene,sotheremaybefactorsinhibitingthemfromsuchaction.Thisistooeasilylostsightof.Inthenatureofthecase,armedforcesthathaveintervenedinpoliticsaremorevocalinexplainingandjustifyingtheiractionthanarethenumerousbodiesoftroopsthathaveremainedfaithfultotheirobedience.Weshalldealwiththemfirst.

MOTIVESINHIBITINGTHEMILITARYFROMINTERVENTIONThemostobviousofsuchfactorsis,ofcourse,thelackofmotive.Themilitarymustnotbeconceivedaseverywheresimmeringwithdiscontent.Wecanthereforeleavemotivesandturntothesecondaspectofthedispositiontointervene--i.e.desireorwill.Animportantfactorinhibitingadesiretointerveneismilitaryprofessionalism.

-23-

1.Professionalismanditsconsequences

'Professionalism'formsthecentralconceptofamostimportantstudyofmilitaryintervention,ProfessorHuntingtonTheSoldierandtheState.1ForHuntington,itisthedecisivefactorinkeepingthesoldieroutofpolitics,andthewholeofhisargumentismadetohangonthis.

Forhim'professionalism'comprisesthreeingredients.Theyareexpertness;socialresponsibility;andcorporateloyaltytofellowpractitioners.Modernarmedforcesmaythereforebedescribedasaprofession.Theyaretechniciansinthemanagementandorganizationofviolence;theyfeelaresponsibilitytotheirclient(i.e.thestate);andtheyhaveapowerfulcorporatetraditionandorganization.Butthisprofessionalism,ashesaystruly,isofrecentdate.BeforetheFrenchRevolutionthevariousofficercorpswereeithermercenarieswhofollowedthepaymaster,ornoblemenwhofollowedtheirking--evenwhenhewentintoexile.Whereasthebeginningofthenineteenthcenturyknewnoprofessionalarmies,thebeginningofthetwentiethcenturysawfewarmiesthatwerenot.

Professionalizationmakesthearmedforces,asitwere,self-centred.Likeotherprofessionstheydevelopasenseofcorporateunityvis-àvisthelayman--those'civvies','frocks',or'pékins'ofsoldierslang.Theirtask--organizingandequippingaforce,trainingit,planningitsactivities,letalone'fightingit'incombatagainsttheenemy--isafull-timeone.Itcallsforspecialskillanddemandslongtraining.Thus,thegreatertheprofessionalism,themoreimmerseddoestheofficerbecomeinhisowntechnicaltasks,andthelessinvolvedinanypolicyissuesthatdonotaffectthem.Huntingtonmaintainsthatthelogicalconsequenceisfortheofficercorpstoleavepoliticstothepoliticians.Theofficers'ownresponsibilitybecomesincreasinglyconfinedtorepresentingtherequirementsofthemilitarytothecivilianauthorities,givingadvicetothem,and,finally,whensocharged,executingtheirdecisions.

Havingdefined'professionalism'asstrictlyasthis,itisnotsurprisingthatHuntingtonshouldarguethatthesurestwaytoinsulatethemilitaryfrompoliticsistoencouragethemtobefullyprofessional.Inthiswaythemilitarywouldbemade'politicallysterileandneutral....Ahighlyprofessionalofficercorpsstandsreadytocarryoutthewishesofanyciviliangroupwhichsecureslegitimateauthoritywithinthestate.'2'Anofficercorpsispro-

____________________1 S.P.Huntington,TheSoldierandtheState.2 Ibid.,p.84.

-24-

fessionalonlytotheextenttowhichitsloyaltyistothemilitaryideal....Onlyiftheyaremotivatedbymilitaryidealswillthearmedforcesbetheobedientservantsofthestateandwillciviliancontrolbeassured....'3

Insofarasprofessionalismmakesthemilitarylookontheirtaskasdifferentfromthatofthepoliticians,andasself-sufficientandfull-time,itought,logically,toinhibitthearmyfromwishingtointervene.Yetitisobservablethatmanyhighlyprofessionalofficercorpshaveintervenedinpolitics--theGermanandJapanesecasesarenotorious.Itisofnousetoretortthatinsuchcasesthesearmiescannotbedescribedas'fully'professional.ThisisthewholeweaknessofHuntington'sthesis.Allismadetohanguponaveryspecialdefinitionofprofessionalism,andbypuredeductionfromthis,ofaso-called'militarymind'.Theargumentthenbecomes'essentialist'.Ifsoldiersareobservedtoactinwaysinconsistentwiththeseconceptsof'professionalism'andthe'militarymind',somuchtheworseforthesoldiers;theyarenotcompletely'professional',notpurely'military'.4Thefactis,however,that,ifthearmedforcesarenottointervene,theymustbelieveinanexplicitprinciple--theprincipleofcivilsupremacy.

2.Theprincipleofcivilsupremacy

ThereasonisthattheverynatureoftheprofessionalismonwhichHuntingtonsetssuchstoreandwhichheregardsas'politicallysterile',infactoftenthruststhemilitaryintocollisionwiththecivilauthorities.

Inthefirstplace,themilitary'sconsciousnessofthemselvesasaprofessionmayleadthemtoseethemselvesastheservantsofthestateratherthanofthegovernmentinpower.Theymaycontrastthenationalcommunityasacontinuingcorporationwiththetemporaryincumbentsofoffice.Itisthisthatexplainsthemysticalconceptof'TheReich'intheattitudesofVonSeecktandGrönerundertheWeimarRepublic.

'TherôleoftheReichswehr',saidSeeckt,'istomaintainthe

____________________3 Ibid.,p.74.

4

AnotherwayoflookingatitwouldbetoarguethatHuntington'sconceptsordefinitionsarepurelyabstract,andhavelittlerelationtothefactsofthecase.ForathoroughanalysisofHuntington'sbookalongtheselines--withwhich,Icompletelyagree--seeProfessorMorris-Jonesreviewarticle,"'ArmedForcesandtheState'",inPublicAdministration,Vol.35,pp.411-16.

-25-

unityoftheReichandthosewhocompromisethisareitsenemiesfromwhichsoeversidetheycome.'5'ToservetheState--farfromallpartypolitics,tosaveandmaintainitagainsttheterriblepressurefromwithoutandtheinsanestrifeathome--this',saidGröner,'isouronlygoal.'6ExactlythesameattitudeisimpliedinthefamousinterviewbetweenSirArthurPaget,Commander-in-ChiefofthetroopsinIreland,andtherecalcitrantcavalryofficers,atthetimeoftheCurragh'mutiny'.AccordingtoGough'saccount,GeneralPaget'saidthatnoresignationswouldbeaccepted,etc.etc....Hesaidthatwemustclearlyunderstandthatthiswasthedirectorderof"theSovereign",andaskedus"ifwethoughthewouldobeytheordersofthosedirtyswineofpoliticians".7HerePagetmakesanimplicitdistinctionbetweenthecommunityorstate(symbolizedbytheSovereign)andthegovernmentoftheday.GeneralMacArthurwastomakethisdistinctionexplicitwhenhesaidin1952:'IfindinexistenceanewandheretoforeunknownanddangerousconceptthatthemembersofourarmedforcesoweprimaryallegianceorloyaltytothosewhotemporarilyexercisetheauthorityoftheExecutiveBranchofGovernmentratherthantothecountryanditsconstitutionwhichtheyaresworntodefend.'8'Noproposition,'addedGeneralMacArthur,'couldbemoredangerous.'Onthecontrary,itisGeneralMacArthur'sviewwhichopensPandora'sbox.Themomentthemilitarydrawthisdistinctionbetweennationandthegovernmentinpower,theybegintoinventtheirownprivatenotionofthenationalinterest,andfromthisitisonlyaskiptotheconstrainedsubstitutionofthisviewforthatoftheciviliangovernment;andthisispreciselywhatwehavedefinedastheverymeaningof'militaryintervention'.Thispurportedcareforthenationalinterestasdefinedbythemilitaryisindeedoneoftheirmainreasonsforintervening,asweshallsee.Thepointhereisthatitflowsinexorablyfromoneparticularfacetofmilitaryprofessionalism.

Asecondmotiveforinterventionalsoflowsfromprofessionalism.Wemaydescribeitalmostasmilitarysyndicalism.Asspecialistsintheirfield,themilitaryleadersmayfeelthattheyalonearecompetenttojudgeonsuchmattersassize,organization,recruitmentand

____________________5 Quoted,J.Wheeler-Bennett,TheNemesisofPower,pp.108-9.6 Ibid.,p.213.7 A.P.Ryan,MutinyattheCurragh,p.142.(Myitalics.)8 Quoted,TelfordTaylor,SwordandSwastika,p.354.

-26-

equipmentoftheforces.Yetoneveryoneofthesepointstheymayfindthemselvesincollisionwiththeciviliangovernment.Intheirprofessionalcapacitytheymaybeimpelledstillfurtherintotryingtoestablishthesecurityastheyseeit--botheconomicallyandsocially--ofwhat,asprofessionalfighters,theyregardastheircivilianbase.Tothem,thecommunityispreciselythis--areserveofmanpowerandmaterialsonwhichtheycandraw.Theymayalsoseektopressonthecivilianauthoritiesthatonlyincertaininternationalconjuncturescantheyguaranteevictory.Suchviewsareallconsequencesofprofessionalism,yettheyhaveoftenledthemilitarytotrytoestablishitselfasanautonomousbody.SuchwastheattitudeoftheGermanandtheJapanesearmiesuptotheoutbreakofthesecondworldwar,andoftheFrencharmyduringtheDreyfusperiod.

Thereisyetathirdreasonwhyprofessionalismmaygiverisetointervention.Thisisthemilitary'sreluctancetobeusedtocoercethegovernment'sdomesticopponents.Theprofessionalarmyseesitselfasthenation'scustodianagainstforeignfoes;theforeigneristheenemy,notafellownational.Italsoseesitselfasafightingforce,notasabodyofpolicemen.Itoftenventsitsdiscomfortathavingtoactagainstitsownnationalsbyblamingthe'politicians',andbythinkingofitselfasbeing'used'bythesefortheirownsordidpurposes.Thestrainwhichsuchdutiesputontheloyaltyofthearmedforcesisoftentoogreatandimpelsthemtodisobeyoreventoactagainsttheirgovernment.TheonlyseriousclashbetweensoldiersandthegovernmentinrecentBritishhistory,theso-called'mutiny'attheCurragh,wasprovokedbypreciselythiskindofsituation.Again,itwasbyplayingontheReichswehr'sreluctancetoactasapoliceforcethatHitlerandHimmlerwereabletopersuadeitnottoopposethecreationoftheS.S.--whichinotherrespectsthegeneralsdistrustedasmilitaryrivals.DisgustattheusemadeofTurkishforcesinasuccessionofpoliticalclasheswasoneimportantreasonforGeneralGürsel'scoupofMay1960inTurkey.9Significantlytherebels'songonthatoccasionwasanoldsoldiers'ballad,datingfromthesiegeofPlevna,whichran:'Shallbrotherstrikebrother?'10

Thusthreetendenciesallpushthemilitarytowardscollisionwiththecivilianauthorities;andeachonegrowsoutofprofessionalism.

____________________10 TheTimes,June16,1960.9 TheTimes,May30,1960.

-27-

Professionalismisnot,therefore,whatHuntingtonsaysitis--thesoleoreventheprincipalforceinhibitingthemilitary'sdesiretointervene.Toinhibitsuchadesirethemilitarymustalsohaveabsorbedtheprincipleofthesupremacyofthecivilpower.Forthisisnotpartofthedefinitionof'professionalism'.Itisaseparateanddistinctmatter.Byitwemean,toquotearecentandconvenientdefinition,that,'bothformallyandeffectively,themajorpoliciesandprogrammesofgovernment...shouldbedecidedbythenation'spoliticallyresponsiblecivilianleaders.'11

Incertaincountrieswithhighlyprofessionalforcesthisprinciplewasbynomeansalwaysunequivocallyexpressed--evenbyconstitutionallaw.TheGermanarmyundertheEmpireowedallegiancetotheKaiserasitsKriegesheer,anditsrelationshiptothepopularlyelectedReichstagwasambiguous.WhiletheparliamentaryoppositionandespeciallytheSocialDemocratsarguedthatitwasresponsibletotheMinisterofWarandthroughhimtotheReichstag,thepartiesoftheRightandthearmedforcesthemselvesmaintainedthatitwasresponsibleonlytotheEmperor.TheJapanesearmedforces,fromtheMeijirestorationin1868tothedefeatof1945,claimedasimilarpositionwithsimilarjustification.

Againstthisviewstandsthemilitary'squiteclearunderstanding,inmodernBritain,forinstance,orintheUnitedStates,thatthecivilpowerisparamountandmustbeobeyed.Beforethewar,'Americanofficersofbothservicestypicallyreferredtothearmedforcesas"instruments"onthedictumthatnationalpolicydictatedmilitarypolicy'.12Thissimpledichotomybetweennationalandmilitarypolicyhasnowadaysbecomecomplicatedandblurred,butthefundamentalaxiomofciviliansupremacyhasnotbeenblownupon.'Economically,politicallyandmilitarily,'declaredGeneralOmarBradley,chairmanoftheJointChiefsofStaff,inafamouscontroversywithJusticeDouglas,'thecontrolofourcountryresideswiththecivilianexecutiveandlegislativeagencies.'13PresidentKennedyhasmadethepositionquiteclear:'Ourarmsmustbesubjecttoultimateciviliancontrolatalltimes.Thebasicdecisionsonourparticipationinanyconflictandourresponsetoanythreat

____________________11 B.M.SapinandR.C.Snyder,TheRoleoftheMilitaryinAmericanForeignPolicy,p.52.12 Huntington,op.cit.,p.307.

13 Quoted,Millis,MansfieldandStein,ArmsandtheState,p.363.ForthesituationprevailingintheUnitedStatesbetweenthemilitaryandthecivilianauthorities,seepp.141-4.

-28-

...willbemadebytheregularlyconstitutedcivilianauthorities.'14InBritainalsotheaxiomisunequivocal.TheretheclassicillustrationderivesfromtheCurraghincidentof1914,asthisistheonlyBritishcasesinceGeneralMonk'stime(1659-60)toraisethequestionofthelimitsofthesoldier'sloyalty.In1914itwaswellknowntothecabinetandtheWarOfficethatmanyofficersservinginIrelandwouldbemostreluctanttofightagainsttheUlsterciviliansinordertoenforcethegovernment'sHomeRulepolicy.UnwiselytheCommander-in-ChiefofthetroopsinIrelandprovidedaloopholeforsuchofficersbyholdingouttothemaratherambiguousopportunitytoresigntheircommissions,andthebulkofthecavalryofficers,commandedbyandincludingGeneralGough,tookadvantageofthisandresigned.Nowtwopointsoughttobenoticedhere.ThefirstisthatGeneralGough'scolleague,GeneralFergusson,whocommandedthe5thDivision,ralliedhisowndoubtfulofficersinthefollowingway.

'ItoldthemthatthefirstdutyofsoldierswastoobeytheordersoftheirKingandofconstitutedauthority....Ipointedouttheresponsibilityofinfluencingthoseunderus.Personalconsiderationsmustgivewaytothedutiesofourrespectivepositionsascommandersoftroops.Iwouldbenopartytoanythingthattendedtoweakendiscipline.Logically,weofficerscouldnotrefusetoobeythepresentordersandyetexpectourmentoobeyorderswhenthey,onstrikeduty,forinstance,wereplacedindifficultiessimilartothosenowconfrontingus.'15

ThesecondpointisthatevenGeneralGoughhimselfwasnotdisobeyingthecivilpower.Hehadbeenofferedtheopportunitytoresignandhadtakenit.Hehadnotdisobeyedaformalorder,andwhenquestionedonhisconductattheWarOffice,adialoguelikethistookplace:

'GeneralEwart[theAdjutant-General]askedmeifIthoughtanyofficerhadanyrighttoquestionwhenheshouldgo,orshouldnotgo,insupportofthecivilpowertomaintainlawandorder.Isaid:"Nonewhatever";andIaddedifSirA[rthur]

____________________

14 PresidentKennedy,SpecialMessagetoCongressontheDefenceBudget,March28,1961(UnitedStatesInformationService).

15 A.P.Ryan,op.cit.,p.145.

-29-

P[aget]hadorderedmyBrigadetoBelfast,wewouldhavegonewithoutdemur,althoughIcouldnotthinkwhyweshouldbewantedthere.'16

InBritishmilitaryhistorysoldierslikeLordWolseley,SirWilliamRobertsonand,morerecently,LordMontgomeryhavehadoccasiontocriticizethecivilpowerandtocontestitspolicies;butallthishasalwaysbeensubjecttotheover-ridingmaximthatinthelastresortthecivilpowerisparamount;andsince1660italwayshasbeen.

Firmacceptanceofciviliansupremacy,notjustprofessionalism,isthetrulyeffectivecheck.In1873theDukeofChambord(thepretendertotheFrenchthrone)camesecretlytoVersaillestowinoverMarshalMacmahontohiscause.Invain.'IsupposedIwouldbeaddressingaConstableofFrance,'theDukeisreportedtohavecried.'ThepersonImetwasacolonelofthegendarmerie!'Itistothispassthatthedoctrineofciviliansupremacybringsthearmedforces:'Tosupportthelawsofthecountry.Thismeanstosustain,protectanddefendtheinstitutionsinforceandthecurrentformoftheState.'17

3.Otherinhibitingfactors

Inadditiontoprofessionalismplusthetraditionofciviliansupremacyotherfactorsservefromtimetotimetodeterthemilitaryfromintervention.

Oneoftheseisfearforthefightingcapacityofthearmedforces.Ifthesebecamehighlypoliticizedwiththeirmemberstakingoppositesides,theirvalueasafightingforcecouldbeseriouslyundermined.FearsofthiskinddroveVonSeeckttobasesalvationforbothReichswehrandReichonüberparteilichkeit.'ThetaskoftheCommander-in-Chief,'runshisOrderoftheDaywhenthearmywasrulingGermanyundertheStateofEmergencyin1923,'istorecognizethevitalinterestsoftheStateandtoseethattheyarerespected.Asforthesoldier,itisnotforhimtoseektoknowmoreortodobetterthanhiscommanders;hisdutyconsistsinobedience.AReichswehrunitedinobediencewillalwaysbeinvincibleandwillremainthemostpowerfulfactorintheState.AReichswehrintowhichthecancerofpoliticaldiscordhasenteredwillbeshatteredinthehourofdanger.'18

____________________16 Ibid.,p.150.17 R.Girardet,op.cit.,p.119.18 Wheeler-Bennett,op.cit.,pp.115-16.

-30-

MustafaKemalhadreachedasimilarconclusionearlyinhiscareer,in1909duringtheheydayoftheCommitteeofUnionandProgress:andheneverswervedfromitthroughouttherestofhislife.ThefirmnessofthisbeliefiswhataccountsforthefactthattheTurkishRepublicwhichhefoundedsubordinatedthemilitarytothecivilianpower.AttheannualpartymeetinginSalonika,in1909,MustafaKemalisquotedassaying:

'AslongasofficersremaininthePartyweshallbuildneitherastrongPartynorastrongArmy.Inthe3rdArmymostoftheofficersarealsomembersofthePartyandthe3rdArmycannotbecalledfirst-class.Furthermore[headded]theparty,receivingitsstrengthfromtheArmy,willneverappealtothenation.LetusresolvehereandnowthatallofficerswishingtoremaininthePartymustresignfromtheArmy.Wemustalsoadoptalawforbiddingallfutureofficershavingpoliticalaffiliations'.19

Anotherfactoristhegenerals'fearofacivilwarinwhichcomradewillhavetofireoncomrade.ThistoowaspotentininducingVonSeeckttokeeptheReichswehroutofpolitics.InthesameOrderoftheDayquotedabovehealsosaid:

'AslongasIremainatmypostIshallnotceasetorepeatthatsalvationcannotcomefromoneextremeortheother,neitherthroughforeignaidnorthroughinternalrevolutionwhetherfromtheRightorLeft-andthatonlybyhardwork,silentandpersistent,canwesurvive.ThiscanonlybeaccomplishedonthebasisofthelawsoftheConstitution.Toabandonthisprincipleistounleashcivilwar.Notacivilwarinwhichoneofthepartieswillsucceedinwinning,butaconflictwhichwillonlyterminateintheirmutualdestruction,aconflictsimilartothatofwhichtheThirtyYears'Warhasgivenussoghastlyanexample.'

Finallythemilitarymayfearthatiftheyinterveneandarevanquishednotonlytheirlivesbutthearmyitselfwillbeforfeit.Suchthingscanhappen.InCostaRica,in1948,ColonelFigueresledapopularrevoltagainstthegovernmentwhichhadjusttriedtoset

____________________

19Quoted,D.LernerandR.R.Richardson,'SwordsandPloughshares:theTurkishArmyasaModernizingForce(WorldPolitics,Vol.13,No.1,1960,pp.19-20).ForeffectsofMustafaKemal'sdoctrineontheTurkishrepublic,seepp.202-3.

-31-

asidetheresultsoftheelection.Hedissolvedthearmyandreplaceditwithapoliceforceof1,000men.'Why,'heasked,'shouldagroupofprofessionalmenassumetherighttoannulthepopularwillasexpressedatthepolls?'20AsimilarthreatfacedthedefeatedGermanarmyinNovember1918.Itwasthreatenedbythelackofsupplies,andalsobythespreadoftheSoldiers'Councils,abettedbytheleftwingsocialistswhowerethededicatedfoesofthemilitary.TheapparentlyunnaturalallianceofthemonarchistGeneralStaffwiththesocialistProvisionalGovernment,whichtheydetestedwithalltheirheart,wasashot-gunmarriagebasedontheirfearthatotherwisetheextremeleftmightseizecontrolandmakeawaywiththearmyaltogether.

Thuscertainforcesmayinhibitthemilitarydesiretointervene.Professionalismmayworkthatway,thoughitsometimesactuallydrivesthemilitaryintointerventionratherthaninhibitsit;fearforthefightingcapacityofthearmedforces,orofacivilwartearingthemintwo,orevenfortheirfutureasaforceofanykindmayalsoturnthemilitary'sthoughtsfromintervention.Themostimportantfactorhoweveristhearmedforces'acceptanceoftheprincipleofcivilsupremacy.

MOTIVESDISPOSINGTHEMILITARYTOINTERVENE1.The'ManifestDestinyoftheSoldiers'

Describingthearmycoupof1948,PresidentBétancourtofVenezuelahaswrittenthatfromtheofficeoftheChiefofStafftherewent'amessageofMessianicintent-the"manifestdestiny",theprovidentialmissionofthesoldiersassavioursoftheircountries.'21

AnelegantexpressionofsuchabeliefistobefoundinaspeechbyDr.Salazar,fiveyearsaftertheestablishmentofhisdictatorship.

'ItwillnotoffendanyonetorecognizethatthematerialandmoraldisastersofthelastdecadesbroughtthedecayofthePortuguesenationtoitsfinalterm.Inpolitics,inadministration,inthepublicandtheprivatesectorsoftheeconomy,thesamespectacleofpermanentdisorderwasdisplayed,withitsnatural

____________________20 Lieuwen,op.cit.,pp.96-7.21 RomuloBétancourt,Venezuela:PoliticayPetroleo(Mexico,1956),pp.468-70.(Myitalics.)

-32-

consequenceinthecollapseoftheprestigeoftheStateathomeandoverseas....

Insuchcircumstances,withalltheforcesofsocietydisorganizedandinperilofdissolution,thechiefproblemwastofindthefulcrumforthereactionofredemption....

TheArmy,neglectedintheintemperateclimateofrecentyears-wars,revolutionsandreforms-isnot,despiteall,whatwewouldlikeittobe;bytheverynatureofitspeculiarconstitution,itlivesapartfrompolitics,subjectedtoahierarchyanddiscipline,sereneandfirmasaguaranteeofpublicorderandnationalsecurity.Thisverysuperiorityofdiscipline,existinginabodyorganizedinthenameofthehonourandthedestinyofthecountrywasthesolefactorcapableofsurmounting,withtheminimumofdislocationanddanger,theobstaclescreatedbytheemptyrigmarolestheninbeing;andtosupporttheNewAuthority,pledgedtoworkforthesalvationandresurgenceofthecountry....'22

Sectionalbodiesallpleadthenationalinterestwhenmakingclaimsfortheirownbenefit,butthemilitaryarespeciallywellplacedtodoso.Inthefirstplace,theyare,purportedly,outsidepartypolitics;theirchargeisthestate;andtheyexist,unlikechurchesandthelike,byadeliberatefiatforthesolepurposeofdefendingthisstate.Secondly,theirclaimismoreplausiblethanthatofmostothersectionalbodies.Quiteapartfromthepublic'sapprovalof'themilitaryvirtues'noothernationalinstitutionsosymbolizesindependence,sovereignty,orequalitywithotherpeoplesasacountry'sarmedforces.Thefirstthinganewnationcreatesisanationalarmy.Thearmysymbolizes,aswellasmakeseffective,itsdistinctiveidentity.Thirdly,bytheverynatureofitsappointedtask,i.e.nationaldefence,themilitaryisandindeedhastobeindoctrinatedwithnationalism.Thisformsitsdistinctiveideology.Itswholeespritdecorpswithoutwhichitwouldhavenofightingspiritisfoundedonthesupposednationalvaluesandvirtues.Allmilitarytraininglaysheavyemphasisonthenationalidentity,andwhipsuppatriotismandnationalisminitsrecruits,andbycontrasthatredandcontemptfortheenemy.Whereallnationsareenemies,one'sownnationisthefocusofloyalty;andallmilitarytrainingpresupposesan'enemy'.Thecombinedeffectofallthesesentiments-recognition

____________________22 Dr.Salazar,op.cit.,pp.147-8.

-33-

ofitsuniquemissioninsociety,complacencywithitsself-sacrificialvirtuesandconsciousnessofitspower-providesthebasisforitsbeliefinits'"sacredtrust"....ThedutyoftheArmytointerveneand"savethenation".'23

Suchsentimentsformthenecessaryconditionforthebeliefina'manifestdestiny',butarenotinthemselvessufficient.Thiswouldhavetobesoughtinsuchfactorsasthesocialcompositionandstatusofthemilitary,itspublicstanding,andtheideologiescurrentinitsranks;andalsoinmorespecificcircumstancessuchasitssuccessorotherwiseinwarandtheinternationalsituationofthetime.

Weknowlittleornothingaboutthemechanismbywhichrivalpoliticalideologiesaretransmittedintoandthroughoutthearmedforces.Onthewhole,themilitaryareeffectivelypreventedfromparticipatingincivilianpartyactivities:anditisnotthroughsuchparticipationthatpoliticalideologiesareusuallytransmittedtoandthroughthem.24

Whataretheideologies,whobearsthemintothearmedforces,whospreadsthemthere?Wearelargelyignorant,buttworemarksarerelevant.First,ideasdonottransmitthemselves;peopleandbookscarrythem.Second,thearmedforceshavealwaysbeen-bytheclosedandintimatenatureofthepersonalrelationstheyfosterpeculiarlysusceptibletoinfiltrationandtheestablishmentofnetworksofconspiracy.Ofthesewehave,everysooften,fascinating

____________________23 TheTimes,April6,1961.

24

Inmostcountries(outsidetheideologicaldictatorships)themilitaryauthoritiesstrivetopreventtheirforcesfromjoiningpoliticalparties.Thereasonsareobvious:thearmedforceshavetoserveasuccessionofministersandgovernments,andofficialneutralityisapreconditionoftheirbeingabletodoso;theparty-affiliatedmembersmightbedismissedbyahostilepartyinpower,withseriousresultsondisciplineandtraining;partydisputesintheforcecouldimpairitsfightingefficiencybybreakingupitscarefullyfosteredespritdecorps;andinanycasethemilitary'smoralauthorityismaximizedbytheargument(putbyDr.Salazarinhisspeechquotedabove)that'itlivesalooffrompolitics...asaguaranteeofpublicorderandnationalsecurity'.Forallthis,themilitaryauthoritieshavesometimesbeenhardputtoittopreventtheirforcesdickeringwithpoliticalparties.TheJapaneseHighCommandtriedvainlytopreventthejuniorofficersjoiningpatrioticsocieties;theGermanHighCommand,astheUlmtrialof1930showed,couldnotresistNaziinfiltration;theSyrianarmyofficerswereconnectedwiththeBa'athpartyby1957;theIraqiofficersinthe1936-41periodwereconsistentlyintriguingwiththepoliticalparties-ifonecansocallthecliquesofpoliticiansthatformedandreformedaroundcertaindominantpersonalitiesintheIraqiParliament.

-34-

glimpseswhichattesttotheirexistencebutdolittlemore:theFreemasonnetworkintheSpanisharmyof1820;thesecretpatrioticsocietiesthatbegantohoneycombtheJapanesearmyafter1930;theGrupodeOfficialesUnidosinArgentinain1943;likewisethemilitaryleaguesinthepre-1939Balkans,suchasthe'BlackHand'andthe'WhiteHand'inSerbia,theofficers'leaguesinBulgaria(1922),andinGreece(1909andlater).25

RecentstudiesofEgyptsince1952showhowtheintensechauvinismofthehighschoolswascarriedforwardintotheMilitaryAcademy,andhowthelike-mindednationalistofficers,knownasthe'FreeOfficers',cametogetherandcarriedontheirclandestinepropaganda.26

2.Themotiveofthe'nationalinterest'

Allarmedforceswhichhavebecomepoliticizedasdescribedholdinsomeformoranotherasimilarbelief:thattheyhavesomespecialandindeeduniqueidentificationwiththe'nationalinterest'.WehavealreadyseenhowDr.Salazarexpressesthisview.Itistobefoundelsewheretoo.'TheArmy,'saidGeneralVonSeeckt,'shouldbecomeaStatewithinaState,butitshouldbemergedintheStatethroughservice;infactitshouldbecomethepurestimageoftheState.'27TheSpanishEnciclopediaUniverselspeaksoftheSpanisharmyafter1931as'thelastbastionofSpanishnationhood'.28'TheArmedForces,'saidPerón,'arethesynthesisofthenation.Theydonotbelongtospecificpartiesorsectors.Theybelongtothenation.'29

However,themilitary'sconceptionofcustodianshipisnotuniform;nomoreisitssubstantivedefinitionof'nationalinterest'.

Somearmedforcesconceiveof'custodianship'asmeaningtheir

____________________

25

ForFrance,seeR.Girardet,op.cit.,passim.Alsohisarticle,"'PouvoirCiviletPouvoirMilitairedanslaFranceContemporaine'",intheRevueFrançaisedeSciencePolitique,March,1960,pp.5-38.ThisexplainsthepoliticizationoftheFrencharmysince1940,aprocesswhichculminatedintheTreizeMaiof1958.Thisisthebestaccountweknowofboththewhyandthehowofpoliticization;brilliantlyaccomplished,itisindispensabletothestudyofmilitaryinterventioninpolitics.ForJapan,therelationsbetweenthepatrioticsocietiesandthearmyhavebeenexploredbyR.Storry,TheDoublePatriots,pp.42-95andpassim.

26 J.andS.Lacouture,EgyptinTransition,p.128.AlsoAnwarelSadat,RevoltontheNile,passim.27 QuotedWheeler-Bennett,op.cit.,p.87.28 Universel(Supplement1936-9),p.1444.29 Quoted,Blanksten,Perón'sArgentina,p.307.

-35-

overtrulershipofthenationandtheestablishmentofamoreorlesscompletepoliticalprogrammeundertheirauthority.Oneexampleofthiswasthewhollymilitarydirectorate(1923-5)ofPrimodeRiverainSpain.AnotherexamplecomesfromthenotionsofcertainmembersofthearmyfactioninJapan(1930-6)whichwentunderthenameoftheKodo-Ha.Itcontainedsomeofficerswhohadcometobelieveinwhatwascalledthe'ShowaRestoration',underwhichthecapitalistsweretosurrendertheirprivilegestotheTenno(Emperor).ThepoliticalpartiesoftheDiet(identifiedinthemilitarymindwiththehatedzaibitsu,theindustrialistclique)weretodolikewise.AndthemilitarywerethentorulethecountryinthenameoftheSacredEmperoroftheShowaperiod.(Hencetheexpression,'theShowaRestoration'.)

Otherarmedforces,however,lookontheirrôleofcustodianshipdifferently.Theyseeitasadutytoarbitrateorveto.Theyfeelauthorizedtoexerciseitwhensomeconvulsionordecisionofthecivilauthoritiesseemstothemtothreatenwhattheythinkarethepermanentinterestsofthenation.Inthisconceptionthearmedforcesarenottomergeintothepublicauthoritiesbuttoremaindistinctandoutsidethembutwiththepowertointerveneagainstthem.

SucharôleissimilartowhatinSpanishpubliclawistermedthepodermoderador,the'moderatingpower'.Theconceptisoneofaheadofstate(asinaconstitutionalmonarchy)whoactsasabalancewheeltotheconstitution,interveningwhenthepoliticalauthoritiesorforcesseemtobeoutofalignmentwithoneanother.30Truecasesofthisbeliefaredifficulttodistinguishfrombogusonesbecausenearlyallmilitaryseizuresofpowerareaccompaniedbythestatementthatthemovementispurelytemporary,designedtocleansepubliclifeandtopermitthenationtochooseitsownrulersfreely.Ascountriesinwhichthepeoplehavebeenfreelychoosingtheirownrulersareveryfew,theclaimisoftenmadewiththegreatestplausibilityandamidtransportsofpublicenthusiasm.ThenumberoftimestheclaimhasbeenmadeinLatinAmericaissogreatthatitwouldbetedioustoparticularizethem.Elsewhere,however,wemaynotesimilarclaimsmadebyNeguib(1952),Kassim(1958)andGeneralGürselofTurkeyin1960.Inallthesecasesthepleahad

____________________

30 Seearticle"'PoderModerador'"intheEnciclopediaUniversel(Madrid,1923).ComparethesituationofthePresidentoftheFrenchRepublicunderArticle5ofthe1958Constitution.

-36-

considerablejustifications.Egypthadbeenundermartiallawsince1939anditselectionswerenotoriously'made';inIraqtheelectionswere,evenmorethaninEgypt,amerefaçade,andpowerresidedinthehandsofatightoligarchy;whileinTurkeytheMenderesgovernmenthadmovedappreciablyclosetosuppressionoftheoppositionandhad,justbeforethecoup,putanembargoonallpoliticalactivities.Butthoughmostmilitaryseizuresofpowerintroducethemselvesasinterimmeasuresdesignedtorestorethefreedomofelections,singularlyfewhavethatresult.Whetherthemilitaryaresincereornotwhenmakingtheclaim,itisalmostcommonformforthemtofallinlovewiththepowerthathascomesoeasily,andtoconverttheir'interim'régimeintofull-bloodedrulebythearmy.ThisforinstanceiswhathappenedinEgypt.Neguibdeclared,ontheverydayofthecoup(July23,1952),thathisfirstmeasurewouldhavetobe'torecallthepreviousparliamentandmakesuretheproceedingsareconstitutional'.31OnAugust8,hepostponedtheelectionsfromOctober1952toFebruary1953.OnDecember10,hedeclaredthattheconstitutionwasabrogatedandthatpowerresidedina'transitionalgovernment';thatforthetime'theleaderoftheRevolutionwillexercisethepowerofsupremesovereignty'.32OnJune18,1953,ColonelNasserdeclaredthatthistransitionalrégimewouldlastforthreeyears,thoughthepeoplewouldbepermittedtodecidewhetheritwastobeaparliamentaryorapresidentialrepublic,andalsotoelecttheirPresident.OnFebruary28,1954,thegreatNasser-Neguibbattlebegan.OnMarch27,NassersuccessfullystruckatNeguibandapreviousdecisiontoholdelectionsandreturntocivilianrulewasabrogatedtilltheendofthethree-year'transitionalperiod',i.e.till1956.

Mostmilitaryclaimstobeactingtorestorepubliclibertieshaveasimilaroutcome,butsomearmieshavehonourablyfulfilledtheirpromises.AsexampleswemightmentiontheBrazilianandtheTurkish.

InBrazil,the1955electionshadresultedinthevictoryofSenhorKubitschekforPresidentandSenhorGoulartasVice-President.Thereuponasectionofthemilitary,ledbyaColonelMamede,calledforamilitaryrisingtopreventtheirinstallation.TheMinisterofWar,GeneralTexeiraLott,was,however,determinedtoseetheconstitutionobserved.HedemandedoftheActing-President

____________________31 Lacouture,op.cit.,p.150.32 Keesing'sContemporaryArchives(1953),12846A.

-37-

(SenhordaLuz)thatColonelMamedebetransferredtoanotherpost.SincetheActing-Presidentrefused,GeneralLottresignedhispost,seizedRiodeJaneiroanddeposedtheActing-President.ThePresidentoftheSenate,SenhorRamos,waselectedinhisplacebythetwoHousesofParliament,untilSenhorKubitschekwasdulyinstalled.GeneralLottdeclaredthatthePresidentsoftheSupremeCourtandofParliamenthadsupportedhisactions'astendingtoreturnthesituationtoanormalconstitutionalrégime'.Shortlyafterwardsallarrestedpersonswerereleasedandeventheunhappyex-Acting-PresidentdaLuzwaspermittednotonlytoreturnbuttotakeuphisseatinCongress.

InTurkeywheretheMenderesgovernmenthadharassedtheoppositionandfetteredthepress,theCommander-in-Chief,GeneralGürsel,seizedpowerinMay1960.ArrestingPresidentBayar,Mr.MenderesandalargenumberofdeputiesoftherulingDemocraticparty,hesetupaprovisionalgovernmentandissuedhispronunciamento.Itstatedthatthearmyhadactedtodeposeasmallgroupwhohadactedagainsttheconstitutionandrepressedcivilliberties.Thenewadministrationwastobetemporary,itwouldrestorerightsandfreedoms,drawupanewconstitution,andbringitintobeingbyfreeelection.33October1961waslaterfixedasthedateforreturntoelections,andthispromisewaskept.

Justasthemilitarymayregardtheir'custodianshipofthenationalinterest'eitherasadutytoruleorasasdutytoarbitrate,sotheyhavenouniformnotionofwhatconstitutesthe'nationalinterest'.Foritisquiteincorrecttosupposedthatthearmedforcesarealwaysonthesideoflandedorindustrialoligarchies;adoftenadnottheyopposesuchgroups.Itisequallyerroneoustosupposetheyareantidemocratic,ortobemoreexact,anti-parliamentary.ArmedforcesthathavesupportedlandedandindustrialoligarchiesincludethoseofPortugalandSpain,ofGuatemala,ElSalvador,DominicaandHonduras.ArmedforcesthathaveattackedsucholigarchiesincludetheEgyptianandIraquiunderNasserandKassim,andthemilitaryofGuatemalaatthetimeofArévoloandArbenz(1944-1954).Somearmedforcesarebitterlyopposedtocivillibertiesandtheparliamentaryrégime:e.g.thePeruvianarmyunderGeneralOdríaortheVenezuelanunderJímenez,nottospeakagain,ofthoseofSpainandPortugal.ThemilitaryofPakistan,theSudan,EgyptandSouthKoreaarelikewiseauthoritarianinoutlook.Butwiththesemust

____________________33 TheTimes,May30,1960.

-38-

becontrastedthearmedforcesofBrazilandlatterlyofArgentina.Wehavealreadynotedtheeventsin1955inBrazil.OftheArgentinianarmy,itmustberememberedthatitwasresponsiblefortheriseofPerónin1943,repentedbrieflyin1945,thensupportedhimfairlyconsistentlyfortenyears;butthatin1955itrevolted,chasedhimintoexileandbrokeuphisparty.ThearmytodaylivesforthedestructionofPeronism;thismaybeduetoitsleaders'fearoftheconsequencesshouldhereturn;neverthelesstheArgentinearmedforcesarenowthedevotedsupporteroftheparliamentaryrégime.34

Theybelieve'thatthearmyhasasacredtrust-thatofsupervisingthedemocraticstructureoftherepublic,ofensuringthatitsdestinyshallneverfallintothehandsoftotalitarians-andespeciallyofPeronistsandCommunists.Whentheelectorateisseducedfromthepathofrecitude,orwhendemocratically-electedauthoritiesbetraytheirtrust,itbecomesthedutyofthearmytointerveneand"savethenation".'35

'Itisdifficult[continuedTheTimes,rathermordantly]toenvisagesomethirtyorfortygeneralsandasmallernumberofadmiralsandairforcecommandersappointedsolelybyprovidencetobethesolejudgesofwhatthenationneeds.'36Acommentofthiskindisonlytoonecessaryatthisstage,torecalltousimplicationsofwhatisimpliedinthisnotionofthe'manifestdestinyofthearmedforces'.

Thisisnotall,however.Oncloserexamination,muchofthemilitary'senthusiamforplayingapoliticalrôleisseentospringfromcircumstanceswhicheitherpandertoorinjureitsprideasaspeculiarcorporation.Furthermore,itssubstantiveconceptionofthenationalinterestidoftenrootedin-evenifittranscends-itsinterestactsprimarilyifnotwhollynotforthenationalinterestatall,butoutofadesiretoprotectorextenditsprivilegesasapeculiarcorporation.

3.Anotherkindofmotivation-thesectionalinterest

Thepleaof'nationalinterest'isoftenhpocritical.Itbecomesmoreandmoresuspectastheinterestsofthemilitaryshiftfromthemore

____________________34 FortheArgentinearmyafter1955,seepp.167-71.35 TheTimes,April6,1961.36 Ibid.

-39-

generaltotheparticular-fromthedefenceofaregiontothedefenceofaclass,fromthedefenceofaclasstothedefenceofthearmyasaninstitution,untilitreachesitsultimatedegredationinthosecases-andthereareverymany-whereofficersinterveneinorder(evenamongotherthings)toimprovetheirownpersonalcareers.

Thecomplexmotivationsofthemilitaryvarywitheachparticularcase.TheEgyptianarmyforinstanceactedfromrageandhumiliationatitsignominiousdefeatinPalestine,fromrabidnationalism,andfromsocialresentmentattheeffendiclass.TheSpanisharmydisplayedanexplosivemixtureofarroganceandboredom,regionalisthostilitytoCatalonianseparatism,allformidablylacedwithindividualcareerism.Topicturethemotivationsofthemilitaryitwouldbenecessarytodescribeeachindividualcase.Buteachisblendedofsuchamixtureofmoodandobjectivesthatitisbesttoprecedeanysuchdescriptionsbyfirstlistingthecommonestofthesemotivesimpellingthearmedforcestointervene.

(a)Classinterest.Themostfacileofallthetheoriesofmilitaryinterventionseekstoexplaineverythingintermsofclassinterest.Accordingtothietheorythemilitarysupportthecivilpowerwhenthisisdrawnfromasimilarsocialclass,andoverthrowitwhenitisdrawnfromadifferentandhostileclass.Ifthisistobetakenasageneralrule,itmakesmostofthepoliticalactivitiesofmilitaryforcestotallyincomprehensible.Venezuela'sarmedforces,forexample,haveintervenedthreetimessince1945-infavourofAccionDemocraticain1945,againstitin1948,infavourofitagainin1958;isittobethereforearguedthattherullingclassesofVenezuelahadalteredthreetimesinthatintervaloftwelveyears?TheIraqiarmyintervenedsixtimesbetween1936and1941;theSyrianarmyseventimesbetween1949and1962;theThaiarmyoneightoccasionssince1932.Classinterestisnotanegligiblefactor;butitisonlyoneofseveralfactorsinfluencingthemilitary.

Incertaininstances,however,itisofgreatandsometimesdecisiveimportance.TheGermanReichswehrafter1918,forexample,wasdeiberatelydrawnfromanarrowclass,andthisinfluenceditspoliticalattitudedecisively.Itsoriginal4,000officerswerremeticulouslyselected,anditsN.C.Os,fromwhomofficer-cadetsweredrawn,werealsochosenasfaraspossiblefromthesonsofthearistocracyandthefornermilitaryclass.Theresultwasthatin192123percentoftheoffficercorpsweremembersofthearistocracy,an

-40-

evenhigherpercentagethanin1913;andin1930,itisestimated,95percentoftheofficerswerestillbeingdrawnfromstratawhichwouldhavebeenconsidered'eligible'undertheKaiser,andonly5percent--amere200inall--fromthepreviouslyineligiblegroups.Thisre-formedmilitarycastesimplycarriedonthetraditionandattitudeofitspre-warpredecessor.Athomeitaspiredtobeonceagaintheunchallengeablysuperiorsocial'Order',andabroadoncemoretheunchallengeablysuperiorarmy.Itwasbitterlyantisocialistandanti-democratic.Atitsbest,undervonSeecktandGröner,itco-operatedwiththeRepublic.Atitsworst,from1930onwards,undervonSchleicher,itsoughttoeradicateSocialDemocracyfromthenationallife:theplanwastogettheagedPresidentHindenburgtoproroguetheReichstagandinstitutepersonalgovernmentunderArticle48oftheConstitution,pendingaconstitutionwhichwouldguaranteethevictoryofthenationalisticandright-wingelementsofthenation.Itsattitudes,too,madeitsjuniorofficersareadypreytoNazipropaganda,andinducedSchleicherandhisimmediatesuccessorstodickerandcolludewiththeNazis,foralltheiraristocraticcontemptforthem.

ClassinterestalsosuppliedanimportantmotivetotheJapanesearmyintheinter-warperiod.Bythe1920s,officerswereincreasinglydrawnfromthemiddleandlowerclassesandfromthepeasantry,whiletheotherrankswerealmostentirelypeasant.Whilethemostseniorrankswereconservativeandoften(still)fromtheSamuraiclanofChoshu,andthemiddlegradegenerallyhadaSamuraibackgroundalso,thejuniorrankscontainedanevergrowingproportionoftheselowermiddle-classelements.By1927,itisestimated,aboutathirdofthejuniorofficerswerethesonsofpettylandownersandsmallshopkeepers.Thismadethemparticularlysympathetictothesocialconditionsoftheshopkeeper,thefarmerandthepeasant.Politically,theopponentsofthearmyweretheparties,andthesewerefinancedbyandactedintheinterestsofthezaibitsu--theindustrialists--notablythetwogreathousesofMitsuiandMitsubishi.Theclassinterestofthearmyexacerbatedthisquarrel.DuringtheGreatDepressiontheofficerswereoutragedatthehardshipsoftheirownkin,orattheplightoftheirmen'sfamilies,oftenforcedtoselladaughtertothecitybrokerswhotoutedforgirlsforthetearoomsandbrothels.Themiddleandaboveallthejuniorranksofthearmythereforebecamebitterlyhostiletothezaibitsuwhomtheyblamedfortheirmisfortunes,andbythesametokentothepolitical

-41-

partiesandtheDietitselfwhichservedasitsinstruments.ForthesereasonstheJapanesearmyquicklyabsorbedtheanti-parliamentary,anti-politicalpartyandanti-capitalistviewsofsuchpeopleasIkkiKita,thepropounderofaJapanesekindofnational-socialism.

TheEgyptianarmy'spoliticalattitudesarealsolargelyinfluencedbyitsclass-structure.WhentheWafdpartyopenedtheMilitaryAcademytolower-classrecruitsin1936,theEgyptianarmyhadneithertraditionnorprestige.Indeedithasbeendescribedasa'mediocrehotch-potchofparadeunits,forcesusedaspoliceforhuntingsmugglers,andcavalrysquadronsforthesonsofPashasintentonplayingpolo'.37Withtheexceptionofthedecorativecavalry,thearmyofficerwassociallydespised,andnoself-respectingbourgeoiswoulddreamofallowinghisdaughtertomarryone.After1936therecruitswhocameintotheAcademywereoftendrawnfromthepettylandowners.Somewerethesonsoffellahinwhohadmadegood,someoflower-gradecivilservants(Nasser'sfatherwasapostmaster).Thesecadetshadnoreasontolovetheeffendiclass--sociallyandpoliticallytheirmasters--andgoodreasontoreturntheircontemptwithhatred.Thesufferingsofthefellahinintheinflationofthewaryearsfurtherinflamedthisclass-resentment;andNasserandhiscronies,fromthedaytheypassedoutin1938,seta'purgeofthestate'asoneoftheirobjectivesbythesideofriddingthecountryofforeigntroopsandreformingthearmy.Itwasnaturalforthem,therefore,toblametheeffendisandthepoliticalpartiesfortheirdefeatinPalestine.Itwasequallynaturalforthemtopresson,oncetheyhadseizedpowerin1952,tosmashtheparties,sweeptheoldrulingclassclearoutofpoliticalinfluenceandpower,andcrippleiteconomicallybylandlawsinfavourofthefellahin.Theabruptturnto'Arabsocialism'in1961,andtheconfiscationorsequestrationofwhatindustryremainedinprivatepossession,ismerelythelatestmanifestationofthisclassinterest.

TheclassinterestofthejuniorofficersisofimportancealsoinLatinAmericanrepublicslikeArgentinaandBrazilwhichareexperiencingthegrowthofamiddleclass.Beforethefirstworldwartheofficerscamemostlyfromtheruraloligarchies,andwhentheyintervenedtheydidsoinsupportoftheireconomicandpoliticalposition.Nowadaysofficersaredrawnincreasinglyfromthefamiliesofindustralists,civilservantsandprofessionalpeople.Thispartlyexplainstheincreasedradicalismofjunior-officerrevoltsinsuch

____________________37 Lacouture,op.cit.,p.130.

-42-

countries.TheArgentinearmyin1943,forinstance(theyearofthefirstcoup),wasnotconnectedwith'theOligarchy':'Thearmyofficers,generallyspeaking,hadnoplaceinsocietyanddidnotcomefromthegoverningclassofestancieros,successfulprofessionalmenandbigmerchants.'38Thenavalofficersdid,andthroughouttheperiodofPerón'srulenevergaveloyalsupporttotherégime,andin1955playedthedecisiverôleinhisoverthrow.InBrazil,theyoungofficers(thetenentes)stageduprisingsinthe'20s,andtheybecametheinstrumentofGetulioVargas'saccessionin1930overtheoppositionoftheold'coffeeoligarchs'ofSaõPaulo.

Thislowermiddle-classmake-uppartlyaccountsalsoforthecounter-revolutionaryactivitiesofthesesameofficers.Thedictatorstheyhoisttopower,e.g.PeróninArgentina,VargasinBrazil,RojasPinillainColombia,haveoftentriedtobecomeindependentofthearmybycourtinglabour,incountries(moreover)wherelabourorganizationsaredependenton,andlargelyanorganof,thegovernmentinpower.Inthesecircumstancestheofficercorpsbecomesworriedontwoaccounts--theirdiminishinginfluenceonthedictator,andtheirbiasagainstlabour.SectionsoftheArgentinianarmy,nottospeakofthenavy,triedtogetridofPerónin1945whilehewasstillVice-President,onaccountofhiscourtingoflabour.In1955,sectionsofthearmy,powerfullysupportedbythenavy,broughthimdown,andsincethatdatePresidentsAramburuandFrondizibothhadtofacecontinualpressurefromthearmedforcestotoughenuptheirsocialpolicies.InBrazil,again,sectionsofthearmyhadhadenoughofVargas'spro-labourpolicyby1945,andmadehimresign;afterhissweepingelectoralvictoryin1950whichtheycouldnotprevent,theirpressureforcedhimtohisdramaticsuicidein1954;andthosesectionsofthearmywhichhadbeenmostprominentlyagainsthimtried,in1955,tosetasidetheelectionofPresidentKubitschek,whichrepresentedatriumphfortheoldVargasalliance.39

(b)Theregionalinterest.Itsometimeshappensthattheofficercorpsispredominantlydrawnfromoneparticularregionofthecountryordevelopsspecialtieswithit;andthistoocanactasamotiveformilitaryintervention.ThemodernBritishexampleof

____________________38 SirDavidKelly,TheRulingFew,p.296.

39ColonelMamedeandhisgroup.Seepp.37-8.Theirinterventionin1961wasforthesamereason--topreventGoulart(veryleftwingandpro-labourandrunning-matetoKubitschekin1955)fromaccedingtothePresidency.

-43-

militarypolitics,theCurragh'mutiny',isaninstanceinpoint.GeneralGoughwashimselfanIrishman,andhiscavalryofficers,whopreferredtoresigntheircommissionsratherthancoerceUlster,wereconnectedwiththeUlstergentrybybirthortiesoffriendshipanddomicile.TheSpanisharmy'scruelandpersistenthatredofCatalonianseparatismwaspartlyduetothefactthatalmostallitsofficerscamefromAndalusiaorCastile--andCastile,pre-eminently,wastheheartlandofSpanishcentralism(inthelabourmovementnolessthaninthearmy).Again,thearmyofpre-warYugoslaviawastheinstrumentofKingAlexander'sillegalabrogationoftheConstitutionin1929andformedtheessentialproptohiscentralizingandanti-Croatpolicy--andtothatofPrincePaul,hissuccessor.Ofthe165generalsinactiveservicein1938nolessthan161wereSerbs.ThearmymovementinPakistanhasalsobeeninfluencedbyregionalism.AllthePakistaniofficerscamefromWestPakistan,thetraditionalrecruitinggroundoftheIndianArmy.LargelyPunjabilandlordtypes,theyhavetendedtoregardtheBengalisasdisloyalautonomistsandseparatists.TheyhavetendedtoregardEastPakistanasalmosta'Colonial'area,needing'strong'government.

RegionalismseemsalsotohaveplayedapartintheVenezuelanarmy'scounter-revolutionof1948,andthesubsequentriseofJiméneztopowerin1950.InVenezuela,Andeanprovincialismisstillstrong,thoughweakening.TheAndinothinksofhisregionasthecradleofthestate.From1889totheaccessionofAccionDemocraticatopowerin1945,notasinglePresidentofVenezuelahadbeenanythingbutanAndino--all,Castro,Gomez,ContrerasandAngaritahadbeenmenoftheAndes.ThemajorityoftheofficerswerealsoAndeans.Theirlocalpatriotismplayeditspartthereforeinthe1948coupwhichejectedtheAccionDemocraticagovernmentandestablishedthemilitaryjuntaofChalbaud,JiménezandPaez.BetweenJiménezandChalbaudtheresoondevelopedarivalryforthePresidencyandinthecontestitwasthearmyanditsAndeanparticularismwhichwonthedayforJiménez,himselfanAndino.Chalbaud,aristocraticbytemperament,soughttobolsterhisstrengthbyalliancesamongthenarrowcircleof'losgrandesappellidos'.PerezJiménez,however,formedconnexionswithagroupofarmyofficers.'Tobackhisappetiteformorepower,'saysPresidentBétancourt,'heformedaPraetoriancamarillawithmilitaryelements.Andallthetimeitwasstimulatedandadvisedbyaciviliangeneralstaff,theso-calledUribantegroup,akindoflodge

-44-

ofprofessionalmenandpoliticiansofTachiraState,inbredwiththenotionthattheyhadbeenborninVenezuela'sPrussia.'40

ThemostrecentandbyfarthemostimportantinstanceoftheregionalmotiveistheFrencharmy'sill-starredattachmenttoAlgeria.TokeepAlgérieFrançaise,unitsoftheFrenchforcesstationedtherehaveonthreeseparateandsuccessiveoccasionsrefusedtoobeythecivilpower.ThefirstoccasionwastheTreizeMai(1958)whentheciviliancolonsofAlgiersroseandweresupportedandthenjoinedbytheforces,ledpredominantlybyGeneralsMassuandSalan,inCommitteesofPublicSafety.Thesecondoccasion,promptedbyGeneraldeGaulle'sgnomicspeechonthefutureofAlgeriaandsparkedoffbyhisdismissalofGeneralMassu,wasinJanuary1960.Onceagainthecolonsroseandoccupiedthegovernmentbuildingsandtheparatroopregimentsmadenomovetointerferewiththem.Thethirdandinfinitelymostseriousoftheactsofinsubordinationwastheopenmutinyandinsurrectionofthe'FourGenerals',theaffairofApril22,1961.41

Whythisfirm,insomecasesfanatical,resistancetotheseveranceofAlgeriafromFrance?Wemustdistinguish:theregularsfeltmoredeeplythantheconscripts,theparatroopsmuchmorefanaticallythantherest,theS.A.S.andS.A.U.detachmentsweredifferentagain.Nevertheless,in1958atleast,onesentimentwaswidespreadthroughoutallsections--thefeelingthatFrancemustremain;andatthesametimearelativelysmallnumberofofficers,butoneswhowerehighlyorinfluentiallyplaced,heldextremeright-wingviewsanddevelopedanactiveinterventionistmood.

OnlyinafewcaseswasthisduetothetroopshavingfamiliesorrelationsinAlgeria,orhavingbeenstationedthereforalongperiod.(Massu'sparatroopers,however,werepartlyrecruitedfromAlgiersandhadbeenstationedthereforthreeyears;andtwoofthefourrebelgeneralsof1961,ZellerandJouhaud,hadfamilytieswithAlgeria.)Itwasdue,inchief,totwocauses.Thefirstwaswhathasbeencalledthe'emotionalgeography'oftheFrenchsoldier,thesecondtheconsequencesandimplicationsof'laguerreauxfoules',thenewkindofwarfareintroducedfromIndochina.

NorthAfricawaspeculiarlyattractivetotheFrenchsoldier.The

____________________

40 Bétancourt,op.cit.,pp.462,482-3.ChalbaudwasassassinatedintheopenstreetonNovember13,1950(itissaid,byamemberoftheUribanteGroup)andthesuccessionwenttoJiménez.

41 Seebelowfortheseincidents,pp.95-8.

-45-

memoryofLyautey,thevirtualcreatorofMorocco,pervadedit.AlsoitwastherethattheliberationofFrancehadbegun.Inadditionitwasaparticularly'goodbillet'--livingwascheapandattractive.And,finally,thearmyhaddevelopedclosecontactswiththeMuslimpopulation;indeed,withsomeexceptionslikeMassu'sparatroopers,itwaspro-Muslimandratheranti-colon.

Secondly,however,theseattachmentstotheMuslimshadbeenfosteredbythe'new'warfare.TheexperiencesoftheIndochinawarturnedmilitarythinkingtoexploringthemethodsandtheoriesofMao-Tse-Tung.Towinthe'revolutionarywar'itwasnecessarytoseizecontrolofthepopularmind,tomarshalandthenpermeatethemasseswithamyth,anidea.Thesetheoreticalnotionsreinforcedtheanswerstoapurelypracticalproblem--howtoretaincontactandderiveinformationandsupportfromthesparseAlgerianpopulationwhowouldotherwiseharbourandsuccourtherebels,outoffearifnotoutofsympathy.Thusfrom1956thearmybranchedoutintobeingbothanadministrativeagencyandapropagandafactory.Inthebled,theS.A.S.unitsweresetuptoadministerandcarefortheMuslimpopulationandtowinthemover.Meanwhilefromthe'XièmeMilitaryRegion'thereissuednewspapers,schoolsforcadres,teamsofsocialworkers,youthclubs,women'sclubs,sothatinsomeregionsthearmyheldinfactalmostamonopolyofpublicauthority.Nowthisefforttowinthemindsofawholepopulationinacountryatwarcouldnotbeneutral.TheoperationhadtobebasedonsomesocialandpoliticalphilosophyandindefaultofdirectionsfromParisthearmybegantoevolveitsown.Itwasnecessarilyaflexibleonebuttwoofitsprincipleswereclear.Onewasthat,comewhatmay,'LaFrancerestera'.ThefriendsoftodaywerenotgoingtobeabandonedfortheF.L.N.tomassacretomorrow.Theslightesthintthatthearmymightleave,andtheMuslimmasseswouldfallawayimmediatelytomendtheirfenceswiththeF.L.N.Thesecondwastheprovisionofsomecounter-faithtotheindependencecryoftheF.L.N.;andthiscouldbelittleelsethantheencouragementofthecivic,politicalandsocialadvanceoftheMuslims,thepromisethat'youshallbelikeus'.Thesetwoprinciples,thepermanenceoftheFrenchpresenceandtheequalityofMuslimsandFrenchmen,couldbe,astheywere,subsumedunderthesloganofAlgérieFrançaise--thoughthismeantsomethingdifferenttothecolons.

ThisrapidlyfosteredattachmenttoAlgeriaandtheimperatives

-46-

ofthepsychologicalwarthatwasbeingattempted,createdintheleadingcadresoftheFrencharmythedeterminationthatAlgeriamustonnoaccountbelosttoFrance;fromthisthedeterminationtoresistanyParispoliticianswhodecidedtothecontrary;andfromthistheactsofinsubordinationwhichculminatedinthedébâcleofthe'FourGenerals'inApril1961.

(c)Thecorporateself-interestofthearmedforces.Themilitaryisjealousofitscorporatestatusandprivileges.Anxietytopreserveitsautonomyprovidesoneofthemostwidespreadandpowerfulofthemotivesforintervention.Initsdefensiveformitcanleadtosomethingakintomilitarysyndicalism--aninsistencethatthemilitaryandonlythemilitaryareentitledtodetermineonsuchmattersasrecruitment,training,numbersandequipment.Initsmoreaggressiveformitcanleadtothemilitarydemandtobetheultimatejudgeonallothermattersaffectingthearmedforces.Asthesecertainlyincludeforeignpolicy,andinvariablyincludedomesticeconomicpolicyandmaywellincludeallthefactorsmakingformorale,i.e.educationandthemassmediaofcommunication,suchclaimsareboundtobringthemilitaryintoconflictwiththeciviliangovernmentwhichtraditionallyoccupiesitselfwithsuchmatters.

Wehavealreadypointedoutthatsuchclaimsastheseareanoutcomeofprofessionalism.Aspecialbodyofpersons,themilitary,arefunctionallyspecialized:designated,indoctrinatedandtrainedtoperformaspecialtask,quitedifferentfromthatoftherestofthecommunity.Themorespecializedtheyarethemoreanxioustotakethestepsthatwillsafeguardandguaranteetheirsuccess.

TheGermanarmy,bothintheImperialera(1871-1918)andunderbothWeimarandHitler,waspowerfully,indeedpredominantly,drivenbythiscorporateinterest.Nationalism,arrogance,classbias,individualcareerismallplayedtheirpartsindeterminingitsattitude;butmostofwhatpassesforagratuitousitchforpoliticalpowerwasduetoitsdeterminationtosafeguard,towinback,evenpartlyextenditsautonomouspositioninpoliticsandsociety.Certainlytherecordlooksextraordinary:intheperiod1871-1914,twoWarMinisters(KamekeandSchellendorff),aMinisterofForeignAffairs(VonBieberstein),aMinisteroftheInterior(Boetticher)andtwoChancellors(GeneralCapriviandPrinceHohenlöhe)weremadetoresignbydirectorindirectmilitarypressure.Yetinsoactingthemilitarywereallthetimeseekingtodefendtheirautonomy.

-47-

FortheImperialConstitutionof1871wasnotunambiguousonthelocationofresponsibilityforthearmy.Therewas,indeed,aMinisterofWar,andtheoppositionintheReichstagprofessedtobelievethatthismeantthatthearmy,throughhim,wasresponsibletotheReichstag(asimilarviewoverasimilarambiguityhadledtothecelebratedcrisisinthePrussianDietin1862).ButtheWarMinister,liketheotherMinisters,wasnotconstitutionallyresponsibletotheReichstaginanycase;hewasresponsibletotheEmperor,andtheEmperorwithhis'militarycabinet'wastheheadofthearmedforces,theKriegsheer.Themilitary(andtheright-wingparties)thereforearguedthatthearmywasautonomousoftheReichstag,workinginparallelwithitdirectlytotheEmperor.ThemilitarypressuresoftheImperialperiodwerechieflydevotedtomakingthistrueinfact.

Thefirstconflictarosein1874overthesizeofthearmy.Since1867,ithadbeenprovisionallyfixedat1percentofthepopulation.In1874,thearmysoughttoperpetuatethisarrangement,inwhichcasetheReichstagwouldhavehadnocontroloverthesize,or,forthemostpart,ofthecostofthearmy.Itrefusedtoagree,andthecompromiseLawoftheSeptennate(fixingarmystrengthforsevenyearsatatime)wasthebestthearmycouldachieve.FromthatpointthereforeitsfixedendeavourwastotransferpowersfromtheWarMinister(whohadtoanswertotheReichstag)topurelymilitarybodies,e.g.theGeneralStaffortheEmperor's'militarycabinet'.Inthis,Albedyll,Chiefofthe'militarycabinet',andWaldersee,QuartermasterGeneralandlaterChiefoftheGeneralStaff,workedtogether.In1883theypersuadedtheEmperortodismisshisWarMinister,Kameke;andthen,forthepriceoftheirsupport,gothissuccessorSchellendorfftotransferthecontrolofwarpersonneltotheEmperor's'militarycabinet'.TheyalsomadehimgranttheChiefoftheGeneralStafftherightofpersonalaccesstotheEmperorwithouttheMinister'sbeingpresent.FromthistimeforwardtheEmperor's'militarycabinet'becameafocusofintrigue.AtfirstitwelcomedGeneralCaprivi'sChancellorship(1890);butCaprivicarriedtheArmyBillof1894intheReichstagwiththegreatestdifficultyandonlyafternewelections,andevensohadhadtomakecompromises.Hahnke,ChiefoftheEmperor's'militarycabinet',andtherestofthecamarillawerethereforeunsatisfied,sothatin1894WilliamIIreplacedCaprivibyPrinceHohenlöhe.Thecivilmilitaryquarrelthenrecommenced,thistimeoverthequestionofmilitarycourts.Themilitarycodewasbeingconsolidatedandrevised,

-48-

andinthecourseofthisitwasproposedthat,conformablytowhathappenedinothercountries,trialsforcertainkindsofoffencesshouldbepublic.Eggedonbyhis'militarycabinet',WilliamIIrefusedtocontemplatethis.VonSchellendorff,theWarMinister,wasdismissed,andGeneralGossler(the'Emperor'sGeneral')putinhisplace.TheparliamentaryleftandcentreseethedwithvexationbutthismerelypersuadedWilliamIIthathispolicywascorrect,andthatthedifficultieswereduetothefeeblenessofhisministers.AccordinglyhedismissedVonBiebersteinandBoetticher,MinistersforForeignAffairsandtheInteriorrespectively,andin1900gratefullyacceptedHohenlöhe'sownresignation.Yet--anditisimportant,inordertomaintainperspective--forallthisbother,WilliamIIsignedthenewcodeafterall.ItshouldbenoticedthattheReichstaghadnotcompletelylostcontrolofthemilitarybudgetandhadbeenabletoforcethearmytocompromisebothin1874and1894;andthatWaldersee'sattempttocreatehisownforeignintelligencenetwork,throughthemilitaryattachés,hadbeendecisivelyrebuffedbyBismarckandCaprivi.

Thewarperiod(1916-18)admittedlyshowsthepowersoftheGeneralStaffattheirheight.Thiswastheperiodoftheso-called'silentdictatorship'ofLudendorffandHindenburg.Inthisperiodthemilitarypressedtothelimittheirviewthattheirtaskentitledthemtodecideondomesticandforeignpolicy;andsuchwastheprestigeofthesetwogeneralsamongthepoliticiansandpublicopinionthatathreatofresignationsufficedtoletthemgettheirway.TheGeneralStaff,therefore,concerneditselfwithpress,filmsandgeneralpropaganda;itestablishedcompletecontrolovertheeconomy;andinthefieldofforeignpolicyitwasthebodyresponsibleforthefataldecisionstocreateanindependentkingdomofPolandandtointroduceunrestrictedsubmarinewarfare,over-ridingtheoppositionoftheForeignOffice,andsecuring(onthreatofresignation)thedismissaloftheChancellor,Bethmann-Hollweg.Itcanfairlybeargued,however,thatwar-timeisexceptionalandthat,insuchcircumstances,themilitary'sclaimtocreatetheconditionsforitsownsuccessismoreplausibleandlikelytobeaccededtowithmuchlessreluctance.Moreover,theLudendorff-Hindenburgpolicywasnotsomuchanaggressionagainstthecivilianauthoritiesasanabdicationbythelattertothetechnicalclaimsofthemilitary,nowgrosslyexpandedbytheexigenciesoftotalwar.

Intheinter-warperiod(1918-38)thearmysoughtfirmlyand

-49-

single-mindedlytorestoreitspre-warpositioninpoliticsandsociety.ButthisbroughtitintocollisionwiththeRepublic,forintheshorttermitentailedre-armament(forbiddenbytheVersaillesTreaty)andinthelongertermtherestorationofauthoritariangovernmentandthecreationofawar-mindednation,readyandabletoprovideconscriptsforthenewWehrmachtandwillingworkersinthearmamentfactories.EventheintriguesofSchleicherbetween1928and1932,howevermuchheenjoyedthemfortheirownsake,hadtheseobjectivesinview.Hispredecessor,Seeckt,however,hadreasonedthattheywerebestachievedbystandingalooffromthepartystruggleratherthanbydabblinginitlikeSchleicher.'Ihaveneverhadnorsoughtinfluenceoneconomicmatters,'hewrotein1923,'noronthequestionoftheRuhrexceptwithregardtothosedetailsdirectlyaffectingthemilitary.WhetherIagreedwiththepolicyoftheReichisimmaterialasIdonotconsidermyselfcalledupontogivemyattitudepublicexpression.'Yethewasfuriouswhenthegovernmentinterferedwithmatterswhichhedidthinklaywithinthelimitsofmilitaryautonomy:when,forinstance,thegovernmentmadehimrevokethemeasureshehadtakenagainsttheinsubordinateBavarianmilitaryinOctober1923,orwhenitappointedciviliancommissionerstoinvestigatehowfartheReichswehrhadparticipatedintheKappputsch.42

Thearmy'sdickeringandsubsequentcollaborationwiththeNazisisalsoattributabletothesamepersistentmotive--thereturntotheoldImperialstatus,sizeandsituation.IntheNazisSchleichersawagreatcivilianfollowingwhich,withmassiveover-confidence,hethoughthecouldharnesstoservethearmy'saim.TheresultofhisbunglingintrigueswastobringtheNazistopower(andtopreparethewayforhisownsubsequentmurder).YettheNazigovernmentwasstillsoinsecurethatithadtosharepowerwiththearmy,andwithvonBlombergthearmyrevertedtoitsconsistentpattern--apowerfulandpricklyautonomyvis-à-visthecivilpower.Blombergwaspreparedtoco-operatewiththeNazisbecausehethoughtthemcapableofidentifyingpeopleandarmy,andofevokingsuchnationalismastomakeconscriptionandre-armamentpossible.Amongthefirstfruitsoftherelationshipwerethere-armamentofGermanyandtheabolitionofcivilcourts'jurisdictionoverthemilitary--thusreturningtotheImperialsituationintwomajormatters.Thearmytookbutwouldnotgive.Itrefusedtoacceptthe

____________________42 H.J.Gordon,TheReichswehrandtheGermanRepublic,pp.275-8.

-50-

tooradicalvonReichenauasCommander-in-ChiefandinsistedonvonFritsch.ItinsistedontheeliminationoftheS.A.asaparamilitaryforceandsodroveHitlertothemurderofRoehmandhisradicalsinthe'nightofthelongknives'.Itresistedpartyinterference,andGestaposurveillanceoveritsownmembers.ThearmywassuccessfulandcouldalmostpersuadeitselfthatshortoftheEmperoritwasbackto1914,when,withsuddennessandfinality,theendcame.In1938,HitlerdismissedBlombergandFritschandeffectivelymadehimselftheheadofthearmedforces.Theautonomyofthearmy,theobjectofhalf-a-centuryofmilitaryresistancetothecivilpower,wasover;andthecivilpowerwashenceforthsupreme.

ThisGermanexampleillustratesthecaseofanarmychieflyintentonsecuringor(after1918)regainingitsautonomy.Exceptforthespecialcircumstancesof1916-18,itmovedbutfitfullybeyondthisintotherealmofforeignaffairsanddomesticpolicy.Weought,therefore,parentheticallytonotethecaseoftheJapanesearmedforcesintheinter-warperiod:parenthetically,wesay,becausetheJapanesearmedforcesdonotproperlyfithere,andweshallbedealingwiththemmorefullylater.43ButtheJapanesearmedforcesillustratethecaseofthemilitaryenjoyingasecureautonomy,butusingthistopressforwardintothecivilianspheretodominateforeignpolicy,economicpolicyandeveneducation.Thispressurewasnotmotivatedbyadesiretodefenditsauthority--thiswassecureenough--buttodominatethecivilauthorities.Itisworthyofnote,however,thatitdidnotembarkonitscampaignuntilanincidentoccurredwhichitchosetointerpretascivilianinterferencewithitssisterservice,thenavy.ThiswastheratificationofthenavalTreatyofLondon,1930.TheTreatywasacceptedandsponsoredbythecivilianPrimeMinisterHamaguchiwhowasnotonlyPrimeMinisterbutwastemporarilyheadingtheMinistryoftheNavyaswell.(Itschief,aserviceman,wasattheLondonConference.)NowthenavaldelegationattheConferencewasdividedinviewsontheTreaty;alsoAdmiralKato,ChiefoftheNavalGeneralStaff,stronglyopposedit.TheservicesandthenationalistsocietiesarguedthatthecivilianPrimeMinisterandcabinethadnorighttosupportatreatyandpressforitsacceptance,thesupremecommandbeingconstitutionallyresponsibletotheEmperoralone.Nevertheless,aftermuchdeliberationanddelaythePrivyCouncilratifiedthe

____________________43 InChapterSeven.

-51-

Treaty.Thereuponthearmybegantofearthatittoowouldbeover-riddenbythecivilians,themoresobecausetheyhadalreadybeenmadetoacceptreductionsinthemilitarybudgetandthesizeofthearmyinthe'twenties,aswellastheconciliatoryChinapolicyofShidehara.Fromthispointon,therefore,thearmybegantoinvadethesphereofthecivilbranchuntil,by1939,iteffectivelycontrollednationalpolicy.

Corporateself-interesthasalsoplayedaprominentpartinthemotivationoftheSpanisharmysince,atthelatest,1890.Here,however,arrogance,classinterestandregionalinterestwereallpowerfulmotives,too.IntheearlieryearsofthenineteenthcenturytheSpanisharmyhadbeeninvolvedin--andtornbetween--thecontendingfactionsofLiberalismandtheChurch.BytheRestorationof1874,thesetwoforceshadreachedsomekindofaccommodation,andtherégimeofthelandedoligarchybegan.Itspoliticalsystemwasunderpinnedbythearmy,whichwasnotafightingmachinebut,asSalvadordeMadariagaputsit,asupinebureaucracybent'onthepreservationofpowerandontheadministrationandenjoymentofadisproportionateamountofthebudget'.44In'thesystem',themonarch(asinIraq,1936-58,towhichSpainofthisperiodoffersastrikingparallel)coulddisposeofcabinetsashewilled.Parliamentarismwasafaçade.Theelectionswere'made'bythepartyinpower,evendowntoitsarrangingfortheelectionofthemembersoftheopposition.Giventheweaknessoftheparties,AlphonsoXIIIwasabletomakeandbreakcabinetsathispleasure.Fromhismajorityin1902hethereforeclaimedandexercisedtherighttocommunicatewithhiscommandersdirectlyovertheheadsofhiscabinet,andheheldaudiencesmilitares.InthiswaytheKingineffectreproducedadualitybetweenciviliansandarmy,eachresponsibletohimbutinparallel,asitwere,andsimilartothatofGermanyandJapan.Asaresultthearmyfounditselfbothstrongervis-à-visthecabinet,andalsomorelikelytocollidewithit.

Oneortwoincidentsillustratehowthemilitary,inpursuanceofitscorporateautonomy,interferedwiththeciviliangovernment.ThefirstisthepassageofthenotoriousLawofJurisdictions,1905.ABarcelonanewspaper,Cut-Cut,publishedacartoon.Theofficersofthegarrisonfounditoffensiveandwreckeditsoffices.ForthistheyreceivedcongratulationsfromthecommandersoftheMadridandSevillegarrisons.Thecabinetretaliatedbyremovingthe

____________________44 SalvadordeMadariaga,Spain(2ndEdition),p.136.

-52-

Captains-Generalofallthreegarrisons.TheMinisterofWar,thesanguinaryGeneralWeyler,protested,andamilitarycoupseemedsoimminentthatthedeputiesattendedtheCortesinarms.Thearmynowinsistedthatallattacksonthearmyandthenationshouldbetriedbycourtmartial.SincetheKingagreed,hisPrimeMinisterresigned.InthenewcabinettheMinisterofJusticetriedtocompromise;heproposedtostiffenthepenaltiesfordefamersofthearmy,butinsistedontheirtrialbytheordinarycourts.Atthis,hiscabinetcolleague,theMinisterofWar,simplytoldtheSenate:'Ireservemyopiniontill[theBill]hascometothecabinet.ThenIwillsaywhetherthearmyissatisfiedornot.'1AtthistheMinisterofJusticeresigned.HismoretimidsuccessorintroducedaBillbywhich,althoughdefamationofflagandcountryweretriableintheordinarycourts,defamationofthearmywastobetriedbycourtsmartial,i.e.bythearmyitself.

AsecondinstanceoftheSpanisharmy'scorporateself-interestwastheoddspectacle,in1917,oftheJuntasdedefensa.ReactingagainstAlfonso'sfavouritisminawardsandpromotionsandagainstthegeneraldecrepitudeofthearmy,theofficerssetuptradeunioncommitteestoprotecttheirprivilegesandbettertheirconditions.Thesejuntasdemandedbetterpay,moderationinrewards,justiceinpromotionsandrespectforseniority.Theydemandedalsothatthemedicalcorpsandthecommissariatshouldbereorganized;and,finally,theydesirednottobeusedtoquellcivildisturbances.45

ThegreatDreyfuscrisisinFrancewas,essentially,anissueofthearmy'sautonomy.Atthatperiod,asfromthetimeoftheSecondEmpireonwards,thearmy'sviewpointwasamystiqueoforder,sympathyforauthoritarianismandaviolenthatredofparliamentaryinstitutions.NearlyallitssuperiorofficershadbeenbroughtupundertheEmpire.AlsotheofficercorpshadbecomeincreasinglyCatholic.In1847only2cadetsoutofatotalof306promotionshadcomefromthereligiousschools,butin1886,140outof410didso.Thesocialandpoliticaleffectwasevenmoremarkedthanthereligious,becausetheproductsoftheseschoolsformedanetworkofschoolandfamilyrelationships.ThesewerethesonsoftheoldfamiliesofFrance,whoenteredthearmybecausetheagriculturaldepressionhadmadeithardforthemtoliveofftheirestates,andalsobecausetherepublicansbarredthemfromthehighpositionsof

____________________1 Myitalics.45 Forthesubsequenthistoryofthejuntas,seepp.152-3.

-53-

state.Also,notafewoftheoldfamiliessawinthemanipulationofthearmytheirsoleavenuetoregainingpower.

Yetdespitetheofficercorps'hostilitytotheRepublicandtoparliamentarism,itretaineditscultofdisciplineandlegality.Itshatredofdemocracywasasentiment,notaprogramme.TheofficersdidnotconspireagainsttheRepublic.Muchmoreimportantthanthearmy'santi-Republicanismwasitsdesireforisolation,forselfgoverningautonomyinsideitssphere.Itdesiredtobeaprivilegedorderdistinctfromtherestofsociety--nottakingtheplaceoftheotherinstitutionsofgovernment,buttakingitsownproudplaceamongthem.Itdidnotmatterifanofficerwereindifferentaboutpolitics,butitdidmatterifhemingledtoofreelywithcivilians.Conversely,theofficerwhoheldstrongandanti-Republicanconvictionsfeltthathisuniformprotectedorcuthimofffromthesocietyofwhichhewasapart.

And,indeed,bytheendofthecenturythecivilauthoritieshadlittlegripofthearmy.ItspromotionsweregovernedbyitsownClassificationCommitteesofgenerals(inwhichtheCatholic'oldboynetwork'playedaninfluentialpart)andwasoutsidecabinetcontrol.MostMinistersofWarweregeneralsselectedfromtheactivelist,andthosewhowerenottended(asundertheWeimarRepublicinGermanyalso)toactasthearmy'sspokesmen.

TheDreyfuscase,initsjudicialandfirstphase,hardlyaffectedmilitaryopinion.46Itwaswhenthecivilianauthoritiesbegantoquestiontheauthenticityofthemilitaryverdictthatthearmybecameexcited.Thiswasacivilianinterferencewiththeirpreciousautonomy;andtheirviewwas,basically,thatwhetherDreyfushadbeeninnocentorguiltywasunimportant--theimportantthingwasthatthearmyhaddecidedtheissue,andtheciviliansshouldkeepoutofit.Astheaffairebuiltup,ofcourse,allkindsofdifferentargumentsandemotionswereintroduced--anti-semitism,antiRepublicanism,theimportanceofnotweakeningthearmy'smorale,theimportanceofnotweakeningthenation'sconfidenceinitsarmy;butthebasicconflictarosefromtheinterference(legitimateand

____________________

46

Cf.G.Chapman,TheDreyfusCase,p.200.'Asatthebeginningof1898,'hewrites,'allthesoldiersdesiredwastobemastersintheirownhousewithoutinterferencefromthepoliticians,towhiptheirowndogs,andforthattheywerereadytogotolengthsbutnottoextremes,nottorevolt.Asisolatedasmonksfromthemaincurrentsofciviliansociety,thegeneralsdidnotknowenoughtodeclinethehelpofpoliticalcharlatanswhohopedtousethemfortheirownpurposes.'

-54-

belated)ofthecivilianswiththisproudandhostileautonomouscorporation.WiththetriumphoftheDreyfusardsintheWaldeckRousseauCabinet(1899)thatautonomywasdestroyed.TheClassificationCommitteeswereabolishedandtheirfunctionstransferredtotheMinistry.Theregulationdowryof1,200francsforanofficer'swifewassuppressedandone-tenthoftheSecond-Lieutenancieswerereservedfor'adjutants'withouttheirhavingtopassthroughamilitarycollegefirst.Later,theSt.Cyrienshadtodooneyearintheranksbeforeproceedingtocollege.In1906,civiliansupremacywassymbolizedbygrantingSub-PrefectsprecedenceoverColonels,andPrefectsprecedenceoverGenerals.

Themotiveofcorporateself-intereststandsoutboldlyinthosesituationswherethegovernmentisthoughttobecontemplatingtheestablishmentofsomeformofmilitia.Theprofessionalsreactsharplytothejointthreattotheirprideandtheircareers.LatinAmericafurnishesmanyexamples,largelybecauseciviliangovernmentshavebeensoharassedbythemilitarytherethattheyhavedespairinglyturnedtoarmedmilitiasasameansofshakingoffthemilitaryblackmail.WhenGeneralOdríaseizedpowerinPeruin1948,hechargedtheex-PresidentBustamente,amongotherthings,withdeliberatelytryingtoweakenthepowerandprestigeofthearmedforces,reducetheirnumbersanddisunitethem.The1948VenezuelancoupofColonelChalbaudandMajorJiménezwhichfollowedafewdayslatermadeasimilarchargeagainsttheAccionDemocraticagovernment.AtapressconferenceChalbauddeclaredthatAccionDemocraticahadtriedtointroduce'anarmedmilitiainordertoimposeontheVenezuelans,byviolence,astateofaffairsinspiredintheinterestsoffaction'--achargewhich,incidentally.RomuloBétancourthasstrenuouslydenied.47TheGuatemalanarmy'sdisinclinationtodefendtheArbenzgovernmentin1954waspartlyduetoasimilarsuspicion.InJune1954,therearrivedinGuatemalathenotoriousshiploadofarmsfromPoland(theincidentthatsparkedofftheUnitedStatesprotest,thearmedincursionofCastilloArmas,andthefalloftherégime).Thepurposeofthesearmswasunknowntothepeoplebutrumourhadit,andthesoldierssuspected,thatPresidentArbenzintendeditforaworkers'militia.Thearmyofficersseemtohavelookedonthiswithhostilitybecauseitwascommunistinspired,withindignationbecauseitseemedasifoneoftheirownmen--ColonelArbenz,thePresident--wasbetrayingthem,and

____________________47 Bétancourt,op.cit.,p.473.

-55-

withactualfearbecausetheybelievedthecommunistswereouttogetridofthemphysically.WhenCastilloArmas'srebelcolumninvadedGuatemalaonJune18,thecommunistsstrovetoorganizeapara-militaryforceamongthelabourunionsandestablishedcommitteesofdefencetomakecontactwiththeregulararmy.Thearmyrefusedtogivethismilitiaanyweapons.ArbenzorderedDiaz,hisChiefofStaff,todoso.ThenextdayDiazreportedtohimthattheofficerswouldnotpermithimtodoso,andthenextdaytheofficerswentfurther.TheydemandedArbenz'sresignation48--andsoonreceivedit.

(d)Themotiveofindividualself-interest.Theseismiczonesofmilitaryintervention,theareaswhereitisorhasbeenendemic,tendbyandlargetoberegionswheresocialstratificationismarked,andwhere,byconsequence,thearmyprovidesoneofthefewavenuesforsocialadvancement.ItissoinmostoftheLatinAmericanstates,intheMiddleEast,andincontemporarySouth-eastAsia,andwassoinpre-warEasternEurope.Inmostofthecountriesofthesefourregionsthearmyprovidedameansbywhichboysoflowermiddleclassfamily,orevenpoorfamily,couldrisetoofficerrank.Nowthereisnoreasonwhythesocialaspirant,havingcomesofar,shouldnotwishtoclimbhigherandtogatecrashintothecirclesreservedforthesocialsetitself--i.e.thecirclesofgovernment.Totheextentthatthisistrueofanyparticularstate,itsuggestsself-interestasatleastoneofthemotivesforintervention.

Itisalsonoticeablethatinmanyifnotmostofthecountrieswhichhaveundergoneamilitarycoup,themilitarybudgetandtherewardsandconditionsofthemilitaryaresharplyincreased.ThemilitaryreceiveakindofdonativeakintothatoftheRomanPraetorianGuard.Perhaps,therefore,theirmotivesareinfluencedbythehopeofsuchareward,aswerethePraetorians?

Examinationofindividualcasesshowsindeedthatthisisoftenso,andthatapowerfulmotiveinmilitaryinterventionmaybethematerialinterestoftheindividualofficers.InVenezuela,inSyria,inGreece,inSpain,evenintheGermanReichswehronefindsampleevidenceandthislistcouldbewidelyextended.

InSyria,forinstance,after1946,thearmedforceswerehighlypoliticized--especiallyoverissuesofforeignpolicy--veryselfconscious,andalsohighlyself-interested.TheZaimcoupofMarch1949waspartlysparkedoffbymockeryofthearmyafteritsdébâcle

____________________48 R.M.Schneider,CommunisminGuatemala,1944-45,p.312.

-56-

inPalestine,butalsobytherumourthatPresidentelAzmintendedtocutmilitaryexpenditure.TheShukayrcoupof1954whichbroughtdownthedictatorshipofGeneralShishakliwaspartlyduetohiscolleagues'pureenvyofShishakli'snewfoundeminence,butalsotoresentmentandfearoverhispurgeoftheofficercorps.

Thearmygroup--the'PatrioticMilitaryUnion'--whichrevoltedinVenezuelain1945andbroughttheAccionDemocraticatopowerwereinfluencedbythestagnationofthearmyinwhichtheyfoundthemselves;they'paintedapictureofanarmy',writesBétancourt,'wherenoteventhesuperficialmodificationsintroducedintotheciviladministrationin1936hadbeenrealized,wherethearbitrarymethodsofthedaysofGomezfortheconductofthearmedforcesandtheselectionofcommandersandofficersstillcontinuedaliveandactive.'49SimilarmotiveswereandarecurrentthroughoutLatinAmerica.Thearmiestherehavenorealfightingmissiontoperform;theofficersandmenareunder-employed;thelifeismadeupofroutinepeacetimemanœuvres.Revolutionsmeanopportunitiesforpromotionandnewandimportantjobs.50

Theusualformthatthematerialself-interesttakesissimplyambitiontoplayapart,ordesireforbetterpayandeasierpromotion.AndtheclassicexampleisthearmyofSpain.Thisarmywasgrossly,almostunbelievablyover-officered;in1912,inpeacetime,therewereover12,000officersfor100,000men;in1931therewere21,000officers(asmanyasintheGermanarmyof1939)forsome200,000men.Andofthem,690weregenerals.Thisarmywasalsoveryexpensive,takingaboutonequarterofthebudget.Itwasneverthelessgrosslyill-equipped,sincethebulkofitsbudgetwentonofficers'pay,andyetthiswasnotatallhighbecausetheyweresonumerous.Theofficersdidnotcomefromwealthyaristocraticfamiliesbutfrommiddle-classhouseholdsandtheyhadnoprivatesourcesofincome.Asasinglemantheyoungofficercouldcutadash,oncemarriedhefoundthingsdifficult,andwithafamilyhefoundthemunmanageable.Hetookother,part-timejobs,hetookbribes,inordertomakeendsmeet.Butpromotionwasslow.The

____________________49 Bétancourt,op.cit.,p.160.

50

Cf.Lieuwen,op.cit.,p.127'Manyofficersinthelowerrankswhotalkedofsocialreformreallywantedincreasedpayandmorerapidpromotion.'Forquiteadifferentview,seeT.Wyckoff,"'TheRoleoftheMilitaryinContemporaryLatinAmericanPolitics'"(WesternPoliticalQuarterly,Vol.13,No.3).

-57-

armydidnotevenoffertheconsolationofseriouswork,orofactiveservice,onlyclerking,drill,garrisonduty;evenmanœuvreswererare,sincemoneywasshort.'Thecaptainbegins',writesBrenaninhisbrilliantimaginaryportraitoftheSpanishofficer,'tothinkofallthenicejobsandofalltheprestigethatcomesinSpainfromgovernment.Nowonderthatheisonlywaitingforoneofthosesixhundredgeneralstogivethewordtorise.'51

Itwouldbewrongtoconcludewithoutgivinganexampletoshowthatthisdesireforpromotionandbettermentismetwithinthemilitaryofadvancedindustrialsocietiesaswellasintherelativelyunderdevelopedstatesfromwhichtheillustrationshavebeendrawnsofar.TheUlmtrialof1930showsthatthesamesortofrestlessnessthatoccurredintheSpanisharmywasalsopresentintheReichswehr.In1930,twojuniorofficerswerefoundtobeNazisandengagedinspreadingNazipropagandainthearmy.Suchactivitieswerestrictlyforbiddenbythemilitarycode,andinanycaseGeneralGröner,theWarMinister,whowasstillineffectivecontroloftheofficercorps,wasbitterlyopposedtotheNazis.TheofficerswerebroughttotrialatUlm;andfromhiscelloneoftheaccused,Scheringer,wroteandpublishedthisexplanationofhismotives:

'TheactualpurposeoftheReichswehrasacitadelofthemilitaryidea,andthebasicnucleusforthefuturewarofindependence,pales.Theneedforearningbreadbecomesallimportant.Soldiersturnintoofficials,officersbecomecandidatesforpensions.Whatremainsisapolicetroop.Peopleknownothingofthetragedyofthefourwords:"Twelveyearsassubalterns"....Lettheoldmenbesilent.'52

Hitler'spublicstatementatthetrial,'Weshallcreateforyouagreatarmy,muchgreaterthanyouyourselvesimaginetoday',hadaprofoundeffectontheattitudeofthejuniorofficers.

4.Themixedmotivesofthemilitary

Sucharetheprincipalmotivesonwhichthemilitarytendtoact.Theyactfromamixtureofthemthatvariesfromcasetocase.TheReichswehr'smotiveswereverymixed.Itwantedtohavenothing

____________________

51G.Brenan,TheSpanishLabyrinth,p.62.Thetreatmentaboveisbasedonthisbrilliantwork.CompareasplendidpassageinA.R.Vilaplana,BurgosJustice,pp.204-11.Itamplifiesthepointmadeinthetext.Unfortunately,itismuchtoolengthytoquote.

52 Quoted,Wheeler-Bennett,op.cit.,p.216.

-58-

todowithpoliticianspartlybecauseitdislikedthem,butmoreimportantlybecauseitfearedthattheintroductionofpoliticsintothearmywouldleadtoitsdestructionasaninstitution;and(itsmorefar-sightedleaderslikeVonSeecktandGrönerwouldhaveadded)tothedestructionofitsinfluencesincetheReichswehrwasatitsstrongestwhenneutral,upforauctiontoallsides.OntheotherhandtheromanticnostalgiaforitsheydayundertheEmpire,itsdesiretorecaptureitslostsocialstatusandtowinbackacompleteautonomy,itsdesiretootorealizetheoldTreitschkeianidealof'peacewithinandpowerwithout',allembittereditagainsttheRepublic;anditsclasscompositionledittomortalhatredoftheSocialDemocrats.ItfeltthatitcouldneverattainitsidealwithoutfirstdestroyingtheRepublic,andindeed,evenifithadbeenpersuadedthatthiswasunnecessary,itwouldhavewishedtodestroyitnevertheless.Thesefeelingswerewidespreadamongtheseniorofficers.TheiraristocraticbackgroundmadethemdisdainfuloftheNazis,butintheendtheyfeltthattheycouldclimbbacktopowerontheirbacks.AndwhiletheseniorofficerscamehesitantlytotoleratedealingswithHitler,thejuniorofficerscameincreasinglytoseeinhimtheopportunityfortheirownprofessionaladvancement.

TheEgyptianarmyof1952affordssharpcontrasts.Ithadneverbeenesteemed.Ithadfoughtbutonce,andignominiously.Itsofficerswereofhumblesocialorigin.By1952,the'FreeOfficers'whomadethecoupwererabidwithnationalism,furiouswithwhattheydeemedtobecorruptionandnepotisminthematterofcommandsandequipment,seethingwithpoliticalandclassresentmentattheeffendiswholordeditoverthemandovertheirfamiliesinthevillages.TheEgyptianarmyofficerswereinfactright-wingradicals,quitedissimilarfromthecaste-riddenReichswehrandindeedwithmotivationsmuchmoreakintotheNazistorm-trooperswhomtheGermanofficercorpsdespised.

IntheJapanesearmyinthe1930sthekeymotiveswerenationalism,classfeelingandcorporatepride.Thearmyparticularlywassaturatedwiththesamuraitraditionofbushidoandferociouslyresistedanysignthatthedespisedcivilianswereabouttocurtailtheirprivileges.Itwasthemorehostiletothesedespisedciviliansbecausetheyweretherepresentativesofthecapitalists,whomtheyhatedforthehardshipsandservitudesofthefarmingpeopleandsmalltownsfolkfromwhichthejuniorofficerssprang.Andtheywerefiercelynationalistic,believinginasacredmissionofJapaninAsia.They

-59-

marriedthistotheirothermotivesbytheirprogrammeofconqueringliving-spaceandrawmaterialsontheAsianmainland.

TheSpanishemphasesweredifferent.Thiswasnofightingarmybutabureaucraticmachine.Itsnationalismturnedinwardsnotoutwards.ItdidnotyearnforexpansionorpowerabroadbutforunityandorderinwhatOrtegayGassettcalled'invertebrateSpain'.ItsidealwasofatimelessSpain,centralized,hierarchical,CastilianandCatholic.Theidealcouldindeedbepartlydefinedintermsofitshatreds--forsyndicalismandsocialism,forfreemasonryandforCatalanseparatismandeven--asitsForeignLegionputit--for'intelligence'itself.Thearmywasindeedcompletelyshutofffromtheciviliancurrentsofopinionthatsurgedaboutit.Yetitwasthetraditionalavenuetoacareerinahighlystratifiedsocietyandsoitattractedmediocritieswholongedforacareer;andwhenthisdidnotarrive,theycreatedit.Traditionallytoo--atleastsincetheRestorationof1874--itwasthepoliceforceoftherulingoligarchy.Thusitsnationalism,itsHispanidad,wasbrutallylacedwithclasshatredandwithindividualcareerism.

Somuchformotives;butformotivestobetranslatedintoaction,somethingmoreisrequired.Thissomethingismood--themoodthatnourishesthewill.

-60-

CHAPTERFIVETheDispositiontoIntervene(2)MoodMOODSaremoredifficulttodescribethanmotives.Psychologistshavenotyetestablishedarecognizedvocabularyforthem,letaloneastandardclassification,andtheysaythattheexperimentalmaterialonwhichtobasesuchaclassificationisstilllacking.Thesedifficultiesareaccentuatedinthecaseofthemilitarywhereevidenceofmoodisentirelylackinginallbutahandfulofcases.

Inallinstances,however,oneelementisalwayspresent-theconsciousnessofkind;themilitaryisawareofitsspecialandseparateidentitydistinguishingitfromciviliancorporations.Thisself-consciousness,aswehaveseen,isrootedinandderivesfromtheobjectivepeculiaritiesofthemilitarylife.

Inmanycasesallwecansayisthattoinducethemoodtointervene,onlytwoelementsneedbeaddedtothisself-awareness.Thefirstisasenseofoverwhelmingpower,theknowledgethat,inthepeculiarcircumstancesofthatmomentorthatparticularcountry,thereisnothingthatcanpreventthemhavingtheirownway.Thesecondissomekindofgrievance.Thesegrievancesorgrudgesmaybesomedifferenceofopiniononpoliticalissues-forinstance,thecoupsandcounter-coupsinSyriabetween1949and1962werepartlyduetodifferencesofopiniononSyrianforeignpolicy.Equally,thegrievancesmaybetheemotionalaspectsofsomeorotherofthemotiveswehavelisted-classresentment,regionalgrudges,ambitionorpurepredatorinessbeforeasupineandhelplesspublic.ItisdifficulttoresisttheconclusionthattheThailandexperience(8coups,7constitutionssince1932)ortheIraqicoupsof1936-41andthatof1958,1orthehistoryofmanyLatinAmericanstates,2or

____________________

1

Cf.'AYearofRepublicanIraq'(TheWorldToday,Vol.15,No.7,July1959),pp.286-98.'TheNuri-es-Saidsystemwouldintimefailfromlackofwill:meanwhilenationaldevelopmentswouldundermineitseconomicandsocialbasis.ItsoverthrowinJuly1958was,however,duetoanaccident:thefactthatforreasonsofinternalrivalry,theefficientsecuritysystemwasextendedtoolatetothearmy.Evensotheconclusionwasnotforegoneandwasaffectedbytheresourceandcourageofahandfulofconspirators,andnotablyColonelArifwhenconfrontedwiththeirresolutionofothers.'

2 Peru(till1956),Venezuela(till1958),Ecuador(till1948),Bolivia(till1952),ParaguayandElSalvadortothetimeofwriting.

-61-

therecentcoup(1961)inSouthKoreaarenottobeexplainedinthesesimpletermsalone.

Inanarrowrangeofcases,themilitary'sbehaviourseemsalmosttofollowthelinesofapsychologytext-bookon'Frustration.'Frustrated-nomatterhoworwhy-bytheirsocietyorbythegovernmentoftheday,themilitaryreactpredictably(1)bytheresponsesofangerandhumiliation;(2)by'projecting'theblameontheciviliansand'rationalizing'thisreaction;andfinally(3)by'compensating'forthefrustrationandhumiliationby'takingitout'ontheseunfortunateobjectsoftheircensure.Inthisnarrowrangeofcasesitseemspermissibletorecognizeasinglebasicmoodwhichsparksofftherevoltofthemilitaryandwhichmaybesummedupasamorbidlyacutefeelingofinjuredself-respect.Tobesure,differentarmedforceshavedifferent'flash-points',andsomewilltoleratewhatforothersisquiteinsupportable.Furthermore,thissenseofselfesteem,thissenseofwhatisowingtoone,variesfromenvironmenttoenvironment.Thematterbecomesclearerifthetwoelementsofthiscompoundmood,viz.self-esteemandhumiliation,areexaminedseparately.Theself-esteemmaybeasenseofself-importance,asinTurkey,or,say,oldSerbia,wherethearmyhadreallybuiltupthestate,oritmaybeaquitemorbidsentimentofsuperioritytothewholegenusofcivilians.Andthesenseofinjury,likewise,mayrangefromangeratbeingrejectedanddespisedbysocietyasinGermanyandJapan,orhumiliationatbeingdefeatedinbattleasinGreeceandSpainin1922.Oritmaytakeavicariousform;itmaybehumiliationatbeingidentifiedwitharégimewhichdragsthearmyintocontempt-Pakistan(1958)mayserveasanexample.Sincethismoodissocomplexthebestwaytoillustrateitisnottobreakitintocomponents(aswedidformotives)buttoexaminethetotalmoodofanumberofnationalforces.

-62-

(a)The'self-important'armedforces

Therearearmedforceswhichhaveagoodbutnotexcessiveopinionofthemselvesrelativetothegovernmentortociviliansingeneral.Insomecases,e.g.FranceorPakistan,itwouldbehardtosaythatthesentimentwentmuchbeyondaprofessionalprideinefficiency.Inothers,e.g.Turkey,orpre-warBulgaria,GreeceorYugoslavia,itwentbeyondthis,forthesestateswere,inaveryrealsense,theendowmentofthearmy.TheBalkancountrieshadarisenfromwaragainsttheTurkandweremaintainedbywaramongthemselves.TurkeywasthecreationofAtatürkandhistriumphantarmy.Thesearmieshaddifferent'flash-points'butallaregroupedtogetherherebecause,unlikethesecondgroupweshalldiscuss,theyregardedthemselvesratherastheequals,notthesuperiorsofthecivilianpopulation.

Pakistanservestoillustratethemoodofvicarioushumiliation.Thearmyfeltoutragedatbeingpartofarégimewhichcutsuchapitiablefigureinternationally.'Aperfectlysoundcountryhasbeenturnedintoalaughingstock',saidGeneralAyubKhan.'Politicianshavestartedafree-for-alltypeoffightinginwhichnoholdsarebarred....Therehasbeennolimittothedepthoftheirbaseness,chicanery,deceitanddegradation.'Thearmy,hesaid,had'keptseverelyalooffrompolitics.Youmaynotknow,butIrefusedonseveraloccasionsthelateGhuladMahommad'soffertotakeoverthecountry.IdidsointhebeliefthatIcouldservethecauseofPakistanbetterfromtheplacewhereIwasandalsohadafainthopethatsomepoliticianswouldrisetotheoccasionandleadthecountrytoabetterfuture.'3

ThechangeofdynastyinSerbiain1903vividlyillustratesthisconceptofavicarioushumiliation.Fromthefirstmomentsofitsindependence,SerbiahadbeendividedbetweentheprotagonistsoftheObrenovicandtheKarageorgevičdynasties.In1889,theyoungPrinceAlexanderObrenovičsucceededhisfatherMilan(whohadabdicated),andin1900hemarriedMadameDragaMashin.Thismarriagewaswildlyunpopular.NotonlydidQueenDragacomeofhumbleparentage,butherprivatelifewasextremelydubious.ThemarriageshockedtheverytouchynationalismoftheSerbs(onlyrecently,in1882,anindependentkingdom),andmadethelittlecountrythelaughing-stockofallEurope.Thearmywasparticularlyaffected.Itwastheverynucleusofthenewcountrywhichhad

____________________3 October8,1958.Keesing'sContemporaryArchives(1957-8),p.16458.

-63-

attainedstatehoodonlybycontinuousrevoltandfighting.Itfeltbitterlyhumiliatedatthecontemptintowhichitscreationhadfallen.The1903conspiracy'shorribleendingreflectedthishatredofQueenDraga.Theofficers,havingburstintotheroyalapartmentsandfiredshotsintotheroyalcouple,frenziedlyhackedthebodyoftheQueenintopiecesandthrewhercorpsewiththeKing(whowasstillalive)intothecourtyardbelow.4

Theforegoingareexamplesofavicarioushumiliation.Inothercasesthearmedforcesarereactingtoadirectblowtotheirpride.ThetwomostimportantoftheGreekrevoltswerebothattributabletothis.The1909revolutioncameaboutthus:followingtheYoungTurkrevolutionof1908,CreterevoltedagainstTurkeyanddeclaredherenosiswithGreece.ButthefeebleGreekgovernmentmeeklycompliedwithasuccessionofTurkishultimata,evenagreeingtorefrainfromanyactprejudicialtoTurkishsovereignty.ThisopenconfessionofmilitaryweaknessandsubservienceprovedtoomuchfortheGreekofficers.TheyhadalreadyformedaMilitaryLeagueandtheynowcompelledthePrimeMinistertoresign(August1909).TheythencalledinVenizelosastheirpoliticaladvisorandsupportedhisconveningtheConstituentAssembly,whichsubsequentlyrevisedtheconstitutionandregeneratedthearmedforces.

Themilitaryrevoltof1922wasaresponsetoanevenmorehumiliatingsituation.OnSeptember9theTurksrodetriumphantlyintoSmyrna,drivingtheGreektroopsintothesea,looting,rapingandpillaginginthecity,andthencommittingittotheflames.Ontheinstant,thoseGreekofficerswhohadgotawaytoChiosconstitutedthemselvesaRevolutionaryCommittee,forcedthe31yKingtoabdicate,andthenproceededtotrytheministersandgeneralsresponsibleforthecatastrophe.Accusedandfoundguiltyofsacrificingmilitaryintereststopartyconsiderations,sixofthesewereputtodeath.

TheEgyptianarmy'smoodwasmorecomplex.Aswehavealreadyseen,theEgyptianofficercorpssufferedthroughoutfromastronginferiorityfeeling.FarfrombeingabletocompensateforthisbyvictoryinthefieldorbyejectingtheBritishgarrisons,theywerecondemnedtowitnessaffrontstotheirKingandtheirflagwhichdeeplyangeredthem(furtherinstancesofthisvicarioushumiliation

____________________

4ThestoryisfullydescribedinC.Mijatovich,ARoyalTragedy.Thisisaroyalistaccountbutitcontainsanappendixbyoneoftheregicides.Themoodofwoundedpridestandsoutclearly,e.g.atpp.221,225and227.

-64-

whichwehavealreadydescribed).AnEgyptianhistorianofthe1952revolutionwritesthattheBritishcoupdeforceagainsttheKingin1942wasconsideredbytheofficers'asaninsulttotheEgyptianpeople'5-notanactdirectedattheKingbutaslightuponthenation.6TheBritishrefusaltoevacuateEgyptafter1945wasconsideredingratitudeand'rousedtheresentmentnotonlyofthepeoplebutofthearmy'.7Thearmy'spridethereforewasalreadywoundedwhenthegreatopportunityof1948arrived.ThearmyburnedtoavengeitsinsultsbymassacringtheJewsofPalestine.Insteaditwasdefeated,andthegovernmentconstrainedtoagreetoanarmistice.Herethegeneralizationsofthepsychologistsholdtrue;farfromthearmyblamingitself,itprojecteditschagrinonthegovernment.Thearmyhadfoughtgallantly;but'itsoontranspired,however,thatthebravemenwhowerelayingdowntheirlivesinthefieldhadbeenthevictimsofaseriousplotasaresultofinefficiencyandtreachery'.ThehighrankingofficersoftheGeneralStaff,fightingthewarfromcomfortablequartersinCairo,weretoblame.Worsestill,thearmyhadbeenprovidedwithdefectivearms.Theyweredefeated'notbecausetheenemywasbraverormoreefficientbutbecauseofbetterarmsandequipmentwhilethey,almostunarmed,wereengagedinanunequalfightandwerekillednotbytheenemybutbythetraitors,crooksandcorruptpersonsoftheRoyalCourtandoftheCairoseniorofficers'.Therankandfile'oftenbitterlyremarkedinreplytoinquiries:"Wehavebeenbetrayed,Sir."'Thedejectionofthearmywascompletedwhen,inreturning,itwas'forthefirsttimeinthehistoryofthearmy,tauntedwithreverses.'8Itwasthenthatthesmallgroupofmilitaryconspirators,theso-called'FreeOfficers',whichhadpreservedatenuousexistenceduringthewarperiod,regroupedanddecidedtooverthrowtherégime,andparamountlytheKingwhoheadedit.

ThereisastrikinganalogybetweenwhatovertooktheEgyptianarmyandthemalaiseintheFrencharmywhichculminatedintheeventsofMay13,1958.Theoriginalmoodisvastlydissimilar;unliketheEgyptianarmy,theFrenchhasalongandmostglorioushistory;itwasrespectedandrespectable,andsufferednosuchfeelingsofinferiorityorhatredoftherulingclassaspossessedtheyoungerEgyptianofficers.But,from1940,andespeciallyafter1946,its

____________________5 Rashedel-Barawy,TheMilitaryCoupinEgypt(RenaissanceBookshop,Cairo,1952).p.190.6 Ibid.p.190.7 Ibid.,p.190.8 Ibid.,p.193.

-65-

juniorofficerssufferedsuccessivehumiliationssimilartotheEgyptian,andtheyreactedinasimilarway.Tobeginwith,theyalsobegantofeelabandonedandrejectedbythenation.Theirpayandconditionshadbeguntolagbehindcomparableprofessions.InsteadofspendingmostoftheirlivesongarrisondutyinFrance,from1946theregularofficersspentmostofitinthecolonies,returningtoFranceforonlybriefintervals.DuringthelongyearsoftheIndochinawartheseexpatriateofficersinthearduousterrainofIndochinareadintheirFrenchnewspapersofthedomesticattackson'lasaleguerre'.Theyknewthatreinforcementscameoutandcasualtieswererepatriatedinobscurity.Andsotheygottheimpressionthattheywerecarryingtheburdenalone.Intheseconditions,rejectedbyFrenchsociety,theyturnedinuponthemselves.Thusinitsownway,quitedifferentfromthatoftheEgyptianarmy,theFrenchofficercorpsalsodevelopedasenseofrejectionandacorrespondinggrudgeagainstcivilians.

Secondly,theFrenchofficerstoobegantoexperienceasequenceofdisastersandintheirhumiliationtheytooprojectedtheblameonthepoliticians.ThecriticalmomentwasDienBienPhu,whichledtotheabandonmentofIndochina:thereaftertheciviliangovernmentwassingledoutasthecauseofmilitaryhumiliation.GeneralNavarre,forinstance,attributedthedefeattotworeasons:that'ourrulers'neverknewwhattheywantedinIndochina,or,iftheydid,lackedthecouragetosayso;andsecondly,they'permittedtheArmytobestabbedintheback'byallowingthecommunistsfreereignfortheir'permanenttreason'.'Theaccumulatedtergiversations,mistakesandpoltrooneries',hecontinued,'aretoonumerousandcontinuousnottobeimputabletothemenandeventothegovernmentswhichfollowedoneanotherinoffice.Theyarethefruitsoftherégime.TheyproceedfromtheessentialnatureoftheFrenchpoliticalsystem.'9But,hardontheheelsofIndochinafollowedfurtherreverses.MoroccoandTuniswereabandoned,

____________________

9

ForthetreatmentIhaverelieduponR.Girardet,'PouvoirCivilandPouvoirMilitaire'(RevueFrançaisedeSciencePolitique,Vol.X,No.1.1960).Therehavebeensubsequenttreatments,e.g.R.andJ.Brace,OrdealinAlgeria(NewYork,1960),Chapter6,,butGirardet'sisthemostbrilliantandbestdocumented.ThepassagefromGeneralNavarre,quotedfromhisarticle,istobefoundin'AgoniedeL'Indo-chîne(Paris,1957),p.319,(OneofmymilitarycolleaguescommentsonGeneralNavarre'sremarksbywritingthatNavarre'wasoutfoughtathisowngame-strategyandtactics-andcoveredupbyhavingagoodwhineathispoliticalmasters'.Thismakesmypoint.)

-66-

andthencametheSuezexpedition.Technically,thiswasbrilliantlysuccessful.Allthemorehumiliatingwasthewithdrawal.'Twoyearsafter(DienBienPhu),pushedoutofMoroccoandTunisiawherewehadlordeditforsolong,madedesperatebytheAlgerianproblem,suddenlywewereexpectedtofightaclassicalcombat,withoutthedisseverancesofcivilwar,amilitaryadventurewiththeclearorderofcommand,'knockoutadictator'.ThedisappointmentovertheSuezoperationwasasgreatastheenthusiasmithadroused.Nothingwilleverdescribethemiseryoftheparachutistswho,victorious,hadtoleaveEgyptandturntheirbacksonvictory.'10

Fromthismomentdisaffectionmultipliedamongthejuniorofficers,whohadbornetheheatoftheday.Itwastheseaboveallwhofeltangryandhumiliatedand,significantly,theynotonlyturnedtheirrageandcontemptagainsttherégimeandthepoliticiansbutalsoagainsttheseniorofficersandtheHighCommand.ThiswasthemoodthatprovokedtheeventsofMay13,andthedownfalloftheFourthRepublic.

(b)Armieswithamorbidlyhighself-esteem

Intheforegoingcases,noneofthearmiesregardedthemselvesasinherentlysuperiortocivilians,andsome,liketheEgyptian,startedoffbyfeelingveryinferiortothem.Armiesexist,orhaveexisted,however,withamorbidlyhighopinionofthemselvesascomparedwiththerestofsociety.Affrontsorimaginedaffrontstotheirpridetendtosparksucharmiesintointerventionmorequicklythanintheformerclassandforcausesthatare,objectively,muchslighter.

Hereagaintheirself-esteemisnettledbyvicarioushumiliationsaswellasbydirectonesorbysociety'srejectionoftheirpretensions.TheG.O.U.(GrupodeOfficialesUnidos)whichseizedpowerin1943hadthegreatestcontemptforcivilians.'Civilianswillneverunderstandthegreatnessofourideal.Weshallthereforehavetoeliminatethemfromthegovernmentandgivethemtheonlymissionwhichcorrespondstothem:workandobedience.'SoranaG.O.U.manifestocirculatedamonthbeforetheuprisingof1943.TheArgentinepublic,however,regardeditsarmyasajackbootedarmyofoccupation.'Anon-militaristicpeoplewhoavoidconscriptionliketheplague,theysometimesfeeltheirarmy'smanœuvring,posturingandbickeringiseitheroperabouffeorthescrappingof

____________________10 Quoted,Girardet,op.cit.,fromRéalités,May,1957.

-67-

agroupofrobberbaronsdisputingtheirtake.'11ThisattitudelargelyaccountsforthetoneoftheG.O.U.pamphlet.In1943,however,therewereadditionalwoundstotheofficers'pride-theirvicariousshameatthecorruptionofthegovernmentwhichabasedthemintheeyesoftheworld(asentimentakintothePakistanarmy'sin1958),avicariousshametooatknowingthattheircountrywasdependentontheUnitedStatesandtheimmediatehumiliationofknowingthatthearmywasrun-downandill-equipped.Thecoronelesfeltthatforallthesereasonsthearmyhadlostface.12

AsimilarmoodwaspermeatingtheJapanesearmyby1930.Wehavealreadyhadoccasiontomentionitsgreatprestige.ThemilitaryconsideredthemselvestheheirsoftheSamurai,thetraditional'lordsofthefourclasses',andadoptedBushido,itscodeofhonour.Thefactthatofficerswerebeingdrawnlargelyfrommiddle-andlowerclassfamiliesdidnotaffectthisSamuraitraditionwhichwaswholeheartedlyadoptedbythenewcomers.13Themilitarythereforecontinuedtoregardthemselvesasprivileged.Inthe1920's,however,thepoliticalpartiessuccessfullycutdownthemilitarybudgetsandboldlydenouncedthemilitaryintheDiet,anddespitethepatrioticsecretsocieties,publicopinionfollowedthem.Thesoldiersbecameatargetformockery:'Whatusearespursinatramcar?'...'Bigswordsareanuisancetopassengers.'14ThemilitarythereforeconsideredthepartiesandtheDietastheirenemies.

TheGermanReichswehrofficersalsoregardedthemselvesasaprivilegedcaste.Drawnfromanarrow,aristocraticandreactionarysocialstratum,everyefforthadbeenmadetolinkthemwiththeprewarImperialarmy.Thefield-greyandthesteelhelmetwereretained.EachnewregimentwasmaderesponsibleformaintainingthetraditionofoneofthedisbandedImperialregiments,andallowedtokeepitspeculiarprivilegesandcustomsandtomaintaincontactwithitsformerpersonnel.Butitsofficersbewailedthestill-departedglories-thepre-warimmunityfromthecivilcourts,thepracticebywhichtheindividualofficermightwithimpunitypunishanycivilian

____________________11 J.Bruce,ThosePerplexingArgentines,pp.302-3.12 Cf.R.Josephs,ArgentineDiary,pp.155-8.

13

Acommondevelopment.ParvenuBritishofficerstendtobecomemoreregimentalthanthosewhosemilitaryrootsliefarinthepast,sokeenarelb/>theytoshowtheirorthodoxy.Napoleon'sMarshalsbecameverynobleindeedafterNapoleonhadmadethemDukesofthisorthat--notwithstandingtheirhumbleorigins.(Ney'sfatherwasabarrel-cooper.)

14 M.Shigemitsu,JapanandHerDestiny,pp.28-9.

-68-

whoinsultedhim,thedeferencepaidhimbytheKapitulanten,i.e.thepostmen,customsofficers,policemenwhohadtakenupthecivilservicepostsreservedfortheex-servicemen.OfficersnolongerheldalegallyprivilegedpositionandhadtoendurethestricturesofthepacifisticpublicoftheWeimarRepublic.Internationally,farfrombeingrenownedasthestrongestforceinEurope,theywereamereshadowarmy,hardputtoittofaceuptothehatedanddespisedPoles.Aboveall,thecankerofdefeatgnawedatthem.This,psychologically,wastoomuchtobear.Theyburnedtofighttheoldwaroveragain,thistimetowinit.Also,however,theyeasedtheintolerablepainandhumiliationsofrealitybytherecoursesof'rationalization'and'projection'.Theymaintainedthattheyhadnotfailed,andthattheblamelayelsewhere;thattheywereasgoodandnobleandworthyasevertheywere;itwastheotherswhowereignoble.Therationalizationoftheirdefeatwasaccomplished,ofcourse,bytheinfamousdolchstoss,'stab-in-the-back',theorypropoundedbyLudendorff-thatpanic-strickencommanderwhohadinsistedonSeptember29,1918,that'thegravityofthemilitarysituationadmitsofnodelay',andthat'apeaceoffertoourenemiesmustbeissuedatonce'.Thearmy,soranthistheory,hadneverbeenbeaten;thehome-fronthadcrackedandhadbetrayedit.Thusalltheobloquywasprojectedontotheunhappysocialistsasthesignersofthepeacetreaty,andontotheRepublicwhichtheywerelargelyinstrumentalinestablishing.

FinallyonemustnoticethequitemorbidsuperiorityfeelingofthearmyofSpain.Wehavealreadyhadoccasiontoremarkhowthisarmy,fromabout1900onwards,hadfeltrejectedbysocietyandhaddrawnhermeticboundariesarounditself,nourishingitselfonitsownvaluesandhatingwithoutunderstandingthemovementsofseparatismandsocialismandsyndicalismthatweresurgingthroughSpain.AfteritsdecisiveandhumiliatingdefeatbytheMoorsatAnuelin1921theSpanishofficersreactedliketheGreekofficersafterSmyrna,ortheGermanofficersafter1918,ortheEgyptianofficersafter1948,ortheFrenchofficersafterDienBienPhu.TheSpanisharmyneverthoughttoblameitselfbutaccusedtheciviliansofbetrayingit.Fromthisdisastroushumiliationitresponded,ascommonly,byseekingpsychologicalcompensationelsewhere.IftheSpanisharmyhadnotdefeatedtheRif,itwouldshowthatitcouldatleastdefeatitsowncivilians.ThusarosethedictatorshipofPrimodeRiverain1923.

-69-

Thismorbidpreoccupationwithitsownpreciousself-esteemlayatthebottomofitsfatalonslaughtontheSpanishRepublicin1936.True,itsufferedvicarioushumiliationsfromtheinstability,thebreakdownoflawandorder,andtheseparatistandpacifisticforceswhichhadbeenunleashedby1936;butitcouldhaveremediedthesebyplacingitselfatthedispositionoftheauthoritiesratherthanbyconspiringagainstthem.Thekeytoitsbehaviourliesinitschronicmoodofarroganceanddisdainforciviliansanditsdeep-rootedbeliefthatunlessitwaseverything,itwasnothing.Thismonumentalarroganceiswellattested(becauseitissocompletelyunselfconscious)inthespecial1936-9SupplementtotheEnciclopediaUniversel.15

ThearticlesaysthatthearmyreceivedtheproclamationoftheRepublic'impassively'.Itwasaccustomedtovicissitudes(itsays)andwasalwaysunsuccessfulinits'longingtoacquirethematerialandmoralimportancewhichwasduetoitasthenationalarmy,thatistosay,themostimportantorganfortheinternalandexternallifeoftheNation'.Hence(itcontinues)itreceivedthenewrégimewithcoldscepticism.Someofficerscurriedfavour;otherssuspendedjudgement;themostadventuroushowevertookpartintheabortiverisingofGeneralSanjudoinAugust1932.Therefollowed'awholecampaignofhumiliationdirectedbythepublicauthoritiesthemselves'.Thesehumiliationsthearmy'borestoically'.Meanwhilethecommunistcellsbegantohoneycombthearmy,whichwasbynowdeprivedofitsmostcapableandinfluentialleaders.Consequentlyitsdisciplinewasmenaced.'Theideastoodoutclearly-tobringaboutthedisappearanceofthelastbulwarkofSpanishnationhood:thearmy.'Theofficercorpsrealizedthenthattheycouldnotremainimpassiveanylongerinfaceofsuchevents,forthesewouldbringaboutthedisappearanceofthenationitself.'Thenandonlythen',feelingittobe'theirsacredduty',didtheybegintoprepareforwhatlaterwastobecalled'theGloriousNationalUprising'.Thisistheofficial,Franco-istaccountofthearmy'srole.

THEDISPOSITIONTOINTERVENEThedispositiontointervene,then,isaskeinofmotivesandmood.Wehaveseenhowvariousareitscomponentsandhowdifferentlytheyarecombinedinindividualcases.Centraltothedispositionis

____________________15 EnciclopediaUniversel,Supplement,1936-9.pp.1444etseq.(Published1943.)

-70-

oneelementwhichisthetaprootalikeofboththemotivesandthemood.Thatisthemilitary'sconsciousnessofhavinganidentitythatisseparatefrom,differentfrom,andyetjuxtaposedwiththeciviliansandthepoliticians.Aswehavepointedout,thisderivesfromtheobjectivecharacteristicsoftheprofessionalizedstandingarmy.Itisthisself-awarenessthatpermitsthemilitarytoconceivethattheyhaveauniqueduty,adutyofsupererogation,towatchoverthenationalinterest.Thisnotionofthe'nationalinterest'constitutesamotive;butitiscolouredbysectionalandregionalinterests,bythecorporateself-interestofthemilitaryassuch,andbytheindividualcareerism,egotismandambitionofitsmembers.

Thesemotivesprovideanecessarybutnotasufficientconditionforintervention.Tomovethemilitarytoact,thesemotiveshavetobecatalysedintoanemotion.Therealization-incertaininstancesthatthereisnothingandnobodytostopthemilitarytakingwhatitdesires,mayconvertthesemotivesintothemoodforaction.Conversely,thefrustrationofitsdesires-somestingingrebufftoitsprideortheindifferenceorderisionofsociety-mayprovokethefamiliarreactionsofanger,theshiftingoftheblametotheciviliansand,finally,thedesiretovindicateitselfbyimposingitswilluponthem.

Evenso,thisisnotquiteall.Themilitarymaywellbeangryorhumiliated,anddisposedtointervene;buthowtheywilldoso,whentheywilldosoandpossiblywhethertheywillinfactdosomayandusuallydoesdependonanotherfactor.Thisfactoristheopportunitytointervene.Thedispositiontointerveneisanemotion;andthoughitistruethatsomearmedforces,likesomeindividuals,actblindlyontheiremotions,mostpeoplemakesomekindofrationalcalculationbeforedoingso.Suchcalculationisbasedontheobjectiveconditionsinwhichtheactionwilltakeplace.Therearesomeconstantlyrecurringpoliticalsituationsinwhichtheopportunitiesforanarmedforcetointervenesuccessfullyaremaximized.Thesearewhatwemustnowdescribe.

-71-

CHAPTERSIXTheOpportunitytoInterveneCERTAINsituationsmakethecivilpowerabnormallydependentonthemilitaryauthorities.Othersenhancethemilitary'spopularitywhilecorrespondinglydepressingthatofthecivilauthorities.Themilitary'sopportunitiestointervenearemaximizedifbothsituationscoincide.

1.(a)Increasedciviliandependenceonthemilitary'Waristooimportanttobelefttothegenerals.'Fewciviliansseemtohaveagreedwiththisandstillfewergenerals.Warusuallyexpandstheinfluenceofthemilitary.TheprimacyofthecivilpowerinBritainandinGermanyduringthesecondworldwardoesnotinvalidatetherathernarrowpropositionputforwardhere:thatwarconditionsareamongthecircumstancesthatmayprovidethemilitarywithopportunitiesforintervention.Inthatsamewar,forinstance,thecivilianauthoritiesoftheUnitedStateshandedthemajordecisionsonpolicyandstrategytotheChiefsofStaff,andadmittedthemtoashareinthemobilizationofthecivileconomy.'Ihavewashedmyhandsofit,'saidtheSecretaryofStatetotheservicechiefs,'anditisnowinthehandsofyouandKnox-theArmyandtheNavy.'1InJapantoo,from1937onwards,themilitaryobtainedthelastwordonallpolicymatters,includingcivilianones.Ultimatepowercametoresideinthe'LiaisonCommittee'.Ostensibly,thisbroughtthepoliticiansandservicechiefstogether,buteffectivelyitwascontrolledbyitsthree-mansecretariatinwhichthetwoservicememberswereparamount.Thusthewholenationwasharnessedtothemilitarymachine.2

____________________1 Quoted,Huntington,op.cit.,pp.315-17.

2Cf.ToshikazuKase,EclipseoftheRisingSun,pp.87-9,andMamoruShigemitsu,JapanandHerDestiny,pp.320-1.ThemostthoroughtreatmentistobefoundinY.C.Maxon,ControlofJapaneseForeignPolicy.

-72-

Inbothinstancesthecivilianshadvoluntarilysurrenderedtothemilitary.Howwarfareexpandsthemilitary'spoliticalpowersisbetterdemonstratedwherethecivilianshavetriedtoresist.Wehavealreadymentionedthe'silentdictatorship'ofHindenburgandLudendorffinGermanyduringthefirstworldwar.Wherecivilianresistancedeveloped,e.g.whentheKaiserdemurredtoremovingBethmanHollwegfromtheChancellorship,thetwogeneralsreliedontheirindispensabilitytogettheirownway;theythreatenedtoresign.InBritainitwastheotherwayround.Thecivilauthoritieshadtousealltheirinfluencetomaketheirgeneralsresign.Kitchenerwasneveroverruledorevenseriouslychallengedinthecabinetinthefirstsixmonthsofthewarandevenafterhiscabinetcolleagueshadlostconfidenceinhimtheyhadtoleavehimnominallyinchargeandsimplywhittlehisfunctionsaway.3LloydGeorgehadtoadoptsimilartacticsagainstSirWilliamRobertson.Itspeaksvolumesfortheincreasedwar-timepowerofthemilitarythatLloydGeorgeshouldseriouslyhavefearedthatthegeneralswould'formacabalwhichwouldoverthrowtheexistingwarcabinetandespeciallyitschiefandenthroneagovernmentwhichwouldbepracticallythenomineeandmenialofthemilitaryparty.'4

LordBeaverbrookaptlycommentsthat'peoplemaywondernowattheabsolutelackofself-assertiveness,amountingalmosttoacompleteabdicationofauthority,whichmarkedAsquith'sattitudetowardstheHighCommand.Itisonlyfairtorecognizehowwidespreadwasthefeelingoftheinferiorityofthehighlyplacedciviliantothehighlyplacedsoldierbothattheoutbreakofwarandformanymonthsoryearsafterwards.Infact,inmanycasesitmaybesaidtohavelastedforthewholedurationofhostilities.'5Thatthese

____________________3 Cf.P.Magnus,Kitchener(GreyArrowEdn.),pp.287etseq.

4 LordBeaverbrook,MenandPower,pp.43-57,186-216and408-14;D.LloydGeorge,WarMemoirs(2vol.Edn.Odhams),pp.1668-9.

5

LordBeaverbrook:PoliticiansandtheWar,pp.237-8.DescribingthesuperioritycomplexofG.H.Q.hecontinues:'ThepictureofMinisterswhichtheGeneralsdrewtothemselvesandwhichwasreflectedtosomeextenttothepublic,wassomethinglikethis.TheMinistersatinaleatherboundarmchairinaroomwhereeventhefaintesthumofoutsidetrafficwashushed,andpulledatalongcigarwhilehelanguidlysuperintendedtheactivitiesofhissecretaries.Fromthisreposehewouldcheerfullygivetheorderspeeding"glumheroesupthelinetodeath"bythousands-althoughheknewnothingofwar.Hethenrosetogoouttodinnerwithothersofhiscolleagueswhohadbeensimilarlyemployed.IftheMinistereverdidshowanyactivity,itwasoftheinconvenientkindbywhichanignorantcivilianinterferedwiththesuperbexpertefficiencyexhibitedbytheGeneral.Andinthemeantime,too,theGeneral,insteadofsmokingacigar,wasdailyqualifyingforaV.C.bythehardshipsheenduredandthedangersheran.'(pp.238-9.)

-73-

sentimentscouldariseinBritainofallcountriesaffordsthemostimpressiveofallexamplesofthevastexpansionofinfluencewhichaccruestothemilitaryinwar.

Muchthesameoccursin'coldwar'conditions.Suchconditionsarenotuniquetothepost-1945period.Thepre-1914situationcouldequallywellbedescribedinsuchterms.InthatperiodtheFrencharmy,whichhalfthepopulationdistrustedduringtheSecondEmpire,hadbecomethe'sacredarch'oftheentirepopulationunderthefearofrenewedGermaninvasion.Also,themilitary'sinvolvementinforeignpolicyoccurredinthepre-1914periodaswellastoday:forinstance,theBritishagreementwiththeFrenchonfleetdispositionsplayedsomepartinconvincingwaveringcabinetmembersthatBritainmustenterthewaragainstGermany.

Nowadays,deferencetothemilitaryinthefieldsofforeignpolicyandevendomesticpoliciesisacommonplace.Inacontextofthe'coldwar'itspringsfromthesheersizeofnationaldefenceexpenditure,whichaffectsthewholenationaleconomy;fromtheincreasingtechnicalityofwarfare,makingmuchofitamatterforcomplicatedspecialisms;fromtheinabilityofcivilianleadersanylongertoassessmilitarytacticsandstrategyascompetentlyasinthepast;fromthefactthattoday'sbattlefieldsareentirecountriesorregions;andfinallyfromthegruesomeimmediacyofthenuclearthreat,whichthrustsonsomeindividualorindividualsresponsibilityforasplit-secondmilitaryappreciation.ThattheexpansionofmilitaryinfluenceintheUnitedStateshasattractedmoreattentionthanithasinothercountriesiseasilyexplicable.ItderivespartlyfromtheirrepressiblegarrulousnessofAmericanmilitarymen,ascomparedwiththetortuoussilenceoftheirRussiancounterparts;fromthepresenceofafreeandcriticalpressintheUnitedStates;fromagovernmentalsystemthathastraditionallyputapremiumuponthevirtuesofpublicity-againincontrastwiththeloudsilencesofRussia;and,finally,fromapoliticallymotivatedcriticismwhichseesinAmericatheheadandfrontofcapitalistoffence.Suchcloudyindicationsaswehaveofcivil-militaryrelationsinRussia-notablyduringtherevolutioninHungaryin1956andMr.

-74-

Krushchev'sreactiontotheU2incidentin1960-suggeststhattheRussianmilitaryplayapartnotunlikethatofthePentagon.6

1.(b)TheeffectofdomesticcircumstancesIntheforegoingexamplesthegovernmentdependsonthemilitarybecausethisisindispensabletoitsforeignpolicy.Domesticcircumstancesmayalsoproducethiseffect.Thegovernmentmayhavetorelyonthemilitaryasapoliceforce.Wecandistinguishthreekindsofsituationsinwhichthisislikelytohappen:situationsofovertoracutecrisis;situationsoflatentorchroniccrisis;andfinallypower-vacuumsituations.

(a)Overtcrisis.Overtcrisesoccureveninlong-establishedstateswithwell-developedcivilinstitutions.Thecharacteristicofsuchcrisesisthatrivalpoliticalforceshavearisenwillingandabletouseviolence,whicharesoequallymatchedthatnogovernmentcanrelyonsupportfromanysingleonewithoutdrawingonitselfthefullviolenceoftherest.Suchacountryiseffectivelyinastateofpotentialorevenincipientcivilwar.Thecausessometimeslieinthedislocationsofsomedisastrousdefeat;sometimesintheaftermathofaprotractedandbitterwarofpoliticalliberation;sometimestheyspringfromaviciousspiralofdomesticevents.

OvertcrisisiswellillustratedbytheconditionofGermanybetween1918and1924.Withthecease-fireofNovember1918,alltheoldhabitsofpoliticalallegiancedissolved.Thetraditionalpoliticalorderhaddeterminedthegoalsofthepre-warpoliticalstruggles,ifonlyastheobjectofattack;onceitwassweptaway,politicsmovedintounchartedseas.Thefamiliarlandmarksoflegitimacyhadbeenobliteratedandthenceforthitwasopentoanygrouptosteerbyanymeansandforanyhorizonitfancied.TheProvisionalGovernmentcouldnotbaseitselfonmuchpublicsupport,forpoliticalopinionhadbrokenintomutuallyhostilegroupings,eachpreparedtouseviolence.Ithadtocontendsimultaneouslywithmutinousunitsofthearmedforces,withtheill-suppressedrageandhumiliationofthemonarchistandnationalistgroups,withthepressureoftheIndependentSocialistsandtheSpartakists,andwiththeunpredictableSoldiers'andWorkers'Councils.Possessingnoauthorityitcouldrestonlyonforce.7Hencethenotorious'pact'of

____________________6 Seepp.99-109.

7 ThesituationinFrancein1799,ontheeveofBrumaire,wassimilarandhadsimilarresultstothoseinGermany.Seep.214.

-75-

November9betweenGröner,representingtheHighCommand,andEbert,representingtheCivilPower:thegovernmentwouldprotectthearmyandthearmywouldprotectthegovernment.Thegovernmentwouldprovisionthearmy,bringithomeand,bybeguilingtheSoldiers'andWorkers'Councils,woulddiscountenanceindisciplineintheranks.Inreturnthearmywoulddefendthegovernment.ThispactwassealedinthebloodoftheSpartakistsinJanuary1919;andwhentheNationalAssemblymetitwasundertheprotectionofbayonets.

Succeedinggovernmentswerelikewise'couchedbetweenthefellcontendingpointsofmightyopposites'.By1923thecabinetwasfacedwithseparatistmovementsintheRhineland,left-winginsurrectionsinSaxony,ThuringiaandHamburg,andmilitaryinsubordinationinBavaria.FacedwiththedisintegrationoftheReichandattackedbybothleftandright(becausehehadcancelledthecivildisobediencecampaignintheRuhr)ChancellorStresemanfoundthearmyhissolesupport.UnderArticle48oftheConstitutionastateofemergencywasdeclaredandthefunctionsofgovernmentweretransferredtotheMinisterofNationalDefence.InpracticethismeanttoGeneralVonSeeckt,theCommanderoftheReichswehr.ForthenextninemonthsGermanywasruledbythearmyactinginsupportofthecivilpower.

Asecondexampleof'overtcrisis'isprovidedbySpainduringthesameperiod-1916-23.Herethecauseswereinternal.Itwouldtakeustoofarafieldtoexplainthereasonsforthis.TheylieinSpain'shistoryandgeographyandinthetemperamentofherpeoples.ItmustbeenoughtosaythatfromthebeginningofthetwentiethcenturyopinioninSpainwassplitalongthreelinesofcleavageseparatismagainstcentralism,churchagainststate,capitalagainstlabour-andthatthesedidnotcoincidebutcutacrossoneanother.Thus,Catalanseparatismcouldbepro-capitalist(e.g.theLliga)oranti-clericalandanti-capitalist(e.g.theAnarchists)-andsoforth.Thepublicwassplitintofactions,noneofwhichwascapableofanythingbutthemosthastyandfragileallianceswithanyother.'Today',wroteOrtegayGassetin1917,'Spainisnotsomuchanationasasetofwatertightcompartments.'These'compartments'werenotevenconcernedwithtryingtowinallies.ByacurseofSpanishculturalhistory,theSpanish'TrueBeliever'actedasthoughhisprivatetruthwassharedbytherestofthepopulationexceptthefoolsortheknaves;andtherefore(againinOrtegayGasset'swords),

-76-

'Theonlyformofpublicactivitywhich,beneathalltheconventionalphrases,satisfieseachclassistheimmediateimpositionofitsownpeculiarwill:inshort,directaction.'8

Between1916and1923successivegovernments-purportedlycabinetsdependentonparliamentarysupport-hadtocontendsuccessivelyandoftensimultaneouslywiththreemajormovements,eachlikelytoshatterunderthestressoftheirinternalfeuds.Theantidynasticmovementwasfiercelydividedbetweenliberal-republicans,centralizingsocialistsandtheseparatistanarchistsandsyndicalists.Theseparatistmovement(mostimportantinCataloniabutlinkedwithsimilarmovementsinGaliciaandtheBasquecountry)wassplitbetweencapitalistsandworkers,pro-clericalsandanti-clericals.FinallytherewerethemilitaryJuntasdedefensa,theorgansofofficers'tradeunionism.9

Themurderousinternecinehatredsofthepoliticalfactionsmeantthatnogovernmentcouldsurviveexceptwitharmysupport.Thewaywastherebyopenedforanyamountofmilitarypressureonthepoliticians.TheJuntasdedefensa,especiallywhentheMoroccandisasterof1921embitteredthemagainstthecivilians,behavedasblindlyandselfishlyasanyoftheelementstheywerebusyrepressing.Henceasuccessionofevermoreephemeralcabinetswereformedbythefavourandwerethenoverthrownbytheimpatienceofthearmy.Thelogicaloutcomewas,asPrimeMinisterMauradespairinglycried:'Quegobiernianlosquenodejangobernar'-'Letthosewhowillnotpermitustogovern[i.e.thearmy]takeoverthegovernment'.ThisiswhatfinallyhappenedbythepronunciamentoofGeneralPrimodeRiverainSeptember1923.

Thusthecharacteristicofovertcrisisisafragmentationofopinionintomutuallyhostilepoliticalmovementsofsuchpugnacityandpowerthatthegovernmentisdeprivedofanycoherentbodyofpopularsupport,andtosurviveatallmustturntorelyingonoverwhelmingforce:andthismeansrelyingonthearmedforces.

(b)Latentcrisis.Muchmorecommonisthesituationoflatentcrisis.Thisconnotesasituationwhereinapoliticalorsocialminorityruleinawaywhichthemasseshatebutwhichtheyaretooweaktooverthrow.Facedbyaconsensusofindifferenceoractivehatred,oftenexpressingitselfinsporadicdemonstrations,murdersorjacqueries,therulingoligarchymaintainsitselfbyrelyingonthearmy,and,

____________________8 OrtegayGasset.EspañaInvertebrada,p.57.9 Opcit.,p.67.

-77-

therefore,thisbecomesitsmaster.AclassicallysimpleillustrationoftheeffectofsuchapoliticalsituationistobefoundinatelegramsenttoWashingtonbytheUnitedStatesChargéd'AffairesinBoliviaonJuly14,1937:

'PresidentTororesignedlastnightafterarmywithdrewitssupport.'10

MostoftheBalkancountrieswereinthisstateduringtheinter-warperiod.Thesecountries-Rumania,Bulgaria,Yugoslavia,GreeceandAlbania-werepredominantlyagrarian.YetexceptinRumaniaandBulgaria11thepeasantwasnotrepresentedbystrongpoliticalpartiesandeventheyweretoofeebletochangethesocialorder.Alltheydidwasneedletherulingcliqueintodefendingitsprivilegeswithgreaterviolence.Apartfromthesetwoexamples,thepoliticalpartiesbothinRumaniaandBulgariaandthroughouttherestoftheBalkanswerecomposedoftheurbanclassesandrepresentedthemerchants,pettymanufacturers,bankersandprofessionals.Theirinterestswerehostiletothoseofthepeasantrywhomtheydespised,exploited-andfeared.Insuchcountries,thearmywastheonlyforcetoprotecttherégimeagainstciviluprisings.TheinterwarhistoryofGreece,Bulgaria,AlbaniaandRumaniawaslargelyshapedbytheirsoldiers.InYugoslavia,wherepeasantunrestandCroatseparatismcoincided,theSerbian-officeredarmywasthekeystoneoftherégime.

Theworldisstillencumberedbysimilarrégimes-PersiaandSouthVietnam,forinstance.Insuchcountriesthearmyisthepoweronwhichthegovernmentrelies.Thereforeithasnodifficultyinobtainingallitdemands,andifitwantstogoverninitsownnameitcanandwilldoso.

Post-warIraqmayserveasatype-exampleofaconditionoflatentcrisis.Before1958itsrulinggroupwasanarrowknotofsheikhs,landlordsandpoliticians.ThisruledbymanipulatingtheformsofparliamentarydemocracyinawayidenticalwiththeSpanish'Restoration'régime.12Beforethewar,governmentinstabilitywasduetorivalrieswithintherulingclique.After1945,however,

____________________

10 ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates(DepartmentofState,Washington,1937),Vol.V,p.250.Boliviawasacountryofwhichitusedtobewellsaidthat'whatthearmywantsthecountrywants'.

11 AndtheCroatareasinYugoslavia.12 Seep.52.

-78-

governmentshadtofaceamurderousbutpoliticallyhelplesshostilityamongtheprofessionalpeople,thestudents,thefewworkersandthedeclassedlabourersofthetowns.Thisopinionwasknownas'thepopularforce'.Itwaspowerfullyimbuedwithpan-Arabismandembitteredbythecorruptionandselfishnessoftheoligarchyandthelackofsocialreforms.Theoligarchymetthisoppositionbydelation,brutalityand,inthelastresort,martiallaw.The'popularforce'firstshoweditspotentialin1948ontheoccasionofthePortsmouthTreatywithBritain.Thepoliceweretakenbysurprise.ThegovernmentfellandtheTreatyhadtoberepudiated.Onthenextoccasion,in1952whenevenmoreseriousriotingoccurred,theRegententrustedthegovernmenttotheChiefoftheGeneralStaff.Undermartiallawhedissolvedthepoliticalparties,suppressedtheirnewspapersandimprisonedtheirleaders.In1956,whenthe'popularforce'wasfrenziedovertheSuezcampaign,thegovernmenttooktimebytheforelock:itimposedmartiallawbeforethestreetsfilled.In1958,thoughopinionwasagainover-wroughtbyeventsintheLebanon,PrimeMinisterNuri-es-SaidwassoconfidentthatheorderedtroopstomarchthroughBagdadtoJordan,tobereadytointerveneontheSyrianandLebanesefrontier.Unluckilyforhim,thesetroopshappenedtobeledbyofficerswhohadbeenconspiringforthreeyearspast.Theyhadnodifficultyinseizingthekeypointsinthecapital,andofmurderingtheRegent,theKingandNuri-esSaidhimself.Withthemgone,therégimecollapsed.Thearmyhadsimplytakentheplaceoftherulingcliqueithadbeenupholding.

(c)Thepowervacuum.Thereremaincaseswherethereis,effectively,noorganizedpoliticalmovementofanystrength,andsingularlylittleifanypoliticalopinionatall.ThesesituationsarerapidlypassingawayowingtotheemergenceofindustryinhithertomedievaleconomiesontheonehandandtheimpactofWesternideasontheother.Amongsuchideas,Marxismmustbereckonedapowerfulforce,carriedasitiswithmissionaryzealandtheimplicitorexplicitbackingofRussiaandChina.Hencethemosttypicalexampleslieinthepastthoughthisisnotbyanymeansaremoteone:Peru,Venezuela,Ecuador,Boliviauptoabout1920,Guatemala,ElSalvador,Hondurasuptoabout1930,ParaguayandHaititothisday,maybesaidtobecountriesinwhichorganizedpublicopiniondidnotexistorwassoweakastobeinconsiderable.13

____________________13 Thisisfurtherdevelopedbelow,ChapterNine.

-79-

Incircumstanceslikethesethereisnothingtopreventthemilitaryfromactingasitpleases.Thesixcoupsd'étatwhichsucceededoneanotherinIraqfrom1936to1941wereself-generatingandwouldhavegoneonindefinitelybutfortheBritishinterventionin1941.ThepoliticsofIraqfrom1936to1941resembledagameof'changeyourpartners'-aloosegroupofpoliticiansrentbyrivalriesconfrontedaloosegroupofambitiousofficers.Fromtimetotimeacliqueofpoliticianswouldlinkhandswithacliqueofofficersandtherebygetthemselvesinstalledinoffice.Thenanothercliquefromeachsidewouldmomentarilycombinetooustthefirstcombination;andsoforth.

2.ThepopularityofthemilitaryThepopularityorprestigeofthearmedforcesisasecondobjectivefactorwhichmayhelpthemtointervene.Suchpopularityisveryerraticanditfluctuateswithtimeandcircumstance.Theinitialpopularitywhichsooftenaccompaniesacoupmaywearoffquitequickly.ThusthevocalpublicandtheintelligentsiaofPakistanaretodayincreasinglydisenchantedwiththeAyubKhanrégime.LikewiseintheSudan.

InhisstudyoftheFrencharmybetween1815and1939,Girardethasshownhowandwhyitspopularityfluctuatedsomarkedlyduringthecourseofthecentury.TaintedwithBonapartismandJacobinismafter1815,itwascoldlyreceivedbythewealthierclasses,butbythesametokenwaspopularwiththemasses.Astrikingchangebegantooccuraftertheeventsof1848whenthearmyalonehadstoodbetweenLaGrandePeuroftheParisbourgeoisieandtheinsurrectionaryworkmenwhoinvadedthestreets.UndertheEmpire,thearmybecamethedarlingoftheupperclasses,anditbecameincreasinglyclericalandaristocratic.Forsometwentyyearsaftertheshockofdefeatin1870,itwastheidolofbothconservativesandprogressivesalike;nationalhumilitationhadwipedoutrancour.Thearmywasthekeystone.ThentheDreyfusaffairrevealedhowsectionalithadbecome-clerical,illiberalandanti-Republican.Thenceforthtilltheoutbreakofthewaritwasasfiercelyhatedinsomequartersasitwasadulatedinothers.

Itis,therefore,impossibletogeneralizeaboutthefactorsonwhichthepopularityofthearmydepends.Norisitnecessary.Oneneednoteonlythatitisparticularlyhelped,shoulditnourishanypoliticalambitions,byanycircumstancesthattendtodiscreditthecivilian

-80-

régimes.Inefficiency,corruption,andpoliticalintrigueappeartobetheveryreverseofthatausterity,briskauthoritarianism,politicalneutralityandpatriotismwhichpristinepublics,unaccustomedtomilitaryrule,tendtoattributetothemilitary.Itisnotsurprising,therefore,thatthemilitaryfindincivilianmismanagementtheopportunity,themotiveandsubsequentlythepretextfortheirintervention.

ConsiderthecaseofPrimodeRivera.Wehavealreadymentionedthatby1923Spainwasdeepinsocialcrisis.TheJuntasdedefensahadcontributedtothiscrisisandtheprincipalreasonforPrimodeRivera'scoup,oratleastthetimingofit,wastosuppresstheparliamentaryinquiryintotheMoroccandisaster.Yethiscoupwasacclaimedwithwildenthusiasm.Thereasonisquitesimple:thepoliticiansandtherégimecouldnothavebeenmoreunpopular.Inhisownwords:

'Wedonotfeelobligedtojustifyouraction,whichsensiblepublicopiniondemandsandimposes.Murdersofpriests,exgovernors,publicofficials,employers,foremenandworkers;audaciousandunpunishedhold-ups;depreciationofthevalueofmoney;thehoggingofmillionsofconcealedexpenditures;acustomspolicysuspectforitstendenciesbutevenmorebecausewhoevermanagesitboastsofimpudentimmorality;basepoliticalintriguesseizingonMoroccoastheirpretext;irresolutiononthismostseriousnationalproblem;socialindisciplinewhichrenderslabourinefficientandofnoaccount;agriculturalandindustrialproductionprecariousandinaruinousstate;communistpropagandaunpunished;impietyandbarbarousness;justiceinfluencedbypolitics;barefacedseparatistpropaganda;tendentiouspassionsovertheproblemofresponsibility[forMorocco].'14

Thereisenoughtruthinthiscatalogueofwoestoexplainwhythecoupwaswidelypopularandsoeasilysuccessful.

Kassim'splaidoyermakessimilarandequallyvalidplaywiththecorruptionandineptitudeofthepoliticians.'TherevolutionhastakenplacetofreethepeopleofIraqfromtyrannyandcorruptionindomesticaffairs....UndertheoldrégimetherewasnolaworjusticeinIraq.Onlytheinterestsofthegoverningclasseswereservedbytheadministrationofthelawunderthatrégime.'15The

____________________14 PronunciamentoofGeneralPrimodeRivera,September13,1923.15 Keesing'sContemporaryArchives(1958),16306(b).

-81-

justificationofthePakistancoupwassimilar.'Self-seekingleadershadravagedthecountryortriedtobarteritforpersonalgain.''Weakandirresolutegovernmentshavelookedonwithmasterlyinactivityandcowardiceandallowedthingstodriftanddeteriorateanddisciplinetogotopieces.'-'Politicianshavestartedafree-foralltypeoffightinginwhichnoholdsarebarred.Theyhavewagedaceaselessandbitterwaragainsteachotherregardlessoftheilleffectsonthecountry,justtowhettheirappetitesandsatisfytheirbasemotives.Therehasbeennolimittothedepthoftheirbaseness,chicanery,deceitanddegradation....'16

TheextenttowhichtheseremarksofGeneralAyubKhanhitoffthepopularmoodcanbegaugedbyMr.Wint'sreportonthe'1958Revolution',ashecallsit.'Thegovernmentandpoliticiansweredespised',hewrites.'Incontrast,thearmygamedprestige.Forthearmywasconspicuouslyefficientandconspicouslyincorrupt.Thusanunbalancedevelopedbetweentherespectedandcapablearmyandthedespisedandincompetentpoliticians.Thearmymighthavemovedintopoliticalcontrolearlierbutforonething:itscommandershadtakenovertheBritishmilitarytraditionthatanarmyshouldkeepalooffrompolitics.TheyhadtwicerefusedinvitationstosetupadictatorshipbytheformerGovernor-GeneralGhuladMohammed.'17Mr.WintthendescribeshowthealmostunbelievablescenesintheEastBengalParliamentfinallyimpelledGeneralAyubKhantoact,18andheconcludes:'Oneresultofthesediscreditablehappeningswasthatnoneofthepoliticianswhomthearmydespisedwasabletomakeaprotest.Theysimplywithdrew.Therewasnofightinthem,andthereasonwasthattheyknewtheycouldraisealmostnopublicsupportiftheyopposedthearmy.AfterthefirstfewdayspublicopinionsupportedtheRevolution.'19

Thusthedeclineofconfidenceinthepoliticiansandcivilprocessesisliabletoenhancethepopularityofthemilitary.Bythe

____________________16 Gen.AyubKhan,October10,1958:Keesing'sContemporaryArchives(1958),16458(a).17 GuyWint,"'The1958RevolutioninPakistan'"(St.Antony'sPapers,Number8,1960),pp.76-7.

18

TherewastobeageneralelectionthereinFebruary1959.Clearlythegovernmentinpowerwould'fix'it.Henceafiercestruggletogain-ortomaintain-powerasbetweengovernmentandopposition.TheoppositionmanagedtogettheSpeakercertifiedasmad,theDeputySpeakerbeingoneoftheirs.Inreturn,thegovernment'ssupportersarmedthemselvesatthenextsessionwithbitsofwoodandkilledtheDeputySpeaker.

19 Wint,op.cit.,loc.cit

-82-

sametoken,itweakenstheauthorityofthecivilianrégimeandrendersitaneasierpreytotheinterventionofthearmy,which,inthesecircumstances,comestoberegardedasadeliverer.

Dispositionandopportunity:thecalculusofinterventionIntheprecedingchapterswediscussedthemilitary'sdispositiontointervene,andwehavenowrevieweditsoccasionoropportunityfordoingso.These,thesubjectiveandobjectivefactors,arebothrelevanttothefactorlikelihoodofintervention.Itwillbeseenthattherearefourpossiblesituations.A. Neitherdispositionnoropportunitytointervene.Inthiscasenointerventionwilloccur.B. Bothdispositionandopportunitytointervene.Inthiscaseinterventionwilloccur.

C.

Nodispositiontointervenebuttheopportunityfordoingso.AnexampleofthiskindofsituationcomesfromIraq,in1952.GeneralMahmud,theChiefoftheGeneralStaff,wasentrustedwiththepremiershiptorestoreorder,thepolicehavingfailed.Twomonthslater,orderhavingbeenrestored,GeneralMahmudresignedfromthepremiership.Hehad,oneistold,'nopoliticalambitions'.

Atfirstsight,then,onewouldsaythatthedispositiontointerveneisparamount-thatifthatislacking,nointerventionwilltakeplace.Onthewholethisistrue.Whatmightalsohappen,however,maybeillustratedbythreecases.Firstthearmymightaftermuchproddingandpushing,reluctantlyinterveneafterall.Thisiswhat,wearetold,happenedinPakistan.InthefirststageoftheinterventionthePresident,i.e.thecivilpower,abrogatedtheconstitution,dissolvedtheAssemblies,abolishedthepartiesandproclaimedmartiallawwithGeneralAyubKhanashischiefmartiallawadministrator.ThiswasonOctober7,1958.ButonOctober24thePresidentappointedGeneralAyubKhanPrimeMinister;andthen,onOctober28,afterswearinginthenewMinistersonthepreviousday,thePresidentresignedandhandedover'allpowers'totheGeneral.20

AsecondpossibilityisillustratedbytheofficialversionoftheeventsinBurmaonSeptember26,1958.PremierUNuannounced

____________________

20

Thisisthe'officialversion'.PakistancircleshaveadifferentversioninwhichGeneralAyubKhanwastheimportunatepartyandPresidentMirzathereluctantone.SomecolourisgiventhisbytheGeneral'sstatementonOctober10thatwhilstitwasthePresident'sconstitutionaldutytohaltthedisintegrationofthecountryitwouldhavebeenthearmy'sresponsibilitytodosoifthePresidenthadnotacted.

-83-

thatsincehistourinUpperBurma,hewasconvincedthattheforthcomingelectionscouldnotbefairandfreeandhehadthereforeinvitedtheChiefofStaff,GeneralNeWin,toformagovernmentwhichwouldmakearrangementsforfreeelections.HealsoarrangedfortheGeneraltobelegallyinvestedbytheParliament.Ifthisversionbethewholetruthitwouldamounttointerventionbyinvitation.21

Athirdpossibilityisthatofalegal'temporarydictatorship'ofthemilitary,likethatofGeneralVonSeeckt,in1923,underArticle48oftheWeimarconstitution-ortheIraqcase(GeneralMahmud)alreadymentioned.

D.

Disposition,butnoopportunity.Thissituationisnotuncommon.Itleadstoabortiveputsches.TheKappPutschof1920wasofthiskind.SowasthatofGeneralSanjurjoinSpainin1932(Sanjurjohimselfknewthathisrisingwasboundtofail,butfeltinhonourboundtotry).TheabortiverebellionoftheFourGeneralsinAlgeriainApril1961alsofallsintothiscategory.

Theopportunitytointervene,andthelevelofpoliticalcultureNoneoftheseopportunitiesforinterventionariseatrandom,exceptfortheonesoccasionedbyexternalcircumstances.Warsorcoldwarsareindeedunpredictable.Butthoseopportunitiesoccasionedbydomesticconditionsaretiedupwiththenatureofthesocietyinwhichtheyoccur.Inwhatway?

Aswehaveseen,alltheopportunitiesofthiskindarisethroughsomeweakeningofthepublicsupportforthegovernment,andtherebyitsincreaseddependenceonthemilitary.Thelessitsauthoritythemoreitmustrelyonforce.Butthisissimplytosaythatthegreaterthe'publicattachmenttocivilianinstitutions'thelessopportunityandthelesslikelihoodofsuccesswillthemilitaryenjoy:andviceversa.AndthisbringsusbacktoChapterThree.Therewecoinedatermtoexpressthisdegreeofattachmenttocivilianinstitutions.

____________________

21

Itisinfactmostunlikelytobeanythingbutaminimalpartofthetruth.TherewasatthattimeconsiderablefrictionbetweenthearmyandUNu'sfractionoftheA.F.P.F.L.party.ThearmythoughtUNu'sA.F.P.F.L.tooclementtothecommunistrebels.FortheirpartthemembersofhispartyaccusedthearmyofinterferinginseveraldisputesinfavouroftheOpposition-A.F.P.F.L.TheHomeMinistercertainlybelieved,onSeptember22(i.e.fourdaysbeforeUNu'sannouncement),thatthearmywaspreparingacoup.ThisGeneralNeWindenied.ItoughttobenoticedthatGeneralNeWindid,twoyearslater,turnthegovernmentbacktothecivilians,butalsothatinMarch1962heoverthrewtheciviliangovernmentandestablishedamilitarydictatorship.

-84-

Wecalleditthelevelofpoliticalculture.Wesuggestedthatonemightconceiveofsocietiesasrangedatvariouslevelsofpoliticalcultureaccordingtothestrengthortheweaknessoftheirattachmenttotheircivilianinstitutions.Wenowseethatthehigherthislevel,thefeweraretheobjectiveopportunitiesopentothemilitary;andthatifittriesnotwithstanding,thelesssupportitwillreceive.Thelowerthelevel,however,themorenumeroustheopportunities,andthegreaterthelikelihoodofpublicsupport.

Themilitary'sopportunity-anditspublicwelcome-bothderivefromthelevelofpoliticalculture.The'level'(i.e.thecompleteness)towhichthemilitarypresstheirinterventionalsodependsonthis.Thisformsthesubjectofthenextchapters.

-85-

CHAPTERSEVENTheLevelsofIntervention(1)CountriesofDevelopedPoliticalCulture'Levels'ofinterventionINTERVENTIONcanbepushedtovariouslevelsofcompleteness.TheactivitiesofaVonSeecktarenotdifferentinkindfromtheactivitiesof,say,aKassimorNasser,butdifferindegree.

Wecanrecognizefourlevelsofmilitaryintervention.Firstwehavethelevelofinfluenceuponthecivilauthorities.Bythisismeanttheefforttoconvincethecivilauthoritiesbyappealingtotheirreasonortheiremotions.Thislevelistheconstitutionalandlegitimateone,entirelyconsistentwiththesupremacyofthecivilpower.Themilitaryauthoritiesactinpreciselythesamewayandwiththesameauthorityasanyelementsinthebureaucracy,thoughtheirinfluencemaywellbeweightierandonoccasionover-riding,inviewofthegreaterrisksinvolvedbytherejectionoftheiradvice.

Thesecondlevelisthelevelofpressures,or'blackmail'.Herethemilitaryseektoconvincethecivilpowerbythethreatofsomesanction.Thespanofsuchpressuresiswide.Itcanrangefromhintsoractionsthatarejustbarelyconstitutionalatoneendtointimidationandthreatsthatareclearlyunconstitutionalattheother.ItwouldbedifficulttosaythattheCurragh'mutiny'wasdownrightunconstitutional,anditcanevenbearguedthatinstrictlegaltermsitwasnotunconstitutionalatall.Nevertheless,itconstitutedaneffectiveexerciseofpressureontheBritishgovernment.InhisMemoirs,LordMontgomerysaysthatheassembledthemilitarymembersoftheArmyCouncilandgotthemtoagreetoresigninabodyifthecabinetdecidedonanythinglessthan18months'NationalService,andthathenotifiedtheSecretaryofStateofthisdecision.1

____________________1 TheMemoirsofField-MarshalMontgomery.(FontanaEdn.1960),pp.486-7.

-86-

Mr.Shinwell(theSecretaryofStateinquestion)hasdeniedthis.However,supposingithappenedasdescribed,again,itisdoubtfulwhethertheactionwasunconstitutional.Itisonthemargin.Attheotherextreme,threatstostageacoup,forexample,areplainlyunconstitutional.Atboththefirstandsecondlevels,themilitaryisworkinguponandthroughthecivilauthorities.Eveninacompleteform,itspowerisalwaysexercisedbehindthescenes.Themilitaryis,atmost,apuppet-master.Thethirdlevel,however,isthatofdisplacement,i.e.theremovalofonecabinetorrulerforanothercabinetorruler.Thisisachievedbyviolenceorthethreatofviolence.Theobjectistoreplaceonesetofcivilianpoliticiansbyanotherandmorecompliantset.However,thecivilianrégimeassuchisnotoverthrown-onlyoneparticularsetofcivilians.Thefourthlevelsweepsawaythecivilianrégimeandestablishesthemilitaryinitsplace.Thisisthefourthandmostcompletelevelofintervention,thelevelofsupplantment.

TheparametersofthelevelsofinterventionThelevelstowhichthemilitarypresstheirinterventionarerelatedtothelevelofpoliticalcultureoftheirsociety.Wemustthereforelookatthisconceptmoreclosely.Thelevelofpoliticalcultureishigh,when

1. the'politicalformula',i.e.thebelieforemotionbyvirtueofwhichtherulersclaimthemoralrighttogovernandbeobeyed,isgenerallyaccepted.Or,tosaythisinanotherway,where

2.thecomplexofcivilproceduresandorganswhichjointlyconstitutethepoliticalsystemarerecognizedasauthoritative,i.e.asduty-worthy,byawideconsensus.Or,againinotherwords,where

3. publicinvolvementinandattachmenttothesecivilinstitutionsisstrongandwidespread.Thecriteriabywhichwecanassessthisattachmenttoandinvolvementintheinstitutionsoftherégimearethree.Wemustask:

1. Doesthereexistawidepublicapprovaloftheproceduresfortransferringpower,andacorrespondingbeliefthatnoexerciseofpowerinbreachoftheseproceduresislegitimate?

-87-

2.Doesthereexistawidepublicrecognitionastowhoorwhatconstitutesthesovereignauthority,andacorrespondingbeliefthatnootherpersonsorcentreofpowerislegitimateorduty-worthy?

3. Isthepublicproportionatelylargeandwell-mobilizedintoprivateassociations?i.e.dowefindcohesivechurches,industrialassociationsandfirms,labourunions,andpoliticalparties?

Wherealltheseconditionsaresatisfiedthelevelofpoliticalculturemaybesaidtobehigh;totheextentthattheyarenot,itiscorrespondinglylow.

TheseconditionsareobviouslybettersatisfiedinBritainthaninIraq.Itismoredifficult,however,tosaywhethertheyarebettersatisfiedinBritainthaninSweden.Furthermore,thisnotionof'politicalculture'isnotunitary.Itisacomplexofthethreeconditions,andthesecanberankedindifferentways.Thuswemightfindonecountryinwhichthepublicwasweakandill-organizedbutreasonablyunited,whileinanotheritwasdisunitedbutverystronglyorganized.Forthesereasonsitwouldbedifficulttoarrangesocietiesinacontinuousrank-order,andevenmoredifficulttofindonethatsatisfiedeverybody.

Itisnotsohard,however,togroupsocietiesinanumberofbroadcategoriesofdescendingordersofpoliticalculture(thoughborderlinecasesstillofferdifficulties).And,forpurposesofrelatingthelevelofinterventiontotheorderofpoliticalculture,itismuchclearer.

Inthefirstgroup,wheretheorderofpoliticalcultureishighest,allthreeoftheconditionsarefulfilled.Insuchcountries,theinterventionofthemilitarywouldberegardedasawhollyunwarrantableintrusion.Publicsanctionforsuchactionwouldbeunobtainable.Britain,theUnitedStates,theScandinaviancountries,Switzerland,Canada,AustraliaandNewZealand,Eire,andHollandareexamples.Weshallcallthese,countriesofamaturepoliticalculture.

Inthesecondgroup,civilinstitutionsarehighlydeveloped.Thepublicisaproportionatelywideone,wellorganizedintopowerfulassociations.Civilproceduresandpublicauthoritiesarewellrooted.But,unlikethefirstgroup,thelegitimacyoftheproceduresfortransferringpoliticalpowerandthequestionofwhoorwhatshouldconstitutethesovereignauthorityarebothindispute.GermanyfromtheEmpiretotheaccessionofHitler,Japanbetweenthetwo

-88-

wars,andFrancefromtheThirdRepubliconwards,fallintothisgroup.Sotoo,asweshallsee,doestheU.S.S.R.Insuchcountries,themilitarywouldhavetoreckononastrongpublicresistancetotheirinterventions.Weshallcallthese,countriesofadevelopedpoliticalculture.

Inthethirdgrouparethosecountrieswherethepublicisrelativelynarrowandisweaklyorganized,andwheretheinstitutionsandproceduresoftherégimeareindisputealso.Hereopinionwouldnotbestronglyresistivetomilitaryintervention;thisopinion,beingweakandself-divided,isinafluidstate.AtthetopofthiscategorywecanplacecountrieslikeTurkey,ArgentinaandSpain;atthebottomcountrieslikeEgyptandSyria,Pakistan,IraqandtheSudan,orSouthKorea.Weshallcallthesecountriesofalowpoliticalculture.

Fourthcomethecountrieswhereforpracticalpurposesanygovernmentcanignorepublicopinion-thepoliticallyarticulatearesofewandweaklyorganized.MexicoandArgentinainthefirsthalfcenturyoftheirexistence,HaitiorParaguayortheCongotoday,areofthiskind.Weshallcallthesecountriesofminimalpoliticalculture.2

Aslongasthelistedcharacteristicspersistinsuchsocieties,thelegitimationofmilitaryrulewouldbeunobtainableinthefirstgroup,resistedinthesecond,fluidinthethird,unimportantinthefourth.

Thelevelstowhichinterventionispushedvaryaccordingtothegroupintowhichasocietyfalls.Thesefourordersofpoliticalcultureform,asitwere,theparametersofthelevelsofmilitaryintervention.

____________________

2

Thereisalsoafifthclass,withwhichweshallnotbeconcerned.Thismightbestyledtheantediluvianclass(thedelugeinquestionbeingtheFrenchRevolution).Thesearethetraditionalmonarchieswheretheidealsofnationality,liberty,equalityandpopularsovereigntyhavenotyetpenetrated.Anotherandbetterdescriptionisperhapstheproto-dynasticsocieties,societieswhereallegianceisowedtothedynasty.Inthesesocietiesthepublic,asanactiveandorganizedforce,doesnotexist.Itisapassivebody,stillinitstraditionalmouldsofkinshipandvillagecommunities.Thistraditionallystructuredopinionexhibitsapassiveconsensusonthemodeoftransferringpower(i.e.throughthedynasticline)andonthesovereignauthority,themonarch.Theseproto-dynasticstatesarefastpassing:buttheYemen,SaudiArabiaandEthiopiastillremain.Anymilitaryinterventioninsuchstatesasthesewouldbeexercisedinthenameofthedynasty-asitwasintherevoltoftheEthiopianImperialGuardin1960.

-89-

COUNTRIESOFDEVELOPEDPOLITICALCULTURE

Insocietiesofthisorderofpoliticalculturelegitimationofmilitaryruleisresisted.Thetypicallevelsofmilitaryinterferencerangefrominfluencetoblackmail.Theviolentoverthrowofagovernmentmayindeedbeattempted,sincethemilitarymayberashenoughtotryanything;buttheattemptsarerare,briefandunsuccessful.Thecharacteristicmethodsarethosewhichoperatefrombehindthescenesandthereasonisthatthecivilinstitutionswhicharebeingmanipulatedaretheonesthatcommandeffectivepublicsupport.

Evenattheheightoftheirpower,i.e.duringthePacificwar,thearmedforcesofJapansparedtheconstitutionandthepoliticalinstitutionsithallowed.Truethepartieshadbeeninducedtodissolvethemselvesandperfunctoryandunsuccessfuleffortsweremadetoconstituteasortofpopular'rally'oftheJapanesepublic.ButtheDietcontinuedtosit,andtheformerpartymencontinuedtositinitandcriticizethegovernmentthroughoutthewar.

ForalthoughthemilitarywaspowerfulinJapan,itwasonlyoneelementofanold-establishedandtraditionalsystemofwhichtheotherelementswerealsostrong.Themilitaryhadaprivilegedconstitutionalposition;ithadstrongrootsinthepeasantryandsoapowerfulsocialbasis.Itcontrolledaneducationalsystemofitsown.Itenjoyedgreatprestige,andhadcenturiesofheroictraditionbehindit.Despiteallthis,ithadtoco-existwithotherequallywellrootedinstitutions.Therewere,firstofall,theformalinstitutionssetdowninthe1889Constitutionand,becausethiswasanimperialdocument,hallowedassacrosanct--astheTenno(orEmperor)wassacrosanct.TheseinstitutionsweretheTennohimself,whoseservantstheywere,andhisImperialHousehold.TherewastheGenro,thecounciloftheeldersofthefiveclanswhichhadactedtillthelate1920sastheeffectivebalancewheelofthewholeimperialconstitution.ThereweretheDietandtheCabinet.Operatingthroughtheseinstitutionswererivalpolitical'orders',whichhademergedjustasthemodernarmyandnavyhad,attheMeijirestorationof1868.ThegreatclansofChoshuandSatsumahadlaidholdofthemachineryofstate:havingdoneso,theclansmengraduallysplitintothemilitarybureaucracy(theGumbatsu)andthecivilbureaucracy(theKanbatsu),andthusbothhadacommonclanorigin.Thiscivilbureaucracywasacorpsd'éliterecruitedbyopencompetitive

-90-

examination,almostexclusivelyfromTokyoandKyotouniversities.Ithadagreatprofessionalself-esteemandlookedontheotherforces,includingthemilitary,witharrogantdisdain.Thirdlythereweretheparties.ThesewerefirstformedfromtheclansthathadbeenleftinthecoldwhenChoshuandSatsumaseizedtheadministrationafter1868.SincethentheyhadlosttheirclanassociationsandinsteadweretheorgansofthenewlyarrivedZaibitsu,particularlythegreathousesofMitsubishiandMitsui.Tradeandindustrydevelopedwithprodigiousspeedand,withit,urbanization,industrialassociationsandlabourunions.Japanhadbecomeamodernindustrialstateanditspublicwaswide,highlyliterateandorganized.Thepartiesthereforewerealsoarealforce.Thesevariousforcesinfiltratedwhateverorgansofgovernmenttheycould.ThemilitaryoperatedthroughtheSupremeCommand.TheZaibitsuandtheKanbatsurivalledoneanotherbyinfiltratingthesameorgans,e.g.thePrivyCouncil,theHouseofPeersandtheDiet.Thepointisthat'theParliamentaryStatehadneverexistedwithouttheconcurrentsupportandcoexistenceofthebureaucraticandmilitaristicelements,allofwhichmadeupacharacteristicJapanesepolity.'3ThehistoryofmodernJapanfrom1890to1945wasastrugglebetweenmilitary,civilbureaucracy,thecapitalistsandthetwopoliticalparties.

Thecharacteristiclevelsofmilitaryintervention,therefore,wereinfluence,and,from1930onwards,blackmail-alarge-scaleoffensiveagainstthecivilianelementsusingpoliticalintrigue,constitutionalobstruction,popularpropaganda,andterrorismandmurder.Butalthoughsmallgroupsofplottersdidfromtimetotimeplantodestroythecabinetandseizepowerforthearmy(e.g.theMarchandOctoberincidentsof1931),onlyoncedidtheybringtheissuetothetest.ThiswasintheFebruarymutinyof1936,anditsoutcomeproveddecisivelythatthetraditionalcivilianinstitutionsofJapanweretoopervasiveandresistantforovertmilitaryinterventiontosucceed.

Forinthefirstplace,themutinywastheculminatingpointintheclashoftwoarmyfactions,theKodo-haandtheTosei-ha,which,significantly,stoodforoutrightmilitaryruleandcovertmilitarymanipulationofthecivilauthoritiesrespectively.TheKodo-haenvisagedthesuppressionofthepartiesandoftheDiet,andtheforcibleregimentationoftheZaibitsuelementsunderamilitary

____________________3 P.A.M.Linebarger(Ed.),FarEasternGovernmentandPolitics,p.404.

-91-

governmentrulinginthenameoftheEmperor.TheTosei-haenvisagedaone-partysystem,workingwithinthetraditionalsystem,andcontrolledbythemilitary.Secondly,themutinywasinitiallysuccessful.TwoinfantryregimentsandsomeoftheGuardslefttheirbarracks.Theysplitupintomurderbandsandsucceededinkillingalargenumberoftheseniorstatesmen.TheythenoccupiedazoneinthecentreofTokyo.Atthisstagetheauthoritieswerecompletelyataloss,andinnopositiontoofferanyresistance.Thirdly,however,thiswaspreciselyasfarasthemutinywent.Noseniorofficersjoinedtherebels.Nopopularmovementsdemonstratedforthem.Noseniorpoliticiansofferedtheirsupport.Andontheirside,therebelsdidnothingeither-excepttoleaveamimeographedmanifestoateachofthenewspaperofficesonthenextmorning.Forfourdaystherebelsandtheauthoritiesfacedoneanotherinsilence.ThedecisiveactionwasinitiatedbytheEmperor,usuallyapassivespectatorofthepoliticalscene.Herehemadeitabsolutelyclearthatthiswasamutinyandthatitmustbesuppressed.Withthisdecisionthewholecivilmachineryofthestateoperatedoncemore.Martiallawwasdeclared,troopswerebroughtinfromtheoutside,andthenavypreparedtoact.Therebelsweresummonedtosurrender,andfinallydidso.Theyweredeniedtheprivilegeofapublictrial,and,instead,weretriedbysecretcourtmartial.Furthermore,unlikepreviousplotters,theringleaderswereexecuted.Fourthly,theignominiouscollapseoftherebelliondidnotweakenthearmy'spositionvis-à-visthecivilauthorities.Itimmenselystrengthenedit,butnotbywayoftheKodo-ha.Thisfactionwasdefeated.Powerinthearmypassedtothe'control'school,theTosei-ha.From1936itsuccessfullycarriedoutitsprogramme,sothatby1940thepartieshadbeendissolved,theZaibitsuharnessedtoasiegeeconomy,andultimatedecisionsvestedinthemilitary-dominatedLiaisonCommittee.Thustheeventsof1936dramaticallyexposedthefutilityofattemptingovertmilitaryrule,andvindicatedtheviewthat,inJapaneseconditions,themilitarymustsecuretheircontrolfromwithin.'Therewerelimitstoitspower.Itcouldnotrulethecountrydirectlyand,indeed,preferredthetraditionalmethodofindirectrule.Itcouldnotdispensewiththepoliticians,theForeignOffice,thebureaucratsandtheindustrialists.Whileithaditsalliesamongallthesegroupsitalsohaditsenemies.'4

____________________

4 F.C.Jones,'TheMilitaryDominationofJapanesePolicy,19311945'.(SoldiersandGovernments,Ed.M.Howard,p.125.)

-92-

WhattheFebruarymutinyistotheJapaneseexperience,theKappputschof1920istotheGerman.Duringthewholeperiodfrom1918to1934theGermanarmyhadthefinalword.Yetitsrôlewascharacterizedbytwofeatures.Inthefirstplaceitwasalwaysconcealedbysomeconstitutionalorciviliancloak-evenintheKappputschtherebelliousarmyunitsplannedagovernmentunderKapp,acivilian.Secondly,withtheexceptionoftheKappputsch,italwayssoughtsomepretextoflegality.EvenSchleicher,theinveterateschemerforamilitarygovernment,soughttoachievethisbyinvokingtheStateofEmergencyunderArticle48oftheConstitution.Furthermore,heandhislikesoughtallianceswiththeNazisonlybecausetheyknewthatthearmycouldnotrulewithoutsomepowerfulmassbasistogiveitsupportandcolouroflegitimacy.Oneofthereasonswhichconvincedthemofthiswas,precisely,thefailureoftheKappputsch.

TheunderlyingreasonliesinthetraditionofcivilinstitutionsinGermany,andthehighlyorganizednatureofthepublicwhichsupportedthem.TheEmpirehadinheritedfromPrussianotonlythearmybutalsothebureaucracyandwiththisthecultofregulationsandpunctilicuslegalism.WithintheEmpire,too,therehadgrownup-asinJapan-avastindustrialization,sothatthepublicbecameurbanized,andorganizedintoindustrialassociationsandtradeunions.Moreover-unlikeJapan-thechurcheswereapowerfulcivilianforce.ThustheEmpirewasasocietyinwhichcivilianinstitutionsandlegalitywereimportant;inwhichthepublic,organizedbychurches,economicassociationsandpoliticalparties,waspowerful;andinwhichcivilianorgansliketheEmperorandthebureaucracywerestronglyrootedintradition.TheWeimerperioddidnotdestroytheholdofinstitutionslikethebureaucracyorthearmyuponthepublic,andstrengthenedratherthanotherwisetheorganizednatureofpublicopinion.Theeffectofthe1918defeatwas,rather,todestroythepreviousconsensusonthecharacteristicsandlocationoflegitimateauthority.

Aswehavealreadyshown,thisbroughtaboutasituationofovertcrisislastingfrom1918tothetriumphofHitler,duringwhichthearmybecamethearbiterofGermanpolitics.Yetthetraditionofcivilianismandlegalitywassostrongthat,asinJapan,itcouldexercisepoweronlybehindthescenes.TheKappputschdemonstratedtheimpossibilityofovertaction,i.e.theviolentoverthrowofgovernmentforanotherofamorecomplaisantcomplexion.

InFebruary1920theGermangovernmentreceivedtheAlliedlist

-93-

ofwarcriminals.AnationalistfrenzyshookGermanyfromLefttoRight.Andthearmy,fromLüttwitztoVonSeeckt,determinedtofightratherthancomply.

WhiletheBauergovernmenttemporized,GeneralLüttwitzfavouredamarchonBerlin.Hismilitarycolleaguespersuadedhimtowaituntillegalmeanswereexhausted.HethereforeconfinedhimselftothedemandthatthegovernmentshoulddissolvetheAssembly,andholdnewelectionsfortheReichstagandforthePresidency.

Meanwhilehewasintouchwithaformercivilservant,Kapp,aleadinglightinanextremelyright-wingpartywhosepurposewastolockupthegovernmentandestablishanauthoritarianrégimeunderaReichsverweser,inwhichthePrussianvirtuesofdutyandobedienceweretobereaffirmed.

BauerrefusedLüttwitz'sdemands;andLüttwitz,oncehelearnedthatthenavalbrigadewasbeingtakenfromhim,felthemustactimmediately.ThePresidenttoldhimtoobeyordersorresign;thattheReichswehrwasnotbehindLüttwitzandthatifheactedthePresidentwouldproclaimageneralstrike.Thenextday,thegovernmentopenlydismissedLüttwitzandissuedwarrantsforthearrestofKapp.SoLüttwitzmarched.

ThegovernmentfledtoDresden,andKappwasinstalledattheChancellery.Apparentlynovictorycouldbemorecomplete.But,againasinJapan,nobodyralliedtothenewgovernment.Nopoliticalleadersorpartiesofferedsupport.IndeedthecivilservicebegantoresistandtherestoftheReichswehrweresilent.And,atthedemandofthegovernment-in-exile,thegeneralstrikewasindeedproclaimed.ThelifeofBerlin-communications,light,foodsupply-wasinstantaneouslyandtotallyextinguished.MeantimethewretchedKapp,liketheJapanesemutineers,markedtime.Hedidnotevenhaveamanifestoready.Ithadtobetypedbyhiswifeonaborrowedmachineandwascirculatedtoolatetoreachthemorningpapers.Inthefaceofthestrikeandthetotalabsenceofsupport,heremainedindecisive.SomeeffortsofLüttwitz'stroopstogettheworkersbacktoworkledonlytosomefutilecasualties.OnMarch17,afterfivedaysofpointlessisolationintheChancellery,Kapp,accompaniedbyhishystericalandweepingdaughter,fledtoFinland.Theputschwasover.Itleftinitswakeallthesignsofviolentcivilianresistance-revoltsinSaxonyandtheRuhr,WorkersCouncilseverywhere.TheGeneralStaff,asGörlitzcomments,'hadanewobjectlessonto

-94-

demonstratetheabsurdityofamilitarydictatorshipwithoutamassbasis'.5Fromthenon,theGermanarmy,liketheJapanese,workedbyinfluenceandblackmail.ThesewerethelevelsimposedbythepoliticalculturelevelofGermansociety.

AndthesamelevelsareimposedbythepoliticalculturelevelofFrance;thisisthemoraloftheFourGenerals'revoltofApril22,analogousinallessentialswiththeKappputschandtheFebruarymutiny.'France'seconomicandsocialstructurehasgonewellbeyondtheeraofpronunciamentos',wroteMauriceDuverger.6When,in1958,Soustelletoldafellow-conspiratorthathehimselfwouldnotinitiateabreachoflegalitybutwouldleavesuchadecisiontothegenerals,hiscolleague(acivilianlikeSoustelle)replied,'ThatsentencecanonlybespokeninSpanish.'7TheTreizeMai(1958)showedthatthearmycouldbringdownagovernmentandimposeanewone.April22,1961,justasforciblyshowedthatitcouldnotstandaloneasarivalgovernmenttothecivilpower.Forthisistheessentialdifferencebetweenthetwosituations;inthefirst,theexerciseofcovertpressuresandintimidationtoimposedeGaulle;inthesecond,theopen,publicanddirectseizureoftheauthorityofthestateinAlgeriainflagrantdefianceofthelegalorder.In1958,therevoltbeganwithcivilians,andthearmyinAlgeriawassuckedintoit;in1961,itbeganwiththearmyandnociviliansjoinedit.In1958,MassuandSalanputthemselvesattheheadoftheciviliansreluctantly,firstto'control'themandthentointimidatetheNationalAssemblyintorejectingPflimlinasPrimeMinister.WhentheiractiononlyprovokedtheAssemblyintoinvestingPflimlintheybecameterrifiedattheirtemerityinbreaching'republicanlegality'.'Noussommesfoutus'wasMassu'sreactiontothenews,andthestiffeningattitudeoftheParisgovernmentalarmedthegeneralsstillmore;butin1961,thefourgeneralsdecideddeliberatelytobreachlegalityanddefytheconsequences.In1958theircompromisedstatusledMassuandSalantoclutcheagerlyatthesuggestiontoraisethecry,'DeGaulleaupouvoir';forachangeofgovernmentwasnowtheirbestandpossiblytheironlyhopeofimmunity.Butin1958,whattransformedtheirsituationwasGeneraldeGaulle'spublicannouncementthathewaswillingtoassumethepowersoftheRepublic.Tothearmyandnotmerelythegenerals-deGaullerepresentedamorecongenial

____________________5 W.Görlitz,TheGermanGeneralStaff,p.221.6 Quoted,A.Werth,ThedeGaulleRevolution,p.89.7 Quoted,P.WilliamsandM.Harrison,DeGaulle'sRepublic,p.56.

-95-

régimethantheFourthRepublic;tothepeopleandpoliticiansofFranceherepresentedanescapefromthepossibilityofcivilwar.Ashehimselfputit,'belongingtonobodyIbelongtoeverybody'.IftheFourthRepublicbegantototteratthatpoint,itwasduetodeGaulle,nottoGeneralsMassuandSalan.ItwasonlywhenciviliansentimentbegantoswingbehinddeGaullethatthearmybegantoplotitsbreachesoflegalityandthewarofnervesagainsttheRepublic.NotuntildeGaullehadspokendidtheairforcedipitswingsinsaluteoverColombey,andunitsbegintochalkuptheircrossesofLorraine.ItwasonlythenthattheemboldenedGeneralSalanauthorizedtheraidonCorsicaandthusforthefirsttimeopenlybrokethelaws;anditwasonlythenthatoperation'Resurrection'wasplannedtoseizeMetropolitanFrance.Thethreatofviolencewasunleashedwhen-andnotuntil-analternativeciviliangovernmentandasupportingpublicopinionwasforthcoming.Andbythesametokentheresistanceofthegovernment,powerfulandincreasingbeforethenameofdeGaullewascanvassed,firstfaltered,thencrumbled,andultimatelycollapsed,asdeGaulle'smagicnamefirstconfusedthesupportersoftherégimeandfinallycapturedthem.

TreizeMaidemonstratedthatthearmycouldintimidateagovernmentintoresigning-providedthearmyhadpowerfulciviliansupport.Butitreceivedsuchsupportonlybyadoptingasitscandidateonewhowasamasterfulpublicfigureinhisownright,andapoliticiantoboot.April22demonstrated,percontra,thatbydefyingthisfigureitbroughtagainstitselfthefullweightofcivilianresistance,andthatinfaceofthisitwaspowerless.

IntheearlyhoursofApril22,1961,the1stDivisionofparatroopersenteredthecityofAlgiersandpossessedthemselvesofthepublicbuildingswithoutanystruggle.GeneralChalleproclaimedastateofsiegeandorderedallcivilauthoritiestoobeytheordersofthearmy.Inhispronunciamentohedeclaredthatheandhiscolleagues(GeneralsZeller,JouhaudandSalan)weresimplyactingtokeeptheiroath,'thearmyoathofguardingAlgeria'.WithinafewhoursthegarrisonsofOranandConstantinewerebroughtover.AsintheKappputschandtheFebruarymutiny,thetriumphofthearmywasinallappearancescomplete.Atthatmomentthesituationofthemetropolitangovernmentseemeddesperate.

Itssecurityserviceshadfailed-throughcomplicity,ithassincebeenalleged.ThebulkofthearmywasinAlgeria,nowinthehandsoftherebels.Theremainderofthearmy,situatedinGermany,was

-96-

onlydoubtfullyloyal.AtanymomentskybornetroopsmightinvadeParis.Thereseemednothingtostopthem.Butthegovernmentwenttoworkwiththeonethingthataloneremainedtoit-itsmoralauthority.AndthishadbeenswelledbytheoverwhelmingvoteofconfidencereceivedbyGeneraldeGaulleinthereferendumofJanuary8,onlythreemonthsbefore.

Itdidnotcompromise,itattacked.Itdeclaredthecoup'agraveandpremeditatedactofindiscipline'.Recallingthatthewillofthenationhadbeenexpressedintherecentreferendum,thePrimeMinisterstatedthat'Thegovernmentisdeterminedtomakethewillofthenationrespected'.ThePresident,GeneraldeGaulle,clampeddownuponFrancetheStateofEmergency,underthenotoriousandcontroversialArticle16oftheConstitution;andthen,advancingtothetelevisionscreen,andspeakingdirectlyintothehomesofthepeopleofFrance,hepronouncedthesegraveanddefiantwords:

'Iforbidallsoldierstoobeytherebels....Ishallmaintainthis[my]legitimatepowerwhateverhappens,uptothetermofmymandateoruntilsuchtimeasIceasetohavenecessarymeanstodosoorceasetobealive....InthenameofFranceIcommandthatallmeans-Irepeatallmeans-beusedtobarthewaytothosemen....Françaises!Français!Aidez-moi!'

Buses,lorries,coachesstoodreadytorushupontheairfieldsandblockthemagainstairbornetroops.Thegovernmentaskedthepeopletoflocktotheairfieldsif,despitethesemeasures,troopsmanagedtoland.RepublicanandmobileguardsinarmouredcarsandtanksmovedtoprotecttheElyséePalace.TheauthoritiesbeganarmingacivilianHomeGuard.ThesecuritypolicesweptParisforsuspects.Theparachutistsdidnotcomethatnight.ThenextdaythegovernmentbegantoformaforceofRepublicanguardsandreservists,10,000strong.ItimposedafinancialandshippingblockadeofAlgeria.Asasignofciviliansolidarity,tenmillionworkmenstruckforonehourthroughoutMetropolitanFrance.LaterthatdayGeneralCrépin,theCommander-in-ChiefofthedoubtfuldivisionsinWestGermanydeclaredforthegovernmentandhisformationsbegantorolltowardsParis.TheAlgerianparatroopersdidnotcomeonthatnighteither.

Theirdelaywasfatal.TherebelgeneralsheldallAlgeria;butnobody(excepttheinevitableOrtizandLagaillarde)joinedthem.InMetropolitanFrancenobodydemonstratedforthemandno

-97-

politicianscameforwardtojointheircause.TheyremainedinphysicalcontrolofAlgeria;thatwasall;andthatwasalsoantoobrief.InthefaceoftheirisolationandthegrowingresistanceofthepeopleofFrance,unitswhichhadconstrainedlyjoinedthegeneralsbegantoreturntotheirallegiance.TheparatroopsmarchedoutofOran.RebelparatroopsfailedtotakeMersElKebirfromthefleet.TheairforcerefusedtolifttroopstoFrance;someofitsplanesactuallyfledtoFrance.Conscripttroops,listeningtothewordsofdeGaulleontheirtransistorsets,becamerestiveorofferedpassiveresistance.Seizingitsopportunitythegovernmentbecamestillfirmer.GeneraldeGaulleorderedallforcesinAlgeriatouse'allmeansincludingtheuseofarmstostoptheinsurrection,thensmashitandfinallyliquidateit'.Thatnight,too,thefleetsailedsouthwardfromToulon.

Afewhourslater,therevoltcollapsed.The1stDivisionwithdrewfromAlgiersandloyaltroopsoccupiedthecity.ThegeneralsfledsaveforGeneralChallewhowasseizedandhurriedofftoaParisprison.

Inallthesethreecases-Kappputsch,FebruarymutinyandtheAprilrebellion-thearmy,actingaloneandindefianceofcivilianopinion,wasisolatedandthendefeatedbycivilianresistances.Inallthesecountries,whereverlawfulauthoritymightbethoughttolie,therewaswidespreadconsensusthatitdidnotliewiththemilitary.Inallthesecountries,therefore,thearmywaspowerlesstogetitswayunlessanduntilithadlearnedthatitmustworkwithinthecurrentpoliticalformula,withinthetraditionsoflegitimacy.Thatmeant,frombehindsomebodyofcivilianleaderswhoenjoyedamassbackingamongthepopulation.AftertheKappputschfailed,thetruereignoftheReichswehrbegan-butfrombehindthescenes.AftertheFebruarymutiny,theTosei-hafactionoftheJapanesearmyhadnodifficultyindominatingallsuccessivegovernmentsuntilmilitarydefeatin1945.TheFrencharmyreversedthisorderofexperience;successfulinbringingdeGaulletopowerin1958,itfailed,likeitsGermanandJapaneseforebears,inadirectchallengetothecivilpower.Thereasonliesinthesethreecountries'orderofpoliticalculture.Consensusonlegitimacyorthemodesoftransferringpoliticalpowerwerenotperfectenoughforgovernmentalwaystobeabletoresistintimidationandblackmail:butitwaswidespreadenough,andtheorganizationandmobilizationofcivilianlifewasstrongenough,toresisttheopenassumption

-98-

ofpowerbythemilitary.Thecharacteristiclevelsofmilitaryinterventioninsuchcountrieswerethereforeinfluence(constitutionalenough)andpressureandblackmail.

Beforeleavingcountriesofthesecondorder,i.e.withadevelopedpoliticalculture,wemust,however,consideroneothercountrythatfallsintothisclass.ThisistheU.S.S.R.Inthiscountry,theovertdisplacementorsupersessionoftherulinggroupinflagrantdefianceofthecivilinstitutionsandnotablyoftheCommunistPartyisasunlikelytooccur(andasunlikelytobesuccessfulifitdidoccur)asinWeimarGermany,pre-warJapanandcontemporaryFrance.Ontheotherhand,militaryinfluence,pressureandevenblackmailaimedatejectingtherulinggroupoftheCommunistPartyandreplacingitbyanalternativepartygroupcouldoccurand,indeed,hasdoneso.

However,tosuggestthatcivil-militaryrelationsintheU.S.S.R.maybeevenmentionedinthesamebreathasothernon-communistcountrieswillstrikemanyasbeingoutrageous.Somewillresenttheimplicationthatanyfrictionbetweensoldiersandcivilianscouldariseinaworkers'socialistrepublic.Attheotherextreme,otherswillobjecttotheU.S.S.R.beingregardedasequalinitspoliticalcultureleveltotheothercountrieswehavedealtwithhere.AnothersetofobjectionswillcomefromthosewhoimaginethattherelationshipoftheCommunistPartytothearmedforcesissopeculiarastobeunique,andwhothinkthatacategoryof'party-controlled'armiesmustbeerectedasaspecialandextraordinarycase,notsubjecttothekindofconsiderationwehavesofarbeenurging.Letus,therefore,taketheseobjectionsinorder;for,bydoingsoweshallineffectbemakingoutourowncaseforplacingtheU.S.S.R.atthissecondlevelofpoliticalculture.

Tobeginwith,civil-militaryrelationsintheU.S.S.R.arenotfrictionless;butamythologyexistswhichpreventscertainfolkfromperceivingthis.TheSoviethandbook,TheU.S.S.R.TodayandTomorrow,tellsusthattheSovietarmy,'beingthearmyofasocialiststate,hascertaindistinctivefeatures'.Amongtheseitnotesparticularlythatitis'anarmyofthepeople';that'contradictions'betweentheofficersandmendonotexistbecausetheysharethesameworldoutlook;andthatitisan'integralpartoftheRussianpeople'.8NowinthefirstplacetheSovietarmyisnotanarmedmilitia,notthecommonpeopleinarms,notasetofpartisandetachmentsora

____________________8 TheU.S.S.R.TodayandTomorrow,Moscow,1959,p.56.

-99-

revolutionaryarmylikeFidelCastro's'3000'.Itisanenormousstandingforce,withahighlyprofessionalizedofficercorpswho,moreover,enjoyapamperedstatusinsociety;anditdisposesofadisciplinewhichcompareswiththeoldPrussianarmyatitsharshest.Second,itsclasslessnessisneitherherenorthere.'Bourgeois'officercorpsmakecoupsanddisplacegovernmentsthataresimilarly'bourgeois'incomplexion:andtheydosotosetupanewgovernmentequallybourgeois,butmorecomplaisanttothemilitary.Inasimilarmannermighta'classless'andindeedacommunistarmydisplacea'classless'andcommunistgovernmentinfavourofanequallyclasslessandcommunistone,butwhosepolicywasmorepleasingtothemilitary.Andthird,thisispreciselywhatsuccessiveSovietgovernmentshavefearedsincetheRedArmywasestablishedin1917-aso-called'Bonapartist'coup.Furthermore,theydidsowithgoodreason.Theirrelationswiththeirarmedforceshavebeenshotthroughwithfriction-aswitnesstheKronstadtmutinyof1922,thegreatpurgeof1937,andthethreemilitaryinterventionsof1953,1955,and1957.

However,theSovietmilitaryisbynomeansuntrammelledinitsactivities.Ithasfarlessscopeforinterventionthanithadinthe1920sand1930sandmuchlessthanthemilitaryhaveinthesatellitecountries,whichareofamuchlowerorder-thethirdorder-ofpoliticalculturelevel.ItistemptingtoseeintheU.S.S.R.astateof'latentopposition'tothegovernment,asin,say,pre-1958Iraq.OtherswhochampiontheU.S.S.R.seeitasafirstorderstate,'themostdemocraticintheworld',inwhichthe'contradictions'ofcapitalistsocietieslikeBritain,SwedenortheUnitedStateshavelongsincebeentranscendedandwhere,therefore,afortioritherecanbenodoubtastothemasssupportenjoyedbytheSovietgovernment.Yetthetruthseemstoliebetweentheseextremeviews.For,firstly,thereisaconsensusonwherelegitimacyresides.ItisthoughttoresideintheCommunistParty.Itsimprimatur,itsendorsement,isgenerallyacceptedasmakingdecisionslegitimateandduty-worthy.Bythesametoken,theexpression'anti-party'carriesastigmaofusurpation.Itmaywellbethattheconsensusonthisisafragileone,andahighlyartificialone;thatitissecuredonlybycontinuousunremittingindoctrinationandthesanctionsoffear;thatitrestsonacquiescenceandaboveallonlonghabituationinwhatistodayoneofthestuffiestofconformingsocietiesintheworld;andthat,ifcrackedbysomeexternalorinternalblow,amuch

-100-

moremobileandadventurousopinionwouldrapidlyemergeasitdidinHungaryandistodayemerginginPoland.Nevertheless,atthemoment,thisconsensusexists.Particularactsoftherégimeareunpopular;buttherégimeitselfisnotactivelyunpopular.Inthisrégime,theparty,atthemomentatanyrate,isgenerallyregardedasthelegitimatesourceofauthority.

Furthermore,civilianorganizationsarehighlydeveloped.Indeed,thesituationtodayisnotunlikethatinpre-warJapan.There,aswesaw,politicsconsistedoftheinterplayofcertainmassiveinstitutions:thebureaucracy,thecapitalistZaibitsu,thearmedforces,thetwoparties.Thearmedforceshadtolivewithandworkthroughthesewell-establishedinstitutionswhichwere,moreover,indispensabletothenationallife.Inlikemanner,politicsinSovietRussiaconsistsoftheinterplayofthenotableswhoheadandspeakforthenotalwaysidenticalinterestsofmassiveinstitutions-inthiscasetheparty'apparatus',thecivilbureaucracy(i.e.stateapparatus),themanagers,thepoliceandthearmy.UnlikeJapan,alltheseareintegrated-asfarasintegrationispossible-bythecommonelementofpartymembership,andtheneedtorespecttheauthorityofthosewho,forthemoment,leadtheparty(i.e.itsPraesidium).Themilitarymust,liketheotherelements,workwithandthroughtheseotherinstitutions.Itcannotreplacethem-theyareindispensable.Norcanit,anymorethanthey,setupinoppositiontotheparty.ThiswouldcertainlysurvivedecapitationjustastheDemocraticPartyinTurkeyhasdone,andwouldbeable(astheTurkishDemocraticPartywasunabletodo)topullintooppositionalargepartofthemassassociations-tradeunions,industrialplantsandthelike-whichtheyhaveinfiltrated.Therefore,allmustbedoneinthenameoftheparty.Solongasthisisso,thepartymembershipwillnotonlyaccept,butfervidlyexecutethedecision.Themomentthisisnotso,therankandfileoftheparty,whosesupportforapartydecisionistakenforgranted,couldandwouldcreatemassivedislocation.

Thus,twoofthefeaturesofahighpoliticalculturearepresent:consensusorlegitimacy,andwell-developedcivilinstitutions,includingapartywhichbuttressesthisconsensus.Whatlacks,however,isthethirdnecessaryelement:fixedandorderlyprocedurestodeterminethetransferenceoflegitimateauthorityfromonepersonorgrouptoanother.Therearenorulesforthis,andthedecisionisarrivedatbyapurepower-struggleinsideagroupofdedicatedoligarchs,whoowetheirplaceinthegametothesectors(party

-101-

apparatus,civilbureaucracy,police,military,etc.)whichatthemomenttheyhappentohold.9Thisstruggleisunremittingandruthless:truly,homohominilupus.ItisthisfeaturethatputstheSovietUnioninthesecondorderofpoliticalculture.Itpossessestenaciousandwell-establishedcivilinstitutions.Itenjoysaconsensusonwhatconstituteslegitimacy.Butthetransferenceoflegitimateauthorityisregulatedbynoorderlyandfixedproceduresandisaccomplishedbyagrimandoftenmortalstruggle.

Inthethirdplace,Sovietcivil-militaryrelationshipsarenotsuigenerisasthecatch-phrase,'party-control',seemstosuggest.Certainly,theSovietUnion'smonopolisticparty,designatedbothinlawandactualoperationas'theleadingcore'ofallSovietinstitutions,isasingularfeaturewhichhasimportantconsequences.Buttheexpression,'party-controlofthemilitary',notonlyexplainsnothing;itispositivelymisleading.Itexplainsnothingbecauseitishighlyambiguous.Itmayrefertothefactthatthemilitaryare,intheSovietcontext,supposedtoholdthemselvesresponsibletothepartyratherthan,asinothercountries,tothegovernmentofthedayortheHeadofState.Inshort,itmayrefertotheauthoritytowhomthemilitaryoweallegiance.Inthatcase,onewouldhavetoestablishothercategoriessuchas'Royal'-control(asinPersiaorthepre-warBalkancountries)wherethenatureofthearmy'ssuperiororganhasplayedasignificantpartindeterminingthelevelandtheresultsofmilitaryintervention.Butinanycase,theSovietarmy'slegalsuperiormightbeeithertheSupremeSovietortheCommunistParty;Sovietconstitutionallawsimplydoesnotpermitofapreciseanswer.10AndifitistheSovietarmy'sdefactostatusweareconcernedwith,thenagain,suchisthecomplexityandthereciprocityoftherelationshipbetweenpartyandmilitarythatnosimpleanswer,intermsofaruler-ruledrelationship,ispossible.11

Ontheotherhand,'partycontrol'mayrefertoameans,aspecificmeansadoptedbytheSovietauthoritiestobringaboutanidentityofviewbetweenthemselvesandthearmedforces,i.e.thepermeationofthearmedforcesbypartisansofthegovernment.Ifthisiswhatpartycontrolmeansthenitdiffersonlyindegree,notsuigeneris,

____________________10 H.J.BermanandM.Kerner,SovietMilitaryLawandAdministration,pp.5-7.11 Ibid.,pp.7-9.

9H.S.Dinerstein,WarandtheSovietUnion,pp.133-8;R.Conquest,PowerandPolicyintheU.S.S.R.,pp.46-8;R.L.Garthoff,'TheMilitaryinSovietPolitics'(ProblemsofCommunism,Vol.VI,No.6,pp.45-8).

-102-

fromotherarmedforces.TheefforttomakethearmedforcesconformtooneparticularpoliticalviewpointisnotpeculiartotheSovietUnion,ortoitssatellitesortorevolutionarygovernments.TheGreekarmywaspurgedofRepublicansbetween1920-3.JiménezofVenezuelalikewisepurgedhisarmyofknownandsuspectedopponents.HeusedsecretdelatorsandspiestoinformuponsuspectmembersofthearmedforcesjustastheSovietUniondoes.ThedifferencebetweenthemethodsusedintheSovietUnionandintheseotherandcapitalistcountriesisoneofdegree;noothergovernmentintheworlddemandssohighadegreeofidentitywithitsprogrammeasdoesSovietRussia,anddisposesofsuchabatteryofcontrolstoestablishit.

Thustheexpression,'partycontrol',ishighlyambiguousandbyitselfcontributeslittletounderstandingSovietcivil-militaryrelations.Thisisnotall.Itcanbehighlymisleading.Forifitisintendedasanexplanationofhoworwhythemilitaryarebroughttoconformwithcivilianprogrammes,itlaysstressonthewrongfactors.Therewasindeedatimewhen'partycontrol'explainedthisidentity.Thatwasinthedaysofthecivilwarsandtheiraftermath,whentheRedArmywasfightingforavaguelyexpressedrevolutionagainstcounter-revolution,andwhenitsofficercorpswaslargelycomposedofex-imperialofficers.Inthoseconditions,thepermeationofthearmybycommunist'cells',andtheflankingoftheofficersbymilitarycommissars,didindeedguaranteeloyaltytotherevolutionaryrégime.But,asthearmybecameincreasinglybolshevizedquiteadifferentproblemarose.In1924,thepercentageofofficerswhowerecommunistswas31percent,in192756percent,andby1930some90percent.Theproblemwasnolongertosecurethatthearmywascommunist;foritwas.Theproblemwasnowtosecurethatitscommunism-likethatofthetradesunions,orthepartymembersthemselves-wasoftherightvariety.TheinstitutionofthePoliticalCommand,underthecontroloftheparty'sCentralCommitteeandwithitsstaffofzampolitsandpolitruks12lacedintothearmycommandatallechelonsindeedservedtomakeandkeepthearmy'communist'.From1923onwards,however,andnotablyafter1930,theproblemhasbeentokeepitorthodox.Otherwisethearmymighthavehaditsownpeculiarversionofcommunism,differing

____________________

12 Zampolitisanabbreviation,meaningAssistantCommanderforPoliticalAffairs.Politruk,anotherabbreviation,signifiespoliticalinstructor.

-103-

fromandopposedtothegovernment'sorthepartyleadership's(justaspresumably'bourgeois'armieshavetheirownversionofcapitalismdifferentfromthegovernment's)inwhichcasethecivil-militarygulfopensonceagain.HencetheSovietgovernment'sconcernhasnotbeenconfinedtoindoctrination,whichisanecessaryconditionofcivil-militaryidentitybutnotasufficientone.Thesufficientconditionisorthodoxy;andthishasbeenachievedbyinfiltratingthearmedforceswiththesecretpolice,thecounter-intelligenceservicesoftheK.G.B.13Aboveregimentallevelstherearethespecial'OO'14detachments.Belowthat,thearmyispermeatedbythesecretcounter-intelligencepolice.Thereissimpleandconvincingproofthatpartyaffiliationisnolongerthedecisivemechanismforsecuringmilitaryloyalty,butthatthisisaccomplishedbytheK.G.B.'ssecuritynetwork-theproofcomesfromthegreatpurgeof1937.InitStalineliminated40percentofthemoreseniorandbetweenonehalfandone-quarterofthejuniorofficers.Yethedidnotconfinehimselftothecommandofficers.Onthecontrary,thepoliticalofficerswhoweresupposedlythepoliticaltutors,mentorsandcontrollersofthearmedpersonnel,werethemselvespurgedbytheO.G.P.U.inequaldegreewiththecommandstaff!15

Howthendoescivil-militaryfrictionariseintheSovietUnion,andwhatarethecharacteristiclevelsofmilitaryinterventionthere?

Fromitsinception,theSovietgovernmenthasbeenobsessedbyafearof'Bonapartism'.Andveryproperlyso.Revolutionaryandviolentinorigin,itjustlyfearedtobeoverthrownbyitsownmethods.HencetoadegreeunparalleledoutsidetheIronCurtain,ithasdoneallwithinitspowertocontrolitsarmedforces,ofwhich

____________________13 TheCommitteeonStateSecurity.

14

OOcomesfromtheRussianOsobyiOtdel.TheyaretheSpecialSections,i.e.counter-intelligencesections.DuringthesecondworldwartheywererenamedSMERSH,anabbreviationfortheRussianwordsmeaning'Deathtospies'.These00sectionsandtheirworkarewelldescribedinthelatterpartofZ.Brzezinski,PoliticalControlsintheSovietArmy,pp.54etseq.

Theearlierpartofthislittlebutimportantbookcontainsanaccountofthepartynetworkinthearmy,andisusefulinsupplementingBermanandKerner,op.cit.

15ThisgeneralthesisisamplysupportedthroughoutJ.EriksonmasterlyTheSovietHighCommand,whichIwasprivilegedtoreadingalley-proof.Forabriefbutauthoritativedescriptionoftheparty'spoliticalandsecurityapparatusinsidethearmedforces,seeBermanandKerner,op.cit.

-104-

itnourishesaperennialsuspicion.Ithassoughttodosobythreemainmeans.First,ithaspermeatedthearmedforceswithitsownideology,i.e.byitsPartymembers,andhaskepttheseloyaltotheleadershipbythesecretpoliceandthe'OO'detachments.Second,ithasbeenextremelycarefulnottousethearmedforcesasaninternalpoliceforce;insteadithasestablishedhand-pickedtroops,theM.V.D.regiments,forallsuchrepressivework.Finally,ithastakenallpossiblepainstopinchoffthosemotivationswhichmostcommonlyopposearmiestotheircivilleaders.Ithaspinchedoffaseparateclassinterestintheofficercorps;thisisas'classless'asthegovernmentitself.Ithaslikewisepinchedoffregionalinterestbynondiscriminationamongitsvariousnationalities.Andithaseffectivelypinchedoffself-interest.Ithaspamperedtheofficers,restoringtheImperialepaulettes,titlesandsalutes,payingthemwellandgivingthemsocialprivileges.

Oftheusualmotivations,aswehavelistedthemaboveinChapterFour,onlytworemain:themotiveofthenationalinterest,andthemotiveofcorporateself-interest.ThesetwodevilshavenotonlynotbeencastoutbytheSovietleaders'measures;theyhavebeenactivelyprovokedbythem.First,corporateself-interest.TheSovietarmedforcesarefullyprofessionalized;butideologicalorthodoxy,towhichtheymustpaylipservice,hamperstheirsearchformilitarydoctrine,justasithampersbiologistsoreconomistsintheSovietUnion.TheruleofStalinwasparticularlyfrustratinginthisrespect;forinstance,itprovedimpossibleseriouslytodiscusstheissueof'surprise'inwar,since,accordingtoStalin,thiswasnotimportantinthelongrun.16Inaddition,fromtheverybeginningthecommandershavechafedatbeingrestrictedbythepoliticalcommissars.Theyhaveconstantlydemanded'unitarycontrol'asagainsttheparty'sinsistenceon'dualcontrol'.Thevicissitudesofthe'dualcontrol'mechanismtelltheirownstoryhere.Thesystemwasintroducedin1918.In1936,withtheincreasingthreatofwar,thecommandstaffbegantoelbowoutthepoliticalcommandonthepleathattheylackedtechnicalskills.In1937,whenthepurgebegan,however,'dualcontrol'wasrestoredinitsfullintensity,withthecommissarcoequalwiththecommander.AfterthefiascooftheFinnishwar(1940),MarshalTimoshenko,thenewCommissaroftheArmedForces,wasabletopersuadeStalinthatthedualcommandmustbeabolishedandsoitwas.Thentheevengreaterfiascoofthe

____________________16 R.Conquest,op.cit.,p.330etseq.

-105-

firstmonthoftheGermanwar(1941)broughtaboutitsreintroduction.InOctober1942,however,itwasagainabolishedandonemancontrolrestored.MarshalZhukovwasejectedfromcontrolofthearmedforcesin1957becauseheostensiblysoughttoweakenthealreadyenfeebledpoliticaladministrationstillfurther.In1960,however,afurtherchangemadethecommandofficerhimselfresponsibleforideologicaltrainingwiththepoliticalofficersresponsibletohim.

Thusthemotiveofprofessionalself-interestremains,andisresistivetoideologicalrequirements.Atthesametimetherégime'sveryanxietytoindoctrinateandpoliticizeitsarmedforcesinthehopeofmakingthempoliticallyreliablemayhave,andhashad,diametricallyoppositeeffects.Itmaycreateinthemanideaofthenationalinterestdifferentfromthatoftherulinggroup;andindeedithasdoneso.Eriksonobservesoftheperiod1923-5,that'factionalworkwithinthearmedforcescarriedwithitthethreatofsplittingtheRedArmyintotwocamps'andthat'thecontrolapparatusmightnotonlyceasetocontrolbutworkagainsttheinterestsoftherulingpoliticalgroupinconditionsofinner-partyconflict'.17Thelogicisobvious.TherulinggroupofthehourusesthePoliticalCommandandtheK.G.B.toeliminatethepoliticallyunreliableandtopromoteintoauthoritythosewhosubscribetotheirownviews.ThustheHighCommandiscommittedtoaspecificpoliticalviewandisloyaltoaparticulargroupofpartyleaders.Supposenowthattheseleaderssubsequentlysplitintotworivalfactions:thesupportofthemilitarymaybethrowntoeither-butitwillcertainlynotstayneutral!Andbythesametoken,whentherulinggroupsplits,bothsideswillbidforthesupportoftheHighCommand.

Thisispreciselywhathashappened,notoncebutmanytimes,andthewayinwhichithappensandtheconsequencesforthemilitaryillustratethecharacteristiclevelsatwhichtheSovietmilitaryintervenesinpolitics.In1923,forinstance,thepartywasdividedbetweenTrotsky'sminorityandthemajoritywhofollowedthe'Troika'ofleaders,viz.Zinoviev,KamenevandStalin.TrotskywasstillnominallyresponsiblefortheRedArmy,andthepartycellswithinittendedtosupporthim;indeedthewholeMoscowgarrisonpassedtohisfactioninthisway.TheTroikathereforesoughtforacounter-

____________________

17 Erikson,op.cit.Itisimpossibletogivethepagereferenceasthebookhasnotyetbeenpublished.Myitalics.

-106-

poiseanditfoundthisamongthe'red'commanders,i.e.thosewhohadheldonlyN.C.O.rankornoneatallintheimperialarmy,asagainsttheex-imperialofficerswhomTrotskybefriendedandonwhomhemuchrelied.This'emergentcommandgroup'threwitssupporttotheTroikainthevital1924CongressandwasabletoplacethecontrolofthePoliticalCommandinthehandsofoneofTrotsky'senemiesandtoappointhisopponentFrunzeashisnominaldeputy,buteffectivelyasthecontrollerofthemilitarymachine.OneoftheconsequenceswasthatVoroshilov,Budenny,S.Kamenevandthe'1stCavalryclique'generally,weregiveninfluentialpostsandbecamedevotedStalinists.

Stalin(1930-53)gavethemilitarynoopportunitytoplayanindependentpoliticalrôle.Since1953,however,inconditionsofintensecompetitionfortheleadershipandever-changingalliancesinthetopechelonsoftheparty,themilitaryhaveinterveneddecisivelyonthreeoccasions.ThefirstwastheeliminationofBeriain1953.ItiscertainthatarmyunitsenteredMoscowfromtheoutsideonthenightofhisarrest,anditisevensaidthatMarshalsZhukovandKonievcarriedoutthearrestthemselves.18ThesecondoccasionwasthedepositionofMalenkov;herethemilitaryleadersintheCentralCommitteecasttheirvotesagainstMalenkov.19ThethirdoccasionwasinKrushchev'scriticalstruggleagainsthisopponentsonthePraesidium-Molotov,Bulganin,Kaganovich,MalenkovandShepilov-latersignificantlydubbedthe'anti-partybloc'.Inthis,MarshalZhukovsupportedKruschev,certainlybyhisvoiceandauthority,possiblybyforceorthethreatofforceagainstthe'bloc',ashasbeensuggested.20

Inallthreecases,themilitarybenefitedsubstantially.Beria,asheadofthegreatrival'establishment',theM.V.D./K.G.B.,wasanaturalenemy.Thearmedservicescouldonlystandtobenefitfromtheweakeningofthesecurityforces.ItissignificantthatimmediatelyafterBeria'sfallthearmyreceivedthefirsthigh-levelpromotionssincetheendofthewar.In1955,themilitaryopposedMalenkovontwoimportantcounts:hisapparentintentiontoturnfromheavyindustrytoconsumergoodsandhispessimismabouttheeffectsofnuclearwar.21AssoonasMalenkovhadbeensweptaway,the

____________________18 Garthoff,'TheMilitaryinSovietPolitics'(ProblemsofCommunism,Vol.VI,p.46).19 Conquest,op.cit.,p.332.20 Ibid.,p.312.21 Garthoff,op.cit.,p.46.Conquest,op.cit.,p.333.Dinerstein,op.cit.,pp.98etseq.

-107-

succeedingBulganin-Krushchevleadershipmetthemilitarydemandsforstockpiling,formilitaryindustryandforbudgetappropriations;sixnewmarshalswerecreated;andMarshalZhukovwasgiventheMinistryofDefence.

Thearmedforcesreachedtheirhigh-watermarkofinfluencefrom1956toOctober1957-significantly,theperiodwhenKrushchev'sbattleforthesuccessionwasatitsheight.Substantially,Krushchevrepresentedanddrewhisstrengthfromthepartyapparatus(whichhecontrolled),andhisopponents(e.g.Molotov)drewtheirsfromthestateapparatusandthemanagerialsectors.ThestrugglecametoaclimaxwithKrushchev'splantodecentralizeandregionalizethegreatindustrialministries,astepboundtobringthemmorestrictlyunderthepartyapparatchiks.DuringthisperiodthemilitarywereKrushchev'sindispensableally.MarshalZhukovwaspromotedtocandidate-membershipofthePraesidium,whiletheheadofthePoliticalAdministrationoftheArmedForceswascorrespondinglydemoted;andZhukovwasabletowringfromtheparty'sCentralCommitteethedecreethat'criticismoftheordersanddecisionsofcommanderswillnotbepermittedat[military]partymeetings'.22InJune,Zhukov'ssupportforKrushchevagainsttheconcertedoppositionofMolotov,Kaganovich,MalenkovandShepilovseemstohavebeendecisive;itwascertainlyofmassiveimportance.TherewardwasZhukov'spromotiontofullmembershipofthePraesidium-unprecedentedforaservingsoldier.

Yet,aswehavesuggested,themilitary'spoliticalinterventioniseffectiveonlywhenthetop-leadershipissplit.WithKrushchev'svictoryoverhisopponents-notonlydubbedan'anti-partybloc'butalsoslavishlyinsultedbyaservilepartyCongress-theriftintheleadershipwasclosed.Withitthemilitarysufferedadeclineinstatus.ZhukovwasstrippedbothofhisPraesidium-membershipandhisministryonlyfourmonthsafterhelpingKrushchevtotriumph;andhewascastigatedforpreciselythosethingstheleadershiphadallowedhimtodo-asuresignthathehadextortedthem.Hehad,inshort,advancedmilitaryprofessionalismagainsttheclaimsofpartyideology.Thechargesagainsthimclaimedthathehad(1)'violatedtheLeninistpartyprinciplesfortheguidanceoftheArmedForces.(2)pursuedapolicyofcurtailingthePartyorganizations,political

____________________22 Conquest,op.cit.,p.338.

-108-

organizationsandmilitarycouncils;and(3)ofabolishingtheleadershipandcontrolof(a)thePartyanditsCentralCommitteeand(b)theGovernment,overtheArmyandNavy.23UnderMarshalMalinowski,hissuccessor,thepartycells'rightanddutytocriticizethecommandwasrestored.

IntheSovietUnion,then,thecivil-militaryrelationshipisfarfromfrictionless,asissometimessupposed.Themilitarydohavepointsofviewwhichconflictwiththoseofothercomponentsoftheparty'sPraesidium.Successivegovernmentshavenotsucceededindeprivingthearmedforcesofconcernfortheircorporateprofessionalinterests,norinpreventingthemfromhavingtheirownvariantinterpretationofwhatthenationalinterestrequires.Thesecanandhaveconflictedwiththecurrentpartyline.Butthearmedforceshavenotandcannotsetthemselvesupinopencontradictiontotheparty.Suchisitslegitimacyandsuchitsorganizedholdontheothercivilinstitutionsthatthearmedforcesmustwork-asdotheothergreatinstitutions-initsnameanduponitsleadership.Thisconfinesitslevelofinterventiontoinfluenceoratthemosttopressureorblackmail,bythemeansdescribedandasintheinstancescited.

____________________

23 Conquest,op.cit.,p.339(quotingthePlenumof1957).Hewasalsoaccusedofpursuinga'cultofpersonality'.

-109-

CHAPTEREIGHTTheLevelsofIntervention(2)CountriesofLowPoliticalCultureINSOCIETIESoflowpoliticalculture-thethirdorder-thelevelsofmilitaryinterventionaremuchextended.Asinstatesofdevelopedpoliticalculture,interventionbypressureandblackmailoftenoccurs;but,inaddition,themilitaryarejustaslikelytocomeoutintotheopen,overtlyoverturninggovernmentsandinstallingothers(displacement)orevensupplantingthecivilianrégimeforgood,installingitselfinitsplace.AmongcountriesofthistypearetobereckonedArgentinaandBrazil,Turkey,Spain,Egypt,Venezuela,Pakistan,the(pre-war)Balkancountries,Syria,Iraq,andtheSudan.Thereisunquestionablyagreatgapbetweencountriesattheheadandthetailofthelist.Inanyothersensethanthelevelofpoliticalculture,ArgentinaandSudanarepolesapart.Yetpolitically,thereislessofagapbetweenthemthanthereisbetweenanyofthemandthestatesofthesecondorderofpoliticalculturedealtwithabove.Thehigherupthislistofthird-orderstates,themoredifficultitprovesforthemilitarytoretainpowerwithoutsomeformatleastofciviliantrappings,orwithoutorganizingciviliansupport;andthelowerdownthescale,theeasieritisforthemilitarytoretainpowerintheirownnameandbytheirownstrength.IndifferentwaysbothArgentinaandTurkeydiffersharplyfrommostoftheothercountriesinthiscategory.Theyfallintothiscategory,however,becauseliketherest-albeitfornotquitethesamereasonsorbythesameways-theytoosufferacutelyfromtheabsenceofconsensus,andfromthefeeblenessoftheorganizedattachmenttotherégime.

WearenotthefirsttobracketArgentina,asfarasherpoliticalbehaviourisconcerned,with'theeconomicallyunder-developedand

-110-

politicallyinexperiencedpeoplesjustemergingfromcolonialsubjectioninAfricaandAsia'.1Itisindeedsurprisingthatthisshouldbeso,foratfirstsightArgentinapossessesmostoftheobjectivepreconditionsofpoliticalstability.Thereisno'patriachica'herebut,onthecontrary,axenophobicandarrogantnationalism.HerinstitutionshavebeendevelopedsincetheConstitutionof1853.Herpopulationiswellfedandliterate.Hers,however,isapolitygonesour.

Theproceduresforpoliticalchangehavebeendiscreditedbyflagrantcorruptionandabuseforawholecentury,minusonlythefourteenyearsofRadicalruletill1930.Secondly,notionsoflegitimacyhavebeenfragmented.Thethreemainsectionsofsociety--estancieros,middleclassesandlabour--haveallbeenatcross-purposes,eachgroupopposingtheothertwo.Furthermore,upto1943nopartyhadrooteditselfamongthemasses.ThetraditionalRadicalandConservativepartiescameintobeinginthelocalitiesonlyatelectiontime.Additionally,theRadicalsweresplitintothreefactionsbasedonpersonalloyalties.TheonlypowerfulpartyArgentinahasknownwasthatofPerón,anditwasanofficialcreation.ThusArgentina,despiteitshighlevelofmaterialandliteraryculture,isafflictedwithakindofanomie.Itssocietyiscompartmentalized,whereeachsectionisatcross-purposeswiththeremainder.Thesituation--albeitfarlessferocious--resemblesthekindofsituationinSpaininthetwentiethcentury.And,sincetheoverthrowofPeróntherehasarisenyetanewcleavageoverlegitimacy,forhisfollowersstillconstituteanumerousandhostileforceamongtheelectorate.Togetherwiththefeeblenessofthepartiesandthehostilityofanowpowerfullyorganizedlabourmovement,thishascreatedinArgentinaastateofovertcrisis.2

____________________

1 A.P.Whitaker,"'TheArgentineParadox'"(TheAnnalsoftheAmericanAcademy,March1961,p.104).

2

Cf.A.P.Whitaker,op.cit.,p.103.TheforegoinglineswerewrittenwithoutthebenefitofProfessorWhitaker'sadmirableessay,anditwaswithinterestandpleasurethatIfoundhisownviewneartomine.ComparethispassagefromhisAbstract:'ApermanentcrisisinArgentinasince1930hasproducedextremefragmentation,asdistinguishedfrompluralismandhasmadeitnecessaryforthemilitaryactivelytoprotectthestabilityandintegrityofwhatevergovernmentholdsoffice.AlthoughthebehaviouroftheArgentinesisgenerallytypicalofthebehaviourofpeopleinunderdevelopedcountries,Argentinahaslongenjoyednationalindependenceandhasbeenwelldeveloped.Themiddleclassislargeandliteracyishigh.'

-111-

Turkey3approximatedmorecloselytotheothers,butwasstillveryfarremovedfromsayIraqortheSudan.Thegreatestdifferencelayinherwellorganizedparties.These,theRepublicanandtheDemocratic,wereneithertransientelectoralorganizations,norpersonalistfollowings.Theyhadbranchesthroughoutthevillagesand,sincetheRepublicbegan,hadsetouttoinform,indoctrinateandorganizethemasses.4Yet,fortherest,Turkey'slevelofpoliticalculturewasandstillisimmature.Itis,basically,stillacountrywhereanintellectualélite(whichinthiscaseincludesthearmyofficers)istryingtoimposewesternstandardsonatraditionalsociety.Eversince1908ithasbeenpassingthroughacrisisofregeneration:alongtime--overhalfacenturyofstresses,punctuatedbyarevolution-from-abovein1923.Localismisstillafeatureofitssociety,especiallyintheAnatolianvillages.ItisdoubtfulhowfarAtatürk'snovelconceptionofaTurkishnationalityhassupersededthetraditionalconceptoftheTurksasbeingessentiallyapeculiarpartofIslam.Traditionalismstillfightsasuccessfulbattleagainstthelaic,almostcomtistphilosophyoftheurbanélites,andoneofthereasonsforthe1960coupwasthegrowingextenttowhichtheDemocraticgoverningpartyhadlentitselftotheresistantclericalismofthecountryside.

SincethedeclarationoftheRepublic,indeedsincetheYoungTurkrevolutionof1908,therehasbeennoconsensusontheproceduresfortransferringpower.Atatürk'stwoeffortstocreate'loyalopposition'partiesbothfailed;thefirst,theProgressivePartyofKasimKarabekir,becauseitwasimplicatedintheKurdishrevoltof1925;thesecond,theLiberalPartyofFethiBeyin1930,becauseitsoonbecamethevehicleoftheclericalsandreligiousfanatics.TheformationoftheDemocraticPartyin1945anditstriumphintheelectionsof1950,waswidelyhailedasevidencethattherégimehadatlastlegitimizeditselfandcouldhenceforthrelyonorderlyproceduresforthetransferenceofpower.ButtheshamelessjiggerypokerybywhichtheDemocraticPartymanipulatedtherulesinordertocrippleitsopponentsandtoretainitsholdonpowerdemon-

____________________3 IhaveputthisinthepasttensetorefertothesituationasitwasbeforeMay1960.

4

Until1945(exceptfortwointervalswhenoppositionwasbrieflytolerated)therewasbutoneparty,theRepublicanPeople'sParty.In1945,permissionwasgivenforanumberofdissidentsfromthisparty(includingCelalBayarandAdnanMenderes)toformanoppositionpartyandfromthentillMay1960thesepartiescompeted.

-112-

strateclearlyhowlittleagreementexistedontheproceduresfortransferringpower.5

ThisdisagreementonproceduresitselfreflectsthelackofconsensusonKemalAtatürk'sresolutewesternization.Sincehisdeathin1938andthedisappearanceofhisprestigiouspersonality,thehistoryofTurkeyhasbeenthatoftheeffortsoftheprogressivebutnarrowéliteoftown-bredwesternizerstopreservehisreformsagainstpopularreaction.Assoonasthetwo-partysystemwasintroducedin1945,thereactionaryforcesamongthelargelyilliteratevillagersbecameadecisivefactor.TheMenderesgovernmentincreasinglypanderedtothisclericalreaction'buyingvoteswithreligion'.ThemoreitdidsothemoreitdrewonitselftheattacksoftheRepublicanPartyandthepress;andthereforethemoreitfeltimpelledtosuppressthemandtoaltertherulesinitsownfavour.

Nevertheless,aftermakingdueallowanceforlocalpeculiarities,asinTurkeyandinArgentinaorinSpain,theremainingcountriesatthisthirdlevelofpoliticalculturehavecommoncharacteristics.

Localparticularismispronounced,andnationalandlocalpoliticsoperateatseparatelevels;politicsisfoughtoutbetweenurbanélitesovertheheadsofthepeasants;rootedinone'ssocialinfluenceandpower,itisastruggletosecureorexpandsuchinfluenceandpoweratthenationallevel,andintermsofpersonalfollowings.Again,inallthesecountries,alatentoppositionexistsbetweenthelargelypeasantmassesontheonehandandthetightlyentrenchedoligarchyofrulersontheother.Becauseindustrializationissoslight,neitherindustrynororganizedlabourarecapableofeithersustainingorofbringingdowntherégimes.Urbanization,itselfapreconditionofdensemass

____________________

5

TheRepublicanParty's'HousesofthePeople'(itslocalheadquartersinthevillages)werecloseddown.In1953,itsassetswereconfiscated,aswereitsAnkaraheadquartersanditsnewspaper,Ulus.Presslaws,ofeverincreasingseverity,in1954,1956andfinally1960,crippledtherighttocriticizethegovernment.In1957,whenthereseemedafairchancethatthethreeoppositionpartiesmightbeattheDemocraticPartybyforminganelectoralalliance,thisrightwasarbitrarily--andverythoroughly--suppressedbytheelectorallawof1957.Atthesametimedemonstrationsandprocessionswereforbidden,severerestrictionsputupontherighttoassemble,andoppositionpoliticians,likeGulek(theSecretaryGeneraloftheRepublicanParty),harassed.WithoutsuchmeasuresitisunlikelythattheDemocratswouldhavewonthe1957election.Afterthatdate(thoughitpolledonlyfiveorsixpercentovertheRepublicanParty)thegovernmenttighteneditsrepressivemeasures,harassingIsmetInönu,theveteranleaderoftheRepublicans;andfinally,inApril1960,suspendedallpartyactivitiesandsetupawhollypartisancommitteetoinvestigatewhatweredescribedasthe'subversiveandillegalactivities'oftheRepublicanParty.

-113-

organization,isstillrudimentaryandthebulkofthepopulationarevillagers.6TheonlycivilorganizationofanystrengthinthistypeofcountryistobefoundintheLatinAmericanones,wheretheCatholicChurchexists.InAsia,thenativereligions--Buddhism,Hinduism,Islam--donotpossesssuchahierarchicalstructure.Inallthesecountries,thepoliticalpartiestendedandtendtobeasfeebleastheywerenumerous.TheonlypartiesofanyweightinLatinAmericahavebeenthosefew'labour'partieslikeA.P.R.A.inPeruortheM.N.R.inBolivia,ortheAccionDemocraticainVenezuela,anditissignificantthatinthesecountriesthemilitaryhavenothadawalk-over.TheonlyotherstrongLatinAmericanpartieshavebeenthosewithofficialbackinglikeVargas'sLabourPartyinBrazil,Perón'spartyinArgentina,andtheP.R.I.inMexico.Thetraditionalparties--Radicals,Liberals,Conservativesandthelike--arehighlypersonalizedparties,ledbyurbancliquesandwithfewandshallowrootsinthevillages.TheMiddleEasternpartiesandtheSouthEastAsianonesareexclusivelyofthistype.Thepoliticalinstitutionsofallthesecountries(untilthemilitaryrevolutions)wererecent,tarnishedbycorruptmanipulationandfraud,oftenimposed,andhardlycomprehendedbythepopularmass,letalonelovedandrevered.TheParliamentwas,tothem,afaçadeforaselfishtown-trainedoligarchy.Thepeoplewerenotinvolvedinit.

Suchthenarethecharacteristicsofthethirdorderofpoliticalculture.Thesearecountrieswhosepopulationshave--orhad--littleattachmenttoorevencomprehensionoftheirpoliticalinstitutions,countriesoflatentoppositiontotherulinggroup,countriesinwhich

____________________

6

Thefollowingtableunderlinessomeofthecharacteristicsmentioned:Industrialization Urbanization Education

Percapita %ofenergy %of population

consumed(intons)millions

populationinlabourbunions

incitiesofover100,000

%ofpopulationliterate

Argentina 0.97 21.6 37.2 87Brazil 0.39 4.2 13.2 50Turkey 0.23 0.8 8.2 35U.A.R. 0.24 1.1 19.4 25Iraq 0.48 0.0 16.6 15Venezuela 2.18 5.5 20.6 69Pakistan 0.05 0.5 5.9 19Sudan 0.04 0.5 3.5 10Source:AlmondandColeman,ThePoliticsoftheDevelopingAreas(Appendix).

-114-

thereisnoclearandwell-establishedpoliticalformula;andcountriestooinwhich,forthemostpart,civilianorganizationisfeeble.Insuchcountries,politicsdoesnotruninclearlydefinedchannels;thereisnowidespreadconsensusonthechannelsitshouldrunin;andeveniftherewere,opinionistooinchoatetomakeitdoso.Herethelegitimacywhichattachestoinstitutionsisnotparamountasin'mature'politicalcultures,norresistanttoovertmilitaryruleasin'developed'politicalcultures.Itisfluid;and,possibly,evenductile.Itiseasilyimpugnedbythemilitary,andintheleast-developedpoliticalculturesofthisthirdorder,ithasbeenrelativelyeasyforthemilitarytoreshapeitbyanewpoliticalformulawhichlegitimizestheirownpretensions.

Insuchsocieties,militarydisplacementofthegovernmentmeetsafardifferentreceptionfromthatmetedoutinthesocietiesofthehigherorders.Inpre-warGermanyandJapanasincontemporaryFrance,theovertmilitarycoup,aswehaveseen,hasmetwithsuchfrozenhostilityfromsociety'smassorganizationsastoperishinitstracks.Itisrarelyattempted,andisdoomedtofail.Inthesocietiesofalowlevelofpoliticalcultureitisoftenattempted,andisoftensuccessful.Thepublic'sattachmenttoitspoliticalinstitutionsissoshallowthatthemilitary'sdepositionofthegovernmentbyforceorthethreatofforceisatleastnotresistedandmoreoftenthannotisinitiallyverypopularindeed.

Thereasonforthisisthreefold.Inthefirstplace,theexistinginstitutionsareeitherdiscreditedorincomprehensible.Secondly,theseinstitutionshave,usually,abuttedinasituationofdeadlockwherechangecannotbebroughtaboutconstitutionally.Thirdly,insuchcircumstancesthedepositioniswidelywelcomedthroughoutsocietybecause,initially,themilitarycoupmeansallthingstoallmen.Thearmyispopularnotbecauseofwhatitstandsfor(whichnobodyknows,atfirst),butofwhat,quitepatently,ithasfoughtagainst.Thisistrueofthegreatbulkoftheexamplesinthisclassofcountry(though,admittedly,notofall).Incaseswherethemilitaryhasapastrecordofintervention,theirviewsmightbeonlytoowellknown,asinSpainin1936andVenezuelain1948andArgentinain1962.Itistrue,however,ofthehistoryofArgentinabetween1930and1955,ofTurkeyinthe1960coup,oftheSpanishcoupof1923,andofthecoupsinEgypt,Iraq,PakistanandtheSudan.

InArgentina,forinstance,therégimeof1930wasthoroughlydiscredited.Thoughthecountrywasreelingfromtheeconomiccrisis,

-115-

theoctogenarianIrigoyenoccupiedthePresidentialchair,andinhisdotagehiscorruptsubordinatespaddedthepublicpayrollandhelpedthemselvestofavours.Secondly,therewasaconstitutionaldeadlock.TheRadicalPartyhadcometopowerinfreeelectionsin1916,andhadmaintainedthemselvesinpowerbythesamemeansuntil1930.Inthatyear,however,theirmajorityintheChamberdisqualifiedsuccessfullyoppositioncandidates.ThissuggestedthathenceforththeRadicalPartyitselfwould'make'theelectionsinthemannerpractisedupto1914.Consequently,whenGeneralUriburuoccupiedBuenosAiresanddeposedtheacting-President(Martinez),7hewaswildlyapplauded;thecrowdscheeredhistroopsandshoweredthemwithflowers.

In1943,itwasmuchthesamestory.TherégimeestablishedbyGeneralUriburuhadprovedconservativeandunpopular,andwasbasedonflagrantmanipulationoftheelections.Also,PresidentCastillo,whosucceededthewell-likedbutincapacitatedPresidentOrtizin1940,wasactivelyunpopularbecauseoftheeconomiccrisisbroughtonbythewar.Onceagaintherewasconstitutionaldeadlock:since1941Castillohadgovernedbystateofsiegeanditwasclearthathewouldusethis,to'impose'hischosensuccessor,PatronCostas.NowCostaswastheepitomeofthehated'oligarchy'.Forallthesereasonsthemilitaryrevoltof1943whichdeposedCastilloandinstalledfirstGeneralRawsonandthenGeneralRamirezwasevenmorepopular--andmoremisunderstood--thanthatof1930.'Vivalalibertad!Vivalademocracia!'shoutedthecrowdsoncemore.8

____________________7 PresidentIrigoyenhadresignedthepreviousday,infaceoftheimminentcoup.

8

Cf.RayJosephArgentineDiary,pp.40etseq.forthefirstreactionsandthesubsequentbewilderment.The1955revolt,whichoverthrewPerón,isnotsoclearacase.InsomequartersthePeróndictatorshipwaspopular.Thedictatorhadtakenwell-chosenstepstowinciviliansupportforhisrégimeandhadcreatedapowerfulpoliticalpartyforthispurpose.In1955,therégimewascertainlyhatedbytheanti-Peronistaparties,bytheCatholicChurch,andbythearmedforces.Thedeadlocksituationagainpersisted,worsethanin1930or1943,sinceArgentinawasnowapolicestate,andhenceonlymilitaryactioncouldpossiblyoverthrowit.Publicreactiontothevictoryoftheanti-Peronistarevoltwasmixed.WhileuptowncrowdscheeredGeneralLonardi,wreckedthePeronistaH.Q.inBuenosAires,andburnedpicturesofPerón,pro-Perónriotsbrokeoutintheworking-classquarters.Therewasanotherpro-PerónriotofindustrialworkersinRosario.

Thealteredcircumstancesof1955areduetothenatureofthePerónrégimewhichwasnotasimplemilitarydictatorshipatall.ItcreatedforitsinstitutionsamasssupportneverpreviouslyaccordedtoanArgentiniangovernment.Forthenatureoftherégime,seebelowatChapterEleven.Bycontrast,thelong-drawn-outsequenceofthreatsandarmeddemonstrations,culminatinginthephysicalremovalandthesubsequentimprisonmentofPresidentFrondiziinMarch1962,wentonamidsupremeindifference.ThearmedforceshadintervenedsooftensincetheoverthrowofPerónin1955--itissaidthatPresidentFrondizihadsurmountednolessthantwenty-threecrisesincivil-militaryrelations--thattheboredandlistlesspublic,wellknowingthattheywerepoliticallyhelpless,simplywentabouttheirbusiness.

-116-

SimilarwastheinitialreactiontoGeneralGürsel'sbloodlesscoupinTurkeyinMay1960--inthetownsatanyrate.InIstanbul,cheeringcrowdshungoutflags,dancedinthestreetsandchanted'Hurriyet,Hurriyet!'(Freedom,Freedom!).InAnkara,thearmedforceswerecarriedshoulder-high.PremierAdnanMenderes'srepressivemeasureshaddiscreditedaconstitutionalreadytarnishedbythetamperingwiththe1957election;theuniversitystudentsandprofessorswereoutragedatMenderes'sinterferencewiththecurriculum,thelawyerswiththegovernment'sarbitrarymeasures,thepressatthesuppressionofitsfreedomandbusinessmenatthemazeofimportcontrols.ThewholetrendofMenderes'slegislationsince1953hadbeentowardsthesuppressionoftheRepublicanParty.Withtheestablishmentofthecommissionofinquiryintothealleged'subversivemethods'oftheoppositionitwasprettyclearthattheconstitutionalchannelsofchangewouldsoonbeclosedentirely.Onceagain,ifchangewastocome,whocouldbringitaboutexceptthearmy?

ThemilitaryrevoltsinEgypt(1952)andIraqandPakistan(1958)conformtothe'model'evenmoreclearlythantheArgentineandTurkishcases.Inallofthesecountries,thepurportedparliamentarysystemwasmysterious;largelyifnotentirelyalienatedfromthepublic;shamelesslymanipulatedtoprovideacolouroflegalitybyanarrowambitiousandselfisholigarchy;andthereforetaintedwitheveryillthatappearedtoaffectthenation--corruption,inefficiency,betrayaland'colonialism'.Eachofthesecountries,furthermore,hadcometoaconstitutionaldead-end.Theinstitutionshadbeenmanipulatedtomaintaintherulersinpowerandwouldcontinuetobeso.Ifchangeweretocome,itmustbefromoutsidethe'system'.LikewiseinSpainin1923.Theretheconstitutionalprovisionshadbeensomisusedforacenturyastoappearentirelyuntrustworthy.Theconditionsofendemicsocialdisorderonlyunderlinedtheirinefficiency.

Inallofthesecountriesthemilitary'sdepositionofthegovernmentwashailedwithadeliriumofdelight--inIraq,indeed,withan

-117-

almostcannibalisticorgy.IntheSudan,thediscreditoftheinstitutionswasofadifferentorder--itwasnotduetotheirbeingtaintedwithcorruption,buttodespondencythattheone-year-oldsystemhadnotonlynotbroughtthemilleniumbuthadbroughtaquarrelwithEgyptandeconomicrelapse.Furthermore,thedisintegrationofthegoverningcoalitionandtheimpossibilityofforginganyotherseemedtoforetokentheruinofthesystem.GeneralAbboud'scoupwas,therefore,greetedwiththesameroundofunthinkingapplauseasinthecountriesalreadymentioned.

Inallthesecases,thepublic'sattachmenttotheirpoliticalinstitutionswassofragilethatitnotonlyofferedneitherprotestnoroppositiontothemilitary'sviolentdepositionoftherulers,butitdancedwithdelight.Whereexpediencyissufferedtotriumphoverprinciple,itisalwaysandonlybecausetheprincipleisnotstrongenough.Soitisinthesestates,anditisherethattheyoffertheirsharpestcontrasttothestatesofthe'mature'or'developed'politicalculture.

Inthesecountries,then,thepoliticalformulaisfeebleenoughtoallowthemilitarytodisplacetheciviliangovernmentbyviolenceorthethreatofit,i.e.topermitofthemilitaryreplacingonegovernmentbyanother.Butthisdoesnotnecessarilymeanthatitissofeebleastopermitofthemilitarysupplantingciviliangovernmentaltogether,andrulinginitsownname.Inmanycountriestheinitialpopularityofthedisplacementis,aswehavesuggested,becausenochangeisotherwisepossibleandthesituationissuchthatpeoplehavecometobelievethatanychangeisforthebetter.Atthisfirststagethemilitaryisanunknownquantity.Itisthesecondstage,whenthemilitaryhavetodecidewhattodonext,whichprovidesthebetterindexofthefragilityofthepoliticalformula,andthewantofcivilianorganizationtosupportit.Topermitthemilitarymerelytodisplaceonegovernmentforanotherisonething;toallowittoruleisquitedifferent.

Nowoccursacuriousparadox.Ifcivilianorganizationhappenstobestrongincountriesof'low'politicalculture,thisconditionproducestwocontradictoryeffects.Itbothengendersresistancetomilitaryattemptstopassfromsimpledepositiontothecompletesupplantmentofthecivilauthorities,andyetimpelsthemilitarytoattemptthisverything.TheresultisahistorycheckeredbyshortlivedmilitaryinterregnaasinArgentina.Thereasonisthis:theprevioussupportersofthedisplacedgovernmentmaybestrongenoughtostageareturntopowerandthereforethemilitarymust

-118-

reckonwiththepossibilityoftheirvengeance.Itthereforetakesstepstopreventsuchareturntopowerandisthusimpelled,atsomestage,totakefullpowerstoitself.Butwhenitdoessoitrunsintoincreasingresistance,notmerelyfromtheex-supportersofthegovernmentbutfromallsides.Thisinducesthemilitaryeithertogivewayandcallforsomekindofelections,oralternativelytogointopoliticsitselfasasortofpoliticalparty,inordertolegitimizeitselfbysomeplebiscitaryorelectoralprocedure.Ineithercase,itmuststillfeartheresultsofafallfrompower.Itthereforecontinuestoplayanactivepoliticalrole,ifonlyforself-defence.'Whoridesthetigercanneverdismount.''Whosoeverdrawshisswordagainsttheprincemustthrowthescabbardaway.'Thesetwoproverbspithilyexpressthelogicofthesituation.

Incountrieswithalowpoliticalculture,wherecivilianorganizationisfeeblehowever(andthisistrueofmost),thisparadoxoperatesinakindofreversesense.Thesheerabsenceofciviliancounterpressuresencouragesthemilitarytosetupafull-bloodedmilitaryoligarchy;ontheotherhand,thesheerinvulnerabilityofthemilitaryleavesthisasamatterofchoice,notofnecessity.

Examplesofthefirstparadox,i.e.thecountrieswithrelativelystrongcivilianorganization,areprovidedbytheArgentine,byTurkeysince1960,bypre-warGreece,and,insomedegree,bythecourseofeventsinEgyptbetween1952and1954.Examplesofthesecondparadox,i.e.countrieswithrelativelyfeeblecivilianorganization,mightbeseeninIraqandtheSudan(forcompletesupplantmentofthecivilianrégime)andinpost-1946Syria(forsuccessivedisplacementsoftheciviliancabinets).

Theresultisthatallthecountrieswitha'low'politicalculturepresenttoouterappearancesimilarfeatures,irrespectiveofhowhighorlowtheyareinthescaleofthiscategory;i.e.theyexhibiteitherdisplacementorcompletesupplantment;butthereasonsforthisdifferfromcountrytocountryasexplained.

Letusillustratethisbyfirstexaminingsomecasesfromthemostadvancedofthecountriesinthisorderofpoliticalculture;forinstance,ArgentinaandTurkey.Inboth,themilitarydeposedthegovernment.Inboth,oncetheinitialpopularityofthecouphadpassed,themilitaryfoundthemselvesdrawnfurtherandfurthertowardsthetotalsupplantmentofthecivilianrégime,andyet,atthesametime,forcedmoreandmorestronglytomakeconcessionstothecivilianoppositionthisprovoked.IntheArgentinecoupof1930,

-119-

GeneralUriburusaidatfirstthathewouldholdnew--andhonest-elections.ButitthenappearedfromagreatRadicalvictoryintheelectionsforBuenosAiresProvincethattheveryRadicalshehadejectedwerelikelytoreturn.UriburupromptlydeclaredtheBuenosAireselectionvoid,indefinitelypostponedtheotherprovincialelections,anddeclaredineligibletheRadicalcandidatesforthePresidentialelection.HeevencontemplatedcancellingthePresidentialelectionaltogetherandrulingbyforce.Buthismeasures,accompaniedastheywerebyapurgeofthebureaucracyandtheimprisonmentandexileofhisopponents,nowshoweduptherégimeasanundisguisedmilitaryoligarchy.Thecivilianresistanceappearedtoostrongtoremainsuppressedforever.Inthisdilemma,Uriburuthesoldiergavewaytohiscivilianallies,theConservativeestancieroaristocracy,andlimitedhimselftomanipulatingtheelectionsinsuchawayastosecuretheirvictory.ThusdidhefendoffthevengeancewhichotherwisetheRadicalswouldsurelyhaveinflicted.Inall,Uriburu'sdirectmilitaryrégimelastedlittlemorethanoneyear.

The1943coupofGeneralRamirezusheredinamilitaryoligarchywhichlastedsomeone-and-a-halfyears.Andhereagainisseenthepush-pulltowardsandawayfromopensupplantmentofthecivilianrégime.Onthisoccasion,unlike1930,thearmyplotters--theG.O.U.--hadnointentionwhateverofholdingnewelections.Theyunquestionablyenvisagedsomesortofmilitaryoligarchy,thoughtheirpreciseplansarestillobscure,andindeeditisverylikelythattheywerebothdisunitedandvagueonanythingbutshort-termobjectives.Whatiscertain,however,isthattheyhadnotlongbeeninpowerbeforewidespreadoppositiondeveloped,andthrustthemintoincreasingrepression.Theiropponents--thepress,theuniversities,thetradeunions--werestruckdowninturn;butthemorerepressivetherégimethemoreunpopularitbecame.InJune1945,whentheindustrialists,merchantsandcattlebreederssignedanopenmanifestoagainstVice-PresidentJuanPerón,thedismayedmilitarybegantogiveway.ElectionswerepromisedinJulyandinAugustthestateofsiegewaslifted.Therenowtookplaceamassiveall-partydemonstrationinthecapital,the'MarchofConstitutionandLiberty'.Clearlyelectionsbodedillforthearmy.ThefearofpoliticaldestructionnowpromptedtheG.O.U.toarrestPerón,inthebeliefthathewastheirJonah.Theireffortfailed.Foronething,theyhadnoclearalternativetoPerón.Foranotherthedescamisadoscounter-demonstratedinfavourofPerón.Fromthatpointthemilitarytookthe

-120-

onlypossiblewayout-theonetroddenbyGeneralUriburu.Theydecidedthattheremustbeelections,andthattheircandidate,Perón,mustwin.9Hedid;andforthemomentthepoliticalfutureofthearmedforceswassecured.

EventherevoltagainstPerónin1955,openlycommittedasitwastotherestorationofdemocraticliberties,manifestsmuchthesamepreoccupationsasin1930and1943.PerónresignedinSeptember1955,butnewpresidentialelectionswerenothelduntilFebruary1958,andintheinterveningperiodoftwoyearsandahalfthemilitaryruled.For,justasthejuntaof1943hadreasontofeartheconsequencesofanelectoraltriumphofthetraditionalcivilianforces,sothejuntaof1955hadtofeartheelectoraltriumphofthePeronistas.Thearmedforceswerethemselvessplitonthisissue.GeneralLonardi,theleaderofthejuntaandtheProvisionalPresident,wasremovedwithinafewweeksbytheanti-Peronistafactioninthearmedforces;andevenaslateasNovember1956itprovednecessarytoremovemembersoftheHighCommandwhowantedtoperpetuatemilitaryrule,andreplacethembyofficerswillingtoturnthegovernmentovertothepoliticiansandtechnicians.Again,thoughelectionshadbeenpromisedforlate1957,atthebeginningofthatyeartheywerepostponedtill1958.AllthistimethejuntabusieditselfwithmakingArgentinasafeforthearmy.Todoso,ithadtodestroyboththetradeunionandthepoliticalorganizationsofPeronism,andtobanthePeronistapartyfromparticipatingintheelections.And,havingonceintervenedinthisway,ithasbeenforcedtoholdupthehandsofthegovernmentagainstthePeronistaseversince.10

____________________

10

'Thearmedforces'dilemmawasdramaticallyhighlightedbytheeventsofMarch-April1962.MuchagainsttheirwishesPresidentFrondizihadlegalizedthePeronistpartyandpermittedittocontesttheCongressionalandProvincialelections.Theyscoredasignalvictory,pollingover35percentofthepopularvote.ThearmedforceswerenowtornbetweentheirwishtorespectconstitutionalityandtheirhostilitytothePeronists.AftertendaysofpressureonPresidentFrondizi,whorefusedtocomplywiththeirwishesandresign'voluntarily',theyhustledhimofftoprison;whereupontheirdilemmareopenedunderhissuccessorProvisionalPresidentGuido.Guidorefusedtointerventtheprovinces,canceltheelections,andarrangeforanimmediatepresidentialelectionastheforcesdemanded.Hisrefusalsplitthearmedforcesintotwofactions:thoselikeGeneralsFragaandRauchwhoplacedconstitutionalityhigherthantheirdislikeofthePeronists,andthoselikeGeneralsPoggiandCarrerawhosepreferenceswereexactlytheopposite.ThetwofactionsalmostcametothepointoffiringononeanotherontheCampodeMayo.ThenthenavypronounceditselfforthePoggi-Carrerafaction,andundertherenewedpressurePresidentGuidoconcededtheirdemands.Seepp.169-71.

9

Forthefirstyearofthemilitarydictatorship,seeRayJosephs,ArgentineDiary.ThemotivesoftheAvalosgroupinarrestingPerónarestillobscure,butBlanksten(Perón'sArgentina)definitelyaffirms(p.59)thattheyregardedhimasthereasonforthearmy'sunpopularity.ForthegrowingoppositiontotherégimeseeMacdonald(LatinAmericanPoliticsandGovernment),pp.63-5andBlanksten,op.cit.,pp.56-60.Theelectionsweremarkedbypressureandviolencefromtheopeningofthecampaigntilljustbeforeelectionday.Cf.Macdonald,op.cit.,pp.78-80andBlanksten,op.cit.,pp.64-70.Thattheelectionsthemselveswereorderlyandfairisduetothefactthat,twelvedaysearlier,theU.S.StateDepartmenthadpublisheditsBlueBookchargingArgentinawithcollaborationwiththeNazis,andthiscreatedaxenophobicsurgeofpopularityforPerónatthelastminute.Furtherpressureontheelectoratewasthereforedeemedunnecessary.

-121-

ThecourseofaffairsinTurkeyhasruninmuchthesamedirection,andforasimilarreason-thestrengthofthepoliticalparties.

WhenGeneralGürseloverthrewtheMenderesgovernmentinMay1960,hepromisedthatthearmywouldquitpowerassoonasanewconstitutionhadbeenacceptedandelectionsforanewAssemblyhadbeenheldunderit.ThoseelectionswerepromisedforAutumn1961.Inthemeantimethearmyruled.Butthisrulebecamemoreandmorerepressiveassupportforthedisplacedrulersrallied.Forthearmy,indisplacingMenderes,wasejectingthefreechoiceofonehalfofthenationandtheleaderofaparty-theDemocratParty-sufficientlywellorganizedtopersist,evenwhendecapitated.Thusfromtheverybeginningthearmywasforcedtopassbeyondthesimpledepositionofacabinettotheeradicationofamassparty.Inordertodothis,amongotherthingsitarrestedandputontrialover400Democratdeputiesandofficials,purgedthearmedforcesof7,000Menderesofficers,attackedthefreedomofthepress,dismissed147universityteachers,andarrestedopponentsanddemonstratorsalloverthecountry.

ThefearoflosingpowertotheDemocratsympathizersworkedevenmorestronglyonthearmedforcesasthetimefortheelectionsapproached.Forinstance,toprotectthemselvesfromfuturevengeance,thejunta(theNationalUnityCommittee)hadaclauseinsertedintheConstitutionmakingtheconstitutionalityofitsinterimlawsunchallengeable.ByJuly1961,thearmedforceshadseriouscauseforalarm.Foronething,newpartieswereanglingfortheformerDemocratvote-notablytheJusticeparty.Headedbyoneofthepurgedofficers,GeneralGumuspala,thispartydrewits

-122-

followingfromformerDemocratsandfromthe7,000officerswhohadbeendismissedbythejunta.Secondly,whenthenewconstitutionwassubmittedtoareferendum,overfourmillionvotedagainstitasignthattheMenderes'ssupportersadheredtotheirformerallegiance.'Thearmy,'itwasreported,'feltthatifthiswentontheresultwouldevenbeareversalofpowerinwhichthelivesoftherevolutionarieswouldnotbesafe.'11

TheirreactionwasmuchasinArgentina.Sincetheywerecommittedtoholdingelections,theymustmakesureofwinningthem.ToensurethisthearmedforcesinsistedontheexecutionofthedeathsentencepassedbytheYassiadatribunalonMenderes.InthewordsofTheTimescorrespondent,Menderes'sfatewassealedbytheverynumberofhissupporters.Twoofhiscolleaguesperishedwithhim.Another460weresenttoprison.Thenthepoliticalpartieswerebroughttogether,and,overawedbythephysicalpresenceofGeneralGürsel,theservicechiefsandtheCommander-in-Chiefofthegendarmerie,weremadetovowto'turntheirbacksonMenderesandtheformerDemocratparty'.

Thearmedforceshad,however,reckonedwithoutthevoters.TheelectionreturnedtheRepublicansinaminority.MostofthevotewenttothethreeotherpartiesandparticularlytotheJusticepartywhichinasensewastheresiduarylegateeoftheoldDemocrats.InthelowerHouseithadalmostasmanyseatsastheRepublicansandintheSenatetwiceasmany.

Thearmedforceswereinrealperilandcouldnotdisengagefrompoliticseveniftheywantedto.Forself-protectionalone,theyhadtobringaboutagovernmentoftheirownchoosing.TheyforcedthewithdrawalofanoppositioncandidateforthePresidency(aformerDemocrat),leavingGeneralGürselassolecandidate.Theyvetoedthethreesmallerparties'attempttoformacoalitiontoexcludetheRepublicans.Finally,under'thescarcelyveiledthreatoffurtherinterventionfromthearmedforces',theJusticePartywasforcedintoashot-guncoalitionwithitsbitterestrivals,theRepublicans,underthePremiershipofoldGeneralInönu.12Thecoalitionfelltobickeringandmadenoattempttotacklethedomesticproblemsofthecountry.Thereuponsomeoftheyoungerandmoreradicalelementsinthearmytriedtobringpressureuponit.OnFebruary23,1962,unitsoftheWarAcademyandthegendarmerieOfficers'School

____________________11 TheTimes,September21,1961.12 TheTimes,November15,1961.

-123-

andabattalionoftheArmouredWarfareSchoolstagedademonstration.TheydemandedthattheNationalAssemblybedissolvedorthatatleastitbepurgedofsometwohundredofitsmostreactionarymembers,andthattheconstitutionbeamended.TherevoltwasputdownbytheSupremeCommand,andtheringleadersarrested,butonlyafterithadfeltobligedtotakeGeneralInönuandhiscabinetintoprotectivearrest.TheincidentledtheSupremeCommandtointerveneinpoliticsoncemore:thecabinetandAssemblywerepresentedwithaBillprescribinguptofiveyears'heavyimprisonmentforattemptstoshoworsaythattheMayRevolutionwasunjustified,illegitimateorillegal,orforthosewhochallengedthesentencespassedontheMenderessupportersattheYassiadatribunal.InadditiontheBillproscribedanypartywhich'praisedordefended'theformerDemocraticpartyorwhichclaimedtobeits'successor'.Penaltieswerealsolaiddownforthosewhomaintainedthat'democracycannotbeappliedinTurkey'(sic).TheTimescorrespondentnotedthattherecouldbe'littledoubtthatthenewmeasurewasadirectresultofpressurebytheleadersofthearmedforces'.13ItcanbeconfidentlypredictedthatthemilitarywillremaininTurkishpoliticsforatleastageneration,andthattheworstisstilltocome.

Thus,wherecivilianorganizationisatalladvanced,asinArgentinaorTurkey,aparadoxicalresultoftenassertsitselfassoonastheinitialpopularityofthearmycoupwearsoff;whatbeganas'displacement'engendersanurgefor'supplantment'.Havingcastoffitspoliticalneutralitythemilitaryfearsreprisalsfromitscivilianopponents.Themoreitrepressesthem,themorenakedlyoligarchicdoesthemilitaryrégimeappear,andthelesslegitimate.Hencetheviciouscircleofrepressionandresistance;andforthearmyseekingfutureimmunity,the'perpetualandrestlessdesireforpower'.'Andthecauseofthis,'saysHobbes,'isnotalwaysthat[themilitary]hopesforamoreintensivedelightthan[it]hasalreadyattainedto;orthat[it]cannotbecontentwithamoderatepower;butbecause[it]cannotassurethepowerandmeanstolivewell,which[it]hathatpresent,withouttheacquisitionofmore.'14

Wherecivilianopinionisinchoate,anditsorganizationfeeble,theseconsiderationsdonotapply.Thearmedforcesareinvulnerable,becausethepotentialcivilianoppositionissofeebleandconfused.

____________________13 TheTimes,March5,1962.14 T.Hobbes,Leviathan,Book1,Chap.XI.Myitalics.

-124-

Insuchcountriesthemilitarymaysimplytopplecabinets,oneafteranother,oralternatively,supplanttheciviliansandgovernovertlyintheirownname.Syriamayserveasanexample.

Syria,forinstance,isnotanation.Thefamilymakesthefirstclaimonpersonalloyalty,thenthetribeorreligiousgroup,thentheregion;andthereloyaltystops.TheanimosityofAleppoandDamascus,forinstance,isoneofthemotiveforcesinSyrianpolitics.'Sofar',commentsoneobserver,'menhavenotdevelopedadeepconstructivesenseofloyaltytowardsaland,apeople,anation,orastate...[Hence]theabsenceoftheconceptofthestatenotonlyamongthecommonpeople,buteventhosewhomcircumstancesbringtopower...'15TheSyrianpeopledoindeedsharefeelingsofArabism,anti-Zionismandanti-westernismwithafanaticalandviolentintensity;butthisismoreaptlystyleda'publicemotion'ratherthana'publicopinion'intheusualsensegiventothisterm.

Politicalparties,inthesenseoforganizedgroupingswithprogrammesandideologies,hardlyexist.Thisispartlyduetothelackofadevelopedpublicopinion-andofcoursethisitselfispartlytheresultofthefeeblenessoftheparties.Itisalsoduetothepovertyofcommunications,thelowlevelofliteracy,andthedependenceoftheoverwhelmingmassofthepeopleuponthelargelandowners.TheresultisthatmostoftheSyrianpartiesareinfactthefollowingofahandfulofmagnates.TheConferenceofsuchpartiesisnotameetinginwhichanorganizedgroupofmembersparticipatebutameetingofafewtoppeoplewhohavebeenthereforalongtimeandwho,fromtimetotime,co-opttoworkwiththemothersofsimilarstandingorsocialinterests.ThemoreliterateSyrians,however,havetendedtomoveintocertainideologicalparties:theSyrianPopularParty,arightwingandactivistorganizationwhosepolicyistheunionofSyriawithJordanandIraq,andthepro-RussianleftistBa'athorArabRenaissanceparty.Butneitherofthesehashadamassfollowing.Thefirstisproscribed,andthesecondhasbeenimportantonlywhenthearmyuseditasitsstalking-horseinthedaysofColonelSerraj,from1954-1958.

EventsinSyriashowacharacteristicalternationofblackmail,displacementandsupplantment.Thearmyisfartoostrongandopiniontooweakforittohaveanyenemiesbutthoseinitsownranks.InMarch1949,ColonelZaimoverthrewtheciviliangovernment,dissolvedParliament,abolishedthepoliticalparties,pro-

____________________15 Ziadeh,op.cit.,p.285-286.

-125-

claimedareferendumforthePresidency,becamesolecandidateandwas-notsurprisingly-elected.WithinlessthantwomonthsaconstitutionalistfactionofthearmyledbyColonelHinnawiarrestedhimandhadhimshot.Hinnawithenestablishedaciviliangovernmentunderarmyprotection.This,theAttasiPashagovernment,begantofavourthe'GreatSyria'notionofunionbetweenSyriaandIraq:andthereupon,inDecember,anotherfactionofthearmy,ledbyColonelShishakli,arrestedHinnawi,deposedthegovernmentandinstalledoneofitsown-theelAzamcabinet.Thiswaslater(May1950)replacedbyacabinetledbyelKudsi.Withinayearittoowasatloggerheadswiththearmy.ElKudsiproposedtotransferthegendarmeriefromarmycontroltotheMinistryoftheInterior,i.e.tociviliancontrol,inordertopreventitinterferingintheelections.ThearmythereuponmadehimresignandreplacedhimbyelAzam(March1951).Alittlelatertheperformancewasrepeatedwithadifferentcast.ThistimethePremierwasDr.Dawalibi.HefellfoulofthearmypartlybecausehesupportedtheSyria-Iraqunion,partlybecausehetootriedtoremovethegendarmerieandpolicefromarmycontrol.ColonelShishaklihadhimarrestedinamidnightcoup,andheldhimuntilheagreedtoresign.Shishaklithenappointedhisownhack,ColonelSelo,asChiefofState,PrimeMinisterandDefenceMinister'pendingtherestorationofParliamentarylife'(December1951).NextyearShishaklitookstepstohavehimselfelectedPresidentunderanewandimposedconstitutionandthenceforthruledpersonally.HisendcameinFebruary1954whenthegarrisonsrevoltedalloverSyria.ThenceforwardSyriareturnedtothefaçadeofparliamentarianism,withthearmycontrollingeventsbehindthescenes.ThiswastheperiodinwhichthedominantfactionofthearmyledbythesinisterColonelSerrajofitsDeuxièmeBureaumadecommoncausewiththeBa'athpartyandtheIndependentstoterrorizeandsuppressopposition.ThiscoalitionfinallyendedSyria'sindependencebybringingitintounionwithEgypt,intheso-calledUnitedArabRepublic,in1958.Thepreviousparliamentaryrégimewasnowsweptaway.LegislativepowernominallyresidedinaNationalAssemblynominatedbyPresidentNasserandconsistingof400Egyptiansand200Syrians-manyofthemexDeputies.TheexecutivepowerlayinaRegionalExecutivecouncilof15,alsonominatedbyPresidentNasserandwhosechairmanwasnoneotherthanColonelSerraj.

Thisrégimelastedlessthanthreeyears.Notfornothinghasit

-126-

beensaidthat'eventheProphethimselfcouldnotgovernDamascus'.OnSeptember28,1961,amilitaryfactionrevoltedandinabloodlesscoupendedtheunionwithEgyptandre-establishedtheparliamentaryrégime.HavinghustledtheEgyptiantroopsandofficialsfromSyriansoil,thejuntaproclaimedelections,andthenretiredintothebackground.Thusitcameaboutthat,asin1951,ElKudsiwasPresidentoftheSyrianRepublicandDr.DawalibihisPrimeMinister.

Exactlysixmonthslatertherégimewasoverturnedoncemore,inyetanothermilitarycoup.Itsoriginandpurposearestillextremelyobscure.Theoriginalgroupofconspiratorsclearlywantedamoreradicaleconomicandsocialpolicythantherestoredlandlordrégimewasproviding.Thereismorethanasuspiciontoothatthegovernment'scontactswithJordanhadrevivedmilitaryfearsofanothermovetowardsthe'FertileCrescent'notionwhichhadprovedfataltoDr.Dawalibiin1951,andtohispredecessors.Eventheeventsareobscure.OnMarch28,agroupofofficersoverthrewtheDawalibigovernmentinabloodlesscoupandmovedtoestablishadirectmilitaryoligarchy.TheyacceptedtheresignationofthePresident,PrimeMinisterandcabinet,dissolvedtheNationalAssembly,anddecreedthetransferofallexecutiveandlegislativepowertotheHighCommand.

Withinforty-eighthours,however,theoriginalconspiratorsfoundthemselveschallengedbyasecondgroupbasedonAleppo.ThisgroupdemandedthereunionofSyriawithEgypt.PlanesbombedAleppo,andthenameetingofthetwofactionswasarrangedtotakeplaceatHoms.Here-soitappears-theHighCommand,inthepersonofGeneralZahreddin,theCommander-in-Chief,asserteditsauthorityoverbothgroups.Theoutcome,atanyrate,wasanarrangementbywhichtheleadersofboththeDamascusandtheAleppofactionsweretobeexiled,andbywhichPresidentElKudsiwastoberecalledtooffice.AfewdayslaterGeneralZahreddin,havingnominatedanewHighCommand,proclaimedtherestorationoftheparliamentaryrégime.TheAssemblywasrecalled,andanewcabinet,consistingofnewcomerswithamoreleftishtingethantheirpredecessors,wasestablished.Significantly,GeneralZahreddinbecameMinisterofDefenceinthisnewgovernment.

Despitetheobscurityoftheeventsandtheanonymityoftheprincipalactors,fourconclusionsseemtoemergewhichsubstantiatethepictureofSyriaasalandwherethearmyandonlythearmy

-127-

decideswhetheritwillrulethroughciviliansorovercivilians.FirstitisclearthatbetweenSeptember28,1961,andMarch28,1962,atleastfourseparatearmyfactionswereinvolved.TheconspiratorsofSeptember28wereananti-Nasserfaction.Thesecond,theDamascusconspiratorsofMarch28,wereanti-Nasserbutopposedtotheviewsofthefirstgroup,bothbecausetheyfavouredmoreradicaleconomicpoliciesandbecausetheywereinimicaltoanalignmentwithIraqandJordan.Thethirdgroup,theAleppogroup,werepro-Nasser.ThefourthwasthepersonalfactionoftheCommanderin-Chief,GeneralZahreddin,whoappearstohavecomeforwardtopreventcivilwarbetweentheopposingfactionsinthearmyandtohavesucceededbyreasonofhisseniority.

Secondly,itislikelythatGeneralZahreddin'sdecisiontoreturntotheparliamentaryrégimeandtoreinstatePresidentKudsiwasapisaller-imposedbyhisdesiretostiflethesharpdifferencesofopinioninthearmywhicharoseassoonasanyonefactionseizedpower.Thecivilianrégime,hemightwellhavethought,was'theonethatdividesthearmyleast'.Thirdly,theeventsclearlyshowthattheabrogationortherestorationoftheparliamentaryrégimeowedabsolutelynothingtoanycivilianresistancetomilitaryrule.Onewayortheotherway,decisionsastotheformoftherégimedependedentirelyonthewillorwhimofthetemporarilydominantfactionofthearmy.Finally,GeneralZahreddin'sactioninnaminganewHighCommand(whichimpliesa'purge'ofthepreviousHighCommand)andhisacceptanceofthepostofMinisterofDefenceinthenewcabinet,providestheguaranteethatthenewgovernmenthasthesupportofthearmyandthatconverselythearmy'swisheswillberespectedbythecabinet.

Inthelightofallthis,eneralZahreddin'sexplanationofwhythearmydecidedtoreverseitspreviousdecisiontoestablishamilitaryrégimeandchoseinsteadtoreinstatethecivilianone,readslikesupremeirony-or,perhaps,supremecynicism?Atransitionalcabinetsuchaspreviouslyhadbeencontemplated,hesaid,wasrejectedbecause'itwouldberesponsibletothearmyandwouldtherebycontradicttheprincipleofconstitutionallife.Thearmywouldnotinterfereincivilianpolitics.'16

____________________16 NewYorkTimes,April14,1962.

-128-

CHAPTERNINETheLevelsofIntervention:(3)CountriesofMimimalPoliticalCultureSARMIENTO'SgreatclassicDonFacundodescribestheturmoilsinnewlyindependentArgentina.Mrs.Mann,itstranslator,commentedonit:'Theruraldistrictsnevermadeamovementwhichrevealedapoliticalidea.Itistruethatthegauchosfollowedcertainpartisansofthatepoch,butitwasbecausethosepartisansweretheimmediateauthoritywhichtheyrecognized:theyfollowedthemfrompersonalaffectionandfromthehabitofobedience,butfromnopoliticalconvictionnorfromanydesiretomakeanysystemprevailfortheirinterestasaclass.'1

Mrs.Mann'sdistinctionisaltogethervalid;anditpointstotheexistenceofafourthandlowestlevelofpoliticalculture-tosocieties,usuallyonesintransitionfromastaticandtraditionalculture,wherethepublicwithviewsonwhatisorisnotlegitimateinpoliticsisutterlynegligibleandhardlyexistsatall.Insuchcountriesquestionsastolegitimacyandconsensusareirrelevant.Onegroupofthesecountriesareindeeddeeplydivided-but'byculturalandethnicpluralism,byprovincialism,regionalism,localism,andcasteism',2asCarnellsaysofthenewstatesofSouth-EastAsia,buttowhichwemaywithequaljusticeaddmanyothers.Anothergroup,likeThailand,areplacid,coherentandstillpredominantlytraditionalistsocietieswhichindulgetheirrulingélitesintheirstruggleforpowerwithoutfeelingatallinvolvedinit.Inbothcases,whatCarnellstatesoftheSouth-EastAsiancountries3istrueofallsuchstates:

____________________

1 D.F.Sarmiento:CivilisationandBarbarism,trs.Mrs.HoraceMann,1868(NewYork,1960),p.xx,myitalics.

2 F.G.Carnell,PoliticalIdeasandIdeologiesinSouthandSouth-EastAsia(unpublishedpaperdeliveredattheU.K.PoliticalStudiesAssociation,1960).

3 WiththeexceptionsofIndia,thePhilippinesandNorthVietnam.

-129-

'Ifthereisapolitical"style",itispoliticalcrisis.Iftheymusthaveaname,"fluctuatingoligarchy"mightpossiblybeappropriate.Thepowerholdersarefluidalternatinggroupsofpoliticians,bureaucrats,andarmyofficers.'

Thecharacteristicofstatesatthelowestlevelofpoliticalcultureisnotthatthereare'nopeopleableandwillingtoholdpoliticalideas'ortoactfrom'politicalconviction',butthatthesearesofewandsoscatteredastobealtogethernegligiblewhenpoliticalissuesaretobedecided.Theseissuesaredecidedbyforceorthreatofforce.Inthecountriesdividedbytribalismorracethismayinvolvewholemassesinbitterinternecinestrife,asinthefirstdaysofindependentLatinAmericaorintheCongotoday.Incountriesnotsodividedintheseways,asinpresent-dayParaguayorHaitiandparticularlyThailand,theseissuesaredecidedbythefactionsoftheprofessionalarmedforceswiththerestofsocietyasmereonlookers.Thepowerofthemilitaryischecked,ifatall,onlybyitstechnicalweaknessinthefaceofsavagepopulations-likeBalubatribesmenintheCongo,orthegauchosinearlyArgentina,orthebarbarousllaneroswholancedBolivar'sarmiestodeathinVenezuela.Inmanycases,however,itisnotcheckedforthereisnootherorganizedforceinsocietyatall.Governmentinthesesocieties,is(toquoteSarmiento)'foundedupontheunpremeditatedconsentwhichanationgivestoapermanentfact.'4

Inthesestatesthemilitary'scharacteristicmodeofproceedingis,parexcellence,byviolentdisplacementoropensupplantmentofthecivilianauthorities(thelattermodebeingfarmorecommonandcontinualthaninthecountriesofthethirdorderofpoliticalculturewhichwehavealreadydiscussed).Whetherinofficeoroutofit,themilitaryrule,oftenopenlycontemptuous(likeRosasofArgentinaorDiazofMexico)ofthelegalforms.

Themilitarydonotrequiretheassistanceoreventheblessingofcivilianinstitutionsorforcestoacquireandmaintaintheirpower.Iftheyclothethemselvesincivilianformsitisbutanadditionalreinsurance,itisnotanecessaryone.Inthesecountriesthemilitaryisthesolepoliticalforce;andassuchitisentirelyatlarge.

TheLatinAmericanrepublicsinthenineteenthcenturywereinthiscondition.There,inGarcia-Calderon'swords,'Therudeandbloodstainedhandofthecaudilloforcestheamorphousmassesintodurablemoulds.SouthAmericaisruledbyignorantsoldiers.Thereisthereforenohistoryproperlysocalledforithasnocontinuity;

____________________4 D.F.Sarmiento,op.cit.,p.130.

-130-

thereisaperpetualricorsobroughtaboutbysuccessiverevolutions;thesamemenappearwiththesamepromisesandthesamemethods.'5

SomeLatinAmericanstatesarestillinthiscondition.Elsewhereintheworld,otherstateshavebutrecentlyfallenintoit.Amongtheformer,ParaguayorHaitiprovideexamples;amongthelatter,Thailand,andIraqbetween1936and1941.Toillustratetherôleofthemilitaryinthesestatesandotherslikethemlittlemoreisrequiredthanabriefchronology.

Paraguayhasaboutonemillioninhabitants,mostlymestizoand,forthemostpart,speakingnotSpanishbutGuarani,thenativeIndiantongue.Asunçión,itscapital,with200,000population,isnottypical.Itistheonlycityofanysizeinanotherwisecompletelyruralcountry.Apartfromahandfulofwealthyproprietors,thepopulationismiserablypoor.Cottonisthemainexportcrop;thereislittlelightindustry,andnoheavyindustryatall.About85percentofthepeopleareilliterate.Tradeunionsarenotunknown,butexistonsufferancefromthegovernmentandunderitscontrol.Theparties--ColoradosandAzules--arepersonalistcliques.Wecanomititsnineteenthcenturyhistory,dominatedbythesuccessivedespotismsofthesinisterDr.Francia,LopezI,andthebloodthirstymegalomaniacLopezIIwhoperishedinbattlein1870.From1870to1940therewerefourteenfull-scalecivilwarsandfewpresidentsservedouttheirlegalterm.Letusbeginourmoredetailedchronologyin1935,thedateofthearmisticeintheChacowarwithBolivia.

ThemilitaryweredisaffectedbytheArmisticeof1935andthereforetheyexecutedacoupin1936,installinganex-serviceman,ColonelFranco,asPresident.Laterin1936,thearmydeposedFrancoandinstalledDr.Paiva,thePresidentoftheUniversityofAsunçión,whosuppressedtwoarmyrebellionsandgovernedtill1939.Inthis,theelectionyear,thearmysupportedEstigaribia,oftheAzulefaction,whowenttothecountryassolecandidate(candidatounico),was'elected'in1940andimmediatelydeclaredhimselfdictator.Estigaribiaalsowasanex-servicemanoftheChacowar.Hewasshortlyafterwardskilledinaplanecrash.HewassucceededbytheMinisterofWar,Morinigo,anothersoldier,whoinstantlyconvertedhisprovisionalPresidencyintoathoroughgoingdictatorship,andcarriedoutthemostsavagerepressionknownsinceLopezII'sday.HeleanedforsupportontheyoungarmyofficersoftheColoradofaction,andhecalledhisrégime'selectivedemocracy'.In1943he

____________________5 F.Garcia-Calderon,LatinAmerica:ItsRiseandProgress,pp.88etseq.

-131-

wasreturnedasPresidentinanelectioninwhichhewasthecandidatounicoandin1944,aftersomeamusedcontemplationofhisopponents,crushedthemall:theFrancistas(whosupportedex-PresidentFranco),theTiempistas(theuniversitygraduateswhoseorganwasIlTiempo)andthenascenttradeunionswhohadbeenrashenoughtostrikeratherthansubmittogovernmentcontrol.Morinigoruledfrom1940to1948,anduptoandincludingthatyearhadsuppressedtwenty-sixcoups.In1948,anotherelectionyear,MorinigoselectedGonzalezasPresidentialcandidate.Hewasdulyelected,ascandidatounico,by96percentofthevotescast.Sixmonthslater,however,yetanotherarmyrevoltremovedMorínigofromhispostofCommanderin-Chief,andsixmonthslaterthemilitaryremovedhisnomineePresidentGonzalezalso.ItreplacedhimbyGeneralRolón,andthen,onemonthlater,replacedRolón.byMolasLopez.In1949,MolasLopezsubmittedtoelection,againascandidatounico.But,notlongafterhisinevitable'election',hewasdeposed--notbyanarmycoupthistime,butbyacongressionalmanœuvre.Inhisplace,theCongresschosethepopularDr.Chaves,formerForeignMinister,andtheleaderoftheColoradofaction.Thiscivilianinterludewasbrokenin1954when,onceagain,theAsunçióngarrisonrevolted.ItoverthrewChavesandinstalleditsCommander-in-Chief,GeneralStroessner,asPresident.Stroessner,afterjailinghisopponentsandcrushinganewthetradeunions(whomChaveshadpermittedtoreform)wasre-electedin1958inanelectioninwhichasusualhewasthesolecandidate.Exceptforafewdaysin1959thecountryhasbeengovernedunderacontinuous'stateofsiege'since1947.

Haiti,oursecondexample,hasapopulationofthreemillion,forthemostpartsmallholdersofnegroextraction.AttheotherextremeistheHaitianmulattoélite,wealthy,cultivated,andcosmopolitan.Thetinymiddleclassismadeupofimmigrants.Tradeunionismisembryonic.Partiesnolongerexist,andevenwhentheydidwerepersonalistcliques.Thesocialélite,notmorethan3percentofthepopulation,playsalmostnopartinpoliticswhilethepeasantpopulationis90percentilliterate.Eversinceindependencethearmy--nowtheGardeNationale--hasactedasking-makerandking-breaker.FromtheoverthrowofBoyerin1842totheUnitedStatesoccupationoftheislandin1915,onlyonePresidenthasevercompletedhisterm.Admittedlythreediedinoffice.Butonewastorntopiecesbyafuriousmob,onewaspoisoned,oneblownupandtheremainingfourteenwereallforcedoutofpowerbythearmy.

-132-

ThewithdrawaloftheAmericanforcesin1934enabledSténioVincent,amulattomemberoftheélite,tosecureelection.HebenefitedbyawaveofHaitiannationalismwhichwouldhavemadeaheroofanyonewhoendedtheAmericanoccupation.Exceptionally,therefore,Vincentservedouthisfulllegaltermandhandedovertohisdeputy,ElieLescot,in1941.In1946,whenamobofmarketwomenstormedthehouseofLescot'sMinisteroftheInterior(tearingoutthedoornailswiththeirteeth),thearmyneverstirred--untilLescotfled.ThenittookoverandselectedEstiméasaPresidentialcandidate.Estimébegantoencouragetheformationoftradeunionsandpermittedtheformationofpoliticalparties.In1950hesoughttohavetheconstitutionamendedsothathecouldsucceedhimself.ThereupontheofficercorpsissuedaproclamationtotheeffectthatithadunanimouslyaskedtheJuntaof1946totakeoveragain.Itscandidatewasnowtheleaderofthecoup,GeneralMagloire,whoassolecandidatewaselectedPresident.Likehispredecessor,Magloirealsosoughttoaltertheconstitutionsothathecouldcontinueinoffice.Hewasoverthrownbyanarmycoupin1957andDanielFignoléwasnominatedPresident.Hiswidespreadpopularityandhisintentionofholdingelectionsassoonaspossibleimmediatelyarousedthehostilityofthearmywhichdeposedhimwithinthreeweeks.ThearmythennominatedDr.Duvalierassolecandidate.DuvaliertookofficeinOctober1957andstillrules.Hehasestablishedanirondictatorshipinwhichalloppositionhasbeencrushed.Hehasevenshatteredthepowerofthearmyitself--bycrosspostingsandpurgings.However,thisdoesnotmeanthatheleansonciviliansupport,butsimplythatinsteadofrelyingupontheGardeNationale,hehasbuilthimselfupa5,000strongcounterforceofpalaceguards,civilianmilitia,andcivilianhoodlumscalled'tontonmacoute'.

InIraq,again,therewerenopoliticalpartiesatalluntilafterthewar,andeventheseweremeregroupings,withnothing,oralmostnothing,inthewayoforganization.Beforethewarpoliticalideashardlyexisted,andevenafter1941werevagueandconfused.Thefaçadeofparliamentarianismwasidentifiedinthepopularmindonlywithitsabuses:fraud,peculation,corruptionandrepression.Therégimehadnopopularrootsatall.Between1936and1941thearmy--orrathertherivalfactionsofthearmy--proceededbysimplydeposingonecabinetandimposinganotheroftheirownchoice.Thusin1936,GeneralBakrSidquioccupiedthecityofBagdad,proclaimingthat:'Thearmy...

-133-

hasrequestedHisMajestytheKingtodismissthecabinetandformanewonecomposedofsinceremenundertheleadershipofHikmatSuleyman....'6ThistheKingdid,andthesamepatternwasrepeatedin1937whentheanti-BakrfactionofthearmydeposedHikmat,andsoonin1938,1940and1941.Theseriesendedinthethirdcoupoftheyear1941when,atlast,theRegentdecidednottolendhimselftothetechnique.Heranaway,thusmakingitconstitutionallyimpossibleforRashidAli,thearmy'snominee,tobecomePrimeMinister.ThereuponRashidAliturnedfromdisplacementtosupplantment.HedeclaredtheRegentdeposed,constitutedamilitarygovernmentcalledtheGovernmentofNationalDefence,andthenforcedtheParliamenttorecognizeit.ThisRashidAligovernmentwasoverturnedbytheBritishforcesin1941andtheRegentthereuponreturnedandtheconstitutionwasrestored.

ThemilitarydominateThailandtoo;butherethestyleofnationalpoliticsisverydifferentfromthesqualorofHaitiandthecarnageofParaguay.Themilitarycoupswhichhavemadeandunmadeconstitutionsandgovernmentssince1932havebeencarriedoutwithmoderationandlittlebloodshed.Thepublichavebeenonlookers,notparticipants.YettheresultismilitarydominationasinHaiti,ParaguayandIraq,andthereasonis,onceagain,thetotalabsenceofanyciviliancounterforcetoitspower.(Inthisrespectalone,andinthepoliticalconsequencesthatflowfromit,arethesesocietiescomparable.)

TheessenceoftheThaisituationisthedistinctionbetweenthemassofthepopulationandatinyfraction,possibly1percentofthewhole,whoformthepoliticalpublic.ThebulkofThailand'spopulationlivesup-country,engagedinagriculture.Thefarmers,whoareeconomicallywelloffandstableandsecureintheirproperties,arebothinarticulateandtotallyindifferenttonationalpolitics.PoliticsistheconcernofthedropsicalcityofBangkok,withitsmillioninhabitants,andinthiscityitistheconcernofaverynarrowgroupindeed.Itsbaseconsistsofthosewhohavehadaschooleducationandmorerarelyauniversitytraining.Mostoftheseareemployedinthebureaucracy.Abovethem,andsignificantlyinfluential,areaboutonethousandpersons--theveryhighestcivilservants,someprominentpoliticians,afewwealthymerchantsandtheofficersoffieldrankinthearmedforces.Atthetop,andmanipulatingtheselowerlevels,areaboutfifteenpersons,mostlymilitaryofficersbutwithoneortwooutstandingcivilians.Thesearetherulinggroup.

____________________6 M.Khadduri,IndependentIraq(London,1960),p.84.

-134-

Thecivilserviceisbothfragmentedanddocileandplaysnoindependentpoliticalrole.MembersofParliamentmay,byunusualtalents,succeedinbecominginfluentialbutParliament'simportancewasderivativeonly,beingacreatureoftheall-powerfulexecutive(itwasabolishedaltogetherin1958).Tradeunionshardlyexist,andthe'parties'havelittleornoextra-parliamentaryorganization.Eachcandidatehastogethimselfelectedbyhisownindividualeffortssecondedorthwartedbygovernmentinterferencewiththecampaignandthecountingofvotes.These'parties'haveneverrepresentedsocialforces,onlycliques.

Governmenthasalwayscomefromaboveanditstilldoes.Uptothecoupof1932,itlayinthehandsofabsolutemonarchsofmildlywesternizingtendencyandtheircourtcircle.Thisrulewassupplantedin1932bythatofatinymilitary-civiliancircle,inwhichthemilitarypredominated,andhavedoneeversince.Themonarchhasbeenrelegatedtoadecorativeroleandthemilitarycliquescarryouthispreviousfunctionsinasimilarlybenevolentautocraticway.

Thepost-1932politicsofThailandisthehistoryofthreemilitaryrevoltsandtheiraftermaths:thoseof1932,1947and1957.In1932aconspiracywashatchedbetweencertaincivilservantsandofficers,disgruntledatbumpingupagainsttheroyalhierarchyandfeelingabletoproceednofurther.Bothgroupswerewestern-educated,andbothwereresentfulofthecourtmonopolyofsupremepower.Thisgroup,havingseizedBangkok,endedtheabsolutemonarchy,establishedaquasi-Parliament,halfofwhichwastobenominated,andproclaimedthemselvesas'ThePeople'sParty'.Itsmilitarywing,ledbyColonel(laterFieldMarshal)Phibun,soonquarrelledwithitscivilianwing,ledbyNaiPridi,aParis-educatedlawyer,anddrovehimintoexile.ThenceforthPhibun,thesoldier,governedthecountry,firstasMinisterofDefenceandthen(in1938)asPrimeMinister.Hefellin1944,andgavewaytoNaiPridi:forPhibunhadbecomeidentifiedwithThailand'spro-Japanesepolicyduringthewar,whilePridihadralliedtheanti-Japaneseresistance.Therefollowedabrief,'civilian'interludeunderPridiwhichendedwiththeseconddecisivemilitarycoup,thatof1947.

ThisrevoltwasengineeredbythePhibungroup.Itcalledforelections,andwhenthesewentagainstitin1948itforcedoutthevictoriousNaiKuang(theirnomineeafterthe1947coup),andestablishedFieldMarshalPhibunasPrimeMinister.Thenfollowedasplitinthetriumphantarmedforces.Thenavyandmarineswho

-135-

werehostiletoPhibunsupportedhisenemy,Kuang,andinFebruary1949stagedtheirowncounter-revolt.TheywerecrushedbyPhibun'sloyalistforces,however.In1951,thenavyandmarineskidnappedPhibunandrevoltedoncemoreonlytobecrushedagainafterthreedays'heavyfighting.PhibunremainedPrimeMinisteruntil1957.

Butthearmywasnowthrowingupyoungerleaders,andfromthefightingof1951twoemergedaspotentialrivalstotheFieldMarshal.OnewasPhaoSriyanon,theDirectorGeneralofPolice,theotherGeneralSaritThanarat,theCommanderoftheBangkokgarrison.Theirchancecameafter1955whenaftervisitingtheUnitedStatesandBritainFieldMarshalPhibundecidedtorelaxtherepression,toencouragepoliticalpartiestoregister,andtoseekanelectoralmandateforhimself.Theelectionsof1956,however,werenotonlyconductedwithgrossirregularityandinterference,but(fromPhibun'spointofview)withgrossinefficiency;forthe'official'partybarelyscrapedamajority.GeneralSarit--whohadbeenacandidate--wasabletoclaimthattheelectionswerefraudulent.ToplacatehimPhibunmadehimCommander-in-Chiefofallthearmedforces,andgavehimaseatinthepatchworkcabinetwhichheformedinanefforttoconciliatethefactionshehadletloose.Phao,rivaltobothPhibunandSaritalike,wasalsointhecabinet.

Nowoccurredthethirdcoup,thatof1957.GeneralSaritandhisforcesrevolted.Phibunfled,Phaowentintoexile.Newelectionswerecalled,inwhichGeneralSarit'snew'Unionist'partytriumphed.GeneralSaritthenappointedhisdeputy,GeneralThanom,asPrimeMinisterwhilehehimselfwenttotheUnitedStatesformedicaltreatment.SuddenlyreappearinginOctober1958,heengineeredabloodlesscoup,thrustoutGeneralThanom,abrogatedtheconstitutionandproclaimedhimselfabsoluteruler.Inall,since1932Thailandhasexperiencedeightcoups,andexperimentedwithsevenconstitutions.Throughoutthewholethirtyyears,however,themilitaryhavebeenthesolesourceofpoliticalpowerandthesoleinstrumentofpoliticalchange.

CHANGESINTHELEVELOFPOLITICALCULTUREAsociety'slevelofpoliticalcultureisnotnecessarilystatic,andindeeditmaychangeveryquickly.Itisnotidenticalwithcertainquantifiableobjectivefactorssuchasthedegreeofindustrializationorliteracy,althoughitissubstantiallyaffectedbytheseandtosome

-136-

extentcorrelatedwiththem.Itdependsonopinion,andtheextenttowhichthisiseffectivelymobilized.Nowthiscanchangeveryfastincountrieswith'low'or'minimal'politicalcultures;forveryoftenthereasonsfortheabsenceofapoliticalpublicliesintheprohibitionoffreeassociationandfreediscussion,andoncethesearepermitted,organizedviewpointscanbecomeasignificantpoliticalforce.ThiscanbeseenfromtheexamplesofVenezuelaorGuatemala.Venezuelahadsufferedfrom1908untilhisdeathin1935,underthebrutalandbarbaroustyrannyofGomez.Hisdeathsetoffatrainofblindandbloodydisturbanceswhichresultedinstillfurtherrepressionunderhissuccessor.Nevertheless,partiesnowformedundergroundandtosucheffectthatin1941thePresident(GeneralMedina)thoughtitexpedienttosanctionthem,includingeventheAccionDemocratica.Thisrapidlybuiltuparealorganization,rootedinthevillages.Itwassoeffectivethatby1943GeneralMedinafounditnecessarytoestablishanofficialpartytocombatAccionDemocraticainthemunicipalelections.Thisinturnledsomedissidentjuniorofficersin1945toseektheallianceofAccionDemocraticaintheircoupofthatyearandthisinturnledtofreeelectionsof1946inwhichAccionDemocraticawasvictoriouswithahugemajority.ThewholeofPresidentJiménez'sreignofterrorfromhiscounter-revolutionof1948tohisfallin1958couldnotwipeoutthelatentforcesoforganizedopinion.Thus1935wasacriticaldate.Before1935,onewouldhavebeenjustifiedinconsideringVenezuelaasamilitary-dominatedstateinwhichtheforcesofopinioncountedfornothing:herwholehistorywasasBolívarhadpropheticallysaid,'thatofthebarracks'.After1935,certainlyafter1941,Venezuelawasequallyclearlya'third-order'stateinwhichnotionsoflegitimacywerefluid,but,nevertheless,presentandsupportedbyorganizedopinion.Yetthechangesthatoccurredin1935had,obviously,beenlatentbeforethattime;1935simplycrystallizedthemout.PresidentBétancourthashimselfdescribedhow:

'NowVenezuelahadceasedtobeexclusivelypastoralandagricultural.Inthetownsandmoreespeciallyintheoil-fieldstherehadgrownupanewsocialclass--theworkers.Fromexiletherehadreturned,alongsidetheemigrésoffossilizedmentalitywholiketheBourbonshadlearnednothingandforgottennothing,groupsofyoungmennourishedonmodernsocialdisquietude.Thepeoplebegantoencountertheirfutureorganizers

-137-

andleaders:menwholiketheArgentinegenerationofthe1850'shadfilledtheinterminablehoursofexileandprisonwiththestudyofnewsocialdoctrinesandexperiences.Themasses'ardourforatrulydemocraticlifeandtherealizationoftheireminentlyjustslogan"GetridofGomez-ism"foundchannelsinthedemocraticpoliticalparties,inthetradeunions,inthemilitantstudents'organizationsandamongtheorganizedleaders,allofwhichbeganstraightawaytofillwithlife.'7

ThesameistrueofGuatemala.Today,evenunderthereactionaryruleofPresidentYdígoras,thepartiesandthetradeunions,feeblethoughtheybe,areofsomepoliticalsignificance.Before1944theydidnotexistatall.Thecountryhadbeenruledbyasuccessionoflong-liveddictators,thelastofwhom,Ubico,hadruthlesslysuppressedallopposition,anddismissedallprotestswiththewords,'MyjusticeisGod's'.Hefellin1944notasaresultofanyorganizedmovementatall,butsimplybythetacitwithdrawalofsupportbyalltheelementsthathadhithertoacquiescedinhisdictatorship.Fromthenonwardsanunbridledfrenzyofdiscussionandorganizationtookholdoftheurbanpopulation.Itwasthisthatwascanalizedintosupportingthereturnedexile,theschoolmasterArévalo,anditwasunderhimthatthewaywaspreparedforMajorArbenztobecomehissuccessor.ThenfollowedthemassorganizationofthepeasantsbythelegalizedCommunistParty,drawingtheIndiansforthefirsttimeintopolitics.AfterArbenzwasdesertedbyhisarmyinthefaceofthecounter-revolutionaryinvasionofCastilloArmas,muchofthiswasundone;butenoughhasremainedtomaketheunionsandthepartiesofsomepoliticalsignificance.Thusourclassificationofrégimesaccordingtotheirlevelsofpoliticalcultureisalwaysprovisional.Latentforceslurkinsocietyandmaycrystallizeoutaftersomecataclysmoraccident.Factorssuchastheself-consciousnessofopinionorthestrengthanddurabilityofpublicassociationsaremorevolatileandmoresubjecttorapidalterationthantheeconomicandsocialfactorswithwhichMarxistsdeal.Yeteventhesematerialfactorsaremuchlessimmediatelyapparentthanthe'vulgar'Marxiststendtocredit,andthereforewhatEngelssaidofthedifficultiesofMarx'shistoricalmaterialismisequallytrueofourownapproach.Engelswrote:

____________________7 R.Bétancourt,op.cit.,pp.80-1.

-138-

'Eventoday,whenthespecializedpressconcernedprovidessuchrichmaterial,itstillremainsimpossibleeveninEnglandtofollowdaybydaythemovementofindustryandtradeintheworldmarketandthechangeswhichtakeplaceinthemethodsofproductioninsuchawayastobeabletodrawageneralconclusion,foranypointoftime,fromthesemanifoldcomplicatedandeverchangingfactorsthemostimportantofwhich,intothebargain,generallyoperateforalongtimeinsecretbeforetheysuddenlymakethemselvesviolentlyfeltonthesurface....Itisself-evidentthatthisunavoidableneglectofcontemporarychangesintheeconomicsituation,theverybasisofalltheprocessestobeexamined,mustbeasourceoferror.Butalltheconditionsofacomprehensivepresentationofcurrenthistoryunavoidablyincludesourcesoferror,which,however,keepsnobodyfromwritingcurrenthistory.'8

Summary

Wemaysummarizetherelationshipbetweenthelevelsofinterventionontheonehandandthelevelsofpoliticalcultureontheotherbymeansofadiagram,thus:

____________________

8 F.Engels,IntroductiontoMarx'sClassStrugglesinFrance(MarxEngels'SelectedWorks,LawrenceandWishart,1958,Vol.1,p.119).

-139-

CHAPTERTENTheModesofInterventionWEHAVEseenthatinterventionmaybepressedtofourlevels:influence,blackmail,displacementandsupplantment.Theselevelsofinterventionareattainedbycertaincharacteristicmethods,aloneorinconjunctionwithoneanother.Theymaybelistedas:1. Thenormalconstitutionalchannels.2. Collusionand/orcompetitionwiththecivilianauthorities.3. Theintimidationofthecivilianauthorities.4. Threatsofnon-co-operationwith,orviolencetowards,thecivilianauthorities.5. Failuretodefendthecivilianauthoritiesfromviolence.6. Theexerciseofviolenceagainstthecivilianauthorities.

Thesesixmethodsarespecificallyrelatedtothelevelofinterventioninquestionandtherelationshipmaybeexpressedthus:

-140-

From'influence'to'blackmail'Inallcountriesruledbycivilians,thearmedforcesmaytrytoconverttherulerstotheirownpointofview.Theyhaveboththerightandthedutytoattemptthis.Theyareinnobetter,butcertainlynoworseamoralpositionthananydepartmentsoftheciviladministrationwhichalsohavetherightanddutytopersuadethegovernmenttotheirpointofview.Suchdiscussionorpersuasioncannotberegardedas'intervention'.Thisbydefinitionisthemilitary'simposedsubstitutionofitspolicies,orofitsperson,forthatoftheciviliangovernment.

'Influence',however,canbecomesomethingnotfarremovedfromblackmail,assoonasthemilitaryadvisersthreatentoapplysomesanctionshouldtheiradvicenotbefollowed.Thequestionis:whatkindofsanctionconstitutes'pressure'or'blackmail'?Wecanreadilyagreethatthethreatsofphysicalcoercionorofdisobedienceareunconstitutionalinanycircumstancesandthatviewsaccompaniedbysuchthreatsare,clearly,blackmail.Whatarewetosay,however,ofathreatmerelytocreatepoliticaldifficultiesforthegovernmenttorouselegislativeorpublicopinionagainstittotheextent,possibly,ofcausingitsoverthrow?Insomecircumstances,thismightbedeemedthemaximumextensionofmilitaryinfluence;inothers,anexampleofunwarrantedpressureand,assuch,acaseofblackmail.Thelinebetweenthetwoisatenuousone.Thiscanbeseenbycomparingthecasesof,say,theUnitedStatesandBritainwithcertainothercases.Theissueis:whatineachcasearethe'normalchannels'ofmilitaryparticipationinframingnationalpolicyandhowfarhavethemilitarymovedoutsidethese?Dothe'normalchannels'includethemilitary'smobilizationofpublicorlegislativesupportagainstthegovernmentoftheday?InthehistoryofboththeUnitedStatesandBritaintherearemanyinstancesofmilitarycollusionorcompetitionwiththepoliticalpartiesandthepress;andthelinebetweenlegitimateinfluenceandpoliticalpressurebecomeshardtodraw.

ThepresentsituationintheUnitedStatesisparticularlyrelevanthere.Inthemindsofthousands,thePentagonhastakenitsplacealongsidetheEldersofZion,theFreemasons,'WorldFinance'andthelike,inthePandaemoniumoftheworshippersofthe'conspiracytheory'ofhistory.Moreimportantly,manysaneandresponsibleobserversinAmericaandEuropeareconcernedatthedisproportionateresponsibilityoftheAmericanmilitaryfortheframingofgovernmentdecisions.

Thisispartlyduetoadventitiousfactors.TheAmericanmilitary

-141-

establishmentdisposesofanenormouspublic-relationsnetwork.1Itiscaughtupinamassiveandhighlyinfluentialmeshofindustrialinterests.And,since1945,eventshavemadeitlessandlesspossibletodivorcequestionsofdefencefromthoseofforeignpolicy.2Allthishasaddedtothedisquietaboutitsroleinpolicyformation,themoresosincethedevelopmentsareofrecentgrowthandcontrastsharplywiththesubordinateroleofthemilitaryupto1941.

Morefundamentaltothisenhancedroleis,however,theeffectoftheAmericansystemofgovernmentitself.Thisforcesthemilitarytocolludewithorcombatotherpoliticalforcesunderaspotlightofconstantpublicity.InthisitisneitherbetternorworseoffthananyothergovernmentagencyintheUnitedStates.Thegeneralsandadmiralsareaccusedof'speakingoutofturn',andofutteringsentimentswhicharebigoted,orcontrarytoofficialpolicy,orwhichdealwithmatters-likeforeignpolicy-whicharenoconcernoftheirs.Theycertainlydodothesethings.Often,thepublicitygiventotheirviewsisnotintendedbythemandreflectsadministrativeerrorsinclearance.3OftenitresultsfromthecasualnessofAmericanofficialdomorleakagestoreporters.InmanycasesitstemsfromacharacteristicAmericanloquacityandlackofadministrativeself-discipline.YetinallthesecasesitisnotonlynotcensuredbytheAmericanpublicbutispositivelydefendedonthegroundsthat'thepublichavearighttoknow'.ItmustneverbeforgottenthattheAmericanpanaceaforanypolicyproblemispublicity.Inthisrespectthemilitaryarenomoreopen-mouthedorundisciplinedthantheciviladministrators.4

Evenmoreimportant,though,istheeffectoftheseparationofpowers.ThiscreatesrivalryandtensionbetweenthePresidentandtheCongress.Thethreeservices,albeitbroughttogetherintheJointChiefsofStaffCommittee,thinkasthreeseparateservices.They

____________________1 Seeparticularly,M.Janowitz,TheProfessionalSoldier,Ch.19,'Thenewpublicrelations'.2 Ibid.,Chs.13to16.

3 Cf.Lt.-Gen.J.M.Gavin,WarandPeaceintheSpaceAge,pp.169-72,foraleakageduetopoorclearancearrangementsintheDepartmentofDefence.

4

Ontheotherhand,officershaveabusedtheopportunity(giventhembyaNationalSecurityCouncildirectiveof1958)tocarryoutopenpropaganda,ofmostreactionarytendency,againstleadingAmericansandtheUnitedStatesGovernmentitself.Theyhave'indoctrinated'theirtroopswithsuchviews.Theyhavealsosoughttodominatecivilianthinkingbyorganizinganti-communismcourses,FreedomForums,lectures,etc.(See,forinstance,'U.S.Officersabusetheirpower',TheTimes,September13,1961.)

-142-

competitionforlimitedfunds.Thuseachdisgruntledservice-orevenpartofaservice-canplayofftheSecretaryofDefence'sdecisionagainsttheCongressionalcommittees,which,undertheconstitution,havetherighttoconducthearings.Thisrightofappealhasmadetheprivatediscordspublicandhasalsomultipliedsuchdiscords:fornoservicewillconsidercompromiseuntilithasessayedtheappealtoCongress.Hencetworesults.Inthefirstplace,thepubliccometoknowofthe'non-official'viewsofeachsectionofthearmedforces.Thismaynotbeduetoanofficer'sdisloyaltytothePresident,buttothemoralconflictheisforcedintowhenaCommitteequestionshimastohisownpersonalviews.5Secondly,bureauxorservicesmayprompttheirsupportersintheCommitteestoaskleadingquestions.6Theresultisopenpropagandabyeachbranchoftheservice,whichisfullyreportedandoftenexaggeratedinthepress;andbittermutualrecriminationsonstrategyandtacticsbetweentheproponentsofthedifferentviews.In1948,SecretaryForrestalhadtodealwiththe'airforcerevolt':in1949,SecretaryJohnsonhadtocopewiththe'admirals'revolt';andin1956,SecretaryWilsonhadtocopewiththearmy'scalculatedleakagesofinformation.TheAmericansystemleadsindeedtowhathasbeencalled'legalizedinsubordination'.Inallthis,boththoseCongressionalgroupswhoaredisinterestedlyconcernedwithaPresidentialdecision,aswellasthosewhohavebeeninfluencedbyamilitaryinterest,areempoweredtoengageinlobbying.ProfessorHuntingtoncitesthreetypesofsuchlobbying.FirstcomeattemptstomaketheAdministrationconstructcertaintypesofweapons;e.g.theJointCommitteeonAtomicEnergyhasplayedanimportantpartinpromptingthedecisiontobuildtheH-bomb,Polaris,andI.R.B.M.sSecondly,thereareattemptstopreventcutsinfavouriteforces(e.g.themarines)orsupplymoremoneytoothers(e.g.theairforce).Finally,Congressinvestigatesmattersofstrategy;e.g.the1951MacArthurhearings,the1956SymingtonAirpowerhearingsorthe1957-8JohnsonMissileinvestigation.7

____________________

5 Cf.Lt.-Gen.J.M.Gavin,op.cit.,pp.166;168-9.Gen.MaxwellTaylor,TheUncertainTrumpet,pp.112-14.

6 Lt.-Gen.Gavin,op.cit.,p.167.

7

ProfessorS.R.Huntington,'StrategicDecisionMakingintheU.S.A.'(unpublishedpaper,deliveredtothe7thRoundTableofI.P.S.A.,1959).Cf.also,hismorerecent"'InterserviceCompetitionandthePoliticalRolesoftheArmedServices'"(AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,March,1961,pp.40-52).M.Janowitz,op.cit.,Chs.17,18,19.

-143-

Inaword,theAmericangovernmentalsystemanditstraditionofpublicityforcesthemilitarynotonlytospeakoutbuttoestablishrelationshipswithpoliticalforces.ItdoesthesametoallinterestedgroupsintheUnitedStates-bothtoadministrativegroupsandtoprivateones.8Theverypressureofthesystemforcesthemilitarytoshoutjustasloudly-indeed,moreloudlythan-therest;andeachservicemust,simultaneously,trytoshoutmoreloudlythanitsfellows.Thisgivesanimpressionofavastmilitaryinfluenceingovernment,whereasitisevidenceonlyofavastamountofnecessitatednoise.Ithassomearbitraryandunpredictableeffectonreadjustingtherelativebudgetsofthethreeservices:butitisquestionablewhetheritenhancestheinfluenceofthemilitaryasawholevisà-visthecivilauthorities.Oneobserver,atanyrate,thinksthatthebootisontheotherfootandthat'sofarfromthemilitaryelementexpandingattheexpenseoftheciviliangovernment,itisarguablethatthecivilianhasconstantlyandinevitablyencroachedonthemilitary'.9HearguesthatinboththeUnitedStatesandBritainthebudgethasbeenthedecisivefactorindeterminingmilitarypolicyandthatthishasbeenfirmlycontrolledbythecivilians;anditmustbeownedthatthisthesisfindsveryconsiderablesupportfromtheaccountgivenbyGeneralMaxwellTaylor,inhisUncertainTrumpet.

GiventhenthepreconditionsofAmericanconstitutionallawandusage,itismorejudicioustoconsidertheAmericanmilitary'seffortstoexercisepoliticalpressureasanextensionoftheirlegitimatemeansofinfluence,ratherthanasblackmail.10

InBritain,thecabinetsystemlessensthemilitary'sopportunitiestomountParliamentarypressureagainstthegovernment;and,furthermore,thelobbyingofM.P.sbyservicechiefsisabreachofconstitutionalusage,ifnotofafixedconvention.YetBritainhashadherexperienceswithservicelobbiesnotdissimilartothoseoftheUnitedStates.WehavealreadyhadoccasiontomentionthestrugglebetweenLloydGeorge,thePrimeMinister,andhisservicechiefs,notablySirWilliamRobertson,inthe1917period.ThattheoutcomewassolongdelayedwasduetoRobertson'spoliticalsupport,in

____________________

10 Iexceptfromthis,ofcourse,thepropagandaexercisesmentionedinthefootnoteatp.142above.Thereisnoexcusewhatsoeverforthisflagrantabuseofpublicpositionandpublicfunds.

8 Cf.S.E.Finer,AnonymousEmpire(London,1958).pp.92-3.

9M.Howard,'SomeReflectionsonDefenceOrganizationinGreatBritainandtheU.S.A.1945-1958'(unpublishedpaperdeliveredtothe7thRoundTableofI.P.S.A.onCivil-MilitaryRelations,1959).

-144-

Parliament,inthepressandamongthepublic.And,intheperiodbeforetheoutbreakofthefirstworldwar,tworivalfactionsattheAdmiraltyeachsoughttobringpoliticalpressuretobearonthegovernment.OntheonesidewastheFirstLord,LordFisher,andontheotherAdmiralBeresford.FishercapturedtheNavyLeague(apowerfulpressuregroup),andreckednothingoflobbyingM.Psorsendinghis'journalisticJanissaries'tosecureafavourablepress.Neitherdidhisopponents,theso-called'SyndicateofDiscontent'.TheirsupporterssplitofffromtheNavyLeaguetoformtheImperialMaritimeLeague;11theytoohadtheir'BigNavy'press,andtheysoughtandfoundsupportinParliamentespeciallyamongtheConservativeopposition.

Thoughsucheffortsareunusualandunconventional,theyarenotnecessarilyunconstitutional.Whetheroneistoregardthemasthelegitimateextensionofinfluenceorasthebeginningsofpoliticalblackmaildependsonhowoneregardsservingofficers'unauthorizeddisclosureofinformationtopressandtopoliticians.Ifonestressestherightofthelegislaturetobeinformedandtoredressgrievances,thentheseweretechniquesofinfluence:ifonestressesthedutyofservingofficerstoobeytheirsuperiors,thentheymustberegardedaseffortsatblackmail.

However,inbothBritainandtheUnitedStatesthepoliciesadvocatedborestrictlyonprofessionalmatters.Sectionsofthemilitarywerevyingwithothersectionstohavetheirprofessionalclaimsmet.12Thisisverydifferentfromothercaseswherethe

____________________

11

Cf.,forinstance,ThePassingoftheGreatFleetbyH.F.WhattandL.G.H.GrahamHorton,thejointfoundersoftheImperialMaritimeLeague(1909).ThewholeofthisepisodeisdescribedindetailinA.J.Marder,FromtheDreadnoughttoScapaFlow(O.U.P.1961),Vol.I,whichappearedasthisworkwasgoingtopress.SeeespeciallyChaptersVandVIII.

12

Cf.M.Janowitz,op.cit.'The[American]militaryprofessionisnotamonolithicpowergroup.Adeepsplitpervadesitsranksinrespecttoitsdoctrineandviewpointsonforeignaffairs,asplitwhichmirrorsciviliandisagreements.Instead,themilitaryprofessionandthemilitaryestablishmentconformmoretothepatternofanadministrativepressuregroup,butonewithastronginternalconflictofinterest.Itisaveryspecialpressuregroupbecauseofitsimmenseresources,andbecauseofitsgraveproblemsofnationalsecurity.Themilitaryhaveaccumulatedconsiderablepowerandthatpowerprotrudesintothepoliticalfabricofcontemporarysociety.Itcouldnotbeotherwise.However,whiletheyhavenoreluctancetopressforlargerbudgets,theyexercisetheiropiniononpoliticalmatterswithconsiderablerestraintandunease.Civiliancontrolofmilitaryaffairsremainsintactandfundamentallyacceptabletothemilitary;anyimbalanceinmilitarycontributionstopoliticomilitaryaffairs-domesticorinternational-isthereforeoftentheresultofdefaultbycivilianpoliticalleadership'(p.viii).

-145-

militaryhavecorporatelyopposedthecivilianauthorities,andadvocatedapolicywhichwaslessaboutprofessionalmattersthanitwasageneralpoliticalprogramme.

ThemoststrikingofsuchcasesisthatoftheJapanesearmedforcesinthe1930s.TheJapanesemilitary,particularlythearmy,actedlikeapoliticalpartyinallsensesbutone-itdidnotputupcandidates.From1935itopenlyassumedresponsibilityforthetrainingofyouth,andthereafterits'thoughtsupervisors'andinspectioncommissionsbegantooperateintheschools.Studentswereencouragedtospyontheirfellows.Officerscameintoinstructtheschool-teacherson'morals'.Inaddition,jointlywiththeDepartmentofEducation,itpublishedmillionsofpropagandapamphletswhichputthearmycaseforexpansionandwarabroadandforacontrolledeconomyathome,andweredistributedtotheschoolsandcolleges,andtoeveryvillage.Officerstouredthecountrylecturinginfactories,schoolsandvillagehalls,andinallthistheextensiveex-servicemen'sassociationsandtheJapaneseWomen'sSocietyforNationalDefencegavevociferousassistance.

Inaddition,however,thelawandconventionoftheJapanesestateassignedtothemilitaryanautonomouspoliticalrôle.ThecabinethadtoincludetheMinistersofWarandoftheNavyandbyconventionalsothesehadtobeofficersontheactivelistandsounderorders.(In1913therulewasabrogatedandtheministerscouldbedrawnfromtheretiredlistbutinpracticetheconcessionhadlittleeffect.Therulewasrestoredin1936.)Hencethemilitarycouldbreakacabinetbywithdrawingtheirrepresentativesandrefusingtoappointothersuntilandunlesstheyweresatisfiedwiththechoiceoftheotherministers.Themilitarymadefrequentuseofthispowertobringpressureonthecivilians.Itwouldbeotiosetocataloguealltheoccasions;13aselectionfromthe1936-7periodwillsufficetoillustratethetechnique.In1936,theEmperorcalledontheex-ForeignMinisterHirotatoformacabinet.Thearmywasbynowdeterminedtoblockpartygovernment.It,therefore,nominatedGeneralTerauchiasMinisterofWar,andHirotawasabletoformhiscabinetonlyaftersecuringTerauchi's(i.e.army)approvalforeachandeveryoneofthecabinetmembers.Forinstance,Hirota'sfirst

____________________

13 Cf.C.Yinaga,"'TheMilitaryandtheGovernmentinJapan'"(AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,Vol.35,pp.529-39).

-146-

choiceforForeignMinisterwasYoshida-aliberal.'Butnaturally,'commentedtheAmericanAmbassador,JosephGrew,'thearmywouldn'thavehimforamomentanditwassoonannouncedthatHirotahadrunintohotwaterandwashavingdifficultyinforminghiscabinetandthatGeneralTerauchi,hischoiceforMinisterofWar,wouldnotserveunlessradicalalterationsweremadeinHirota'sslate....IttookHirotafourdaystosmoothouthisdifferencesofopinionwiththearmy....'14

TheHirotacabinetwasindeeda'puppetofthearmy'15itdiverted46percentofthebudgettothearmedforces.InJanuary1937,thecivilian-armydifferencesagaincametoahead.WhenHamadaoftheSeiyukaiPartylaunchedaparliamentaryattackonthearmy'spoliticalactivities,GeneralTerauchiclaimedithadbeeninsultedandtheWarOfficeissuedamidnightpressstatementcriticizingtherégimeofpoliticalpartiesandparliamentarism.Hirotaresigned.Allthenegotiationsforanewcabinetwerenowsetafootoncemore.ThistimetheEmperorcalledonGeneralUgaki.Invain.'Itwasthearmyandsolelythearmywhichwasresponsibleforthefailure.AllotherimportantgroupsinthecountryfavouredUgaki.'16Furthermore,inthearmyitwastheKwantungArmyfaction(i.e.thearmyinManchuria,ledbyGeneralItagaki,itsChiefofStaff)whorefusedtohaveUgaki.Ugakiwasregardedastoomoderate,ashehadonceconcurredwithhisciviliancolleaguesinacabinetwhichhadcutdownthesizeofthearmy.

ThenextchoiceforPrimeMinisterwasGeneralHayashi.HetriedtobringintheextremistGeneralItagakieitherasWarMinisterorVice-Premier,butwasblockedbytheotherarmyfactionsandbythenavy.Hiscabinetwas'vetted'bythesegroups,andasaconsequenceoftheirpressure,onceagainnopartypoliticianswereappointedtothecabinet.17

Otherarmies,e.g.theSpanisharmyinthedecadesbeforethefirstworldwar,alsotendedtoactlikeaparty,andbringpressureupontheirciviliancolleagues;butthisJapaneseexamplemustsufficetoillustratethetechniqueofbringingpressuretobearuponthe

____________________14 J.Grew,TenYearsinJapan,pp.160-1;cf.alsoM.Shigemitsu,op.cit.,p.108.15 M.Shigemitsu,loc.cit.

16 ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates(DepartmentofState,Washington,1937),Vol.IV,pp.703-14.

17 Forotherexamplescf.K.Colegrove,"'TheJapaneseCabinet'"(AmericanPoliticalScienceReview.Vol.30,pp.916-19).

-147-

civiliangovernmentbycollusionorcompetitionwithcivilianpoliticians.

Blackmail:intimidationandthreatsTheJapaneseexampleofcollusionandcompetitionwithciviliansmayberegardedasinfluenceorblackmailaccordingtotaste.Whenweconsidermilitaryintimidationofpoliticiansbyviolenceandbythreatswearequitecertainlyatthelevelofblackmail.

InJapan,thearmy'scompetitionwiththepartieswasaccompaniedbythemurderofprominentpoliticians.Thiswasnotofdeliberatesetpurpose;manyoftheassassinswerenotsoldiersbutcivilians,andeventhesoldier-assassinswerenotactingunderorders.Nevertheless,themurderswerecarriedoutinthearmy'sinterest;themurderers(savein1936)gotofflightlyforthatreason;andthearmybenefited.In1930,theanti-militarist'Lion'Hamagauchiwasshotbyaright-wingpatriotanddiedofhiswounds.In1931,aplotwasuncoveredtoblowthewholecabinettopiecesandinstalamilitaryjunta.InFebruary1932,aformerFinanceMinister,Inoye,wasmurderedbytheright-wing'LeagueofBlood'andBaronDan,ofthehouseofMitsui,waskilledamonthlaterbyayoungnavalofficer.InMay1932,PrimeMinisterInukai,whobelievedinapeacefulpolicytowardsChina,wasmurderedbyagroupofcadetsandofficers.Theyhadafielddayincourtwheretheybaskedinpublicsympathyandnotonereceivedacapitalsentence.'Themilitaryarestillsupremeandstillformadictatorshipofterrorism',wrotetheAmericanAmbassadorGrewinearly1933.'ThereseemslittledoubtthatSaito[thePrimeMinister]wastoldtofallinlineorelsetherewouldbeaninternalcrack-upinthecountrycommencingwiththeassassinationofhimselfandotherswhohadopposedwithdrawalfromtheLeagueofNations....'18TheclimaxofthemurdercampaignoccurredintheFebruarymutinyof1936.Therebels'planwastokilleveryimportantmemberofthecabinet,andseveralwereindeedsurprisedintheirhomesandshotdown.ThistimetheEmperorhadasayintherepression;asfarashewasconcerned,therebellionwasanactofmutiny.Therebelofficersweredeniedthepublictrialtheycovetedandtheringleaderswereexecuted.Fromthenonthecampaignofassassinationsceased.

Averydifferentbutevidentlymosteffectivevariantofthetechniqueoffrighteningthearmy'spoliticalenemies,practisedinSyria

____________________18 J.Grew,op.cit.,pp.73-4.

-148-

between1955and1956,wasthejudicial'frame-up'.Herethearmycolludedwithcertainfavouredpoliticalgroups,whileterrorizingtheirpoliticalopponents.TheleaderofthemilitaryfactionwastheyoungheadoftheSyrianarmy'sDeuxièmeBureau,Lt.-Col.Serraj,andthepoliticalfactionhefavouredwastheBa'athparty.

TheBa'athpartycameintoprominencein1954,whenelectionswereheldafterthedepositionofthedictatorShishakli.ThemajorityoftheChamberwereIndependents.Alsoabouttwenty-eightmembersofthePeople'spartyandthirteenoftheNationalPartywerereturned(theseweretheoldernationalistpartiesandrepresentedthesociallypowerfulclasses).ButtherewerealsoreturnedsixteenmembersoftheBa'athparty.ItwasaradicalpartyoftheurbanintelligentsiawhichproclaimedArabunitywithastrongpro-Egyptianslant,denouncedimperialismandhencetheWest,andstoodfor'positiveneutralism',andfavouredsocialreforms.19Itsviewhadmademuchheadwayamongthejuniorarmyofficers.SerrajcooperatedwiththeBa'athwhosesuccessinthe1954elections(ithadonlytwomembersinthepreviousParliament)hasbeenascribed20partlytoarmyfundsandarmysupport.21

Asheadofcounter-intelligence,Serrajhadasecretbudgetandcontrolledanetworkofagentsandspies.HenowusedhispositiontodestroytheBa'ath'senemies.Thefirsttobecrushedwasthesmall,activist,right-wingPopularParty,whichhatedandfoughttheBa'athandstoodfortheunionofSyriawithIraq.TheoccasionwastheassassinationofColonelMalki,theDeputyChiefofStaff,andbrothertooneoftheBa'athleaders.Theassassin(asergeant)committedsuicide,butthegovernmentstatedthattheassassinationwaspartofaplotbythePopularParty.Seventy-fiveciviliansandthirtyarmyofficerswerechargedwithcomplicityandtriedbytheofficeofthemilitaryinvestigator.Thedeathsentencefortwenty-sixexecutivemembersofthePopularPartywasdemanded,22andthePartyitselfwasdissolved.ItwasasaresultofthistrialthatColonelSerrajfirstemergedintoprominence.Thiswasin1955.Oneyearlater,TheTimes

____________________

19FortwodifferentassessmentsoftheBa'ath,seeW.Z.Laqueur,NationalismandCommunismintheMiddleEast,andG.Majdalany,'TheArabSocialistMovement(TheMiddleEastinTransition,W.Z.ed.Laqueur),pp.324-50.

20 Cf.W.Z.Laqueur,"'Syria:NationalismandCommunism'"(TheMiddleEastinTransition,p.328).

21 Itwillberememberedthatthearmycontrolledthegendarmerie,andthatthiswasinfluentialatelectiontime(seep.126).

22 Threeweresentencedtodeath,butthesentenceswerenotcarriedout.

-149-

TimeswasdescribingSyriaasbeing'inthegripofamilitarydictatorship'headedbySerraj.23

SerrajstruckhissecondblowonJanuary8,1957,whenfortysevenSyriansincludingsomeoftheleadingpoliticiansweretriedbycourtmartialforconspiringtooverthrowthegovernmentbyarmedrevolt,withbackingfromBritain,France,TurkeyandIraq.Amongtheaccusedwastheex-dictatorShishakli.Onlythreeofthedefendentswereacquitted.Nearlyalltheaccusedwereright-wingormoderatepoliticiansandtheeffectofthetrialwastopurgetheoppositioninthepartiesandthearmedforces.

ThethirdblowwastheexpulsionofthreeUnitedStatesofficialsinAugust1957,onthegroundsthattheyhadbeenpreparingaplottooverthrowtherégime.FourdayslaterSerrajpurgedtheseniorappointmentsintheSyrianarmy,andreplacedtheCommander-inChiefbyBrigadierBizri,believed(byTheTimescorrespondent)tobeaCommunistPartymember.

Concurrently,theSyrianParliamenttookonamoreandmoreanti-western,pro-Sovietandpro-Egyptiancast.TheIndependentsteamedupwiththeBa'athtoformamajoritygroup.ManyoftheoldPeople'sPartyandotheroppositionistsbegantofeelthepressureofthegovernmentandsomeofthemostprominentofthemfled.ThePresidentoftheChamberwasreplacedbyAkramHourani,theleaderoftheBa'ath.InthiswaywasthestagesetfortheunionofSyriawithEgypt-withColonelSerrajastheSyrianMinisteroftheInterior.24

Amoreusualformofpoliticalblackmailthantheonedescribedisthemilitarythreattorefusetodefendthegovernmentortoattackitunlessitsdemandsaremet.ThisiswhattheFrenchforcesinAlgeriathreatenedtodounlessdeGaullecametopower.25LikewiseinGreecein1936,wherethearmyofficersthreatenedtorevoltifagovernmentwereformedwhichdependedoncommunistsupport.SomeofthemostvividillustrationsofthistechniquecomefromtheearliestdaysoftheWeimarRepublic.Inearly1918,Field-Marshal

____________________23 TheTimes,November28,1956.

24

Later,hebecamePresidentoftheExecutiveCouncilofthe'Northernregion'oftheUnitedArabRepublic(September1959).Heresignedin1961,afterquarrellingwiththeEgyptianCommander-in-Chief,HakimAmer,andhisresignationwasimmediatelyseizedonbytheSyrianofficerstolaunchtheirrevoltagainstEgyptonSeptember28,1961.SerrajwasimprisoneduntilhecontrivedtoescapetoEgyptafterthecoupofMarch28,1962.

25 Seep.96-thethreattolaunch'OperationResurrection'.

-150-

VonHindenburgthreatenedPresidentEbertthatunlesshetookactionagainsttheSpartakists,theField-Marshalwould'actonhisownresponsibilityandwouldemployallthemeansathisdisposalagainstthem'.EbertperforcegavewayandallowedtroopstoenterBerlin.26Afewdayslater,theSoldiers'Congressputforwardits7-pointdemands:officersweretobeelected,powerwastoresideintheSoldiers'Councils,theregulararmywastobesupplantedbyacivilguard,andsoforth.ThesetheField-Marshalpositivelyrefusedtoobey.'IdeclinetorecognizetherulingoftheCongress,'hesaid.'Ishallopposeitbyeverymeansinmypower.Ishallnotpermitmyepaulettesormyswordtobetakenfromme.Nowasbefore,theArmysupportstheGovernmentandexpectsittocarryoutthepromisetopreservetheArmy.'Ebertrepliedthatthismustthereforeendincivilwar.'Itisnotwewhobeganthequarrel,'wasHindenburg'sreply,'anditisnotourbusinesstoendit.Wehavetakenourdecisionanditisirrevocable.'Onceagainthegovernmentgavewaytothisbullying.27

DisplacementandsupplantmentThedisplacementofagovernmentorthesupplantmentofthecivilianrégimearebroughtaboutinthreeways.

(1)Thefirstisthesameaswehavealreadydescribed,viz.byathreattorevolt,or,alternatively,torefusetodefendthegovernmentagainstitsfoes.Sofarwehavedescribedthisasatechniqueofblackmail,butitcanalsobeatechniquefordisplacementorsupplantment.

TheIraqicoups,1936-41,illustratethis.Notallofthemwerecarriedthroughbyphysicalviolence.Insomethemerethreatwassufficient.BakrSidqi'scoupof1936wasindeedaphysicalone,butthecounter-coupof1937whichdisplacedhispuppetcabinetwasexecutedbythreats.Ithappenedthus.WhenBakrSidqiwasassassinatedin1937,PrimeMinisterHikmatdecidedtoarresttheringleaders.TheMosulgarrisonsupportedthem,however,andaccordinglydeclaredthatithad'severedrelationswithBagdad'.Itwassoonjoinedbythreeothergarrisons,buttheBagdadgarrisonstayedloyal.Justasitlookedasifcivilwarmustbreakout,anoutlyingportionoftheBagdadgarrisonalsodefected.Thusnearlyall

____________________26 Wheeler-Bennett,op.cit.,p.31.27 Ibid.,p.33.

-151-

theIraqigarrisonshaddeclaredtheywouldnotobeythegovernment.InthesecircumstancesHikmatsimplyresigned.

ThefallofHikmat'ssuccessor,Midfai,wasbroughtaboutevenmoresimply.Heowedhiselevationtothearmycoupjustdescribed.By1938thecoupfactionhadbrokenintotwo,oneofwhichwasknownas'TheSeven'.Attheendof1938itdecidedtooverthrowMidfai.Havingconcentratedtheirforcesandputthemonthealert,theconspiratorshadthePremiertoldataprivatepartythatunlessheresignedtheforceswouldmarch.Midfaiimmediatelyagreedtoyield,andnextdayheandhiscolleaguesformallytenderedtheirresignationtotheKing,inthepresenceoftheChiefoftheGeneralStaffandotherleadingarmyofficers.

LikewiseinSpain,duringtheperiodoftheJuntasdeDefensa,1917-23.Whenthesesprangupin1917theMinisterofWarpromptlyorderedthearrestoftheleaders.TheJuntasretortedwithanultimatum,andthecabinet,notevenassuredofthesupportofthemonarch,hadnoothercoursethantoresign.ThegeneralstrikeandthedisordersinBarcelonawhichbrokeoutimmediatelyafterwardsthenmadecivilgovernmententirelydependentonmilitarysupportandthenceforwardcabinetaftercabinetfellasaresultoftheJuntas'threatsofdisobedience.When,in1917,theyinsistedonLaCiervabeingMinisterofWar,thePrimeMinister(Dato)hadtoresignandthewholeofthesucceedingcabinethadtobebuiltaroundLaCierva.

In1919theSanchezTocagovernmentfellowingtoarmyopposition,also.InthiscasetheJuntashadimposedcertainconditionsonofficersstudyingattheEscueladeGuerra.SomecaptainswhodeclinedtoaccepttheconditionswerebroughtbeforeaCourtofHonourandtoldtoresign.Civilianopinionwasshocked,andtheSanchezTocagovernmentdecidedtoallowanappealtotheSupremeCouncilofWar,buttheJuntasbroughtpressureontheWarMinisterandhe,inturn,refusedtoallowthecaptainstoappealtotheSupremeCouncil.Thecabinetthereuponresigned.Later,in1922,thescenerepeateditself.BythistimethedisasteratAnuelhadoccurredandwascastingitsshadowoverSpanishpolitics.ThePrimeMinisterwasMaura;but,indeferencetotheJuntashehadhadtoappointtotheMinistryofWarthatsameLaCiervawhomtheJuntasregardedastheirspokesman.CivilianopiniondemandedaninquiryintotheAnueldisaster.Mauracomplied,onlytomeettheenragedprotestsofLaCiervaandtheJuntas.Itwasnowthat

-152-

Maura,resigning,issuedthefamouswords:'Letthosewhopreventgovernmentgoverninstead.'

(2)Asecondwayinwhichthemilitarycanbringdownagovernmentorsupplantthecivilianrégimeisbyrefusingtodefendthegovernmentfromcivildisorder.Itwasinthisway,forinstance,thatGeneralSongYoChan,theChiefoftheGeneralStaffoftheSouthKoreanarmy,broughtaboutthedownfallofPresidentSyngmanRhee.OnMarch15,1960,PresidentSyngmanRheewonhisfourthterminaflagrantlyriggedelection.Anation-widerevoltfollowed.StudentdemonstrationsstartedinSeoulandspread.InApril,thepolicefiredoncrowdsmarchingonSyngmanRhee'sresidence,withdreadfulconsequences-115deadand777wounded.GeneralSongcalledonthePresidenttosaythatthearmywouldprobablyrefusetoshootifthestudentsriotedagain,butSyngmanRheetooknoaction.Afewdayslatertheissuecametoahead.ThreehundredSeoulUniversityteachersweregatheredattheNationalAssemblybuildingtoprotest;yetthearmytanksrumbledpastthem,apparentlyunheeding.Bycurfewtime(7p.m.)thecrowdhadbecomeenormous,andoncethearmyloudspeakersproclaimedtheirsympathywiththedemandsfornewelections,almostthewholepopulationturnedout.UnderarmyprotectionastudentdelegationwaiteduponSyngmanRheeandsecuredhisresignation.ThenextdaythesuccessorgovernmentofChungHuhwasformallyinstalled.

AnotherexampleisthefalloftheArbenzgovernmentinGuatemala,in1954.Bythatyearthebulkofthearmy'sofficershadbecomedisinclinedtofightforPresidentArbenz.OnJune5,theGeneralStaffsenthimamemorandumrecommendingthecurbingofthecommunists,onlytohavethePresidentrejectitandstatethathewouldmaintainhispolicies.AfortnightlaterCastilloArmasandhiscolumninvadedthecountrywithabout1,500poorlyequippedmenandwascheckedafteranadvanceoftwentymiles.TheonlyengagementwastheBattleofChiquimulainwhichonlyafewhundredmenwereinvolved,andwherethecasualtiestotalledamereseventeen.Therethearmyremainedpassiveuntil,afewdayslater(June27),representativesofitsofficercorpsmetthePresidentandsecuredhisresignation.AtemporarymilitaryjuntatookoverandonJuly2madetermswithCastilloArmas.

(3)Wenowcometothefinalmethodofdisplacingagovernment

-153-

orsupplantingtherégime-theuseofviolence.Andherewemustdistinguish.

Theexpressioncommonlyusedis'coup'.Whenwecometoexaminethisclosely,itisclearthatitisageneralterm.InEurope,withitsmorelimitedexperiencesofsuchmatters,theexpressioncoupd'étatisnotspecificallydistinguishedfromsay,acoupdeforce,andweusetheexpressions,'militaryrevolt','mutiny','rebellion','coup','revolution'interchangeablywithoutaskingwhatpreciselyhashappened.LatinAmericans,withtheircloseracquaintanceshipwiththephenomenon,distinguish.Forthem'revolution'isaportentousword,signifyingsomemassivealterationinacountry'ssocialstructure.Mexicotalks,accordingly,ofitsRevolutionof1910andwearsthisasabadgeofpride.Militarydespotsalsolayclaimtothetermfortheirownsuccessfulconspiracies,justasitiscommonexperiencethatthemoreauthoritarianarégime,themoreanxiousitistolabelitselfademocracy.28Theywillclaimthattheirsis'nomerebarracks-revolt'(cuartelazo)butatrue'revolution'.Thepeoplesknowotherwiseandemployotherterms.

ThefirstistheGolpedeestado,literallythecoupd'état,butwhichtothemsignifiestheseizureandeliminationofthepersonoftheheadofstate.ThesecondiswhatEuropeansusuallythinkofwhentheyusethetermcoupd'état,asinthe'coupd'étatofLouisNapoleon':andthis,inLatinAmerica,isthecuartelazo,the'barrackscoup'.Mostoftheexercisesofviolencediscussedinthesepages-theEgyptiancoupof1952,theIraqicoupof1958,theJapanese,GermanandFrenchcoupsof1936,1920and1961respectively,werespecificallycuartelazos.Sometimesthegolpeiscarriedoutatthesametimeasthecuartelazo.

Sometimesthecuartelazo,failing,isrepressedbyloyalisttroopsandsometimesitleadstocivilwar.Ifeitherhappensitissurelytheresultofamiscalculationforthewholepointofbothgolpeandcuartelazoistocarryoutthedisplacementorthesupplantmentwiththeminimumofbloodshed.

(a)Golpedeestado.Fromcasesalreadycited,wecanselecttwoclearinstancesofasuccessfulgolpe,unaccompaniedbyfurtherviolence.ThefirstistheremovalofPresidentRamirezandhisreplacementbyGeneralFarrellinArgentinain1944.Theofficers'clique(theG.O.U.)wereenragedwhenRamirezbrokewiththeAxispowersanddecidedtooverthrowhim.Agroupofofficers,withPerónprominentamongthem,burstintotheCasaRosadaand,with

____________________28 Seep.242

-154-

pistolslevelledathishead,forcedhimtoresign.'FatiguedbytheintensetasksofGovernmentwhichhaveobligedmetotakearest,'ranhisletter,'IdelegateonthisdatethepositionwhichIoccupytothepersonofH.E.theVice-PresidentoftheNation,BrigadierGeneraldonEdelmiroJ.Farrell.'

Wehavementionedthecoup(cuartelazo,really)ledbyColonelZaimofSyriabywhichhemadehimselfdictatorin1948,andhowhehimselfwassoonoverthrownbyacounter-coup.29Thiscountercoupwasaclassicgolpedeestado.Inthesmallhoursofthemorning,PresidentZaimandhisPrimeMinisterwerearrestedintheirhomesbyagroupofarmyofficers,summarilytriedbyatribunalofofficerssittingastheSupremeWarCouncil,sentenced-andshot.Theconspiratorsthenissuedproclamationsannouncingthetrialandexecutionofthe'tyrant',and'traitor';denouncedhiswickednessandmisdeeds;andpromiseddemocraticgovernment.

Itmayseemthatthismethodofdisplacingagovernmentistoosimpletobevalid.Itiscertainlyspeedyandimmediate,buttobesuccessfulithastobeanythingbutsimple.Tosucceeditrequiresthemostshrewdassessmentofpoliticalforcesinthecountryandthemostcarefulplanning.Itdemandstheorganizationofacadreofleadersandsub-leaders,theappointmentofthetake-overmeninadvance,and,ifnecessary(aswithZaim),arrangementsforpropagandaagainstthevictim.Italsorequires'reinsurances'suchasaplaneoracartomakeaget-awayiftheplotisunsuccessful.

(b)Golpeandcuartelazocombined.Moreusually,thegolpeistheculminatingactofacuartelazo.Twoexamplesarebynowfamiliartous.TheFebruarymutinyof1936inJapanwasacuartelazoinwhichtherebelsseizedcontrolofcentralTokyo,andsimultaneously,aswesaw,sentoutmurder-bandstohuntdownandkillmembersofthecabinet.Technicallyspeaking,itfailedbecauseitsleadershadmadenoneofthe'followthrough'arrangementslistedabove.InIraq,ontheotherhand,BrigadierKassimhadpreparedhisground;andthen,havingseizedBagdad,heproceededtomurdertheRegentandtheKingandthen,later,tohuntdownandkillNuri-es-Said,thePrimeMinister.

Oneotherexample,notpreviouslyreferredto,willhelptocompletethepicture.ItcomesfromColombia,where,by1953,PresidentGomezhadcreatedaterriblesenseofnationaldisaster.Thecountrywasplungedintoabarbarouscivilwar.Gomezthenquarrelledwiththearmy.Herefusedtosanctionthearrestofacertainindustrialist

____________________29 Seepp.125-6.

-155-

whowassuspectedofplottingtokilltheCommander-in-Chief,GeneralRojasPinilla.Thecabinetresignedinprotest,whereatGomezdecidedtoarrestRojasPinilla.Rojasgottohearofthis.HesenttankstosurroundthePresidentialPalace,forcedthePresident'sresignationandnextmorningassumedpowerasProvisionalPresident.30(c)Thecuartelazo.Likethegolpe,thecuartelazodemandsverycarefulpreparation.Tosucceeditneedsamasterlycomputationofthebalanceofnotonlythecivilianpoliticalforces,butofthereactionsofthedifferentbranchesoftheserviceandofthedifferentgarrisonsorunits.Withthedifferentiationofthevariousarmsthecalculationshavebecomeformidablycomplexandwherecuartelazosfail,itisusuallybecausesuchcalculationshavegoneawry.Forthepremiseonwhichthecuartelazoisbasedistheunityofthearmedforces:that,inthewordsofVonSeecktwhenaskedtosuppresstheKappputsch,'ReichswehrdoesnotfireuponReichswehr'.Theassumptionisthattheuncommittedgarrisonsandunitswillstandasideatfirst,andthenjumponthebandwagonifthemovementlookslikesucceeding.Theresultoftenjustifiestheassumptionandaccountsforthefactthatawholerégimecanoftenbesubvertedbyahandfuloftroops,andthatsomanyofthecuartelazos-liketheTurkishoneforinstance-arebloodless.Ontheotherhandthecalculationmaybequitefalsefromtheoutset.TheFrenchgenerals'cuartelazoof1961failedtoestimatecorrectlythereactionsofthenavy,oftheairforce,andoftheconscripts.Thecuartelazofollowsaclassicpattern,notsimplyinSpainwhereithasbeendescribedasa'highlyformalizedplay',butinallcountries.IfthetermsusedherearemostlySpanish,theproceduresdescribedoccureverywhere-inThailand,Iraq,Egypt,Europe,aswellasSpainandLatinAmerica.Inchronologicalordertheyare:i. (i)Thetrabajos,ortentativetestingofopinion.ii. (ii)Thecompromisos,i.e.the'deals',andthecommitmentstotakepart.iii. (iii)Action!Thetreasonofasinglegarrisonorbarracks.iv. (iv)Thepronunciamento,manifesto,proclamationorgrito(cry).

v. (v)Themarchonthecentresofcommunicationtowardsthecapitalortheseizureofcommunicationcentres,andgovernmentbuildingsinthecapital.

____________________

30Butwithoutanyintentiontobecomeso.Hehadactedinself-defenceandafterthegolpeofferedthePresidencytotwopoliticians-whorefused-beforeproclaiminghimself.Cf.TadSzulc:TwilightoftheTyrants,p.224.

-156-

vi. (vi)Theannouncementthatthegovernmenthaschangedhands.

vii. (vii)Theappointmentofamilitaryjuntatoassumegovernment,thepromisethatthechangeismerelyprovisional,togetherwiththerounding-upofopposition.

Toshowtheuniversalityofthepattern,letuslookatthreediverseexamples:theBakrSidqicuartelazoinIraq(1936),theNeguibNassercuartelazoinEgyptin1952andthePakcuartelazoinSouthKoreain1961.

GeneralBakrSidqihadwonagreatreputationinIraqin1936astheeffectivesuppressorofthetribalrevolts.AnumberofpoliticianslookedtohimasthestrongmanwhocouldrenovateIraq.HehimselftookKemalAtatürkashismodelofthesoldier-reformer.

Attheautumnmanæuvres,BakrSidqiwasappointedactingChiefoftheGeneralStaff,sincetheChiefoftheGeneralStaffwashimselfonleave.ThesemanæuvresweretotakeplaceintheKhanaquin-Bagdadarea.BakrSidqithereforedecidedtomarchonthecapitalbeforetheytookplace.HetookintohisconfidencetheMinisterofWar,Abd-el-LatifNuri.Then,backathisheadquarters,northofBagdad,herevealedhisplantosomeofhisofficers:the2ndDivisionwastostaybehindtodefendthefrontierwhilehewouldsendthe1stDivisionuptostagetheattack.Havingexplainedtheseplans,heandtheMinisterofWarjointlydrewupapetitiontotheKing,demandingtheresignationofthecabinet.ThetwomenalsodrewuptheirProclamationtothepeopleofBagdad,anddecidedthatthe1stDivisionshouldbecalled'TheNationalReformForce'.

Theyhadtheirsuccessor-governmentreadyinthepersonofHikmat,oneoftheAhaligroupofreformers.Ontheeveofthemarch,Hikmatreceivedhiscopyofthepetition,whilecopiesoftheProclamationwereissuedtoreliablearmyofficersfordistributionnextday.MeanwhiletheairforcehadbeensoundedandagreedtosupporttheplotbysendingafewplanestoBakr'sheadquarters.

Thatnightthe1stDivisionmovedandpitchedcampinthenorthernoutskirtsofBagdad.Thenextmorning,asthemarchintothecitybeganat7.30a.m.,BakrSidqideclareditundermilitaryoccupation.Onehourlatertheplanesflewover,droppingcopiesoftheProclamation,whilearmyofficersandsomepolicemenalsohelpedtodistributeit.

ThePrimeMinistercalledthecabinet.Notveryenthusiastically,

-157-

hesuggestedresistance.TheKingsimplyremainedsilent.ThereuponthePrimeMinistertenderedhisresignation.Thecuartelazowasover.

InEgypt,theplotterswerethatbandofardentandrebelliousspiritswhocametocallthemselvesthe'FreeOfficers'andwho,afterbeingscatteredincross-postingsduringthewar,cametogetheragainafter1945.TheythendreamedofoverturningthegovernmentandthedefeatinPalestinein1948madethemmoreurgent;buttheearliestdatebywhichtheywerelikelytosucceedwas,totheirmind,in1954or1955.ButafterthesackofCairoin1952andthefalloftheWafd,policeactivityincreasedandtheFreeOfficershadtothinkofanimmediateblow.Hencetheirsearchfora'frontman'andNeguibwasapproached.HehadbeeninalmostconstantcontactwiththeFreeOfficersforthelastyear,whenHakimAmer(Nasser'sfriend)becamehisA.D.C.

Thepolicewerenowsoactivethatthegroupfelttheymustactatonce,ifatall.Theirdifficultywasthattheywereallstaffofficersandhadnofightingtroops.Thecircleofconspiratorsthereforehadtobewidened.AlShafiofthecavalryagreedandsodidShawkioftheinfantry:butMehannaoftheartillerynotonlyrefusedbutgavereasontobelievethathewasactivelyhostile.

ThedatechosenwasAugust5,whentheCourtandthecabinetwouldbeatAlexandria,thesummercapital.However,onJuly20newsarrivedthatKingFaroukwasabouttodismisshisministry,andappointtheredoubtableSirriAmerasMinisterofWar.Itwasalsorumouredthatallfourteenoftheconspiratorsweretobearrested.Theythereupondecidedtostrikeinthenextforty-eighthoursandmetontheappointeddaytolaytheirfinalplans.ItnowappearedthattheChiefoftheGeneralStaffhadwindofsomeplot,sotheydecidedtomarchonehourearlierthanarranged.Shawkiandhis13thInfantryRegiment,togetherwithSadiq'stanks,occupiedG.H.Q.andarrestedtheChiefoftheGeneralStaff.Muhieddin'sarmouredcarsthrewacordonroundthemilitaryareasofAbbassiaandHeliopolis.AlShafi'stanks,meanwhile,occupiedthestrategicpointsinthecentreofCairoandseizedthetelephoneexchange,thebroadcastingstation,therailwayandtheairports.By3a.m.theconquestwascompleteandtheFreeOfficersinG.H.Q.proclaimedGeneralNeguibasCommander-in-Chiefofthearmy,andinformedtheBritishandAmericanembassies.At4a.m.thePrimeMinistertelephonedfromAlexandriatoGeneralNeguibtofindoutwhathad

-158-

happened,butwasinclinedtomakelightoftheaffair.ThedecisivemomentoccurredwhentheconspiratorslearnedthatthepowerfulElArishgarrisonhadcomeover.Onlynowdidtheconspiratorsmaketheirappealtothepublic.GeneralNeguibexplainedtothereportersthattheofficers'aimswerelegality,continuityanddemocracy;andat6a.m.thepronunciamentoofthemovementwasbroadcast.Meanwhileanemissary,thefirebrandElSadhat,offeredthePremiershiptotheofficers'choice,thepoliticianAliMaherwho,temporizingalittletillhesawthearmywasinfullcontrol,finallyagreed.Nextday(July24),AliMaherwaitedontheKinginAlexandriaandemergedasPrimeMinisterwithalistofministersinhispocket.TwodayslaterthearmypresenteditsultimatumtotheKing,whohadnochoicebuttoagreeandabdicate.Theinitialaimsofthecuartelazowereallsecured.

ToturntoSouthKorea:ThereMajor-GeneralPak,agedfortyfour,hadapparentlybeenplottingtoseizepowerforsometime;butthestudentriots,thefallofSyngmanRheeandthesubsequentelectionsin1960hadovertakenhim.ThenewPrimeMinister'splantoreducethesizeofthearmy,andhisearlyretirementofsomeprominentofficerspresentedPakwithhisopportunity.HisdifficultieslayinthereactionoftheUnitedStatesforcesinKorea,intheattitudeofthefrontiertroops,andintheneedforaseniorcommander,sincehehimselfwasmerelythechiefofoperations.ItisreportedthatheandhisfellowscalledonGeneralChang,theChiefoftheGeneralStaff,andthreatenedtokillhimunlessheledtheenterprise.Accordingly,at3.30a.m.inthemorningofMay16,1961,infantry,marines,tanksandparatroopersoccupiedSeoul,andbydawnwereincompletepossession.However,thecuartelazowasnotyetfullysuccessful.ThePrimeMinisterhadescapedandwasinhiding.ThecommanderoftheUnitedStatesforcesrefusedrecognition.Theattitudeofthefrontiertroopswasstillindoubt.Andagroupofseniorofficershadbarricadedthemselvesinandseemedabouttoofferresistance.Buttheofficerssurrendered,theAmericantroopsdidnotmove,thefrontiertroopsdefectedtotheinsurgentsandwithintwodaystheex-Premierhadgivenhimselfup.Thealmostbloodlesscouphadbeeneffectedbyamere3,600menoutofanarmynumbering600,000.

Theseexamplesillustratevariousaspectsofthatbasicpatternwehavedescribed;but,sinceallwereveryneat,andallweresuccessful,theygivetheimpressionthatacuartelazoisaneasyshortcutto

-159-

power.Itshouldberememberedthereforethatfarmorecuartelazosfailthansucceed.Furthermore,somemeetsomuchresistanceastoturnintocivilwar.

SincethefallofJiménezin1958,therehavebeenseveralunsuccessfulcuartelazosinVenezuela.Asanexample,wemayconsidertheattemptofApril1960.At3a.m.,aformerWarMinister,GeneralCastroLeon,crossedfromneighbouringColombiatoSanCristobal(about400milesfromthecapital)andassumedcommandofits500mangarrisonfromhisfellowconspirator,thecolonelcommanding.Byradiohebroadcastarecordedappealtoothergeneralstojoinhim.

InCaracas,thePresidentconvenedtheheadsofthearmedforces,andtogethertheyandthePresidenttelephonedallgarrisonsandstategovernors.Theairforcewasorderedtostrafetherebelheadquartersandtoflyinlocaltroops,buttheweathermadethisimpossibleforsometime.

MatterswentworseforCastroLeonhowever.TheStatenationalguardrefusedtojoinhim.Hesent150mentocapturethelocalairfield.Theydesertedtothegovernmentforces.Hesentanother180troopstocaptureasecondairfield.Theywereheldoffby200hastilyarmedpeasants.Bythetimetheloyalplaneswereabouttoattack,CastroLeonhadfledandthecuartelazowascrushed.

TheabortivecuartelazoofJune1955inArgentinawasamorecomplicatedandfarmoreseriousaffair.ItbeganwithatotallyunexpectedattackontheCasaRosadabynavyaircraft.Astheydroppedbombs,machinegunsfromtheNavyMinistrybegantofireintotheCasaRosada,andafewminuteslateralineofrebelmarinesadvanced.

Perónhadreceivedtenminutes'warning.Itwasenough.Truckloadsofsoldiersroaredofftowardstherebelmarinesand,supportedbytanks,drovethemback.TanksandlightartillerybesiegedtheNavyMinistryandforcedittosurrender.Thebattleseemedoverbytheearlyafternoonwhensuddenlyanewwaveofplanessoaredover,strafingandbombing.Theloyaltanksnowadvancedagainandcapturedtherebelairbase.ThepilotsgaveupandflewofftowardsUruguayandthecuartelazowasover.Ithadcost360deadandabout1,000wounded.Whyhaditfailed?Firstofall,foghadhinderedtheplan.ItpreventedbothplanesandshipsfrommovingfreelyandpreventedtheseabornelandingontheBuenosAireswaterfront.Secondly,thecompromisoshadnotkepttheirword;theyhadnotjoinedin.

-160-

Betweentheclean-cutsuccesseswhichwehavedescribed,andthecompletefailures,somecuartelazosdevelopintoabriefbutbloodycivilwar.ThesecondandsuccessfulArgentinecuartelazoofSeptember1955wasofthiskind.

ItdifferedfromtheJunerisingintwoways.First,allthreeservicesjoinedin.Second,therisingbeganintheprovincesandconvergedonthecapital.

Itbeganinthenight,whenrebeltroopsoccupiedCordoba,Arroyo-SecoandCuruzu-Cuatfa,whilerebelsailorstookoverthenavalbaseofSantiago(nearBuenosAires)andthatofPuertoBelgrano(nearBahiaBlanca).Perón'stroopscounter-attackedfiercely.Attheendofthefirstday'sfightingtheyrecapturedSantiago,andatthebeginningoftheseconddayhadenteredArroyo-SecoandCuruzu-Cuatía,whiletroopsweremarchingonPuertoBelgranoandCordoba.Nowtherebelleader,GeneralLonardi,issuedhisgrito,denouncingthedictator;andwhilethebattleforCordobaraged,thenewscamethattheSecondArmy(inWesternArgentina)haddefectedtotherebelsandheldSanLuisandMendoza.AsthedayturnedagainstPerón,thenavythrewitsweightintothebattle.IthadsilentlyconcentratedontheUruguayshoreandnowAdmiralRojasannouncedthatthefleetwasheadingupriverforthecapitalandwouldbombarditunlessPerónresigned.Nextmorningobserverscouldcountnolessthantwenty-onerebelwarshipsintheriver.Themovementwasdecisive.ThenavygavePerónuntil10a.m.onSeptember19toresignunconditionally.Aftersomeprevaricationhedidso,andtookrefugeonaParaguayangunboat.TrucetalkswereheldatseabetweentheloyalistandrebelcommandersandonDecember21bothsidesproclaimedGeneralLonardiasProvisionalPresident.

Onefeaturethatmuststrikeanyobserverofcuartelazosistheextenttowhichtheydiscountcivilianreactions.Oneoftheconsiderationsintheirplanningis,tobesure,thestepstobetakentoparalysecivilianreactions:hencethesecuringofthecentresofcommunication,thetelephoneofficesandtheradiostation,andhencealsotheimmediateimpositionofacurfewandthebanondemonstrations.Allthisassumesthatcivilianreactionwillbeweakenoughtobeparalysed,anditalsoassumesthattheloyalistelementswillnotbepreparedtoarmthepopulace.

TheexplanationliesinwhathasbeensaidinChapterSeven;onthewhole,themilitaryaresensibleenoughnottoattemptcuartelazosin

-161-

countrieswherecivilianresistanceislikelytobeconsiderable.Cuartelazostakeplaceincountrieswitharelativelylowlevelofpoliticalculture,preciselybecauseitisinsuchcountriesthatthemilitaryrealizetheycandiscountcivilianhostilityorevencountonciviliansupport.Mad-dogactsliketheKappputsch,theJapaneseFebruarymutinyandthegenerals'revoltinFranceareexceptionstotheusualmilitarytechniquesinsuchcountries,i.e.threats,intimidation,orcollusionwithcivilianpoliticians.

Nevertheless,sounpredictableisthehumantemperamentthatsomewhere,sometime,undersevereprovocation,anysoldiermaybetemptedtochancehisarm.Incountrieswithpowerfulcivilianforces,thisleads,aswehaveseen,tothewitheringawayoftherevolt.Butwherethemilitaryarearrogantenoughtostrikeandthecivilianforcesopposedtothemstrongenoughtoresistbuttooweaktotriumph,thecuartelazocanleadtothemostappallingtragedy.Thisiswhathappenedin1936inSpain.TheSpanisharmyhadbeennurturedonbloodlessvictorieslikethoseof1923and1930-orequallyonbloodlessfailureslikeSanjurjo'sin1932.IthadbeenbloodedonstrikersandCatalanstoolongtohaveanythingbutacontemptforcivilianresistance.Itwaspoliticallytooignorantandtoocontemptuousofpoliticians,especiallyliberalones,evertodreamthattheymightresist-andresistbyarmingthepopulation.Aboveallitdidnotrealizethatby1936theforcesoftheleftwerethemselvesspoilingforafight-thattheywereanxioustohavearevolution,but,since'their'governmentwasinpower,unwillingtostartit.ForthefirsttimetheSpanisharmyhad,initsarrogantignoranceofpoliticaltendencies,unwittingly'pickedsomeoneitsownsize'.Theanarchists,thetradeunionists,theBasquesandtheCatalanswerejustaseagertofightasthearmywas.

GeneralMola'sconspiracyfollowedtheusualSpanishcourse,saveforthefactthatthistimethegeneralsthoughtitwisertohavesomeciviliansupporters,notablytheCarlistlevies.Hithertotheyhadpreferredtoactas'nosotrossolos'(ourselvesalone).But,otherwise,therisingwasplannedascuartelazosare.Bythetimetheyhadcompletedtheirplans,theonlyforcesthatseemedunpledgedtothemwerethenewlyformedRepublicanAssaultGuardsandthesmallairforce.InadditiontheyhadtheCarlistlevies,andthepromise,ifnecessary,ofplanesandtanksfromGermanyandItaly.Theplanswereextensivelyandmeticulouslyworkedout.Onthishypothesis,theplotappearedcertaintosucceed.Therecanbelittledoubttoday

-162-

thatthegeneralsregardedthewholeaffairasatypicalcuartelazowhichcouldbeexpectedtooccupyallSpain,exceptpossiblyBarcelonaandMadrid,inadayorso,afterwhichthegovernmentasusualwouldloseitsnerveandcapitulate.Thecuartelazowas,however,onlyhalfsuccessful,forBarcelonaandMadridandValenciapassedtothegovernmentforces,andthenavyremainedloyal.Furthermoreafteritsoverturesforcompromisewererejectedbytherebels,thegovernment'sreactionstiffenedandittookthecoursewhichalonecouldmakecivilianresistanceeffective:itarmedthepopulation,apopulationonlytooeagertofight.Thecuartelazo,neithersuccessfulnoraborted,turnedintothecarnageofthefrightfulthreeyears'war.31

____________________

31 Cf.G.Brenan,op.cit.,esp.Chap.XIV;alsoH.Thomas,TheSpanishCivilWar(London,1961),pp.95-170.

-163-

CHAPTERELEVENTheResultsofIntervention-TheMilitaryRégimesLITTLEefforthasbeenmadetodistinguishbetweenvariousclassesofmilitaryrégimes.Theproblemiscertainlyadifficultone.Tobeginwithnotallrégimesofmilitaryprovenancearemilitaryrégimes,althoughinpracticemostofthem,infact,are.Arégimeofmilitaryprovenanceisanyrégimethathasoweditsestablishmenttosomemilitaryintervention.TheVthFrenchRepubliciscertainlyarégimeofmilitaryprovenance,butitisnotamilitaryrégime.TheSecondEmpireofNapoleonIIIwasarégimeofmilitaryprovenance,butnotamilitaryrégime,andlikewisetheTurkishRepublicuntil1960,andtheMexicanRepublictoday.Forarégimetobea'militaryrégime',theremustbeevidencethatthegovernmentisinthehandsofthearmedforcesorthatitactsentirelyorpredominantlyattheircommand.

Again,evenamongthemilitaryrégimesthemselves,thereareclearlyquitedifferenttypes.Forinstance,TheTimescorrespondentfeltable(November28,1956)todescribeSyriaunderColonelSerrajasaconcealed'militarydictatorship'.Nowifthiswereindeedso,itwasobviouslynotthesamekindofdictatorshipasColonelNasser's,orGeneralFranco's,orField-MarshalSarit's.

However,therearecertainobstaclestoclassification.Perhapsweoughttoregardmilitaryrégimessimplyasasetoftechniquesusedbythemilitarytocarryouttheirpoliciesratherthanaspoliticalorconstitutionalstructures.Formanyoftheformsthrownuparecreatedinconditionsofillegality.Evenmoreaboutthemisfluidandpersonal.Theformalconstitutionalstructuresgivenoguidanceastohowtherégimeworksandwhereallthatisclearisthatauthorityisbeingexercisedonlyafterpersonalstrugglesbehindthescenes,itis

-164-

oftenimpossibletofindoutwhoorwhatisthedominantforce.

Weproposethereforetodistinguishthreebroadtypesofmilitaryrégimes.Thefirstisindirectrule,wherenominallyaciviliangovernmentrulesandtakesconstitutionalresponsibility.Thistypeofmilitaryrégimecomesaboutwheninterventioniscarriedonlytothelevelofblackmail(whichpresupposesaciviliangovernmentbeingblackmailedbythemilitary)orofdisplacement(whichpressupposesoneciviliangovernmentbeingchangedforanother).

Thethirdisdirectrule.Here(asinTurkey,1960-1)thearmyitselfassumesresponsibility,althoughitmaywellappointaciviliancabinet(asintheTurkishorSudanesecases)tocarryoutitspolicies.Elsewhere(asinArgentina,1943-5)itmayrulethroughajuntaofitsownmembers.Thisformortechniqueobviouslyonlyoccurswhenthemilitaryhavesupplantedthecivilianrégime.

Inbetween(andthereforethesecondtype)comesakindofrégimewhich,forwantofabettername,maybestyled'dual.'Sucharégimerestsontwopillars:thearmyisoneandthecivilianpartyorsomeorganizedcivilianopinionistheother,andtherulingoligarchyordespotisattheheadofboth.Moremilitarydictatorshipstakethisformthanisatfirstrealized.Fortheindividualwhohasbeenhoistedtopowerqualeaderofthearmedforcesoftentendstoimmersehimselfinthefunctionsofgovernment,andashedoessohebeginstodissociatehimselffromactivecommandofthearmedforcesandtobuildupotherandcivilianforcesonwhichtorely.Sometimesthisdualrégimeisconstitutionalized.Theroyaldictatorships,thatpeculiarphenomenonoftheinter-warBalkans,mayservetoillustratethisconstitutionalpattern;forinstancethatofKingCarolofRumania,restingontheNationalRenaissanceFrontontheonehand,andthepoliceandarmyontheother.Morecommon,asweshallsee,arethedefactodualrégimes.TheclearestcaseofallisthePeróndictatorship;forPerón'spowersrestedjustasmuchonhisJusticialistPartyandthedescamisadosasitdidonthearmy,anditwaspreciselythisfactthatenabledhimtoplayoffoneforceagainsttheother.Nowwhereastheindirectrulerégimesstemfromthelevelsofblackmailanddisplacement,andthedirectrulerégimesfromthelevelofsupplantment,dualrégimesmaystemfromanyoneofthesethreelevels.Wherethemilitaryovertlytakeoncertainofficialresponsibilitiesforgovernmentalongsideandamongthecivilianforces,thisrepresentstheborderlinebetweentheblackmailordisplacementoftheseauthoritiesontheonehand,andtheirsupplantmentof

-165-

themontheother.Ifthemilitarywentfurtherthanthis,theywouldbesupplantingthecivilianauthorities.Ifthemilitarydidnotgoasfarasthis,theywouldbeblackmailingordisplacingthecivilianauthorities,notsupplantingthem.Thisovertassumptionofcertainofficialresponsibilitiesalongsidethecivilianforcesisthemaximummanifestationofwhatwehavecalledblackmailanddisplacementortheminimummanifestationofwhatwehavecalledsupplantment.Thuswerecognizethreemaintypesofmilitaryrule:indirect,dualanddirect.Thisclassificationcanbeelaboratedtodistinguishbetweentwokindsofindirectruleandtwokindsofdirectrule.Thefirstkindofindirectmilitaryrulemaybestyled'limited',orperhaps'intermittent'.Herethemilitaryinterveneonlyfromtimetotimetosecurevariouslimitedobjectives.Incontrast,stands'complete'orcontinuousindirectrule,i.e.whenthemilitarycontrolalltheactivitiesofthenominalgovernment.Likewisetherearetwokindsofdirectrule.Thefirst,likethatofBrigadierKassiminIraqorGeneralGürselinTurkey,1isdirectmilitaryrule-unqualified.(Thoughthisdoesnotruleouttheuseofciviliancabinetsestablishedbythejuntaandtakingitsordersandactinginitsname.)But,asweshallsee,suchjuntasfeelnakedinaworldswayedbymoralbeliefs;andtheyfrequentlybegintoestablishancillarycivilianorganizations,liketheNationalUnioninEgypt,orputthemselvesthroughtheformsofaplebiscite,inordertoacquireanauraoflegitimacy.Theessenceofsuchelectoralmanæuvresandcivilianancillaries,however,istheirdependenceon,orrathertheiremanationfrom,themilitaryjunta.Therégimeisadirectmilitaryrégimedeckedoutwithsomeciviliantrappings.Weshallstyleit,therefore,'directrule,quasi-civilianized'.Wecanthusrecognizethefollowingformsofthemilitaryrégime:

Indirect:limitedIndirect:completeDualDirectDirect,quasi-civilianized

Furthermore,theseformsofmilitaryrégimeexpressthelevelstowhichthemilitaryhavepushedtheirintervention.Weshowedatsomelengthhowthoselevelswererelatedto,indeedconditioned

____________________1 BeforethereturntoconstitutionalisminOctober1961.

-166-

by,acountry'slevelofpoliticalculture.Bythesamereasoningthen,theformofmilitaryrégimeisrelatedtoandconditionedbythecountry'sorderofpoliticalculture.Wecan,asbefore,expressthisgraphicallyintheformofthetableonpage168.

IndirectlimitedmilitaryruleTheclassicexamplesofthistypeofrégimeareinter-warGermanyandJapan,towhichwehavealreadydevotedmuchattention.WecanfairlystyletheJapaneseexperience,1931-45,asindirectandlimitedmilitaryrule.Aswehaveseen,therangeofmattersthemilitarycontrolledwasverylimitedatthebeginningofthisperiodbutgrewmoreandmoreextensiveafter1936,reachingitsmaximumwiththeprogressofthePacificWar.

TheobjectivesoftheGermanarmy-withoneexception,theSchleicherperiod1930-22-werealwayslimited.Itwasandintendedtoremain,aStand,i.e.anOrder.Thehardcoreofitspurposewasthelimitedobjectiveofestablishingitselfasanautonomouscorporationinapowerfulstate.Furthermore,aftertheKappputschwhichthenceforwardservedasitsclassicwarning,thearmyworkedwithin,notagainst,thelegalframework.ThishadbeenitsmethodundertheEmpire,anditrevertedtoitafter1920.f3

TheseJapaneseandtheGermanexamplesillustrateindirectrulein'secondorder'states,i.e.thoseofdevelopedpoliticalcultures.There,respectforformsandattachmenttoinstitutionswasstrongenoughtopreventthemilitaryattemptingtoestablishanythingbutanindirectformofrule.ThenatureofthiskindofruleisthereforepossiblyexpressedmorevividlybycurrentpracticesinArgentina.Hereisacountryofthethirdorderofpoliticalculture,inwhichthearmedforceshave,fromtimetotime,exercisedruledirectly,orindualharness,orindirectly.Atthemoment(1959-62),Argentinaaffordsaperfectillustrationofmilitaryindirect-limitedrule.Basically,itspoliticaldilemmaisthis:themilitary,havingoverthrownPerónin1955inthenameofparliamentarism,arecommittedtoexcludingthePeronistasfrompower;whilethepoliticians,fortheirpart,realizethattheycansecuretheirelectoralandpoliticaltriumphonlybywooingtheex-Peronistaofficialsandtheex-Peronistavote.ThisledtorepeatedmilitarypressureonthePresident,ArturoFrondizi.InJuly1959,afterPerónhadpublishedwhatheclaimed

____________________2 Forthisepisodeandthedualruleitintroduced,seep.175.3 Forthelegalismofthearmyseep.93.

-167-

-168-

wasapre-electionpactbetweenhimselfandFrondizi,4anumberofthemilitarymendemandedchangesinthegovernment.ThewholecabinetwasthereforesackedexceptfortheMinisteroftheInteriorandthethreeserviceministers.InSeptember1959,theanti-PeronistaCommander-in-Chief,GeneralToranzo,againthreatenedmilitaryactionandtherebyforcedPresidentFrondizitodismisshisMinisterofWar(GeneralCarlosAnaya)andreplacehimbyGeneralLarcherwhohadspentfouryearsinPerón'sprisons.InOctober1960,therewasanotherhead-onclash.Thistimethemilitarydisagreedwiththegovernment'spolicyfortheoil-fields.AsthedisputesharpenedtheydemandedapurgeofPeronistasfromtheadministrationandanaccompanyingbatteryofanti-communistmeasures.ThistimethePresidentheldoutandtheonlynotabletoresignwastheunfortunateWarMinister,theanti-PeronistGeneralLarcher,sincethearmyregardedhimashavingbeentootepidinurgingitscase.5Butthebattlewasnotover.GeneralLarcherwassucceededbyGeneralFraga,whomthemilitaryplacedinthecabinettoseethattheirdemandsweremet.InApril1961,thearmytriedtosubmitanultimatumviaGeneralFraga,demanding'fundamentalchanges'inthegovernment'sattitudetotheex-Peronistas,anendtocorruption,andanew'order'inpolitics,educationandthenationaleconomy.Thistime,however,thearmywasdivided.AgoodproportionsupportedGeneralFragawhorefusedtopressthesedemandsonthePresident,andinconsequenceitwastheCommander-in-Chief(GeneralToranzoMontero)whoresignedandthecivilpowerthattriumphed.6Thatthisdidnotmeanthepermanentdefeatofthemilitarywassoonshown,inFebruary1962,whenthearmedforcescompelledPresidentFrondizitogivewayonanimportantmatterofforeignpolicy.AtthePuntedelEsteConferenceoftheOrganizationofAmericanStates,ArgentinawasoneofthecountrieswhichrefusedtovoteforCuba'simmediateexclusionfromtheOrganization.ButPresidentFrondizithereuponfoundhimselfcompelledbymilitarypressuretobreakoffdiplomaticrelationswithCuba.

Thisincidentwasbuttheprologuetotheimmensedramaincivil-militaryrelationswhichtookplaceinMarchandApril,1962.ItbeganwiththeProvincialandCongressionalelectionsofMarch18.

____________________

4 FrondizionlywonthePresidencybecauseex-PresidentPeróninstructedhisfollowerstovoteforhim.

5 TheTimes,October13,14and18,1960.6 TheTimes,April4,1961.

-169-

ForthefirsttimesincethefallofPerón,thePeronistaswerebeingallowedtocontesttheelections.Hithertotheyhadbeenabletoshowtheirdiscontentonlybyabstentionfromthepolls.TheinnovationwasamanæuvreofPresidentFrondizi,whosupposedthatPeronismwasonthewane.Theelectionsprovedarudeshock.ThePeronistaspolled35percentofthepopularvoteandwonfiveoftheProvinces,includingBuenosAires.ThePresidentimmediately'intervented'thefiveProvinces,whilethearmedforcesmetinangryconclavetodecidewhattodonext.SomefavouredoustingthePresident,othersnot.AtfirsttherewastalkofamilitarypactwithFrondizi:hewouldbeexpectedtoinviteallthedemocraticpartiesintoacoalitiongovernment,totrytocombinethefracturedRadicalparty,torevisethetradeunionregulationsandtobanthePeronistsagain.HowevermostoftheNavyofficersandagroupofinfluentialcolonelsrefusedtoagreetothisarrangement.WhiletheyexertedpressureontheircolleaguestodemandtheresignationofthePresident,whomtheyheldresponsiblefortheresurgenceofPeronism,otherscalledinex-PresidentAramburutomediate.ButAramaburuwasunsuccessful:everygroupinginArgentina'spubliclifeseemedtohaveitsownexclusivepolicy.Frondizi'sCongressionalopponentscondemnedthe'intervention'ofthefiveProvincesanddemandedthattheresultsoftheelectionsberespected,whileattheotherextremethenavymadeanofficialdemandforthePresident'sresignation.WhileFrondizihimselfpositivelyrefusedtoresignboththePresidentoftheSenateandthePresidentoftheChamberofDeputies(whowererespectivelythesecondandthethirdinlinetothePresidency)positivelyrefusedtoacceptthePresidencyifitwasvacated.

Theextremistfactionsinthemilitarybecamemoreprominent.Thenavy,adamantforFrondizi'sresignation,wasreportedlymovingshipstoBuenosAires.GeneralRawsoncommandingtheIIIrdCavalrydivision,demandedthatFrondizibeoustedbyforce.Ontheotherhand,Frondizi'sIntransigeantRadicalParty,whichwasthelargestintheChamberandaltogethercontrolledtheSenate,declaredthatitwouldquittheCongressifthePresidentwereforcedfromoffice.ThemilitaryextremistsretortedtothisbymovingtroopsintoBuenosAiresandseizingtheCasaRosadaitself.Nevertheless,hestillrefusedtoresign,andhisSecretaryforWar,GeneralFraga,supportedhim.ButGeneralFragawaspromptlyisolatedbyGeneralPoggi,theCommander-in-Chief,thePresidentwaspreventedfrom

-170-

callinganextraordinarysessionofCongress,andtheMinisteroftheInteriorforbiddentobroadcasttothenation;andonMarch29thePresidentwasarrestedandimprisonedonMartinGarciaIsland,whileVice-PresidentGuidowassworninasProvisionalPresident.

Thisdidnothoweverendthecrisis.Itsimplyrenewedit.OnApril19,thethreeserviceSecretariesdemandedthatthePresidentshouldtakeimmediateactionagainstthePeronistparties.Specificallytheydemandedthattheelectionsshouldbecancelled,thePeronistpartiesbannedandtheremainingProvincestakenoverbymilitaryinterventors.ThePresidentrefusedandhisentirecabinetresignedexceptforthethreeserviceSecretaries.Thereuponarmyunitsbegantomoveintothecapital,attheorderoftheCommander-in-Chief,GeneralPoggi.Atthispoint,however,therenewedmilitarypressuremetanunexpectedcheck.GeneralPoggi'stroopswereopposedbytheBuenosAiresgarrison,ledbyGeneralRauch.WhilethetwobodiesoftroopsfacedeachotheracrosstheCampodeMayo,GeneralRauchaccusedbothGeneralPoggiandtheSecretaryforWar(GeneralCarrera)ofissuingultimatatoforcethePresidentintounconstitutionality.BothCarreraandRauchwereinducedtoresigntheircommands.Thepeacewaskeptinthiswaybutthedeadlockwasunresolved.Onceagain,theNavyprovedthedecidingfactor.ItinsistedthatPresidentGuidofulfilthemilitary'sdemands.OnApril24,therefore,theProvisionalPresidentissueddecreesinterventingalltheremainingProvinces,cancellingtheresultsoftheProvincialelectionsandcallinganewPresidentialelectionforthemonthofJuly.

Thesevicissitudes,withthearmyintermittentlyexertingcontroloverthecivilpoweroncertainparticularmatters,illustratethemilitaryrégimeoftheindirect-limitedtype.

Indirect-completemilitaryruleOneoftheclearestexamplesofthistypeofrégimeisprovidedbyCubafromtheRevolutionof1933toBatista'selectiontothePresidencyin1940.Allthroughthattimeex-SergeantBatista,asCommander-in-Chiefofthearmy,wastheeffectivegovernment,butheexerciseditsrulethroughaseriesofpuppet-Presidentswhoweremadeandbrokenasoccasionserved.BatistafirstseizedpowerinSeptember1933andestablishedtheusualmilitaryjunta.ItwasheadedbyDr.GrauSanMartin,oneofthestudents'leaders,and

-171-

withstudentsupporthebecamethefirstofBatista'sPresidents.Afterthearmyhadsuppressedacounter-revolution(November1933)itreplacedthestudentsasthedominantpowerinthegovernment.BatistadecidedthatGraumustresigninfavourofColonelMendieta,theleaderoftheNacionalistaparty,butGraurefusedandwassupportedbytheleft.Batistathereuponchoseacompromisecandidate,Hevia,theSecretaryofStateforAgricultureandleaderofthe1931risingagainstex-PresidentMachado.Asthemilitarytookoverallthemunicipalandprovincialgovernments,HeviatooktheoathofofficeonJanuary16,1934.Thirty-twohourslaterheresignedand,significantly,addressedhisresignationnottotheRevolutionaryjuntabuttowhereitmattered--toColonelBatista.HeviawasBatista'ssecondPresident,andhissuccessor,ColonelMendieta,becamethethird.Labourandthestudentsweredispleased.Violenceerupted.Thearmybrokethestrikes,suspendedconstitutionalguarantees,andputtheislandundermilitarycontrol.Halfthecabinetprotestedanddemandedthereturnofconstitutionalguarantees,butBatistarefusedtheirdemandandcontinuedwithhisrepressivepolicywellinto1935.BythistimethefourmainpartieshadagreedthatanelectionshouldbeheldinDecember1935.Theyevennominatedtheircandidates.Unfortunately,attheverylastminute,theyquarrelledovertheelectorallaw.ProvisionalPresidentMendietathereuponresignedindespairandwassucceededbytheSecretaryofState,Barnet,whothusbecameBatista'sfourthPresident.UnderBarnet,afewdayslater,theelectionswerefinallyheldandGomezwaselectedinanorderlyelection--thefirstconstitutionalPresidentsince1933and,astheeventwastoprove,Batista'sfifthPresident.GomezstraightwayalienatedBatistaandthearmybyejecting3,000civilservantstomakewayforparty-men.ItsohappenedthatmostofthemweremilitaryreservistsandasCommander-in-ChiefBatistaexpressedthearmy'sdispleasure.Hehadatthistimeevolvedaplanforthearmytoestablishandoperatespecialschoolsforworkers'children,andtofinancethesebyalevyonthesugarcrop.Gomezdisapprovedofthearmymeddlinginsuchthings.TheCongresshoweverwassubservienttoBatista.ItpassedhisBill,andwhenPresidentGomezvetoedit,itimpeachedhim--ironicallyenough--for'violationoftheconstitution'and'coercionofrepresentatives',amongotherthings.ThusendedthefifthBatistaPresident,tobesucceededbytheVice-President,LaredoBru.Astowhoreallygovernedtherewasnodoubt.TheLaredoBrucabinetwas

-172-

largelyBatistized;theSecretaryofStateandtheSecretaryofDefencewerebothsoldiers,theSecretaryofHealthwasamajorofthereserve,theSecretaryofAgriculture,Lopez,wasafamiliaroftheCommander-in-Chief.Andtwodaysaftertheinauguration,itwasColonelBatista,theCommander-in-Chief,andnotthePresident,whoannouncedtheprogrammeofthenewgovernment.

Shortlyafterthis,ColonelBatistastoodforthePresidencyhimself,andwassuccessfullyelected(1940).Hethusbroughttoanendthisepisode,inwhichhehadbeendefactorulerwhilethenominalrulewasinthehandsofsixsuccessivePresidents--aperiod,inourterminology,ofindirect-completemilitaryrule.

DualruleWehavealreadypointedoutthatthiskindofrégimetakesvariantforms.Thedecisionastowhatisandwhatisnota'dualrégime'turnsonone'sestimateofhowrealandhowpowerfularethecivilianforcesonwhichthegovernmentrelies.Therecanbenodoubt,however,thatthePeróndictatorshipwasarégimeofthistype.Byeveryaccount,itreposedupona'soldier-workeralliance',ona'curiousanduneasypartnership'7betweenthearmedforcesandthetrade-unionmovementandPeronistapartywhichPerónbuiltup.Thearmywas,asBlankstenputsit,a'fundamentallyindispensablebulwarkofthePerónrégime';8butsowastheorganizedworkingclasssupportwhichPeróncommanded.He'intervented'9theC.G.T.in1943,andsooncaptureditbyarrestingandimprisoninganyleaderswhoshowedrebelliousness,and,finally,imposedonitasecretariatoffivemen,allPeronistas.Fromabout300,000in1942,Perónbuiltitup,by1953,tosome800,000;anditwashis.Theothercivilianorganizationonwhichherelied--andindeedofwhichhewasthehead--wasthePeronistaor'Justicialist'Party.Formedin1949itwasacompoundofcertainnationalistgroups,ofsome'collaborationist'Radicalleaders(promptlyexpelledbytheirparty)and,forthemostpart,oftheArgentineLabourPartyonceitsindependentleaders(likeCiprianoReyes)hadbeenremoved.Thispartywasarealone,inthesensethatitwasadoctrinairepartyofaquarter-of-amillioncard-carryingmembers,andhadanationalorganizationrootedintheconstituencies.

____________________7 Blanksten:Perón'sArgentina,p.306.8 Ibid.,loc.cit.9 i.e.heinstalledgovernment'Interventors'toruntheunions.

-173-

Therégimewas'dual'becausebothelementswereessentialtotherégime,andbecausePerónstoodattheapexofboth;itwasasortof'personalunion',notoftwoterritories(likeAustria-Hungary)butoftwoorganizations,onethearmy,theothercivilian.Perónwas,defactoanddejure,theheadofthearmedforces;hewas,atthesametime,'Chiefofthe[Peronista]movement',andmightcountermandanyofitsdecisions,superviseelectionsofcandidates,anddetermineitsagenda.

Perónsurvivedbyplayingoneorganizationagainsttheother.Itwastheyellingdescamisados,nothismilitarycolleagues,who,onthefamousOctober17,1945,madesurethathewouldrunasthePresidentialcandidate.ThePeronistamilitiahelpedtoscotchthecuartelazoofJune1955.Afterthatrevolt,Perónplayedfortimebypromisingrelaxationsuntil,onAugust31,headdressedacrowdof100,000supportersoutsidehisPalaceandurgedthem(withglances,itissaid,attheofficersbyhisside)tokillallthosewhotriedto'getinourway'.Hiscourtshipofthearmedforcesalsoroseandfellaccordingtothepoliticalrequirementsofthemoment.InPerón'sfirstterm,hisciviliansupportwaspowerfulenoughtopermithimtoreducemilitaryappropriations.Hehalvedthearmybudgetbetween1945and1949;hebroughtthebuildingofbarracksandtheliketoahalt;halfofhiscabinetwerecivilians.Inhissecondterm,however,theemphasiswastheotherway.Economicallytherégimewasfailing;andEvitaPerón,aninestimableallytoherhusband,diedin1952.Perónbegantomoderatehispro-labourpolicies,andthereforesoughttostrengthenhissupportamongthemilitary,particularlythenavywhichhadalwaysbeenhostile.

TheFrancorégimeofSpainmayalsoberegardedasa'dual'régime,butthecaseisnotasclear-cutasPerón's.ItturnsonwhetherweregardthecivilianforcesinSpain--theMonarchistsandtheFalange--asinanysenseacounterpoisetotheviewsandtheinfluenceofthearmy.IfweregardtheFalangeandtheMonarchistsasquiteuninfluential,weshouldbestclassifytherégimeasadirectbutquasi-civilianizedrégime,i.e.weshouldbesayingthatthearmyisstillthesoleeffectivesourceofpowerandauthority,andthatthesyndicatesandthepseudo-CortésandtheFalangistPartyitselfaresimplyciviliantrappings,emanatingfromanddependentonthearmy.Tocomplicateclassificationstillfurther,itappearsthattheinfluenceoftheFalangehasconsiderablyfluctuated-beingverypowerfulin1943,forinstance,andthereaftersufferingasharpcheck.

-174-

Theplainfacts,however,aresimplythattheHeadofStateandPrimeMinister(GeneralFranco)isalso'HeadoftheF.E.T.'(theFalange)and'HeadoftheArmedForces'.Furthermore,theF.E.T.,albeitgravelyweakenedsinceitsprime,isamassmovement,and,moreimportantlystill,controlstheworkers'syndicalorganizationsinwhichelectionsbegantobeheldfrom1944.Inaddition,monarchistsentiment(nomonarchistpartyisallowed)isapowerfulforcewhichtheCaudillocanbringintoplayifnecessary.MostobserversdescribeFranco'spositionasplayingofftheFalange,theChurchandthearmy.Ifthisisreallyso,thisrégimealsowouldappeartobeofadualnature,albeitnotasclear-cutasthatofPerón.

Boththeserégimesaroseincountriesof'low'(thirdorder)politicalculture,wherenotionsoflegitimacywerefluid:theArgentinianrégimewasamilitaryretreatfromtheirbare-facedoligarchyof19435,theSpanishwasaretreatfromthebrutalarmedrapeandmilitaryoccupationofSpainbetween1936and1939.Suchrégimesmayalsoarise,however,incountriesofthesecondorder,i.e.ofdevelopedpoliticalculture,wherelegitimacyisresistivetothemilitary'ssupplantmentofcivilianism,andwherethemilitarytypicallyoperateonthegovernmentbynon-violentmeans.Inthesecountriesthedualrégimerepresentsanadvancefromthetypicalindirectcovertformofmilitaryrégime,intotheopen.TheSchleichercabinetof1932,inGermany,providesanexampleofwhatwemean.UptothatpointthearmyhadbeenrepresentedinthegovernmentbytheMinisterofWar(whetherhewasacivilianor,likeGröner,ageneral).SchleicherwasMinisterofDefenceinVonPapen'sgovernment;sofarthisisasimplecaseofindirectandcovertarmyrule.TheSchleicherChancellorshipofDecember1932representedaverydifferentstateofaffairs--ajumpintotheopen.Schleicherwastheacknowledgedleaderoftheofficercorps.Henowbecame,simultaneously,ChancellorandMinisterofDefence.Bythismove,thearmy,whoseleaderhe(doubly)was,assumedadirectandovertconstitutionalresponsibility.AsforSchleicher,likePerón,hispoweralsoreposedontwopillars:theReichswehr,andtheparliamentaryforces,togetherwiththeirbackinginthecountry,aswellasthewholemystiqueofcivilianlegitimacywhichsurroundedtheofficeofChancellor.ThefactthathisciviliansupportswerefeeblecomparedtoPerón'sandcollapsedunderhiminshortordermustnotobscurethebasicpattern:Schleicherwasattheapexoftwoorganizations,civilianandmilitary.

-175-

DirectmilitaryruleThisis,atleast,anunsophisticatedformofrégime,easilyrecognizable;andexamplesabound.

InitspurestformitmaybefoundinthePrimodeRivera'Directorate',1923-5.Asalreadyexplained,deRiverawastheCaptainGeneralofBarcelona,andhispronunciamentowassupportedbytheleadersofanumberofothergarrisonsandfinallyacceptedbyKingAlfonsoXIII.AtemporaryjuntatookpowerinMadrid,inpreparationforhisarrival.Onenteringthecity,thegeneraldismissedthisjuntaandorganizedwhathecalledaDirectorate,whichwastogovernSpainforthenexttwoyears.Itconsistedentirelyofmilitarymen.Furthermore,foreachofSpain'smilitaryregionsaBrigadierGeneralwasappointed.ThisDirectoratewasacollegiatebody,collectivelyresponsibletotheDictatorwhowastheSoleMinister.Onceitwasestablished,theSoleMinisterdismissedtheCortés,sothathealsobecamethesolelegislativeorgan;andthenheproceededtodissolveallthemunicipalcouncilsandreplacethembyassociatesandrepresentativesofthemilitarypolicy,whilegovernmentrepresentationinstate-subsidizedconcernswasalsotakenoverbymilitarymen.

TheRawson-Ramírez-FarrellrégimeinArgentina,1943-5,isasimilarexampleofdirectrulebythemilitary.Withoneexception(theFinanceMinister)everyoneinGeneralRamirez'scabinetwasamilitaryman.InalltheProvinces,thecivilianadministratorswereremovedandreplacedbymilitarymenalso,andmostofthemayorsofcitieswerereplacedbyyoungcolonels.AnotherdirectmilitaryrégimewasthatestablishedinVenezuelain1948,afterthemilitaryoverthrowoftheconstitutionalgovernment.Governmentwastakenintothehandsofathree-manjunta,allarmyofficers.In1950oneofthese(Chalbaud)wasmurderedinmysteriouscircumstancesandthetworemainingtriumvirsthoughtitexpedienttoreplacehimbyatamecivilian;butthejuntacontinuedtoruleinthenameofthearmedforcesuntilthedecision,in1953(whichweshalldiscusslater),to'legitimize'therégimebyholdingelections.

Manyofthecontemporarymilitaryrégimesareofthisnature.TheSudaneserégimeissimplyamilitaryoligarchyledbyGeneralAbboud,inwhichtradeunionsandpartiesweretoleratedonlysolongasandinsofarastheyservedtheoligarchy'spurposes(inJuly1960thepartiesweresuppressedandtheirleadersarrested).TheIraqirégimeisthepersonalruleofBrigadier-GeneralKassim,

-176-

thoughnominallyheisbutthechairmanofathree-mansupremecouncilofstate,andrulesthroughacabinetcomposedpartlyofciviliansandpartlyofsoldiers.InSouthKorea(sincethecuartelazoofMay1961)thesupremepowerhasbeenassumedbythejuntaofthesuccessfulofficers,stylingitselftheSupremeCouncilforNationalReconstruction.Afterseizingpoweritlostnotimeinsuspendingtheconstitutionandrulingbydecree.

InTurkey(1960-1)thepatternwasdifferent.Indeeditwasquitecomplex,andinthisrespectvividlyillustratesthepointwemadeatthebeginningofthischapter-thefluidityofinstitutions,theminglingofdejureanddefactoelementswhichmakethedescriptionofthemilitaryrégimessocontingent,ifnotsubjective,aprocess.Thecoupleadersestablishedthemselvesasa'CommitteeofNationalUnion',consistingof38officers(laterreducedto22).ThisCommitteeforthwithsetupacabinetconsistingof15civiliansand3armyofficers,nominatingitsleader,GeneralGürsel,asHeadofState,PrimeMinisterandMinisterofDefence.PressreportsmakeitquiteclearthatallmajordecisionsweretakenbytheCommitteeofNationalUnion.ForinstanceitwastheCommitteethatdraftedtheprovisionalconstitution;andthis,itshouldbenoted,gaveitpowertocontrolandifnecessarydismissthecabinet.10TheCommitteewastheorganthatgavethegovernmentthedirectiveonwhichitwastobaseitsplansforthecountry'sfuture;11whichdismissedthe157professors;whichenforcedresidenceonthe55feudallandowners;andwhich,aboveall,insistedontheYassiadatrialsoftheDemocraticministersanddeputies.

Butanothercomplexityemergedlater,whenthetimecametoconsiderthenewconstitutionwhichtheCommitteehadalwayspromised.ThiswasconsideredbyaConstituentAssembly(nominated,butcontainingahighproportionofpartypoliticians),butjointlywiththeCommitteewhichappearstohaveexercisednotonlyarighttoinitiateproposalsbutalsoarightofveto.AfurthercomplicationonlyappearedinJune1961,ayearaftertheinitialseizureofpower.MembersoftheCommitteewerenotpermittedtoholddirectarmycommands.InJunetheCommitteetriedtogetridoftheairforcechief,GeneralTansel,bysendinghimonamissiontoWashington,whereupontherewasa'sortofrebellion,intheairforce'(includingthe'buzzing'ofAnkarawithlow-flyingjetaircraft)which

____________________10 TheTimes,June14,1960.11 TheTimes,September12,1960.

-177-

forcedtheCommitteetoreverseitsdecision.Evidentlytheactivemilitarycommandwas,bynow,anautonomouspowerintheadhocrégimeestablishedbythecoupof1960.TheTimescorrespondentsignificantlyreportedthattherehadbeenagrowingbreachinrecentmonthsbetweentheHighCommandofthearmedforcesandtheNationalUnityCommittee.TheformerresentedtheCommittee'sinterferencewithmilitaryappointments,and,moregenerally,wasdissatisfiedwithitsconductofthenation'saffairssincethecoupd'état.12InSeptemberTheTimesreported:'TheArmyhaslatelymovedmoreintopoliticalfocusandhastoalargeextenttakenovertherunningofthecountryduringthecriticalperiodofthe[Yassiada]trial,verdictsandelections.Thepowerofthe22-manJunta,nottomentionthepurelynominal18-mancivilianGovernment,hasrelativelydeclined.Forexample,thewholeGovernmentandlargepartoftheJuntawereknowntohaveopposedtheexecutionsoftheformerleaders,butwhenthejudgmentscametobeconfirmed,theArmyandtheAirForceinsistedonaminimumofthreedeathsentencesbeingcarriedout....'13

LaterinOctober,anotherreportexplained:'ForsomemonthsithasbeenclearthattherealrulersinTurkeyhavenotbeenintheJunta,whoarepowerlessandpartlydiscredited,butasecretcabalofsometwohundredofficersinthearmedforcesknownastheOrdusurasi(thecouncilofthearmy).Thispowerfulbodyissaidtoincludethechiefsoftheairandnavalstaffs,andtohavethepatronage,thoughnottheactualmembership,oftheelderlychiefoftheGeneralStaff,GeneralCevdetSunay.FourorfiveextremistmembersoftheJuntaarealsoinit,anditissaidtohavehighlyplacedcivilianmembersintheministries.ItwasprimarilyOrdusurasiwhichinsistedontheexecutionofMr.Menderes,Mr.ZorluandMr.Polatkin....'14

Beforeconcluding,itisworthwhiletodrawattentiontooneinstitutionaldistinctionthatdoesoccuramongthistypeofrégime.Itwillhavebeennoticedthatinsomecasesthenominalaswellastheeffectivegovernmentlieswithamilitaryindividualorjuntaofindividuals.ThusinSouthKorea,orinthePrimodeRiveracaseorthatoftheVenezuelanmilitaryrégimebetween1948and1952,bothnominalandeffectivepowerrestsinthehandsofa

____________________12 TheTimes,loc.cit.13 TheTimes,Sept21,1961.14 "'AVoteagainstKemalism'",TheEconomist,October21,1961,p.233.

-178-

militaryindividualorgroup.Inothercases,however,whileeffectivepowerresideswitharevolutionaryjuntaofofficers,thenominalpower(orpossiblyadministrativepower)lieswithsomeotherespeciallyconstitutedbody.ThusaftertheEgyptiancoupof1952(whichweshalldiscussinsomedetailbelow),effectivepolicy-makingpowerresidedintheOfficers'RevolutionaryCouncil,whichinstructedthecabinet(andeven,forsometime,thenominalRevolutionarymilitaryleader,GeneralNeguib).TheTurkishcasealreadydescribedprovidesanotherexample.IntheSudan,effectivegovernmentresidesintheSupremeCouncilofthearmedforces,composedof12officers;andthishasnominatedaCouncilofMinisters,7ofwhomareontheSupremeCouncilwhile5arecivilians.

Directmilitaryruleinitsbruteform,unjustifiedbyanyotherprinciplesthanitsownsuccessanditsvaguepromisestodowellbythepeople,isashort-livedformofrule.Itoftenpretendsthatitistransitional--aprovisionalformabouttoleadtosomethingelse.And,inasense,thisclaimistrue--willy-nilly.Suchrégimesaretransitional.Insomecases,asinArgentinaafter1945,theyrecedetoadualtypeofrégime,or(asafter1955)toaformofindirectrule.Inothers,however,wherecircumstancesortheambitionofthevictorioussoldierydictatethatthepowertheyhavewonshallnotbelaidaside,themilitaryjuntaseekssomeendorsementofpopularapproval;andtherégimetherebymovesforwardtoaquasi-civilianizedtypeofrégime.Themilitarystillrule;buttheyclothethemselveswiththeevidencesofciviliansupport.

Thereasonstheydosohavealreadybeenrecognized.Theyareimplicitinallthathasgonebefore;legitimacybreedspower.Evenamocklegitimacyismorecompulsivetocitizensthanthatflagrantabsenceofanyrighttorulethatinheresinthesword.Otherreasonscreepin,tobesure,particularlyinthosecountriesofthefourthandlowestorderofpoliticallegitimacylikeHaiti,theCongo,andParaguaywhereitlittlehelpsorhindersagovernment'sholdonthepopulacewhetheritberegardedbythemaslegitimateornot.Theneedofsuchrégimesfordiplomaticrecognitionmaybeacompellingfactor;likewisetherulingjunta'sdesiretobeonallfourswiththeconstitutionally-basedgovernmentswithwhomithascontactsandwhomitfearsandenvies.Thereis,inthecomityofestablishedgovernments,somethingsecondclass,parvenu,aboutanadhocorprovisionalrégime.Hencesuchgovernmentsseek,astheyputit,to'regularize'thesituation.Butthechiefmotiveistheinternal

-179-

importanceofestablishingaclaimtogovern.Inthefirstplace,theyslamthedoorofillegalityinthefaceofrivalsseekingpowerbythesamemeansasthegovernmenthasacquiredit.Inthesecondplace,theydo,oratleastmay,winoverasectionofciviliansentimenttothatfeelingofhabitualobedienceowedtoalegalandlawfulsuperiorwhichisthebedrockofanygovernmentalstability.

Sometimestheprocessofquasi-civilianizationisasimpleendorse-mentbytheelectorate.Thenthemilitarycanclaimtobetheelectedchoiceofthepeople.Oftenitgoesfurtherwiththecreationofallmannerofwhatpurporttobeorgansofdemocraticself-expression.Whetheroneortheotherorboth,theyallhavethesameobject:tohoodwinkthenativepopulationandbamboozletheworld.Theirsuccessinthelatterobjectisremarkable.

TheLatinAmericans,whoseexperienceofsuchendeavoursislongerthanthatoftheArabsandtheAsians,andwhosepoliticalsophistication(orcynicism)isconsiderablymoredeveloped,have,intheirusualway,developedaspecialvocabularyfortheprocessesofsimulatingpopularsupport.Theytalkofcontinuismo--thetacitsettingasideoftheexpiryoftheconstitutionaltermofoffice;ofimposicion--thegovernment,likeNasser's,'imposing'itscandidateoritspartyandthenarrangingforthesetobeelected.Andthereiscandidatounico--seeingtoitthat,onewayortheother,theofficialcandidateshallhavenobodytocontendwith.WehavealreadyseentheoperationofthecandidatounicoinParaguayforthelastdozenelections.ButParaguayoughtnottobesingledoutbythefingerofscorn.IntheEgyptianpresidentialelectionColonelNasserwasthecandidatounicoalso.

Thevariousmodesbywhichdirectmilitaryruleistrickedoutintheregaliaoflegitimacyandcivilaffectionarebestexplained,however,bylookingatanumberofdirectmilitaryrégimesandobservingthestepstheytook.Peru(1948-56)providesafineclearcaseofcandidatounico.In1948,GeneralOdríaoverthrewthelawfulelectedgovernmentandmadehimselfautocratwithanall-militarycabinet.Thepresswascensored,constitutionalguaranteesoffreedomsuspended,andthedeathpenaltyimposedfor'politicalcrimes'.Congresswasprorogued.Butatthesametimetherégimewaspassedoffasprovisional--forGeneralOdríapromisedelections'atanearlydate'.Aftertwoyearsofthis,theGeneralresignedinfavourofhisVice-PresidentinordertostandasPresidentialcandidate.(Suchnicety,inviewofwhatwastohappen!)Sincetheonlyreallypowerful

-180-

oppositionparty,theA.P.R.A.,wasproscribed,GeneralOdríafoundhimselfwithonlyoneelectoralopponent-theGeneralErnestoMontagne.ButMontagne'snominationpapersweredeclaredfraudulentandhiscandidaturerenderedvoid,andGeneralOdríawasreturnedunopposedbyan80percentpoll.ThenceforthhegovernedPeruasitsconstitutionalPresident,withadocileCongressandacabinethalfofwhosemembersweremilitary.

TherégimeofGeneralRojasPinilla,inColombia,wasmuchlessorthodox.Rojashadseizedpower15amidtheenthusiasmofthepopulacewhoweresickofthemachetismointhehinterlandsandlookedtoRojastopacifythetwosides.Rojasquicklydevelopedhisowncreativeambitions,however,andbecameincreasinglyradical,grandioseandoppressive.Frombeginningtoendhisrulewasbasedonthearmyandhefellwhen,appalledatthepopularinsurrectionwhichragedagainsthiminMay1957,thearmywithdrewitssupportandtoldhimhemustresign.RojastoleratedalegislaturebutthiswasaConstituentAssemblyselectedforaspecialpurpose,soin1957hecreatedanotherandsubservientone.Hiscabinetcertainlycontainedciviliansbuthe,asPresidentandheadofthecabinet,maintainedthathewasresponsibleonlytothearmedforces,andhedubbedhisrégime'theGovernmentofthePeopleandtheArmedForces'.Rojasmadenoseriousattempttocreatehisowncivilianbacking(asPeróndid)andhetoleratedtheexistenceofthetraditionalandthepowerfulLiberalandConservativeparties.Inthishereallyhadnoalternative,fortheseparties,exceptionallyforLatinAmerica,werethoroughlyrootedinpopularlife.Rojasdidrealize,however,thattherégimelookedincreasinglynaked,andin1956hebegantotalkaboutsomethinghestyleda'ThirdForce'.However,nobodykneworknowstothisdaywhetherthismeant'ArmyandPeople',orwhetheritpresagedthefoundationofanofficialparty.Thiswasaveryoddrègime,andonlyRojas'sconcessiontosuchlegitimizingdevicesashislegislature,andhisnotionsof'ThirdForce'andsoforthwouldplaceitinthisquasi-civiliancategory.Ifonedecidesthatsuchtrappingsweretooinsignificanttoberated,itmightbebettertoregardthisasadirect,unqualifiedmilitaryrégime.

ThewaybywhichthePrimodeRiverarégimeofSpain'civilianized'itselfwasamysteriousplebiscite.In1925deRiverareplacedtheall-militarydirectoratewithwhichhehadgovernedsince1923by

____________________15 Seep.156.

-181-

onemadeupofcivilians.Nextyearheheldafour-dayplebiscitewhichgathered6,700,000votes-recordedbywhom,andhowmanybyeachvoterhasneverbeenmadeclear.16In1927hecreatedaSupremeNationalAssembly,purportedlyto'representallclassesandinterests'.Notsurprisingly,itwasnominatedbythedictator.Itmetfortwenty-fourhoursineachmonthandwasadvisoryonly.PrimodeRiveraalsocreatedthePatrioticUnionof'goodcitizens',whocarriedoutmonsterdemonstrationsinfavouroftherégime.Thewholeofthiswassomuchflim-flamanddisappearedlikeabubblein1930whenthearmyexpresseditsnon-confidenceinthedictator,andpowersilentlyslippedfromhimtoGeneralBerenguer.

ThewholeofthisfarceresembleswhathashappenedinEgyptsince1952,butasEgyptisparticularlyrelevanttoanotheraspectofthemilitaryrégimes,itwillbedescribedbelow.Asaconcludingexampleofthequasi-civilianizationofadirectmilitaryrégime,weshallthereforetaketheJiménezdictatorshipinVenezuela.Afterseizingpowerin1948themilitaryjuntasuppressedtheAccionDemocraticaPartybutpermittedtheC.O.P.E.I.(ChristianDemocrat)andU.R.D.partiestocontinue.Asalreadyexplained,therégimewasanunqualifiedmilitaryoligarchy.Threeyearslater,however,thejuntadecidedto'constitutionalize'it.Why?Opinionsdiffer.SomesaythatJiménezwantedCaracastobethesiteofthePan-Americanconference,othersthatcertainoilcontractswerebeingheldupuntilaconstitutionalgovernmentcameintoexistence.Inanyevent,Jiménezdecidedthathisarmygovernmentwouldseekendorsementfromthepeople.TothisendtheAccionDemocraticaremainedunderproscription,civillibertieswere'regulated';and,aboveall,anypoliticalpartiesseekingtocontesttheelectionhadtobelicensedbytheauthorities-aprocesswhichinvolvedpolicesurveillanceoverthewholeoftheirovertactivities.

Thegovernmentnowcreateditsownparty,theF.E.I.(FrenteElectoralIndependente),anewbodydesignedtobringabout'amassiveadhesiontothenationalarmyandColonelJiménez'.17

TheelectionstookplaceinfreedomandsecrecyandwithnodisordersonNovember30,1952.TheyweretoestablishaConstituentAssemblytorevisetheconstitution:butasthisConstituentwasalsotodesignatetheprovisionalPresidenttheelectionstookontheaspect

____________________16 Madariaga,op.cit.

17 R.Bétancourt,op.cit.,p.554;cf.L.B.Lott,"'The1952VenezuelanElections'"(WesternPoliticalQuarterly,Vol.X,No.3,pp.541-59).

-182-

ofaPresidentialrace.BytheendofthefirstscrutinyitbecameclearthattheproscribedAccionDemocraticavotewasbeingcastfortheotherandconstitutionalpartiesbutagainstthegovernment-sponsoredF.E.I.ThefirstbroadcastreturnsshowedU.R.D.with54percent,C.O.P.E.I.with15percentandtheF.E.I.withonly25percent.Atthispointthebroadcastsstoppedabruptly.PerezJiménezdissolvedthemilitaryjuntaandwiththeendorsementsofthechiefsofthesixdistinctsectionsofthearmedforces,proclaimedhimselfprovisionalPresident.Hisapologiaisworthyofrecord.'Althoughitistrue,'hebroadcast,'thatthebasicfactoroftheRepublicisthenormalevolutionofconstitutionallife-yetwhatisalsocertainisthattheaccomplishmentofthenationalwell-beingwhichwillgiveVenezuelathegrandeurshedeservesstandshigherthanthis.'18Afterabriefbutveryeffectiverepression,only71deputiesoftheConstituentAssemblyremainedfreetoconvene.Indeedthetruenumberisreally50,since21ofthosewhoattendedwere'candidate'members.BoththeU.R.D.andtheC.O.P.E.I.memberswereabsent.TheConstituentwasamererump.ItwasthisbodythatendorsedPerezJiménezasProvisionalPresident.

Butnow,accordingtotheConstitution,thegovernmentshouldproceedwiththemunicipal,theCongressionalandthe(true)Presidentialelections.Instead,inthewordsofRomuloBétancourt,'theusurpationpretendedtoconstitutionalizeitself,foritself,andbyitself,inApril1953,throughoneofthemostcynicaldisplaysofcontemptforthenormsofrepresentativegovernmentrecordedinAmericanhistory'.19ThisrumpandservileConstituentAssemblyitselfnominatedthemembersofthenationalCongress;theDeputiesoftheStateAssemblies;thecouncillorsforsomehundredsoflocalgovernmentareas;thejudgesoftheSupremeCourt;theProcuradorGeneral;and,finally,ofcourse,PerezJiménezastheconstitutional(nolongerprovisional)PresidentoftheRepublic!

DynamicsofthemilitaryrégimesCommonly,theformtakenbythemilitaryrégimeinagivencountrydoesnotstandstill.Itisusualforonetypeofrégimetochangeintoanother.Nowthesechangesdonottendtotakeplaceamongthetypeswehaveclassifiedinanyarbitraryfashion,butalmostasthoughthesetypesrepresentedakindofscaleorspectrumandthe

____________________18 R.Bétancourt,op.cit.,p.558.19 Ibid.Cf.Time,April16,1953.

-183-

changestookplaceupordownit.Thisisnotaltogethersurprisingbecause,roughlyspeaking,thescalerunsparallelwiththedepthofmilitaryintervention.Thetable

Indirect:limitedIndirect:completeDualDirectDirect,quasi-civilianized

correspondsbroadlytocovertintervention,thenovertintervention,thenthesupplantmentofthecivilianrégime,and-initsfinalmanifestation-theintenttoperpetuateandinstitutionalizethissupplantment.Withquasi-civilianizationtherégimemovesoutoftherealmoftheprovisional,andpurportstobearégimeinitsownright.

Itis,therefore,verycommontofind'runs'or'sequences'ofrégimes,upanddownthe'scale'representedbythistableofrégimes.Theserunsorsequencesoccurasthemilitarydecidetoseekincreasingcontrolofthesituation(e.g.Syria,Egypt)or,alternatively,appalledattheirembroilmentandfearfulofthewrathtocome(Argentina,Turkey),todisengagefrompolitics.ConsiderArgentina,forinstance.Heretheindirect-limitedruleofthepre-1943periodwassucceededbytheRawson-Ramirez-Farreffrégimeofdirectrule(1943-5);this(markingthebeginningofthemilitaryretreat)bythedualrégimeofPerón(1945-55);andthis,finally,bythepresentperiodofindirectlimitedruleundertheprovisionalPresidentsLonardiandAramburu,thenPresidentFrondiziandnowprovisionalPresidentGuido.OrconsiderVenezuela:firsttheperiodofdirectmilitaryruleupto1945,shatteredbythecuartelazoof1945andtheestablishmentoftheindirect-limitedruleofthesoldiersundertheAccionDemocraticagovernment,1945-8:this,inturn,wasfollowedbyareversiontodirectmilitaryrulebyPerezJiménez(1948-52),andthis,again,byaquasi-civilianizedrégime(1952-8).Thencameasharpbreakwhenthemilitarydecidedtodisentanglethemselvesfromtherégime.TheirfeelingswerepartlyoccasionedbythequiteformidableundergroundcivilianoppositiontotheconstitutionalPresident,whichbrokeoutintoopendisturbancesafterthegrotesque'plebiscite'whichpurportedlyre-electedJiménezin1957;partlyduetotheirdislikeoftheunpopularityaccruingtothemforhavingtorepresssuchdisturbances;butalso,andvery

-184-

significantly,becausethe'quasi-civilianized'régimehadtendedtoerodeitsconnexionwiththearmedforcesandtorelyincreasinglyuponasecretpolice.RomuloBétancourt,wheninexile,quitepropheticallypointedoutthisfeatureasearlyas1956.Thefirstreactionofthearmedforcestothepublicdisturbanceswas(successfully)todemandtheexileoftheChiefoftheSeguridadandoftheMinisteroftheInterior.Whenthedisturbancescontinued,however,theleadersofthearmedforcesdecidedtodisengage.TheywithdrewtheirsupportfromPerezJiménezandreturnedtotherégimeofindirect-limitedrule(1958tothepresent).

Syriaprovidesanenlighteningsequence,insofarasitillustrateshowthearmedforces,havingtakenthefirstovertsteptointerferewithcivilianprocessesmaybecompelledtogofurtherandfurtheruntilattheendtheymustthemselvesbecomethegovernment.TheelectionsofDecember1949returnedaChamberfavourabletothemuch-canvassedunionwithIraq.ThatverynightColonelShishaklicarriedoutacoupd'état,andimposedacabinetofhisownchoosing.Thisheraldedthefirstphaseofarmyrule,thatofindirect-completerule.Cabinetswereformedbyanumberofpoliticiansbut,asDr.Ziadehputsit,'Cabinetsgovernedthecountrybutallknewthearmyruled'.20InNovember1951,however,anewcabinet,formedunderDr.Dawalibi,refusedtobeapuppetandlookedsuddenlydangeroustoarmyinterest.21ColonelShishaklistruckagain,thususheringinthesecondregime,thatofdirectmilitaryrule.AsChiefoftheGeneralStaffheheadedamilitaryjuntastyledtheSupremeMilitaryCouncil-ofatypefamiliarenoughbynow.InthiscapacityheforcedthePresidentoftheRepublicandthePrimeMinistertoresignandappointedhisfamiliar,oneColonelSelo(MinisterofDefenceandspokesmanforthearmyintheprecedingcabinets),asHeadofState,PrimeMinisterandMinisterofDefence.ColonelSeloinhisturnappointedanall-civiliancabinet,butthistookordersopenlyfromtheChiefoftheGeneralStaff,ColonelShishakli.22Thisperiodofdirectmilitaryruleisdrearilyfamiliar,resemblingthosealreadydescribed.TheChamberwasdissolved,thecourtsandcivilservicepurged,thepoliticalpartiessuppressed.

____________________20 A.Ziadeh,SyriaandtheLebanon,p.112.

21ItwasdeemedtobefavourabletotheunionwithIraqand,moreimmediately,itwassaiditwasabouttotransferthegendarmeriefromthearmytothecivilauthorities.Thegendarmeriecontrolledtheelections.Seep.126.

22 ApatternsimilartothatoftheSudanunderGeneralAbboudtoday

-185-

Thisrégimenowgavewaytothethirdtype,thequasi-civilianizedrégime.Themannerinwhichthiswasbroughtaboutshows,parenthetically,howlittletheciviliancabinetandhowmuchthearmedforcescountedfor.ForGeneralShishakli,23qua'PresidentoftheSupremeMilitaryCouncil',sentthedraftofthenewconstitutiontoColonelSeloasHeadofStateandPrimeMinister,andaskedhiscabinettoholdareferendumonthedraft;whichtheydid.

Thisusheredinthequasi-civilianizedmilitaryrégime.Shishaklihadnowformedhisownparty,theArabLiberationparty.ThiswasthesolepartyfightingtheelectionandShishakliwasthesolecandidateforPresident.NeedlesstosaytheconstitutionwasapprovedandShishakliwaselectedPresident.His'constitutional'régimelastedonlytillFebruary1954.Inthecourseof'civilianizing'hisrégimehehadlostcontactwiththeconspiraciesinthearmy.Hismilitaryenemiesnowoverthrewhimandthesystemrevertedbacktotheindirect-limitedrégimes(1954-8)inwhichColonelSerrajwastodistinguishhimselfasalreadydescribed,thentoEgyptiandomination(1958-61)untilitreturnedagaintoindirect-limitedgovernment(1961-2).

However,noexampleequalsthatoftheEgyptianrégimeeitherforthecompletenessofthestagesithaspassedthrough,ortheorderedlogicoftheirsequenceandthelightitthrowsonthecompulsionsofthemilitary.FortheEgyptianofficersdidnotconspiretosupplantthecivilianrégimeatall.Theyweremuchtoounselfconfidentforthat.Theysetouttodisplacethegovernment,andreplaceitbyanoblerone;butappetitegrewbywhatitfedon,andtheywereled,monthinandmonthout,downourtableofrégimesuntiltheyendedupasthenewgoverningclass,rulingbehindascreenofcivilianforms.Inthecourseofthis,too,theymadeatruerevolution,bothinthesenseofalteringthebalanceofsocialclassesandofnationalizingorcontrollingtheeconomy,butalsointhattheycompletelysetasideandindeeddestroyedtheformerrulingclass;andsetthemselvesinitsplace.Thisexampleisamodel.TheArgentine,Venezuelan,andSyriancaseshaveshownalimitednumberoftransitions,ineachcasefollowedbyadecisiveretractionfromovertpower.TheEgyptiancaseillustratesthemilitarymovingdownthewholespectrumofformsofrégime,and,forthemoment,stabilizingitselfinthequasi-civilianizedtype.

____________________23 ShishaklihadbythisdatepromotedhimselftotherankofBrigadierGeneral.

-186-

Initially,theFreeOfficers'conspiracyhadneitherintendednorexpectedtogovern.Neguibdeclaredthat'ourmovementhasnothingtodowithpolitics',24andNasserhimselfthoughtoftheofficersasa'commandovanguard';thatonceheandhisassociateshadpurgedthebadelements,'goodpoliticians'wouldrunthecountry.ThereforethefirstthingthevictoriousplottersdidwastoengineerthedownfallofthecabinetandensuretheinstallationofAliMaherasPrimeMinister;andthesecondthing,tosecuretheabdicationofKingFarouk.Thusbegan,onJuly23,1952,phaseone-therégimeofindirect-limitedrule.AliMaherchosehisowncabinet.Fortheirpart,theFreeOfficersestablishedanExecutiveCommittee.Itintervenedtosecurecertainconditions;forinstance,itsecuredrisesinmilitarypayanditestablishedaspecialmilitarycourttotrytheleadersoftheKafrelDawarcotton-millriots.ButitwasunabletogetAliMahertoenactitscherishedland-reformlaw,anditcameupagainstincreasingresistancefromtheoldstylepoliticians,e.g.NahasPashaandtheWafd,andfromtheMoslemBrotherhood.

FrombetweensometimeinAugustandSeptember,thecontrolexertedbytheExecutiveCommitteeoftheFreeOfficersbecameincreasinglycomplete,exemplifiedinsuchincidentsastheirarrest(September7)offorty-threeoftheolderpoliticians.Thistransitionalperiodmayberegardedasthesecondphase-thatofindirectcompleterulebythesoldiersanditledonSeptember7toaformalchangeintheinstitutionalarrangementswhichusheredindualrule.AliMaherwasdismissed.Inhisstead,GeneralNeguib,theChairmanoftheFreeOfficers'Committee,alsobecamethePrimeMinisterofanall-civiliancabinet.InhisPooh-bahcapacitiesasPrimeMinister,MinisterofWarandMarine,Commander-in-ChiefandMilitaryGovernorofEgypt,Neguib'spowernowrestedontwopillars,themilitaryandthecivilian.TherealityofthemilitarycomponentmaybeattestedbythedecisionofSeptember30wherebyeachgovernmentdepartmentwasafforcedbythirtyofficers,'tosupplythesewithprogressiveadministrativeelementsandtoensureclosecoordinationofarmypolicyandadministrativeaction'.25Therealityoftheciviliancomponentwasnoless.ThedeputyPremierandMinisteroftheInteriorwasSolimanHafez,anopponentoftheWafd,andthecabinetwassupportedalsobyananti-Nahasfaction

____________________24 Wheelock,op.cit.,p.12.25 Keesing'sContemporaryArchives(1952),12537B.

-187-

oftheWafd,ledbyFahmiGomaa.Fourcabinetministers,besides,formedanewpolitical'party'.

Thisdualrégimefounditself-indeedthrustitself-intoastrugglewiththetwomostpowerfullyorganizedsegmentsofpublicopinion-theMoslemBrotherhoodandtheWafd.OnDecember10,1952,thestrainprovedtoomuch.Thearmy,determinednowtobemaster,jettisonedtheircivilianalliesandmovedintothefourthphase,ofdirectmilitaryrule.OnDecember9,practicallyallthepoliticiansweredismissedfromthecabinetandreplacedbycivilservants,andonDecember10GeneralNeguibannouncedthatthe1923Constitutiontowhichlipservicehadhithertobeenpaidwasabrogated.Authority,heproclaimed,hadnowpassedtoa'transitionalgovernment'.

ThesucceedingmovesconformtothesamedismalpatternofovertmilitaryrulewhichwehavedescribedforothercountriessuchasArgentina.Allpoliticalpartieswereabolishedandtheirfundsseized.Politicallyinsecureofficers(e.g.Mohanna)werearrested.Formerministerswereindictedbeforespecialcourts.Therewasnoneedtomakespecialprovisionforthesuspensionofindividualguaranteesasthecountryhadbeenundermartiallawsincebeforetherevolution.Institutionally,importantchangesweremade.ThewholeauthorityforgovernmentwastransferredtoanewlycreatedRevolutionaryCommandCouncil(theR.C.C.)whichwascomposedentirelyofmembersoftheExecutiveCommitteeoftheFreeofficers.Athree-yeartransitionperiodwasannouncedbefore'constitutionalgovernment'wouldberesumed.Inthemeantime,'theLeaderoftheRevolutionwillexercisethepowerofsupremesovereignty....[His]powerswillapplytotherightofappointinganddismissingministerswhowillhaveexecutiveauthorityintheirrespectivespheresofwork:andtheR.C.C.andtheCouncilofMinisterswillformaCongresswhichwilldiscussthegeneralpolicyoftheState'.26InpracticethefinalauthorityrestedwiththeR.C.C.whichhadaweeklysessionwiththecivilianministers.

ThisperiodofrulelastedashadbeendecreeduntilJanuary1956,i.e.forthreeyears.Duringthattime,however,theOfficers'movementwasforcedtoitscriticaldecision:wasitgoingtorulethecountry,orwasitgoingtodisengage?Aswehaveseen,theArgentinearmy,twicefacedwiththisdecision-in1930and1945-wasnotpreparedtoweardowncivilianresistanceandremaininpower.

____________________26 February10,1952,Keesing'sContemporaryArchives(1952),12846A.

-188-

Insteaditdisengagedandreturnedtoindirectrule.TheTurkisharmywasfacedwiththesamedecisionin1961andmadeasimilarjudgement.IntheR.C.C.,thedesiretodisengagecamefromGeneralNeguib,andthedeterminationtoholdon,tobecomeanewrulingclass,wasledbyNasser.AfirstattempttooustNeguibonFebruary28,1954,failedandforthesucceedingmonthpreparationswentaheadforelectionsandareturntolegitimacy.OnMarch28,anthiswasreversed.Aclassicgolpedeestadowaseffected;Neguibwasseizedandlaterdemoted,andthedecisiontomaintainpowerreaffirmed.NasserbecamePrimeMinisterinacabinetofadifferenttype.HenceforthallmembersoftheR.C.C.werecabinetministers.

The'gleichschaltung'ofcivilianlifecontinued.Nasseremergedundisputedmaster,withthearmypurged,thecivilianorganizationsdestroyed,theuniversitiesstifled,theWafdandMoslemBrotherhoodbothshatteredandallpoliticalpartiesbanned.

ThedirectmilitaryrégimeofNasserpassedintoitsfinalphase,thatofquasi-civilianization,in1956.Thiswastheendofthe'transitional'period,ashadbeenpromised.Asetofbogusinstitutionswasoffered-bogusbecausetheyweremereemanations,ancillariesofthearmy.OnJanuary16,1956,anewconstitutionwasofferedthecountry,aconstitutionwithapowerfulPresidentandacomparativelyfeeblebutelectedAssembly.ThiswassubmittedtoaplebisciteinJune.Nootherpartiesthantheofficial'NationalUnion'werepermitted.TheplebisciteshowedthatColonelNasser(nominatedforPresidentbytheR.C.C.)was0.1percentmorepopularthantheconstitution.Hereceived99.9percentofthevotesandtheconstitutiononly99.8percent.

ThereaftertheR.C.C.wasdissolved,andallcabinetministerswhohadbeenofficershadtodroptheirtitles(exceptofcoursetheCommander-in-Chief).Therégimehadtoshowitselfcivilianized.Howgenuinethatcivilianizationwasmaybegleanedfromthefollowing:therearenoindependentparties,onlyanofficialorganization,theNationalUnion,thecreatureofthegovernment.TheNationalAssemblywasanappointivebody,handpickedbyPresidentNasser.27Thepressisnationalized,andentirelygovernment-controlled.Thegovernment,then,isColonelNasserandhishandpickedcircleof

____________________

27

Ithassincebeendissolved,pendinganewconstitution.TheAssemblydidshowsomeindependenceandboldness.ItalsodidusefulworkinrevisingBillsthatcamebeforeit.Butithadnostandinginhighpolicymatters,ofcourse,andnomeansofbringingpressureonthePresidentwhocreatedit.

-189-

assistants,almostentirelymilitary.Thebasisofthegovernmentisthearmywhichhasdonewell,sociallyandfinancially,aswellaspolitically,outoftherégime.Theinstitutionsaresomuchflim-flamtoconcealtheelementaltruth:thatthisisstillmilitaryrule,albeitwithfancytrappings.28

Thereturntothebarracks:(1)abdicationOvertrulebythemilitary,whetherdirectorquasi-civilianized,raisestwofurtherquestions.Thefirstoftheseis:whatinducesthemilitarytoterminatetheirrule?Thesecondiswhetherandhowfaritispossibleforamilitaryrégime,startingwithquasi-civilianinstitutions,toproceedtogivereallifetotheseandultimatelytorecivilianizeitself.

Ineithercasetwofactsmustalwaysbeborneinmind.Inallcountriesofthefourth(minimal)orderofpoliticalculture,asinagreatmajorityofthoseofthethirdorder,themilitaryissostrongvis-à-vistheciviliansthatittendstoloselittleofitssignificancebysubstitutingindirectfordirectrule.Secondly,insuchcountriesparticularlythosewithweakcivilianbasessuchasSyria,Thailand,Paraguay-theusualconsequenceofthefallofonemilitaryrégimeistheimmediateinstallationofanother.

Thecaseswehavetoconsider,therefore,arethoseofsuchthirdorderstatesasArgentina,Colombia,VenezuelainSouthAmerica;Egypt,Pakistan,SyriaandIraqinAsia.Immediatelyadifficultyappears.Thedirectorquasi-civilianizedmilitaryrégimeswhichhavecollapsedinthenearpastandsoaffordabasisforgeneralizationareallLatinAmerican:tobeprecisethoseofPerón(1955),Odría(1956),RojasPinilla(1957)andPerezJiménez(1958).TheAsianrégimesarestillinbeing"29andoneofthem,Nasser's,willshortlybetenyearsold.Thusthebasisofourexperienceisverynarrow.Ithasalsotobesaidthat,howevertenuoustheinformationabouttheconspiratorial

____________________

28ThisisnottosaythatColonelNasseroreventherégimeisnotpopular.Ithinkitis.Thepointisitdoesnot,ordarenot,dependonitspopularityforitscontinuance.Itdependsonthearmedforces,andacceptspublicpopularityasakindofbonus.

29

AyubKhan'sdirect-militaryrulehasgivenwaytothenewconstitutionsincetheselineswerewritten.Itistooearlytosaywhetherthismarksgenuineabdicationbythemilitary,orwhetheritisnotamerequasicivilianizationofmilitaryrule.IfProfessorNewman'sstricturesontheConstitution("'DemocracyunderControl'",TheTimes,March16,1962)arecorrect,itisthelatter.Iam,atpresent,stronglyinclinedtotakethisview.

-190-

cellsandorganizationsthatplannedthemilitarysupplantmentofcivilianrule,suchastheG.O.U.inArgentinaortheFreeOfficersinEgypt,30thereisfarfarlessknownabouttheconspiracies,themethods,orthemotivesofthemilitarymenwhodecidethereturntocivilianrule,andsobringtheovertruleofthemilitarytoanend.Infactweknownexttonothingofthis.Nobodyprominentinsuchenterpriseshasvouchsafedtowritehismemoirs.

Onthebasisofthelimitedevidencewhichisallthatisavailable,itappearsasthoughthe'returntothebarracks'-whatwehavecalledthemilitary's'disengagement'fromovertrule-occursthroughthecumulationofthreeconditions:thedisintegrationoftheoriginalconspiratoralgroup,thegrowingdivergenceofinterestsbetweenthejuntaofrulersandthosemilitarywhoremainasactiveheadsofthefightingservices,andthepoliticaldifficultiesoftherégime.

Whenacuartelazohasbeensuccessfulandthecivilianshavebeenthrustoff-stageasinSouthKoreaortheSudan,itstillremainstruethatthe'military'assuchcannotrule,butonlyahandfulofthem.Anindividual,orajunta,installshimselfinpowerinthenameofthearmedforces,andisimmediatelyfacedwiththeproblemofguaranteeingtheirloyalty,aloyaltyweakenedbytheexampleofsubversionwhichtheyhavejustlearned.Thebulkofthearmedforces,i.e.thosenotcalledontogovern,aretreatedtoavigorousregimenofrewardsandpunishments.Somepartoftherewardiscorporate:betterpayforallranks,perhapscertaintax-freeprivileges,newequipmentandthelike.Forinstance,inParaguay,afterthecoupof1954,themilitarybudgetroseto50percentofthetotal;inArgentina,duringthe1943-5period(whentheG.O.U.wereinfullcommand),themilitaryappropriationsfor1944weredoublethosefortheprecedingyears,andin1945werelargerthantheentirerestofthegovernmentbudgetforthatyear.Oragain,asinEgypt,oneofthefirstactionsofthevictoriousjuntawastoraisearmypay.ThearmstradewithRussiawhichtheArabmilitaryrégimes,e.g.Egypt,Syria,Iraq,havepursued,isoneoftheconsequencesofthemilitaryrégimewhichrequirestherulingjuntatogivethemilitarynewandexpensivematerialtoplaywith,materialwhichtheWesthasbeentooslowtodeliver.Certainaspectsofindustrializationarealsopartofthehugemassbribewhichisnecessarytoholdtheloyaltyofthemilitary:e.g.theexploitationoftheoil-fieldsinArgentina,which,asfarasthemilitaryareconcerned,mustbedevelopedevenwithoutbenefit

____________________30 Seepp.37;64-5.

-191-

offoreigncapital;orthearmamentfactorieswhichPresidentNasserhasestablishedinEgyptandwhichhenowproposestodevelopuntiltheyarecapableofturningoutheavyequipment.

Atthesametimethemilitaryjuntahandsoutgovernorships,senioradministrativeposts,comptrollershipsofvariouskinds,ambassadorships,nottospeakofthetoppolicy-makingposts.Forthoseofreliablepoliticalopinions,promotionsarerapid.Politicalintervention,onceithasoccurred,breachestheformerpoliticalneutralityofthearmedservices.Therulingjunta,therefore,must,ofdirenecessity,ensurethatthekeycommandersarewell-affected.

Simultaneouslywiththerewardsgothepunishments.Thenumbersofofficerspurgedbytherulingjuntaisoftenveryhigh.ThenumberspurgedbyGeneralGürselappeartohaverisento7,000.ThenumberspurgedinEgyptbetween1952and1954aloneare,topublicknowledge,some500-thefullfigureisprobablyhigher.31Atthesametime,asecretpolicesystemhastobeorganizedthroughoutthearmedforces.IntheVenezuelaofPerezJiménez,forinstance,itwasnotlongbeforethearmedforceshadbecomeinsignificantcomparedwiththeSeguridadNacionalunderEstrada.Thiscontrolledallthemainspringsofthestate,and,inBétancourt'swords,thearmybecame'avirtualprisonerofthevastapparatusofespionage,delation,torturesandassassinationscreatedbythepoliticalpolice.Whatbeganasaninstrumenttoterrorizethecivilpopulationhasfinishedbyinvestingtheverycadresoftheofficercorps,inthearmy,thenavyandtheairforceandtheNationalGuard.''Venezuela,'hesaid,'sufferstherigoursofarégimewhichcontinuestotalkinthenameofthearmedforcesbutwhichinrealitygovernsanddespotizesoverthecountrywiththealmostsolitarysupportofahypertrophiedHimmler-likepolice.'32

Such,then,arethepositivepoliciestherulingjuntatendtopursuetosecuretheirrule,and,thereby,theovertruleofthemilitary.Thefirstofthethreeweaknessesthattendstodevelopinthissituationisthedisintegrationoftherulinggroup-notnecessarilythejunta,thoughthisoftendoesdisintegrate,butthewidercircleofofficerswhichhaveborneittopower.Parentheticallywemayremark

____________________

31 September25,1952:450dismissed;January16,1953:16triedanddismissed;June6-22,1954:15triedandimprisoned.

32Bétancourt,op.cit.,p.572.Thefirstreactionofthearmytothepopularoutbreakswhichshooktherégimeinlate1957andearly1958was,significantly,todemandandsecurethedismissalandexileofEstrada,headoftheSeguridad.Seep.185.

-192-

thatnothingismorenatural,nothingmoretobeexpected.Itisdifficultenoughforciviliancabinetsnottodisintegrate,andthePraesidiumoftheCommunistPartyoftheSovietUnionisfromtimetotimecleftintoferociousfactions.Themilitaryconspiratorsseizepowerwithconsiderablylessinthewayofcommonpolicyorideologythanthesecivilians.Furthermore,thewayinwhichtheyhavecometopowerisbytreasonandviolence;foronefactiontoopposeitsopponentsbythesemeansisjustasvalidasthewayinwhichbothinallianceoriginallyseizedpower.Themilitaryjunta,quasi-civilianizeitselfhowitwill,hasthelieinthesoul.Itsuffersfromtheviceoforigin.Soitisthatpracticallyeverysuccessfulactofmilitarysupplantmenthasbeensucceededbystruggleamongthevictoriousconspirators.InEgypt,after1952,Mohanna,oneoftheFreeOfficers,hadtobecastoutbecausehesupportedtheMuslimBrotherhood,thenNeguibandhissupporterssuchasMohieddinweredefeatedandpurgedintheirturn.IntheArgentine(1943),theG.O.U.firstputuptheWarMinisterRamirez,asprovisionalPresident,thenwithdrewhimforGeneralRawsonandfinallyreinstalledRamirez.WhenRamirez,bowingtonecessities,decideditwasnecessarytoseverrelationswiththeAxis,theG.O.U.decidedtodeposehimanddid,substitutingGeneralFarrell.Then,anxiousatPerón'srapidrise-thoughhehadbeenintheforefrontofthedepositionofRamirez-theyimprisonedhimandonlyreleasedhimfromfearofthedescamisados,andbecausebythen(October15,1945)theyhadrunoutofideasandleaders.Likewise,aftertheoverthrowofPerónin1955,itwasonlyamatterofweeksbeforeGeneralLonardi,whowantedtoconciliatetheex-Peronistas,wasmadetoresigninfavourofGeneralAramburuwhofavouredatoughline.InVenezuela,afterthecuartelazoof1948,therewastherivalrybetweenColonelChalbaudandColonelJiménez,endedbythemurder,inmysteriouscircumstances,oftheformer:inGuatemala,therivalrybetweenColonelAranaandMajorArbenz-likewiseterminatedbythemysteriousmurderoftheformer.Turkey,sinceMay1960,sawfirstthecollisionbetweenGeneralGiirsel,theHeadofState,andtheright-wingradicalgroupledbyAlparslanTürkes,andthen,in1961,afurthercollisionbetweenGeneralGiirselandtheanti-Türkesgroup,ledbyGeneralMadanoglu.

Policydifferencesarenotthewholestory.Althoughthisismoredifficulttoprove,forobviousreasons,thereisnodoubtatallthatpurelypersonalrivalriesoftenplayaprofoundpartindisintegrating

-193-

therulingmilitarygroup.Andthisagainisverynatural.TheseofficershaveallbeenattheMilitaryAcademytogether,haveworkedinthesameoffices,takenpartinthesameexercises;theyhaveinfactformedpartofaclosedsocietyalltheirworkinglives.ThetemptationforanynumberofthemtosaythatGeneralX,whoisnowtheprovisionalpresident,isablockheadisoverwhelming;thetemptationtosayitofMajorthisorColonelthat,nomoreexaltedinrankthanoneselfandyetnowtheHeadofState,isfarmorecompellingandembittering.

Insummary:the'rulinggroup'ofthemilitary,i.e.thosewhotakeoverthegovernmentofthecountryafterthecuartelazo,tendstodisintegrate.Inaddition,however,agulftendstoopenbetweenthisgoverninggroupoftheofficersandthosewhoremainbehindinactivecommandofthearmedforces.Wehavealreadyparentheticallycitedamostrecentanddramaticcaseofthis:therefusaloftheTurkishairforcetoobeytheordersoftheNationalUnityCommitteeinthematterofGeneralTansel'spostingoverseas,thegeneralgrievanceoftheactiveservicecommandersatthe'interference'oftheNationalUnityCommittee:i.e.atthetwenty-twoofficerswhoparticipatedinthecuartelazoandwerethenrunningthecountry,and,finally,theirclashwiththeNationalUnityCommitteeontheissueofexecutingMenderes.33

Pastexperienceshowsthatitisveryrarefortheleaderofthemilitaryconspiracytoretainforlongtheloyaltybothofthecountryatlargeandofthearmedforces.MenlikeKemalAtatiirkhavebeenabletodoit,butthemajorityoftheleadersthrownupbymilitaryrevoltsareveryinferiorincalibrecomparedtohim;andindeed,tobetruthful,byanyworldstandardofstatesmanship.

Thenew,ex-militaryrulers,itseems,finditincreasinglyhardtogovernthecountryandyet,atthesametime,toretaintheirformergriponthearmedforces.Inthefirstplace,theymaybetemptedtoleanonciviliansupport,andthisisapttorousethejealousyofthearmedforces.Themilitary'soppositiontoPerónsprangpartlyfromtheirresentmentatthisalliancewiththelabourmovement;thesamethingistrueoftheGuatemalanarmy'soppositiontoMajorArbenz.Secondly,theex-militaryruleroftentakesdecisionswhichappearpoliticallycompellingtohiminhispositionofruler,butwhichoffendthesoldierswhocontinuetoreactwithablindimpatience.GeneralRamirezofArgentina,forinstance,finallyrecognizedthat

____________________33 Seep.178.

-194-

hemustbreakoffdiplomaticrelationswiththeAxis;buttheG.O.U.wouldnotforgivehimandremovedhimforGeneralFarrell.Thirdly,itwouldappear-thedirectevidenceislimited-thatastheexmilitaryrulerbecomesimmersedinpoliticsandadministration,helosestouchwithmilitarypolitics;hisrivalsedgethemselvesintokeypositions,thenformprivateunderstandingswithoneanotherforselfprotectionorself-advancement;andallthistakesplaceclandestinely.Theartstheex-militarydictatorusedtoattainhispre-eminenceareavailabletothoseleftbehindinactivecommandpositions.Itisraretofindanex-militaryrulerlikeBatista,whowasabletomaintaintheaffectionofthearmedforceseightclearyearsafterhehadvoluntarilysteppeddownfrompowerin1944.Finally,thepoliticalpurgesandtheactivitiesofthesecuritypoliceannoythearmedforcesandmaywellbemoreeffectiveinarousingresentmentagainsttheexmilitaryrulerwhoreliesonthesemethodsthaninmaintainingloyalty.Aswehaveseen,theactivitiesofthesecuritypolicywereoneofthearmedforces'grievancesagainstJiménezinVenezuela;andinTurkeyGeneralGiirselandhisCommitteeofNationalUnionwereveryexercisedindeedbytheactivitiesofthe7,000orsoofficerswhomtheyhaddismissed.

Weakenedbythedisintegrationoftheoriginalfaction,andwiththecivil-militarytensionbeginningtoaccumulateoncemore,thesenewandex-militaryrulersareinnopositiontomeetanyseriouspoliticalopposition.Theirrégimesaresuppressive,nottotalitarian.Theydonot,asthepeople'sdemocraciesdo,inculcateapositivephilosophyoftherégimethroughouteverywalkoflife.Theydonot,asthepeople'sdemocraciesdo,absorbtothemselveseveryinterest,association,andinstitutionofsociallife.EveninPerón'sArgentina,whichamongsuchrégimeshadgonefurthesttowardstotalitarianism,societywashighlypluralisticbySovietstandards.Innoneoftheserégimeshasprivateindustrybeenabolished;34inmanyofthemthepoliticalparties,orthelessinnocuousofthem,werepermittedtooperate;andeveninPeruandVenezuelawherethemassparties(A.P.R.A.andA.D.)wereillegalized,theymaintainedasuccessfulmoralholdoverthemasses.Themilitarygovernmentshavebeen,asitwere,simplysuperimposedonthetopoftheseelements.Thustheconditionshavebeenpresentfordemonstrationsandfordislocationsofcivillifewhich,thougheasilysuppressiblebyaunitedandresolutesoldiery,mightwellservetomakeanimpressionupona

____________________34 Thisabolitionisnow(1961-2)takingplaceinEgypt.

-195-

régimewheretheoriginalconspiratorsareatloggerheadsandwheretherulersandthemilitaryhaveoncemorebeguntodriftapart.Addtothisthefactthatfewofthemilitarydictatorsormilitaryjuntasseemtohavemuchpoliticalcapacity.ItisliketheoccasionwhensomebodycomplainedtoVictorHugothathiscook,whowasalsohismistress,hadservedaverypoormealandHugoretortedthat,afterall,onecouldhardlyexpecthertobegoodateverything.Thereisnogoodreasonwhygenerals,colonelsormajorsshouldmakegoodpoliticiansandafairnumberofprimafaciereasonswhytheyshouldmakeverybadones.Inanyevent,fewofthenowfallendictatorsseemtohavebeenverycapableaspoliticians.Mostofthem,forinstancePerónandJiménezandRojasPinilla,werethoroughlybadeconomists.Mostofthem-PerónandRojasPinilla,forinstance-quarrelledwiththeCatholicChurch.Inalltheserégimestherecameapointofmasscivilianprotest,withtheindustrialists,studentsandthechurch,andsometimesthemanualworkers,unitedinjointprotest.Atmomentslikethese,everythingturnedontheattitudeofthearmedforces;andthefactisthattheseinmanycasesdecidedsuddenlytojettisontheirex-leaderandtorelinquishopenrule.IntheseLatinAmericancases,onereasonisthat,asfarasexperienceshows,thearmedforcesaremorbidlyconcernedwiththeirpopularity.UnliketheSpanisharmy,withdrawnintoitselfandutterlyuntouchedbytheintellectualandemotionalmovementsofsurroundingsociety,themilitaryinArgentina,Colombia,PeruandVenezuelaseemtohavebeensensitivetosuchcurrentsandtheseappeartohaveaffectedtheirresolution.

ThefallofRojasPinillaofColombiain1957illustratesthewayinwhichanovertmilitaryrégimeisapttocrumble.By1957Pinillahadquarrelledwiththebusinessmen.Hehadrunupaconsiderableadversebalanceofpayments.Hehadquarrelledwiththechurch;partlybecausehehadtriedtocentralizeallsocialwelfareactivitiesinthegovernment'shandandpartlybecausehehadtriedtocapturethechurch-supportedUniondeTrabajadores.InMay,RojasdecidedtoarrestLeonValencia,thejointcandidateoftheunitedLiberalandConservativeparties.Thisnewssparkedoffastudentriot,andforawholedaythestudentsdemonstratedthroughBogotáwhilepoliceandtroopslookedtenselyon.ThatnighttheGeneralPresidentmoved35,000troopsintothecity.

Butresistancespread.Ex-PresidentCamargosteppedintoorganizethecity'sleadingbusinessmenandbankersinacommercial

-196-

strike.Next,thePrimateissuedapastoralletter,nothisfirstbutcertainlyhisbitterestattackonRojas.Thisprovedtobetheconclusiveargumentfortheheadsofthearmedforces.Afterafourhourconference,theydeputedtheCommander-in-Chief,GeneralNavas,totellthePresidenthemustgo.AtfirstRojasrefusedtobelieveit.Threehourslaterhewaspersuaded.Ashebroadcasthisresignationtothenation,powerpassedtoajuntaestablishedwiththeobjectofliquidatingthemilitaryrégimeandreturningthecountrytocivilianrule.

Thereturntothebarracks:(2)re-civilianization

Asecondfashionofwithdrawingfromthepoliticalarenaisalsoconceivable.Coulditnothappen,wemayask,thatthesequasicivilianorganizationsandinstitutions-theseofficial'parties',theseofficialcongressesorassemblies-mightsomedaytakeonalifeoftheirown?Couldtherégimenotpasstherebyfromaquasicivilianizedmilitaryrégime,likeEgypt's,toare-civilianizedone?

Whatwouldbethecriteriaofsuchre-civilianization?Briefly,thatpolicydecisionsshouldbetakenthroughthesecivilianorganizationsandbythemethodspeculiartothem;andthattheyshouldbetakenautonomously,propriomotu,andnotunderthecovertorovertdictationofthemilitaryleaders.Onemustnotnecessarilyexpectthatthemilitaryshouldlackinfluence,perhapsaverywideinfluence.Normustonenecessarilydemandthattherégimeshouldbeaneffectivelyrepresentativesystem.Itwouldsufficeifitschiefpersonnel,itsprincipalpolicymakers,andischaracteristicmodesofmakingpolicywereallcivilian.

Onlytworégimesofmilitaryprovenanceseemtofitthisdescription:Mexicoandpre-1960Turkey.Bothcasesaresomewhatpeculiar.Inthefirstplace,themilitarymovementthatendowedthemwiththeircivilianinstitutionwasveryunlikemostofthemovementswehavebeenconsidering.Allthoseoriginatedasconspiraciesinwhichtheregulararmedforcesdisplacedorsupplantedthecivilauthorities.TheMexicanandTurkishcasesapproximatemuchmorenearlytowarsofliberationsuchashavebeenwagedinIndonesiaorinAlgeriaandthearmiesmorenearlyresembledrevolutionaryarmies,likethoseofthetwocountriesmentioned,thananormalregularstandingarmy.Thisdistinctionisveryimportant.Sucharmiestendtoincorporateeveryactiveelementofanationincludingmanywhichareusuallyregardedastheantithesis

-197-

oftheregularsoldier,suchastheintellectual,theauthorandthepolitician,justasthe'newarmy'thattheBritishregularsfoughthardtopreventinthe1914-18periodcontainedalltheseelements.Forthisreasonsucharmiesdonottendtofeelthesentimentsofmilitaryprideandcorporateself-identityasmuchastheregulararmies.Furthermore,asliberationarmies,theirideologytends,initiallyatanyrate,tofavourpopularparticipationingovernment.

Inthesecondplace,inboththesecasesithastakenalongtimeforthe're-civilianization'tostrikeroot.Itisnowforty-twoyearssinceObregónbecamePresidentofMexicoandthesameperiodhaselapsedsinceKemalAtatürkenteredthescene.

InMexico,cuartelazosoftheusualtypecontinueddownto1938whenGeneralCedillo'swascrushed,anditwasnotuntil1946thatMexicohaditsfirstcivilianPresident(Alemán)sincetheRevolution.Aslateas1937,thearmywaqsstillrecognizedasdominatingthesituation.TheoccasionwasPresidentCárdenas'sexperimentingivingthemilitaryofficialrepresentationasoneofthepartsoftheP.R.M.,35theofficialparty.Whencriticsprotestedhesaid:'Wehavenotputthearmyinpolitics.Itwasalreadythere.Infact,ithadbeendominatingthesituationandwedidwelltoreduceitsinfluencetoonevoteoutoffour.'36Itisinthelasttwentyyearsthatre-civilianizationhasbecomemarkedandtheapparentautonomyofthemilitarylessened.

TheMexicanmilitaryarestillimportant-indeed,vitallyimportant-tothecontinuanceoftherégime;butinthesensethattheyassistthecivilpower,notdictatetoit.Since1929therehasbeenbuiltupbesidethemilitaryavastorganizedblocofcivilianinterests-thebureaucracy,thewhitecollarandprofessionalworkers,manuallabourandthepeasantry:allthemassorganizationsinthecountryexcepttwo-theprivatecapitalistsandtheRomanCatholicChurch.Thisgreatblocistheofficialparty,theP.R.I.Itscandidatesalwayswin;itsworkersalwaysgetfavours;andsoithasbecomeavastnationalbandwagon,onwhichpracticallyeverybodyseekstoclimb.Thestrugglesbetweenitsbureaucratic,agrarianandlaboursectorsareadjustedinsidethehighcouncils.Thelocalpork-barrelsaredeliveredtoitsfieldworkersandorganizers.Sovastandpervasiveisthisgreatpoliticalmachinethateventhosewhodonotbelongtoitfindtheirpathsmoothediftheydobusinesswithit;andthisis

____________________

35 ThePartyoftheMexicanRevolutionnowtheP.R.I.(PartyoftheInstitutionalizedRevolution,orofRevolutionaryInstitutions).

36 Lieuwen,op.cit.,p.114.

-198-

trueoftheMexicanarmytoday,whichstillrepresentsoneofthegreatinterestswhichnoPresidentwouldfailtoconsult,whichiscloselytiedintotheapparatusofProvincialgovernment,andwhichstillgeneratesanenormousinfluenceonpolitics.Butitdoesthistodayinsidetheframeworkoftheparty,notasanexternalforcehammeringattheparty.Inthisgreatcivilianhive,thePresidentisQueenBee,evendowntohisprerogativeofselectinghissuccessor.Thishedoeswithaneyetoallthepressuresandcounter-pressuresinthepartyandwithaviewtoselectingthecandidatemostlikelytobeabletoconciliateallofthese.CharacteristicallythePresidentsarenowadaysbeingdrawnfromthepartyapparatusortheciviladministration.Cárdenashimself,albeitageneral,hadbeenPresidentoftheparty'sexecutivecommittee.PresidentAlemán(1946)had,amongotherthings,managedtheelectioncampaignofhispredecessor(andselector),AviloCamacho;PresidentCortineshadmanagedtheelectionforhispredecessor(andselector),PresidentAlemán;andPresidentLopezMatéoshadlikewisemanagedtheelectionforhispredecessor(andselector)PresidentCortines.Whatcouldbemoreuncharacteristicofmilitaryinstitutions,whatcouldreekmoreheavilyofthecivilianandthepolitician?

Thissystemisnotsomuchanendorsementbythemilitaryasanoutgrowthofwhat,aslateas1929,wasstillamilitarydominationofthecountry.Thepostrevolutionaryperiod(1917-29)wascharacterizedbyasortofhalf-militarycaciquism,withtheformerrevolutionarygeneralseachinchargeofazoneordistrict.TheformationoftheP.N.R.37in1929gaveaciviliancolouringtothisstillmilitarytenure.ThekeyfigurewastheregionalorStatecaudillo,whostillhadhisrevolutionaryfollowing,which,inturn,hadafollowingamongthe'popularclasses'.Thepresident(whetherObregónorCalles)wasasoldierandalltheregionalbossesweresoldierstoo.Theendofthe'tormento',theperiodofcivilwar,hadmeantmerelythattheseregionalandstategeneralswerenowstyledGovernorsorZoneCommanders:fromgeneralstheybecamecaciques.In1929,GeneralCallesconvenedtheseex-generalsandgotthemtofuseintoaparty,knownthenastheP.N.R.Eachlocalmachinebecameinstitutionallylinkedwiththewhole.ThePresident,asjefemaximo,dealtonlywithhiscaciques;theyinturnwiththeirsubordinates;andthese,withthepeople.Butsincethecaciquecouldonlyhold

____________________

37 ThePartyoftheNationalRevolution.Thenamewaschangedin1937toP.R.M.(PartyoftheMexicanRevolution);then,in1945,asexplainedabove,toP.R.I.

-199-

hisfollowingbygrantingthemfavours,sothedemandsofthepopulationwereforwardedupwardsandinreturnservices-the'pork-barrel'-wereprovideddownwards.

Fromthisbeginninggrewtoday'sgreatP.R.I.machine.SuccessivePresidentsmobilizedsectorsofthecivilpopulationandbroughtthemintotheparty,whichsoonbecameorganizedonathree-sectorbasisoflabour,peasantryandbureaucracy.Toenhancetheirownofficetheystrovetoperfectthismachinesinceitheldallnominationsandindeedelectionsinitshands.Itwasandisaperfectmineofpatronageandhenceofcivilianpoliticalpower.Inperfectingitsmechanismtheymagnifiedtheirownpower.AtthesametimethesesuccessivePresidentsstrovetode-politicizethearmy.Theunsuccessfulrevoltsin1923,1927and1928helped,fortheyenabledthePresienttopurgetheofficercorps.Thevacancieswerefilledbyyoungermen,professionallytrainedinMexico'sownmilitaryschools,orsentabroadfortraining.38Bytheendofthesecondworldwar,theold'politicals'hadbeenlargelypensionedoffandthenewarmymuchsmallerthanitsrevolutionaryoriginalof1920-wasprofessionallytrained.

IthastakenMexicooverfortyyearstoreachthisstability.Thepowerofcivilianismhasbeenphenomenallyincreasedascomparedwiththebeginningoftheperiod,i.e.thelastdaysofPorfirioDiaz,whenindeeditwouldbedifficulttosaycivilianismhadanystrengthatall.Inthefirstplace,thelastfortyyearshaveprovidedthepublicwithapoliticalformula,alegitimizingmyth.ThisisthemythofTheRevolution,anepic-movementwhichmeansmostthingstomostMexicans;andsince'c'estparlemalentenduuniverselquetoutl'universs'entend',thishasprovidedaconsensusunbelievableintherivenMexicoofthenineteenthcentury.Secondly,theofficialpartyhassuccessfullyclaimedtoembodythisRevolution.Thirdly,andtherefore,itisthroughthepartyandwiththeparty'ssanctionthatpoliticaldecisionshavebecomepubliclyacceptable.And,finally,thispartyis,aswehavesaid,ahugecivilianbloc.Thusatoneandthesametimetheareaofdisputesoverpoliticallegitimacyhasbeennarrowedandaverypowerfulandextensivecivilianorganizationtobackuptheinstitutionsofgovernmentshasbeencreated;andalthoughnobodycouldclaimthattherepresentativesystemwasdemocratic,itisneverthelesstruethatgovernmentandgovernedarelinkedbymaterialself-interest,andthisissatisfiedonbothsides

____________________38 SeeLieuwen,op,cit.,Chapter4,forthestepstaken.

-200-

throughtheproceduresoftheparty.TherankandfileoftheP.R.I.havelittlesayinnominatingcandidates,andpartiesotherthantheP.R.I.havenochanceofdefeatingthecandidatesitputsup.Thehigherechelonsofthepartymakethenominationsandthesearetantamounttoelection.InallthisthePresidenthasthefinalsay.

Thusthepublicisnotautonomous;anditmaybepreciselythisthathasmostservedtosubordinatethemilitarytothecivilhierarchy.ForanautonomouspublicmightselectaPresidentialcandidate(likeGeneralMugica39)whomthemilitarywouldnottolerate.OritmightadvocatesomenewSantaAnnawhowouldbeopposedbypowerfulcivilianforces,suchasorganizedlabour.Orthecompetitionforvotesbetweenthepartiesmightdrivethesetoadoptpolicieswhich,onceagain,couldopentheoldriftbetweenmilitaryandcivilian.PreciselybecausethePresidenthastocopewiththepressureswithinhisparty,andnotwiththoseofthepublic,heisdealingwithforcesunderhiscontrol.Alldecisionsaretakeninthelightofthebalanceofforces,ofwhichthemilitaryisoneofthemostpowerful.InMexico,thePresidentisabletotakeaconsideredviewofalternativesinsteadofbeingcommittedbythemandateoftheelectorate,andabletoconciliaterivalfactionsinprivateinsteadofhavingtochooseoneortheotherinpublic;itmaywellbethatthisisoneofthemostimportantofthereasonsfortherenascenceofcivilianisminMexico.40

TheTurkishcasebearsmanyresemblancestotheMexican.Itscollapseintomilitaryinterventionismin1960bynomeanssignifiesthattheinstitutionsplantedbythemilitaryhadnotstruckroots.Ratherthereverse:theyhadbecomeautonomous.

Theseinstitutionswere,certainly,theendowmentofthearmy.'Theincantatoryflourishofconstitution,parliament,partyandelectiondoesnothidethebasicfactthattheRepublicwasestablishedbyaprofessionalsoldierleadingavictoriousarmyandmaintaininghimself,intheearlystagesatleast,byacombinationofpersonalandmilitarypower.'41Buthere,evenmorethaninMexico,themilitarytookonthenatureofarevolutionaryarmyofliberationratherthanthecorporateviewpointofaprofessionalofficercorps,asintheLatinAmericanandMiddleEasternexamplesofquasicivilianizedrégimes.ThearmywasasmuchtheagentoftheTurkish

____________________39 Averyleft-wingcandidate.

40FortheMexicanpoliticalsystemsee,particularly:R.E.Scott,MexicanGovernmentinTransition;I.B.Simpson,ManyMexicos;H.F.Cline,TheUnitedStatesandMexico,andMexico,RevolutiontoEvolution.

41 B.Lewis,TheEmergenceofModernTurkey,p.364.

-201-

nationalistmovementasitsinspiration.ThemovementthatthrewouttheforeignerandestablishedtheRepublicwas,indeed,acoalescenceofthearmywiththepopularmovementsknownasthe'AssociationsfortheRightsofAnatoliaandRumelia'.42Andthewaythismovementdeveloped--initsGrandAssemblyatAnkara,incontrasttothemanœuvresofthediscreditedpuppetgovernmentofIstanbul-enhancedthisrepresentativequality.Secondly,boththearmyandtheAssemblywereinviolentreactionagainsttheinterventionoftheofficercorps(assuch)inpoliticsanditssupplantmentofthecivilrégime.43Forthegovernmentwhichhadbroughtthecountrytoprostrationhadbeen,since1908,preciselythatindirect-completemilitaryrégimeoftheCommitteeofUnionandProgress,andMustafaKemalandtheAssemblywerestronglyopposedtotheCommittee'saimsandmethods.Thirdly,neitherAssemblynorarmycould,eveniftheywantedto,standagainstthetoweringfigureofMustafaKemal,andKemalquitedeliberatelywantedhiscountrytobecomeawesternizedparliamentarystate.Hebackeditwithhisarmy;andheovertoppedthearmyitself;44buthisidealwasnotamilitarydominatedrégime,butaparliamentaryone.ThegreatstatuetohimatAnkarashowshimnotinmilitaryuniform--he,theGhazi!-butinwesterneveningdress.BothheandIsmetInönurenouncedmilitarytitles;andtheconstitutionsubordinatedthemilitarytothecivilpower.Fromasearlyas1909,MustafaKemalhadopposedtheminglingofmilitaryandpoliticalresponsibilitiesasfataltothestrengthofthearmyandequallyfataltotheeffectivenessofgovernment.45'Tobevictoriousintheinternalaffairsofacountryisduelesstoanyarmythantothesuccessfulofficesofgovernment.'46TheConstitutionof1923,amongotherthings,forbadeDeputiestoholdmilitaryoffice.Themilitarywereseparatedfromtheinternalpoliceandsecurityforces:inthecountrysidetheGendarmeriewasresponsibleforlawandorder,andthiswascontrolledbythecivilianMinistryoftheInteriorandonlycameundertheGeneralStafffor

____________________

42 D.A.Rustow,"'TheArmyandtheFoundingoftheTurkishRepublic'"(WorldPolitics,1949,pp.513-52;esp.p.544).

43 Ibid.,pp.545and549.

44 Lewis,op.cit.,p.364.SeeRustow,op.cit.,atp.549forAtatürk'squarrelwith,andtriumphoverhisfellowgenerals.

45 Seethequotationabove,p.31.

46Quoted,D.LernerandR.R.Richardson,SwordsandPloughshares:TheTurkishArmyasamodernizingforce(WorldPolitics,Vol.13,No.1,p.20).Thearticleisavaluablecontributiontothethemediscussedinthetext.

-202-

routineadministrativepurposes.Inthetowns,thecivilianpoliceforcelikewisecameundertheMinistryoftheInteriorandhadnodirectrelationshipwiththearmedforces.

Kemal'sinstrumentofgovernmentwastheparty--thePeople'sParty,and,until1945,thesoleparty.Thiswastobethetransmissionbeltbetweengovernmentandpeople.Itwascloselytiedinwiththestateorgans;formostofitslifetheMinisteroftheInteriorandtheparty'sSecretaryGeneralwerethesameman,andtheValiwasthechairmanofeachVilayetpartyorganization.ThePeople'sPartywasatrueanddeep-rootedorganization,too,notasimple'front'organizationtogivetherégimethemeretrappingsofcivilianism.ItwasthedirectsuccessoroftherevolutionaryAssociationfortheRightsofAnatoliaandRumeliaandtookoveritsassets.Itwasnotapartyfortheseizureofpowerbutoneformaintainingit.Itcreatedanation-wideconstituencyorganizationanditslocalofficialswere,everywhere,theagentsoftherégime.ItestablishedPeople'sHousesforpropagandaandeducationalworkalloverTurkeyandlater,in1940,setup'People'sRooms'inthesmallertownsandthevillages.

Thispartyhadnorival(withtwoshort-livedexceptions)until1945whensomeofitsdissidentswerepermittedtoformtheoppositionDemocraticParty.Untilthen,andindeeduntil1950whenitfellfrompower,thePeople'sPartywastheinstitutionthroughwhichpolicydecisionsweretaken.AslongasAtatürkwasalive,hetookthosedecisions;buthehadthemexecutedthroughtheAssemblyandtheparty.Hedidnotcallinthearmy.Ismetlnönu,hissuccessor,wasfarlessabsolute;buthefollowedthesamecivilianizedcourse.

AslongasthePeople'sPartywasthesoleparty,theidentityofrégimeandmilitarywasnotdifficulttomaintain.TheoverridingpersonalityofAtatürkguaranteedthequiescenceofthearmytillhisdeathin1938.IsmetInönu,hislieutenantandsuccessor,alsohadagreatholdonthearmy'sloyalty.IndeedapersistentrumourhasitthattheselectionofIsmetInönuasPresidentin1938,insteadofCelalBayar(acivilian)wasdeterminedbythearmy.NeitherwithAtatürknorIsmetInönuincommandwasanestrangementbetweenpartyandarmylikelytotakeplace.Furthermore,thefactthatthepartywasaninstrumentofgovernment,notaregisterofpublicopinion,madeitrelativelysimple--asinMexico--foranypossiblecollisionstobeavertedbybackstagediplomacy.

-203-

TheformationoftheDemocraticpartyin1945anditsvictoryin1950radicallyalteredthesituation.Forthefirsttimetheelectoratebecameindependent;Andasthetwopartiesbidforitsvotesitbecameclearthatadivergenceopened,forthefirsttime,betweentheviewsofthearmyandtheviewsofacivilianadministrationcarryingoutapopularmandate.ThecoupofMay1960wastheconsequence.

ThatcoupandwhathasfollowedunderthedirectmilitaryrégimeofGeneralGürseldoesnotprovethatthecivilianinstitutionsofTurkeywereasham.Paradoxically,itprovesthereverse:thatthetwopartieshadbecomegenuineparties,andthattheAssemblywastheauthoritativearenaofpolicymaking.ThesubsequentdifficultiesofthemilitaryjuntainrepressingthesupportersoftheDemocraticParty,theresistive'No'voteinthereferendumonthenew(1961)constitutionandtheresultsofthe1961electionallpointtothesameconclusion.AslongasKemallived,hiscivilinstitutionswerequasicivilianonly,forhiswillalwaysprevailed.AslongasthePeople'sPartyheldsolepower,i.e.till1945,theinstitutionswerestillquasiinstitutions;theyweregivennochancetofunction.Sincethentheyhavebeengiventhischance;andtheyhaveturnedouttoberealinstitutions,andnotshams.

ThustheMexicanandtheTurkishcasesbothdemonstratethepossibilityofthemilitaryendowingthecountrywithcivilianinstitutionsandretreatingawayfrompoliticsintoprofessionalism.Butforthereasonsgiventhemilitarymovementsthatinitiatedtheseinstitutionspartookofapopularnature;thearmieswerenotthetypicalregularstandingarmiesbutpopularincharacter;andinanycase,theinstitutionsthussetuphavebrokendownunderthetestofpoliticalstressinTurkeyandhavenotyetbeensubjectedtosuchatestinMexico.MexicoandTurkeydonotdemonstratethataquasi-civilianizedmilitaryrégime,suchasthatinEgypttodayorinVenezuelaorColombiaupto1958,maydenatureitself,andturnintoacivilianrégime.ThecircumstancesoftheMexicanandTurkishrevolutionsarethemselvestoodissimilarfromthoseoftheMiddleEasternandSouthAmericancuartelazostomaketheargumentadmissible.

-204-

CHAPTERTWELVEThePastandtheFutureofMilitaryIntervention1THEexperiencesofRome,ofthemedievalItaliancity-states,ofEnglandundertheCommonwealthandtheProtectorate;theactivitiesofsuchcorpsastheMamelukes,theJanissaries,theStreltsi;alltheseseemtoattesttheantiquityaswellastheperennialismofmilitaryinterventioninpolitics.Neverthelessthesedifferinessentialaspectsfromthemilitaryinterventionsoftodayforwhichtheyprovideanalogiesratherthanantecedents.Themilitaryinterventionthatwehavebeendescribingisamodernphenomenon,notyettwocenturiesold.

Romehasbequeathedtheterms'dictatorship','Caesarism',and'Praetorianism',thelasttwoofwhicharesometimesusedassynonymouswith'militaryintervention'.Certainly,thesituationinthelaterEmpirewherethePraetoriansandlaterthelegionsliterallymadeandundidtheImperialsuccessionamidawelterofcarnageseemstorepresenttheneplusultraofmilitaryintervention.ObjectiveconditionsintheEmpirelargelycorrespondedtothosewehavestyledstatesofloworminimalpoliticalculture.Anyruleofsuccessionhadlongdisappeared.Civilianpoliticalforces,evenarecognizedaristocracyandgoverningclass,hadlongsinceatrophiedandtheRomanSenatehadbeenreducedtoacipher.AtthesametimetheEmpire,onthedefensiveagainsttheBarbarians,wastotallydependentonthearmiesandonthegenerals.Thearmiesrepresentedtheonlycoherentformationscapableofmakingoratleastofenforcinganypoliticalinitiative.Yetforallthisitishardtofindanypoliticalmotivationbehindthearmies'activities,fromthewarsofMariusandSullaonwards,otherthanindividualself-interest--thedesiretoputtheirownmaninoffice,toreceivebetterpayandconditions,

-205-

anddonatives.Theyhadnosocialandpoliticalprogramme,anddidnotconceivethemselvesasaseparateidentitysetagainsttherestofsociety.Indeedtheyactedasseparateunitsstrugglingagainstoneanother.'Inthestrictsense,theRomansoldierswerenotpartisans.Theydidnotfightforacertainthingbutforacertainperson.Theyrecognizednothingbuttheirleader,whoattachedthemtohimselfbyraisingimmensehopes;butsincetheirleader,defeated,wasnotabletofulfilhispromises,theywentovertotheotherside.'1

ThedespotismsoftheItaliancondottierearenottrueantecedentseither.Hereagain,theforcesactedforpelfandoutofloyaltytotheirchief.Theirrulewasillegitimateandrecognizedtobesobythecitizenstheyhadsubjected.MacchiavelliPrinceissimplyaprimerforsuchusurpers.Itpurportstotellthemhowtoacquirelegitimacy,and,ifthisprovesimpossible,howtocorruptortobreaktheresistanceofthecitizens.TheStreltsiandJanissarieswereking-makersandking-breakers,likethePraetorians,forreasonsofpersonalloyaltyandtoensurerespectfortheirspecialprivileges.

OnlythepoliticalrôleoftheEnglishNewModelArmymaybedeemedagenuineprecursorofwhatthelastcenturyhasbroughtforth.Itssocialcomposition;itspoliticalorganization;itsideologicalbasis;itscorporatepoliticalview,wherebytheArmyCounciltreatedasanindependentpowerwiththecivilianauthorities--alltheseprefigurethe'revolutionary'armiesofthetwentiethcentury.Likethestandingarmiesofthemodernera,too,itsoughttovalidatetheclaimtorulebyclaimingtoberepresentativeofthepeople,andifnotthepeople,oftheGodly:andlikethemitwasdrawnirresistiblyintorejectingoneafteranotherthelegislaturesthatpurportedtorepresentthepeople--whethertheLongParliament,oritsRump,orthearmy-nominated'Barebones'Parliament-untilintheenditwasdraggedintorulingovertlythroughtheMajor-Generals.Butthoughwemayreckonitatrueantecedent,itwasauniqueone.Itshistoryandsignificancewasburiedininsularobscurityandmisunderstandingfortwocenturies.Itgeneratednoforceseitherofattractionorrepulsionthroughouttheworldwhichcouldstimulatefurtheradventuresonthesamepattern.Itisinthisrespectthatitessentiallydiffersfromtheeventwhichisthetrueseedplotofmilitaryinterventionasweknowittoday--theFrenchRevolution

____________________1 BarondeMontesquieu,GrandeuretDecadencedesRomains,Ch.13.

-206-

andEmpire.Hereinwereengenderedornourishedfivefactors,processes,movements-whichseparatelyandconjointlyformthenecessaryconditionsofmilitaryintervention.

2Thefirstofthesefactorsistheprofessionalizationoftheofficercorps.Aprofessionalizedcorpsofthiskindcontrastssharplywiththearistocraticofficersorthesoldiersoffortunewhichitreplaced.Tosomeextentmilitaryprofessionalismworksagainstinterventioninpolitics.Confiningthearmedforcestotheirspecializedrôle,itimpliesleavingthepoliticianstotheirs.Bythesametoken,however,suchprofessionalismalsoimpelsthemilitaryintopolitics.Tobeginwithitopensagapbetweenthearmedforcesandthepoliticians:forundertheoldrégimes,policy-makingandthetaskoffightinglayinthesamehands--thatofthearistocracy.Secondly,theanxietiesoftheprofessionalofficerimpelshim,aswehavealreadyseen,tointrudeintothepolitician'scontroloverforeignaffairsandevenoverdomesticmatterswherethisfrustratesandimpingesonthemilitarytask.

Thesecondfactoristheriseofnationalismandofthenationstate.Thenationreplacesthedynastyastheobjectofmilitaryloyalty.Nationalismprovidesthemilitarywithacivicreligionandanoverridingsetofvalues.Becausetheyhaveauniqueroleasguardianofthenationalterritory,theyregardthemselvesandaremuchregardedastheultimaterepositoriesandcustodiansofthenation'svalues.Threehighlysignificantconsequencesflowfromthis.First,wherenationalismhasgrippedthemasses,thearmedforcestendtobecomethevisiblesymbolandthepledgeofnationhoodandindependenceandtoattractanesteemforthatreason.Secondly,nationalismprovidesthemilitarywithanideologyandpossiblyevenaprogramme;inthisitcontrastssharplywiththesentiment,amongtheforcesoftheoldrégimes,ofloyaltyandenthusiasmforadynastyorapersonage.Thirdly,whereasintheoldrégimeloyaltytostateandtorulerweresynonymous,inthenation-statethisisnolongernecessarilyso.There,itmustfirstbedemonstratedtothemilitarythatthegovernmenttheyserveissynonymouswithandrepresentativeofthenation.Thereisnologicalreasonwhytheyshouldnotregardanalternativegovernment,andeventhemselves,asmorerepresentativeandmoreworthyofthenationthanthegovernmentinoffice;

-207-

andsincetheirtranscendentdutyisloyaltytothenationthismayentailadutytobedisloyaltothegovernment.

Thethirdfactor,closelyassociatedwiththesecondbothhistoricallyandlogically,isthesubstitutionforthedivineauthorityofkingsofthedogmaofpopularsovereignty.Sovereigntyisbelievedtoresideinthepeople;andthepeopleareidentified(asinSiéyès''Qu'est-cequeleTiersEtat?')withthenation.FromRousseausprangthedoctrine,inSirHenryMaine'swords,of'ThePeople(withacapitalP),theSovereignPeople,thePeoplethesolesourceofalllegitimatepower.FromthiscamethesubordinationofGovernments,notmerelytoelectorates,buttoavaguelydefinedmultitudeoutsidethem,andtothestillvaguermastershipoffloatingopinion.Thencebeganthelimitationoflegitimacyingovernmenttogovernmentswhichapproachdemocracy.'2

Sincethattime,heremarked(i.e.'sincerulersbecamedelegatesofthecommunity'),'therehasbeennosuchinsecurityofgovernmentsincethecenturyduringwhichtheRomanemperorswereatthemercyofthePraetoriansoldiers'.Thisistruertodaythanwhenhewroteitsomeeightyyearsago.Inthedynasticstate,themostthemilitarycoulddowastoreplacethemonarchy.Alltheycoulddowastoexerciseindirectruleandinfluence,throughthepersonofthatmonarch.Onlythemonarchconferredlegitimacy,andhewascorporeal,visible,tangible.Thedogmaofvoxpopulivoxdeiismoreamenablesincethereisnohardandfastdefinitionofwhatisvoxandwhatispopulus.Anypersonandgroup,includingthearmy,whichsucceedsinmusteringameresemblanceofpopularsupportcanclaimtobethelawfulgovernment;andindeed,itisnotevennecessarytogosofar.Itispossibletoarguethattheclaimantrepresents,ifnottheactualobservedwillofthepeople,thenits'real'will--whatisinitstrueinterest,orwhatrepresentsitshighermorality,andsoforth.Bythistokenanyfactioncanseizepowerandlegitimizeitselfinthenameofthesovereignpeople.Thusthepathislaidwideopenforthemilitarytointerveneandtosupersedethecivilpoweraltogether,onthepleathattheyembodythesovereigntyofthepeople.

Thefourthfactoriscloselyconnectedwithboththeriseofnationalismandofthedogmaofpopularsovereignty.Itistheemergenceofwhat,forlackofanybetterterm,wemaycall'theinsurrectionaryarmy',i.e.anarmyworkingfortheliberationofthe

____________________2 SirH.Maine,PopularGovernment,p.158.

-208-

nationalterritoryorfortheoverthrowofthesocialorder.Insurrectionaryarmiesthereforehavearudimentaryideology.Furthermore,theydrawtheirstrengthfromthepublicatlargeandtendtoberepresentativeofthewholepopulation.Inthemintellectuals,scholars,andnaturalleaderstransformthemselvesintofightingmenandmayshowunexpectedandunsuspectedgiftsofmilitaryskill,administrativeability,anddiplomacy.Insurrectionaryarmiesinterveneinpoliticsexhypothesi;thisiswhytheyhavecomeintoexistence.Theirsignificanceliesintheirlegacytothestateoncevictoryhasbeenwonandtheydisband.Inthenatureofthingstheirleaderstendtobecometherulersofthenewstate,forinthefirstplacethesearmieshaveactedasaforcinggroundfortalent,andsecondlytheyareclothedwithalltheprestigeofliberation.Thusthesuccessfularmyofinsurrectiontendstoprovidetheleadershipintheneworder;andthismayperpetuateatraditionofmilitaryinterventioninpolitics.Wherenationhoodandrevolutionhavecomeasthebequestofthearmy,thearmyregardsitself--andisoftenregarded-ashavingaprivilegedpositionascustodianandguarantor.Wehavenoticed,forinstance,howtheTurkisharmyhasregardeditselfastheguarantorofKemalismwhichwasitsgift.InlikemannerbeganthemilitarycaudillismoofSouthAmerica.'AsthegeneralsofAlexanderdisputed,afterhisdeath,fortheprovincesofEurope,Asia,Africa,theremainsoftheimperialfeast,andfoundednewdynastiesinthefloodofOrientaldecadence,sothelieutenantsofBolivardominatedAmericanlifeforaperiodoffiftyyears.FloresinEcuador,PaézinVenezuela,Santa-CruzinBoliviaandSantanderinColombiagovernedasheirsoftheLiberator.'3

Finally,intimatelyconnectedwithnationalism,withpopularsovereignty,andwiththearmiesofinsurrection,isafifthfactor:theemergenceofnewstatesfromcolonialsubjectionandtheirattainmentofsovereignindependence.Fewofthese,historically,havebeenastheU.S.A.,andpossessedagenuineandsignificanthistorical'formation'incivilianpoliticsandself-government.Mostofthesecountrieswererentbyeconomic,ethnicandreligiouscleavages.Concealedandrepressedbytheauthoritariancolonialrégimethesedivisionsburstintotheopenassoonasitwaswithdrawn.Theywereoftenexacerbatedbythedogmasofnationalism

____________________

3F.Garcia-Calderon,LatinAmerica:itsRiseandProgress,p.87;alsoJ.Benito,"'Lospuntosdepartidadelaorganizationpoliticahispanoamericana'"(EstudiosPoliticos,Madrid,No.91,p.148).

-209-

andpopularsovereigntythroughwhichindependencehadbeenwonandwhichsappedthetraditionalbasisofsocietywithoutsupplyingamoralequivalent.Thusmanyofthenewstatesfacedindependencewithapassionatenationalismontheonehandandaneedforstrongcentralgovernmentontheother:asureinvitationtomilitaryintervention.

3Thesefivefactors--ormovements--allarosewithinadecadeofoneanother.Allsprang,byactionandreaction,fromtheFrenchRevolutionandEmpire.InsomerespectstheAmericanWarofIndependencewasaprecursor;thereinaretobefoundadoctrineofpopularsovereignty,aninsurrectionaryarmy,asecessionfromcolonialrule.Butitsdoctrineofpopularsovereigntywasaqualifiedone,trammelledbyrepresentativeinstitutions,limitedgovernment,andanelaboratesystemofchecksandbalances--nottospeakofthedominanceofarulinggroupwhoweresuccessfullydeterminedtoresisttheruleofmajorities.Theinsurrectionaryarmy,drawnfromthecitizensasitwas--theContinentalArmy--wasmodelledontheEnglishregularforces;anditsleadershadnointentionsoflaunchinga'people'swar'.Furthermoreitsavowedpurposewastocombat,amongotherthings,standingarmies,thequarteringofarmedtroopsoncivilians,andthemilitaryenforcementof'worksofdeath,desolationandtyranny';4sothat,onlysixmonthsafterthewarhadcometoanend,thegreatContinentalArmyhadbeenreducedtoamere700men.AsforthesecessionfromtheBritishEmpire,unlikethemajorityofnewstates,thenewlyindependentcolonieshadreceivedalonghistoricalformationinstatecraftandhadthrownuptogovernandadministerthemselvesoneofthemosttalentedgenerationsofleadersthatcivilizationhasseen.Furthermore,nothingthatoccurredintheworldofthatdaycouldhaveanimpactcomparabletoonethatoccurredinthecountrywhichdominatedtheculturallifeofallEurope--France;certainlynotaneventoccurringinafar-offandemptycontinentontheperipheryofaEuropewhichwasalreadyonthemarchtoitscenturyofworlddomination.And,finally,insofarasthefeaturesoftheAmericanRevolutionwereexercisinganinfluenceabroad,theywereswallowedup,overwhelmed,bytheparoxismicviolence,thecolourandthedramaoftheeventsinParisfrom1789.

____________________4 TheDeclarationofIndependence,1776.

-210-

(1)PopularsovereigntyThenotionthat'sovereigntyresidesessentiallyinthenation'wasexplicitlystatedinthe1789DeclarationofRightsofManandtheCitizenbutitwasqualifiedbytheretentionofLouisXVIasKingoftheFrench.ThecrucialsteptowardsthepositionthatsovereigntyresidedabsolutelyinthenationoccurredwhentheParismobstormedtheTuileriesandmassacredtheSwissGuards.ThiswasthefamousjournéeofAugust10,1792.Thebalancedconstitutioncametoanend;theinsurrectionaryCommuneofParisseizedcontrolandterrorizedtheNationalAssembly;andonSeptember22,1792,theMonarchywasabolishedandtheRepublicproclaimed.Fromthispoint,theRevolutionassumedtheunqualifiedauthorityofpopularsovereignty.TwomonthslateritproclaimeditasauniversaltobebackedbytheforceofFrencharms.'TheFrenchnationdeclares',ranitsproclamation,'thatitwilltreatasenemieseverypeoplewho,refusinglibertyandequalityorrenouncingthem,maywishtomaintainrecallortreatwiththeprinceandtheprivilegedclasses:ontheotherhanditengagesnottosubscribetoanytreatyandnottolaydownitsarmsuntilthesovereigntyandindependenceofthepeopleswhoseterritorythetroopsoftheRepublicshallhaveenteredshallbeestablishedanduntilthepeopleshallhaveadoptedtheprinciplesofequalityandfoundedafreeanddemocraticgovernment.'

Fromthismomentalltheoldnotionsof'legitimacy'wereonthedefensive:whetheradynasticrightorprescriptiverightorsimpleacceptanceoflongusageandtradition.By1885,SirHenryMainewasabletoobservethat'RussiaandTurkeyaretheonlyEuropeanstateswhichcompletelyrejectthetheorythatgovernmentsholdtheirpowersbydelegationfromthecommunity.'5Fromthismoment,too,thevoiceofthepeoplebegantospeak,asithasneverceaseddoing,'intongues'.PopularsovereigntywasassumedtojustifythedespotismoftheJacobins,anddid,infact,justifythedespotismofNapoleon.ItwasheldtobeimmanentintheJacobinseizureoftheParisCommune;inthestormingoftheTuileriesinAugust10,1792;andinthesubsequentdominationoftheNationalAssemblybytheJacobin-dominatedmobsofParis.Itwasheldtobeimmanent,likewise,inthejournéeofJune2,1793,whentheJacobinParisCommuneinvadedtheConventionandbroughtaboutthefalloftheGironde.ItwasheldtobeimmanentintheJacobinusurpationandtheTerror.

____________________5 SirH.Maine,op.cit.,p.9.

-211-

Butitwasequallyheldtobeimmanentinthejournéeofthe9Thermidor,1794andthefalloftheJacobins,andintheirpersecutionafterthe1stPrairial.Itwaslikewiseheldtojustifythesuppressionoftheroyalist-dominatedsectionsofParisinthejournéeofVendémiaire1795.NotonceinallthesejournéeswerethepeopleofFranceconsulted;butnotonceinallofthemwastheactiontakennotcarriedoutintheirname.Whenthepeopleweregenuinelyconsulted,itwastomakeNapoleonFirstConsul,thenLifeConsulandfinallyEmperor.TheinfinitemalleabilityofthenewpoliticalformulawasfullygraspedbytheCorsican.'Theappealtothepeople',hewrotetoThibaudeauinAugust1802,'hasthedoubleadvantageoflegalizingtheprolongmentofmypowerandofpurifyingitsorigins.Inanyotherway,itmustalwayshaveappearedequivocal.'6Andagain:'Ididinnowayusurpthecrown;Ipickeditupfromthegutter.Thepeoplesetitonmyhead.'7WiththeFrenchRevolutionthePandora'sboxhadbeenopened.Popularsovereigntymightmeangovernmentbypopularconsent;equallywellitmightnot.Rulershipnowlayopentoanyonewhocouldsufficientlycolourhisclaimtorepresentthesovereignpeople.

Furthermore,thehistoryofthistimesimplyforetokenedwhathavesincebecomepoliticalcommonplaces;thetendencyofoneusurpationtobreedanotherandthetendencyinsuchcircumstancesforthemilitarytobecomethedecisivefactor.ThefirstisvividlyillustratedbyaspeechwhichRobespierrewithhischaracteristichumourlessnesssincerelybelievedtobeaself-justification.'Afteracoup,'hesaid,'itisnotpossibletomarktheprecisepointatwhichthewavesofthepopularinsurrectionshouldbreak.'...'Why,'heasked,'doyounotputontrialsimultaneouslythemunicipality,theelectoralassemblies,theParissectionandallthosewhofollowedourexample?Forallthesethingshavebeenillegal--illegalastheRevolution,asunlawfulasthedestructionofthethroneandoftheBastille,asillegalaslibertyitself.'8WhatRobespierreunwittinglyimplied,Napoleonboldlyproclaimed.'Doyouthink,'heaskedtheConseild'Etatin1800,'thatthe18Fructidor,the18Brumaire,eventhe10Augustwereregularandobtainedgeneralconsent,thatyoushouldwishunremittinglytoplacetheinstitutionswhichthose

____________________6 Quoted,Napoléon:VuesPolitiques(Paris,1939),p.65.7 Ibid.,pp.66-7.ToMontholon,atSt.Helena.8 QuotedJ.L.Talmon,TheOriginsofTotalitarianDemocracy,p.102.(Myitalics.)

-212-

journéesbroughtforthabovethoseconsecratedbytimeandtradition?'9

Whenallthejournées,andallthegovernmentstheyestablished,wereeitherequallyirregularorequallythewillofthepeople,theswordcreptinasthearbiter.ThattheRevolutionassuchbegan,wasduetotherevoltoftheGardesFrançaisesonJuly12,1789.Thenceforwardthedissolutionofdisciplineinthearmyproceededapace,andinitsdefaultpowerpassedtotheNationalGuardwithitsunitsintheParissections.Itwasduringthisperioduntil1795thattheusurpationofpowerwascarriedoutatthehandsofthepopulationofParis,injournéesofapopularandinsurrectionarycharacter.By1795thearmywasreconstitutedandbecameapoliticalforceonceagain,andfromthatyearbecameevermoreobviouslydecisive.

Itfirstre-enteredpoliticsinVendémiaire1795.DeterminedtoperpetuatethemselvesthemembersoftheoutgoingConventionpassedthe'lawofthetwo-thirds'.Bythis,two-thirdsofitssuccessorlegislatureunderthenewconstitution(theCouncilofFiveHundred)wasinthefirstinstancetobemadeupofmembersoftheConvention.AclamourimmediatelyaroseinthesectionsofParis,nowunderRoyalistinfluence.On13VendémiairetheymarchedontheTuileries.Facingthem,underBarras,weretheregularforces,withNapoleonincommandofthecannon.The'whiffofgrapeshot'establishedtheregulararmyonceagainastheultimatebulwarkofthecivilpower.

InthisactionofVendémiaire1795thearmyperpetuatedtheruleoftheThermidoreans.InFructidor1797itwascalledbyonefactionoftheseThermidoreanstoproscribeandsuppresstheother.Thisisthefirstcoupd'étatwhich,beingcarriedonbyacivilfactionwithmilitarysupportandusingelectoralmalpracticeswhichhavesincebecomeacommonplace,hasanauthenticallymoderntang.ThetroopsunderGeneralAugereauadvancedontheTuileriesandarrestedtheoppositionrepresentatives.WhenoneofthemaskedAugereaubywhatrighthedidso,theGeneralreplied:'Bytherightofthesword.'TherumpoftheCouncilofFiveHundredwasthensurroundedbytroopsandforcedtopassthelawbywhichtheelectionsin49Departmentswereannulled,andthetriumphantfactionchargedwithfillingthevacancies.Allnewspaperswereplacedforoneyearundertheinspectionofthepolice,andtheDirectorsreceivedtherighttoproclaimanycommuneinastateofsiege.

____________________9 Napoléon:VuesPolitiques,p.46.TotheConseild'Etat.

-213-

InNapoleon's18Brumaire,1799,theprocessreacheditsterm.Boththeobjectiveconditionsandthestateofmindofthesoldierywereripeforfurtherintervention.Francewaspassingthroughanovertcrisis.TheDirectorycouldnotrelyonanymiddleopinion,butwascaughtandtossedbetweenthetwogreatforcesofRoyalismandJacobinism,equallyhostiletooneanotherandtotheDirectoryitself.Incapableofrelyingoneither,theDirectorswereforcedtorelyonthearmy,firsttorepressonefactionandthentheother-thecelebratedpolicyoftheBascule.WhilethefeeblenessandcorruptionoftheDirectorybroughtitsprestigetoanadir,bythesametokentheprestigeofthearmywhichalonekepttheRepublicfrominvasionwasatitsheight.ThewarpolicyoftheDirectoryplayedintoitshands,fortheDirectory'sincapacitytofeed,clotheandequipthearmy,itsconnexionwithspeculatorsandfournisseurs,anditsverycivilianism,broughtthearmytohateanddespiseitandtoblameitforalltheirmisfortunes.NotallthegeneralswereonBonaparte'ssideinthe18Brumaire(AugereauandBernadottestoodbytheJacobins),butnoservingofficerofanydescriptionhadanyusefortheDirectoryasitstood.WhenSiéyèsandhiscolleagues'lookedforasword'tooverthrowtheDirectorytheyfoundfirstJoubert,andonJoubert'sdeath,Napoleon.HadNapoleonnotbeenavailabletherecanbelittledoubtthatsoonerorlatertheywouldhavefoundathirdcandidate.

(2)NationalismandNationalSovereignty.Nationalismandnationalsovereigntywereproclaimedatthesametimeandbythesameformulaasthedoctrineofpopularsovereignty.ItwasSiéyèswhofirst,inhisQu'est-cequeleTiersEtat?boldlyidentifiedPeopleandNationandclaimedfortheNationwhatRousseauhadclaimedforhis'generalwill'.WhattheRevolutiondidwastodramatizetheideaoftheNation,tomakeFrenchmenselfconsciousoftheircommonbonds,andabovealltofurnishasymbolismandimagerywhichgrippedtheimaginationofthemassesandprovidedthemwithaheadyandfanaticalreligion.IfwemustputadatetothefirstmanifestationofthisspirititwouldsurelybeJune17,1789.ThatwasthedaywhentheTiersEtat,rejectingtheroleofpartofanEstates-General,proclaimeditselftheNationalAssembly.Thenfollowedthe'federation'demonstrations,through1789and1790:meetingsofcitizensalloverFrancewhichgreetedthesuppressionoftheancientProvincesby'abjuringeverydistinctionofour

-214-

provinces,offeringourarmsandourwealthtolaPatrieforsupportofthelawswhichcomefromtheNationalAssembly'.ThesedemonstrationsculminatedinthevastnationalisticfêteofJuly14,1790,intheChampdeMarswhere50,000delegatesfromalloverFrancetookthefederationoathandswore'fraternité'.

Thewarof1792andthefearofinvasionbroughtthenew-bornpatriotismtoadelirium.NowadaysLaMarseillaiseisnolongerthemarchingsongofthepatrioticleviesoftheRhinearmy,butmerelyanothernationalanthem,albeitwithamorestirringtunethanmost.Atalleventsfewpeopleseriouslyponderits(many)verses.Yetthese,andmoreparticularlythefirst,vividlyillustratethefervourofpristineandfreneticFrenchnationalism.Theversecallsforresistancetobarbarousinvaders,invaderswhowillmurderone'ssonsandcomrades:invaderswho,however,arealsopoliticalenemies--thetoolsoftyranny.Defenceofthepeopleanddefenceofthenew-wonpoliticalorderaremergedinone.Theverseisnotaddressedtotheregulararmy.Itdoesnot(likeGodSavetheQueen)refertothedynasty.Onthecontraryitisaddressedtocitizens(notsubjects);andtothe'enfantsdelapatrie'--thatistothecommonandequalbondsunitingallFrenchmenintheircapacityasnationals.Fortheiruseof'lapatrie'isaneologism.Tillthen,FrancehasbeendescribedasunRoyaume,andpatriewasdefinedbytheAcademy(aslateas1776)asthepays,thepartofthecountryinwhichamanhappenedtobeborn.

MeanwhileintheinteriortheRevolutionestablished,orrathersoughttoestablish,patriotismasanewreligionontheruinsoftheRomanChurch.Tothisendwasinstitutedthedécadi,andthecultassociatedwithit.'Thedécadi,'writesVandal,'thefinalandculminatingdayofthedécade,waschosenforthecelebrationofthecultwhichhadbecomethereligionoftheStateandwascommonlystyledthedecadalcult.ForletusnotforgetthattheRevolution,frighteninglyanti-Christianasithadbecome,remainedreligious.Itstillretainedapassionforliturgies,afrenzyforrites,andspentpartofitstimeinventingreligions.ThedecadalreligionwasnothingelsethantheorganizedcultoftheNation.Ontheappointedday,inasolemnorapastoralsetting,theadministratorsofeachcantonassembledthepopulationaroundthealtaroftheNation,readoutandpassedcommentsonthelaws,deliveredlaysermons,catechizedchildren,recitedthecharacteristicsofcivicvalue-alltotheaccompanimentofsingingandtheorgan.'10

____________________10 A.Vandal,L'avènementdeBonaparte(Paris,1905-7),Vol.I,pp.30-1.

-215-

ItwasthearmiesoftheRevolutionthatcarriedthenationalisticcontagiontoFrance'sneighbours.Thearmiescameasliberatorsandstayedastax-gatherers,plunderersandrulers.Inreactiontotheirarrogantnationalism,thenationalismoftheinvadedandoppressedpeoplesawoke.IfwearetoputafirmdatetothisitmightwellbethefamousDosdeMayo,May2,1808,whenthepeopleofMadridaroseagainsttheFrenchandinitiatedthesavagewaroftheSpanishpriestsandpeopleagainsttheinfidelforeigner.YetsimultaneouslywiththisrisingafurioushatredoftheFrenchhadawokeninPrussia.

HumiliatedbyJenaandthedisastrouspeace,'all',wroteStein,'thirstedforrevenge;plansofinsurrectionwhichaimedatexterminatingtheFrenchscatteredaboutthecountrywerearranged...theincubusoftheFrenchgarrisons,ofmarchingsthroughthecountry,indescribableprovocations,keptalivethehatredof[the]French.'11ThiswastheyearinwhichFichtepublishedhisAddressestotheGermanNation,thefirstmajorpronouncementofGermannationalism--anunconsciouscommentary,asSeeleycalledit,ontheSpanishconflict.

(3)PopulararmiesThearmieswithwhichtheRepublicfoughtitswarswerenottrulyinsurrectionaryorrevolutionaryarmies.Theirnucleusconsistedoftheoldregulartroops,whiletheengineerandartillerycorpshadretainedmostoftheirformerofficers.Theadmixtureofvolunteerandthe'levéeenmasse'didnotmaketheminsurrectionaryorfully'popular'.Butthearmyof1795(bywhichdatetheamalgamoftheoldandnewelementswascomplete)wasanewmilitaryphenomenonnevertheless.Firstofall,itsofficerswerenolongertheoldaristocraticclassbutfreelydrawnfromtheranksofprofessionaltalent:itwasthereforeimbuedwithazealfortheRepublicansocialprinciplesofequalitywhichhadpermittedthemtorise.Secondly,thevolunteers,brigadedwiththeoldregiments,leavenedthemasswiththeirfervourforthenationandfortheRevolutionandsogavethewholeforceadynamicandself-consciousideology.

Thesuccessofthisarmyincarryingthewarintotheenemies'countriesnotonlyprovokedtheenemypeoplesintoacounternationalismoftheirown,aswehavealreadyseen;italsoproducedasimilarmilitaryreaction.InSpaintheanti-Frenchreactionpro-

____________________11 Quoted,J.R.Seeley,LifeandTimesofStein,Vol.II,pp.26-7.

-216-

ducedanentirelynewkindofarmyandofwarfare,viz.genuinelyinsurrectionaryforcesmadeupofthepeopleatlarge,andirregularwarfare--theguerrilla,i.e.the'littlewar'.Popularrisingshadoccurredbefore;therevoltoftheNetherlandsisaclassiccase.TheRevolutiondidnotproduceanewphenomenon,butvastlystimulatedanoldone.

ThisSpanishexperiencewasatrueexampleofanarmyofpopularinsurrection.ItwasnotimmediatelycopiedinEurope.ItsfirstimitationsweretobefoundintheSpanishcoloniesthemselves,whereforthenexttenorfifteenyearscivilwarsbegantorage,offrightfulferocity;andthen,afterthese,intheBalkanswheretheGreekpeopleroseagainsttheTurks.

(4)ProfessionalismWhilenationsandcauseswhichhadnoarmywerecreatingarmiesoftheirownandaddingthetermsguerrillaandpartisan-warfaretothedictionary,thosewhichdidhavearmiesweredevelopingthemintheoppositedirection,i.e.bypurgingtheirpoliticalandtheiramateurcharacteristics,andcreatinginsteadaprofessionalorganization.HerePrussiawasthepioneer.ThearmyreformsofSteinandScharnhorstmarkthefirstself-consciouseffortinEuropetoprofessionalizetheofficercorps.HumiliatedbyJenaandAuerstadt,KingFredericWilliamIIIappointedaMilitaryReorganizationCommissioninwhichSteinandScharnhorstweredominant.Theirobjectwastwofold:firsttoregeneratePrussiannationalismandatthesametime'bringthearmyandthenationintoamoreintimateunion';andnexttoraisethecompetenceoftheofficercorpsfromthemorassofabysmalignoranceandinefficiencytowhichthearistocraticmonopolyofentrancehadbroughtit.ThefirstwasachievedbyStein'ssocialreforms,andbythesystemofnationalmilitaryconscriptionandtraining.ThesecondwasbegunwiththefamousdecreeofAugust6,1808.'Aclaimtothepositionofofficer',itran,'shouldfromnowonbewarrantedinpeacetimebyknowledgeandeducation,intimeofwarbyexceptionalbraveryandquicknessofperception....Allsocialpreferencewhichhashithertoexistedisherewithterminatedinthemilitaryestablishmentandeveryone,withoutregardforhisbackground,hasthesamedutiesandthesamerights.'12Tothisendanyyoungmanofseventeenyearswhohadservedthreemonthsintherankscouldtakeregimentalexamina-

____________________12 Quoted,G.Craig,op.cit.,p.43.

-217-

tionsforadmissiontotherankofcornet;andbeforethecornetswereadmittedtotherankoflieutenanttheyhadtositafurtherexaminationinBerlin.Atthesametimethemilitaryschoolswerethoroughlyreorganized;theoldschoolsweredissolvedandthreenewschoolsofwarestablished,andaSuperiorMilitaryAcademywasfoundedinBerlinwhereinselectedofficersweregiventhreeyears'advancedtraining.ThecompetingmilitaryagencieswhoserivalryhadhelpedbringaboutthedébâcleofJenaweresubordinatedtoanewandcentralizedMinistry.13

TheprofessionalizationofthePrussianofficercorpstookplaceintwomovements.Inthefirstpartofthecentury,thestressfellonopeningupthecareertotalent,andontheneedforeducationalqualifications.Thesecondmovementtookplacemidwaythroughthecentury.HerethestresswasonthedevelopmentofaGeneralStaffandtheprovisionofadvancedmilitaryeducation.By1875thePrussianofficercorpswasfullyprofessionalized.Thequalificationforentrancewaseducational,anexaminationsystemwasinfullswing,andtheprovisionofcentresofmilitaryeducationwascomplete.Advancementproceededbymerit.AGeneralStaffhadbeenformed.Allthesefeaturesformedpartofoneinterlockingsystem:andtheofficercorpswhichwastheproductenjoyedtothehighestdegreeasenseofcorporateidentity.

FrancefollowedGermany,butatoneremove.Britainwasstillslower.Neverthelessitwouldbetruetosaythatatthebeginningofthenineteenthcenturynoneofthethreecountriespossessedaprofessionalofficercorps.By1914alldid.

(5)TheemergenceofnewstatesTheAmericanWarofIndependencewasthefirstinwhichcoloniesdeclaredtheirsecessionfromaEuropeanempire,andestablishedtheirindependentstatehood.NeverthelessthenewUnitedStateswhicharosewasnottypicalofthemajorityoftheemergentstatesoftoday.Ethnicallyitwashomogeneous.Socialtensionswerenotmarked.Itsufferedfromnosectariancleavages.Itwasendowedwithgreatnaturalwealthandabusyandinventivepopulation.Itpossessedvigorousinstitutionsofself-government,andasuperabundanceofpersonswiththewillandskilltooperatethem.Withinafewyearsofindependenceitwasabletodosomethinguniqueintheannalsofcolonialindependencemovements--to

____________________13 Ibid.,pp.37-65.

-218-

establishanadministrativesystemmorepureandmoreefficientthanthemetropolitancountry's.14

Thereforeifwearetoseekfortheantecedentsofwhatistypical(thoughbynomeansuniversal)intheemergentstatesoftoday,weshallhavetolookelsewherethanthebirthoftheUnitedStates,anditisintherevoltoftheSpanishAmericancoloniesthatwefindit.

Theseemergentsocietiesstoodincompletecontrasttothethirteencolonies.Theirpeoples,eventhenarrowclassofthewealthy,hadnoexperienceofself-government.Thepopulationswerebitterlyselfdivided.TheCreoleshatedtheSpanish,andbothfearedthebulkofthepopulation,composedofilliterateandbrutalizedIndiansinastateofserfdomandslavery.Localitystoodalooffromlocality,nativetribefromnativetribe,thecountrysidefromthetownsandtherichfromthepoor.Thechurchhaditsfanaticalpartisans;equally,itsfanaticalopponents.

Fewnewstateshaveeverarisenwithalesspromisingstart.Independencewasaprotractedbusinesswhichplungedthesesocietiesintounremittingandunbelievablyhideouscivilstrifeandanarchyforsomefifteenyears.HeretheservilewaroftheslavesofHaitiagainsttheirFrenchownersservedastheprologue.Thatwarbeganin1790andendedin1804withHaitiasanindependentstate.Onthemainland,however,eventsmarchedontheheelsoftheaffairsofSpain.ThedepositionofFerdinandVIIbyNapoleon(1808)createdalegalhiatusofwhichtheaspiringCreoleelementssoontookadvantage.InRiodeJaneiro,theProvisionalJuntaassumedpowerin1810,butindependencewasnotproclaimedtill1816.InVenezuela,theextraordinarycabildoestablisheditselfin1810andin1811aCongressproclaimedindependence.ThiswasfollowedbyCartagena.MeanwhileinMexico,HidalgotookuparmsagainsttheSpanishauthoritiesin1810,andonhisdeathMoréloscontinuedthestruggle.Independencewasproclaimedin1813.Butallthesemovements,withtheexceptionofthoseinthePlateprovinces,hadfounderedby1816.Itwasnottillafter1820that,onebyone,theinsurrectionaryarmiestriumphedandindependencebecameafact.

4ContemporarymilitaryinterventionisthefruitofthefivefactorswhichemergedfromtheparoxyismoftheFrenchRevolution,

____________________

14 S.E.Finer,"'PatronageandthePublicService'"(PublicAdministration,Winter,1952,pp.329-59.)

-219-

between1789and1810:thedoctrineofnationality,thedoctrineofpopularsovereignty,theinsurgenceofpopulararmies,theprofessionalizationofthearmedforcesand,finally,theemancipationofimperialdependencies.

Ofthesefivefactorstwoareprimary,theothersderivative.Theprimaryfactorsarethedynamicnoveldoctrinesandemotionsofnationalismandpopularsovereignty.Themilitaryeffectsarederivative:ontheonesidetheformationofpopulararmiestoadvancethesedoctrines--whatBurkecalled'anarmeddoctrine'-and,ontheother,theprofessionalizationofarmiesthebettertowithstandthem.Themovementforcolonialindependenceisdoublyderivative:fromthenewdoctrines,whichmergeintothedoctrineofnationalself-determination,andfromthepopularmovementsandifneedbepopulararmiestoachievethis.

SoitwasinLatinAmerica.ThisrepresentsthefirsttriumphantemanationfromthecockpitofEurope.

FromthecloseoftheNapoleonicperiod,the'armeddoctrine'hasspreadwiderandpenetrateddeeply.Todayfewcountrieshavenotfeltinsomemeasuretheappealsofnationalismandpopularsovereignty.Thetwonotionstendtoworkindoubleharness.Sometimesthedemandforpopularsovereigntyhasprecedednationalism,sometimesithasbeentheotherwayabout;buttheleadsandlagswereneververylengthy,andinmostcasesthetwonotionsmarchedtogether.

ThefirsthalfofthenineteenthcenturysawthemmoreorlesstakepossessionoftheWest,North,andSouth-eastofEurope.Inthenextquartercentury,CentralEurope--GermanyandAustria--begantosuccumb.By1878,onlyinTurkeyandImperialRussiawastherenoconcession,evenimplicit,totheseprinciples;andbothsignificantlywere'prisonhousesofnationalities'.Yetby1910bothhadcaughtthecontagion.Russiahadexperiencedthe1905RevolutionandestablishedtheDuma;TurkeyhadexperiencedtheYoungTurkRevolutionandtheCommitteeofUnionandProgress(1908).MeanwhileAsiawasbeginningtostir.InIndiatheCongresswasestablishedin1886;inChinatheBoxerRebellion(1900)wastheforewarningofresurgentnationalism.Theseportentswerefollowedbysignificantaction:thePersianrevolutionof1905-6,theIndianCongress'sdemandforrepresentativeinstitutionsandeven(itsminority'sview)independence,andthe1911RevolutioninChina.Thefirstworldwaractedasare-agent.With1919,theprincipleof

-220-

self-determinationbecameoneofthedogmasofthepost-warEuropeansettlement,nationalismhadawakenedintheArablands,wasrampantinChinaandIndia,andwasjustbeginningitscareerinSouth-EastAsiaandsub-SaharanAfrica.

Theworldhadhithertobeenparcelledoutintovastmulti-nationalstates,commonlycalledempires.Nowthesebegantodisintegrate.WehavealreadyseenhowtheSpanishandPortuguesecoloniesinLatinAmericawontheirindependence.Theirexamplehadbeenfollowedbythenationalities(Serbs,Greeks,Rumanians)ofTurkeyin-Europe.By1878thesewerealmost,andby1914entirelyindependentoftheTurk,alongwiththeMontenegrins,theAlbaniansandtheBulgarians.Withthefirstworldwarathirdgreatwaveofsecessionarrived.TheGerman,AustrianandRussianempirescollapsedleavingbehindastringofnewstates.TheOttomanempirealsodisintegratedleavingitsArabsuccessorsastemporaryandconditionalspoilsinthehandsoftheBritishandFrench:Egyptitself,Syria,TransjordanandIraq.Thusabandofyoungandbrandnewsuccessor-statestothefourempiresstretchedinanarcfromthePolarSeatothePersianGulf.

Wearestillwitnessingtheeffectsofthefourthgreatwave-theaftermathofthesecondworldwar.Oneempirehasindeedadvanced;RussiareabsorbedtheBalticstatesandreducedallSouth-easternandEasternEurope(includinghalfGermany)todependency.Butoverseas,inAsiaandthenAfrica,theBritish,theDutch,theFrenchandtheBelgianempireshavedisintegrated.InAsiatherecameintoexistenceIndonesia,thefoursuccessor-statestoFrenchIndochina,Malaya,Burma,Pakistan,IndiaandCeylon.InAfrica,firstTunisia,LibyaandMoroccobecameindependent,andthen,withthecreationofGhana,begantheliquidationofalltheEuropeanpossessionssouthoftheSaharawiththe(present)exceptionsofthoseofSpainandPortugal.

Inthiswaydidnationalism,popularsovereigntyandtheemergenceofnewstates--threeinterlockingfactors--sweepthroughtheworld.Theremainingtwofactorsofourfivespreadwiththem,viz.insurrectionaryarmies,andprofessionalizedarmies.LatinAmericaandtheBalkanshadliberatedthemselvesbytheirownpopularlevies.After1917sodidthesuccessionstatestoRussiaandtoAustria.TheRedarmiesofRussia,theKuo-min-tang(andlaterthecommunist)forcesofChinare-enactedanideologicalwarfarelastseenintheeraoftheFrenchRevolution.Thiskindofwarfareflared

-221-

upagainintheaftermathofthesecondworldwar.Whenthemovementwasdominatedbythenationalistideologyitled,asinIndonesiaandinSouthVietnam,tothenationalindependenceofthecountryundernationalistleadership.Whenitwasdominatedbythecommunistsitsfatewasvarious:successfulinChina,YugoslaviaandNorthVietnam,unsuccessfulinBurma,MalayaandGreece,itbroughtthefirstthreeintothetotalitariancamp,butinthelastthreeenhancedthestatusofthetriumphantnationalistforces.

Inallsuchcountries,assoonasthefightingwasover,theauthoritiesmadehastetoconverttheleviesintoaregulararmyandtoprofessionalizetheofficercorps.InthosecountrieslikeIndiaandPakistanandGhanaandMoroccowhereindependencewasconcededpeacefully,aprofessionalforcewaspartoftheImperiallegacy.Ineithercase,professionalizationwastherule.Thisprofessionalization--ourfifthdecisivefactorintheevolutionofmilitaryintervention--hadbeendevelopingatthesametimeasnationalismandpopularsovereigntywereextending.By1914everymajorworldpower,includingtheUnitedStatesandJapan,hadprofessionalizeditsforces.Thereafterthenewlyindependentstatesadoptedthesamemethods,mostlybysendingtheirofficersabroadorbyinvitingmilitarymissionsofthegreatpowerstotraintheirforcesathome.Themoreadvancedestablishedtheirownindigenoussystems,basedontheoverseasmodel.

Inthisway,thefactorsofspecialsignificanceformilitaryinterventionhavebecomeallbutubiquitous.

5Thedynasticstateandthecolonialdependencyhavenowallbutdisappeared.Intheirplacestandoveronehundredsovereignstates,equippedwithprofessionalforces,andfoundedonthetwinformulaeofnationalself-determinationandpopularsovereignty.TheconditionsthatpermittedofmilitaryblackmailinGermanyandFrance,andofthedisplacementorevensupplantmentofciviliangovernmentsinPortugalandSpainhavethuspenetratedallthesecountries.Theresultsaremostmarkedintheex-imperialterritories,andthesebandsofsuccessor-statesformsomanyseismiczonesofpreternaturalmilitaryeruption.

Intermsofchronologythereare,first(1810-24),theLatinAmericansuccessor-statestoPortugalandSpain.Secondly(1829-

-222-

1914),theBalkansuccessorstatestotheOttomanempire,andTurkeyitself:Serbia,Greece,Bulgaria,RumaniaandAlbania.Next(1918-46)cometwosetsofstates:thesuccessorstotheRussian,GermanandAustrianempiresinEasternEurope(theBalticStatesandPoland),andtheArabsuccessor-statestotheOttomanempire;thesestates,Iraq,Syria,Lebanon,JordanandEgypt,becamesovereignatvariousdatesafter1918,butallwerefullyindependentby1946.Sofar,everyoneofthestatesnamedormentionedhassufferedfromcontinualmilitaryinterventioninitspolitics.Finally(post1946),therearethesuccessor-statestotheDutch,Belgian,FrenchandBritishempires.Manyofthesearelessthantenyearsold,butalreadyIndonesia,Laos,SouthVietnam,Burma,Pakistan,SudanandtheCongohaveexperiencedmilitaryintervention.

Intermsofgeographytherearereallytwozones.ThefirstisCentralandSouthAmerica.Thesecondisahugearc.ItbeginsintheBalticwiththethreeformerBalticstatesandsweepsdownthroughPolandintoRumania,GreeceandTurkey.ItturnssouthtotheNileValleyintotheCongoandalsoeastthroughthefertileCrescent,throughPersiaandPakistantoBurma,Siam,andex-FrenchIndochina,untilitendsinIndonesia.Practicallythewholeofthemilitaryeruptionsoftoday,whentheyarenotoccurringinLatinAmerica,takeplaceinthoseareasofthisgreatarcwhicharestilloutsidetheSovietandChinesesystems.

SomeancientstateslikePersiahavesufferedmilitaryintervention,andothersalso,likeFranceandGermanyand(notably)SpainandPortugal.LikewisesomenewstateslikeIndia(notably)andCeylonhavesofarprovedimmune.But,ingeneral,militaryintervention,especiallyinthemoreopenandextremeforms,isoutstandinglyacharacteristicofthenew,nottheolderstates.Therearetwoprincipalreasonsforthis.Itisinthesestatespre-eminentlythatlegitimacyhasbeenshakenandisstillindispute.Secondly,thesestatesaretheonesinwhich,forthemostpart,thematerialconditionsforfosteringandsustainingpowerfulcivilianorganizationsarestilllacking.Thereisathird,supplementary,reasonwhichappliestoaminorityofthesestates:thepre-existenceofatraditionofmilitaryintervention.

(1)InsearchoflegitimacyTheconstitutiveprinciplesofthenewstateareindeednationalismandpopularsovereignty.Itisinthenameofthesethatthestatehasemergedintoindependence.Thisdoesnotmean,however,thatthe

-223-

newstateiseitheranationorademocracy.Theseprinciplesarenormsandslogans,notfacts.Theyarecarriedandproclaimedbythewesternizingrulingélite.Theyhaveinvaryingdegreepenetratedaclassof'transitionals'.Buttheyarenotyetacceptedbythemasseswhoarestilltraditionalistic.Forthese,theolderloyaltiestodynasty,religion,tribeandlocalitystillmaketheprincipalappeal.Theproportionsofthepopulationwhichmakeupthesethreegroupsvariesfromsocietytosociety.Inallofthem,however,thewesternizedgroupisatinyfraction,andthetransitionalandtraditionalclassesthebulkofthepopulation.15WhatCarnellsaysofthenewstatesofSouthandSouth-EastAsiaapplies,broadlyspeaking,toallthesuccessor-statesexceptthethreeBalticstates.Theyare,hewrites,'transitionalsocietiesdeeplydividedbyculturalandethnicpluralism,byprovincialism,regionalism,localismandcaste-ism.Tinywesternizedélitesofpoliticians,bureaucratsandarmyofficersaregropingtentativelyandexperimentallyforappropriatewaysofsubstitutingnationalconsensusandeconomicgrowthforafragmentarytraditionalsocialstructureandabackwardruraleconomy.'16

Foronceindependencehasbeenwon,itbecomesclearthattheprinciplesofnationalityandpopularsovereigntyareinsufficienttopromotenationalconsensus.Thepartiesthathavecometopoweronthesloganofnationalindependenceeithergivewaytomoreextremeandmoresociallyconsciousparties,orseektoprojectthefervourofnationalismintoanindefinitefuture.Oftheformer,thetraditionalnationalistpartiesofSyriaareanexample.17Ofthelatter,thenationalismsofPresidentsNasserandNkrumaharecharacteristic.ForEgyptianandGhanaiannationalism,theseleaderssubstituteanindefiniteandlesstangible'anti-colonialism'.NasserproclaimsthattheEgyptianpeoplehaveamissiontolead,simultaneously,theArabzone,IslamandAfrica.18Nkrumah,inhisturn,dedicatesGhanatoirredentism:themissiontoliberateandeventofederate

____________________

15

Cf.D.Lerner,ThePassingofTraditionalSociety(FreePress,Illinois,1958).ThisworkisastatisticalappraisalofthesituationintheMiddleEast.Atthetimeoftheirresearch(1950-8),ProfessorLernerandhisassociatesestablishedthatTurkeyandLebanonshowedthegreatestpenetrationbyWesternideas,PersiaandJordantheleast.EgyptandSyriacamemidway.

16 F.G.Carnell,PoliticalIdeasandIdeologiesinSouthandSouth-EastAsia(U.K.PoliticalScienceAssociation,1960).

17 W.Z.Laqueur(Ed.)TheMiddleEastinTransition,p.122.18 W.Z.Laqueur,op.cit.,pp.22,129-44,145-65.D.Lerner,op.cit.,pp.403-9.

-224-

Africa.Inthisveinthestruggleforindependenceisdeclaredpermanent.Itisprojectedforward,everforward,sothatthepristineenthusiasmsofindependenceshouldbeprolongedindefinitely.

Nordoesthedogmaofpopularsovereigntyassistconsensus.Itdoesjustthereverse.Thesenewstatesarerarelynations.Hatredoftheimperialpowerisnotthesameasnationalself-consciousness,andbeyondthispoliticalconsciousnessisusuallyverylow.Inthesecircumstancespopularsovereigntyaccentuatesprovincialparticularism,communalism,tribalismandlaysthewesternizingélitesbytheheels.Nationalismandpopularsovereigntysucceedindiscreditingthetraditionalbeliefsystems,oratleastindisplacingthem,butnotinsupplantingthem.Theresultisaconfusionandtensionoverlegitimacy--overwhatformofrule,whichpoliticalvalues,aredutyworthy.Hencethenewleaders'questforsomenationalideologythatwillsynthesizenationalismandpopularsovereigntywiththetraditionalvaluesandsoprovidethepopulationwithanewfaithtolivebyandthegovernmentswithanewpoliticalformulatogovernby.Arabnationalismrootsitselfinadeepstrainofpan-Islamism.Nehrutakesrefugeineclecticism,UNuofBurmainakindofBuddhistMarxism,NgoDiemofSouthVietnaminaso-calledpersonnalisme,andSukarnoinaMarxisttinctured'gotong-rōjong'.19

Indeed,inmanynewstatestheirconstitutiveprinciplesofnationalismandpopularsovereigntymaybenotmerelyinadequatetoproduceconsensus,butpositivelyinimicaltoit.Suchistheexperience,indeed,ofsomeEuropeanstateswithmorecompletehistoricalformationsthanmanyofthenewstates.AfterthemakingofItalyitwasnecessaryto'maketheItalians'.Spanishnationalism,whichturnedNapoleonoutofthepeninsula,subsequentlyprovedincapableofabsorbingandtranscendingCatalonianseparatism.Agreatnumberofthesuccessor-statestotheempiresarepolyethnicsocietiesandherethedogmaofnationality,successfulinunitingthevariouscommunitiesagainsttheimperialpower,soonactsasadissolvent.Forthesecommunitiesbegintobecomeconsciousofthemselvesasnations,andtodemandself-determination.Whynot?Whereistheprincipleofself-determinationtoend?Whyshoulditnotendjustintheconstitutionofasmanystatesastherearenationallyself-consciousminorities?ImperialIndiawaswilly-nillyrentintotwoatthetimeofindependence;but,facedwithSikhdemandsforaseparateSikhstate,Mr.Nehrudeclaresthat'wewill

____________________19 F.G.Carnell,op.cit.

-225-

toleratenofurtherdivisionwhateverhappens.Evenifitiscivilwar,itwillbecivilwar.'Partitionwasenough,indeedtoomuch--IndiawasstillsufferingfromtheeffectsofthecreationofPakistan;anyfurtherdivisionswouldbreakherbeyondredemption.20InKenyathemereprospectofindependencehassparkedoffanalarmingtribalself-consciousness.Thetwomainpartiesarethemselvestriballybased,K.A.N.U.ontheKikuyu-Luocombination,K.A.D.U.ontheMasaiandothertribes.Theformerdemandaunitarystate.Thelatter,fearingKikuyudominance,demandafederalsystembasedontribaldivisions.21InGhana,Nkrumahinsiststhat'inthehigherreachesofournationallife,thereshallbenoreferencetoFantis,Ashantis,Ewes,Gas,Dagombas,"strangers"andsoforthbutthatweshouldcallourselvesGhanaians--allbrothersandsisters,membersofthesamecommunity--thestateofGhana".22

And,bythesametoken,insuchsocietiespopularsovereigntyalsoactsasadissolvent.AsinIndonesia--aprizeexhibit--ithasbroughtaboutfactionandconflictwhichservestoadvantageinhomogeneoussocieties,butwhichinself-dividedonessimplyaccentuatesthelocal,tribal,ethnic,religiousandclassdifferences.

Thusinsuchsocietiesthepoliticalformulaiselusive,legitimacystillatlarge.Ofthethreeelementsconstitutingahighlevelofpoliticalculturetheselackthefirsttwo:consensusonthelegitimatelocusofsovereigntyandconsensusontheproceduresforestablishingmorallyvalidpublicdecisions.

Thethirdconstituentofahighlevelofpoliticalcultureisasufficiencyofcivilianorganization,willingandcapableofsustaininganddefendingthesociety'spoliticalinstitutions.Inmostofthesesocietiesthistooislacking.Andthisisdirectlyrelatedtotheirbackwardstateofeconomicdevelopment.Thematerialpreconditionsforadequatecivilianorganizationdonotyetexist.

(2)ThematerialpreconditionsforcivilianconsensusSuchcivilian'organizations'asthenewstatesdoinheritareinimicaltoitsconstitutiveprinciplesofnationalityandpopularsovereignty.Tribalandreligiousandethnic'organizations',whicharethelotof

____________________20 TheTimes,October7,1961.21 TheTimes,October6,1961.

22QuotedbyD.Austin,PartiesinGhana,1949-60(U.K.PoliticalStudiesAssociation,1960).Seeforanextendeddiscussion,H.L.Brettan,PoliticalProblemsofPolyethnicSocietiesinWestAfrica(I.P.S.A.,WorldCongress,1961).

-226-

mostofthem,are,astheprevioussectionshows,morelikelytopulverizethenewstatethantointegrateit.Theythreatenarelapseinto'overtcrisis',asituationwherethegovernment--anygovernment--canrelyonnosectionofcivilianopinionwithoutsimultaneouslybringingonitselfthehostilityofalltherest:asituationwherethereisnonaturalmajority,onlymutuallyexclusiveandhostileminorities.

Thecivilianorganizationsneededtosustainandnourishthecivilinstitutionsaretheintegratingonesliketradeunions,businesses,voluntaryorganizations,andpoliticalpartieswhicharenotmutuallyexclusiveandwhichcrossthetribalethnicandreligiousboundariestoproducefunctionalorganizationswithagooddealofoverlappingmembership.Nowtheseareessentiallymoderninstitutions.Thatthebasisofpoliticalorganizationunderwentanhistoricaldevelopmentfromkinshiptoterritoryhasoftenbeenremarked;neighbourhoodunitssupplantedthefamily,gensortribeastheunitofpoliticalactivity.Sincethentheprocesshasmovedon,andanessentialcharacteristicofthemodernstateisthattheterritorialunithasgivenwaytothefunctionaloneasthebasisofpolitics.

Functionalassociationscanonlydevelop,however,whencertainmaterialpre-conditionsaremet.Tradeunions,businesscorporations,voluntarysocietiesandthelikereflectahighdegreeofsocialspecialization.Thisinturnrequiresahighlevelofcommercialintercourseandindustrialactivity,andafairlyhighlevelofnationalincometoprovidethenecessary'socialsurplus'.Alsosuchassociationscannotemergewithoutanadequatelevelofcommunicationsandofliteracy.Theabsenceoftheseprecludesallbutthemostricketyandephemeraloffunctionalassociations;23theirabundancenotonlymakesthemlargerandmoredurable,butenablesthemtobecomepoliticallyaware,self-consciousandarticulate.

Inmostofthenewstates,thematerialconditionsarenotsufficientlyadvancedtohomogenizesociety;aretoodevelopedtoleaveitinitstraditionalstate;butarejustdevelopedenough(sofar)toexacerbatedivisions.Theindustrialproletariatistooweaktobeacceptedasalegitimateconstituentinthepoliticalprocess,toostrongandtoowretchednottobeanextremeanddisruptiveforce.Literacy,educationandmass-communicationhavenotgonefarenoughtopermeatethemassesbuttheyhavedevelopedsufficiently

____________________23 D.Lerner,op.cit.,passim;alsoS.M.Lipset,PoliticalMan(London,1961),pp.61-71.

-227-

tocreate,overandagainsttheseruralmasses,anurbanéliteofmodernizers.Itisamistaketoattributepoliticalinstabilitytoalowstandardofliving.Thisiscommonintraditionalsocietiesandcompatiblewithverystablepolitics.Theinstabilityarisesinthemovementawayfromtraditionalism.Itistheintroductionofsharpandasyetlocalizedsocialdiscontinuitiesthatmakesforinstability.Itisaccentuated,asmodernizationtakesitsholdandliteracyandcommunicationsincrease,bythepeople'sexposuretothepossibilitiesofreceivingamoreattractivekindoflife.

Theseconclusionsareborneoutbyempiricalinvestigations.Ithasbeenshownforinstancethaturbanization,communications,literacyandpoliticalparticipationareinterdependentandthatthehigherasocietystandsinonerespectthehigherittendstostandinalltheothers.24Anothersurvey,offorty-eightstatesinEuropeandLatinAmerica,showedthatthelesswealthy,thelessindustrialized,thelesseducatedandlessurbanizedasociety,thelesspoliticallystableitwaslikelytobe.25C.Issawireachedsimilarconclusions,thoughbydifferentmethods,fortheMiddleEast.'DemocracydoesnotthriveinthepresentdayMiddleEast',hefound,because'theeconomicandsocialbasiswhichitrequiresisasyetnon-existent.Thatbasispresentsthefollowingaspects:sizeofterritoryandpopulation,levelofeconomicdevelopment,distributionofwealth,industrialization,homogeneityoflanguageandreligion,degreeofeducationandhabitofco-operativeassociation'.26Theseconclusions,foundtobetrueforLatinAmericaandtheMiddleEast,arejustasapplicabletothenewstatesofSouth-EastAsiaandtoAfrica.

(3)TherelevanceofthemilitarytraditionThedifficultiesofsuchnewstatesareaffectedbyathirdfactor-theirmodeoforigin.Some,anincreasingnumberinthelengtheningcatalogue,havegotofftoagoodstart.Thesearethecountrieswhereseverancefromtheimperialpowerhasoccurredbyagreementandindeed,withanimperialendowmenttosetthenewstateonitspath.Thenewstateisleftwithaworkingadministration,andevenwithadministratorsandadvisers.Inmanycases,suchasGhana,Nigeria,

____________________24 D.Lerner,op.cit.,pp.55-65.25 S.M.Lipset,op.cit.,pp.45-76.

26 TheMiddleEastinTransition,W.Z.Laqueur(Ed.),C.Issawi,'EconomicFoundationsofDemocracyintheMiddleEast',pp.33-51.

-228-

Malaya,itstartsoffwithafavourablebalanceoftradeanditsreservesandbalancesstandhigh.Morerarely,butnotablyinIndia,theimperialconnexionhasgraduallybroughtaboutthewesternizationofanextensivemiddleclass,andequippeditwithmodernprofessionalandadministrativeskill.

Suchstatesstartoffwithatraditionofciviliancontrol.Furthermore,theirarmieshavebeentrainedinthistradition:thattheirfunctionistocometotheaidofthecivilpower,andfortherest,topreservethestrictestpoliticalneutrality.Anumberofthesuccessorstatesdidnotbeginlifesopeacefully.TheLatinAmericanstatesalmostwithoutexceptionsecuredindependenceonlyaftertheraisingofinsurrectionandthecreationoftheirownpopularleviesamongscenesofhideouscrueltyandcarnage.Hereindependencewasagiftofthemilitaryandthemilitaryhaveneversufferedthepopulationtoforgetit.'Oneheritageofthewarwasamilitarismofmonstrousappetite.So...inallHispano-AmericathePresidencyoftheRepublicwasconsidered,defacto,as"thehighestrankinthearmy".'27

Oftherecentsuccessor-states,Burma,IndonesiaandSouthVietnamhadtorelyextensivelyontheirarmies,eithertoachieveindependenceortoreducethechaoswhichattendedsuchindependence.AsaresultofJapaneseoccupationpolicyallthreepossessednationalarmies.WhentheJapaneseleft,theseforcesservedasthemilitaryinstrumentofthenationalistmovements,prepared,iftheneedarose,tocontestthereturnoftheEuropeans.InBurma,independencewasgrantedwithoutfighting,butthenewstatewasimmediatelyfacedwithcivilwar:thecommunists,theKarensandfinallytheShanareasallrevolted.Thearmy,notunnaturally,acquiredmuchprestigeastheguarantorofthenationalidentity;andasaresultitsteppedin(orwascalledin?)whencivilgovernmentunderUNureachedanimpassein1958,andruledthecountryfortwoyearsunderitsGeneral,NeWin.Itsteppedinagainin1962topreventKarens,Shansandthelikefromattainingfederalstatus.SouthVietnam,aspartofFrenchIndochina,wasinvolvedinthenationaliststruggleagainsttheFrench.WhenthemovementsplitandNorthVietnambecamecommunist-dominated,theareaofSouthVietnamremainedthestrongholdofforceswhich,thoughanti-French,werealsostronglyanti-communist.Afterpartitionin1954,thenew

____________________

27 J.Beneyto,"'Lospuntosdepartidadelaorganizaçionpoliticahispano-americano'"(RevistadeEstudiosPoliticas,No.91,p.148).

-229-

governmentofSouthVietnamfounditselfcontendingwithdomesticdissidentseachwithaprivatearmy--viz.the'sects'--theCaoDaiandtheHoaHao,andtheforceofriverpiratesknownastheBinhXuyen.InthesecircumstancesthePrimeMinister,NgoDiem,gavebattleandwon.Hereagain,thennationhoodhasbeenagiftofthemilitary.ThecurrentstruggleagainstthecommunistVietKonghasstillfurtherelevateditsimportance.Inthesecircumstancesitisnotsurprisingthattherégimeisafaçade-régimeinwhichsupremepowerlieswiththePresident,NgoDiem,relyingonarmysupport.Finally,inIndonesia,theJapanese-createdauxiliaryarmyofIndonesiansfoughttheDutchfrom1945to1949whenindependencewasfinallygranted.Inthiscountry,pulverizedbypartystrife,themilitaryareinvolvedinpoliticaldecisionsatalllevels.AtthecentretheyhavebeenaccordedaquotaofseatsinPresidentSukarno'snominatedlegislature(1960);attheextremities,theyrevoltedin1956,establishedregionalcouncilsandembarkedoncivilwar.Inordertocrushthisrevoltthecentralgovernmentwasforcedtofallbackonmartiallawandfortwoyears,1957-8,mostpolicydecisionsweretakenbymilitarydecree.Therevolthasnowfadedoutbutatlocalandregionallevelsthearmyofficersstillcontinuetoactaspolicymakers,co-ordinators,leadersandchannellersofpoliticalactivities;28andGeneralNasution,armyChiefofStaff,hasbecomeamantowatch.

Inthesenewstates,then,legitimacyiscontestable;thematerialpre-conditionsforthedevelopmentofpowerfulcivilianassociationsarestilllacking;andsomesufferfromthegrandhandicapofhavingreceivedindependenceatthehandsofthearmedforces.Theywould,therefore,seemtobepeculiarlyvulnerabletomilitaryinterventioninpolitics.Thehistoricalrecordsofarwouldseemtoattestthis,too.Theoldestofthesuccessor-states--theLatinAmericanrepublics-havesufferedfromendemicmilitaryeruptions,andevenafteracentury-and-a-halfonlyArgentina,Mexico,Chile,andpossiblyUruguayandCostaRicacanbedeemedeffectively'national'states.Theremainderareeithermelting-potsinfullbubblelikeBrazil,orsocietiesstilljustasrivenbyethnicandclassdivisionsasthoseofAsiaandAfrica.Thenextoldestofthesuccessor-states,thoseoftheBalkansandEastEurope,usedtosufferlikewisefromendemicmilitaryintervention.Andofthepost-warsuccessor-states,Syria,Iraq,EgyptandtheSudan,Pakistan,Burma,VietnamandIndonesiahave

____________________

28 G.M.Kahin(Ed.),GovernmentandPoliticsofSouth-EastAsia,pp.204-5.J.Mossman,RebelsinParadise,forthecivilwar.

-230-

allsuccumbed:ashavetheirneighbours,TurkeyandPersiaandThailand,which,thoughancientindependentstates,havelikewisefelttheimpactofwesternization.

6THEPROSPECTInnearlyallthenewstates,themodernizingmovementhastendedandtendstomovethroughtwophases--nationalisticeuphoria,followedbysocialdiscontents.Independence(or,inthecaseofancientstateslikeTurkeyandPersia,'nationalrevival')raisesthepartyorcoalitionthathassecuredittopower.Examples,suchastheIndianCongress,theGhanaianConventionPeople'sParty,theTunisianNeo-DestourandtheNigerianNationalCouncilcouldbemultiplied.Thesedominantpartiesareusuallyassociatedwithanddrawsupportfromanheroicleader--aNehru,Sukarno,Nkrumah,BourguibaNyerere,KaundaorBanda.Thispre-eminenceofthecharismaticleaderisoneofthemoststrikingfeaturesofthefirststageofnationalresurgence,andwhereanewstatelosessuchleaders,asPakistanlostJinnahandthenLiaquatAliKhan,itspoliticalfutureisimmediatelyjeopardized.

Thenationalistdynamismspringsfromfierceandevenimmeasureddenunciationofonesingletheme--theiniquitiesofforeignrule.Onceindependenceisachieved,however,thequestionis,whatistobedonewithit?Thisproblemdissolvesthepristineunityofthenationalistmovement.Tobeginwith,dissidenceneednolongerbeconsideredabetrayalofthenationinthefaceoftheimperialpower.Also,themembersofthenationalistmovementhavebeenrearedinanoppositionistmentality;thereforedisagreementstendtospreadoverdomesticmethodsandpolicy,andovernationalismitself.

Again,muchthatwasreprehendedasthecynicismofthecolonialpowerturnsoutnowtobeinseparablefromtheexerciseofgovernmentitself--orsothenationalistgovernmentwillclaim.Andasthenationalistleadersbecomeofficeholderssotheirmentalityandmotivationalters.'PartyH.Q.',reportsareliableobserveroftheGhanaianC.P.P.,'istodayashadowofwhatitusedtobe.Itisnolongerthecentreofoperationsforavibrantandeffectivenationalistmovement.Thelifeofthepartyisnowgovernmentandgovernment

-231-

handouts,andthepartyfollowersareonthepoliticaldoleortryingtogetonit.'29

Also,thesocialproblemrearsitshead.Itisparticularlyembitteredinsocietieswhere(asinthemajorityofnewstates)therearewidediscrepanciesinwealth.Itbecomesmuchmoreacuteastheresultofcertainnewcharacteristiceconomicpoliciesofthenewstates.Forlifeunderindependencehastobeshowntobevisiblyeitherricheroratleastmorepurposivethanundercolonialism.Inthefirstcase,governmentistemptedintoconspicuousexpenditure,e.g.'GhanaianAirlines',orthegrosslyuneconomicminimumwagelawsinEgypt.Inthesecondcase,itistemptedintocapitaldevelopmentprojectswhichabsorbmorethanthecountry'sdomesticsurpluspermits.Whicheverthecasethestate'sinitialendowmentofgoldandforeignexchangereservesrunsout.Thisaccentuatestheclashbetweenleftandrightwings.

Wherethereareethnicandotherminorities,theseasserttheirownindividualities,themoresowhenthedominantpartyorleadershipiscontrolledbysomeculturally-dominantgroup.TheoutlyingIndonesianislandsrevoltagainstJava;theKarensandShansagainsttheBurmese;theTamilspeakersofCeylonagainsttheSinhalese--andsoforth.

Thusithappensthatjustwhentheinherentforcesofdisintegrationmanifestthemselvesandstrongpurposivegovernmentbecomesnecessary,thegovernment'sprestigeandmoralauthorityistarnished.Insomesuchcasesonlythecharismaticpersonalityofanheroicleader--aSukarno,aLiaquatAliKhan--standsinthewayofdissolution.

Whatthenaretheprospectsforthenewstates?Thereseemtobefourpossibilities.

(a)Civilianquasi-democracy.WehavealreadyseenthatMexicoandTurkeyevolved,overaperiodofsomefortyyears,adominant'official'partyarrangement,whichwasneverthelessnottotalitarian.Suchapartywassensitiveenoughtooutsidecriticismandinsidepressurestoreflectpublicopinion:itwasdominantandindependentenoughnottobowtoit;anditwaswellorganizedenoughtoharnesscivilianassociationsandloyaltiesbehindtheinstitutionsitutilized.Thusitwasabletoclosethegapbetweenthewesternizingandurbanélitesandthetraditionalistandruralmasses.Issueswerecompromisedinsidetheframeworkofthepartyinsteadofbeingblownup,

____________________29 DavidApter(in1957),quotedAlmondandColeman,op.cit.,p.297.

-232-

byelectoralcompetition,intomajorcrisesoverlegitimacyandprocedures.Atthesametimethemoreimportantcivilianorganizationsweretiedintothepartywhich,withitsfirmmassbasis,servedtounderpinthecivilpower.

Nowinsomeofthenewerstates,thenationalistpartyorcoalitionthathasbecometherulingpartyatindependenceisclearlymovinginasimilardirection.OnemightciteGhana,Tunisia,Guinea,theIvoryCoast,Senegal,Somalia,TanganyikaandNyasaland.Allhavethrownupdominantorsingle-partysystems.Evenmoresignificantly,someofthesepartieshavedeliberatelydecidedtoperpetuateandtoinstitutionalizethissituation.InIndia,theCongressPartyisdominantbecauseofitsprestige,itsleadership,itspatronageandits'machine'.Ithasnot(ornotyet)neededtograntitselfalegallyprivilegedposition.InGhana,inGuineaandinTunisiaithas.InGhana,forinstance,theC.P.P.governmenthasvoteditselfspecialpowerstoarrestanddetainitsopponents,andhas,inaseriesofpurges,virtuallyexpelledtheoppositionfromParliamentandintimidated,proscribedorexileditsleaders.Atthesametimeithasabsorbedallthesignificantcivilianorganizationsofthecountry:theUnitedGhanaFarmers'Council,theTradesUnionCongress,theCo-operativeMovement,theex-servicemen'sandwomen'sorganizationsandsoforth.AndNkrumahpronouncesitsidentitywiththestate,saying:'TheConventionPeople'sPartyisGhana.OurPartynotonlyprovidestheGovernmentbutisalsothecustodianwhichstandsguardianoverthewelfareoftheState.'

Thisisapatternwhichislikelytospread.Handledefficientlytheofficialordominantpartysystemmightconceivablyprovideacivilianalternativetomilitaryrule.

(b)Civilian'open'democracy:India.ThemosthopefulevidenceforthepossibilityofdemocraticciviliangovernmentisthesuccessfulexperimentinIndia,forherhandicapsaresuchastomakeonewonderhowthesubcontinentisgovernedatall,letaloneinaliberalspirit.ItistruethatIndiapossessescertainadvantages.ShehasadominantpersonalityinNehru;awidespreadandeducatedmiddleclasswhichsuppliesherofficers,administratorsandprofessionals;awell-trainedcivilservice;asocialpolicywhich,evenifitdoeslittletobridgethegapbetweenrichandpoor,atleastvisiblytriestodoso;and,finally,adominantpartyrootedinthevillages.Yetthishastobesetagainstapparentlycrushinghandicapsfargreaterthanthatofalmostanyothersuccessor-state.Hersize:apopulationofsome

-233-

380millions;oneofthelowestaveragepercapitaincomesintheworld;widespreadilliteracy;amultitudeoflinguisticandcommunaldivisions.AslongastheIndianexperimentprospers,thepossibilityofastabledemocraticorderforthenewstatesispossibletoo.OtherstatesmaynotpossessallIndia'sadvantages(thoughmanyofthembeganlifewithafairnumberofthem),butnonestartoffwithatitheofherhandicaps.

(c)Civiliantotalitarianism(Communism).Inpractice,militantcommunismhasbeenfarlesssuccessfulthanmighthavebeenexpected.IthasarrivedeitherwiththeRussianarmies(EasternEuropeandtheBalkans)orwithChinesemilitarysupport(NorthVietnam).Neverthelessthepossibilityoffurtheradvanceisveryreal.InmanyofthenewstatestheCommunistParty,evenunderground,istheonlycohesiveanddisciplinedorganizationinthecountryoutsidethearmy.Itispossessedofacoherentdoctrine,heldwithtenacityandpressedwithfanaticism.Itisequallypreparedtoleadinsurgentmassesor,asinGuatemalaandCuba,toinfiltrateapopularmovement,andemergeincontrolofthekeyorganizationsofthestate.

Itmakesaspecialappealtonewstatesindifficultiesoncethefirstfervourofnationalismhaswornoff.Itsclass-wardoctrinefindssupporterswherethedisparitiesinwealtharegreat,wherethenascentproletariatisatitsmostfrustratedandextreme,andwherethecontoursofpigmentation,wealthandpoliticalpowerarevisiblyseentocoincide.Andtheseconditionsobtaininaverylargenumberofthenewstates.

Secondly,theSovietexamplemakesaspecialappealtoantiWesternism,afeelingwhichisunderstandablywidespreadintheformerAsianandAfricanpossessionsoftheEuropeanpowersandwhich,intheformofanti-Americanism,isverymuchaliveinLatinAmerica.TheSovietsystemisseenasawayofwesternizingwithouthavingtohumiliateoneselfbycopyingtheWest;indeed,byturningone'sbackonit.Furthermore,itseemsa'getrichquick'systemasopposedtothelaboriouslyslowpacewhichtheWesternmodelappearstodemand.AndboththeSovietUnionandChinahavetriedtoportraythemselvesasformercolonieswhichhavebecomerichandpowerfulaftershakingofftheimperialyoke.

Finally,itisdemagogic,inthatitsappealisbothpopularandalsoauthoritarian.Itthereforeattractstheyoungandidealistic,butalsothedisappointedor'failed'professionalortechnicianorarmyofficer.

-234-

Governmentistobeforthemasses:butbyanélite.Theintellectual,thewhitecollarworker,theofficerarequitepreparedtobethatélite.

(d)Militaryintervention.Yetnoneoftheprecedingalternativesseemlikelytospreadwidelyortotakeafirmhold.TheopendemocracyofIndiaisthemostunlikelyofall.Thenewstateslack,aswehaveseen,theideologyandthesocialbasisonwhichalonethisopensystem,withitsorderlyrepresentativesystemandtoleratedoppositioncanthrive.Themajoritydoctrinegivesfullreigntoalltheparticularisms--ethnic,communal,class--bywhichtheseimperfectsocietiesareriven.ItmaybethattheIndianexperimentprovessuccessfulandthatothercountriescanfollowsuit.Butitseemsunlikelythattheywillbemany;andtheywillbeinherentlyunstable.EveninLatinAmerica,with150yearsofexperimentbehindit,theonlyopensystemsthatappeartobeworkingsmoothlyarethoseofUruguayandCostaRica.Well-developednationswithalonghistoricformationlikeFranceandGermanyandJapanhaverelapsedfromopendemocracyintomilitaryintervention.Itishardtoseewhystateswithmuchlessunitedcommunitiesshoulddoanybetter.

Nordoesthesingle--ordominant--partypatternenjoyafairerprospect.First,evenifsuchpartiesestablishthemselvessuccessfully,theyhaveatendencytogostale.TheEgyptianWafdpartywentstaleinthisway,andfinallytheinitiativepassedtotheactivists--theMoslemBrotherhoodandthearmy.TheIndianCongressrunsthesamerisk.Itsgreatadvantagesareitsleader,Mr.Nehru,anditstriumphanthistory;butthefirstisnotimmortal,andasTayaZinkinsays,'Historyknowsnogratitude....TheCongresshaslostanenormousamountofprestige,despiteitsimmenseachievementsandthis...hastranslateditselfintoawidespreadseriesofopenquarrels....Innearlyeverystatetherearedissidentandrebelgroupsandthepartydisciplinehascrumbled.Butthesearenotthecausesofdecay,theyarethesymptoms.ThecauseisthealienationofCongressfromthemoderneducated.'30AsimilarstalenessisreportedfromtheverymuchyoungerC.P.P.ofGhana.'Comrades,'Nkrumahsaidin1959,'itseemstomethatmaybefromcomplacencyandexhaustionsomeofourolderpartymembersseemtohavelostinsomedegreetheearlyspiritofzeal.'31

____________________

30 TayaZinkin,"'IndiaandMilitaryDictatorship'"(PacificAffairs,Vol.XXXII,No.1,March1959,pp.90-91);cf.K.M.Pannikar,CommonSenseaboutIndia,Chap.III.

31 DennisAustin,op.cit.

-235-

Secondlyitisnoeasythingtopreventsuchpartiesfrombreakingup.Theytrytobeallthingstoallmen;theyseektoincorporateallimportantorganizedsectionsofopinion:theyseektodominateandpoliticizeallpoliticallyimportantvoluntarybodiesoutsidetheirranks.Intryingtoaccommodatealltheseinterest-groups,theMexicanP.R.I.haslurchedfromlefttoright,buthasheldtogether.TheTurkishPeople'sPartydidnot,andwasfinallyconstrainedtoallowitsdissidentstohiveoffandformtheDemocraticParty--withdisastrousresultsfifteenyearslater.TheBurmeseA.F.P.F.L.splitintotwofactionsin1958andsopromptedthemilitaryinterventionofGeneralNeWin.ThePakistanMuslimLeaguesplinteredintoknotsofpoliticianscarryingonapurposelessgameofgeneralpost.AndatthemomentofwritingtheGhanaianC.P.P.ispassingthroughanacutecrisis,whichmusteitherleadtoasplitorapurge.(ThearrestwithouttrialoffiftyofNkrumah'sopponentswhichaccompaniedthiscrisiswassignificantinthathalfofthosearrestedhad,tillrecently,beenkeensupportersofthegovernment.)

Inanycase,bynomeansallnewstatesstartoffwithsuchdominantpartysystems.ThiswasunknowninLatinAmericaandtheBalkans,uncommonintheNearEast.Amongthemorerecentstates,theSudan,Nigeria,theCongoandsomehalf-dozenoftheex-Frenchterritorieshavemulti-partysystemsandwillsoonbejoinedbyUgandaandKenya.InAsia,CeylonandIndonesiahavemulti-partysystems.Theselistsareillustrative,notexhaustive.Inthesecountriesthemulti-partysystemstendtoinstitutionalizeanddeepenthepre-existingsocial,ethnic,religiousandtribaldivisionsinsociety.Theyenfeebleauthorityandrenderitunintelligible.InIndonesia,wherethesoleunifyingforceingovernmentisthepersonalityofSukarno,hisrecentactivitiesprovideagrotesquecommentaryonmulti-partyisminanewanddividedstate.The1955electionsprovidedalegislaturecomposedofSukarno'sownP.N.I.,theMuslimMasjumiParty,thentheMuslimUlamaParty,andinadditionthecommunists,thesocialists,theChristianPartyandtheCatholicParty.Between1957and1959,theislandsrevoltedagainstJava,andeffectivepoliticalcontrolhadtobehandedovertothecentralgovernment'smilitaryforces.By1959thePresidentwastellinghisfour-year-oldConstituentAssembly(stillworkingoutthenewconstitution)thathewantedaPresidentialcabinettorule'withoutinterferenceoroppositionasconceivedbythesystemofliberaldemocracy'32--averyunderstandabledesire.SincetheCon-

____________________

32

'PresidentSoekarno,saidtodaythatpoliticalandeconomicliberalismweremotherandchildtogrowingcapitalismwhichultimatelywouldresorttoFascism.Thiswascapitalism'slastefforttopreserveitself."WedonotwantFascism",hesaidwhenopeninghisnewly-nominatedParliament."ThisiswhywebroughtliberalizationtoanendandreplaceditwithGotang-Rojōng(mutualhelp)democracy".'(DailyTelegraph,August17,1960).Thisremindsmeof'Kingfish'HueyLong,theGovernor(anddictator)ofLouisiana.'Senator,'askedanewspapercorrespondent,duringthe1930s,'Senator,doyouthinkwe'regoingtogetFascism?''Sure,'repliedtheSenator,'butwe'llcallitanti-Fascism.'

-236-

stituentdemurred,hedissolvedit.HethenproceededtoformanewcabinetinwhichtheChiefsofStaffweresignificantlyincluded,andpersonallynominatedanewlegislaturefromwhichhisopponents,theMasjumiandSocialistpartieswereexcluded.Finallyhebannedthesepartiesaltogetherandsubjectedallpoliticalactivitiestotightgovernmentcontrol.HisnewsystemisitselfunderpinnedonlybyatacitaccordbetweenSukarno'sownparty(P.N.I.),theCommunistPartyandthearmy,andthetensionbetweenthelasttwoisincreasing.Thisunstablesituationwillalmostcertainlybepunctuated,ifnotterminated,byalternatecommunistandmilitarybidsforsupremepower.

Undereitheralternative,then--whetherofopenor'guided'democracy--thelikelihoodofsocialdisintegrationisverygreat.Thelegitimacyofthegoverningbodyisindispute,theproceduresunintelligible,andthesocietyisrivenbymutuallyincompatiblefactions.Thesearesocietieslivingontheedgeofovertcrisis,liabletoeruptassoonastheinitialeuphoriaofliberationdiesdownanditssymbolstarnish.Insuchcircumstanceseitherthegovernmentbecomesamerespectatorwhileopposinggroupsteareachothertopieces,orelse,consciousofitsresponsibilities,itsummonsthearmytoitssupportandcrushesthesefactionsdown.Nowwehaverunintothesesituationsbefore.ThefirstisatypicalPrimodeRiveraorAyubKhansituation('aperfectlygoodcountryhasbeenturnedintoalaughingstock').Insituationslikethis,soonerorlaterevenanarmytrainedintheBritishtraditionofpoliticalneutralitywillactlikeonetrainedintheSpanishtraditionsofsuperciliousintermeddling,andwillsupplantthecivilpower.ThesecondisatypicalVonSeecktsituation.Itslifeentirelydependentonthearmy,thegovernmentbecomesamerepawnandthearmyexercisesindirectrule,byblackmailorpressure.

Thethirdalternative,attemptedcommunization,isatpresentonlylikelytobringaboutanidenticalresult,butmorequickly.Formost

-237-

governments,mostpopulationsand--notunexpectedly,therefore-mostarmies,today,communismisstillunattractive:sounattractivethattheyarepreparedtofightit.Examplestothecontraryexistbutsofartherearenotmany.CommunistsuccessinLaos,forinstance,isduetotheRoyalLaotianArmy'slackofoffensive(andevendefensive)spiritagainstthePathetLao.Intime,stillmoregovernmentsandpopulationsandarmiesmaybecomeindifferent.Atthemoment,however,thecommunistchallengeappearstogovernmentandarmyasmerelyonemoredivisiveorrebelliousfactoramongalltheothers.Onpastform,thecommunistchallengetakestheshapeofeitheraformidablepartychallenge(asinIndonesia);orapowerfulgripoverworkers'andpeasants'organizations(China,NorthIndochina,Greece,Guatemala);orarmedinsurrection;oralltogether-asinBurma,VietnamandGreece.Mostgovernmentsinthenewstatesthereforeseecommunistsasanotherofthedivisiveforcesinsociety,alongwithtribalismandcommunalismandsoforth.Aslongastheydoso,thecommunistchallengewillsimplypushthegovernmentintothehandsofthemilitary,andevengivethemilitaryboththereasonandtheopportunitytosupplantcivilianinstitutionsaltogether.Communistvictoryislikelytotakeplace,forthemoment,onlyintheareaswhereSovietRussiaandChinaenjoyafavourablegeographicalposition.Allthismaychange,andwouldcertainlydosoiftheworldbalancetippedinfavouroftheEast.

Ofallthealternativesthereforethemostprobableissomeformorotherofmilitaryintervention--possiblyindirector'dual',butmoreoftenthannotovertanddirect.Wedonotmeanthiswillbecomeauniversalpattern.Itwouldbesurprisingifoneortwoofthenewstatesdidnotmakeasuccessofsomekindofopendemocracy,andstillmoreofsomevariantofone-partyrule,whilesomefringeterritoriesarelikelytobeoverrunbycommunism.Wemeannomore--butcertainlynoless--thanthatmilitaryintervention,ofwhichweareevennowseeingagooddeal,willnotonlycontinuebutbecomeverymuchmorecommon.Thearrivalinthesecountriesofnationalismandtheprincipleofpopularsovereignty,togetherwiththepresenceofastandingarmy,hasrenderedthemjustasliabletomilitaryinterventionofthemoderntypeastheEuropeanlandsfromwhichtheseprinciplesoriginated;whiletheinherentfragmentation

theirsocieties,theirlackofconsensus,andtheshallowpopularbasisoftheirnewinstitutions,makethemmuchmorevulnerabletotheconsequencesofnationalism,popularsovereigntyandstanding

-238-

armiesthantheEuropeanoriginals--certainlynotlessvulnerablethanSpainandPortugalandGermany.

Thiswillseemmorethanharshtothemanygenerous-mindedwesternerswhoseeinthenewstatesofAsiaandparticularlyAfricaanewbirthoffreedom,apristinepoliticalinnocencenowthatthemireofcolonialismhasatlastbeensloughedoff.'Theworld'sgreatagebeginsanew,thegoldenyearsreturn.'Tothemitmaysmack,notofamelancholyscepticismbutsomeironicschadenfreude,orwhatisworse,racialism.

Buttosaythatasocietyisreadyandabletogovernitselfisnotthesameassayingthatitspeoplearereadytogovernthemselves.Itmaymeansimplythatafewofitspeoplearejustascapableofgoverningthemassasweretheadministratorsandagentsoftheimperialpower.Andinmostcasesthisisjustwhatitdoesmean.WhatisthemilitarydictatorshipofPakistan33andtheSudanbutGovernorGeneral'srulewithanativeinsteadofaBritishGovernor-Generalandarmy?WhatisthepatternofruleintheMiddleEastbutareversiontotheOttomanandMamelukepattern--acombinationofamilitaryoligarchy,thepermanentofficials,andthe'learned'class.34WhatisthepatternofruleinThailandbuttheruleofabsolutemonarchyredivivus,withasoldierinsteadofthemonarchexercisingabsolutepoweroveratraditionalsociety?WhatisandhasbeenthepatterninmostLatinAmericanRepublicsbutviceregalauthoritywritlargeinthehandsofall-powerfulPresidents?Formsofgovernment(nolessthantheories,asSirHenryMainewouldhaveit)possessthatfacultyoftheherointheBorderballad-'whenhislegsweresmittenoff,hefoughtuponhisstumps'.

TheLatinAmericanstateshavebeenahundred-and-fiftyyearsinthemaking:mostofthemarestillhalfmade,stillunstable.TheBalkanstateswithabouthalfthatlifespanuntilabsorbedbytheSovietUnionwerestill,attheendoftheprocess,imperfectnationsrockedbyinstabilityandmilitaryintervention.WiththeexceptionofLebanonalltheArabstatesoftheMiddleEasthavesuccumbedtomilitaryrule.ExceptforIndiaandthePhilippines(Malayaistoorecentanexample)nonewstateinSouthandSouth-EastAsiaisstable,PakistanandSiamandBurmahaveexperiencedmilitary

____________________33 Nowexpired,infavourofthenewconstitution.

34 A.Hourani,"'TheDeclineoftheWestintheMiddleEast'"(InternationalAffairs,April1953,p.180).

-239-

rule,andone,Indonesia,isindissolution.TheAfricanstates,inbeingandtobe,areunlikelytoenjoyadifferentfate.Theirsocietiesarenomorecoherentandtheireconomiesnomoreadvancedthanthoseoftheirpredecessorsinindependence.Andthereisabsolutelynoreasontosupposethattheypossessagreaterpoliticalcapacitythanotherculturesandnations.ThepasthistoryofHaiti,LiberiaandEthiopiahardlyencouragesthatbelief.

Andthisistoreckonwithoutmimesis.Amongunstablestates,particularlythosewitharageforinnovation,militaryinterventionhasprovedtobehighlycontagious.Totakebutafewexamples,ofrecentdate,thereisgoodevidencethatitwasthesuccessofPerónin1945thatinspiredthewaveofmilitaryrevoltsinParaguay(1947),Peru(1948)andVenezuela(1948).The1936revoltofBakrSidqiinIraqwasinspiredbyAtatürk'sexampleandledtothesuccessionofcoupandcounter-coupbetween1936and1941.TheEgyptianmilitaryrevolutionof1952providedtheinspirationfortheabortivecoupinJordanin1957andthesuccessfulonesinSudanandIraqin1958.Likewise,theIraqicoup,thedictatorshipofNeWininBurma,andthecircumstancesofGeneraldeGaulle'saccessiontopowerin1958affordedwelcomeprecedentsforGeneralAyubKhan'sdictatorshipinPakistan.

Inalllikelihood,then,thoseofthenewstateswhicharenotovertakenbytotalitarianismandattractedintotheRussianandChineseorbits,willoscillateforalongtimetocomebetweenmilitaryrégimesandcivilianrestorations.ThepastpatternsofLatinAmericaandtheMiddleEastarelikelytooccurintheneweststatesinAsiaandinAfrica.

Atthispointweoughttoconclude.But,preciselyatthispointthequestionofvaluesissuretoberaised.'Arethesedictatorshipsandrevoltsandpressuresdesirable?'itwillbeasked.'Aretheygoodorbad?'Now,firstofall,itisnopartofthisstudytoanswersuchquestions;wehavetriedtoexplainwhyandhowthisworldpatternofmilitaryinterventionhasarisenandwhyitthrives.However,evenifweweredisposedtotrytoanswersuchquestions,thereisnoscientificcanonbywhichtodoso.Ouranswerwoulddependonapriordisposition,entirelysubjective,astowhatgoalsweregardasmostimportant.Therearesometodaywhoarewillingtooverlookthedespoticnatureofanyrégimeprovidingthatitactsorclaimsto

-240-

actinthenameofthemasses;orthatitpurportedly'raisesthestandardofliving';orthatitservesthecauseofanti-colonialism,etc.Thereareotherswho,onthecontrary,willrefusetoextenuateanydespotismwhateveronthehighgroundthatitistheantithesisoflibertyandjustice.

Fourthingsmayhoweverbefairlysaid.Thefirstisthatinalargenumberofcasesthefrequencyofmilitaryinterventionisaproofthatthesocietyisasyetpoliticallyimmatureandunfitforrepresentativeinstitutions.JohnStuartMill,forwhomrepresentativegovernmentwas'theideallybestformofpolity',washimselfalmostover-eagertoassertthis.Ifthepeoplearenotreadytofightfortheseinstitutions,iftheyaretoolittlevaluedforthis,hewrote,theyseldomacquireafooting;andeveniftheydothey'aresuretobeoverthrownassoonastheheadofthegovernmentoranypartyleaderwhocanmusterforceforacoupdemainiswillingtorunsomesmallriskforabsolutepower'.Unlessthepeopleareabletotakesufficientinterestinpublicmatterstopermitapublicopiniontoform,the'selfishandsordidfactions'whicharisebytheflatteringandbriberyoftheirpoliticallyunselfconsciousfellowelectorscan,asinSpanishAmerica,'keepthecountryinastateofchronicviolenceandcivilwar'.'Adespotism,notevenlegalbutofillegalviolence,willbealternatelyexercisedbyasuccessionofpoliticaladventurersandthenamesandformofrepresentationwillhavenoeffectbuttopreventdespotismfromattainingthestabilityandsecuritybywhichalonetheevilscanbemitigatedanditsfewadvantagesrealized.'35Millrecognizedthe'necessity'ofsomedespoticrégimes;buthesawthemforwhattheywere,asapisaller.Hedidnot,liketoday'spimpsoftyranny,pretendthatthedespotismwassuperiortothesystemofrepresentativegovernment;andnordowe.

However,secondly,inalargenumberofthecaseswehavecited,thecorporateself-interestofthemilitaryhasitselfsignallycontributedtothispoliticalimmaturity.Ifinsomecases,likethatofAtatürk,militaryinterventionhasbeentutelaryandconstitutive,inthevastmajorityofcasesithasnot.Earlierinthisbookweanalysedthemixedmotivesofthemilitary.Itisforthereadertomakehisownjudgement;butinours,inavastnumberofcasesthisinterventionhasbeenlittleornothingmorethananattemptuponfeeblebut

____________________35 J.S.Mill,RepresentativeGovernment,EverymanEd.,p.220.Ihavechangedthetense.

-241-

neverthelessoperativecivilianinstitutionsbyasmallgroupofwilfulmenarmedwithlethalweapons,nurturedinarrogance,andprickedonbypride,ambition,self-interestandrevenge.

Thirdly,whateverthemotive,theresultissomeform-directorindirect-ofcorporatedespotism.Whateverourviewsontheendswhichsuchrégimesmayserve,andhoweverdesirablethesemayseemtobe,wehavetheduty,firstandlast,atleasttorecognizethemforwhattheyare:asdespotisms.Yethereisalistofofficial'styles'withwhichsomeofourdespotshavedecoratedtheirrégimes:

Nasser: PresidentialDemocracyAyubKhan: BasicDemocracySukarno: GuidedDemocracyFranco: OrganicDemocracyStroessner: SelectiveDemocracyTrujillo: Neo-Democracy

Theonestylemissinghereis'democracy',withoutqualification.

Lastlyoneoughttocontemplatethemorecommonoftheexcusesformilitaryinterventioninahighlycriticalspirit:someofthemaremorethanusuallyspecious.Acommonjustification,forinstance,isthattheinterventionwasdesirableinordertopreserveorderinahighlydisturbedpoliticalsituation.Soitwellmightbe,butonemustfirstinquirewhetherthisresultcouldnothavebeenachievedbythemilitarycomingtotheaidofthecivilpowerinsteadofattackingandsupplantingit,asinSpainorPakistanorBurma.Anothercommonexcuseisthatthemilitaryrégimehascreatedgreatersocialequalityandmaterialprosperitythanitscivilianpredecessor.Again,thismaybetrueinparticularcases;butoneoughttobearinmindthattherearefewmilitaryrégimesofwhichthiscanbeunequivocallyasserted,whiletherearenumerousexamples-therégimesofArbenz,orRojasPinilla,orJiménezorPerónorKassim,forinstance-wheretheeffectwasthedisorderifnottheruinoftheeconomy.Byanyworldstandardsmilitaryrégimeshaveshownlessthanaveragecapacityforstatesmanshiporeconomics.Andyet,evenifitcouldbeshownwithoutdoubtthatthemilitaryinterventionhadindeedbroughtmaterialwellbeingandpoliticalstabilitytoacountry,itisnecessarytoaskonefinal,becausetranscendentlyimportant,question:whethertheshort-termpoliticalandeconomicgainisnotlikelytobeoverbalancedbyalonger-termcatastrophe?For,inmostcases,militaryinterventionhasputastoptocon-

-242-

stitutionalevolution.Wehaveseenthatthemilitaryengageinpoliticswithrelativehastebutdisengage,ifatall,withthegreatestreluctance.Armedforcesortheleaderswhomtheyhaveraisedtopowerhaveindeedbeenknowntowithdrawfromactivepoliticsandretireintoascrupulousneutrality;but,inthehistoricalrecord,theseareveryrare.Moreusualisthesituationdescribedearlierinthisbook:thosearmedforcesthathavetriedtodisengagefrompoliticshavehadtohastenbackassoonastheirquondampoliticalenemiescamewithinsightofregainingpower,whilethosethathaveelectedtoremainandrulehavebeenejectedonlybypopularrevolt,orbyfurthermilitaryrevoltsoftheirownmalcontents.Inmostcasesthemilitarythathaveintervenedinpoliticsareinadilemma:whethertheirrulebeindirectorwhetheritbedirect,theycannotwithdrawfromrulershipnorcantheyfullylegitimizeit.Theycanneitherstaynorgo.Ifeverweareaskedtoendorseamilitaryrégime,therefore,wemustsurelyaskourselveswhetheranyimmediategaininstabilityandprosperityitbringsisnotoverweighedbytheverygreatlikelihoodthat,foranindefinitetimetocome,publiclifeandallthepersonalexpectationsthathanguponitwillcontinuetobeupset,wilfullyandunpredictably,byfurthermilitarythreats,blackmailorrevolt.

Therestillremainthoseverynumerouscaseswhere,aswehaveseen,themilitaryaresopowerfulandthecivilianforcessoinchoateandfeeblethat,comewhatmay,themilitaryareboundtodominatepolitics.Here,wearenotcalledontoendorseanything.Wearemerelycalledontoattesttoafact.Whateverourprivateopinionsoftheserégimes,wehavetorecognizethatthestateofsocietymakestheminevitable.Ourattitudetothemcanonlybe,inDante'swords,

...comecoluichepiangeedice.

-243-

[Thispageintentionallyleftblank.]-244-

BibliographyThisbibliographyisnotintendedtobecomprehensive.Itis,principally,alistofthebooksandarticlescitedinthetext.TothisIhaveaddedthetitlesofcertainotherworkswhichIfoundparticularlyusefulforbackground,orforestablishingsomespecificpointmentionedinthetext.

Fortheperiodsince1958,andalsoforsomeepisodespriortothatdate,Ihavebasedmynarrativeandmyinferencesonthefilesoftheperiodicalscitedbelow.

STANDARDWORKSOFREFERENCETheAnnualRegister. TheMiddleEast,1961('Europa'EncyclopaediaBritannica publications).EnciclopediaIllustradaUniversel Keesing'sContemporaryArchives.(Madrid). TheStatesman'sYearBook.

PERIODICALSTheDailyTelegraph. TheTimes.TheEconomist. TheWorldToday(RoyalInstituteTheNewYorkTimes. ofInternationalAffairs,TimeMagazine. London).

THEMILITARY:ORGANIZATION,ANDGENERALCONSIDERATIONS

ANDREZEJEWSKIStanislaw MilitaryOrganizationandSociety,London,1954.

AnnalsoftheAmericanAcademyofPoliticalScience MilitaryGovernment,Vol267,1950.

FERREROGuglielmo Militarism,London,1902.

FREEMANF.D. TheArmyasaSocialStructure(SocialForces,Vol.27,1948-9).

HOWARDMichael(Ed) SoldiersandGovernments:NineStudiesinCivil-MilitaryRelations,London,1957.

HUNTINGTONSamuelPhillipsTheSoldierandtheState:theTheoryandPracticeofCivil-MilitaryRelations,Harvard,1957.

IRIBARNEM.F.

LaCoordinationdelaPolitiqueExterieureetdelaPolitiqueMilitaire(Mimeo)(WorldCongressoftheInternationalPoliticalScienceAssociation,1961).

-245-

PAGEC.H. Bureaucracy'sOtherFace.(SocialForces,Vol.25,1946-7).

SPINDLERD.G. TheMilitary:ASystematicAnalysis(SocialForces,Vol.27,1948-9).

VAGTSAlfred AHistoryofMilitarism:CivilianandMilitary,London,1959.

AFRICANCOUNTRIES

APTERDavidE.TheRôleofTraditionalisminthePoliticalModernizationofGhanaandUganda(WorldPolitics,Vol.13,1960).

AUSTINDennis PartiesinGhana,1949-1960.(Mimeo)(BritishPoliticalStudiesAssociationConferencepaper).

BRETTONH.L.

PoliticalProblemsofPoly-ethnicSocietiesinWestAfrica(Mimeo)(WorldCongress,InternationalPoliticalScienceAssociation,1961).

DAVIESHezekiahOladipo Nigeria,TheProspectsforDemocracy,London,1961.

HAILEYWilliamM.Lord

AnAfricanSurvey(Revised,1956),London,1957.

HODGKINThomasLoveNationalisminColonialAfrica,London,1956.AfricanPoliticalParties,London,1961.

HOLTP.M. AModernHistoryoftheSudan,London,1961.KIMBLEGeorgeH.T. TropicalAfrica,2vols.,NewYork,1961.

LEGUMColin Pan-Africanism,London,1962;NewYork,1962.

NKRUMAHKwame ISpeakofFreedom:AStatementofAfricanIdeology,London,1961.

SCHACHTERRuth Single-partySystemsinWestAfrica(AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,Vol.45,1961.)

SEGALRonald PoliticalAfrica:AWho'sWhoofPersonalitiesandParties,London,1961.

BRITAINALANBROOKEAlanFrancisBrooke,Viscount(Ed.A.Bryant)

TheTurnoftheTide,London,1957.TriumphintheWest,London,1959.

BANNINGStephenThomas(RevisedP.G.Clark) MilitaryLaw,Aldershot,1954.

BEAVERBROOKWilliamMaxwellAitken,Lord

PoliticiansandtheWar,1914-1916,London,1928.MenandPower,1917-1918,London,1956.

HANKEYMauricePascalAlersHankey TheSupremeCommand,2vols.,London,1961.

,Lord

-246-

HOWARDMichael

SomeReflectionsonDefenceOrganizationinGreatBritainandtheU.S.A.(Mimeo)(RoundTableonCivil-MilitaryRelations,InternationalPoliticalScienceAssociation,1959).Civil-MilitaryRelationsinGreatBritainandtheU.S.A.,1954-1958(AmericanPoliticalScienceQuarterly,Vol.55,1960.)

ISMAYHastingsLionelIsmay,Lord Memoirs,London,1960.

JOHNSONFranklynDefencebyCommittee:TheBritishCommitteeArthurofImperialDefence,1855-1959,London,1960.

LLOYDDavidGEORGE WarMemoirsofDavidLloydGeorge,London,1938.

MAGNUSSirPhilip Kitchener,London,1961.MONTGOMERYBernardLaw,Viscount Memoirs,London,1958.

MARDERA.J. FromtheDreadnoughttoScapaFlow,Vol.1,London,1961.

RYANA.P. MutinyattheCurragh,London,1956.THOMASHugh TheStoryofSandhurst,London,1961.

TURNERErnestSackville GallantGentleman:APortraitoftheBritishOfficer,1600-1956,London,1956.

WILLIAMST.D.

AspectsofStrategyandForeignPolicyandTheirInfluenceonCivil-MilitaryRelations.(Mimeo)(RoundTableonCivil-MilitaryRelations,InternationalPoliticalScienceAssociation,1960).

FRANCEBRACERichardandJoan OrdealinAlgeria,Princeton,1960.

BRINTONCrane ADecadeofRevolution,1789-1799,NewYork,1934.

BROMBERGERMerryandSerge LesTreizeComplotsduTreizeMai,Paris,1959.BarricadesetColonels,Paris,1960.

BRUUNG. EuropeandtheFrenchImperium,1799-1814,NewYork,1938.

CHAPMANGuy TheDreyfusCase,London,1955.

CLARKEMichaelK. AlgeriainTurmoil:AHistoryoftheRebellion,London,1960.

GOODWINAlbert TheFrenchRevolution,London,1953.

GIRARDETRaoul

LaSocietéMilitairedanslaFranceContemporaine,Paris,1953.PouvoirCiviletPouvoirMilitairedanslaFranceContemporaine(RevueFrançaisede

SciencePolitique,Vol.10,1960).

-247-

HUGOVictor NapoleontheSmall,London,1952.

KELLYGeorgeA.TheFrenchArmyRe-entersPolitics.(AmericanPoliticalScienceQuarterly,Vol.56,1961).

LARTEGUEYJ.LesMercenaires,Paris,ND.LesCenturions,Paris,1960.LesPretoriens,Paris,1961.

MACRIDISR.,andBROWNB.E. TheDeGaulleRepublic,Illinois,1960.

PALMERRobertBoswellTheAgeoftheDemocraticRevolution:APoliticalHistoryofEuropeandAmerica,1760-1800,Princeton,1959.

STAEL-HOLSTEINAnneLouiseGermaine,Baronnede LaRevolutionFrançaise,Paris,1821.

THOMPSONJamesMatthew TheFrenchRevolution(3rdEdition),Oxford,1947.NapoleonBonaparte:HisRiseandFall,Oxford,1952.

VANDALAlbert L'AvènementdeNapoléon,2vols.,Paris,1905-7.WERTHAlexander TheDeGaulleRevolution,London,1960.

WILLIAMSPhilip AlgerianTragedy(Encounter,Vol.88,1961).TheFrenchArmy(Encounter,Vol.99,1961).

--andHARRISONMartin DeGaulle'sRepublic,London,1960.GERMANY

BENOIST-MÉCHINJ.G.P.M. Histoiredel'ArméeAllemande,Paris,1936.

COPERRudolf FailureofaRevolution:Germanyin1918-1919,London,1955.

CRAIGGordonAlexander ThePoliticsofthePrussianArmy,1640-1945,Oxford,1955.

GORDONHaroldJ. TheReichswehrandtheGermanRepublic,1919-1926,Princeton,1957.

GÖRLITSWalter TheGermanGeneralStaff,London,1953.TAYLORAlanJ.P. Bismarck,London,1955.TAYLORTelford SwordandSwastika,London,1952

WHEELER-BENNETJohn TheNemesisofPower:TheGermanArmyinPolitics,London,1953.

TheWoodenTitan:Hindenburg,London,1936.

EASTERNEUROPEANDTHEBALKANS

DELLINL.A.D.(Ed.) Bulgaria,NewYork,1957.

DJILASMilovan LandWithoutJustice:AnAutobiographyofhisYouth,London,1958.

-248-

FORSTEREdward AShortHistoryofModernGreece(3rdSeymourEdition),London,1958.

MUATOVICHChedomilARoyalTragedy,BeingtheStoryoftheAssassinationofKingAlexanderandQueenDragaofServia,London,1906.

ROUCEKJosephSlabey ThePoliticsoftheBalkans,NewYork,1939.BalkanPolitics,Stanford,1948.

SETON-WATSONHughEasternEuropeBetweentheWars(2ndEdition),Cambridge,1945.TheFastEuropeanRevolution,London,1950.

STAVRIANOSLeftenStavros TheBalkanssince1453,NewYork,1958.PORTUGAL

LIVERMOREHaroldVictor AHistoryofPortugal,Cambridge,1947.

OLIVEIRAAntoniodeSALAZAR ElPensamientodelaRevolutionNacional,BuenosAires,1938.

SPAIN

AGESTALuisSanchez HistoriadelConstitucionalismoEspañol,Madrid,1955.

BORKENAUFranz TheSpanishCockpit,London,1937.

BRENANGeraldTheSpanishLabyrinth(2ndEdition),Cambridge,1950.TheFaceofSpain,London,1950.

MADARIAGASalvadorde Spain(2ndEdition),London,1942.

MARVAUDAngel L'Espagneau2iemeSiécle;EtudePolitiqueetEconomique,Paris,1913.

MARXKarl,andENGELSFrederick RevolutioninSpain,London,1939.

ORTEGAYJoséGASSETEspañaInvertebrada(5thEdition)Madrid,1948.TheRevoltoftheMasses,NewYork,1932.

PEERSEdgarAllison TheSpanishTragedy,1930-1936(3rdEdition),London,1936.

RAMOSAntonioOLIVEIRA Politics,EconomicsandMenofContemporarySpain,London,1946.

RUIZAntonioVILAPLANA BurgosJustice:AYear'sExperienceofNationalistSpain,London,1938.

THOMASHugh TheSpanishCivilWar,London,1961.WHITAKERArthurP. SpainandtheDefenceoftheWest,NewYork,1961.

------ GermanyandtheSpanishCivilWar.DocumentsonGermanForeignPolicy,SeriesD,Vol.III,H.M.S.O.,London,1951.

-249-

JAPAN

COLEGROVEK. TheJapaneseCabinet(AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,Vol.30,1936).

GREWJosephE. TenYearsinJapan,London,1944.KASEToshikazu EclipseoftheRisingSun,London1951.LINEBARGERPaulMyron(Ed.)

FarEasternGovernmentsandPolitics-ChinaandJapan,NewYork,1954.

MAXONY.C. ControlofJapaneseForeignPolicy,UniversityofCalifornia,1957.

MICHAELFranzHenry,andTAYLOREdwardGeorge

TheFarEastintheModernWorld,NewYork,1956.

MORRISIvanI. NationalismandtheRightWinginJapan,London,1960.

OKAKURAKakuzo TheAwakeningofJapan,London,1905.QUIGLEYHaroldScott,andTURNERJohnElliott

TheNewJapan:GovernmentandPolitics,Minneapolis,1956.

REISCHAUERRobertKarl Japan:Government-Politics,NewYork,1939.

SHIGEMITSUMamoru JapanandHerDestiny:MyStruggleforPeace,London,1958.

STORRYRichard TheDoublePatriots,London,1957.

WAKEFIELDHarold NewPathsforJapan,London,1948.

YINAGAC.TheMilitaryandtheGovernmentinJapan(AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,Vol.35,1946).

------ ForeignRelationsoftheUnitedStates,Vols.IVandV,1937.Washington,U.S.DepartmentofState,1954-5.

UNITEDSTATESOFAMERICA

GAVINLt.-Gen.J.M. WarandPeaceintheSpaceAge,NewYork,1958.

HUNTINGTONSamuelPhillips

Inter-serviceCompetitionandthePoliticalRôleoftheArmedServices(AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,Vol.45,1960.)StrategicDecisionMakingintheU.S.A.(Mimeo)(RoundTableonCivil-MilitaryRelations,InternationalPoliticalScienceAssociation,1959).

JANOWITZM. TheProfessionalSoldier,Glencoe,Illinois,1960.

MILLISWalter

ArmsandMen:AStudyinAmericanMilitaryHistory,NewYork,1956.ArmsandtheState:Civil-MilitaryElementsinNationalPolicy,NewYork,1958.

-250-

SAPINBurtonM.,andSNYDERRichardCarlton

TheRôleoftheMilitaryinAmericanForeignPolicy,NewYork,1954.

SCHLESINGERA.M.,andROVERERichard TheGeneralandthePresident,London,1952.

TAYLORGeneralMaxwellDavenport TheUncertainTrumpet,NewYork,1960.UNIONOFSOCIALISTSOVIETREPUBLICSBERMANH.J.,andKERNERN.

SovietMilitaryLawandAdministration,Cam-bridge,Mass.,1955.

BRZEZINSKIZ. PoliticalControlsintheSovietArmy,NewYork,1954.

CONQUESTRobert PowerandPolicyintheU.S.S.R.,London,1961.

DINERSTEINH.S. WarandtheSovietUnion,London,1959.ERICKSONJ. TheSovietHighCommand,London,1962.

GARTHOFFRaymondJ.HowRussiaMakesWar,London,1954.SovietStrategyintheNuclearAge,London,1958.

HARTCaptainLiddell(Ed.) TheSovietArmy,London,1956.

INKELESAlex,andBAUERRaymondA.

TheSovietCitizen:DailyLifeinaTotalitarianSociety,Cambridge,Mass.,1959.

POOLIthieldeSola SatelliteGenerals:AStudyofMilitaryElitesintheSovietSphere,Stanford,1955.

SCHAPIROLeonard TheCommunistPartyoftheSovietUnion,London,1959.TheU.S.S.R.TodayandTomorrow,Moscow,1959.HistoryoftheCommunistPartyoftheSovietUnion,Moscow,1960.

LATINAMERICAGENERALLYADAMSRichardNewbold(Ed.) SocialChangeinLatinAmerica,NewYork,1960.ALEXANDERRobertJackson,andPORTERC.O.

CommunisminLatinAmerica,NewJersey,1957.TheStruggleforDemocracyinLatinAmerica,NewYork,1961.

AnnalsoftheAmericanAcademyofPoliticalandSocialScience

LatinAmerica'sNationalisticRevolutions,Vol.334,1961.

BAILEYHelenMiller,andNASATIRAbrahamPhineas

LatinAmerica:TheDevelopmentofItsCivili-zation,NewJersey,1960.

-251-

BLANKSTENGeorgeI. PoliticalGroupsinLatinAmerica(AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,Vol.53,1959).

BRYCEJames SouthAmerica,London,1912.

DAVISHaroldEugene(Ed.) GovernmentandPoliticsinLatinAmerica,NewYork,1958.

FERGUSONHalcro TheBalanceofRaceRedressed,London,1961.

FITZGIBBONRussellNumke(Ed.),andJOHNSONKennethF.

TheConstitutionsoftheAmericas,asofJanuary1st,1948,Chicago,1948.MeasurementofLatinAmericanPoliticalChange(AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,Vol.55,1961).

GARCIAFranciscoCALDERON LatinAmerica:ItsRiseandProgress,London,1913.GILFedericoGuillermo,andPIERSONWilliamWhatley GovernmentsofLatinAmerica,NewYork,1957.

HANKELewisUlysses ModernLatinAmerica,2vols.,NewYork,1959.

JOHNSONJohnJ. PoliticalChangeinLatinAmerica,Stanford,1958.

LIEUWENRobert ArmsandPoliticsinLatinAmerica,NewYork,1960.

MACDONALDAustinFaulks LatinAmericanPoliticsandGovernment,NewYork,1954.RIPPYJamesFred LatinAmerica:AModernHistory,Michigan,1958.

STOKESWilliamS. ViolenceasaPowerFactorinLatinAmericanPolitics(WesternPoliticalQuarterly,Vol.5,1952).

SZULCT. TwilightoftheTyrants,NewYork,1962.

UCAZAJullioTIGERINO SociologiadelaPoliticaHispano-Americana,Madrid,1950.

ArgentinaALEXANDERRobertJackson ThePerónEra,NewYork,1951.BLANKSTENGeorgeI. Perón'sArgentina,Chicago,1953.BRUCEJames ThesePerplexingArgentines,NewYork,1953.JOSEPHSRay ArgentineDiary,NewYork,1944.KELLYSirDavid TheRulingFew,London,1952.PENDLEGeorge Argentina(2ndEdition),London,1961.

SARMIENTOD.F. DonFacundo,orLifeintheArgentineRepublic,Trs.Mrs.H.Mann,NewYork,1960.

BoliviaALEXANDERRobertJackson TheBolivianNationalRevolution,NewJersey,1958.

-252-

Brazil

DACUNHAE. RebellionintheBacklands(Ossertoens),Chicago,1957.

HAMBLOCHErnest

HisMajestythePresident:AStudyofCon-stitutionalBrazil,London,1935.

HARRISMarvin TownandCountryinBrazil,NewYork,1956.LAMBERTJacques LeBrésil,Paris,1953.

MORAZÉCharles LesTroisAgesduBrésil:EssaidePolitique,Paris,1954.

ColombiaFLUHARTYV.L. DanceoftheMillions,Pittsburgh,1957.CubaFITZGIBBONRussellH. CubaandtheUnitedStates,Wisconsin,1935.

PHILLIPSRuby Cuba,IslandofParadox,NewYork,1959.GuatemalaSCHNEIDERRonaldM.

CommunisminGuatemala,1944-1954,NewYork,1958.

SILVERTKalmanHirsch

AStudyinGovernment:Guatemala,NewOrleans,1954.

TAYLORP.B. TheGuatemalanAffair:AcritiqueofU.S.ForeignPolicy(AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,Vol.51,1957).

HaitiBELLEGARDEDantes LaNationHaitienne,Paris,1938.

COMHOIREJ.L. ElCampesinoHaitiano,ysuGobierno(Cienciassociales,Vol.7,1956).

LEYBURNJamesG. TheHaitianPeople,Oxford,1941.

RODMANShelden Haiti,theBlackRepublic,NewYork,1954.Mexico

CLINEHowardF.C.

TheUnitedStatesandMexico,Cambridge,Mass.,1953.Mexico,RevolutiontoEvolution,Oxford,1962.

PADGETTL.U. Mexico'sOnePartySystem:ARevaluation(AmericanPoliticalScienceReview,Vol.51,1957).

SCOTTRobertEdwin

MexicanGovernmentinTransition,Illinois,1959.

SIMPSONL.B. ManyMexicos(3rdEdition),California,TANNENBAUMFrank

Mexico:TheStruggleforPeaceandBread,NewYork,1950.

Paraguay

RAINEPhilip Paraguay,NewJersey,1956.VenezuelaBÉTANCOURTRomulo Venezuela:PolitícayPetroleo,Mexico,1956.

ROURKEThomas(pseud.) Gomez,TyrantoftheAndes,NewYork,1936.

-253-

LOTTR.B. The1952VenezuelanElections(WesternPoliticalQuarterly,Vol.10,1957).MIDDLEEASTERNCOUNTRIESGENERALLY

BERGERMorroeTheMilitaryRégimesintheMiddleEast(Mimeo)(TheCongressforCulturalFreedom,Seminar,1960).

FISHERSydneyNettleton(Ed.) SocialForcesintheMiddleEast,Ithaca,NewYork,1955.

HUORANIAlbert TheDeclineoftheWestintheMiddleEast(InternationalAffairs,Vol.29,1953).

KIRKGeorge

ContemporaryArabPolitics,London,1961.TheMiddleEasternScene(YearbookofWorldAffairs,London,1960).PoliticalProblemsofSelectedPoly-ethnicSocietiesintheMiddleEast(Mimeo)(WorldCongress,InternationalPoliticalScienceAssociation,1961).

LAQUEURWalterZe'ev

CommunismandNationalismintheMiddleEast,London,1956.TheMiddleEastinTransition,London,1958.(Ed.)TheSovietUnionandtheMiddleEast,London,1959.

LERNERDaniel ThePassingofTraditionalSociety,Glencoe,Illinois.

MARLOWEJohn ArabNationalismandBritishImperialism,London,1961.

PARTNERPeter AShortPoliticalGuidetotheArabWorld,London,1960,NewYork,1960.

------ TheMiddleEast(3rdEdition),RoyalInstituteofInternationalAffairs,London,1958.

IraqBIRDWOODChristopherBromheadViscount

Nuri-es-Said:AStudyinArabLeadership,London,1959.

CARACTACUS(pseud.) RevolutioninIraq,London,1959.HARRISG.L.(Ed.) Iraq,NewHaven,1958.KHADDURIMajid IndependentIraq:AStudyinIraqiPolitics,London,1960.SyriaandJordanZIADEHA. SyriaandLebanon,London.PATAIRaphael TheKingdomofJordan,Princeaton,1958.TurkeyLERNERDaniel,andROBINSONRichardD.

SwordsandPloughshares:theTurkishArmyasaModernisingForce(WorldPolitics,Vol.13,1960).

-254-

LEWISBernardTheEmergenceofModernTurkey,London,1961.

LEWISGeoffreyL. Turkey(2ndEdition),NewYork,1960.

RAMSAUERErnestE.TheYoungTurks:PreludetotheRevolutionof1908,Princeton,1957.

RUSTOWDankwartA.TheArmyandtheFoundingoftheTurkishRepublic(WorldPolitics,Vol.11,1959).

TheUnitedArabRepublic(SouthernRegion:Egypt)

BARAWYRashidEl TheMilitaryCoupinEgypt,Cairo,1952.

HARRISG.L.(Ed.) Egypt,NewHaven,1957.LACOUTUREJeanandSimonne EgyptinTransition,London,1958.

NASSERGamalAbdul Egypt'sLiberation:ThePhilosophyoftheRevolution,Washington,D.C.,1955.

NEGUIBMohammed Egypt'sDestiny,London,1955.

PROCTORJ.H.

TheLegislativeActivityoftheEgyptianNationalAssembly,1957-1958(Parliamen-taryAffairs,Vol.13,1959-60).

VATIKIOTISP.J.TheEgyptianArmyinPolitics,Bloomington,Indiana,1961.

WHEELOCKKeithM. Nasser'sNewEgypt,London,1960.SOUTHANDSOUTH-EASTASIAGENERALLYBRIMMELLJackHenry CommunisminSouth-EastAsia,London,1959.

BUTWELLRichard SoutheastAsiaToday-andTomorrow,Lon-don,1962;NewYork,1961.

CARNELLF.G.PoliticalIdeasandIdeologiesinSouthandSouth-EastAsia(Mimeo)(BritishPoliticalStudiesAssociationConferencepaper,1960).

KAHINGeorgeMcTurnan GovernmentsandPoliticsofSouth-EastAsia,Ithaca,NewYork,1959.

MENDETibor South-EastAsiaBetweenTwoWorlds,London,1955.

ROSESaul SocialisminSouthernAsia,London,1959.THAYERPhilipW.,andPHILLIPSWilliamT. NationalismandProgressinFreeAsia,Baltimore,1956.

BurmaBUTWELLR.,andVONDERF. The1960GeneralElectioninBurma(PacificAffairs,Vol.

MELIDEN 33,1960.)

FURNIVALLJohnSydenham ColonialPolicyandPractice:AComparativeStudyofBurmaandNetherlandsIndia,Cambridge,1948.

PYELucian Politics,Personality,andNation-building:Burma'ssearchforidentity,Yale,1962.

TINKERHugh TheUnionofBurma(3rdEdition),Oxford,1961.

-255-

IndiaZINKINTaya IndiaandMilitaryDictatorship(PacificAffairs,Vol.32,1955).IndonesiaMOSSMANJames RebelsinParadise:Indonesia'sCivilWar,London,1961.

NASUTIONAbdulHaris

FundamentalsofGuerillaWarfareandtheIndonesianDefenceSystem,PastandFuture,Djakarta,1960.

WERTHEIMW.F. IndonesianSocietyinTransition,NewYork,1956.

Korea

ALLENR.C. SouthKorea,TheNewRégime(PacificAffairs,Vol.24,1961).

PakistanWINTGuy The1958RevolutioninPakistan.(St.Antony'sPapers,No.8,1960).SouthVietnamSCIGLIANOR. PoliticalPartiesinSouthVietnam(PacificAffairs,Vol.33,1960).Thailand

DARLINGF.C. MarshalSaritandAbsolutistRuleinThailand.(PacificAffairs,Vol.33,1960).

LANDONK.P. SiaminTransition,Shanghai,1939.THEFUTUREOFTHEEMERGENTNATIONSGENERALLYALMONDGabrielA.,andCOLEMANJamesS.(Ed.)

ThePoliticsoftheDevelopingAreas,Princeton,1960.

HAYESCarltonJ.H.TheHistoricalEvolutionofModernNationalism,NewYork,1949.Nationalism:AReligion,NewYork,1960.

KEDOURIEElie Nationalism,London,1960.

PARKINSONFrancisSocialDynamicsofUnder-developedCoun-tries(YearbookofWorldAffairs,London,1960).

RUSTOWDankwartA. NewHorizonsforComparativePolitics(WorldPolitics,Vol.9,1957.)

SHILSE.A. PoliticalDevelopmentsinNewStates(ComparativeStudiesinSociologyandHistory,Vol.2,1960).

POLITICALTHEORYHOBBESThomas TheLeviathan,Everymanedition,London.

-256-

LIPSETSeymour PoliticalMan,London,1961.MAINESirHenrySumner PopularGovernment,London,1885.MARXKarl,andENGELSFrederick

SelectedWorks,2Vols,London,1958.Correspondence,Moscow,1957.

MOSCAGaetano(Ed.LivingstonArthur)

TheRulingClass,NewYork,1939.HistoiredesDoctrinesPolitiques,Paris,1936.

PARETOVilfredo(Ed.LivingstonArthur)

TheMindandSociety,4Vols.,NewYork,1935.

ROUSSEAUJeanJacques TheSocialContract,Everymanedition,Lon-don.

TALMONJacobLaib

TheOriginsofTotalitarianDemocracy,Lon-don,1952.PoliticalMessianism:TheRomanticPhase,London,1960.

-257-

[Thispageintentionallyleftblank.]-258-

IndexofPersonsAbboud,Ibrahim2,118,176Albedyll,E.L.von48Alemán,Miguel199AlexanderObrenovic,King63-4AlexanderI,ofYugoslavia44AlphonsoXIII52-3,176Amer,AbdulHakim150n.,158Amir,Sirri158Angarita,I.Medina44Aramburu,P.Eugenio43,170,184,193AranaFrancisco193ArbenzGuzman,Jacobo38,55-6,138,153,193,194,242Arévolo,JuanJosé38,138AttasiPasha,Hashem126Augereau,Pierre213,214AyubKhan2,63,82,83,190n.,237,240,242Azam,KhaledEl126Banda,Hastings231BarnetyVinageras,José172Barras,PaulFrancoisde213Batista,Fulgencio171-3Bauer,Gustav94Bayar,Celal38,203Beaverbrook,Lord73-4andn.BenBella209n.BenKhedda209n.Berenguer,Dámaso182Beresford,LordCharlesWilliam145Beria,Lavrenti107Bernadotte,JeanBaptiste214Bétancourt,Romulo32,44,55,137,185,192Bethmann-HollwegTheobaldvon,49Bieberstein,AdolfMarschallvon47,49Bismarck,Ottovon49Bizri,AfifAl150Blomberg,Wernervon50-1Boetticher,KarlHeinrichvon47,49Bolivar,Simón137Bourguiba,Habib231

Boyer,JeanPierre132Bradley,Omar28Budenny,Semyon107Bulganin,Nikolai107BustamenteRivero,JoséLuis55Calles,PlutarcoElias199Camacho,Avilo199Camargo,AlbertoLleras196Caprivi,Leo,Countvon47,48,49Cardenas,Làzaro198,199Carnell,F.G.129,224CarolII,King,ofRumania165Carrera,General,122n.,171CastilloArmas,Carlos55-6,138,153Castillo,Ramon116Castro,Cipriano44CastroLeón160Cedillo,Saturnino198Chalbaud,C.Delgado44,55,176,193Challe,Maurice96-8Chambord,Dukeof30ChangDoYung159Chaves,Dr.Federico132Chung-Huh153Contreras,E.Lopez44Cortines,Ruiz199Crépin,Jean97Cromwell,Oliver9daLuz,Coimbra38Dan,Baron148Dato,Eduardo152DawalibiMarufEd-126,127,185deGaulle,Charles2,45,95-7,98,150,239deMadariaga,Salvador52deRivera,Primo14,18,36,69,77,81,176,178,181-2,237Diáz,Carlos56Diaz,Porfirio130Diem,Ngo225,230Douglas,JusticeW.O.28Draga,Queen,ofSerbia63-4

Dreyfus,Alfred53-4Durkheim,Emile9Duvalier,Dr.Francois133Ebert,Friedrich76,151Engels,Friedrich138-9

-259-

Estigaribía,JoseFelix131Estimé,Dumarsais133Estrada,Pedro192Farrell,Edelmiro,J.154-5,176,193,195FerdinandVII,ofSpain219Fergusson,SirCharles29FethiBey112FidelCastro6,100Fignolé,Daniel133Figueres,José31Fisher,JohnArbuthnot,Lord145Flores,JuanJosé209Forrestal,James143Fraga,Rosendo122n.,169,170Francia,Dr.J.G.Rodriguez131Franco,Rafael131,132FrancoyBahamonde,Francisco18,164,174-5,242Fritsch,WernerFreiherrvon51Frondizi,Arturo1,43,117n.,121n.,122n.,167,168-71,184Frunze,Mikhail107Garcia-Calderon,Francisco130-1GhuladMohammed63Girardet,Raoul11Gomez,JuanVicente44,57,137Gomez,Laureano155-6GomezyArias,Miguel172Gonzalez,Natalicio132Gossler,Heinrichvon49Gough,SirHubert26,29,44Goulart,Joäo1,37,44n.GrauSanMartin,Ramón171-2Gröner,Wilhelm26,41,59,76,175Guido,President122n.,171,184Gulek,Kasim113Gumushpala,Ragip122Gürsel,Cemal2,18,27,36,38,117,122-3,166,177,192,195Hahnke,Wilhelmvon48Hamada,Kunimatsu147Hamagauchi,Yuko51,148Hayashi,Senjuro147

HenryV20Herodotus10Hevia,Carlos172HidalgoyCostilla,Miguel219Himmler,Heinrich27Hindenburg,PaulvonB.49,73,151Hinnawi,Sami126Hirota,Koki146-7Hitler,Adolf27,51Hobbes,Thomas7,124Hohenlöhe,Prince47,48,49Hourani,Akram150Hugo,Victor18,19n.,196Huntington,Samuel24,25,143Inoye,Junnosuke148Inukai,Tsuyoshi148Irigoyen,Hipolito116IsmetInonu123-4,203Itagaki,Seishiro147Jiménez,Perez38,44,55,103,137,160,182-3,184-5,192,193,195,196,242Jinnah,MahommedAli231Johnson,LouisA.143Joubert,Barthélemy214Jouhaud,Edmond45,96Kaganovitch,Lazar107,108Kameke,A.K.G.von47,48Kamenev,Lev106Kamenev,Sergei107Kapp,Wolfgang93-5Karabekir,Kasem112Kassim,AbdulKarim2,36,38,81.86,155,166,176-7,242Kato,Admiral51Kaunda,Kenneth231KemalAtaturk,Mustafa31,63,11213,194,198,202-3,240Kennedy,PresidentJ.F.28Kita,Ikki42Kitchener,HoratioHerbert,Earl73KongLee2Koniev,Ivan107Krushchev,Nikita75,107-8

Kubitschek,Juscelino37,38,43Kudsi,NazemEl126,127-8LaCierva,Juande152Lagaillarde,Pierre97Larcher,Rodolfo169LaredoBru,Federico172-3Lemus,JoséMaria2Lescot,Elie133LiaquatAliKhan231LloydGeorge,David73,144Lonardi,Eduardo116n.,121,161,184,193Lopez,CarlosAntonio131Lopez,Francisco131Lott,Texeira37-8LouisXVI,20,211

-260-

Louis-Napoleon(NapoleonIII)18Ludendorff,Erich49,69,73Lüttwitz,WaltherFreiherrvon94Lyautey,LouisHubert46MacArthur,Douglas26,143MachadoyMorales,Gerardo172Madanoglu,Cemal193Magloire,Paul133Maher,Ali,159,187Mahmud,Nur-ad-Din83,84Maine,SirHenry208,211Malenkov,Georgi107-8Malinowski,Rodion109Malki,AdnanAl-149Mamede,Colonel38,43n.Mann,Mrs.Horace129Mao-Tse-Tung46Massu,Jacques45,95-6Matéos,Lopez199Maura,Antonio77,152-3Medina,I.Angarita137Menderes,Adnan37,38,113,117,122-4,178,194MendietayMontúfur,Carlos172Midfai,JamilAl-152MilanI,ofSerbia63Mill,JohnStuart241Mirza,Iskander83n.MolaVidal,Emilio162MolasLopez132Molotov,Vyacheslav107,108Montagne,Ernesto181MontgomeryofAlamein,BernardLaw,Viscount30,86Monk,George,DukeofAlbemarle29Morelos,JoséMaria219Morínigo,Higinio131-2Mosca,Gaetano21n.Mugica,Francisco201Nahas,Pasha187NaiKuang135-6NaiPridi135

NapoleonBonaparte211,212,213,214Nasser,GamalAbdel18,37,38,42,86,126,157-9,164,180,187-9,190n.,192,224-5,242Navarre,Henri66andn.Neguib,Mohammed36,37,157-9,179,187-9Nehru,Jawaharlal225,231,233,235NeWin1,2,84andn.,229-30,236,240Nkrumah,Kwame224-5,226,231,233,235,236Nuri,Abd-El-Latif157Nuri-es-Said62n.,79,155Obregon,Alvaro198Odría,Manuel14,38,56,180-1OrtegayGasset59,76-7Ortiz,J.97Ortiz,RobertoM.116Osorio,ColonelOscar2Paez,JoséAntonio209Paez,Llovera44Paget,SirArthur26,30Paiva,Felix131PakChungHi159Papen,Franzvon175PatronCostas116Paul,Prince,ofYugoslavia44Perón,Evita174Perón,JuanD.35,39,111,114,116n.120-1,160-1,165,167,173-4,175,184,194,195,196,242Pflimlin,Pierre95PhaoSriyanon136Phibun,Songkhram135-6Poggi,General122n.,170-1Quadros,Janio1Ramírez,Pedro116,120,154-5,176,184,193,194-5Ramos,Nereu38RashidAli134Rauch,General171Rawson,Arturo116,176,184,193Reichenau,Waltervon51Reyes,Cipriano173Rhee,Synghman153Robertson,SirWilliam30,73,144RojasPinilla,43,156andn.,181,1967,242

Rolon,Raimundo132Rosas,JuanManuelde130Rousseau,Jean-Jacques17,20,208,214Sadhat,AnwarEl-159Salan,Raoul45,95-6Salazar,Dr.Oliveira12,32-3,34n.,35SanchezToca,Joaquin152SanjurjoSacanell,José70,84,161SantaAnna201SantaCruz,Andrés209Santander,FranciscodePaola209

-261-

SaritThanarat2,136,164Sarmiento,D.Faustino129,130Scharnhorst,Gerhardvon217Schellendorff,PaulBronsartvon47,48,49Scheringer,Lieutenant58Schleicher,Kurtvon41,50,93,167,175Seeckt,Hansvon25-6,30,31,35,41,50,59,76,84,86,95,156,237Selo,Fawzi116,185-6Serraj,AbdulHamid125-6,149-50,164,186Shafi,HusseinAl-158Shepilov,Dmitri107,108Shidehara,Kijuro52Shinwell,Emanuel87Shishakli,Adib57,126,150,185-6Shukayr,Brigadier57Sidqi,Bakr133-4,151,157-8,240Siéyès,EmanuelJoseph208,214SongYoChan153Soustelle,Jacques95Stalin,Joseph104,105,106-7Stein,BaronHeinrich216,217Streseman,Gustav76Stroessner,Alfredo132,242Sukarno,Ahmed225,230,231,236-7,237n.,242Suleyman,Hikmat134,151-2,157-8Sunay,Cevdet178Tansel,Irfan177,194Taylor,Maxwell144Terauchi,Juichi146-7Thanom.Kittikachon136Timoshenko,Semyon105Toranzo,Montero169Toro,David78Trotsky,Leon9,106-7Trujillo,RafaelMolina242Turkës,Alparslan193Ubíco,Jorge138Ugaki,Issei147UNu83-4andn.,225Uriburu,José116,120

Valencia,Leon196Vargas,Getulio43,114Venizelos,Eleutherios64Villa,Pancho6Vincent,Sténio133Voroshilov,Kliment107Waldeck-Rousseau,Pierre-Marie55Waldersee,CountAlfredvon48,49WeyleryNicolau53WilliamII,Emperor73Wilson,CharlesE.143Wint,Guy82Wolseley,GarnettJoseph,Viscount30YdígorasFuentes,Miguel138Yoshida,Zengo147Zahreddin,AbdelKerim127-8Zaim,Husni57,125-6,155ZapataEmiliano7Zeller,André45,96Zhukov,Georgi106,107-8Zinkin,Taya235Zinoviev,Grigori106

IndexofCountriesAfrica228,240Albania2,78,221,223Algeria1,45-7,95-8Angola3Argentina:levelofpoliticalculture21,110-11,119

military,moodof67-8--,motivationsof:'thenationalinterest'39,121n.;classinterest42-3--,opportunitytointervene115etseqmilitary,rôleof:19thcentury21,129;1930Coup116,119-20,184;1943Coup116,120-1;militaryrjgime,1943-45165,176-7,184,193,194;Perónrégime194555165,173-4,184,195,196;1955Coups116n.,121andn.,160-1;1955-623,167-71,184;1962Coup1,121n.,169-71--,techniquesofintervention154-5

Australia88

-262-

Balkans,The3,35,78,110,165,221,223,230,236,239BalticStates221,223Bolivia15,62n.,78,79,114Brazil15,42,114

military,motivationsof:'thenationalinterest'37,39;classinterest43rôleofmilitaryin:1930s43;1945Coup43;1955Elections37-8,43

Bulgaria2,35,63,78,221,223Burma1,2,223,236,238,239,242

1958Coup83-4,229,236,2401962Coup84n.independenceof221,222,229

Cambodia2Canada88Ceylon223,236

independent221minorities232

China79,220,221,222,234,238,240Colombia3

Coupof1953155-6RojasPinillarégime43,181,196-7

Congo,Republicof2,3,89,130,179,223,236CostaRica31,235Cuba2,171-3,234Dominica38,62n.EasternEurope56,221,230,231Ecuador1,2,3,62n.,79Eire88Egypt:levelofpoliticalculture110,117

military,moodof64-5,66--,motivationof:'thenationalinterest'36-7,38,186-7--,opportunitytointervene117-18--,rôleof:before195237,187;1952Coup37,158-9,187;Neguibrégime(1952-4)37,179,187-8;Nasserrégime3,37,164,166,180,182,188-90,191,192--,techniquesofintervention158-9

ElSalvador1,3,38,62n.,79Esthonia2Ethiopia2,89,240France:levelofpoliticalculture88-9,95etseq

military,moodof63,65-7--,motivationsof:classinterest53-4;regionalinterest45-7;corporateinterest27,53-4;principleofcivilsupremacy30,54-55

--,rôleof:inrevolutionaryperiod(1789-99)213-14;19thcentury11,27,30,53-5,80,164;1958Coup2,35,95-6;1961Coup95-9revolutionin:effectsof207etseq

Germany:levelofpoliticalculture93military,moodof68-9--,motivationsof:principleofcivilsupremacy28;'thenationalinterest'27,35;classinterest40-1,68;corporateinterest27,47-51,167;individualself-interest,58-9--,opportunitytointervene73,75-6--,rôleof:theEmpire(18711914)28,47-9;FirstWorldWar49;1918-2075-6;KappPutsch93-5,98;WeimarRepublic25-6,30,31,32,40-1,50,76,175;Hitlerrégime50-1;Alliedmilitaryoccupation16--,techniquesofintervention150,167

Ghana:independence221,222ConventionPeoples'Party231-2,233,235,236militarytradition228nationalismin224-5,226,232

Greece35,56,62,63,64,78,119,150,217,221,222,223,238Guatemala3,234,238

levelofpoliticalculturein138military,motivationsof:classinterest38,194;corporateinterest55-6--,opportunitiestointervene79--,rôleof:Ubicorégime138;1944Coup139;Arevolorégime139;Arbenzrégime139;1954Coup55-6,139,153;Ydigorasrégime138

Guinea233Haiti21

levelofpoliticalculture130,132rôleofmilitaryin132-3

Holland88Honduras3,38,79

-263-

India220,223,229CongressParty231,233,235Democracyin233-4,235,239Independenceof221,222Minoritiesin225-6

Indochina221,223Indonesia3,223,230,239

independence222,230minorities,232multiparty-ism236-7popularsovereigntyand226,236-7

Iraq:levelofpoliticalculture78-9,133-4military,opportunitytointervene81-2--,rôleof:1936Coup157-8;1936-4140,133-4,151-2;1941-5837,78-9;1958Coup1,79;Kassimrégime3,14,166--,techniquesofintervention152,155,157-8

IvoryCoast233Japan:levelofpoliticalculture91

military,moodin62,68--,motivationsof:'thenationalinterest'36;classinterest41-2;corporateinterest27,51-2--,opportunitytointervene72--,rôleof:1868-193091;19304591,146-7,148,167;1936Coup90-1,167--,techniquesofintervention91,146-7,148

Jordan2,3,223,240Kenya3,226,236Korea,South1,3,38,89,177

1961Coup62,159,191Laos15,223,238LatinAmerica3,42,56,61,114,130,131,154,209,223,228,235,236,239,240

nationhoodand230warsofindependence219,220,221,222,229

Latvia2Lebanon1,2,223,239Liberia240Libya221Liechtenstein2Lithuania2Malaya221,222,229Mexico114,154,164

re-civilianizationof198-201,204,236MiddleEast3,56,114,228,239,240Morocco221Nepal4Nicaragua3Nigeria228,236Nyasaland233Pakistan2,3,38,190,221,222,223,230,231,236,239,242

levelofpoliticalculturein89,110,117military,moodof62,63--,motivationsof:'thenationalinterest'82;classinterest44--,opportunitiestointervene82-3,117--,rôleof:1958Coup83andn.,115,117-18,240;AyubKhandictatorship14,80,239;post1961régime190n.,239n.

Panama2Paraguay:levelofpoliticalculture131

rôleofmilitaryin131-2Persia78,220,223,231Peru3,15,62n.,114

military:motivationsof:corporateinterest55--,opportunitiestointervene,79--,rôleof:1948Coup55,180,240;Odriarégime14,38,180-1

Philippines,The239Poland223Portugal1,3,32-3,223Prussia216

militaryreformsin217-18Rome205-6Rumania78,165,221,223SanMarino2SaudiArabia4,89Senegal233Serbia2,35,62,63-4,221,223Somalia233South-EastAsia3,56,114,129-30,221,224,225,239,240Spain:levelofpoliticalculture76-7,89,110

-264-

military,moodof69-70--,motivationsof:'thenationalinterest'38,59;classinterest38;regionalinterest44;corporateinterest52-3;individualself-interest57-8--,opportunitytointervene76-7,81,111,152-3,162-3--,rôleof:FrenchImperialperiod217;19thcentury35,52;'Restorationrégime'(1874-1916)52-3;1916-2353,152-3;PrimodeRiverarégime(1923-30)14,18,176;TheRepublicandCivilWar(193039)70,162-3;Francorégime14,164,174-5,242--,techniquesofintervention147

Sudan2,3,38,80,89,110,112,115,118,119,165,176-9,191,223,236,239,240Switzerland88Syria:levelofpoliticalculture110,124,125

military,moodof61--,motivationsof:'thenationalinterest'61;individualselfinterest61--,rôleof:1949-51Coups56-7,125-6,155,185;Shishaklirégimes(1951-54)126,185-6;1961Coup1,127,164;1962Coup1,127-8--,techniquesofintervention1258,148-50

Tanganyika233Thailand:levelofpoliticalculture130,134-5

rôleofmilitary,1932-622,3,129-30,134-6Tunisia221,231233Turkey:levelofpoliticalculture89,110,112-13

military,moodof,27,62,63--,motivationsof:principleofcivilsupremacy31,202-3--,opportunitytointervene37,117--,rôleof:1918-23201-2;1923-50202-4;1950-60113,197,203-4;1960Coup38,117,122-5;militaryrégime(1960-1)1,2,37-8,165,166,177-8,179,184,192-4

Uganda236UnionofSovietSocialistRepublics:levelofpoliticalculture89,99,100-2

military,motivationsof:'thenationalinterest'106-9;corporateinterest105-6--,'Partycontrol'of102-5--,rôleof:1917-30103,106-7;1930-53103-6,107;1953-62107-9--,techniquesofintervention107-9

UnitedKingdom,The:levelofpoliticalculture86,88military,motivationsof:principleofcivilsupremacy28,29-30;'thenationalinterest'26,27;theregionalinterest43-44--,rôleof:newmodelarmy206-7;Curragh'mutiny'27-30,43-4;NavyLeague145;FirstWorldWar,73-4n.,144-5;SecondWorldWar72--,techniquesofintervention86-7,144

UnitedStatesofAmerica:levelofpoliticalculture88,218military,motivationsof:principleofcivilsupremacy26,28-9

--,rôleof:WarofIndependence210,218;SecondWorldWar72;1945-6274,141-4,145--,techniquesofintervention141-4

Uruguay235Venezuela:levelofpoliticalculture110,137-8,190

military,motivationsof:'thenationalinterest'32,38;classinterest40;regionalinterest44-5;corporateinterest55;individualself-interest57--,rôleof:1945-48184,193;Jiménezrégime(1948-58)182-3,192,195;1958Coup184-5,195,196--,techniquesofintervention160

Vietnam,North222,234,238Vietnam,South78,223,234

independence222,229-30Yemen,The4,89Yugoslavia44,63,78,222

-265-

IndexofSubjects'AprilRevolt'(France)96-8Army:typesof6-7;asorganization7-10publicprestigeof11-13;peculiarnationalrôleof32-4Authority[seelegitimacy;politicalformula;civilinstitutions]Blackmail[seepressure,military]Civilinstitutions:defined21;publicattachmentto21-2,87-9Civilsupremacy,principleof:defined28-9;Britain28,29-30;U.S.A.28-9;France30Classinterest,military40-3;andmilitaryintervention40;inWeimarRepublic40-1;inJapan41-2;inEgypt42;inLatinAmerica42-3Collusionorcompetitionwithcivilpower,military142-8;inU.S.A.142-4;inU.K.,144-5;inJapan145-8Communismandnewstates,234-8CommunistPartyoftheSovietUnion:controlofmilitary99-109Condottieri206Corporateinterest,military47-56;Germany47-51;Japan51-2;Spain52-3;France53-5(andseeDreyfusCase);LatinAmerica55-6Cuartelazo154,155-7;inIraq157-8;inEgypt158-9;inKorea159;inVenezuela160;inArgentina160-1;inSpain162Displacementofthecivilpower,military,151etseq'DispositiontoIntervene',military:defined23,70-1DreyfusCase,53-5'FebruaryMutiny'(Japan),91-2'FreeOfficers,the'35[andseeEgypt]FrenchrevolutionandEmpire:thestartingpointformodernmilitaryintervention210etseq;spreadinginfluenceof220-3Golpedeestado154-6GrupodeOfficialesUnidos35,67-8[andseeArgentina]Independence,national:significanceformilitaryintervention209-10;AmericanColonies218-19;LatinAmerica219;in'new'states228-31Individualself-interest,motiveof:inSyria56-7;inVenezuela57;inSpain57-8;inGermany58Influence,military141-7;inU.S.A.141-4;inU.K.144-5;inJapan146-7Insurrectionaryarmies:andmilitaryintervention208-9;inLatinAmerica209;inFrance216;inSpain217;innewstates228-31Intervention,levelsof86-9;[seeinfluence;blackmail;displacement;supplantment];defined86;relationtopoliticalculture87-9,118-28,129-30Intervention,military:statisticsof2-3;asdistinctphenomenon4-5;defined23;futureof235-40Intimidationofcivilpower,military148-51;inJapan148;inSyria148-51Janissaries206JuntasdeDefensa77,152-3

KappPutsch93-5Kodo-ha36'Latentcrisis':defined77,113-15;inBalkans78;inIraq78-9,117;inEgypt117Legitimacy17-18;andmilitary17-22,87-9,179-80;innewstates223-6Modesofmilitaryintervention[seeinfluence;collusion;threats;intimidation;refusaltoassistcivilpower;cuartelazo;golpedeestado]

-266-

Military,politicalstrengthof:inorganization6-10;inprestige,10-13Military,politicalweaknessesof:technicalinadequacy14-16;moralinadequacy17-22Moodtointervene,Military61-3;vicarioushumiliation63-4,67etseq;directhumiliation64-7,68-70;inPakistan63;inSerbia63-4;inGreece64;inEgypt64-5;inFrance65-7;inArgentina67-8;inJapan68;inGermany68;inSpain69-70Motivespreventingmilitaryintervention30-2;[seeprofessionalism;civilsupremacy]Motivespromotingmilitaryintervention32-59;nationalinterest32-9;classinterest40-3regionalinterest43-7;corporateinterest47-56;individualself-interest56[andseeundertheseheadings]Nationalinterest,militaryconceptsof32-9;inGermany35;inSpain35;inJapan36;inBrazil37-8;inTurkey38;inLatinAmericaandMiddleEast38-9Nationalism,nationalself-determination:significanceformilitaryintervention,207-8;historicalemergenceof214-15;bynewstates223-6,231-2Newmodelarmy206Opportunitytointervene,military[seeovertcrisis;latentcrisis;popularityofmilitary;powervacuum;war,effectof]:andlevelofpoliticalculture84-5;inArgentina115-16;inTurkey117;inEgypt,IraqandPakistan11718;inParaguay131-2;inHaiti132-3;inIraq,(1936-41)133;inThailand134-6Overtcrisis:defined75;inGermany75-6;inSpain76-7;inArgentina110-11Parties,political:militaryaffiliationwith34andn.--,andlevelofpoliticalculture889;inArgentina111;inBalkans78-9;inGermany50-1,93,175;inIraq153;inJapan36,91,1467;inTurkey112-13andn.;inSpain52;inU.S.S.R.99-109passim;byothercountries114-15--,andeffectsofmilitaryintervention119-28;inParaguay131;inSyria149-50;inThailand133;inVenezuela137--,rôleofinmilitaryrégimes195-6;inArgentina165-71,173-4;inColombia181,196;inEgypt187-9;inSpain174-5,182;inSyria185-6;inVenezuela182-3--,singleordominantpartysystemsinMexico197-201,232-3;inTurkey201-4,232-3;inAfrica233;inIndia233;asalternativetomilitaryrôle235-7--,materialprerequisitesof227-8Podermoderador36Politicalculture:defined87-8--,levelsof88-9,111-15,129-31;inJapan90-1;inGermany93;inU.S.S.R.99-104;inArgentina111-12;inTurkey112-13;inSyria125;inParaguay131;inHaiti131;inThailand134-5;inRomanEmpire205-6--,changesin128-9--,relationtomaterialfactors226-8'Politicalformula'20-1,118;popularsovereigntyas208Popularsovereignty,dogmaof208;andmilitaryintervention208;historicalemergenceof211-14;bynewstates223-6;231-2Popularity,military11-12,80-3;inFrance11,80;inSpain81;inIraq81-2;inPakistan82-3;inArgentina115-16;inTurkey11718;inMiddleEast117-18'Powervacuum':defined79;examples79-80andchapter9,passim

PraetorianGuard205Pressureagainstcivilpower,military141-7;inJapan146-8;inSyria148-50;inGermany150-1Professionalism,military:defined24;inhibitsmilitaryintervention24-5;promotesmilitaryintervention25-8,207;historicalemergenceof217-18Refusaltoassistcivilpower,military153;inKorea153;inGuatemala153

-267-

Régimes,military,typesof164-7;indirect-limited,inGermany167;inJapan167;inArgentina16771;indirect-complete,inCuba171-3;'Dual',inArgentina173-4;inSpain174-5;inGermany175;Direct178-80;inSpain176;inArgentina176;inSudan176-7;inTurkey177-8;Direct,Quasicivilianized179-80;inPeru1801;inColombia181;inSpain182;inVenezuela182-3--,dynamicsof183-5;inSyria1856;inEgypt186-90--,collapseof191-7--,recivilianizationof197-204;inMexico197-201;inTurkey201-4Regionalinterest,military44-7;'CurraghMutiny'44;FranceandAlgeria45-7;Venezuela44-5Romanimperialarmies205-6Streltsi206Supplantment,military151etseqSyndicalism,military[seecorporateinterest]Threatsagainstcivilpower,military151-3;inIraq151-2;inSpain152-3Tosei-ha91-2'Treizemai'95-6Violence,militaryexerciseof,againstcivilpower154etseq[seecuartelazo;golpedeestado]Virtues,themilitary10-12War,andmilitaryintervention72-5Willtointervene61-3[seemood,military]

-268-