Sampson v. United States, 1st Cir. (2013)

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    United States Court of AppealsFor the First Circuit

    No. 12- 1643

    GARY LEE SAMPSON,

    Pet i t i oner , Appel l ee,

    v.

    UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA,

    Respondent , Appel l ant .

    No. 12- 8019

    GARY LEE SAMPSON,

    Respondent ,

    v.

    UNI TED STATES OF AMERI CA,

    Pet i t i oner .______________

    APPEALS FROM THE UNI TED STATES DI STRI CT COURT

    FOR THE DI STRI CT OF MASSACHUSETTS

    [ Hon. Mar k L. Wol f , U. S. Di st r i ct J udge]

    ___________________

    Bef or e

    Lynch, Chi ef J udge,Sel ya and Li pez, Ci r cui t J udges.

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    Mar k T. Qui nl i van, Assi st ant Uni t ed St at es At t or ney, wi t h whomCar men M. Or t i z, Uni t ed St at es At t or ney, was on br i ef , f orappel l ant .

    Wi l l i am E. McDani el s, wi t h whom J enni f er G. Wi cht , CadenceMer t z, Wi l l i ams & Connol l y LLP, J . Mar t i n Ri chey, El i zabet h L.Pr evet t , Feder al Publ i c Def ender ' s Of f i ce, and Susan K. Mar cus wer e

    on br i ef , f or appel l ee.

    J ul y 25, 2013

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    SELYA, Circuit Judge. Few accout erment s of our cr i mi nal

    j ust i ce syst em ar e ei t her mor e f undamental or mor e preci ous t han

    t he accused' s ri ght t o an i mpar t i al j ur y. That r i ght i s t hr eat ened

    when as i n t hi s case j ur or di shonest y occur s dur i ng t he voi r

    di r e pr ocess yet i s not di scover ed unt i l wel l af t er f i nal j udgment

    has ent er ed on t he j ur y' s ver di ct . But f i nal i t y i s al so val uabl e,

    and not ever y i nst ance of j ur or di shonest y requi r es set t i ng asi de

    a pr evi ousl y r ender ed ver di ct .

    I n i t s pr esent post ur e, t hi s case poses i mpor t ant

    quest i ons about when and under what ci r cumst ances t he bel ated

    di scover y of j ur or di shonest y dur i ng t he voi r di r e pr ocess demands

    vacat ur of a j ur y ver di ct . The st akes ar e hi gh t he j ur y her e

    r ecommended a deat h sent ence and the cases t hat popul ate t hi s

    arcane cor ner of t he l aw are muddl ed.

    The ar chi t ect ure of t hese appeal s i s easi l y descr i bed.

    Gar y Lee Sampson, t he def endant i n t he under l yi ng cr i mi nal case, i s

    on deat h r ow f ol l owi ng hi s convi ct i on on t wo count s of car j acki ng

    ( deat h r esul t i ng) , a penal t y- phase hear i ng i n whi ch t he j ur y vot ed

    t o r ecommend capi t al puni shment , and an unsuccessf ul di r ect appeal .

    See Uni t ed St ates v. Sampson ( Sampson I ) , 486 F. 3d 13 ( 1st Ci r .

    2007) , cer t . deni ed, 553 U. S. 1035 ( 2008) . I n an ef f or t t o undo

    hi s sent ence, t he def endant br ought a habeas pet i t i on, see 28

    U. S. C. 2255, and conf r ont ed t he di st r i ct cour t wi t h a cl ai mt hat

    j uror di shonest y dur i ng t he voi r di r e process ant ecedent t o t he

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    penal t y- phase hear i ng depr i ved hi mof an i mpar t i al j ur y. Fol l owi ng

    an evi dent i ar y hear i ng, t he di st r i ct cour t agr eed; i t vacat ed t he

    deat h sent ence and ordered a new penal t y- phase hear i ng. Uni t ed

    Stat es v. Sampson (Sampson I V) , No. 01- 10384, 2012 WL 1633296, at

    *15 ( D. Mass. May 10, 2012) ; Uni t ed St ates v. Sampson (Sampson I I ) ,

    820 F. Supp. 2d 151, 202 ( D. Mass. 2011) . The government seeks

    i mmedi at e revi ew of t hi s deci si on.

    We f i r st addr ess nuanced quest i ons t hat cast doubt upon

    our appel l at e j ur i sdi ct i on. Concl udi ng, as we do, t hat we can

    pr oceed t o the mer i t s of t he j ur or di shonest y cl ai m, we adopt t he

    di st r i ct cour t ' s f i ndi ngs of f act, ar t i cul at e t he pr oper l egal

    f r amewor k, ar r ay the di st r i ct cour t ' s f i ndi ngs of f act agai nst t hat

    f r amework, and hol d t hat t he def endant ' s sent ence must be set asi de

    and a new penal t y- phase hear i ng conduct ed.

    I. BACKGROUND

    We rehear se here onl y t hose f act s t hat are needed t o tee

    up t hi s pr oceedi ng. The r eader who hunger s f or mor e det ai l s shoul d

    consul t t he l i t any of ear l i er opi ni ons i n t hi s case. See, e. g. ,

    Sampson I , 486 F. 3d 13; Sampson I I , 820 F. Supp. 2d 151; Uni t ed

    St ates v. Sampson ( Sampson I I I ) , 820 F. Supp. 2d 202 ( D. Mass.

    2011) ; see al so McCl oskey v. Muel l er , 446 F. 3d 262 ( 1st Ci r . 2006) .

    I n 2001, t he def endant engaged i n a cr i me spr ee t hat t ook

    hi m up t he east er n seaboar d. The spree i ncl uded a ser i es of bank

    r obber i es i n Nor t h Car ol i na and a bot ched at t empt t o surr ender t o

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    t he Feder al Bur eau of I nvest i gat i on. See McCl oskey, 446 F. 3d at

    264. The def endant t hen perpet r ated t wo Massachuset t s car j acki ngs

    t hat l ed t o t he sl ayi ng of t he car j acked dr i ver s ( Phi l l i p McCl oskey

    and J onat han Ri zzo) . I n each i nst ance, t he def endant hi t ched a

    r i de wi t h t he vi cti m, f or ced t he vi cti m at kni f epoi nt t o dr i ve t o

    a secl uded area, and commi t t ed murder .

    Fol l owi ng t hese gr uesome i nci dent s, t he def endant f l ed t o

    New Hampshi r e i n Ri zzo' s vehi cl e, f or ci bl y ent er ed a house, and

    st r angl ed t he car et aker ( Rober t Whi t ney) . He t hen dr ove Whi t ney' s

    vehi cl e t o Vermont , abandoned i t , and r esumed hi t chhi ki ng. Another

    Good Samar i t an, Wi l l i am Gr egor y, gave hi m a l i f t . To r epay hi s

    ki ndness, t he def endant at t empt ed t o f or ce Gr egor y at kni f epoi nt t o

    dr i ve t o a secl uded spot . Thi s t i me, however , t he i nt ended vi ct i m

    escaped. The def endant l at er cal l ed 911, surr ender ed t o t he

    aut hor i t i es, and conf essed.

    On Oct ober 24, 2001, a f eder al gr and j ur y si t t i ng i n t he

    Di st r i ct of Massachuset t s char ged t he def endant wi t h t wo count s of

    car j acki ng, deat h r esul t i ng. 1 See 18 U. S. C. 2119( 3) . A

    supersedi ng i ndi ct ment , deemed necessar y t o compl y wi t h Ri ng v.

    Ar i zona, 536 U. S. 584, 609 ( 2002) , r ei t er at ed t hese char ges; and

    1 Si nce nei t her Whi t ney' s mur der nor Gr egor y' s car j acki ng wascharged by t he government , t hese separate cr i mes were r el evant onl yas aggr avat i ng f act or s f or sent enci ng pur poses. Sampson I I , 820 F.Supp. 2d at 160.

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    t he gover nment served a not i ce of i nt ent t o seek t he deat h penal t y

    under t he Feder al Deat h Penal t y Act ( FDPA) , 18 U. S. C. 3593( a) .

    I n due cour se, t he def endant admi t t ed gui l t wi t h r espect

    t o bot h count s. The di st r i ct cour t empanel ed a deat h- qual i f i ed

    j ury t o consi der t he puni shment t o be i mposed. See i d.

    3593( b) ( 2) ( A) ; see al so Uni t ed St at es v. Gr een, 407 F. 3d 434,

    436- 37 ( 1st Ci r . 2005) ( di scussi ng "deat h- qual i f i ed j ur y"

    r equi r ement s) .

    The voi r di r e l ast ed sevent een days and i nvol ved an

    extensi ve ef f or t t o ensur e t hat each j ur or coul d and woul d

    deci de t he def endant ' s f at e sol el y on t he evi dence. As a

    pr el i mi nar y mat t er , hundr eds of pot ent i al j ur or s wer e r equi r ed t o

    answer under oat h sevent y- seven wr i t t en quest i ons, car ef ul l y

    desi gned t o el i ci t i nf or mat i on concer ni ng possi bl e bi as and l i f e

    exper i ences t hat mi ght have subconsci ousl y af f ect ed an i ndi vi dual ' s

    abi l i t y t o consi der t he def endant ' s sent ence obj ect i vel y. Many

    veni r epersons were excused based on t hei r wr i t t en r esponses. Those

    who passed must er were i nt err ogated by t he cour t and the part i es.

    Pr ospect i ve j ur or s wer e r epeat edl y di r ect ed t o answer al l

    quest i ons accur at el y and honest l y. Al l wer e advi sed t hat , upon

    r equest , r esponses concer ni ng sensi t i ve subj ect s ( whet her wr i t t en

    or or al ) woul d be kept out of t he publ i c r ecor d.

    Af t er i ndi vi dual quest i oni ng, t he di st r i ct cour t excused

    pot ent i al j ur or s f or cause f or a wi de var i et y of r easons, i ncl udi ng

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    pr et r i al exposur e t o i nf or mat i on about t he case, at t i t udes t hat

    r ai sed quest i ons about i mpar t i al i t y, emot i onal l i f e exper i ences

    compar abl e t o mat t er s t hat woul d be ai r ed at t r i al , and r esponses

    t hat l acked candor . Event ual l y, t he cour t seat ed a j ur y of t wel ve,

    al ong wi t h si x al t er nat es. Dur i ng t he si x- week penal t y- phase

    hear i ng, t he cour t l ear ned t hat t wo j ur or s had answer ed voi r di r e

    quest i ons i naccur at el y and r epl aced t hem wi t h al t er nat es.

    The penal t y- phase hear i ng t urned i n l ar ge measur e on t he

    exi st ence vel non of st at ut or y and non- st at ut or y aggr avat i ng

    f act or s and mi t i gat i ng f act or s. See 18 U. S. C. 3592( a) , ( c) ,

    3593( c) . I n t he end, t he j ur y unani mousl y r ecommended t hat t he

    def endant be sent enced t o deat h on bot h count s. The di st r i ct cour t

    f ol l owed t hi s r ecommendat i on and i mposed a sentence of deat h. See

    i d. 3553, 3594; Uni t ed St ates v. Sampson, 300 F. Supp. 2d 275,

    278 ( D. Mass. 2004) . The cour t al so deni ed a f l ur r y of post - t r i al

    mot i ons. Uni t ed St ates v. Sampson, 332 F. Supp. 2d 325, 341 ( D.

    Mass. 2004) .

    On di r ect r evi ew, we af f i r med t he sent ence. Sampson I ,

    486 F. 3d at 52. The Supr eme Cour t deni ed t he def endant ' s ensui ng

    pet i t i on f or a wr i t of cer t i or ar i . See Sampson v. Uni t ed St at es,

    553 U. S. 1035 ( 2008) .

    On J une 25, 2008, t he di st r i ct cour t appoi nt ed new

    counsel t o handl e post - convi ct i on pr oceedi ngs. See 18 U. S. C.

    3599( a) ( 2) . Af t er some pr ocedur al ski r mi shi ng, t he def endant

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    f i l ed a pet i t i on t o vacat e, set asi de, or cor r ect t he j udgment .

    See 28 U. S. C. 2255. Per t i nent l y, t he def endant cl ai med t hat he

    was depr i ved of t he r i ght t o have hi s sent ence deci ded by an

    i mpar t i al j ur y because thr ee j ur or s, desi gnat ed f or t he sake of

    anonymi t y as J ur or s C, D, and G, had f al sel y answer ed mat er i al voi r

    di r e quest i ons. 2

    The di st r i ct cour t prudent l y convened an evi dent i ar y

    hear i ng t o det er mi ne the scope and sever i t y of t he al l egedl y

    i naccur at e voi r di r e r esponses. Thi s hear i ng was hel d over t hr ee

    non- consecut i ve days. The f i r st sessi on concer ned al l t hr ee of t he

    cont est ed j ur or s; t he second and t hi r d sessi ons f ocused excl usi vel y

    on J ur or C.

    Af t er car ef ul consi der at i on, t he di st r i ct cour t concl uded

    t hat t he i naccur aci es cont ai ned i n J ur or D' s and J ur or G' s

    r esponses wer e uni nt ent i onal er r or s t hat di d not j ust i f y set t i ng

    asi de t he r esul t s of t he penal t y- phase hear i ng. Sampson I I , 820 F.

    Supp. 2d at 197- 201. The cour t r eached a di f f er ent concl usi on as

    t o J ur or C, f i ndi ng t hat she had r epeat edl y and i nt ent i onal l y

    pr ovi ded di shonest r esponses t o i mpor t ant voi r di r e quest i ons. I d.

    2 The def endant ' s sect i on 2255 pet i t i on al so i ncl udes cl ai ms

    t hat he was deni ed ef f ect i ve assi st ance of counsel ; t hat t hegover nment vi ol at ed i t s obl i gat i ons under Br ady v. Mar yl and, 373U. S. 83 ( 1963) ; t hat t he gover nment commi t t ed mi sconduct dur i ng t hegr and j ur y pr ocess; t hat execut i on woul d vi ol at e hi s Ei ght hAmendment r i ght s due t o hi s severe ment al i mpai r ment ; and t hat t heFDPA and/ or t he deat h penal t y ar e unconst i t ut i onal . Onl y t he j ur ydi shonest y cl ai m i s bef or e us.

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    at 192- 97. The cour t s t at ed t hat t r ut hf ul answer s woul d have

    r esul t ed i n J ur or C' s excusal f or cause dur i ng voi r di r e because

    t he cour t woul d have " i nf er r ed bi as. " I d. at 165- 66, 194- 97.

    Consequent l y, t he cour t set asi de t he def endant ' s sent ence, 3 i d. at

    181- 97, and on May 10, 2012, order ed a new penal t y- phase hear i ng,

    Sampson I V, 2012 WL 1633296, at *15.

    At t he gover nment ' s behest , t he cour t subsequent l y

    cer t i f i ed t he f ol l owi ng quest i ons f or i mmedi at e appeal under 28

    U. S. C. 1292( b) : " ( 1) whether [ McDonough Power Equi pment , I nc. v.

    Gr eenwood, 464 U. S. 548 ( 1984) ] r equi r es proof of act ual bi as or

    i mpl i ed bi as t o obt ai n r el i ef ; and, i f not , ( 2) whet her [ t he

    di st r i ct ] cour t cor r ect l y st at ed t he McDonough t est . " Sampson I V,

    2012 WL 1633296, at *15.

    Recogni zi ng t hat i t s r i ght t o pr osecut e an i mmedi at e

    appeal of t he di st r i ct cour t ' s or der was f r ei ght ed wi t h

    uncer t ai nt y, t he government went down t hr ee di f f erent but

    compl ement ar y r oads. Fi r st , i t sought t o pur sue an appeal of t he

    deci si on as a f i nal or der under 28 U. S. C. 1291 and/ or 18 U. S. C.

    3731. Second, i t sought t o pur sue an i nt er l ocut or y appeal under

    t he aegi s of 28 U. S. C. 1292( b) . Thi r d, t he gover nment ar gued

    t hat , shoul d we f i nd t he deci si on not ot her wi se i mmedi at el y

    3 I n a separate opi ni on, t he cour t summari l y di smi ssed some oft he def endant ' s ot her cl ai ms. See Sampson I I I , 820 F. Supp. 2d at212- 13; see al so supr a note 2. These r ul i ngs need not concern usbecause t he cour t has wi t hhel d the ent r y of or der s on them.Sampson I V, 2012 WL 1633296, at *15.

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    appeal abl e, i t nonet hel ess ought t o be r evi ewed t hr ough an exer ci se

    of advi sor y mandamus. See i d. 1651. We have consol i dated al l of

    t hese i ni t i at i ves.

    Because r esol ut i on of t he j ur i sdi ct i onal conundr um i s

    l ogi cal l y ant ecedent t o any di scussi on of t he j ur or di shonest y

    cl ai m, we st ar t t her e.

    II. APPELLATE JURISDICTION

    The most convent i onal assurance of appel l at e j ur i sdi ct i on

    i s t he exi st ence of a f i nal deci si on. See i d. 1291 ( vest i ng

    cour t s of appeal s wi t h j ur i sdi ct i on over "appeal s f r om al l f i nal

    deci si ons of t he di st r i ct cour t s" ) . The gover nment assever at es

    t hat t he di st r i ct cour t ' s deci si on vacat i ng t he def endant ' s

    sent ence and gr ant i ng hi m a new penal t y- phase hear i ng i s a f i nal

    deci si on and, t hus, i s i mmedi at el y appeal abl e. The gover nment i s

    wr ong.

    The beacon by whi ch we must st eer i s t he Supreme Cour t ' s

    deci si on i n Andr ews v. Uni t ed St at es, 373 U. S. 334 ( 1963) . Ther e,

    t he Cour t hel d t hat an or der i n a sect i on 2255 pr oceedi ng t hat

    vacat ed a pr evi ousl y i mposed sentence and r equi r ed a new sentenci ng

    hear i ng was not a f i nal deci si on and, t hus, not i mmedi at el y

    appeal abl e. I d. at 339- 40. Fi nal i t y does not at t ach unt i l t he

    def endant i s sent enced anew. I d.

    The gover nment cont ends t hat Andr ews i s not cont r ol l i ng

    because t he deci si on appeal ed f r om her e i s not an or der f or

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    r esent enci ng but , r at her , a gr ant of a new t r i al whi ch, i n a

    sect i on 2255 case, i s i mmedi at el y appeal abl e. See Uni t ed St at es v.

    Gor don, 156 F. 3d 376, 378- 79 ( 2d Ci r . 1998) ( per cur i am) ; Uni t ed

    St at es v. Al l en, 613 F. 2d 1248, 1251 ( 3d Ci r . 1980) . I n suppor t ,

    t he government suggest s t hat a penal t y- phase hear i ng i n a capi t al

    case i s mor e aki n t o a t r adi t i onal t r i al t han t o a r esent enci ng.

    I t emphasi zes t hat a j ur y must be empanel ed and cer t ai n aggr avat i ng

    f act ors must be pr oven beyond a r easonabl e doubt . See 18 U. S. C.

    3593( b) - ( c) ; Ri ng, 536 U. S. at 602, 609.

    To be sure, such si mi l ar i t i es do exi st , but t hey ar e

    super f i ci al . I n any event , t he quest i on of whet her an or der f or a

    new penal t y- phase hear i ng i n a capi t al case shoul d be char act er i zed

    as a gr ant of a new t r i al as opposed t o an or der f or r esent enci ng

    i s not open t o us. 4 I n Andr ews, t he Supr eme Cour t st ated squarel y

    t hat " [ w] her e, as her e, what was appr opr i at el y asked and

    appr opr i at el y gr ant ed was t he r esent enci ng of t he pet i t i oner s, i t

    i s obvi ous t hat t her e coul d be no f i nal di sposi t i on of t he 2255

    pr oceedi ngs unt i l t he pet i t i oner s wer e r esent enced. " 373 U. S. at

    340. We are bound by t hi s pr ecedent . See Fi gueroa v. Ri ver a, 147

    F. 3d 77, 81 n. 3 ( 1st Ci r . 1998) .

    4 As t he gover nment poi nt s out , cour t s somet i mes r ef er t o apenal t y- phase " t r i al . " But t he r el evant por t i on of t he FDPA, 18U. S. C. 3593( b) , descr i bes t he penal t y- phase pr oceedi ng as a"sent enci ng hear i ng. " We t hi nk t hat Congr ess' s descr i pt i oncont r ol s.

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    Gi ven t hi s hol di ng, i t i s i ndi sput abl e t hat t he gr ant of

    a new penal t y- phase hear i ng i n a capi t al case i s not a f i nal

    di sposi t i on of t he pr oceedi ngs. " I n gener al , a j udgment or

    deci si on i s f i nal f or t he pur pose of appeal onl y when i t t er mi nat es

    t he l i t i gat i on bet ween t he par t i es on t he mer i t s of t he case, and

    l eaves not hi ng t o be done but t o enf orce by execut i on what has been

    det er mi ned. " Par r v. Uni t ed St at es, 351 U. S. 513, 518 ( 1956)

    ( i nt er nal quot at i on mar ks omi t t ed) . A deci si on or der i ng a new

    penal t y- phase hear i ng i n a capi t al case does not sat i sf y t hi s

    benchmar k. The l i t i gat i on r egar di ng t he def endant ' s sent ence wi l l

    not t er mi nat e unt i l af t er t he concl usi on of t he penal t y- phase

    hear i ng and t he cour t sent ences hi m anew.

    I n a var i at i on on thi s t heme, t he gover nment suggest s

    t hat t he or der f or a new penal t y- phase hear i ng must be f i nal

    because t he l ast t hi ng t hat t he j udge does i n an FDPA case i s t o

    or der a penal t y- phase hear i ng ( af t er al l , under most ci r cumst ances,

    t he FDPA r equi r es t he j ur y t o det er mi ne t he sent ence) . Thus, t he

    government ' s suggest i on goes, an order gr ant i ng a new penal t y- phase

    hear i ng i s necessar i l y f i nal .

    Thi s suggest i on i s hopel ess . I t may be a j ury t hat

    determi nes t he sent ence, but i t i s t he j udge who must empanel t he

    j ury, presi de over t he new penal t y- phase hear i ng, and i mpose t he

    sent ence. See 18 U. S. C. 3593( d) , 3594. Such a ser i es of st eps

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    t o be taken f al l s comf or t abl y wi t hi n t he ambi t of sect i on 2255.

    See 28 U. S. C. 2255( b) .

    I n det er mi ni ng t hat no f i nal deci si on has yet been

    r ender ed, we do not wr i t e on a pr i st i ne page. Two ot her cour t s of

    appeal s have conf i r med t he appl i cabi l i t y of Andr ews t o capi t al

    penal t y- phase hear i ngs and concl uded t hat no f i nal di sposi t i on

    exi st s unt i l t he new hear i ng i s compl et e and t he cour t i mposes a

    new sentence. See Uni t ed St ates v. Hammer , 564 F. 3d 628, 632- 36

    ( 3d Ci r . 2009) ; Uni t ed St at es v. St i t t , 459 F. 3d 483, 485- 86 ( 4t h

    Ci r . 2006) . We agr ee wi t h t hese cour t s.

    We l i kewi se r ej ect t he gover nment ' s ent r eat y t hat t he

    Cr i mi nal Appeal s Act ( CAA) , 18 U. S. C. 3731, whi ch per mi t s an

    appeal f r om an "or der . . . gr ant i ng a new t r i al " i n a cr i mi nal

    case, f ur ni shes a basi s f or j ur i sdi ct i on. The Andr ews Cour t

    speci f i cal l y hel d t hat t he CAA "has no appl i cabi l i t y" t o sect i on

    2255 pr oceedi ngs. 373 U. S. at 338. Andr ews i s bi ndi ng on us.

    Thi s br i ngs us t o t he gover nment ' s asser t i on t hat we have

    j ur i sdi ct i on under 28 U. S. C. 1292( b) . By i t s t er ms, sect i on

    1292( b) conf er s di scret i onar y appel l at e j ur i sdi ct i on over cer t ai n

    i nt er l ocut or y or der s not ot her wi se appeal abl e. But t hi s avenue i s

    avai l abl e onl y when an "or der i nvol ves a cont r ol l i ng quest i on of

    l aw as t o whi ch t her e i s subst ant i al gr ound f or di f f er ence of

    opi ni on and [ ] an i mmedi at e appeal f r om t he or der may mat er i al l y

    advance t he ul t i mat e t er mi nat i on of t he l i t i gat i on. " I d. The

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    di st r i ct cour t f ound t hat t hese condi t i ons had been sat i sf i ed and

    cer t i f i ed quest i ons t o us under sect i on 1292( b) . Sampson I V, 2012

    WL 1633296, at *11- 15. The gover nment , i n t ur n, f i l ed a pet i t i on

    aski ng t hat we agr ee t o exer ci se our sect i on 1292( b) j ur i sdi ct i on.

    Ther e i s, however , a t hreshol d quest i on. Congress has

    expr essl y r est r i ct ed t he oper at i on of sect i on 1292( b) t o "ci vi l

    act i on[ s] . " 28 U. S. C. 1292( b) . Whet her a sect i on 2255

    pr oceedi ng may appr opr i at el y be char act er i zed as a ci vi l act i on f or

    pur poses of sect i on 1292( b) i s an unset t l ed quest i on. Thi s

    uncer t ai nt y r esul t s f r om per vasi ve "conf usi on over whet her 2255

    pr oceedi ngs ar e ci vi l or cr i mi nal i n nat ur e. " Wal l v. Khol i , 131

    S. Ct . 1278, 1289 n. 7 ( 2011) ; see 3 Char l es A. Wr i ght et al . ,

    Feder al Pract i ce and Procedur e 622 ( 4t h ed. updat ed Apr . 2013) .

    Sever al cases i ndi cat e that sect i on 2255 pr oceedi ngs are

    pr edomi nant l y ci vi l . See, e. g. , Hef l i n v. Uni t ed St at es, 358 U. S.

    415, 418 n. 7 ( 1959) ; Roger s v. Uni t ed St at es, 180 F. 3d 349, 352 n. 3

    ( 1st Ci r . 1999) . Ot her cases i ndi cat e t hat sect i on 2255

    pr oceedi ngs ar e pr edomi nant l y cr i mi nal . See, e. g. , Uni t ed St at es

    v. Mar t i n, 226 F. 3d 1042, 1047 n. 7 ( 9t h Ci r . 2000) ; Uni t ed St at es

    v. Qui n, 836 F. 2d 654, 655- 56 n. 2 ( 1st Ci r . 1988) .

    An advi sor y commi t t ee note suggest s t hat a sect i on 2255

    pr oceedi ng shoul d be consi der ed "a cont i nuat i on of t he cr i mi nal

    case, " r at her t han a separ at e ci vi l act i on. E. g. , Rul e 3, Rul es

    Gover ni ng Sect i on 2255 Pr oceedi ngs, advi sory commi t t ee' s not e.

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    Some cour t s have f ound t hi s cont r ol l i ng, see, e. g. , Uni t ed St at es

    v. Cook, 997 F. 2d 1312, 1319 ( 10t h Ci r . 1993) , and others have not ,

    see, e. g. , Uni t ed St at es v. Nahodi l , 36 F. 3d 323, 328- 29 ( 3d Ci r .

    1994) .

    To compl i cat e t he mat t er , some cour t s have abj ured an

    i r oncl ad char act er i zat i on and have t r eat ed sect i on 2255 pr oceedi ngs

    as hybr i d; t hat i s, as ci vi l f or some pur poses and cr i mi nal f or

    ot her pur poses. See, e. g. , Uni t ed St at es v. Hadden, 475 F. 3d 652,

    664- 65 ( 4t h Ci r . 2007) ( col l ect i ng cases) ; Uni t ed St at es v.

    Fi or el l i , 337 F. 3d 282, 286 ( 3d Ci r . 2003) ( " [ W] hi l e a 2255

    mot i on i s deemed a f ur t her st ep i n t he movant ' s cr i mi nal case, i t

    i s al so consi der ed a ci vi l r emedy f or pur poses of appel l at e

    j ur i sdi ct i on. " ) ; see al so Tr enkl er v. Uni t ed Stat es, 536 F. 3d 85,

    94 ( 1st Ci r . 2008) ( maki ng si mi l ar observat i on r egar di ng anal ogous

    pet i t i on f or wr i t of cor am nobi s) .

    Ther e i s a smat t er i ng of di r ect precedent ; cour t s

    occasi onal l y have aut hor i zed or r ef used t o aut hor i ze the use of

    sect i on 1292( b) i n sect i on 2255 cases. Compar e, e. g. , Uni t ed

    St at es v. Pel ul l o, 399 F. 3d 197, 202 ( 3d Ci r . 2005) ( gr ant i ng

    i nt er l ocut or y appeal ) , wi t h, e. g. , Mur phy v. Rei d, 332 F. 3d 82, 83

    ( 2d Ci r . 2003) ( per cur i am) ( denyi ng i nt er l ocut or y appeal ) . But

    t hese cour t s have done so wi t hout el aborat i on and t he deci si ons

    ar e, t her ef or e, gener al l y unhel pf ul .

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    Gi ven t hi s l ack of uni f or mi t y, we t hi nk that i t i s an

    open and eni gmat i c quest i on as t o whether sect i on 1292( b) can be

    depl oyed i n a sect i on 2255 case. I n t he l ast anal ysi s, we f i nd i t

    unnecessary t o answer t hi s vexi ng quest i on t oday. I nst ead, we

    pr ef er t o t ake a di f f er ent r out e and exer ci se j ur i sdi ct i on over t he

    under l yi ng j ur or di shonest y i ssue t hr ough our advi sor y mandamus

    power . See Uni t ed St at es v. Hor n, 29 F. 3d 754, 769- 70 ( 1st Ci r .

    1994) ; see al so 16 Char l es A. Wr i ght et al . , Feder al Pr act i ce and

    Procedur e 3934. 1 ( 2d ed. updated Apr . 2013) ( "Wr i t r evi ew t hat

    r esponds t o occasi onal speci al needs pr ovi des a val uabl e ad hoc

    r el i ef val ve f or t he pr essur es t hat ar e i mper f ect l y cont ai ned by

    t he st at ut es per mi t t i ng appeal s f r om f i nal j udgment s and

    i nt er l ocut or y or der s. ") .

    I n pur suance of t he Al l Wr i t s Act , 28 U. S. C. 1651,

    f eder al cour t s "may i ssue al l wr i t s necessary or appr opr i at e i n ai d

    of t hei r r espect i ve j ur i sdi ct i ons and agr eeabl e t o t he usages and

    pr i nci pl es of l aw. " Thi s pr ovi si on al l ows a cour t of appeal s, i n

    cer t ai n ci r cumst ances, t o af f or d i mmedi at e r evi ew t o ot her wi se

    unappeal abl e or der s. See, e. g. , Hor n, 29 F. 3d at 769.

    The t ype of wr i t most appropr i at e her e i s advi sor y

    mandamus. Thi s wr i t i s reserved f or a smal l cl ass of cases i n

    whi ch t he usual general mandamus r equi r ement s ar e not met . See i d.

    I t i s " st r ong medi ci ne and, as such, shoul d be di spensed

    spar i ngl y. " I n r e Sony BMG Musi c Ent m' t , 564 F. 3d 1, 4 ( 1st Ci r .

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    2009) . We t ypi cal l y exer ci se t hi s power t o set t l e subst ant i al

    quest i ons of l aw when doi ng so woul d gi ve needed gui dance t o

    l awyer s, l i t i gant s, and l ower cour t s. See Hor n, 29 F. 3d at 770.

    Advi sor y mandamus i s par t i cul ar l y wel l - sui t ed t o t he r esol ut i on of

    i mpor t ant quest i ons " whi ch, i f not i mmedi at el y addr essed, ar e

    l i kel y t o r ecur and t o evade ef f ect i ve r evi ew. " Gr een, 407 F. 3d at

    439.

    The case at hand f i t s snugl y wi t hi n t hese nar r ow

    conf i nes. To begi n, t he case pr esent s an unset t l ed quest i on of

    syst emi c si gni f i cance. See Hor n, 29 F. 3d at 769- 70. Vacat i ng a

    determi nat i on made by a j ur y t hat has hear d evi dence f or days on

    end i s a ser i ous step. That i s especi al l y t r ue i n a capi t al case:

    "deat h i s [ ] di f f er ent , " Gar dner v. Fl or i da, 430 U. S. 349, 357

    ( 1977) ( pl ur al i t y opi ni on) , and r epast i nat i ng pr evi ousl y pl owed

    gr ound i n a capi t al case exposes t he f ami l i es of hi s vi ct i ms and

    t he def endant t o r enewed emot i onal st r ai n. I t al so ent ai l s

    addi t i onal cost s.

    Addi t i onal l y, t he r i ght at st ake i n t hi s case deser ves

    gr eat r espect . "Al l woul d agr ee t hat an i mpar t i al j ur y i s an

    i nt egr al component of a f ai r t r i al " and must be " j eal ousl y

    saf eguar d[ ed] . " Ner on v. Ti er ney, 841 F. 2d 1197, 1200- 01 ( 1st Ci r .

    1988) .

    Here, moreover , t he f r amework f or determi ni ng when a new

    t r i al i s war r ant ed because of j ur or di shonest y i s not wel l - def i ned.

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    The l eadi ng case on t he ef f ect of post - t r i al di scover y of j uror

    di shonest y i s t he Supr eme Cour t ' s semi nal deci si on i n McDonough.

    McDonough i nvol ved qui t e di f f er ent f act s and i t s t eachi ngs ar e open

    t o i nt er pr et at i on. Fur t her , t he di st r i ct cour t ' s r eadi ng of

    McDonough i s pr obl emat i c.

    Two ot her dat a poi nt s ar e al so wor t hy of not e. Fi r st ,

    t he i ssue bef or e us wi l l al most cer t ai nl y r ecur . The spect er of

    j uror di shonest y present s a r ecur r i ng danger i n al l cases, ci vi l

    and cri mi nal , capi t al and non- capi t al . A cl ar i f i cat i on of t he

    appl i cabl e l egal st andar d woul d be a gr eat ut i l i t y i n al l owi ng

    cour t s i n f ut ur e cases to cope wi t h t hi s r ecur r ent pr obl em.

    Second, f or bear ance on our par t mi ght wel l r esul t i n t he

    j uror di shonest y quest i on evadi ng r evi ew. Let us expl ai n.

    Were we t o squander t hi s opport uni t y t o r evi ew t he

    di st r i ct cour t ' s deci si on, t he new penal t y- phase hear i ng or der ed by

    t he di st r i ct cour t woul d pr oceed and a newl y empanel ed j ur y woul d

    r ecommend t he sent ence ( l i f e i mpr i sonment or deat h) . I f t he new

    j ury vot es f or a deat h sentence, t he gover nment woul d have no

    i ncent i ve t o appeal and, i ndeed, woul d be f or ecl osed f r om doi ng

    so. See Uni t ed St at es v. Mor an, 393 F. 3d 1, 12 ( 1st Ci r . 2004) .

    Nor woul d t he def endant appeal t he ear l i er gr ant of a new penal t y-

    phase hear i ng si nce i t occur r ed at hi s behest . See Uni t ed St at es

    v. Angi ul o, 897 F. 2d 1169, 1216 ( 1st Ci r . 1990) ( " [ D] ef endant s

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    can[ not ] pr oper l y chal l enge on appeal a pr oposal t hey t hemsel ves

    of f er ed . . . . " ) .

    I f , however , t he newl y empanel ed j ur y vot es f or l i f e

    i mpr i sonment , t he di st r i ct cour t ' s or der may st i l l evade revi ew.

    The def endant , of cour se, woul d not appeal . For i t s par t , t he

    gover nment mi ght be pr event ed f r om appeal i ng t he ear l i er deci si on

    t o vacat e the deat h sent ence and order a new penal t y- phase hear i ng.

    Af t er al l , t he Doubl e J eopar dy Cl ause, U. S. Const . amend. V, cl . 2,

    appl i es t o sent enci ng hear i ngs i n capi t al cases. See Sat t azahn v.

    Pennsyl vani a, 537 U. S. 101, 107- 09 (2003) .

    A j ur y' s di savowal of t he deat h penal t y the second t i me

    ar ound, based on " f i ndi ngs suf f i ci ent t o est abl i sh l egal

    ent i t l ement t o the l i f e sent ence, " woul d nor mal l y be t ant amount t o

    an acqui t t al f or doubl e j eopar dy pur poses. I d. at 107- 09.

    Per mi t t i ng t he gover nment t o appeal af t er a second deat h- el i gi bl e

    j ury has di savowed t he deat h sent ence woul d r ai se ser i ous doubl e

    j eopar dy concer ns, and at t he l east woul d l ead t o an i ncongruous

    r esul t . I ndeed, t he Cour t has sai d t hat " [ t ] he pol i ci es under l yi ng

    t he Doubl e J eopar dy Cl ause mi l i t at e agai nst per mi t t i ng t he

    Gover nment t o appeal af t er a ver di ct of acqui t t al . " Uni t ed St at es

    v. Wi l son, 420 U. S. 332, 352 ( 1975) .

    Wi t hal , we note t hat t he Doubl e J eopardy Cl ause may not

    bar a gover nment appeal f ol l owi ng a second penal t y- phase j ur y' s

    r ecommendat i on of l i f e i mpr i sonment . As a gener al r ul e, no doubl e

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    j eopar dy probl em i s present ed wher e an "er r or coul d be cor r ect ed

    wi t hout subj ect i ng [ t he def endant ] t o a second t r i al bef or e a

    second t r i er of f act . " I d. at 345. The Cour t has hel d t hat

    "[ w] hen a j ur y r et ur ns a ver di ct of gui l t y and a t r i al j udge ( or an

    appel l at e cour t ) sets asi de t hat ver di ct and ent er s a j udgment of

    acqui t t al , t he Doubl e J eopar dy Cl ause does not pr ecl ude a

    pr osecut i on appeal t o r ei nst at e t he j ur y ver di ct of gui l t y. " Smi t h

    v. Massachuset t s, 543 U. S. 463, 467 ( 2005) . The Supr eme Cour t has

    yet t o speak di r ect l y t o t hi s di f f i cul t i ssue.

    We need not ent er t hi s quagmi r e: f or pr esent pur poses,

    i t suf f i ces t o say t hat t her e i s a credi bl e possi bi l i t y t hat t he

    di st r i ct cour t ' s deci si on woul d evade appel l at e scr ut i ny wer e we t o

    def er r evi ew unt i l af t er a new penal t y- phase hear i ng i s compl et ed.

    I f a def er r al of r evi ew car r i es wi t h i t an appr eci abl e degr ee of

    danger t hat t he under l yi ng i ssue wi l l escape r evi ew ent i r el y, t hat

    danger ar gues i n f avor of exerci si ng advi sor y mandamus. See Uni t ed

    St at es v. Pl eau, 680 F. 3d 1, 4 ( 1st Ci r . 2012) ( en banc) .

    To say mor e about t he quest i on of appel l at e j ur i sdi ct i on

    woul d ser ve no usef ul pur pose. For t he r easons el uci dat ed above,

    we deem t hi s case an appr opr i at e one f or t he exer ci se of our

    advi sor y mandamus aut hor i t y. Consequent l y, we pr oceed t o t he

    mer i t s.

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    III. JUROR DISHONESTY

    The gover nment asser t s t hat t he di st r i ct cour t er r ed as

    a mat t er of l aw i n vacat i ng t he def endant ' s sent ence and or der i ng

    a new penal t y- phase hear i ng. I n t he government ' s vi ew, t he cour t

    mi si nt erpr eted t he Supr eme Cour t ' s opi ni on i n McDonough, 464 U. S.

    548 ( 1984) , and erected an er r oneous l egal f r amework f or handl i ng

    post - t r i al cl ai ms of newl y di scover ed j ur or di shonest y.

    Our st andar d of r evi ew i s bi f ur cat ed. We r evi ew f i ndi ngs

    of r aw f act f or cl ear er r or . See Uni t ed St at es v. Geor ge, 676 F. 3d

    249, 256 ( 1st Ci r . 2012) . We r evi ew t he cor r ect ness of t he

    di st r i ct cour t ' s l egal anal ysi s de novo. See Pr ou v. Uni t ed

    St at es, 199 F. 3d 37, 42 ( 1st Ci r . 1999) .

    The government ' s chal l enge pr i mar i l y t ar get s t he di st r i ct

    cour t ' s l egal r egi me. We agr ee wi t h t he gover nment t hat t he

    di st r i ct cour t mi si nt er pr et ed McDonough and er ect ed an er r oneous

    f r amewor k. I n t hi s i nst ance, however , appl yi ng t he appr opr i at e

    f r amework l eads t o t he same resul t .

    To expl ai n t hese concl usi ons, we begi n by canvass i ng t he

    di st r i ct cour t ' s f i ndi ngs of f act . We t ur n next t o t he appr opr i at e

    l egal f r amewor k. Then, we ar r ay t he f act s suppor t abl y f ound

    agai nst t he appr opr i at e f r amewor k. Fi nal l y, we deal wi t h t wo

    per i pheral argument s advanced by t he government .

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    A. Facts Supportably Found.

    The di st r i ct cour t ' s met i cul ous f act f i ndi ng brought t o

    l i ght a l i t any of l i es t ol d by J ur or C dur i ng voi r di r e. We

    r ehear se t he par t i cul ar s.

    The post - t r i al hear i ng st r et ched out over t hree separ at e

    cour t days. Dur i ng t hose occasi ons, t he di st r i ct j udge had ampl e

    oppor t uni t y t o gauge J ur or C' s cr edi bi l i t y and eval uat e her

    i mpar t i al i t y. The cour t suppor t abl y f ound t hat J ur or C gave f al se

    answer s not onl y dur i ng voi r di r e but al so dur i ng t he post - t r i al

    hear i ng i t sel f . These f al se answer s r el at ed pr i mar i l y t o t wo

    aspect s of J ur or C' s l i f e.

    The f i r st ar ea about whi ch J uror C per si st ent l y l i ed

    i nvol ved her ex- husband, P. The second i nvol ved her daught er , J . 5

    The di st r i ct cour t suppor t abl y f ound, based on evi dence

    adduced dur i ng t he post - t r i al pr oceedi ng, t hat P, an empl oyee of

    t he Uni t ed St at es Post al Ser vi ce, r egul ar l y abused al cohol and

    mar i j uana. P r ebuf f ed J ur or C' s adj ur at i ons to seek t r eat ment and

    hi s cont i nued subst ance abuse cont r i but ed t o J ur or C' s deci si on t o

    obt ai n a di vor ce.

    Dur i ng t hei r mar r i age, J ur or C f ear ed physi cal abuse as

    P of t en t hr eat ened t o harm her . On one occasi on, P menaced J ur or

    C wi t h a shot gun. Af t er her sons t ook t he weapon away, J ur or C

    5 The f ol l owi ng summar y of t he di st r i ct cour t ' s per t i nentf i ndi ngs i s dr awn f r omt he cour t ' s exeget i c opi ni on i n Sampson I I ,820 F. Supp. 2d at 181- 88.

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    r epor t ed t he i nci dent t o t he pol i ce. She r equest ed and r ecei ved an

    abuse pr event i on or der t hat r equi r ed P t o st ay away f r om her . P

    vi ol at ed t hi s order , commi t t i ng a cr i mi nal of f ense, when he

    appr oached J ur or C at t hei r home, chased her i nt o t he bedr oom, and

    woul d not l et her l eave. P was ar r est ed and pr osecut ed f or

    vi ol at i ng t he abuse pr event i on or der . When J ur or C bel at edl y

    admi t t ed t hese event s, she char act er i zed t hemas "hor r i bl e" and "a

    ni ght mar e. "

    J uror C descr i bed her exper i ences wi t h J , whose ver y

    exi st ence she had f ai l ed t o acknowl edge ei t her i n her r esponses t o

    t he j ur or quest i onnai r e or dur i ng t he voi r di r e, i n much t he same

    way. As J ur or C wel l knew, J at one t i me hel d an admi ni st r at i ve

    j ob wi t h t he Sani bel Pol i ce Depar t ment i n Fl or i da. J l ost t hi s

    posi t i on i n 1997, however , when she was pl aced on pr obat i on af t er

    admi t t i ng t o t he t hef t of pr oper t y. J vi ol at ed t he t er ms of her

    pr obat i on and was gi ven a si x- mont h i ncar cer at i ve sent ence. J ur or

    C vouchsaf ed her bel i ef s t hat J had been t r eat ed f ai r l y by t he

    aut hor i t i es dur i ng t hi s or deal .

    J al so became a cocai ne addi ct . Ashamed of J ' s cr i mi nal

    conduct and dr ug use, J ur or C had t r i ed t o f or get about t hese

    exper i ences because t hi nki ng of t hem was "ki l l i ng" her . She was

    unwi l l i ng t o admi t t hat such event s coul d happen i n her f ami l y.

    Al t hough J ur or C si gned t he wr i t t en voi r di r e

    quest i onnai r e under t he pai ns and penal t i es of per j ur y, t he pr oof

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    adduced dur i ng t he post - t r i al pr oceedi ng, summari zed above, made i t

    pel l uci d t hat no f ewer t han t en of her r esponses wer e apocr yphal .

    We gi ve t he f l avor of t hi s mendaci t y by r ecount i ng some of t he

    r esponses gi ven by J ur or C on t he quest i onnai r e.

    C Quest i on 32 i nqui r ed whether J ur or C or anyone

    cl ose t o her ever had a dr ug pr obl em. She

    answered "no. "

    C Quest i on 34 i nqui r ed whether J ur or C or anyone

    cl ose t o her wor ked f or t he f eder al gover nment .

    She answer ed "no. "

    C Quest i on 47 i nqui r ed as t o how many chi l dr en

    J uror C had. She i ndi cat ed t hat she had onl y t wo

    sons.

    C Quest i on 59 i nqui r ed whet her J ur or C, or anyone

    cl ose t o her had ever been a vi ct i mof a cr i me or

    a wi t ness t o a cr i me. She answered "no. "

    C Quest i on 61 i nqui r ed whether J ur or C or anyone

    cl ose t o her had ever been quest i oned as part of

    a cr i mi nal i nvest i gat i on. She answer ed "no. "

    C Quest i on 63 i nqui r ed whether J ur or C or anyone

    cl ose t o her had ever been charged wi t h

    commi t t i ng a cr i me. She answered "no. "

    C Quest i on 64 i nqui r ed whether J ur or C knew anyone

    who had ever been i n pr i son. She answered "no. "

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    C Quest i on 65 i nqui r ed whether J ur or C or anyone

    cl ose t o her ever had an exper i ence wi t h t he

    pol i ce i n whi ch she ( or t hat ot her per son) was

    t r eat ed f ai r l y. She answer ed "no. "

    C Quest i on 68 i nqui r ed whether J ur or C or anyone

    el se cl ose t o her had ever been empl oyed i n l aw

    enf orcement . She answered "no. "

    Each of t hese answers was f al se. J ur or C per pet uat ed t hese

    f al sehoods dur i ng t he i ndi vi dual voi r di r e quest i oni ng.

    To make a bad si t uat i on wor se, J uror C cont i nued her

    char ade dur i ng t he i ni t i al sessi on of t he post - t r i al hear i ng. When

    def ense counsel at t empt ed t o pr obe her l i es about P, she resi st ed

    t hat l i ne of i nqui r y, pr of essi ng t hat she di d not "want t o go i nt o

    al l of t hese [ t hi ngs]. "

    On t he second day of t he post - t r i al hear i ng, t he t r ut h

    about J began t o emer ge; J ur or C admi t t ed, f or t he f i r st t i me, t hat

    she had a daught er who had been ar r est ed. 6

    Dur i ng t he same post - t r i al sessi on, J ur or C t est i f i ed

    t hat she di d not speak t o any of her f el l ow j ur or s af t er t he t r i al

    had concl uded. She al so deni ed any cont act wi t h t he vi ct i ms'

    6 J ur or C t est i f i ed t hat she want ed t o cal l t he cour t aboutt hi s set of l i es af t er t he f i r st post- t r i al sessi on but di d nothave t he t el ephone number . The cour t , not i ng t hat i t s t el ephonenumber was on both her subpoena l et t er and on the cour t ' s generalwebsi t e, f ound t hi s excuse i ncr edi bl e. Sampson I I , 820 F. Supp. 2dat 187.

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    f ami l i es. These st at ement s wer e unt r ue and J ur or C admi t t ed as

    much dur i ng t he f i nal sessi on of t he post - t r i al hear i ng. Al t hough

    t hese l i es di d not occur dur i ng voi r di r e, t hey ar e pl ai nl y

    r el evant t o J ur or C' s cr edi bi l i t y and st r ongl y suppor t t he di st r i ct

    cour t ' s f i ndi ng of j ur or di shonest y.

    Based on t hi s and ot her evi dence, t he di st r i ct cour t

    f ound t hat J ur or C had i nt ent i onal l y and r epeat edl y di ssembl ed

    about P and J because of bot h t he emot i onal pai n i nvol ved i n

    di scussi ng t hese exper i ences and her desi r e to avoi d t he

    humi l i at i on of shar i ng t hem. Sampson I I , 820 F. Supp. 2d at 181,

    197. Thi s f i ndi ng has over whel mi ng suppor t i n t he r ecor d. J ur or

    C hersel f acknowl edged t hat she had wi t hhel d t he i nf ormat i on about

    P and J because, when compl et i ng t he quest i onnai r e, she "di dn' t

    t hi nk [her ] per sonal l i f e had anythi ng t o do wi t h [ ] bei ng a

    j uror . " I d. at 187. I n al l event s, her demeanor whi l e t est i f yi ng

    evi nced her emot i onal pai n and humi l i at i on; she was vi si bl y

    di st r aught when di scussi ng P and J , cr yi ng and i ncoher ent l y

    at t empt i ng t o excuse her mendaci t y. See i d. at 184, 185, 190.

    B. The Legal Framework.

    We come next t o t he under l yi ng l egal pr i nci pl es t hat

    gover n post - t r i al cl ai ms of newl y di scover ed j ur or di shonest y. I t

    i s const i t ut i onal bedr ock t hat "[ i ] n al l cri mi nal pr osecut i ons, t he

    accused shal l enj oy the r i ght t o a speedy and publ i c t r i al , by an

    i mpar t i al j ur y. " U. S. Const . amend VI . An i mpar t i al j ur y i s one

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    "capabl e and wi l l i ng t o deci de t he case sol el y on t he evi dence

    bef or e i t . " McDonough, 464 U. S. at 554 ( i nt ernal quot at i on mar ks

    omi t t ed) . The r i ght t o an i mpar t i al j ur y i s nowher e as pr eci ous as

    when a def endant i s on t r i al f or hi s l i f e. See Ross v. Okl ahoma,

    487 U. S. 81, 85 ( 1988) .

    The FDPA enshr i nes t hi s r i ght . I t r equi r es t hat t he j ury

    be unani mous i n concl udi ng t hat t he deat h penal t y i s j ust i f i ed.

    See 18 U. S. C. 3593( d) . I f even a si ngl e bi ased j ur or

    par t i ci pat es i n t he i mposi t i on of t he deat h sent ence, t he sent ence

    i s i nf i r mand cannot be execut ed. See Mor gan v. I l l i noi s, 504 U. S.

    719, 729 ( 1992) .

    Voi r di r e i s a si ngul ar l y i mpor t ant means of saf eguar di ng

    t he r i ght t o an i mpar t i al j ur y. A pr obi ng voi r di r e exami nat i on i s

    " [ t ] he best way t o ensur e t hat j ur or s do not har bor bi ases f or or

    agai nst t he par t i es. " Cor r ei a v. Fi t zger al d, 354 F. 3d 47, 52 ( 1st

    Ci r . 2003) . Thi s goal , however , i s not easy t o achi eve: a per son

    who harbors a bi as may not appr eci ate i t and, i n any event , may be

    r el uct ant t o admi t her l ack of obj ect i vi t y. See McDonough, 464

    U. S. at 554; Cr awf or d v. Uni t ed St at es, 212 U. S. 183, 196 ( 1909) .

    As t he Supr eme Cour t expl ai ned over a cent ur y ago, " [ b] i as or

    pr ej udi ce i s such an el usi ve condi t i on of t he mi nd t hat i t i s most

    di f f i cul t , i f not i mpossi bl e, t o al ways recogni ze i t s exi st ence. "

    Cr awf ord, 212 U. S. at 196.

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    The voi r di r e process, whi ch i s f l ui d r at her t han

    mechani cal , i s f r ust r at ed when a pr ospect i ve j ur or i s di shonest .

    Bot h t he j ur or ' s di shonest y and her mot i vat i on f or t hat di shonest y

    may cast doubt upon her i mpar t i al i t y. See McDonough, 464 U. S. at

    556. "I f t he answer s t o [ voi r di r e] quest i ons ar e wi l l f ul l y

    evasi ve or knowi ngl y unt r ue, t he tal esman, when accept ed, i s a

    j uror i n name onl y. " Cl ar k v. Uni t ed Stat es, 289 U. S. 1, 11

    ( 1933) .

    I n McDonough, t he Supreme Cour t spoke t o t he quest i on of

    when a par t y i s ent i t l ed t o a new t r i al af t er l ear ni ng t hat a j ur or

    f ai l ed t o di scl ose mat er i al i nf or mat i on dur i ng t he voi r di r e. I n

    McDonough, a seat ed j ur or i n a pr oduct l i abi l i t y case, when quer i ed

    dur i ng voi r di r e whether he or hi s i mmedi ate f ami l y members had

    ever sust ai ned sever e i nj ur y i n an acci dent , di d not di scl ose t hat

    hi s son had been hur t i n a t r uck t i r e expl osi on. 464 U. S. at 549-

    51. Fol l owi ng a ver di ct f or t he def endant and t he di scl osur e of

    t hi s i nf or mat i on, t he di st r i ct cour t deni ed a mot i on f or a new

    t r i al . 7 The cour t of appeal s r eversed. The Supr eme Cour t r ul ed

    t hat t he j ur or ' s "mi st aken, t hough honest , " r esponse di d not

    necessi t at e a new t r i al . I d. at 555. Emphasi zi ng t hat a par t y " i s

    ent i t l ed t o a f ai r t r i al but not a per f ect one, " i d. at 553

    7 The government argues t hat st andards f or r evi ew of post -convi ct i on cl ai ms of j ur or di shonest y must be mor e st r i ngent t hanst andar ds f or r evi ew of a di st r i ct cour t ' s deci si on dur i ng voi rdi r e t o excl ude a j ur or f or bi as. Because we base our deci si on onMcDonough, we do not di scuss t hi s argument .

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    ( i nt er nal quot at i on mar ks omi t t ed) , t he Cour t expl ai ned t hat

    par t i es cannot be gr ant ed a new t r i al i f t he onl y pur pose i s " t o

    r ecreat e t he perempt ory chal l enge pr ocess because counsel l acked

    . . . i nf or mat i on, " i d. at 555.

    The McDonough Cour t di st i ngui shed t he case bef or e i t f r om

    a si t uat i on i n whi ch a j ur or was i nt ent i onal l y di shonest dur i ng

    voi r di r e, and t he combi nat i on of t he undi scl osed i nf or mat i on and

    such di shonest y demonst r at es bi as. To secur e a new t r i al , i n t he

    l at t er si t uat i on, a par t y must show " t hat a j ur or f ai l ed t o answer

    honest l y a mat er i al quest i on" at voi r di r e, and " t hen f ur t her show

    t hat a cor r ect r esponse woul d have pr ovi ded a val i d basi s f or a

    chal l enge f or cause. " I d. at 556. I n t hi s r egar d, t he Cour t not ed

    t hat " [ t ] he mot i ves f or conceal i ng i nf or mat i on may var y, but onl y

    t hose r easons t hat af f ect a j ur or ' s i mpar t i al i t y can t r ul y be sai d

    t o af f ect t he f ai rness of a t r i al . " I d.

    We t hi nk i t f ol l ows t hat , under McDonough, a par t y

    seeki ng a new t r i al based on j ur or di shonest y dur i ng voi r di r e must

    sat i sf y a bi nar y t est . See i d. ; see al so Cr owl ey v. L. L. Bean,

    I nc. , 303 F. 3d 387, 407 ( 1st Ci r . 2002) . The par t y must show,

    f i r st , t hat t he j ur or f ai l ed t o answer honest l y a mat er i al voi r

    di r e quest i on. 8 See McDonough, 464 U. S. at 556. For t hi s pur pose,

    8 Of cour se, a j ur or , dur i ng voi r di r e, may make honest , butmi st aken r esponses. Thi s cat egor y i ncl udes si t uat i ons i n whi ch,f or exampl e, t he j ur or mi sunder st ands t he wor di ng of t he quest i on,f ai l s t o r ecal l t he cor r ect r esponse, or i s not asked a quest i ont hat woul d necessi t at e di scl osur e of t he r el evant i nf or mat i on. We

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    a voi r di r e quest i on i s mat er i al i f a r esponse t o i t "has a nat ur al

    t endency t o i nf l uence, or i s capabl e of i nf l uenci ng, " t he j udge' s

    i mpar t i al i t y det er mi nat i on. Neder v. Uni t ed St at es, 527 U. S. 1, 16

    ( 1999) ( i nt er nal quot at i on mar ks and al t er at i on omi t t ed) .

    The second par t of t he bi nar y t est r equi r es a f i ndi ng

    t hat a t r ut hf ul r esponse t o the voi r di r e quest i on "woul d have

    pr ovi ded a val i d basi s f or a chal l enge f or cause. " McDonough, 464

    U. S. at 556. J ur or s nor mal l y ar e subj ect t o excusal f or cause i f

    t hey ar e bi ased or i f t hey f ai l t o sat i sf y st at ut or y

    qual i f i cat i ons. 2 Char l es Al an Wr i ght et al . , Feder al Pr act i ce and

    Pr ocedur e 382 ( 4t h ed. updat ed Apr . 2013) . I n t hi s i nst ance,

    onl y bi as i s r el evant .

    What const i t ut es a val i d basi s f or excusal wi t hi n t he

    pur vi ew of t he bi nar y t est i s t he quest i on t hat l i es at t he hear t

    of t hese appeal s. The di st r i ct cour t t ook a cat egor i cal appr oach

    t o t hi s quest i on, i dent i f yi ng t hr ee such bases: act ual bi as,

    i mpl i ed bi as, and i nf er abl e bi as. Sampson I I , 820 F. Supp. 2d at

    162- 67. We f i nd t hi s cat egor i cal del i neat i on unhel pf ul .

    The McDonough Cour t saw no need t o use pi geonhol es of

    t hi s sor t . The Cour t st ar t ed by def i ni ng i mpar t i al i t y as a

    do not expl or e her e t he ef f ect of honest but mi st aken voi r di r er esponses. For pr esent pur poses, i t suf f i ces to say t hat i n t heabsence of di shonest y, post- t r i al r el i ef , i f avai l abl e at al l , wi l lr equi r e a mor e f l agr ant showi ng of j ur or bi as. See Ami r aul t v.Fai r , 968 F. 2d 1404, 1405 ( 1st Ci r . 1992) ( per cur i am) .

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    condi t i on t hat al l ows a j ur or t o be "capabl e and wi l l i ng t o deci de

    t he case sol el y on t he evi dence. " McDonough, 464 U. S. at 554

    ( quot i ng Smi t h v. Phi l l i ps, 455 U. S. 209, 217 ( 1982) ) . The f l i p

    si de of i mpar t i al i t y i s bi as, but t he Cour t war ned t hat "hi nt s of

    bi as [ ar e] not suf f i ci ent . " I d. I nst ead, onl y "[ d] emonst r at ed

    bi as i n t he responses t o quest i ons on voi r di r e may resul t i n a

    j uror ' s bei ng excused f or cause. " I d.

    Thi s means, of cour se, t hat cogni zabl e j uror bi as i s a

    val i d basi s f or excusal . But McDonough i mposes no r equi r ement t hat

    cogni zabl e bi as be conf i ned t o any par t i cul ar sub- cat egor i es.

    Ever ythi ng depends on t he par t i cul ar ci r cumst ances. Seen i n t hi s

    l i ght , we t hi nk that at t empt i ng t o cl assi f y bi ases i n sub-

    cat egor i es i s l i kel y t o do mor e har m t han good. Consequent l y, we

    eschew t he di st r i ct cour t ' s f or mul at i on and hew t o t he l i ne pl ot t ed

    by t he McDonough cour t . I d. at 555- 56.

    Ref r ai ni ng f r om a cat egor i cal appr oach makes emi nent l y

    good sense: af t er al l , bi as i s not a pedagogi cal concept i on but

    r at her a st at e of mi nd. To r eveal t he exi st ence of t hi s st at e of

    mi nd, " t he Const i t ut i on l ays down no par t i cul ar t est s and pr ocedur e

    i s not chai ned t o any anci ent and ar t i f i ci al f or mul a. " Uni t ed

    St ates v. Wood, 299 U. S. 123, 145- 46 (1936) .

    When al l i s sai d and done, t he exi st ence vel non of a

    val i d basi s f or a chal l enge f or cause i s not a mat t er of l abel s.

    Any i nqui r y i nt o pot ent i al bi as i n t he event of j ur or di shonest y

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    must be bot h cont ext speci f i c and f act speci f i c. The out come of

    t hi s i nqui r y depends on whether a reasonabl e j udge, armed wi t h t he

    i nf or mat i on t hat t he di shonest j ur or f ai l ed t o di scl ose and t he

    r eason behi nd t he j ur or ' s di shonest y, woul d concl ude under t he

    t ot al i t y of t he ci r cumst ances t hat t he j ur or l acked t he capaci t y

    and the wi l l t o deci de the case based on the evi dence ( and t hat ,

    t her ef or e, a val i d basi s f or excusal f or cause exi st ed) . See

    McDonough, 464 U. S. at 554. The part y seeki ng t o upset t he j ur y' s

    ver di ct has t he bur den of showi ng t he r equi si t e l evel of bi as by a

    pr eponderance of t he evi dence. See DeBur go v. St . Amand, 587 F. 3d

    61, 71 ( 1st Ci r . 2009) .

    A number of f actors may be rel evant i n determi ni ng

    whet her a j ur or has bot h t he capaci t y and t he wi l l t o deci de t he

    case sol el y on t he evi dence. Thi s compendi um may i ncl ude ( but i s

    not l i mi t ed t o) t he j ur or ' s i nt er per sonal r el at i onshi ps, see, e. g. ,

    Uni t ed St ates v. Col ombo, 869 F. 2d 149, 151- 52 (2d Ci r . 1989) ;

    Uni t ed St at es v. Scot t , 854 F. 2d 697, 698- 700 ( 5t h Ci r . 1988) ; t he

    j uror ' s abi l i t y t o separ at e her emot i ons f r om her dut i es, see,

    e. g. , Denni s v. Mi t chel l , 354 F. 3d 511, 518- 19, 521 ( 6t h Ci r .

    2003) ; Bur t on v. J ohnson, 948 F. 2d 1150, 1158- 59 ( 10t h Ci r . 1991) ;

    t he si mi l ar i t y bet ween t he j ur or ' s exper i ences and i mpor t ant f act s

    pr esent ed at t r i al , see, e. g. , Uni t ed St at es v. Tor r es, 128 F. 3d

    38, 47- 48 ( 2d Ci r . 1997) ; Bur t on, 948 F. 2d at 1158- 59; t he scope

    and sever i t y of t he j ur or ' s di shonest y, see, e. g. , Dyer v.

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    Cal der on, 151 F. 3d 970, 983- 84 ( 9t h Ci r . 1998) ( en banc) ; Scot t ,

    854 F. 2d at 699- 700; and t he j ur or ' s mot i ve f or l yi ng, see

    McDonough, 464 U. S. at 556; Skaggs v. Ot i s El evator Co. , 164 F. 3d

    511, 516 ( 10t h Ci r . 1998) . Al t hough any one of t hese f act or s,

    t aken i n i sol at i on, may be i nsuf f i ci ent t o gr ound a f i ndi ng of a

    val i d basi s f or a chal l enge f or cause, t hei r cumul at i ve ef f ect must

    nonet hel ess be consi der ed. See Uni t ed St at es v. Per ki ns, 748 F. 2d

    1519, 1532- 33 (11t h Ci r . 1984) .

    C. Integrating Fact and Law.

    I t r emai ns f or us t o eval uat e t he i mpact of t he f act s

    suppor t abl y f ound i n t er ms of t he appr opr i at e l egal f r amewor k. But

    t her e i s a rub: t he di st r i ct cour t mi sunder st ood t he appl i cabl e

    l egal f r amewor k, i nst ead cr eat i ng a new sub- cat egor y t hat i t cal l ed

    "i nf er abl e bi as" t o ser ve as t he cor ner st one of i t s concl usi on t hat

    J uror C' s di shonest y necessi t at ed a new penal t y- phase hear i ng. See

    Sampson I I , 820 F. Supp. 2d at 165- 67, 192- 96.

    The di st r i ct cour t ' s mi st aken vi ew of t he l aw, however ,

    does not r equi r e us t o t hr ow out t he baby wi t h t he bat h wat er .

    Wher e, as her e, a t r i al cour t , not wi t hst andi ng i t s mi sappr ehensi on

    of t he l aw, makes a det ai l ed set of subsi di ar y f i ndi ngs as t o t he

    r aw f act s, t hose f i ndi ngs somet i mes may be subj ect t o r euse. See

    Soci et e Des Pr odui t s Nest l e, S. A. v. Casa Hel vet i a, I nc. , 982 F. 2d

    633, 642 ( 1st Ci r . 1992) ( concl udi ng t hat , i n a case i n whi ch t he

    t r i al cour t suppor t abl y f ound t he f act s but appl i ed t he wr ong r ul e

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    of l aw, cour t of appeal s had t he aut hor i t y, i n l i eu of r emand, t o

    ar r ay the f i ndi ngs agai nst t he cor r ect l egal st andar d) ; Uni t ed

    St at es v. Mor a, 821 F. 2d 860, 869 ( 1st Ci r . 1987) ( si mi l ar ) . Thi s

    i s such a case.

    We t ur n now t o t he t ask of ar r ayi ng t he l ower cour t ' s

    f act ual f i ndi ngs agai nst t he cor r ect l egal f r amewor k. The f i r st

    par t of t he bi nar y t est f ocuses on whet her J ur or C f ai l ed t o answer

    honest l y one or mor e mat er i al voi r di r e quest i ons. The di st r i ct

    cour t ' s f act ual f i ndi ngs make mani f est t hat t hi s benchmar k was

    sat i sf i ed. J ur or C under st ood her dut y t o be t r ut hf ul i n answer i ng

    t he voi r di r e quest i onnai r e, yet her cer t i f i cat i on under t he pai ns

    and penal t i es of per j ur y was knowi ngl y f al se. As J ur or C l at er

    admi t t ed, she had been del i beratel y di shonest when answer i ng t he

    quest i ons t hat cal l ed f or i nf or mat i on about t he expl oi t s of P and

    J .

    The mat er i al i t y of t he quest i ons t hat J uror C answer ed

    di shonest l y i s nose- on- t he- f ace pl ai n. Each quest i on,

    i ndi vi dual l y, was desi gned t o sol i ci t i nf or mat i on t hat pot ent i al l y

    coul d i mpugn a j ur or ' s i mpar t i al i t y; and t he quest i ons,

    col l ect i vel y, bor e heavi l y on t hat subj ect . Quest i ons t hat go t o

    t he hear t of j ur or i mpar t i al i t y ar e unar guabl y mat er i al t o t he voi r

    di r e pr ocess.

    Thi s br i ngs us t o t he second el ement of t he bi nar y t est :

    whet her a reasonabl e j udge, ar med wi t h the i nf or mat i on t hat t he

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    di shonest j ur or f ai l ed t o di scl ose and t he r eason behi nd t he

    j uror ' s di shonest y, woul d concl ude under t he t ot al i t y of t he

    ci r cumst ances t hat t he j ur or l acked t he capaci t y and t he wi l l t o

    deci de the case based on t he evi dence ( and t hat , t her ef or e, a val i d

    basi s f or excusal f or cause exi st ed) . We concl ude t hat t hi s

    showi ng was made. Our concl usi on r est s on t hr ee cr oss- br aced

    pi l l ar s: ( i ) J ur or C' s habi t ual di ssembl i ng; ( i i ) t he i nt ense

    emot i ons J ur or C exhi bi t ed when bel at edl y r el at i ng her l i f e

    exper i ences i nvol vi ng P and J ; and ( i i i ) t he si mi l ar i t i es bet ween

    J uror C' s unr epor t ed l i f e exper i ences and t he evi dence present ed

    dur i ng t he penal t y- phase hear i ng. We comment br i ef l y about t he way

    i n whi ch t hese pi l l ar s i nt er act t o demonst r at e a val i d basi s f or

    excusal f or cause.

    Al t hough j ur or di shonest y, by i t sel f , i s not suf f i ci ent

    t o demonst r at e bi as, i t can be a power f ul i ndi cat or of bi as. See

    Col ombo, 869 F. 2d at 151; Per ki ns, 748 F. 2d at 1532- 33. Here,

    J uror C l i ed r epeatedl y i n t he voi r di r e quest i onnai r e and di r ect l y

    t o t he cour t . Thi s par l ous pat t er n of per si st ent pr evar i cat i on

    suppor t s an i nf er ence t hat J ur or C' s abi l i t y t o per f or m her swor n

    dut y as an i mpar t i al j ur or was compr omi sed f r om t he st ar t .

    What i s mor e, J ur or C' s r epet i t i ve act s of di shonest y

    i l l ust r at e t he power f ul emot i ons she har bor ed about P and J . See

    Bur t on, 948 F. 2d at 1159. To put t hi s pr oposi t i on i n bol d r el i ef ,

    J uror C l ef t no doubt but t hat she woul d r at her l i e t o t he cour t

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    t han di scuss t hese pai nf ul l i f e exper i ences. The r ecor d f ul l y

    suppor t s t he di st r i ct cour t ' s obser vat i on t hat , even year s af t er

    t he penal t y- phase hear i ng, her "shame and embar r assment were so

    i nt ense t hat she coul d not di scuss t hose mat t er s candi dl y,

    unemot i onal l y or , of t en, coher ent l y. " Sampson I I , 820 F. Supp. 2d

    at 193.

    Thi s di spl ay of emot i onal di st r ess i l l umi nat es J uror C' s

    mot i ves f or l yi ng. The McDonough Cour t made cl ear t hat "onl y t hose

    r easons [ f or l yi ng] t hat af f ect a j ur or ' s i mpar t i al i t y can t r ul y be

    sai d t o af f ect t he f ai r ness of a t r i al . " 464 U. S. at 556. Her e,

    i t i s f ar mor e l i kel y t han not t hat as t he di st r i ct cour t f ound

    J ur or C' s r easons f or l yi ng about P and J i mpai r ed her abi l i t y t o

    deci de t he case sol el y on t he evi dence. The magni t ude of J ur or C' s

    emot i onal di st r ess s t r ongl y suggest s t hat i t woul d have been a

    Si syphean t ask f or her t o separ at e the evi dence pr esent ed at t he

    penal t y- phase hear i ng f r omher i nt ense f eel i ngs about her own l i f e

    exper i ences.

    J uror C' s i nabi l i t y t o r emai n det ached i s especi al l y

    t r oubl i ng i n t hi s case because of t he si mi l ar i t y bet ween her

    di st r ess- i nduci ng l i f e exper i ences and the evi dence pr esent ed

    dur i ng t he penal t y- phase hear i ng. When a j ur or has l i f e

    exper i ences t hat corr espond wi t h evi dence pr esent ed dur i ng t he

    t r i al , t hat congr uence r ai ses obvi ous concer ns about t he j ur or ' s

    possi bl e bi as. See Tor r es, 128 F. 3d at 47- 48; Bur t on, 948 F. 2d at

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    1158- 59. I n such a si t uat i on, t he j ur or may have enormous

    di f f i cul t y separ at i ng her own l i f e exper i ences f r omevi dence i n t he

    case. For exampl e, i t woul d be nat ur al f or a j ur or who had been

    t he vi ct i m of a home i nvasi on t o har bor bi as agai nst a def endant

    accused of such a cr i me.

    I n t he case at hand, t he over l ap i s st r i ki ng. We of f er a

    f ew i l l ust r at i ons.

    For one t hi ng, t he j ur or s hear d evi dence t hat t he

    def endant t hr eat ened bank t el l er s at gunpoi nt dur i ng t he st r i ng of

    Nor t h Car ol i na bank r obber i es and hi s mur der vi ct i ms at kni f e

    poi nt . For her par t , J ur or C was f r equent l y t hr eat ened by her

    t hen- husband once wi t h a shot gun and ot her t i mes wi t h hi s f i st s.

    The shot gun t hreat occur r ed i n f ai r l y cl ose t emporal proxi mi t y t o

    t he empanel ment of t he j ur y ( t hr ee years or so) . See Sampson I I ,

    820 F. Supp. 2d at 185. These par al l el s r ai se a ser i ous concer n as

    t o whet her an or di nar y per son i n J ur or C' s shoes woul d be abl e t o

    di sr egar d her own exper i ences i n eval uat i ng t he evi dence.

    For another t hi ng, t he government pr esent ed evi dence

    dur i ng t he penal t y- phase hear i ng t hat t he def endant had subst ance

    abuse pr obl ems pr obl ems t hat cont r i but ed, i nt er al i a, t o t he

    di ssol ut i on of hi s mar r i age. For her par t , J ur or C was f or ced t o

    deal wi t h t he subst ance abuse of both her husband and her daught er .

    I ndeed, P' s subst ance abuse was a cat al yst f or t he di ssol ut i on of

    J uror C' s mar r i age. These par al l el s r ai se a ser i ous concer n as t o

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    whet her an or di nar y per son i n J ur or C' s shoes woul d be abl e to

    di sr egard her own f ami l y' s i nvol vement wi t h subst ance abuse and

    avoi d a bi as agai nst t he def endant on account of hi s subst ance

    abuse.

    Then, t oo, t he j ury hear d evi dence dur i ng t he penal t y-

    phase hear i ng anent t he def endant ' s cr i mi nal hi st or y, i ncl udi ng hi s

    i ncar cer at i on f or r obber y. Anal ogousl y, J ur or C' s daught er

    commi t t ed l ar ceny and was i ncar cer at ed as a r esul t . J ur or C

    t est i f i ed t hat she was deepl y ashamed of her daught er ' s i mmur ement .

    These par al l el s r ai se a ser i ous concer n as t o whether an or di nar y

    per son i n J ur or C' s shoes woul d be abl e t o di sr egar d J ' s t r oubl es

    wi t h t he l aw and avoi d a bi as agai nst t he def endant on t hi s

    account . 9 Thi s concer n i s magni f i ed by t he power f ul emot i ons t hat

    J uror C di spl ayed about her paral l el l i f e exper i ences.

    We concl ude t hat i f f ul l y i nf or med of J ur or C' s

    wi l l i ngness t o l i e r epeat edl y, her f r agi l e emot i onal st at e, her

    past exper i ences wi t h P and J , and t he si mi l ar i t i es bet ween t hose

    exper i ences and t he evi dence t o be pr esent ed dur i ng t he penal t y-

    phase hear i ng, any r easonabl e j udge woul d have f ound that t he

    cumul at i ve ef f ect of t hose f act or s demonst r at ed bi as ( and, t hus, a

    val i d basi s f or excusal f or cause) . I ndeed, t he cour t bel ow

    9 I n t hi s r egar d, J ur or C mi ght al so have i dent i f i ed wi t h t hedef endant ' s par ent s, whom t he penal t y- phase evi dence depi ct ed asbei ng ashamed of t hei r chi l d ( abandoni ng hi m and r ef usi ng t ocooper at e wi t h hi s at t or neys) . See Sampson I I , 820 F. Supp. 2d at158, 181.

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    excused a number of pr ospect i ve j ur or s f or cause on l ess compel l i ng

    gr ounds. Thus, t he def endant was depr i ved of t he r i ght t o an

    i mpar t i al j ur y and i s ent i t l ed t o a new penal t y- phase hear i ng.

    D. Attempts at Avoidance.

    As a l ast r esor t , t he gover nment t r i es t o cat ch l i ght ni ng

    i n a bot t l e. I t ar gues t hat even i f J ur or C' s di shonest y

    const i t ut es a val i d basi s f or di smi ssal f or cause, t he di st r i ct

    cour t had no r i ght t o vacat e t he def endant ' s sent ence and or der a

    new penal t y- phase hear i ng. I t advances t wo t heor i es. We f i nd

    nei t her t heor y per suasi ve.

    To begi n, t he gover nment asser t s t hat t he di st r i ct cour t

    devel oped a new const i t ut i onal r ul e when i t based t he gr ant of a

    new penal t y- phase hear i ng on " i nf er abl e bi as. " The appl i cat i on of

    t hi s new r ul e, t he gover nment ' s t hesi s r uns, t r ansgr essed t he non-

    r et r oact i vi t y pr i nci pl e f or cr i mi nal cases under col l at er al r evi ew.

    See Teague v. Lane, 489 U. S. 288, 310 ( 1989) ( pl ur al i t y opi ni on)

    ( hol di ng t hat a cr i mi nal def endant i s gener al l y not ent i t l ed t o

    col l at er al r el i ef i f gr ant i ng t hat r el i ef woul d r equi r e t he cour t

    t o appl y a new const i t ut i onal r ul e i mpl i cat i ng cr i mi nal pr ocedur e) ;

    Fer r ar a v. Uni t ed St at es, 456 F. 3d 278, 288 ( 1st Ci r . 2006) ( same) .

    Thi s proposi t i on i s r endered moot by our r ej ect i on of t he

    di st r i ct cour t ' s "i nf er abl e bi as" f or mul at i on. The l egal f r amewor k

    t hat we have used does not embody any new const i t ut i onal r ul e of

    cr i mi nal pr ocedur e but , r at her , mer el y appl i es t he r ul e l ai d down

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    by t he Supreme Cour t i n McDonough t o the ci r cumst ances of t he case

    at hand. Such a cour se of act i on does not of f end t he non-

    r et r oact i vi t y pr i nci pl e. Af t er al l , a case i s deemed t o announce

    a new const i t ut i onal r ul e of cr i mi nal pr ocedur e onl y i f t he r esul t

    i s not dr i ven by pr ecedent t hat exi st ed at t he t i me of t he

    deci si on. See Teague, 489 U. S. at 301 ( pl ur al i t y opi ni on) . A case

    does not announce a new const i t ut i onal r ul e of cr i mi nal pr ocedur e

    when i t i s " mer el y an appl i cat i on of t he pr i nci pl e t hat gover ned"

    a pr i or deci si on t o a di f f er ent set of f acts. I d. at 307

    ( pl ur al i t y opi ni on; i nt er nal quot at i on mar ks omi t t ed) ; accor d

    Chai dez v. Uni t ed St at es, 133 S. Ct . 1103, 1107 ( 2013) ; O' Del l v.

    Nether l and, 521 U. S. 151, 156 ( 1997) .

    I f mor e wer e needed and we do not t hi nk t hat i t i s

    t he gover nment ' s asser t i on of t he non- r et r oact i vi t y pr i nci pl e i s

    unt i mel y. The government makes t hi s ar gument f or t he f i r st t i me on

    appeal . A Teague def ense i s not j ur i sdi ct i onal , and t he

    government ' s f ai l ur e to r ai se such a def ense i n a t i meous manner

    const i t ut es a wai ver . See Fer r ar a, 456 F. 3d at 289. Because t he

    gover nment f ai l ed t o i nt er pose t hi s def ense bel ow, i t i s wai ved.

    The gover nment ' s second at t empt at avoi dance i s no mor e

    convi nci ng. I t asser t s t hat because t he def endant seeks

    r emedi at i on on col l at er al r evi ew, const i t ut i onal er r or does not

    ent i t l e hi m t o r el i ef i n t he absence of actual pr ej udi ce. See

    Br echt v. Abr ahamson, 507 U. S. 619, 637- 38 ( 1993) . Bui l di ng on

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    t hi s f oundat i on, t he gover nment i nsi st s t hat t her e has been no

    showi ng of act ual pr ej udi ce her e.

    The gover nment i s wr ong. Ther e i s mor e t han suf f i ci ent

    evi dence of pr ej udi ce i n t he r ecor d t o ent i t l e t he def endant t o

    r el i ef , 10 gi ven t he ext ent of J ur or C' s bi as and t he capi t al

    penal t y- phase pr oceedi ngs i n whi ch she par t i ci pat ed. As t he

    Supr eme Cour t sai d i n Uni t ed St at es v. Mar t i nez- Sal azar , 528 U. S.

    304 ( 2000) , wher e a bi ased j ur or si t s on a j ur y t hat sent enced a

    def endant t o deat h and the i ssue was proper l y pr eserved, t he

    sent ence woul d have t o be over t ur ned, i d. at 316 ( ci t i ng Ross, 487

    U. S. at 85) ; see al so Mor gan, 504 U. S. at 729 ( st at i ng t hat " [ i ] f

    even one [bi ased] j ur or i s empanel ed and t he deat h sent ence i s

    i mposed, t he St at e i s di sent i t l ed t o execut e the sent ence") .

    IV. CONCLUSION

    Thi s case i s a st ar k r emi nder of t he consequences of

    j uror di shonest y. J uror s who do not t ake t hei r oaths ser i ousl y

    t hr eat en t he ver y i nt egr i t y of t he j udi ci al pr ocess. The cost s,

    whether measur ed i n t erms of human suf f er i ng or monetary out l ays,

    ar e st agger i ng. But t he ul t i mat e l esson t hat t hi s case t eaches i s

    t hat t he pr ot ect i ons af f or ded by the Const i t ut i on and l aws of t he

    10 I n vi ew of t he exi st ence of act ual pr ej udi ce, we need notr each t he def endant ' s cont ent i on t hat t he doct r i ne of st r uct ur aler r or appl i es and obvi at es any need f or a showi ng of act ualpr ej udi ce. See Br echt , 507 U. S. at 629- 30.

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    Uni t ed St at es ar e, i n t he end, suf f i ci ent t o pr ot ect agai nst even

    t he most i nsi di ous t hr eat .

    We need go no f ur t her . For t he r easons el uci dated above,

    we di smi ss t he gover nment ' s t wo appeal s. Exer ci si ng our advi sory

    mandamus power , we concl ude as di d the di st r i ct cour t t hat t he

    deat h sent ence must be vacated and a new penal t y- phase hear i ng

    under t aken. Accor di ngl y, we deny t he gover nment ' s r equest f or t he

    i ssuance of an ext r aor di nar y wr i t .

    So Ordered.