AlexWatsonThe Self's Awareness of Itself. Bhaṭṭa Rāmakaṇṭha's Arguments Against the Buddhist Doctrine of No-Self,DeNobili,Wien2006,pp.433.ISBN3-900271-38-0

Thecentralroleandthephilosophicalsignificanceofthecontroversyabouttheexistenceofanātman (“self”)inIndianphilosophyhasbeenexaminedinClausOetke'smasterpiece“Ich” und das Ich,whichphilosophicallyinvestigatestheconflictingopinionsabouttheselfanditsnatureinTheravādaBuddhism,Vaiśeṣika,Nyāya,andBhāṭṭamīmāṃsā.AlexWatson'slearnedbookintroducestheviewsofaŚaivaSiddhāntaauthor,BhaṭṭaRāmakaṇṭha,wholivedinKashmirbetweenA.D.950and1000ca.(p.115),intothisdebate.Infact,thankstotheaccurateworkofNidodiRamachandraBhatt,DominicGoodallandPierre-SylvainFilliozat,amongothers,wealreadyhadexcellenteditionsandtranslationsofsomeRāmakaṇṭha'sworks,whereasaphilosophicalappreciationofhiscontributionwasstilladesideratum.WatsonhasfocusedonaportionofthefirstchapterofRāmakaṇṭha'sNareśvaraparīkṣāprakāśa (“[Commentarythrowing]lighton[Sadyojyotis']InvestigationintotheHumanBeingandGod”,henceforthNPP).ThemotivationbehindWatson’schoiceofauthorliesinthefactthat,accordingtohim(p.77),RāmakaṇṭhawasthemostdialecticallyengagedthinkeroftheŚaivaSiddhāntaschool(hispredecessorsandsuccessorsratherneglectinggenuinephilosophicalconfrontationswithotherschools).Aswell,thistextinparticularistheŚaivaSiddhāntatextthatdevotesthe“mostspacetodialoguewithothertraditions”.Moreover,“Itisnotonlytheamountofspacedevotedto,butalsothemannerof,thisengagementwithothertraditionsthatsetsthefirstchapterofNPPapartfromearlierŚaivaSiddhāntatexts,andindeedfrommanyoftheothersbyRāmakaṇṭha”(p.77).So,bothbecauseofitsdialogiccharacteranditscontent,aninquiryabouttheexistenceandnatureoftheself,thefirstchapteroftheNPPallowsWatsontoinsertRāmakaṇṭhadirectlyintothephilosophicalarenaofclassicalIndianthought.

Thebookisdividedintofiveparts:anintroduction–whichpresentsanoverviewoftheIndiancontroversyabouttheexistenceofanātman (brieflyoutliningthethesesofvariousBuddhistandHindūschools),introducesRāmakaṇṭhaandgivessomeeditorialremarksabouttheNPPtext–followedbyfourchaptersinwhichportionsofthefirstchapteroftheNPParecriticallyedited,translatedandextensivelycommentedonbyWatson.Thebook'schapters,andtheparagraphstherein,presentWatson'sownpartitionsofthetextandaremeanttoguideinitsphilosophicalunderstandingthroughdistinguishingtheopponents'viewsfromthoseofthesiddhāntin (theupholderofthecorrectview,identifiablewithRāmakaṇṭhahimself)andbydemonstratingthevariousstepsofargumentwithineachview.ThefirstargumentWatsonhasselectedfromtheNPPisdedicatedtotheinferenceoftheselfbasedondesireandthesynthesisofcognitions,aninferencemostNaiyāyikasbelievetobetheonlywaytodemonstratetheexistenceoftheself,aswellastotheBuddhistopposingargumentsthereof.Thenextchapterfocusesonself-awareness(svasaṃvedana) asevidencefortheexistenceoftheself,hereRāmakaṇṭhadirectlyopposingtheBuddhistdefeatersoftheNaiyāyikasfoundinthepreviouschapter.ThefollowingchapterdealswithI-cognitions,believedtoyieldevidenceoftheexistenceofaselfbytheMīmāṃsakaKumārilaBhaṭṭa,andtotheBuddhistopponentsofthisview,especiallyDharmakīrti.Rāmakaṇṭha'sviewonthismatterasrepresentedbyWatsonseemstoholdsomeambiguities,insofarasI-cognitionsareconceptualcognitionsandRāmakaṇṭhahasuntilthispointrathermaintainedthattheselfappearspre-conceptuallyinself-awareness(and,hence,cannotbedeniedbyBuddhists,whoalsocreditpre-conceptualcognitionswithnon-erroneousness).Thisconflict(absentintheoriginalversionoftheargument,sinceforKumārilanon-conceptualisationandconceptualisationarejusttwophasesofasingleperceptualact)makestheargumentmoreintriguing,albeitalsomoreintricate(as

shownbyWatson'seffortstomakesenseofit).Finally,inthefinalchapterWatsondepartsfromhisstrictadherencetotheNPPtext,and,inordertoofferabriefviewofRāmakaṇṭha'sownviewofthenature oftheself,thatis,hisequatingitwithcognition,heexaminesandcommentsonadifferentportionofthefirstchapteroftheNPPandonapassageofRāmakaṇṭha'sMataṅgavṛtti. Aftertheconclusions,theNPPpassagesthathavebeenexaminedarepresentedinanappendixtogetherwithtext-criticalnotes.ThevolumeisroundedoutbyseveralindexesInadditiontoWatson'spersonalphilosophicalinterests,leadinghimtoevaluatethesoundnessandstrengthoftheargumentsdevisedbyRāmakaṇṭhaandhisopponents,thebookbenefitsfromthescholarshipofWatsonaswellasthatofhisteachersandcolleagues(firstandforemostDominicGoodall,HarunagaIsaacsonandAlexisSanderson,butalsoKarinPreisendanz,LambertSchmithausen,ErnstSteinkellnerandmanyothers).Hence,itcontainslearnedreferencestootherworksofRāmakaṇṭha(ofparticularinterestareWatson'sconsiderationsconcerningthemutualcontaminationbetweenthemanuscriptsofdifferent worksofRāmakaṇṭha,seefn.82,p.237),butalsotomanyotherIndianauthorswhodealtwiththesamecontroversy.Forinstance,inthefirstchapter,withinhiscommentaryontheNPP,Watsondedicatesanumberofpagestoareconstructionoftheargumentabouttheinferenceoftheselffromdesireandthesynthesisofcognitions,closelyfollowingitssourcesfromVātsyāyanaandthe(Mīmāṃsaka)VṛttikāratoUddyotakara,VācaspatiMiśraandJayantaBhaṭṭa.Inthesamechapter,asimilarexcursusisdedicatedtoareconstructionofthehistoryoftheVaiśeṣika'susageofthecompoundacākṣuṣapratyakṣatva.

OfparticularinterestforthisreviewerareWatson'sfootnotes(especiallynumerousinthesecondchapter)thatreproduceparallelpassagesfromtheMṛgendratanttravṛtti, writtenbyRāmakaṇṭha'sfather,Nārāyaṇakaṇṭha,and,evenmorefrequently,fromRāmakaṇṭha'sParamokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti andMataṅgavṛtti.ItseemsthatRāmakaṇṭharepeatedmanystatementsintheNPPandtheParamokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti verbatim,butreproducedthemsomewhatmorefreelyintheMataṅgavṛtti. Suchconsiderationsareusefulinthephilologicalreconstructionofcorruptedtexts,suchastheParamokṣanirāsakārikāvṛtti (asWatsonhasspecificallyshown), butpossiblyalsofortheevaluationoftheevolutionofRāmakaṇṭha'sthoughtand,moregenerally,theunderstandingofhiscompositionalhabits.Does,forinstance,theexactreproductionofhisownpassagesorthosebyotherauthorsprovethatRāmakaṇṭhahadalibraryathisdisposal?Ontheotherhand,itappearsthatheprobablyconsciouslyrephrasedDharmakīrti(seefn.103,pp.287-8)inordertobettersuittheimmediatecontextofhisdiscussions;doesthisprovethatevenforauthorssuchasRāmakaṇṭha,whoelsewherereproducedtextsaccurately,thesewerenotfeltasinviolable?Finally,howrepresentativeofageneralhabitisRāmakaṇṭha'suseofthetextheiscommentingupontoprovehisownagenda(onthistheme,see,e.g.,p.318)?IhopethatAlexWatsonwillkeeponworkingonthispromisingtrack,inordertoofferusfurtherinsightsintoŚaivaSiddhāntaauthorsandtheirmannerofquotingorreferringtothemselvesandeachother.TheNPPportionsreproducedinthevolumeunderreview,indeed,arestrikinglydevoidofexplicitcreditstoRāmakaṇṭha'sownteachersandpredecessors.

Backtothemainissue,theunderstandingoftheself,WatsondoesnotelaborateonthedegreeofharmonybetweenRāmakaṇṭha'sandhisfellowŚaivaSiddhāntins'views,whilehestressesthedisagreementwiththecommon-streamassumptionsabouttheself,summarisedbyhimasfollows:

AccordingtotheBrāhmaṇicalschoolsofphilosophy,wehave,orratherare,animmaterialandeternalsoulorSelf1.Thisinnercoreofouridentity,existingbeyondourbody,sense-facultiesandmind,istheperceiver

1 Watsonusesindifferentlythesetwotermsinordertotranslateātman.

ofourperceptions,thesubjectofourexperiences.Itisthattowhichtheword'I'refers.Itisunaffectedbythedeathofthebody,andbeginsanewlifebybecomingassociatedwithanotherembryoinaccordancewiththemeritanddemeritithasacquiredthroughitspastactions(p.51).

Rāmakaṇṭha(p.334andpassim)deniestheexistenceofafurtherentitybeyondcognition,andidentifiestheselfwithcognitionitself.HisstrategyagainstBuddhistopponents,infact,consistsoftwosteps:firstheacceptstheirclaimthatthepostulationofaselfbeyondcognitionisunwarranted,sincewedonotexperienceanythingapartfromcognition;thenheconcludesthatthisverycognitionis the formoftheself(thatis,theselfissaidtobesaṃvidrūpa, cidrūpa, jñānātman,etc.).Watsoncorrectlyunderstandsthislatterassertionasastatementofabsoluteidentitybetweenselfandcognition.Butthemereuseofsuchcompoundwordsdoesnotnecessarilywarrantthisanalysis.Infact,whenRāmakaṇṭhaspeaksoftheselfas“havingtheformofcognition”thiscouldjustmeanthatitis–againsttheNyāya'sview–intrinsicallyconscious.The“identity”interpretation,however,becomesfullyjustifiedifintegratedwithotherRāmakaṇṭha'spassages,suchashiscommentaryadKiraṇatantra v.2.25ab,whereheexplicitlyaffirmsthatthereisnośaktimat (possessorofpower)beyondtheśakti (power)ofcognition.AsupplyofsuchquoteswouldhaveimprovedtheconsistencyofWatson'spresentation.Theidentitybetweenselfandcognitionleadstomanyconceptualproblems,insofarastheformerisgenerallyacknowledgedtobepermanent,andthelatterinstantaneous.Thus,Rāmakaṇṭhahastodefendtheviewthatcognitionisitselfeternalandchangeless.Ontheonehand,writesRāmakaṇṭha,evenBuddhistsadmitthataninstantaneousactofcognitioncangraspdifferentobjectsatthesametime;inthesameway,cognitioncanbethoughttobesingleand,thus,eternal,thoughgraspingdifferenttime-moments.Ontheother,Rāmakaṇṭhasuggeststhatonlythecognition'sobjectschange,whereascognitionremainsconstant;thisispossiblebecauseitistheintellect(buddhi) whichisaffectedbytheobjects'changesandnotthecognitionitself.Lookingmorecloselyatthematter,Watsonnoticesthat,accordingtoRāmakaṇṭha,conceptual(savikalpaka) cognitionsdochangeandare,inthissense,tobeconsideredasobjectsofcognition.Insum,whatisleftasunchangingisjustanon-conceptual(nirvikalpaka) cognitiondistinctfromitsobjects.ButhowcouldRāmakaṇṭhaaccountfortheŚaivaSiddhāntaideathatevenaftertheattainmentofliberation,thesupremeself(Śiva)isdifferentfromtheindividualones,iftheyarebothnothingbutcognition?SinceRāmakaṇṭhanegatesthedistinctionbetweendharmaanddharmin,howcouldonedeterminethedifferencebetweenŚivaandtheindividualselveswithoutdifferentiatingdharmas?Moreover,howcouldacognitionbesaidtobeanagent(theagent-characteroftheselfisstressedalsobyWatson,seepp.90-2)?Morespecifically,asforthatspecialkindofagentwhoisŚiva,hisattributesofomniscienceandomnipotenceseemtopresupposethatheisnot(just)cognition.OnthisparticularpointRāmakaṇṭha'sagreementwithhisschool'stenetsisprovenby,e.g.,hiscommentaryonSadyojyotis'Mokṣakārikā,whereheestablishesGod'sexistencebyrelyingontheassumptionthattheremustbeanagentofcommonlyexperiencedeffectsandmentionstheśaktisofknowledge,actionandwillasdistinctfromŚiva(adMK2).Short,thethoroughidentificationofselfandcognitionriskstocollidewithotherteachingsoftheschool.Infact,evenintheabove-mentioned Kiraṇatantrav.2.25ab onefindstheexpressionciddharme puṃsi(“theself,whohasthecharacter(dharma) ofbeingconsciousness”),inwhichtheworddharmamaysuggestadharminbeyondcognition.Thus,Watson'sdepictionofthewayRāmakaṇṭhaadoptstheBuddhistreductionoftheselftocognitionseemstomeincomplete.Itcoversbrilliantlytheknoweraspectoftheself,butitdoesnotjustifyotherphilosophicallyrelevantaspects,suchasitscharacterofagent2.Also,Watson

2AhintforapossiblesolutioncouldbeRāmakaṇṭha'scursoryassertionthatomniscienceandomnipotenceare,

doesnotindulgeinareconciliationofRāmakaṇṭha'stheseswiththebulkofŚaivaSiddhāntaconceptionsabouttheself,andinthiswayhemissesanopportunitytostrengthentheinnovativeweightofRāmakaṇṭha'sviews.Insum,thereaderisleftwiththethought-provokingideaofthenon-distinctionbetweenśakti andśaktimat, butnoexhaustivediscussionofitsimplications.

AfurthertopictowhichIhopeWatsonwilldedicateadeeperinvestigationisadepictionofthemutualrelationsamongKashmirthinkers,especiallyŚaivathinkers.Infact,Watsonconcludeshisbookwiththefollowingremark:

ThePhilosophyofearlyŚaivaSiddhāntaremainsalittle-studiedcornerofIndology.[...]ŚaivaSiddhāntanotbeingknownforitsphilosophy,somemayhaveassumedthat,whenitcomestodealwithaphilosophicalmattersuchastherefutationofBuddhism,itsimplyborrowedtheargumentsofthenon-Buddhistphilosophicalschools.Wehaveseenthatthisisnotthecase:Rāmakaṇṭha'svoiceintheSelf/no-Selfdebateisadistinctone,andhesucceedsinarticulatingasophisticatedstance,worthyoftakingitsplacealongsidethosefoundinthebetterstudiedphilosophicaltraditions.ThephilosophicaltextsofearlyŚaivaSiddhāntacontaintreasuresnotonlyforthoseinterestedintheHistoryofŚaivismbutalsoforthoseinterestedintheHistoryofPhilosophy(p.388).

DespitethefactthatWatsonhasshowninChapter1howRāmakaṇṭha'svoiceisdistinctfromthatoftheNaiyāyikas,VaiśeṣikasaswellasoftheBuddhistepistemologists,neverthelessinordertoevaluateRāmakaṇṭha'soriginality,asimilarcomparisontohiscloserintellectualmilieu,thatis,thecoevalŚaivaKashmircircles,wouldnothavebeenoutofplace.Suchacomparisoncouldopenapromisingfieldforinvestigationespeciallyinregardtothenatureoftheself(asshownbyWatsonhimself,pp.90-92,wherehediscussesthereasonsthatmadebothRāmakaṇṭhaandUtpaladevaspeakoftheselfasanagent),andtohisrelationshipwithBuddhistopponents,sinceinbothcasesRāmakaṇṭhaseemstohavemuchincommonwithatleastVasugupta(insofarasVasuguptaalsostressesthepermanencyofthePerceiver,thoughdifferentobjectsareperceived),UtpaladevaandAbhinavagupta.Forinstance,Watson(pp.245-249)stressesthefactthataccordingtoRāmakaṇṭhatheselfisalwaysaperceiver(grāhaka) and,hence,cannotbecomeanobjectofperception(grāhya), anargumenttypicalofUtpaladevaandAbhinavagupta.Similarly,justbeforethepassagequotedabove,summarizinghisworkWatsonwrites:

Thepresentworkdemonstrateshow,asastrategytoundermineBuddhistarguments,aŚaivaSiddhāntinauthorcreativelyassimilatedcertainfeaturesofBuddhism,therebystrengtheninghisownarmoury,andthenusedthesetoovercomethoseotherfeaturesofBuddhismthatconflictedwithhisowntradition(p.388).

Indeed,asexplainedbyWatson(p.387),sincetheBuddhistEpistemologicalSchoolwasprobablythemostinfluentialschoolofthoughtin10thto11thcenturyKashmir,asimilardevicewasadoptedbyUtpaladevaandAbhinavagupta,andpossiblyalsobyotherŚaivaauthorsandschoolsIamnotawareof.Morespecifically,WatsonhintsatthepossibilitythatRāmakaṇṭhaadoptedKumārilaBhaṭṭa'spatternofusingBuddhistopponentsasuttarapakṣins(upholdersofaviewantithetictothatofthefirstobjectors,aviewthatis,however,laterovercomebythesiddhāntin) tobeatNaiyāyikapositions,onlylaterdefeatingthemhimself(pp.156-7).Nevertheless,thesamemeanscanbefoundinUtpaladeva3,andevenifonewantstoexcludea

infact,justonepower(ekatvāt jñānakriyayoś śaktyor[...]adMK128).3 “AgainsttherealismoftheNyāya,thatclaimedtherealityoftheexternalobjectandtheactualexistenceofconceptssuchasrelationetc.,Utp.setsthecriticismoftheBuddhistlogicians,butonlytoshowthattheywouldeasilygetthebetterofitsrelativelyingenuousrealismifthePratyabhijñādidnotintervenetosupportit.AfterlettingtheBuddhistlogiciansdemolishtheNyāyacategories,heshowshowtheBuddhistalternativeisinfactequallyinadmissible”(Torella1994:xxii-xxiii).

directinfluenceonRāmakaṇṭhafromtheformer(floruit ca.900/925–950/975,accordingtoTorella1994),stillthiscouldbeidentifiedasaKashmirhabitratherthanaborrowingfromKumārila.

BothWatson'sconcludingremarksandhisfascinatingprefaceleadonetoconsiderthepresentworkasaimingataphilosophicaltarget,althoughitissoundlybasedonoriginaltexts.Infact,Watsonopenshisprefacebysaying:

Thepresentworkisanattempttounderstandtheideasofanauthorwritingoverathousandyearsagoinacivilisationprofoundlydifferentfromourown.[...]IfwewanttheclassicalIndiantraditionstorevealthemselves,notourownpreconceptions,andthevoicesoftheirthinkerstocomeacrosslouderthanourvoices,ourmostpowerfultoolisphilology(p.9).

Thisdualattentiontophilosophyandphilology,understoodascarefortextualreconstruction(andthusallvariantreadingsoftheNPPtextor,e.g.,theNyāyamañjarīpassagesreferredtoarereproduced,eveniftheyarenotdirectlysignificant),characterizesthewholebook.Sometimes,itevenleadsonetoquestiontherealpurposeofthebook:doesitintendtoproduceaphilosophicaldepictionandevaluationofRāmakaṇṭha'scontributiontotheātman-controversyordoesitratherintendtocollectasmanypiecesofhistoricalandphilologicaldataaspossibleaboutthiscontroversyanditsparticipants,thusconstitutingasortofencyclopaedicwork(oneofthosebooksonedoesnotreadfrombeginningtoend,butratherconsultswheneverlookingforareference)?Asalreadyhinted,Watson'sownwordspointtothefirstoption;however,inthefirsttwochaptersthephilosophicalrelevanceofRāmakaṇṭha'sthoughtrunstheriskofbeingsomehowovershadowedbythemanynotesfocusingonthereconstructionofhisandotherauthors'texts.Ofcourse,onecannotunderstandanauthor'sthoughtbutthroughhistexts,andtextualcriticismisaconditio sine qua non inordertounderstandSanskrittexts,sincetheyareoftenonlyavailableasmanuscriptsorinunreliableprintededitions.Moreover,Watsonmighthavefelttheneedtodealextensivelywithotherschools'viewsontheselfbecauseOetke'sbookisonlyavailableinGerman(alanguagemoreinaccessiblethanSanskrittomanySouthAsianscholars)orbecauseOetke'sphilosophicalcommitmentisclearlymoreimportantthanthereconstructionofthetextsunderexamination(Oetke,forexample,doesnotregularlymentionvariantreadings,butneverfailstoaddaphilosophicalevaluationoftheargumentbeingdealtwithoracommentonitssignificanceinthecontemporarydebate).Inanycase,bothbecauseofitsphilosophicalapproachandbecauseofitsreconstructionofRāmakaṇṭha's(andothers')texts,Watson'sbooknotonlyenhancesOetke'sachievementsbyaddingRāmakaṇṭha'scontributiontoit,butwillcertainlygivescholarswhodonotreadGermanadeeperappreciationoftheātman-controversy.

References

BhaṭṭaRāmakaṇṭha,Kiraṇavṛtti (commentaryontheKiraṇatantra),criticaleditionandannotatedtranslationbyDominicGoodall,InstitutFrançaisedePondichéry,ÉcoleFrançaiseD'Extréme-Orient,Pondichéry1998.BhaṭṭaRāmakaṇṭha,Mokṣakārikā,inAṣṭaprakaraṇa, editedbyPanditŚrīVrajavallabhaDvivedī,SampurnanandaSanskritUniversity,Yogatantra-granthamālāvol.XII,Varanasi1988.ClausOetke,“Ich” und das Ich.Analytische Untersuchungen zur buddhistisch-brahmanischen Ātmankontroverse, FranzSteiner,Stuttgart1988.RaffaeleTorella(ed.),The Īśvarapratyabhijñākārikā of Utpaladeva with the author's Vṛtti. Critical edition and annotated translation,IsMEO,SerieOrientaleRoman.71,Roma1994.