safety SAFETY PRACTICES

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Inspection of Fire Protection Measures and Fire Fighting Capability at Nuclear Power Plants

A PUBLICATIONWITHIN THE NUSS PROGRAMME

VWfi INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, VIENNA, 1994

This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/

CATEGORIES IN THE IAEA SAFETY SERIES

A new hierarchical categorization scheme has been introduced, according to which the publications in the IAEA Safety Series are grouped as follows:

Safety Fundamentals (silver cover)

Basic objectives, concepts and principles to ensure safety.

Safety Standards (red cover)

Basic requirem ents which must be satisfied to ensure safety for particular activities o r application areas.

Safety Guides (green cover)

Recom m endations, on the basis o f international experience, relating to the fulfilm ent o f basic requirem ents.

Safety Practices (blue cover)

Practical examples and detailed methods which can be used for the application o f Safety Standards or Safety Guides.

Safety Fundamentals and Safety Standards are issued with the approval o f the IAEA Board o f G overnors; Safety Guides and Safety Practices are issued under the authority o f the D irector General o f the IAEA.

An additional category, Safety Reports (purple cover), com prises independent reports o f expert groups on safety m atters, including the development o f new principles, advanced concepts and m ajor issues and events. These reports are issued under the authority o f the D irector General of the IAEA.

There are other publications o f the IAEA which also contain inform ation im portant to safety, in particular in the Proceedings Series (papers presented at symposia and conferences), the Technical Reports Series (emphasis on technological aspects) and the IAEA -TECDO C Series (inform ation usually in a prelim inary form).


INSPECTION OF FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES

AND FIRE FIGHTING CAPABILITY AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

A Safety Practice


The following States are Members of the International Atomic Energy Agency:AFGHANISTAN ICELAND PERUALBANIA INDIA PHILIPPINESALGERIA INDONESIA POLANDARGENTINA IRAN, PORTUGALARMENIA ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF QATARAUSTRALIA IRAQ ROMANIAAUSTRIA IRELAND RUSSIAN FEDERATIONBANGLADESH ISRAEL SAUDI ARABIABELARUS ITALY SENEGALBELGIUM JAMAICA SIERRA LEONEBOLIVIA JAPAN SINGAPOREBRAZIL JORDAN SLOVAKIABULGARIA KAZAKHSTAN SLOVENIACAMBODIA KENYA SOUTH AFRICACAMEROON KOREA, REPUBLIC OF SPAINCANADA KUWAIT SRI LANKACHILE LEBANON SUDANCHINA LIBERIA SWEDENCOLOMBIA LIBYAN ARAB JAMAHIRIYA SWITZERLANDCOSTA RICA LIECHTENSTEIN SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLICCOTE D’IVOIRE LITHUANIA THAILANDCROATIA LUXEMBOURG THE FORMER YUGOSLAVCUBA MADAGASCAR REPUBLIC OF MACEDONCYPRUS MALAYSIA TUNISIACZECH REPUBLIC MALI TURKEYDENMARK MARSHALL ISLANDS UGANDADOMINICAN REPUBLIC MAURITIUS UKRAINEECUADOR MEXICO UNITED ARAB EMIRATESEGYPT MONACO UNITED KINGDOM OFEL SALVADOR MONGOLIA GREAT BRITAIN ANDESTONIA MOROCCO NORTHERN IRELANDETHIOPIA MYANMAR UNITED REPUBLICFINLAND NAMIBIA OF TANZANIAFRANCE NETHERLANDS UNITED STATES OF AMERGABON NEW ZEALAND URUGUAYGERMANY NICARAGUA UZBEKISTANGHANA NIGER VENEZUELAGREECE NIGERIA VIET NAMGUATEMALA NORWAY YUGOSLAVIAHAITI PAKISTAN ZAIREHOLY SEE PANAMA ZAMBIAHUNGARY PARAGUAY ZIMBABWE

The Agency’s Statute was approved on 23 October 1956 by the Conference on the Statute of the IAEA held at United Nations Headquarters, New York; it entered into force on 29 July 1957. The Headquarters of the Agency are situated in Vienna. Its principal objective is “ to accelerate and enlarge the contribution of atomic energy to peace, health and prosperity throughout the world” .

© IAEA, 1994Permission to reproduce or translate the information contained in this publication may be

obtained by writing to the International Atomic Energy Agency, Wagramerstrasse 5, P.O. Box 100, A-1400 Vienna, Austria.

Printed by the IAEA in Austria October 1994


SAFETY SERIES No. 50-P-6

INSPECTION OF FIRE PROTECTION MEASURES

AND FIRE FIGHTING CAPABILITY AT NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

A Safety Practice

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY VIENNA, 1994


VIC Library Cataloguing in Publication Data

Inspection of fire protection measures and fire fighting capability at nuclear power plants : a safety practice. — Vienna : International Atomic Energy Agency, 1994.

p. ; 24 cm. — (Safety series, ISSN 0074-1892 ; 50-P-6) STI/PUB/967 ISBN 92-0-103994-8 Includes bibliographical references.

1. Nuclear power plants—Fires and fire prevention. I. International Atomic Energy Agency, n . Series.

VICL 94-00101


FOREWORD

In 1974, the IAEA established a special Nuclear Safety Standards (NUSS) programme under which a number of Codes and Safety Guides have been produced in the areas of governmental organization, siting, design, operation and quality assurance. The NUSS Codes and Guides are a collection of basic and derived requirements for the safety of nuclear power plants with thermal neutron reactors. They have been developed in a complex process which ensures the best possible international consensus.

In order to present further details on the application and interpretation and on the limitations of individual concepts in the NUSS Codes and Safety Guides, a series of Safety Practice publications have been initiated. It is hoped that many Member States will benefit from the experience presented in these books.

The present publication has been developed with the help of experts from regulatory, operating and engineering organizations, all with practical experience in the field of fire protection of nuclear power plants. The publication outlines practices for inspecting the fire protection measures at nuclear power plants in accordance with Safety Series No. 50-SG-D2 (Rev. 1), Fire Protection in Nuclear Power Plants, and includes a comprehensive fire safety inspection checklist of the specific elements to be addressed when evaluating the adequacy and effectiveness of the fire protection measures and manual fire fighting capability available at operating nuclear power plants. The publication will be useful not only to regulators and safety assessors but also to operators and designers.

The book addresses a specialized topic and it is recommended that it be used in conjunction with Safety Guide No. 50-SG-D2 (Rev. 1).

The IAEA is grateful to all the experts who helped in the drafting and reviewing of this publication.



CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION .......................................................................................... 1

1.1. Background .......................................................................................... 11.2. Objective .............................................................................................. 11.3. Scope .................................................................................................... 21.4. Structure .............................................................................................. 2

2. METHODOLOGY ........................................................ ............................... 2

2.1. Document review ............................................................................... 32.2. Personnel interviews .......................................................................... 42.3. Direct observation ............................................................................. 4

3. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS .................................................... 5

4. INSPECTION CHECKLIST ........................................................................ 7

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................... 55

CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW ...................................... 57

LIST OF NUSS PROGRAMME TITLES .......................................................... 59

SELECTION OF IAEA PUBLICATIONS RELATING TO THESAFETY OF NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS .............................................. 63



1. INTRODUCTION

1.1. BACKGROUND

Safety Series No. 50-SG-D2 (Rev. 1), Fire Protection in Nuclear Power Plants, was developed as part of the IAEA Nuclear Safety Standards (NUSS) programme. The Guide established the specific concepts of fire protection related to the design, layout and construction of nuclear power plants. The Guide discussed, inter alia, the recommended concepts for designing the fire detection and fire extinguishing systems and for protecting the plant, as well as the associated main requirements for manual fire fighting.

It is recognized that effective fire protection includes a number of distinct elements that must be integrated into a comprehensive fire safety policy. As a minimum, these elements cover organization; a fire prevention programme, including the administrative control procedures; a comprehensive fire hazard analysis; provision for passive fire protection measures; installation of reliable and effective fire detection and extinguishing systems and equipment (including a degree of redundancy, where necessary, to cover the single failure criterion as defined in para. 531 of Safety Series No. 50-SG-D2 (Rev. 1)); periodic inspection, maintenance and testing of all the fire protection measures (both passive and active) provided; a quality assurance programme; and the manual fire fighting capability. To determine the adequacy of the fire protection essential for safety at a nuclear power plant, all these elements must be assessed.

Although comprehensive evaluation of the overall fire safety arrangements requires a thorough review of all the elements listed above, there is value in applying selected elements separately for specific situations. This Safety Practice supplements Safety Guide 50-SG-D2 (Rev. 1) by providing a detailed fire safety inspection checklist to determine whether the requirements for the fire protection measures and fire fighting capability (including manual fire fighting) have been fulfilled in an operating nuclear power plant. The Guide should be used as a primary reference in the application of this Safety Practice.

1.2. OBJECTIVE

The purpose o f this publication is to outline the practices for inspecting the fire protection measures at nuclear power plants in accordance with Safety Series No. 50-SG-D2 (Rev. 1), and includes a comprehensive checklist of the specific elements to be addressed when evaluating the adequacy and effectiveness of the fire protection measures and manual fire fighting capability provided at operating nuclear power plants. The document will be useful not only to regulators and safety assessors but also to operators and designers.

1


1.3. SCOPE

This Safety Practice provides a methodology and the basis for inspecting the fire protection measures and manual fire fighting capability at nuclear power plants, and for assessing their adequacy. The fire safety inspection checklist reflects the current international practices for inspecting fire safety and provides an objective structure for assessing three elements of fire protection at nuclear power plants: the passive fire protection measures; the design and installation of fire detection and fixed fire extinguishing systems and equipment; and the manual fire fighting capability. This assessment will determine whether the fire protection measures and manual fire fighting capability provided at the plant are in accordance with internationally acceptable practices.

1.4. STRUCTURE

Section 2 describes the methodology to be followed when applying the checklist, including discussion on the specific written documents to be reviewed, the purpose and value of personal interviews with plant personnel, and the necessity of direct visual observation of plant conditions, with a walkdown inspection of the plant.

Section 3 discusses the basis for evaluating each aspect of plant fire protection as ‘satisfactory’, ‘needs further evaluation’ or ‘unsatisfactory’, and describes the important issues to be considered when making recommendations for their improvement.

Section 4 provides a detailed fire safety inspection checklist for determining the adequacy of the fire protection measures and manual fire fighting capability provided at the plant.

2. METHODOLOGY

It is intended that inspection of the techniques used for fire protection and fire fighting be performed by a small group of professional fire safety specialists with experience directly applicable to fire protection in nuclear power plants. The combined experience of the team of technical specialists should include expertise in fire protection system design, knowledge of the fire protection codes and standards, knowledge of the manual fire fighting techniques and experience in fire protection engineering. Judgements of performance are based on the expertise of the individual technical specialists. Therefore, this inspection is not intended to be a formal audit against a single set of codes and standards, but rather a technical exchange of

2


experience and practices at the working level with the aim of improving the reliability and effectiveness of the measures and capability currently provided by the nuclear power plant.

The key objectives of the fire safety inspection are:

(1) To provide the plant with an independent assessment of the effectiveness of the fire protection measures and manual fire fighting capability;

(2) To provide plant management with specific recommendations and suggestions for improvement in areas where performance falls short of internationally acceptable practices;

(3) To provide key personnel at the plant with the opportunity of discussing their experience and practices in fire protection with technical experts who have significant experience in this field.

To be most effective when evaluating the overall fire safety arrangements provided at the plant, the assessment should cover all areas of the site, including the nuclear island and the balance of plant facilities, e.g. the turbine building. However, the primary concern of this publication is the adequacy of the fire protection measures and manual fire fighting capability with respect to the plant systems, equipment and components that are essential for achieving and maintaining safe shutdown of the plant. For the purpose of this Safety Practice, safe shutdown of the plant covers removal of residual heat following initial shutdown and prevention of the release of radioactive materials, as defined in para. 306 of Safety Series No. 50-C-D (Rev. 1), and in para. 202 of Safety Series No. 50-SG-D2 (Rev. 1).

Three primary methods are used to acquire the information needed to assess the effectiveness of the fire protection measures and manual fire fighting capability provided at the plant, and to make specific recommendations for their improvement: a review of written material; interviews with plant personnel; and direct visual observation of the measures and capability.

The fire safety specialists address topics in sufficient detail and to the extent necessary to enable them to make an informed judgement of each item in the checklist. The weaknesses identified are addressed to the degree required to document the specialists’ concerns with sufficient detail and accuracy to make their concerns clearly understandable, and then recommendations are made for addressing these weaknesses. Similarly, the good practices observed during the inspection process are documented for the benefit of other nuclear power plants, and are described in the specialists’ notes in sufficient detail to be readily understood.

2.1. DOCUMENT REVIEW

The specific documents to be reviewed by the technical specialists vary, depending on their availability and on the circumstances at each nuclear power plant.

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It is generally agreed that the documents listed below are important elements of overall plant fire safety. However, the absence of one or more of these review documents should not preclude use of the checklist as an effective tool for assessing the adequacy of the fire protection measures and manual fire fighting capability installed at the plant. The documents to be reviewed include: the fire protection regulatory requirements; the comprehensive fire hazard analysis; the safety evaluation report for fire protection; the fire protection administrative control procedures; the surveillance, maintenance and test procedures for the fire protection systems and equipment; the fire protection system and equipment details and drawings; the fire event records and investigative reports; the training records of on-site and off-site personnel, as applicable; the plant arrangement drawings, including identification of the fire compartment boundaries (as constructed, covering modifications); and the fire emergency plan, including co-ordination with off-site services.

2.2. PERSONNEL INTERVIEWS

Interviews with plant personnel are carried out at all levels with a view to:

(1) Providing additional information not addressed by the documentation;(2) Answering questions and satisfying concerns arising out of the review

documents;(3) Forming a judgement of the plant personnel’s understanding of the fire protec

tion equipment and measures provided, and of their own duties and responsibilities for fire protection;

(4) Forming a judgement of the plant personnel’s competence and professionalism regarding fire protection.

Interviews also provide an opportunity for an exchange of information between technical specialists and plant personnel. These interviews should be seen as part of a constructive dialogue with plant personnel and not as an interrogation. Properly conducted, such interviews play an important role in the inspection process.

2.3. DIRECT OBSERVATION

Site inspection of actual plant conditions is a significant part of the review process. Most of the time allocated to the inspection process should be used to review the fire protection measures and the actual fire fighting capability provided at the plant. Observation of existing conditions includes:

(1) A walkdown inspection of all the relevant plant areas, with emphasis placed on those areas that are important to safe shutdown of the plant, and on any adjacent areas which may form a potential fire hazard to those safety important areas;

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(2) The combustible fire load and the general housekeeping conditions;(3) The control of ignition sources;(4) The adequacy and integrity of the passive fire protection measures (fire rated

barriers, fire doors, fire dampers, fire barrier penetration seals);(5) The design and installation of the fire detection and fire extinguishing systems

and equipment;(6) The maintenance of the active and passive fire protection measures, based on

visual evaluation;(7) The manual fire fighting capability, including witnessing an unannounced fire

drill at the plant.

On the basis of the results obtained from the review documents, personnel interviews and direct observations, the technical specialists form a judgement of the adequacy of the measures and capability provided at the plant, and then make recommendations for correcting those deficiencies that were identified during the inspection. The important areas cover:

(a) The technical knowledge and skills of the manager and staff responsible for the overall fire safety of the plant;

(b) The adequacy of the passive fire protection measures provided;(c) The effectiveness of the fire protection systems and equipment installed at the

plant, to provide the level of protection required (both system design and operability);

(d) The availability and effectiveness of the manual fire fighting personnel (both on-site and off-site).

3. EVALUATION AND CONCLUSIONS

The fire safety inspection checklist provides a means of evaluating the fire protection measures and manual fire fighting capability in place at the nuclear power plant. It is recognized that effective fire protection must include additional elements such as a comprehensive fire hazard analysis; a fire prevention programme, including the administrative control procedures; periodic inspection, maintenance and testing of the systems and equipment; and a quality assurance programme. These elements are to be addressed specifically in two separate documents currently in preparation at the IAEA: Evaluation of Fire Hazard Analysis for Nuclear Power Plants, and Assessment of the Implementation and Effectiveness of the Overall Fire Safety Arrangements of Nuclear Power Plants.

5


The checklist for inspecting the fire protection measures and manual fire fighting capability is divided into eight sections:

A. Fire confinement (passive fire protection measures);B. Fire detection and alarm systems;C. Fixed fire extinguishing systems — General;D. Water based fire extinguishing systems;E. Gaseous fire extinguishing systems;F. Foam and dry powder fire extinguishing systems;G. Fire water supply;H. Manual fire fighting capability.

Regarding the safe shutdown requirements (as defined in para. 202 of Safety Series No. 50-SG-D2 (Rev. 1)), each aspect of plant fire protection and the corresponding protection measures, as identified in the checklist, are evaluated. This evaluation leads to one of three conclusions:

(1) Satisfactory, which means that the particular fire protection measure isprovided in accordance with internationally acceptable practices. No enhancements are required. When a particular item is determined to be satisfactory, generally no record of specific comments is required. However, in certain cases it may be desirable to record specific details that form the basis for such a determination. It is also important to identify good practices that may be beneficial to other nuclear power plants.

(2) Needs further evaluation, which means either that the particular fire protection measure does not meet the requirements, or that further details will have to be provided before a definite judgement is made. In both cases, a specific recommendation is made on how to resolve the issue.

(3) Unsatisfactory, which means that the particular fire protection measure is notprovided in accordance with internationally acceptable practices. This couldarise from the use of inadequate material, systems or equipment; the inadequate fire resistance of specific components; an inappropriate design approach, etc. Each statement is accompanied by an explanation of the technical basis for such a determination.

For each item identified in the inspection checklist, the technical specialists identify the ‘objective evidence’ examined in order to determine the category into which the item falls. Examples of appropriate objective evidence are the documents reviewed (reference the specific document numbers), the personnel interviewed (identify the names and responsibilities) and the plant conditions observed (describe the specific locations and details).

Furthermore, specific recommendations are made on how to correct the deficient conditions. Each recommendation is made after giving appropriate consideration to the specific deficiency needing attention, the indirect aspects related to the

6


deficiency and the root cause analysis of the basic cause of the deficiency; the results of this analysis may indicate the need for a higher level recommendation.

4. INSPECTION CHECKLIST

The fire safety inspection checklist has been prepared for fire safety inspections of a nuclear power plant by professional fire safety specialists. The methodology and contents of the checklist may also be used by regulatory or specialized third party organizations to conduct fire safety inspections of nuclear power plants. In addition, the checklist may be useful to the management of a nuclear power plant as a listing of the numerous elements that must be evaluated in order to determine the adequacy of the fire protection measures and manual fire fighting capability. The checklist will also provide guidance to a nuclear power plant for conducting a self- assessment of fire safety. However, it should not be used by non-specialists in fire protection, and self-assessment should not be considered a substitute for an independent fire safety inspection.

The checklist is intended for a small group of fire safety specialists specifically qualified by education and practical experience to evaluate the adequacy and effectiveness of the fire protection measures (both passive and active) and manual fire fighting capability provided at the plant. The checklist provides a listing of the fire protection elements to be considered. It is not all inclusive and should not limit the investigations of the fire safety specialists; rather, it should be considered as a minimum listing of items to be included in inspection and assessment.

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FIRE SAFETY INSPECTION CHECKLIST

ItemInspection item description

AdequacyComments and objective

evidence reviewedidentifierSat.

Needs furtherUnsat.evaluation

A. Fire confinement (passive fire protection measures)

A.I. Fire confinement by compartmentalization (fire containment approach)

A .1.1. Identification of those fire compartments which contain nuclear safe shutdown systems or equipment, or which adjoin or present outside exposure to compartments containing nuclear safe shutdown systems or equipment. Refer to the plant specific fire hazards analysis for identification of those compartment boundaries which require a specific fire resistance rating, and for the technical justification which provides the basis for the absence of a fire rated compartment boundary.

A .1.2. Determination of the fire rating:

(a) Location and use;(b) Fire load in the compartment and in adjacent

compartments.


Itemidentifier

Inspection item description


evidence reviewedSat.

Needs further evaluation

Unsat.

A .1.3. Fixed fire barriers (fire compartment boundaries such as walls, floors; ceiling, electrical and mechanical penetration seals):

(a) Identification of the fixed fire barriers (lists, drawings, etc.);

(b) The fire rating requirements of those components used in the construction of the fire compartment boundaries;

(c) Qualification of the component (original installation and modifications):— The test method used to determine the fire rating

(independent testing laboratory approval or third party certification);

— Extrapolation of the test results to configuration of the actual installation;

— The installation procedure is in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions;

— Installation is by qualified personnel specifically trained to install such components;

— The fire rating of the components is consistent with that of the fire compartment boundaries;

(d) The integrity of the fixed fire barrier components has not been compromised.


FIRE SAFETY INSPECTION CHECKLIST (cont.)

Itemidentifier Inspection item description


evidence reviewedSat. Needs further evaluation Unsat.

A. 1.4. Fire barrier closures (fire doors, fire dampers, sewers,drains, smoke vents):

(a) Identification of the fire barrier closures (lists, drawings, etc.);

(b) The fire rating requirements of those components used in the construction of the fire compartment boundaries;

(c) Qualification of the component (original installation and modifications):— The test method used to determine the fire rating

(independent testing laboratory approval or third party certification);

— Extrapolation of the test results to configuration of the actual installation;

— The installation procedure is in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions;

— Installation is by qualified personnel specifically trained to install such components;

— The fire rating of the components is consistent with that of the associated fire compartment boundaries;


Item Inspection item descriptionAdequacy

Comments and objective evidence reviewedidentifier Sat. Needs further

evaluation Unsat.

A.1.4.(cont.)

(d) The integrity and operability of the fire barrier closures have not been compromised and the components are in the normal operating position;

(e) Where applicable, components are arranged to facilitate maintenance and inspection.

A.2. Fire confinement by distance (fire influence approach)

A.2.1. Refer to the plant specific fire hazards analysis for identifier tion of those fire areas where separation by distance is provided (lists, drawings, etc.).

A.2.2. Determination of the fire loads, including the transient combustibles.

A.2.3. The requirements of separation by distance are based on accepted standards or on documented technical justification.

A.2.4. Separation distances are free from combustibles and ignition sources — identify the specific separation distance to be m aintained m.


FIRE SAFETY INSPECTION CHECKLIST (cont.)




Needs furtherUnsat.

evaluation

A. 3. Locally applied separating elements (fire influence approach)

A.3.1. Identification of the locally applied separating elements, including the permanent separating elements, fire resistant coatings, sleeves and temporary separating elements (lists, drawings, etc.). Refer to the plant specific fire hazards analysis for identification of those areas where locally applied separating elements are provided, and for the technical justification which provides the basis for the use and/or absence of such elements.

A.3.2. Determination of the fire rating:

(a) Location and use;(b) Fire load (geometry and configuration, as well as

quantity).

A.3.3. Qualification of the locally applied separating element (original installation and modifications):

(a) The test method used to determine the fire rating and functionality (independent testing laboratory approval or third party certification);


Itemidentifier





Unsat.

A.3.3.(cont.)

A.3.4.

(b) Extrapolation of the test results to configuration of the actual installation;

(c) The installation procedure is in accordance with the manufacturer’s instructions;

(d) Installation is by qualified personnel specifically trained to install such elements.

The integrity of the locally applied separating elements has not been compromised.

B.

B .l.

B.1.1.

Fire detection and alarm systems

Fire detector location

In general, all areas throughout the plant should be provided with fire detection equipment. Refer to the plant specific fire hazards analysis for identification of those specific exceptions where technical justifications have been developed for the absence of fire detection equipment.

B.2.

B.2.1.

Fire detection equipment

The categories of detector (or combinations thereof) are appropriate for the hazard(s):


F IR E SAFETY IN SPECTIO N C H EC K LIST (cont.)





Unsat.

B.2.1.(cont.)

(a) Heat;(b) Smoke;(c) Flame;(d) Gas sampling;(e)' Flammable gas.

B.2.2. Qualification of the fire detection equipment (independent testing laboratory approval or third party certification).

B.3. Fire detection systems

B.3.1. The detection system design and installation standard has been used (name standard).

B.3.2. Detection system design and installation, including primary and secondary power supplies.

B.3.3. The number of detectors provided for each system covers the protected hazard area.

B.3.4. Placing and location of detectors:

(a) Structural or equipment obstructions;(b) Ventilation impact/impairment;






Unsat.

B.3.4.(cont)

(c) Distance to ceiling;(d) Distance to the protected hazard area.

B.3.5. Local annunciation is provided (audible, visual). ■

B.3.6. Remote annunciation is provided at a constantly attended location (specify location).

B.3.7. Actuation by fire detection is provided, where appropriate, for:

(a) Fire door closure;(b) Fire damper closure;(c) Fire extinguishing system activation;(d) Equipment interaction/shutdown;(e) Ventilation control.

B.3.8. Special problem cases have been considered for:

(a) Cable routes below raised floor areas;(b) Cable routes above false ceilings;(c) Cable routes within the containment;(d) Areas with high radiation levels.


FIR E SAFETY IN SPECTIO N C H EC K LIST (cont.)





Unsat.

B.4. Fire alarm systems .

B.4.1. Central panel location is constantly attended (specify location).

B.4.2. Qualification of the alarm system equipment (independent testing laboratory approval or third party certification).

B.4.3. The alarm system design and installation standard has been used (name standard).

B.4.4. Alarm system design and installation, including primary and secondary power supplies.

B.4.5. Sequence of alarms is registered on the central panel.

B.4.6. Fire alarms take precedence over system fault signals.

B.4.7. Local annunciation panels are provided:

(a) Quantity (specify quantities and types);(b) Location (specify locations);(c) All electrical circuits are fully supervised to indicate fault

conditions;(d) Battery backup is provided for each local panel.





Needs further evaluation Unsat.

B.4.8. Link to/from the central panel:

(a) Alarm receipt;(b) Manual activation of the fire control installations;(c) Manual activation of the fire pumps for the water supply;(d) Direct from the individual detectors, where provided;(e) To the plant fire brigade from the control room.

B.4.9. Link,to outside organizations.

B.4.10. Manual fire alarm call points:

(a) Quantity provided;(b) Location in hazard areas and in all normal exit paths;(c) Travel distance to the manual fire alarm call points;(d) Direct actions resulting from the manual fire alarm call

points (specify actions);(e) Indirect action via the central alarm receiving facility.

C. Fixed fire extinguishing systems — General

C .l. Fixed fire extinguishing system location and selection

C.1.1. Fixed fire extinguishing systems are installed in all those areas where a significant fire load exists. Refer to the plant







Unsat.

C.1.1.(cont.)

specific fire hazards analysis for identification of those specific exceptions where technical justifications have been developed for the absence of fire extinguishing systems.

C.1.2. The extinguishing medium selected is appropriate for the hazard(s):

(a) Water;(b) Gaseous;(c) Foam;(d) Dry powder.

C.1.3. Appropriate notification of extinguishing system actuation.

D. W ater based fire extinguishing systems

D .L Automatic sprinkler systems (closed heads)

D.1.1. Qualification of the sprinkler system equipment (independent testing laboratory approval or third party certification).

D .l .2. The sprinkler system design and installation standard has been used (name standard).



Adequacy

Sat.Needs further

evaluationUnsat.

Comments and objective evidence reviewed

Type of sprinkler system installed:

(a) Wet pipe;(b) Dry pipe;(c) Pre-action (specify the actuation method).

Sprinkler system design and installation:

(a) Design density and area of application (specify details);(b) Hydraulic calculations (unless pipe schedule);(c) Type of sprinkler heads (specify manufacturer, model

number and other details);(d) Temperature rating of sprinkler heads;(e) Placing and location of sprinkler heads to accommodate

structural and equipment obstructions to discharge the water flow pattern;

(f) Distance from sprinkler heads to ceiling;(g) Spacing of sprinkler heads;(h) Additional sprinklers installed below equipment that

obstructs the water flow pattern;(i) Pipe installation;(j) Dimension of piping;(k) Impact protection for piping, where needed;(1) Pipe supports;(m) As-built drawings are available for review.


FIR E SAFETY IN SPECTIO N CH EC K LIST (cont.)





Unsat.

D.1.5. Analysis of the extinguishing effects (the effect of extinguishing system actuation and possible adverse consequences have been evaluated).

D.2. Deluge system (open nozzles)

D.2.1. Qualification of the deluge system equipment (independent testing laboratory approval or third party certification).

D.2.2. The deluge system design and installation standard has been used (name standard).

D.2.3. Deluge system design and installation:

(a) Design density and area of application (specify details);(b) Hydraulic calculations (unless pipe schedule);(c) Type of nozzles (specify manufacturer, model number

and other details);(d) Placing and location of nozzles;(e) Coverage of nozzles;(f) Pipe installation;(g) Dimension of piping;(h) Impact protection for piping, where needed;






Unsat.

D.2.3.(cont.)

(i) Pipe supports;(j) Simultaneous system operation, where appropriate; (k) Drainage factors;(1) As-built drawings are available for review.

D.2.4. Deluge system actuation method:

(a) Manual (identification and, location of the release devices);

(b) Automatic detection type is suitable for the hazard(s) (specify details).

D.2.5. Detection system design and installation (refer to Section B, Fire detection and alarm systems, for details).

D.2.6. Analysis of the extinguishing effects (effect of system actuation and possible adverse consequences have been evaluated).

E. Gaseous fire extinguishing systems

E l . Carbon dioxide (CO2) systems

E. 1.1. Qualification of the C 02 system equipment (independent testing laboratory approval or third party certification).







Unsat.

E.1.2. The C 0 2 system design and installation standard has been used (name standard).

E.1.3. Total flooding C 02 system design:

(a) Evacuation interlocks (time delays allowed for evacuation);

(b) Pre-fire warning alarm arrangement (visual, audible);(c) System interlocks to ensure closed compartment:

— Fire damper closure;— Ventilation system shutdown;— Fire door closure;— Other;

(d) System calculation method;(e) Initial design concentration;(f) Design concentration is maintained for minimum duration;(g) Availability of a secondary C 02 gas supply.

E.1.4. C 02 system actuation method:

(a) Manual (identification and location of the release devices);(b) Automatic detection type is suitable for the hazard(s)

(specify details).






Unsat.

E.1.5. Detection system design and installation (refer to Section B, Fire detection and alarm systems, for details).

E.1.6. Local application C 02 system design:

(a) Buildup of C 02 concentration (discharge rate);(b) Means of system actuation (provide details).

E.1.7. The consequences of system actuation have been evaluated:

(a) Thermal shock potential;(b) Effect on personnel;(c) Overpressurization (for closed compartments).

E.2. Halon systems

E.2.1. Type of halon gas used (1301, 1211, etc.).

E.2.2. Qualification of the halon system equipment (independent testing laboratory approval or third party certification).

E.2.3. The halon system design and installation standard has been used (name standard).






Needs furtherUnsat.

evaluation

E.2.4. Total flooding halon system design:




(d) System calculation method;(e) Initial design concentration;(f) Design concentration is maintained for minimum

duration;(g) Availability of a secondary halon gas supply.

E.2.5. Halon system actuation method:

(a) Manual (identification and location of the release devices);

(b) Automatic detection type is suitable for the hazard(s) (specify details);






E.2.5.(cont.)

(c) Abort switch, if installed, is of the ‘dead man’ type and is located inside the protected compartment (a dead man type switch is one that requires constant pressure on a spring loaded switch to maintain the abort function; when the pressure is released, the system reverts to the normal operational sequence).


E.2.7. Local application halon system design:

(a) Buildup of gas concentration (discharge rate);(b) Means of system actuation (provide details).

E.2.8. The consequences of system actuation have been evaluated:

(a) Effect on personnel;(b) Corrosion potential from decomposition by-products.

E.3. Other gas extinguishing systems

E.3.1. Type of gas(es) used.

E.3.2. Qualification of the gas system equipment (independent testing laboratory approval or third party certification).







Unsat.

E.3.3. The gas system design and installation standard has been used (name standard).

E.3.4. Total flooding gas system design:




(d) System calculation method;(e) Initial design concentration;(f) Design concentration is maintained for minimum duration;(g) Availability of a secondary gas supply.

E.3.5. Gas system actuation method:

(a) Manual (identification and location of the release devices);(b) Automatic detection type is suitable for the hazard(s)

(specify details).


Item Inspection item description


identifier Sat.Needs further

evaluationUnsat.

evidence reviewed


E.3.7. Local application gas system design:

(a) Buildup of gas concentration (discharge rate);(b) Means of system actuation (provide details).

E.3.8. The consequences of gas system actuation have been evaluated:

(a) Thermal shock potential;(b) Effect on personnel;(c) Overpressurization (for closed compartments);(d) Corrosion potential from decomposition by-products.

F. Foam and dry powder fire extinguishing systems

F .l. Foam systems

F.1.1. The foam concentrate type (protein based, synthetic, aqueous film forming foam (AFFF), film forming fluoroprotein, alcohol resistant, etc.).

F.1.2. The foam expansion ratio (specify low, medium or high).


FERE SAFETY IN SPECTIO N C H EC K LIST (cont.)

Itemidentifier


F .l .3. Qualification of the foam system equipment (independenttesting laboratory approval or third party certification).

F .l .4. The foam system design and installation standard has beenused (name standard).

F .l .5. The post-discharge cleanup and corrosion plan.

F.1.6. Foam system design and installation:

(a) Type of system (balanced pressure, pumped proportioning, etc.);

(b) Type of foam nozzles (aeration type nozzles or sprinkler head, if AFFF);

(c) Placing and location of discharge heads/nozzles to accommodate structural and equipment obstructions;

(d) Spacing of heads/nozzles;(e) Heads/nozzles installed below equipment that obstructs

the discharge pattern;(f) Area of coverage and application rate are suitable for the

hazard(s) (specify details);(g) Hydraulic calculations (unless pipe schedule);




Unsat.






F.1.6.(cont.)

(h) Pipe installation;(i) Dimension of piping;(j) Impact protection for piping, where needed; (k) Pipe supports;(1) As-built drawings are available for review.

F.1.7. The quantity and quality of the foam concentrate are sufficient for the minimum duration required:

(a) Penetration;(b) Accessibility;(c.) Q uan tity o f foam m n r e n t r a t f availahlp. I.;

(d) Available foam concentrate is sufficient for the required duration;

(e) Shelf-life (periodic foam quality test records are available, where appropriate).

F.1.8. Protection of the closed compartment (high expansion foam systems):

(a) Quantity of input points;(b) Time required to flood compartment;(c) Time delays and alarms are provided for personnel

evacuation.







Unsat.

F .l .9. Foam system actuation method:



F . l .10. Detection system design and installation (refer to Section B, Fire detection and alarm systems, for details).

F . l . 11. Water supply for foam system:

(a) Source reliability and adequacy of capacity;(b) Hydraulically proven (pressure, flow and application

rates);(c) Impact protection for supply piping, where needed.

F . l . 12. Analysis of the extinguishing effects (the effect of foam system actuation and possible adverse consequences have been evaluated).




identifierSat.


Unsat.evidence reviewed

F.2. Dry powder systems

F.2.1. Dry powder type (specify type, manufacturer and chemical composition).

F.2.2. Qualification of the dry powder system equipment (independent testing laboratory approval or third party certification).

F.2.3. The dry powder system design and installation standard has been used (name standard).

F.2.4. The post-discharge cleanup and corrosion plan.

F.2.5. Open space protection:

(a) Penetration;(b) Accessibility;(c) Impact of wind/environmental factors.

F.2.6. Protection of the closed compartment:

(a) Access points;(b) Compartment area is occupied by personnel;(c) Time delay is provided for personnel evacuation;(d) Pre-fire warning alarm arrangement (audible, visual).







Unsat.

¥ .2 .1 . Propellant (specify C 02, nitrogen, etc.).

F.2.8. Placing and location of discharge nozzles.

F.2.9. Area of protection is suitable for the hazard(s).

F.2.10. Pipe installation:

(a) Dimension of piping;(b) Pipe supports.

F .2.11. Dry powder system actuation method:



F.2.12. Detection system design and installation (refer to Section B, Fire detection and alarm systems, for details).

F.2.13. Analysis of the extinguishing effects (the effect of dry powder system actuation and possible adverse consequences have been evaluated).






G. Fire water supply

G .l. Water source

G.1.1. Water supply is adequate for the fire load and available at the appropriate flow rate for fire fighting.

G.1.2. Type of water supply:

(a) Potable;(b) Untreated;(c) Brackish;(d) Deionized;(e) Sea.

G.1.3. Water storage tanks (on-site, off-site):

(a) Capacity (each tank) m3; fh'l F.levation above plant grade. m;(c\ Fill rate. m3/h;W) Distance from area to be protected m;(e) Method used to prevent freezing;(f) Method for ensuring an adequate fire water supply, where

combined usage is allowed;(g) Method used to ensure that the minimum water level is

maintained (gauging, low level alarms, etc.).







Unsat.

G.1.4. Open water source:

(a) River;(b) Lake;(c) Sea;(d) Source is protected from freezing.

G.1.5. Subsurface water source:

(a l We.ll (specify dep th m l;

fh) S ustained p u m p in g capac ity ( m 3/h );

(c) Minimum duration that such a capacity is available ( h).

G.2. Supply and distribution pipe

G.2.1. The supply pipe design and installation standard has been used (name standard).

G.2.2. Supply and distribution piping system installation:

(a) Pipe material (specify type);(b) Lining material for ferrous pipe (specify type);(c) Pipe joining method (specify);(d) Pipework, supports or brackets.






Unsat.

G.2.3. Protection of the supply and distribution piping system:

(a) Against freeze-up;(b) Against mechanical damage;(c) Against ground movement;(d) Cathodic protection.

G.3. Ring main

G.3.1. Reliability of the piping arrangement (ageing, corrosion, tuberculation, looped mains, spur mains, isolation valves, etc.).

G.3.2. The ring main piping design and installation standard has been used (name standard).

G.3.3. Diameter nf the ring main piping mm.

G.3.4. Ring main piping system installation:

(a) Pipe material (specify type);(b) Lining material used for ferrous pipe (specify type);(c) Pipe joining method (specify).



Itemidentifier


Adequacy

Sat.Needs further

evaluationUnsat.


G.3.5. Maximum design flow rate (including fixed system demandand hose stream allocation)________ L/min.

G.3.6. Water supply allocation for manual hose stream use________ L/min.

G.3.7. Water supply allocation for water based fixed fireextinguishing systems:

(a) Individual system allocation:

System description Flow rate(L/min)

(b) Branching-off points are hydraulically balanced;(c) Allocation to non-fire process water systems, if

a n y ________ L/min.






G.3.8. Isolation valves:

(a) Location and spacing of valves;(b) Positive valve position indication is provided;(c) Valves are supervised (visual, electrical).

G.4. Fire pumps

G.4.1. Qualification of the fire pump system equipment (independent testing laboratory approval or third party certification).

G.4.2. The fire pump design and installation standard has been used (name standard).

G.4.3. The number of fire pumps.

G.4.4. The single failure criterion is applied.

G.4.5. Location and arrangement of fire pumps:

(a) Separate the fire compartment provided for each pump;

(b) Common area for all the pumps;(c) Pumps exposed to other fire hazards.


FIR E SAFETY INSPECTION CH EC K LIST (cont.)





Unsat.

G.4.6. Flow and pressure rating of each fire pump:

I./min at bar;

T./min at bar

G.4.7. The maximum available pressure from each fire pump:

(a) Compatible with the installed piping;(b) Compatible with the off-site water supplies.

G.4.8. The pump startup and stop method for each pump:

(a) Automatic (give details);(b) Supervised for power failure and pump running;(c) Manual stop.

G.4.9. The pump driver is appropriate for the intended use:

(a) Diesel engine (specify manufacturer, model number, power rating, etc.);

(b) Electric motor (specify power rating and motor type);(c) Reliability of the electric motor power supply.


Itemidentifier





Unsat.

G.4.10. The fire pump control is appropriate for the intended use:

(a) Type (specify);(b) Location;(c) Qualification of equipment;(d) Battery backup is provided.

G.5.

G.5.1.

G.5.2.

Pressure maintenance pumps (jockey pumps)

The number and location of pumps.

The flow and pressure rating of each pump:

r./min at har;

T./min at har

G.6.

G.6.1.

G.6.2.

G.6.3.

Pressure tanks

The number and individual capacity of tanks:

m .

Operating pressure har

Air supply (compressor, plant air, etc.).





evidence reviewedidentifier Sat.Needs further

evaluationUnsat.

G.6.4. Water supply (give details).

G.7. Outdoor hydrants

G.7.1. The number of hydrants.

G.7.2. The sparing between Hydrants m.

G.7.3. Accessibility for fire brigade use and hose connection compatibility.

G.7.4. Type of hydrant installed:

(a) Ground hydrant (below grade);(b) Pillar hydrant (above grade);(c) Number of outlets for hose connections; (H) Outlet diameter mm;(e) Connected to wet or dry supply systems.

G.7.5. Isolation valve is provided in each hydrant branch.

G.7.6. Impact protection is provided around each pillar hydrant and all the ground hydrants are indicated clearly.


Adequacy

Sat.Needs further

evaluationUnsat.



Indoor water supply installations

Rising mains:

(a) Wet or dry type;(b) Number;(c) Dimension________ mm;(d) Location and accessibility.

Hose reels/stations for fire fighting:

(a) Number;(b) Location and accessibility;(c) Design flow ra te ________ L/min;(d) Nozzle diam eter____ mm;(e) Nozzle type (fog, straight stream);(f) Shut-off nozzle;(g) Hose type (cotton, synthetic);(h) Hose length________ m;(i) Hose reel or hose station type;(j) Control valve operation for charging the unit.







Unsat.

H. Manual fire fighting capability

H .l. Organization

H.1.1. Establishment of an immediate action fire fighting team, where available.

H.1.2. Composition of the plant fire brigade (on-site personnel):

(a) Brigade leader;(b) Operations personnel;(c) Health physics personnel;(d) Maintenance personnel;(e) Security personnel.

H.1.3. Composition of the off-site fire brigade:

(a) Full time fire fighters;(b) Volunteer fire fighters.

H.1.4. Co-ordination of efforts (on-site, off-site):

(a) Line of authority at fire scene — a written agreement is provided and a liaison officer to the off-site fire brigade is identified;


Itemidentifier





Unsat.

H.1.4.(cont.)

H.1.5.

(b) Responsibilities of the on-site and off-site brigades are formally established;

(c) Availability/accessibility of radiation monitoring;(d) Dosimeters and access control badges are provided;(e) Means by which the off-site brigades gain access to the

site and the rendezvous points are established;(0 Site access is formally verified by practice drills.

Off-site brigade:

(a) Definite availability for response to plant emergencies:— Adequate reinforcements are available to meet the

radiation levels expected to be encountered;(b) Estimated response time (time to respond to the plant

entrance, to the access plant security and to reach the fire location with the appropriate equipment):— First attendance. min;— Reinforcements min.

H.2.

H.2.1.

Manpower

On-site response:

(a) Immediate action of the fire fighting team (minimum nnmher nf personnel available for response



Itemidentifier





Unsat.

H.2.1.(cont.)

H.2.2.

(b) Plant fire brigade (minimum number of personnelavailable for response );

(c) Minimum number of trained personnel to be available at all times is adequate for the type of installation.

Off-site response:

(a) Degree of confidence in the minimum adequate response of trained personnel;

(b) Absolute minimum number of personnel who will respond to the plant fire:— day— night

H.3.

H.3.1.

Training programme

Overall training programme — on-site personnel and off-site fire brigade:

(a) Training programme;(b) Formal lesson plans are developed and used;(c) Adequate training aids and resources are available

(reference books, films, videos).






Unsat.

H.3.2. Training programme covers all the necessary topics:

(a) Basic nuclear training;(b) Identification of fire hazard;(c) Familiarization of plant;(d) Identification and familiarity with the installed fire

protection equipment;(e) Type of fires expected in nuclear power plants and the

proper method of fighting each type of fire;(f) Proper use of personal protective clothing, including a

self-contained breathing apparatus and the compatible breathing apparatus procedures (on-site personnel and off-site fire brigade);

(g) Use of communication, lighting and ventilation equipment;(h) Methods of fighting fires inside buildings and confined

spaces with limited visibility;(i) Review of detailed pre-fire fighting strategies;(j) Radiological protection — plant procedures and individual

dosimeters.

H.3.3. Classroom training sessions include:

(a) Basic fire training;(b) Regular contingency training;







Unsat.

H.3.3.(cont.)

(c) Development fire training;(d) Leadership for strategy, tactics and command.

H.3.4. Regular hot fire practice (hands on) training, including fire fighting in confined spaces under extreme conditions of heat/smoke.

H.3.5. All members receive both initial classroom and hot fire practice (hands on) training before assignment to the fire brigade.

H.4. Fire drill practice sessions

H.4.1. Frequent drills are conducted to ensure competency:

(a) Individual fire brigade members (on-site and off-site);(b) Fire brigade as a team.

H.4.2. Drills are performed on night shifts and are occasionally unannounced.

H.4.3. Each fire drill is pre-planned and a thorough critique made by the fire brigade members (and qualified observers, where applicable).






Unsat.

H.4.4. Fire drills are conducted in all areas of the plant, including those areas that contain safe shutdown related equipment.

H.4.5. Off-site response groups periodically participate in plant fire drills and receive tours of the plant for familiarity.

H.4.6. All training efforts are documented thoroughly for each fire brigade member, with the detailed records retained and fully accessible.

H.5. Pre-fire fighting strategies

H.5.1. Detailed pre-fire fighting strategies are developed for all plant areas but, in particular, for those areas that contain the equipment needed for safe shutdown of the plant (including those areas which could expose safe shutdown equipment).

H.5.2. Strategies are documented formally and kept up to date.

H.5.3. Strategies are used in routine fire drills and classroom training sessions.

H.5.4. A copy of the strategies is given to the off-site fire brigade response team.



Itemidentifier


H.5.5. A copy of the strategies is available to the on-site fire brigadeleader and control room personnel, and is accessible during fire emergencies.

H.5.6. Strategies include all the appropriate information on firefighting techniques, including the following, as a minimum:

(a) Diagram of the area;(b) List of the fire hazards and explosion risks;(c) Description of the fire protection measures provided;(d) Access routes, escape routes;(e) Details of the vital plant equipment needed for safe

shutdown;(f) Special equipment needed for fire fighting and personal

protection;(g) Radiological/toxic concerns;(h) Ventilation system operation;(i) Special considerations;(j) Water supplies.


evidence reviewedSat.Needs further

evaluationUnsat.






Unsat.

H.6. Fire fighting equipment and resources

H.6.1. A full set of protective clothing is available for all the fire brigade members.

H.6.2. Protective clothing includes, as a minimum, coat, trousers, gloves, boots and helmet; the clothing gives protection in flashover conditions and, where necessary, protects against radiological contamination.

H.6.3. Protective clothing is available in the required sizes for each brigade member.

H.6.4. A self-contained breathing apparatus is available for each brigade member likely to be involved in the fire fighting operations.

H.6.5. Spare air bottles are available (at least two for each self- contained breathing apparatus set).

H.6.6. Radiation monitoring equipment is available, including personal dosimeters.

H.6.7. Fire brigades are equipped for fire fighting with a hose, nozzles, ladders, lighting equipment, lines and pumps.







Unsat.

H.6.8. Adequate portable radios compatible for use in areas containing safe shutdown equipment are provided for fire brigade communications.

H.6.9. Use of radio frequencies by other plant groups avoids impact on fire brigade operations.

H.6.10. The portable radio communication system is designed to provide communication throughout all the plant areas — even in remote areas (dead spots).

H.6.11. The portable radio sets provided for plant fire brigade use can communicate with the control room, with links to the off-site fire brigade response team.

H.6.12. The on-site fire brigade equipment is located in a well controlled, accessible central plant location (specify

. location).

H.6.13. All the fire brigade equipment is checked regularly and is well maintained.






Unsat.

H.7.

H.7.1.

Fire extinguishers (mobile and portable)

The type and number of extinguishers used throughout the plant (i.e. water, C 0 2, halon, foam and dry powder) are adequate and are well sited, tested and maintained.

H.7.2. The extinguisher type selected is appropriate for the protected fire hazard areas in the plant.

H.7.3. Qualification of the extinguisher equipment (independent testing laboratory approval or third party certification).

H.8. Access to fire fighting equipment

H.8.1. Equipment locations are marked clearly.

H.8.2. Escape routes are identified through:

(a) Signposting;(b) Orientation;(c) Plans and instructions.

H.8.3. Where ventilation systems are provided for use by the fire brigade for smoke and heat removal, the operational method is identified clearly and such systems are tested and maintained regularly.







Unsat.

H.9. Fire incident records

H.9.1. Records for all the fire incidents at the plant (large, small, actual fires and false alarms) are retained and easily accessible.

H.9.2. Incident records verify adequate response by the fire brigade services.

H.9.3.

H.9.4.

Records include the cause of fire, the method of extinction, the damage to plant and equipment and the effect on safe shutdown equipment.

The response times recorded include the times for immediate action fire fighting teams, on-site plant fire brigade response and off-site fire brigade response.

H.10.

H.10.1.

An unannounced fire drill is conducted during inspection

Fire drill location in plant.

H.10.2. Fire drill scenario (describe scenario).


Itemidentifier


H.10.3. On-site fire brigade:

(a) The fire brigade response tim e________ min(time required to achieve a minimum staffing level at the fire scene, with full protective clothing and a self- contained breathing apparatus, as well as hose line(s) ready to attack the simulated fire);

(b) The number of on-site fire brigade membersresponding________ ;

(c) The brigade members are familiar with the protective clothing, fire fighting equipment, self-contained breathing apparatus and communications equipment;

(d) The brigade members are familiar with the plant areas, the safe shutdown equipment and the nuclear hazards;

(e) The fire brigade leader demonstrates good leadership skills, strategy and tactics, effective communications, knowledge of plant operation and nuclear considerations, and effective operation and use of the available fire protection systems and equipment.

Off-site fire brigade (if called):

(a) Call out arrangements;(b) Time to respond to plant entrance (________ min);

Adequacy

Sat.Needs further

evaluationUnsat.




Itemidentifier





Unsat.

H.10.4.(cont.)

H.10.5.

(c) Time to access the plant security and to reach the fire drill location with the appropriate equipment( additional mini;

(d) The number of off-site fire brigade members responding;(e) The brigade members are familiar with the protective

clothing, fire fighting equipment and self-contained breathing apparatus, and the communications equipment is compatible;

(f) The brigade members are familiar with the plant areas, the safe shutdown equipment and the nuclear hazards.

Co-ordination between on-site and off-site brigades during thedrill:

(a) Effective liaison is provided between the groups;(b) A definite line of authority is established and accepted by

each group;(c) Effective utilization of the available resources;(d) Compatibility of equipment and procedures;(e) Co-operation with the liaison engineers.


BIBLIOGRAPHY

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Code on the Safety of Nuclear Power Plants: Design, Safety Series No. 50-C-D (Rev. 1), IAEA, Vienna (1988).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Fire Protection in Nuclear Power Plants, Safety Series No. 50-SG-D2 (Rev. 1), IAEA, Vienna (1992).

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, Fire Protection — Vocabulary, Part 1: General Terms and Phenomena of Fire, ISO 8421-1, ISO, Geneva (1987).

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, Fire Protection — Vocabulary, Part 2: Structural Fire Protection, ISO 8421-2, ISO, Geneva (1987).

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, Fire Protection - Vocabulary, Part 3: Fire Detection and Alarm, ISO 8421-3, ISO, Geneva (1989).

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, Fire Protection — Vocabulary, Part 4: Fire Extinction Equipment, ISO 8421-4, ISO, Geneva (1990).

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, Fire Protection — Vocabulary, Part 5: Smoke Control, ISO 8421-5, ISO, Geneva (1988).

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, Fire Protection - Vocabulary, Part 6: Evacuation and Means of Escape, ISO 8421-6, ISO, Geneva (1987).

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, Fire Protection — Vocabulary, Part 7: Explosion Detection and Suppression Means, ISO 8421-7, ISO, Geneva (1987).

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR STANDARDIZATION, Fire Protection — Vocabulary, Part 8: Terms Specific to Fire Fighting, Rescue Services and Handling Hazardous Materials, ISO 8421-8, ISO, Geneva (1990).

NATIONAL FIRE PROTECTION ASSOCIATION, Standards for Fire Protection for Light Water Nuclear Power Plants, NFPA Standards No. 803, NFPA, Quincy, MA (1988).

NATIONAL NUCLEAR RISKS INSURANCE POOLS AND ASSOCIATIONS, International Guidelines for the Fire Protection of Nuclear Power Plants, Revised edition, NNRIPA, Zurich (1983).

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, Branch Technical Position on Fire Protection, BTP-CMEB 9.5.1, Standard Review Plan, Rep. NUREG-0800, NRC, Washington, DC (1981).

55


UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, Fire Protection Guidelines for Nuclear Power Plants, Revision 1, Regulatory Guide 1.120, NRC, Washington, DC (1977).

UNITED STATES NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION, Fire Protection Program for Nuclear Power Facilities Operating Prior to January, 1979, Code of Federal Regulations Title 10, Part 50, Appendix R, NRC, Washington, DC (1993).

56


CONTRIBUTORS TO DRAFTING AND REVIEW

Agapov, A.

Cottaz, M.

Derewnicki, K.P.

Dhobley, R.R.

Enzmann, H.F.

Gorza, E.

Hashimi, J.A.

Hogg, A.B.C.

Kabanov, L.

Kaercher, M.

Kelemen, I.

Magnusson, T.I.

Marttila, J.J.

Mowrer, D.S.

Notley, D.P.

Pilette, C.

Smith, F.M.

Spencer, D.

Svensson, S.

Minatom, Russian Federation

Institut de protection et de surete nucleaire, France

AEA Technology, United Kingdom

Bhabha Atomic Research Centre, India

Swiss Pool for the Insurance of Nuclear Risks, Switzerland

Tractebel S.A., Belgium

Permanent Mission of Pakistan to the IAEA, Austria

Nuclear Electric, United Kingdom

International Atomic Energy Agency

Electricity de France, France

ETV-Eroterv Rt, Hungary

Vattenfall AB, Ringhals Nuclear Power Plant, Sweden

Finnish Centre for Radiation and Nuclear Safety, Finland

HSB Professional Loss Control, Inc.,United States of America

Science Applications International Corporation, United States of America

Atomic Energy Control Board, Canada

AEA Technology, United Kingdom

Home Office, United Kingdom

Swedish Rescue Services Board, Sweden

57


Vandewalle, A.

van Dijk, W.J.M.

Zhang, L.

Zhong, W.

AIB-Vincotte Nuclear, Belgium

Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken, Netherlands

Permanent Mission of China to the IAEA, Austria

International Atomic Energy Agency

Technical Committee Meeting

Vienna, Austria: 8-12 March 1993

Consultants Meetings

Vienna Austria: 11-15 May 1992, 8-12 March 1993, 14-18 February 1994

58


LIST OF NUSS PROGRAMME TITLES

It should be noted that some books in the series may be revised in the near future.

Those that have already been revised are indicated by the addition o f ‘(Rev. 1 ) ’ to the number.

1. GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION

50-C-G (Rev. 1) Code on the safety of nuclear power plants: Governmental organization

Safety Guides

Qualifications and training of staff of the regulatory body for nuclear power plants

Information to be submitted in support of licensing applications for nuclear power plants

Conduct of regulatory review and assessment during the licensing process for nuclear power plants

Inspection and enforcement by the regulatory body for nuclear power plants

Preparedness of public authorities for emergencies at nuclear power plants

Licences for nuclear power plants: Content, format and legal considerations

Regulations and guides for nuclear power plants

50-SG-G1

50-SG-G2

50-SG-G3

50-SG-G4

50-SG-G6

50-SG-G8

50-SG-G9

2. SITING

50-C-S (Rev. 1) Code on the safety of nuclear power plants: Siting

Safety Guides

50-SG-S1 (Rev. 1) Earthquakes and associated topics in relation to nuclearpower plant siting

50-SG-S3 Atmospheric dispersion in nuclear power plant siting

50-SG-S4 Site selection and evaluation for nuclear power plantswith respect to population distribution

1988

1979

1979

1980

1980

1982

1982

1984

1988

1991

1980

1980

59


50-SG-S6

50-SG-S7

50-SG-S8

50-SG-S9

50-SG-S10A

50-SG-S10B

50-SG-S11A

50-SG-S11B

3. DESIGN

50-C-D (Rev. 1)

50-SG-D1

50-SG-D2 (Rev. 1)

50-SG-D3

50-SG-D4

50-SG-D5

50-SG-D6

50-SG-D7 (Rev. 1)

50-SG-D8

50-SG-S5

50-SG-D9

60

External man-induced events in relation to nuclear power plant siting

Hydrological dispersion of radioactive material in relation to nuclear power plant siting

Nuclear power plant siting: Hydrogeological aspects

Safety aspects of the foundations of nuclear power plants

Site survey for nuclear power plants

Design basis flood for nuclear power plants on river sites

Design basis flood for nuclear power plants on coastal sites

Extreme meteorological events in nuclear power plant siting, excluding tropical cyclones

Design basis tropical cyclone for nuclear power plants

Code on the safety of nuclear power plants: Design

Safety Guides

Safety functions and component classification for BWR, PWR and PTR

Fire protection in nuclear power plants

Protection system and related features in nuclear power plants

Protection against internally generated missiles and their secondary effects in nuclear power plants

External man-induced events in relation to nuclear power plant design

Ultimate heat sink and directly associated heat transport systems for nuclear power plants

Emergency power systems at nuclear power plants

Safety-related instrumentation and control systems for nuclear power plants

Design aspects of radiation protection for nuclear power plants

1985

1984

1986

1984

1983

1983

1981

1984

1988

1979

1992

1980

1980

1982

1981

1991

1984

1985

1981


50-SG-D10 Fuel handling and storage systems in nuclear power plants

50-SG-D11 General design safety principles for nuclear power plants

50-SG-D12 Design of the reactor containment systems in nuclearpower plants

50-SG-D13 Reactor coolant and associated systems in nuclear powerplants

50-SG-D14 Design for reactor core safety in nuclear power plants

50-SG-D15 Seismic design and qualification for nuclear power plants

4. OPERATION

50-C-0 (Rev. 1) Code on the safety of nuclear power plants: Operation

Safety Guides

50-SG-01 (Rev. 1) Staffing of nuclear power plants and the recruitment,training and authorization of operating personnel

50-SG-02 In-service inspection for nuclear power plants

50-SG-03 Operational limits and conditions for nuclear power plants

50-SG-04 Commissioning procedures for nuclear power plants

50-SG-05 Radiation protection during operation of nuclearpower plants

50-SG-06 Preparedness of the operating organization (licensee)for emergencies at nuclear power plants

50-SG-07 (Rev. 1) Maintenance of nuclear power plants

50-SG-08 (Rev. 1) Surveillance of items important to safety in nuclearpower plants

50-SG-09 Management of nuclear power plants for safe operation

50-SG-010 Core management and fuel handling for nuclearpower plants

50-SG-011 Operational management of radioactive effluents andwastes arising in nuclear power plants

5. QUALITY ASSURANCE

50-C-QA (Rev. 1) Code on the safety of nuclear power plants:Quality assurance

1984

1986

1985

1986

1986

1992

1988

1991

1980

1979

1980

1983

1982

1990

1990

1984

1985

1986

1988

61


Safety Guides

50-SG-QA1 Establishing of the quality assurance programme for anuclear power plant project

50-SG-QA2 Quality assurance records system for nuclearpower plants

50-SG-QA3 Quality assurance in the procurement of items andservices for nuclear power plants

50-SG-QA4 Quality assurance during site construction of nuclearpower plants

50-SG-QA5 (Rev. 1) Quality assurance during commissioning and operation of nuclear power plants

50-SG-QA6 Quality assurance in the design of nuclear power plants

50-SG-QA7 Quality assurance organization for nuclear power plants

50-SG-QA8 Quality assurance in the manufacture of items fornuclear power plants

50-SG-QA10 Quality assurance auditing for nuclear power plants

50-SG-QA11 Quality assurance in the procurement, design andmanufacture of nuclear fuel assemblies

SAFETY PRACTICES

50-P-l Application of the single failure criterion

50-P-2 In-service inspection of nuclear power plants:A manual

50-P-3 Data collection and record keeping for themanagement of nuclear power plant ageing

50-P-4 Procedures for conducting probabilistic safetyassessments of nuclear power plants (Level 1)

50-P-5 Safety assessment of emergency power systems fornuclear power plants

1979

1979

1981

1986

1981

1983

1981

1980

1983

1990

1991

1991

1992

1992

1984

62


SELECTION OF IAEA PUBLICATIONS RELATING TO THE SAFETY OF

NUCLEAR POWER PLANTS

SAFETY SERIES

9

67

69

72

73

75-INSAG-1

75-INSAG-2

75-INSAG-3

75-INSAG-4

75-INSAG-5

75-INSAG-6

75-INSAG-7

77

79

81

84

86

Basic safety standards for radiation protection,1982 edition

Assigning a value to transboundary radiation exposure

Management of radioactive wastes from nuclear power plants

Principles for establishing intervention levels for the protection of the public in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency

Emergency preparedness exercises for nuclear facilities: Preparation, conduct and evaluation

Summary report on the post-accident review meeting on the Chernobyl accident

Radionuclide source terms from severe accidents to nuclear power plants with light water reactors

Basic safety principles for nuclear power plants

Safety culture

The safety of nuclear power

Probabilistic safety assessment

The Chernobyl accident: Updating of INSAG-1

Principles for limiting releases of radioactive effluents into the environment

Design of radioactive waste management systems at nuclear power plants

Derived intervention levels for application in controlling radiation doses to the public in the event of a nuclear accident or radiological emergency: Principles, procedures and data

Basic principles for occupational radiation monitoring

Techniques and decision making in the assessment of off-site consequences of an accident in a nuclear facility

1985

1985

1985

1985

1986

1987

1988

1991

1992

1992

1993

1986

1986

1986

1982

1987

1987

63


93 Systems for reporting unusual events in nuclear power plants

94 Response to a radioactive materials release having a transboundary impact

97 Principles and techniques for post-accident assessment and recovery in a contaminated environment of a nuclear facility

98 On-site habitability in the event of an accident at a nuclear facility:Guidance for assessment and improvement

101 Operational radiation protection: A guide to optimization

103 Provision of operational radiation protection services at nuclear power plants

104 Extension of the principles of radiation protection to sources of potential exposure

105 The regulatory process for the decommissioning of nuclear facilities

106 The role of probabilistic safety assessmentand probabilistic safety criteria in nuclear power plant safety

TECHNICAL REPORTS SERIES

237 Manual on quality assurance programme auditing

239 Nuclear power plant instrumentation and control:A guidebook

242 Qualification of nuclear power plant operationspersonnel: A guidebook

249 Decontamination of nuclear facilities to permitoperation, inspection, maintenance, modification or plant decommissioning

262 Manual on training, qualification and certificationof quality assurance personnel

267 Methodology and technology of decommissioningnuclear facilities

1989

1989

1989

1990

1990

1990

1990

1992

1989

1984

1984

1984

1985

1986

1986

64


268

271

274

282

292

294

296

299

300

301

306

307

327

328

330

334

338

354

1986

1987

1987

1988

1988

1989

1989

1989

1989

1989

1989

1989

1991

1991

1992

1992

1992

1993

Manual on maintenance of systems and components important to safety

Introducing nuclear power plants into electrical power systems of limited capacity: Problems and remedial measures

Design of off-gas and air cleaning systems at nuclear power plants

Manual on quality assurance for computer software related to the safety of nuclear power plants

Design and operation of off-gas cleaning and ventilation systems in facilities handling low and intermediate level radioactive material

Options for the treatment and solidification of organic radioactive wastes

Regulatory inspection of the implementation of quality assurance programmes: A manual

Review of fuel element developments for water cooled nuclear power reactors

Cleanup of large areas contaminated as a result of a nuclear accident

Manual on quality assurance for installation and commissioning of instrumentation, control and electrical equipment in nuclear power plants

Guidebook on the education and training of technicians for nuclear power

Management of abnormal radioactive wastes at nuclear power plants

Planning for cleanup of large areas contaminated as a result of a nuclear accident

Grading of quality assurance requirements: A manual

Disposal of waste from the cleanup of large areas contaminated as a result of a nuclear accident

Monitoring programmes for unrestricted release related to decommissioning of nuclear facilities

Methodology for the management of ageing of nuclear power plant components important to safety

Reactivity accidents


367 Software important to safety in nuclear power plants

368 Accident management programmes in nuclear power plants:A Guidebook

369 Management for excellence in nuclear power plant performance: A manual

372 Development and implementation of computerized operatorsupport systems in nuclear installations

IAEA-TECDOC SERIES

303 Manual on the selection of appropriate quality assuranceprogrammes for items and services of a nuclear power plant

308 Survey of probabilistic methods in safety and riskassessment for nuclear power plant licensing

332 Safety aspects of station blackout at nuclear power plants

341 Developments in the preparation of operating proceduresfor emergency conditions of nuclear power plants

348 Earthquake resistant design of nuclear facilities withlimited radioactive inventory

355 Comparison of high efficiency particulate filter testingmethods

377 Safety aspects of unplanned shutdowns and trips

379 Atmospheric dispersion models for application inrelation to radionuclide releases

387 Combining risk analysis and operating experience

390 Safety assessment of emergency electric power systemsfor nuclear power plants

416 Manual on quality assurance for the survey, evaluation andconfirmation of nuclear power plant sites

424 Identification of failure sequences sensitive to human error

425 Simulation of a loss of coolant accident

443 Experience with simulator training for emergencyconditions

1994

1994

1994

1994

1984

1984

1985

1985

1985

1985

1986

1986

1986

1986

1987

1987

1987

1987

66


450

451

458

497

498

499

508

510

522

523

525

529

538

540

542

543

547

550

553

444

561

Improving nuclear power plant safety through operator aids

Dose assessments in nuclear power plant siting

Some practical implications of source term reassessment

OSART results

OSART results II

Good practices for improved nuclear power plant performance

Models and data requirements for human reliability analysis

Survey of ranges of component reliability data for use in probabilistic safety assessment

Status of advanced technology and design for water cooled reactors: Heavy water reactors

A probabilistic safety assessment peer review:Case study on the use of probabilistic safety assessment for safety decisions

Probabilistic safety criteria at the safety function/system level

Guidebook on training to establish and maintainthe qualification and competence of nuclear power plantoperations personnel

User requirements for decision support systems used for nuclear power plant accident prevention and mitigation

Human error classification and data collection

Safety aspects of nuclear power plant ageing

Use of expert systems in nuclear safety

Procedures for conducting independent peer reviews of probabilistic safety assessment

The use of probabilistic safety assessment in the relicensing of nuclear power plants for extended lifetimes

Safety of nuclear installations: Future direction

Computer codes for Level 1 probabilistic safety assessment

Reviewing computer capabilities in nuclear power plants

1987

1988

1988

1988

1989

1989

1989

1989

1989

1989

1989

1989

1989

1990

1990

1990

1990

1990

1990

1990

1990

67


570

581

586

590

591

592

593

599

600

605

611

618

631

632

635

640

648

658

659

660

68

OSART mission highlights 1988-1989

Safety implications of computerized process control in nuclear power plants

Simulation of a loss of coolant accident with rupture in the steam generator hot collector

Case study on the use of PSA methods:Determining safety importance of systems and components at nuclear power plants

Case study on the use of PSA methods:Backfitting decisions

Case study on the use of PSA methods:Human reliability analysis

Case study on the use of PSA methods:Station blackout risk at Millstone Unit 3

Use of probabilistic safety assessment to evaluate nuclear power plant technical specifications

Numerical indicators of nuclear power plant safety performance

OSART good practices: 1986-1989

Use of plant specific PSA to evaluate incidents at nuclear power plants

Human reliability data collection and modelling

Reviewing reactor engineering and fuel handling: Supplementary guidance and reference material for IAEA OSARTs

ASSET guidelines: Revised 1991 edition

OSART guidelines: 1992 edition

Ranking of safety issues for WWER-440 model 230 nuclear power plants

Procedures for conducting common cause failure analysis in probabilistic safety assessment

Safety related maintenance in the framework of the reliability centered maintenance concept

Reactor pressure vessel embrittlement

Expert systems in the nuclear industry

1990

1991

1991

1991

1991

1991

1991

1991

1991

1991

1991

1991

1992

1991

1992

1992

1992

1992

1992

1992


669

670

672

681

694

710

711

712

719

722

724

737

740

742

743

744

749

751

Case study on the use of PSA methods: Assessment of technical specifications for the reactor protection system instrumentation

Pilot studies on management of ageing of nuclear power plant components: Results of Phase I

Safety aspects of nuclear power plant automation and robotics

OSART mission highlights: 1989-1990

Safety assessment of proposed improvements of RBMK nuclear power plants

Applicability of the leak before break concept

Use of probabilistic safety assessment for nuclear installations with large inventory of radioactive material

Safety aspects of designs for future light water reactors (evolutionary reactors)

Defining initiating events for purposes of probabilistic safety assessment

Safety assessment o f design solutions and proposed improvements to Smolensk Unit 3 RBMK nuclear power plant

Probabilistic safety assessment for seismic events

Advances in reliability analysis and probabilistic safety assessment for nuclear power reactors

Modelling and data prerequisites for specific applications of PSA in the management of nuclear plant safety

Design basis and design features of WWER-440 model 213 nuclear power plants: Reference plant: Bohunice V2 (Slovakia)

ASCOT Guidelines

OSART Guidelines — 1994 Edition

Generic initiating events for PSA for WWER reactors

PSA for shutdown mode for nuclear power plants

1992

1992

1993

1993

1993

1993

1993

1993

1993

1993

1994

1994

1994

1994

1994

1994

1994

1992

69


PROCEEDINGS SERIES

STI/PUB/673 IAEA safety codes and guides (NUSS) in the light of 1985current safety issues

STI/PUB/700 Source term evaluation for accident conditions 1986

STI/PUB/701 Emergency planning and preparedness for nuclear 1986facilities

STI/PUB/716 Optimization of radiation protection 1986

STI/PUB/759 Safety aspects of the ageing and maintenance of 1988nuclear power plants

STI/PUB/761 Nuclear power performance and safety 1988

STI/PUB/782 Severe accidents in nuclear power plants 1988

STI/PUB/783 Radiation protection in nuclear energy 1988

STI/PUB/785 Feedback of operational safety experience 1989from nuclear power plants

STI/PUB/803 Regulatory practices and safety standards 1989for nuclear power plants

STI/PUB/824 Fire protection and fire fighting in nuclear installations 1989

STI/PUB/825 Environmental contamination following a 1990major nuclear accident

STI/PUB/826 Recovery operations in the event of a nuclear accident or 1990radiological emergency

STI/PUB/843 Balancing automation and human action in nuclear 1991power plants

STI/PUB/878 Probabilistic safety assessment for operational safety — 1992PSA 91

STI/PUB/880 The safety of nuclear power: Strategy for the future 1992

STI/PUB/945 International nuclear safeguards 1994: Vision for the future 1994

70


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94-03877



ISBN 92-0-103994-8 ISSN 0074-1892


Documents

safety SAFETY PRACTICES