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if '1)S A F E T Y S E R I E S

No. 27

Safety Considerations in the Use of Ports and Approaches

by Nuclear Merchant ShipsP U BLISH ED ON B E H A L F O F

IAEA A N D IM CO

I N T E R N A T I O N A L A T O M I C E N E R G Y A G E N C Y

V I E N N A , 1968

This publication is no longer valid Please see http://www-ns.iaea.org/standards/


SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE USE OF PORTS AND APPROACHES

BY NUCLEAR MERCHANT SHIPS



SAFETY SERIES No. 27

SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE USE OF PORTS

AND APPROACHES BY NUCLEAR MERCHANT SHIPS

PUBLISHED ON BEHALF OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

AND THEINTER-GOVERNM ENTAL MARITIME CONSULTATIVE

ORGANIZATION

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY VIENNA, 1968


SA FETY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE USE OF PORTS AND APPROACHES BY NUCLEAR MERCHANT SHIPS (S a fe ty Se r ie s , N o .27)

A BST RA C T. R eport, published on b e h a lf of the IAEA and the In ter-G ov ern m en tal M aritim e C onsultative O rg an ization , o f a p a n e lo f experts convened by the IAEA. T h e report is the ou tcom e o f the last two m eetings held in V ienn a on 9 -1 3 May 1966 and 1 8 -2 2 M arch 1 9 6 8 , a t w hich rep resen tativesof four in tern ational organiza tion s were also present. The purpose o f this pu b lication is to provide guidance to G overnm ents and Port A uthorities on the various procedures and precautionary m easures that m ay be em ployed when n u clear m erchant ships use ports and approaches.

C on ten ts: 1 . Purpose and scope; 2 . Introduction; 3 . G en eral factors in the se lec tio n o f berths;4 . R ad io log ical consideration s; 5 . P ractices concerned with use o f ports by n u clear m erchant ships; B ib liography.

Sep arate ly a v a ila b le in English and French.

(2 0 p p ., 1 4 .8 x 21 c m , paper-bound; 1968) P r ice : US S I . 0 0 ; 8/4 stg

THIS REPORT IS ALSO PUBLISHED IN FRENCH

SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS IN THE USE OF PORTS AND APPROACHES

B Y NUCLEAR MERCHANT SHIPS IAEA, VIENNA, 1968

STI/P U B /206

Printed by the IAEA in Austria October 1968


FOREWORDIn 1961, when the Agency convened the first meeting on.the Safe

ty Considerations in the Use of Ports and Approaches by Nuclear Merchant Ships, the only nuclear ship on the high seas was the USSR icebreaker "L e n in "; since then the United States N. S. "Savannah" has been commissioned and has visited many ports. The "Otto Hahn" of the F ederal Republic of Germany has now been launched and several other countries have plans for nuclear ships.

The purpose of this publication is to provide guidance to Governments and Port Authorities on the various procedures and precautionary measures that may be employed when nuclear merchant ships use ports and approaches. The problem is basically that of siting a nuclear reactor in a populated area, with the extra factor of mobility. Added to this is the fact that the safety standards of the nuclear ship m ay be those of a country other than that of the port of entry. Thus the problem must be solved in international agreements.

The guide is the outcome of the last two meetings held at the A*gency's headquarters on 9-13 May 1966 and on 18-22 March 1968, with experts from seven countries. A lso present at the meetings were representatives of the W orld Health Organization (WHO), the International Association of Ports and H arbors (IAPH), the Inter- Governmental M aritim e Consultative Organization (IMCO) and EURATOM .



CONTENTS

1. PURPOSE AND SCOPE ....................................................................... 1

2. INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................... 2

3. GENERAL FACTORS IN THE SELECTION OF BERTHS . 3

4. RADIOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS ............................................ 3

5. PRACTICES CONCERNED WITH USE OF PORTS BYNUCLEAR MERCHANT SHIPS ....................................................... 6

5 . 1 . Ship design and manning ....................................................... 6

5 . 2 . Ship operation ............................................................................. 75 . 3 . Arrangements prior to entry into port waters . . . . 8

5 . 4 . Conditions whilst in transit to and from berth . . . . 95 . 5 . Conditions at the berth .......................................................... 95 . 6 . Mobility of s h ip ........................................................................... 115 . 7 . Radioactivity control in port ............................................. 125 . 8 . Administrative arrangements for emergencies . . . 12

BIBLIOGRAPHY................................................................................................. 14LIST OF PARTICIPANTS .......................................................................... 19


1. P U R PO SE AND SCO PE

1. 1. The purpose of this guide is to set forth considerations pertinent to m atters of use of ports and harbours 1 by nuclear merchant ships, to indicate the factors which are important to a port safety evaluation and to provide guidance as to various procedures and precautionary m easures that may be employed.

1.2. Such guidance as is set forth herein is in no sense to be regarded as mandatory and nothing in this guide is intended to define, interpret or m odify international law or conventions applicable to the operations of nuclear merchant ships. It is recognized that individual countries w ill wish, at the present tim e, to judge each situation involving the use of their ports and approaches on their individual m erits in accordance with their own procedures and safety standards. Nothing in this guide is intended to be construed as lim iting or detracting from the ex ercise of such governm ental rights.

1 . 3 . . This guide is p rim arily concerned with m atters of safety to be considered when a nuclear ship operates to a port in the course of norm al com m ercial operation. Repair work on the reactor plant and nuclear fuelling are not considered since these operations require separate safety considerations.

1. 4. The manner in which the safety evaluation of the ship's reactor is carried out and the safety criteria used have been ex cluded from consideration in this guide . 2

1. 5. No recomm endations have been made regarding re fe r ence doses to individuals or populations which might be adopted for port safety evaluation, or for planning for possible em ergencies. 3

1 Throughout this document the word port implies a port or harbour.2 In both these areas references are supplied in the bibliography which it is hoped will

provide guidance for those concerned with these matters.3 In both these areas too references are supplied in the bibliography.

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2. INTRODUCTION

2. 1. Nuclear merchant ships are being designed and built to achieve a high degree of safety. If a ship is designed, constructed and operated in accordance with the best current practices for nuclear ships and within the framework of the 1960 Safety Convention, it can be reasonably assumed that:(a) the main nuclear hazard to be considered in port would arise

from the occurrence of a highly unlikely accident of sufficient severity to cause an appreciable release from the ship of gaseous or volatile radioactive m aterials, of which the iodine isotopes and noble gases are of particular significance;

(b) ship design and care in navigation may ordinarily be expected to elim inate the possibility of a serious nuclear hazard due to collision and grounding;

(c) normal operations in ports and at the berth will not give rise to levels of radioactivity in and about the ship in ex cess of those specified for routine operation.

2. 2. Despite this there still rem ains some sm all probability that accidents might be experienced which could lead to o ff-sh ip re leases of radioactive m aterials. W hilst a ship is far out at sea the consequences of such accidents are not likely to be hazardous to m ore than a relatively lim ited number of people. However, the situation could be very different should an abnormal release of radioactive m aterials occur whilst close to land, and particularly within a densely populated port area. Consequently, if a nuclear merchant ship is expected to use a particular port, those responsible for the port and its surroundings should a sse ss the risk such use might entail and establish suitable precautionary m e a su re s .

2 . 3 . In general, there are three main problem s involved in making a technical appraisal of the suitability of a port for use by a nuclear merchant ship:(a) the establishment of the reference doses to individuals or

populations to be used for evaluating accidents involving the release of radioactive m aterials;

(b) the assessm ent of the potential releases of radioactive m aterials from a nuclear merchant ship and their consequences;

(c) the possible limitation of such consequences by careful selection of a berth and by emergency planning.

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3. G EN ERAL FACTORS IN THE SELECTIO N O F BERTHS

3 . 1 . In m ost ports there are several locations or berths where a ship may be m oored. A list of advantages and disadvantages relating to these berths can be drawn up to make the selection e a sie r . These factors from a safety viewpoint might be grouped as follow s:(a) factors influencing the relative probability of an accident

occurring due to external causes, such as shipping channels, shipping frequencies and speeds, location of airports and flight paths, tidal and m eteorological conditions affecting navigation, collision statistics and any unusual dock operations;

(b) factors influencing the dispersal capability of the environment, such as frequencies and tim es of prevailing and extrem e m eteorological, tidal and water flow (flushing) conditions; these might be of particular interest in some geographical and clim atological areas with great seasonal variations (m onsoons, river currents, tides);

(c) factors having a bearing on the potential consequences of an accident, such as surrounding land use, ease of fire fighting, towing, radiation monitoring and other services and depth of water to facilitate ship movement.

3 . 2 . On the basis of such considerations some locations can be tentatively selected. Estim ates can then be made of the radiological consequences should some unforeseen event result in an accidental release of radioactive m aterials at these locations. A comparison of the estim ates made for the various berths can provide further guidance as to the relative advantage of one berth versus the other. When examined together with the probability of the postulated event, an indication of the relative risk of experiencing an unacceptable situation can be obtained.

4. RADIOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS

4. 1. The safety evaluation of the nuclear merchant ship is to be set forth in a "Safety A ssessm en t" as required by the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960,and provided in advance to the Governments of the countries which the merchant

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ship intends to visit. The Safety A ssessm ent should include sufficient detailed information to permit evaluation of the safety aspects of the reactor design and the manner of its intended operation.

4 . 2 . It is clearly beyond the scope of this document to deal with the question of the detailed contents of a Safety A ssessm e n t. Nonetheless, it can be said that such documentation can reasonably be expected to include an evaluation of the safety aspects of nuclear plant design wherein various accident p ossib ilities are analysed. Com monly what is done is to postulate failure of som e component or control system and then to exam ine the consequences of these even ts. T h is analysis is done to a s s e s s the e ffe ctiv e n e ss of(a) features engineered into the power plant to term inate the

accident before the release of radioactive m aterials from the reactor;

(b) features which would m in im ize consequences should the postulated accident sequence involve o ff-sh ip r e le a s e s .

4. 3. These analyses cover a spectrum of events, varying both in probability of occurrence and severity of consequences. Obviously, the Government of registry will have evaluated the ship from the viewpoint of the probability of events identified as potentially serious and satisfied itself on the adequacy of the design and the intended manner of operation. In considering port entry, the Receiving Government also should satisfy itse lf that:(a) the general safety aspects of the ship and its operations r e

present a reasonable basis for consideration for port entry;(b) the consequences of an accident, taking into account the prob

ability of a given release of radioactive m aterials, are acceptable when examined against the conditions and environment peculiar to the specific port and berth(s);

(c) suitable precautionary measures are organized and implemented. Considerations of (b) and (c) above form the basic objectives

of a Port Evaluation.

4 . 4 . For the Port Evaluation those various accidents ex amined in the Safety A ssessm ent, which are postulated to result in off-ship release of radioactive m aterials, either as airborne or liquid effluents, are evaluated, using the particular berth under study, as the reference point. (In so doing, the evaluator should bear in- mind the relative probability of the accidents postulated

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to cause the r e le a se s . ) Com m only what is done is to choose one such event as a "referen ce accident" for purposes of determining a release of radioactive m aterial ("so u rce te r m ") .

4. 5. From this starting point, the dispersion of the airborne release postulated may be described by well-known atmospheric diffusion m odels. Diffusion m odels w ill have been used in the Safety A ssessm e n t, but values of the m eteorological param eters may need adjustment to reflect local conditions. In performing this exercise, the following guidance may be helpful.(a) Such calculations show that the dominant hazard at short

distances is from direct radiation and inhalation, while at larger distances the dominant hazard arises from contamination of agricultural products, especially m ilk. Since the short-range hazard is of immediate concern, the number of people staying in the immediate vicinity of the berth, the distance to the residential area and the population distribution in this area are prim ary factors to consider.

(b) If calculations are made of the consequences resulting from a release of radioactive m aterials, assuming (a) that the ship rem ains at the berth throughout the release and (b) that the ship is moved according to the assessed mobility, the relative m erit of mobility will be indicated.

(c) The radiological consequences calculated should not be treated as being any m ore p recise than the assum ptions used in the calculational m odel.

(d) Radiation doses so calculated are com m only compared with "referen ce d o se s" selected by national authorities for the purpose of evaluating such highly unlikely situations. (There is no international standard. A number of countries have published reference doses; the use of such doses for evaluation purposes does not n ecessarily imply acceptance by the authorities of em ergency exposure of the public to such values. )

(e) In determining whether the exposure is acceptable, not only the doses to the individuals, but also the'integrated dose to the population should be taken into consideration.

( f) Having estimated the doses to individuals within the port area and adjacent residential areas the authorities may want to establish protective m easures such as evacuation, m onitoring, alarm and ship rem oval and the designation of a place for rem ote anchoring. Evacuation may be practicable for

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persons in the port area but one should not consider evacuation of large numbers of people in a residential area as a practical safety m easure.

(g) The long-term contamination effects of the release of radioactive m aterials are not usually of prim ary concern in evaluation of a port, but attention should be given to possible adverse effects on consumptive products, food factories in the affected area, foodstuff w arehouses and the use of land for agricultural purposes.

4. 6 . The release of radioactive m aterials to the harbour water w ill generally not constitute an immediate hazard to people, provided these m aterials rem ain in the water. Special consideration would be necessary for ports located in fresh water from which domestic water supplies may be drawn. Other than this, the main effect on people from such a release might arise from consumption of seafood from the area, but danger from such a possibility can be prevented by imposing restrictions after monitoring of the actual radioactivity lev e ls . The necessary tim e for carrying out these functions will be available.

While the hydrospheric conditions of a harbour and adjacent w aters are not generally lim iting with respect to port suitability, such conditions should be examined to ascertain if there are ways for the released radioactive m aterials to reach the human body. Such exam ination could lead to suitable precautions being taken.

5. PRACTICES CONCERNED WITH USE OF PORTS BY NUCLEAR MERCHANT SHIPS

In consideration of the matter of the operation of nuclear m erchant ships in ports the following practices are set forth for guidance:

5. 1. Ship design and manning

The Receiving Government should ensure that(a) nuclear ships entering its ports have been designed and

constructed in accordance with the provisions of the International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea, 1960, Chapter VIII, and the applicable codes or regulations of the

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Government of reg istry with due regard to the Recom m endations Applicable to Nuclear Ships outlined in Annex C to the 1960 Convention;

(b) the Safety A ssessm ent required by the Final Act of the 1960 Safety Conference has been prepared and approved by the Governm ent of reg istry , and made available sufficiently in advance of the planned v isit of the nuclear ship, so that the Receiving Government m ay make or cause to have made an independent appraisal of the safety of the ship;

(c) the visiting ship has an appropriate and valid Nuclear P assenger Ship Safety Certificate or Nuclear Cargo Ship Safety Certificate as appropriate issued in accordance with the provisions of the 1960 Safety Convention, in addition to other usual statutory documents such as the International Load Line C ertificate;

(d) the M aster, officers and m em bers of the crew of the nuclear ship p ossess the requisite qualifications and have undergone proper training appropriate to their resp on sib ilities and duties in accordance with arrangem ents approved by the Governm ent of reg istry .

5 . 2 . Ship operation

The Receiving Government should ensure that(a) the conventional navigation and safety equipment is in good

order and readily available for use;(b) the em ergency propulsion plant, if provided, is in a state of

readiness;(c) the nuclear plant and its associated system s are in good

working order and comply with the information given to the Receiving Government;

(d) the levels of radioactivity in and about the ship are not in excess of those specified for normal operations;

(e) records of periodic tests of vital safety system s and conditions of the reactor and the ship are available for inspection by a person duly authorized to carry out such an inspection by the Government of the port to be visited; such inspection might entail the issue of an Entry Certificate irrespective of the fact that the ship is in possession of the relevant statutory documents; the Entry Certificate would be evidence to the Port Authority and others concerned that the visited Government is satisfied with the general safety of the ship.

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5. 3. A rra n g e m e n ts p r io r to en try into p o rt w a te rs

With respect to arrangements prior to entry the followingpractices pertain:(a) P rior notification of the ship's intention to call at the port is

given.(b) A s a condition of entry into port waters the ship is inspected

and granted such Entry Certificate as may be required by the Receiving Government.

(c) Daylight arrival is preferred unless advanced methods of shipping control have been developed at the port. It is recognized that delay by weather, tides or other causes might make it im practicable to avoid night arriva l, in which case it might be safer for the vessel to proceed to the berth during darkness rather than to anchor in a busy approach outside port lim its .

(d) For each port a rem ote ship anchorage is designated. The rem ote ship anchorage is to serve as

(i) a location to which the nuclear ship could be directed if conditions in the approaches to the berth preclude the ship 's entry into port;(ii) a location to which the nuclear ship could be taken if necessary as an expedient and em ergency m easure should the ship experience an accident in the port involving potential for sustained o ff-sh ip re lea se of radioactive m aterials; in the latter case the ship would be expected to rem ain at the rem ote anchorage until the re lea se ce ases or until further action is possible .

(e) In the case of ports approached by long inland w ater p a ssag es, additional rem ote anchorages m ay need to be designated for use in these circum stances.

(f) In designating a rem ote anchorage, the following considerations should be taken into account:

(i) since the v e sse l m ay still continue to re lea se rad ioactive m aterials over a prolonged period of tim e following an accident - perhaps weeks - the remote anchorage should be isolated from large groups of population;(ii) the remote anchorage should be located away from the norm al navigation routes so as not to affect the ships navigating nearby.

(g) In ports where adequate surveillance and com m unication facilities are provided so as to be able to inform the nuclear

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v e sse l of the presence of poor v isib ility , adverse weather conditions and obstruction in port w aters, a point is determined past which the nuclear ship should not proceed but is diverted to the remote anchorage. If the ship has passed this point when the adverse port conditions arise , then the v esse l is permitted to proceed at the M a ster 's discretion, assisted by advice from the Port Authority. In ports where no such adequate facilities are provided, the ship proceeds at the M a ster 's discretion at all tim es.

5. 4. Conditions whilst in transit to and from berth

5. 4. 1. The handling of the ship is not affected by the type of power system and therefore pilotage requirem ents for nuclear ships are considered to be no different from those of conventional ships of sim ilar size and draught. Equally no privilege of right of way or special speed lim it appears necessary because a ship is nuclear powered.

5. 4. 2. In port waters a tug or tugs of adequate power accompany the v essel. The location at which the tug or tugs should be provided on the inward journey and should leave the ship on the outward journey is a m atter for individual consideration by Port Authorities. In m ost cases the presence of tugs ensures that in any em ergency it w ill be possible to rem ove the v e sse l to the remote anchorage or other safe location depending on the nature of the em ergency.

5. 4. 3. Nuclear ships are required to display the sam e signals as conventional ships but have not been required to display in addition a "nuclear ship" signal.

5. 5. Conditions at the berth

5 . 5 . 1. In considering berthing arrangem ents attention should be given to the following points:(a) the provision of electric power and/or special lighting

arrangements that the ship or the security forces may re quire;

(b) any possible requirement by the ship for a supply of water for in-ship fire fighting, whether the ship w ill require a

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fixed connection from the shore supply to the ship fire m ains, and how this supply m ay be achieved;

(c) the communication facilities between the ship and shore organization; such facilities might include sh ip -to -sh o re telephone connection to the public telephone service, connection to the port network, use of a direct linp and use of radio-telephone facilities;

(d) the security arrangements at the berth; ports that operate an internal security organization will be able to increase security over the ship and surrounding area; in the case of ports that rely upon the public security forces special liaison might be established so that adequate supervision may be exercised over access to the vessel;

(e) the need and availability of health physics equipment.

5. 5. 2. With respect to berthing arrangem ents the followingsuggestions are made:

[ a) Fire_gr£caution_sj_ Appropriate arrangements should be madeby the Port Authority for adequate fire cover while the vessel is at the berth, having in mind the potential complications that may arise if the nuclear ship is involved in a fire. Due regard should be paid to the necessity for fire-fighting forces to be properly inform ed of any problem s on board the v e sse l.

fbj_ _ Security:(i) Security arrangements in excess of those required for a sim ilar conventional ship should be considered, depending on local circumstances.(ii) The ship should be required to station security personnel at each gangway during the period that she is at berth, to prevent unauthorized a ccess .(iii) The security forces should ex ercise sp ecia l su r veillance, especially during the period outside working hours and the hours of darkness.

(c)_ _ _A.ccessj_ Consideration should be given to the problem of a ccess to the ship in the port area so that em ergency action is not impeded.

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i-d). _ _Manniji£ C)f_th_e_shij) while at the berth:(i) A senior o fficer-in -ch arg e should be available.(ii) A sufficient complement of crew should be on board to man the ship and take her outside port lim its at short notice if necessary.(iii) A continuous fire patrol should be maintained on board the ship.

£ej_ _ J ’jlot j.v_ailabilit^ Arrangements should be made for any necessary pilots to be available on short call for the period that the ship is at her berth.

H L _ Facilities at adjacent berths:(i) No handling of explosives should be perm itted within the vicinity of the nuclear ship.(ii) Careful consideration should be given to the handling of large quantities of hazardous materials at adjacent berths.

5. 6 . Mobility of ship

5. 6 . 1. The emphasis on the m erits of mobility is determined by the result of the safety evaluation of the ship and the vulnerability of the port and the adjacent area. Mobility of the ship is provided either by emergency means aboard the ship,- and/or by tugs available at the port.

5. 6 . 2. In the evaluation of the reliability of the m obility arrangem ents attention should be given to the following:(a) If tugs are employed, the means for providing tugs of sufficient

number and power within the required tim e will need evaluation. Consideration should be given to adequate protection of tugboat personnel.

(b) Characteristics of the port which might impair mobility should be evaluated to determine their effect. Such factors include passage through bridges or locks, sufficiency of water depth to ensure floatation and ship movement at all times, prevalence of adverse tidal and weather conditions, and the degree of port congestion which w ill im pair ship m ovement. If m obility is seriously impaired, other factors may compensate for these

. disadvantages.

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(c) While it is expected that the ship will have sufficient stand-by staff while it is in port, to a ssist with m oving the ship, the receiving country should make sure that this is done.

5. 7. Radioactivity control in port

5^.J?._l^__Reactor £ontainment_: The integrity of the containment system s should not be violated without reference to the Port Authority.

waste^ Discharge of solid, liquid or a ir borne radioactive m ateria ls should be perm itted only after prior consultation with the appropriate authority. If permitted, the d ischarge of radioactive m aterials should be within the lim its fixed in agreement with the authority. Any deviation in excess of these lim its should be properly notified to the authorities. R ecords of radioactive m aterials discharged from the ship whilst in port should be made available.

jj._7._3^_ J\tonitoring_f£r_radiation:(a) Consideration should be given to the need for environmental

monitoring before, during and after the visit of the ship. Such data might be useful for record purposes.

(b) Consideration should be given to the monitoring of the ship's hold at the start of any loading or discharging operations to provide assurance to dock w orkers.

5. 8 . Adm inistrative arrangem ents for em ergencies

Towards defining a set of adm inistrative arrangem ents that should be established as precautionary m easures for dealing with em ergency conditions the following guidance is provided:

5. 8 . 1. The potential problems can be considered to be divided among the control and operation of the ship, the area under the control of a Port Authority (or sim ilar body) and the area outside this boundary which w ill be the responsibility of other appropriate civil authorities.

5. 8 . 2. The effects of a nuclear accident can extend into the port area and even beyond. The M aster of a nuclear ship can be assum ed competent to deal with situations arising in the ship as a

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result of accident conditions involving the release of radioactive m aterial, and the safety of the reactor installation remains the r e s ponsibility of the M aster.

5 . 8 . 3 . Executive responsibility for action concerned with the safety of the port needs to be clearly defined. It may, for example, be invested in a senior m em ber of the Port Authority, advised as necessary by competent experts.

5. 8 . 4. Before the arrival of the ship, provisions should be made for full consultation with all appropriate competent bodies so that their responsibilities for public safety may be clearly defined. These may include police, health officials and those concerned with agriculture and food. Such bodies would be responsible for the control and possible evacuation of the public, the medical treatment of people who may be contaminated and the control of contaminated foodstuffs or milk.

5. 8 . 5. Environmental hazard can extend beyond the confines of the ship. Arrangem ents should therefore be available to warn civic authorities and government bodies. If it appears that radioactive m aterials may be m ore widespread the civic authorities and governm ent bodies should be advised to take appropriate action.

5. 8 . 6 . It can be expected that in many cases assistance will be required from experts in the fields of environmental monitoring, meteorology, health physics and engineering to assist in the a sse ss ment of the probable course of events and the nature and extent of any consequent hazard.

5. 8 . 7. The M aster should be responsible for advising the designated authority immediately of the occurrence of any abnormal reactor conditions constituting potential hazard to public health and safety, and his assessm ent of the situation. Such guidance will enable appropriate action to be taken (for example, the removal of the vessel to the chosen remote achorage).

5. 8 . 8 . Detailed plans and em ergency actions should be prepared in advance of the arrival of the ship and should be available to the M aster. In such plans particular attention should be paid to the adequacy and reliability of communications at all tim es when the emergency plan may be required to operate.

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B I B L I O G R A P H Y

HYDEMAN, L. M ., BERMAN, W. H. , International Control of Nuclear Maritime Activities, Braun- Brumfield, Ann Arbor, Michigan (1959).

INTER-GOVERNMENTAL MARITIME CONSULTATIVE ORGANIZATION, International Conference

on Safety o f Life at Sea, 1960, Final Act of the Conference with Annexes including the International

Convention for the Safety o f Life at Sea, I960 , IMCO, London (1960).

STREET, H ., FRAME, I .R . , Law Relating to Nuclear Energy, Butterworths, London (1966).

PASQUILL, F . , Atmospheric Diffusion, the Dispersion o f Windborne M aterial from Industrial and other Sources, D. Van Nostrand C o ., London (1962).

HILSMEIER, H ., GIFFORD, F. A . , Graphs for Estimating Atmospheric Dispersion, USAEC ORO-545, Washington, D. C. (1961).

BRYANT, P. M ., Methods o f Estimation o f the Dispersion o f Windbome Material and Data to Assist in their Application, AHSB-(RP)-R-42, UKAEA, Harwell (1964).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Assessment o f Airborne Radioactivity (Proc. Symp. Vienna, 1967), IAEA, Vienna (1967).

BEATTIE, J . R . , An Assessment o f Environmental Hazards from Fission Product Releases, AHSB(S) R54, UKAEA (1963).

DOLPHIN, G. W ., BEACH, S. A ., Relative Inhalation Hazards from the Radioisotopes o f Iodine Follow ing A ccid e n ta l R elease o f Fission Products, A H SB-(R P)-R 5, UKAEA, H arw ell (1 9 6 1 ) .

UNITED KINGDOM MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, Maximum Permissible Dietary Contamination after the Accidental Release o f Radioactive M aterial from a Nuclear Reactor, Report to the Medical Research Council by its Com mittee on Protection against Ionising Radiations, Br. med. J . 5127 (April1959) 967-69.

UNITED KINGDOM MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, Maximum Permissible Contamination o f Respirable Air after an Accidental Release of Radioiodine, Radiostrontium and Caesium -137, Report to the M edical Research Council by its Com m ittee on Protection against Ionising Radiations, Br. m ed. J . 5251 (August 1961) 5 7 6 -7 9 .

UNITED KINGDOM MEDICAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, The Assessment o f the Possible Radiation Risks to the Population from Environmental Contamination, HMSO, London (1966).

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Publication No. 6, Recommendations o f Radiation Protection (as amended 1959 and revised 1962), Pergamon Press, London (1964).

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INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Publication No. 8, Radiation Protection: Evaluation o f Risks from Radiation, Pergamon Press, London (1965).

INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE ON RADIOLOGICAL PROTECTION, Publication No. 9, Recommendations on Radiation Protection (adopted September 1965), Pergamon Press, London (1966).

DiNUNNO, J . J . , et a l . , C alculation o f D istance Factors for Power and Test Reactor Sites, T ID - 14844, USAEC, Washington, D .C . (1962).

OAK RIDGE NATIONAL LABORATORY, US Reactor Containm ent Technology, a Com pilation o f Current Practice in Analysis, Design, Construction, Test and Operation, I and II, (COTTRELL, W. B . , SAVOLAIEN, A. W ., Eds) ORNL-NSIC-5, Nuclear Safety Information Center, ORNL (1965).

WHITMAN, G. D . , et a l . , Technology o f Steel Pressure Vessels for Water- cooled Nuclear Reactors, a Review o f Current P ractice in Design, Analysis, M aterials, F abrication , Inspection and T est, O RN L-N SIC-21, N uclear Safety Inform ation Center, ORNL (1967).

LANZL, H ., PINGEL, J . H ., RUST, J . H . , Radiation Accidents and Emergencies in M edicine, Research and Industry, C. C. Thomas, Springfield, 111. (1965).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Reactor Safety and Hazards Evaluation Techniques (Proc. Symp. Vienna, 1962), IAEA, Vienna (1962).

WORLD HEALTH ORGANIZATION, Protection o f the Public in the Event o f Radiation Accidents,WHO, Geneva (1965).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Safety Series No. 8, IAEA, Vienna (1962).

INTERNATIONAL ATOM IC ENERGY AGENCY, Safety Series No. 9, IAEA, Vienna (1967).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Safety Series No. 14, IAEA, Vienna (1965).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Operation, Safety Series No. 16 , IAEA, Vienna

T he Use o f Film Badges for Personnel Monitoring,

Basic Safety Standards for Radiation Protection,

T h e Basic Requirement for Personnel Monitoring,

Manual on Environmental Monitoring in Normal (1966).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Environmental Monitoring in Emergency Situations, Safety Series No. 18, IAEA, Vienna (1966).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Risk Evaluation for Protection o f the Public in Radiation Accidents, Safety Series No. 21, IAEA, Vienna (1967).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, Respirators and Protective Clothing, Safety Series No. 22 , IAEA, Vienna (1967).

15


INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, N uclear Ship Propulsion (Proc. Symp. Taorm ina,1960), IAEA, Vienna (1961).

CROUCH, H. F . , Nuclear Ship Propulsion, Cornell M aritim e Press, Cambridge, Maryland (1960).

DAVIES, A. W ., "Sp ecialized ships o f the nuclear ag e” (Proc. Symp. on the Future for N uclear Powered Ships, London,1965), J . Br. nucl. Energy Soc. £ (1966).

MANTON, R . , "N uclear powered ships: A shipowner's v iew point". Ibid.

HUGHES-HALLETT, J . , "N uclear powered ships: T h e shipper’s in terest". Ibid.

FINNS, S. A . , "Port facilitie s and requirements for nuclear powered ships", Ibid.

WHITESIDE, H. N. E . , "N uclear m erchant ships: International requirements and safety aspects", Ibid.

PEMBERTON, H. N ., "C lassification society requirem ents for nuclear ships", Ibid.

HOPWOOD, H ., "Som e thoughts on the insurance o f a nuclear powered ship", Ibid.

FARMER, F. R . , "Safety in nuclear ships", Paper No. 1292, presented to a meeting of The Institution o f Engineers and Shipbuilders in Scotland on 7 April 1964.

NATIONAL ACADEMY o f SCIENCE, National Research Council, Radioactive Waste Disposal from Nuclear Powered Ships, Washington, D. C. (1959).

INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, R adioactive Waste Disposal into the Sea , Safety Series No. 5, IAEA, Vienna (1961).

BELL, G. D . , THOMAS, S. B . , Measures for the Accommodation of Nuclear Powered Ships in Ports, presented at the Permanent International Association o f Navigation Congresses, Baltimore (September1961).

Report o f the C om m ittee on the Safety o f N uclear Powered M erchant Ships, Cmnd 958, HMSO, London (1960).

BOONOK, R. J . , The role o f the US coast guard in nuclear merchant ship safety, Nucl. Safety 8 2 (Winter, 1966-1967).

BARNET, J . M ., et a l . , N. S. "Savannah" Safety Assessment, T ID -17885, USAEC (December 1962).

EURATOM, T ech n ica l Safety Evaluation o f the N. S. "Savannah” , Report drawn up by a group o f experts representing EURATOM, Bureau Veritas, Germanischer Lloyd, EUR-1621e, I, H, in and IV, EURATOM, Brussels (1 9 6 4 - 1 9 6 6 ).

16


N. S. "Savannah" Port Operation Plan, First Atomic Ship Transport, Port of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, Pa. (July 1965).

N. S. "Savannah" Port Operating Criteria, First Atomic Ship Transport, New York, N. Y. (July 1965).

Guidance to Surveillance for N. S. "Savannah", T ech n ica l Operations Branch, D ivision o f Radiolo g ica l H ealth, Department o f H ealth, Education and W elfare, Washington, D .C . (1964).

BLIZARD, E. P. e t a l,, The Radiation Leakage Survey o f the Shield of the Nuclear Ship "Savannah", ORNL-3336 , T ID -4500, USAEC, ORNL, Tenn. (1962).

COTTRELL, W. B . , et a l . , Environmental Analysis o f N. S. "Savannah" - Operation at Camden, ORNL-2867, T ID -4500 , USAEC (1960).

N. S. "Savannah" Port Operating Plan, First Atom ic Ship Transport, Port o f Bremerhaven, Federal Republic of Germany (1965).

ANDERSON, T . D . , et al. , Activity Release from the N. S. "Savannah” in the Maximum Credible Accident, ORN L-3361-U C-80, T ID -4500 (22nd ed .) .

MILES, M. E . , MANGENO, J . J . , Disposal o f Radioactive Wastes from U. S. Naval Nuclear Powered Ships and their Support Facilities, 1966, Radiological Health D ata and Reports 8 (D ec. 1967) 699- 701.

VAUGHAN, J. W ., MILES, M. E . , Disposal of Radioactive Wastes from U. S. Naval Nuclear Powered Ships and their Support Facilities, Radiological Health Data and Reports 7 (May 1966) 257-62.

17



LIST OF PARTICIPANTS

G. D. Bell (Chairman)

A. Burban

E. G. Case1

J.J. DiNunno2

H. Jensen

REPRESENTATIVES

E . C . Anderson1

J. Bunge

F. Luykx

G. Meilland2

V. Nadeinski1

H.G. Parker1

Y. Sasamura2

T. Worts

1 Attended first m eeting only.2 Attended second m eeting only.

CONSULTANTS

United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority

Commissariat a l'energie atomique, France

United States Atomic Energy Commission

United States Atomic Energy Commission

Atomic Energy Commission, Denmark

World Health Organization

EURATOM

EURATOM


Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization


Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative Organization

International Association of Ports and Harbors

19


OBSERVERS

A. Calori2

R. P. Denise1

R. E. Knowles

H. Nakato1

H. Schmerenbeck

J. M. W ill1

Comitato Nazionale per l'Energia Nucleare; Italy

First Atomic Ship Transport Inc.,United States of America

Board of Trade, United Kingdom

Japan Nuclear Ship Development Agency

Gesellschaft fur Kernenergieverwertung in Schiffbau und Schiffahrt, Federal Republic of Germany

First Atomic Ship Transport Inc.,United States of America

SCIENTIFIC SECRETARIES

J. Beranek 1

A. M assera 2

J. D. Me Cullen 1

International Atomic Energy Agency



1 Attended first meeting only.2 Attended second meeting only.


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Documents

Safety Considerations in the Use of Ports and Approaches ... Safety Standards/Safety_Series... · Safety Considerations in the Use of Ports and Approaches by Nuclear Merchant Ships