Safely Delivering the Department of Energy’s Vision for the East Tennessee Technology Park Mission

Safely Delivering DOE’s Vision for the East Tennessee Technology Park Mission

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Safely Delivering the Department of Energy’s Vision for the East Tennessee Technology Park Mission

Dynamic Radiological Inventory Control at the Tank W-1A Remediation ProjectPresented by:Gary Coleman Jr., M.S., Nuclear Safety EngineerEnergy Facility Contractors Group (EFCOG) Safety Analysis Workshop May 4-10, 2012, Santa Fe, New Mexico

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Dynamic Radiological Inventory Control at the Tank W-1A Remediation Project• Presented by Gary Coleman Jr. M.S., Staff Augmentation

Nuclear Safety Engineering support to UCOR Oak Ridge via Energy Solutions

• Co-Authored by Jerry Gnoose, M.S., Staff Augmentation Waste Coordinator support to UCOR Oak Ridge via Energy Solutions

• Special Thanks to Jimmy Massey, UCOR Project Manager for the Tank W-1 A Remediation Project, and Karen Balo, UCOR Deployed Nuclear Safety Manager for the Tank W-1A Remediation Project


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Background information on Tank W-1A

• Tank W-1A is located within the main campus of the Oak Ridge National Laboratory (ORNL)

• Tank W-1A was installed in the 1950’s, and removed from service in 1986

• While in service, Tank W-1A collected wastes from several high radiation analytical facilities at ORNL


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Background information on Tank W-1A

• During it’s operation, transfer lines to the tank leaked causing soil and groundwater contamination in the vicinity of the tank

• Remediation has been completed, and included removal of contaminated soil, the tank, and the concrete saddles and pad that supported the tank


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The Tank W-1 A Location


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The Tank W-1 A Facility


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Methodology

• Due to the close proximity of the project to other working facilities and personnel, there is a need for strict inventory control at the facility footprint

• The Tank W-1A Detailed Inventory Spreadsheet (TWDIS) was constructed to control and track dynamic inventory of Tank W-1A boxes of soil and waste staged within the Tank W-1A footprint


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Methodology

• ALARA concerns for workers on the site - footprint limited the number of filled containers to 24

• A maximum of 6 boxes that had not been through confirmatory NDA were allowed to be on site


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Methodology

• The initial condition (IC) for inventory control was derived from the ALARA Design Plan, which formed the Specific Administrative Control (SAC) for inventory control

• Because of the high radiation levels from the soil, it was necessary to limit the number of containers on site to prevent unacceptable exposure at the project site boundary

• The Material at Risk (MAR) with the worst case 24 boxes were calculated to support the values used in the Safety Basis Hazard Evaluation (HE)


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Facility Footprint Processing Plan


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B-25 Boxes Being Filled Inside the Enclosure


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Remote Camera View: ALARA at Work


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B-25 Box Non-destructive Assay Station Onsite


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B-25 Box Non-destructive Assay Station Onsite


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Radiological Inventory Juggling


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The Tank W-1A Detailed Inventory Spreadsheet

• The TWDIS Spreadsheet was developed as an aid to control and track the inventory of processed boxes within the project boundary

• The spreadsheet was developed and controlled in accordance with company Information Technology (IT) requirements for level 2 “Safety Significant Software”

• The spreadsheet was accessed by the Waste Coordinator and two back-up designees. Others were given “Read-Only” access as needed


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Totals

Empty/Vendor Site 0

Empty/Container Staging Area 8 Section A

Empty/Tank W-1A Site 0 Section B

Full/Inside Weather Enclosure 0 Section C

Full/Inside Service Annex 0 Section D

Full/Awaiting NDA 0 Section E

Full/Quarantine 0

Full/NDA Complete 0 Section F

Full/WDP Staging Area 0 Section G

Full/Shipped to NNSS 317 Section H


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Empty Containers 8

Total Full Containers 317

# Containers Offsite 317 Sections G + H

# Containers Onsite 0

# Containers (C,D,E+Q) 0 </= 6 per SAC 4.4.1 of DSA

# Containers (F) 0 </=18 per SAC 4.4.1 of DSA


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• The TWDIS Spreadsheet contains warning notes for the user when the container count exceeds 80 % of the DSA limit

• The user has advanced warning to prevent inadvertent exceedance of the respective DSA limit

• There were several other warning parameters loaded into the spreadsheet, to manage inventories inside the Weather Enclosure, and outside on the facility footprint


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The Tank Being Removed Inside the Enclosure


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Results

• Excavation operations began in September of 2011 and concluded in April of 2012

• 316 B-25 boxes were filled, surveyed, characterized, and shipped off-site

• There were no inventory control violations, as the operations crew worked very closely with the Waste Coordinator to communicate container movements in accordance with the DSA SAC’s


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B-25 Boxes Being Loaded for Shipment


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Conclusion

• The TWDIS Spreadsheet is a cost-effective yet rigorous method for protecting the assumptions listed in the project DSA, and flowed into the operating procedures

• A search of the DOE Lessons Learned system revealed several examples of radiological inventory control violations that were related to lack of vigorous controls with regards to inventory movement and control

• Operations in Category 2 Nuclear Facilities should be held to the highest standards with regards to Conduct of Operations


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Conclusion

• The TWDIS spreadsheet is just one small example of the rigor needed to safely and effectively conclude clean-up operations at a Category 2 Nuclear Facility


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References

• BJC/OR-3420 Removal Action for Tank W-1A at the Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Oak Ridge, Tennessee, Project and Facility ALARA Design Review Checklist, Bechtel Jacobs Company LLC, May 2010

• DSA-OR-TW1A-0051 Rev.7, Documented Safety Analysis for the Tank W-1A (Corehole 8) Removal Action, URS/CH2M Oak Ridge (UCOR), February 2012


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Thank you for your attention!

• Any Questions?

• I can be contacted at :

[email protected]

Documents

Safely Delivering the Department of Energy’s Vision for the East Tennessee Technology Park Mission