1436cv(L);14319cv NewYorkStateRifle&PistolAssn,Inc.,etal.v.Cuomo,etal.ConnecticutCitizensDefenseLeague,etal.v.Malloy,etal.

In the 1United States Court of Appeals 2

for the Second Circuit 3 4

5AUGUSTTERM20146

78

Nos.1436cv(Lead);1437cv(XAP)910NEWYORKSTATERIFLEANDPISTOLASSOCIATION,INC.,WESTCHESTER11

COUNTYFIREARMSOWNERSASSOCIATION,INC.,SPORTSMENS12ASSOCIATIONFORFIREARMSEDUCATION,INC.,NEWYORKSTATE13AMATEURTRAPSHOOTINGASSOCIATION,INC.,BEDELLCUSTOM,14

BEIKIRCHAMMUNITIONCORPORATION,BLUELINETACTICAL&POLICE15SUPPLY,LLC,BATAVIAMARINE&SPORTINGSUPPLY,WILLIAMNOJAY,16

THOMASGALVIN,ROGERHORVATH,1718

PlaintiffsAppellantsCrossAppellees,1920

v.2122ANDREWM.CUOMO,inhisofficialcapacityasGovernoroftheState23

ofNewYork,ERICT.SCHNEIDERMAN,inhisofficialcapacityas24AttorneyGeneraloftheStateofNewYork,JOSEPHA.DAMICO,in25hisofficialcapacityasSuperintendentoftheNewYorkStatePolice,26

27DefendantsAppelleesCrossAppellants,28

29 30

2

GERALDJ.GILL,inhisofficialcapacityasChiefofPolicefortheTown1ofLancaster,NewYork,LAWRENCEFRIEDMAN,2

3DefendantsAppellees,4

5FRANKA.SEDITA,III,inhisofficialcapacityasDistrictAttorneyfor6

ErieCounty,78

Defendant.910

OnAppealfromtheUnitedStatesDistrictCourt11fortheWesternDistrictofNewYork12

1314

No.14319cv1516THECONNECTICUTCITIZENSDEFENSELEAGUE,THECOALITIONOF17CONNECTICUTSPORTSMEN,JUNESHEW,RABBIMITCHELLROCKLIN,18STEPHANIECYPHER,PETEROWENS,BRIANMCCLAIN,ANDREW19MUELLER,HILLERSPORTS,LLC,MDSHOOTINGSPORTS,LLC,20

21PlaintiffsAppellants,22

23v.24

25DANNELP.MALLOY,inhisofficialcapacityasGovernoroftheState26

ofConnecticut,KEVINT.KANE,inhisofficialcapacityasChief27StatesAttorneyoftheStateofConnecticut,DORAB.SCHRIRO,inher28officialcapacityasCommissioneroftheConnecticutDepartmentof29EmergencyServicesandPublicProtection,DAVIDI.COHEN,inhis30officialcapacityasStatesAttorneyfortheStamford/Norwalk31

JudicialDistrict,GeographicalAreasNos.1and20,JOHNC.SMRIGA,32

3

inhisofficialcapacityasStatesAttorneyfortheFairfieldJudicial1District,GeographicalAreaNo.2,MAUREENPLATT,inherofficial2capacityasStatesAttorneyfortheWaterburyJudicialDistrict,3

GeographicalAreaNo.4,KEVIND.LAWLOR,inhisofficialcapacity4asStatesAttorneyfortheAnsonia/MilfordJudicialDistrict,5

GeographicalAreasNos.5and22,MICHAELDEARINGTON,inhis6officialcapacityasStatesAttorneyfortheNewHavenJudicial7

District,GeographicalAreaNos.7and23,PETERA.MCSHANE,inhis8officialcapacityasStatesAttorneyfortheMiddlesexJudicial9

District,GeographicalAreaNo.9,MICHAELL.REGAN,inhisofficial10capacityasStatesAttorneyfortheNewLondonJudicialDistrict,11GeographicalAreaNos.10and21,PATRICIAM.FROEHLICH,GAILP.12HARDY,inherofficialcapacityasStatesAttorneyfortheHartford13JudicialDistrict,GeographicalAreasNos.12,13,and14,BRIAN14PRELESKI,inhisofficialcapacityasStatesAttorneyfortheNew15BritainJudicialDistrict,GeographicalAreaNos.15and17,DAVID16

SHEPACK,inhisofficialcapacityasStatesAttorneyfortheLitchfield17JudicialDistrict,GeographicalAreaNo.18,MATTHEWC.GEDANSKY,18inhisofficialcapacityasStatesAttorneyfortheTollandJudicial19District,GeographicalAreaNo.19,STEPHENJ.SEDENSKYIII,inhis20

officialcapacityasStatesAttorneyfortheDanburyJudicialDistrict,21GeographicalAreaNo.3,22

23DefendantsAppellees.24

25OnAppealfromtheUnitedStatesDistrictCourt26

fortheDistrictofConnecticut27 28

29ARGUED:DECEMBER9,201430DECIDED:OCTOBER19,201531

32

4

Before:CABRANES,LOHIER,andDRONEY,CircuitJudges.1 2

3Before the Court are two appeals challenging guncontrol4

legislationenactedbytheNewYorkandConnecticutlegislaturesin5the wake of the 2012 mass murders at Sandy Hook Elementary6School inNewtown,Connecticut.TheNewYork andConnecticut7laws at issue prohibit the possession of certain semiautomatic8assault weapons and largecapacity magazines. Following the9entry of summary judgment in favor ofdefendants on the central10claims in both the Western District of New York (William M.11Skretny, Chief Judge) and the District of Connecticut (Alfred V.12Covello,Judge),plaintiffsinbothsuitsnowpresstwoargumentson13appeal. First, they challenge the constitutionality of the statutes14under theSecondAmendment;and second, they challenge certain15provisionsofthestatutesasunconstitutionallyvague.Defendantsin16the New York action also crossappeal the District Courts17invalidationofNewYorks sevenround load limitandvoidingof18twostatutoryprovisionsasfaciallyunconstitutionallyvague.19

We hold that the core provisions of the New York and20Connecticut laws prohibiting possession of semiautomatic assault21weapons and largecapacitymagazines do not violate the Second22Amendment,and that thechallenged individualprovisionsarenot23void for vagueness. The particular provision of New Yorks law24regulating load limits, however, does not survive the requisite25scrutiny.One further specificprovisionConnecticutsprohibition26on the nonsemiautomatic Remington 7615unconstitutionally27infringes upon the Second Amendment right. Accordingly, we28AFFIRMinpartthejudgmentoftheDistrictCourtfortheDistrictof29Connecticut insofar as it upheld the prohibition of semiautomatic30assault weapons and largecapacity magazines, and REVERSE in31partitsholdingwithrespecttotheRemington7615.Withrespectto32

5

the judgmentof theDistrictCourt for theWesternDistrictofNew1York, we REVERSE in part certain vagueness holdings, and we2otherwise AFFIRM that judgment insofar as it upheld the3prohibition of semiautomatic assault weapons and largecapacity4magazinesandinvalidatedtheloadlimit.5

67

DAVIDTHOMPSON,CharlesJ.Cooper,Peter8A.Patterson,Cooper&Kirk,PLLC,9WashingtonDC,ANDBrianT.Stapleton,10MatthewS.Lerner,GoldbergSegallaLLP,11WhitePlains,NY,StephenP.Halbrook,12Fairfax,VA,forPlaintiffsAppellants.1314BARBARAD.UNDERWOOD,SolicitorGeneral15oftheStateofNewYork(AnishaS.16Dasgupta,ClaudeS.Platton,Officeofthe17SolicitorGeneral,onthebrief),forEricT.18Schneiderman,AttorneyGeneralforthe19StateofNewYork,NewYork,NY,for20DefendantsAppelleesCrossAppellants21AndrewM.Cuomo,etal.2223MAURAB.MURPHYOSBORNE,Assistant24AttorneyGeneraloftheStateof25Connecticut(PerryZinnRowthorn,26MichaelK.Skold,GregoryT.DAuria,27OfficeoftheAttorneyGeneral,onthebrief),28forGeorgeJepsen,AttorneyGeneralofthe29StateofConnecticut,Hartford,CT,for30DefendantsAppelleesDannelP.Malloy,etal.31

32

6

JOSA.CABRANES,CircuitJudge:12

Before the Court are two appeals challenging guncontrol3legislationenactedbytheNewYorkandConnecticutlegislaturesin4the wake of the 2012 mass murders at Sandy Hook Elementary5School inNewtown,Connecticut.TheNewYork andConnecticut6laws at issue prohibit the possession of certain semiautomatic7assault weapons and largecapacity magazines. Following the8entry of summary judgment in favor ofdefendants on the central9claims in both the Western District of New York (William M.10Skretny, Chief Judge) and the District of Connecticut (Alfred V.11Covello,Judge),plaintiffsinbothsuitsnowpresstwoargumentson12appeal. First, they challenge the constitutionality of the statutes13under theSecondAmendment;and second, they challenge certain14provisionsofthestatutesasunconstitutionallyvague.Defendantsin15the New York action also crossappeal the District Courts16invalidation of New Yorks separate sevenround load limit and17voiding of two statutory provisions as facially unconstitutionally18vague.19

We hold that the core provisions of the New York and20Connecticut laws prohibiting possession of semiautomatic assault21weapons and largecapacitymagazines do not violate the Second22Amendment,and that thechallenged individualprovisionsarenot23void for vagueness. The particular provision of New Yorks law24regulating load limits, however, does not survive the requisite25scrutiny.One further specificprovisionConnecticutsprohibition26on the nonsemiautomatic Remington 7615unconstitutionally27

7

infringes upon the Second Amendment right. Accordingly, we1AFFIRMinpartthejudgmentoftheDistrictCourtfortheDistrictof2Connecticut insofar as it upheld the prohibition of semiautomatic3assault weapons and largecapacity magazines, and REVERSE in4part itsholdingwithrespect to theRemington.Withrespect to the5judgmentoftheDistrictCourtfortheWesternDistrictofNewYork,6weREVERSEinpartcertainvaguenessholdings,andweotherwise7AFFIRM that judgment insofar as it upheld the prohibition of8semiautomatic assaultweapons and largecapacitymagazines and9invalidatedtheloadlimit.10

BACKGROUND11

I. PriorAssaultWeaponLegislation12

NewYorkandConnecticuthavelongrestrictedpossessionof13certain automatic and semiautomatic firearms that came to be14known as assault weapons. In 1993, Connecticuts General15Assembly adopted the states first assaultweapon ban, which16criminalizedthepossessionoffirearmscapableoffullyautomatic,17semiautomaticorburst fireat theoptionof theuser, including6718specificallyenumeratedsemiautomaticfirearms.119

The followingyear,after fiveyearsofhearingson theharms20thoughttobecausedbycertainfirearms,theU.S.Congressenacted21legislation restricting themanufacture, transfer, and possession of22

11993Conn.Pub.Acts93306,1(a)(J.A.,No.14319cv,at943).

8

certainsemiautomaticassaultweapons.2The1994 federalstatute1defined semiautomatic assault weapons in two ways. First, it2catalogued18specificallyprohibitedfirearms,including,asrelevant3here, the Colt AR15. Second, it introduced a twofeature test,4whichprohibitedanysemiautomaticfirearmthatcontainedatleast5two listed militarystyle features, including a telescoping stock, a6conspicuously protruding pistol grip, a bayonet mount, a flash7suppressor, and a grenade launcher. The federal statute also8prohibitedmagazineswith a capacity ofmore than ten rounds of9ammunition, orwhich could be readily restored or converted to10accept more than 10 rounds.3 The federal assaultweapons ban11expiredin2004,pursuanttoitssunsetprovision.412

Following the passage of the federal assaultweapons ban,13both New York, in 2000, and Connecticut, in 2001, enacted14legislation that closely mirrored the federal statute, including the15twofeature test forprohibited semiautomatic firearms.5Unlike the16federal statute, however, these state laws contained no sunset17

2ViolentCrimeControlandLawEnforcementActof1994,Pub.L.No.

103322,tit.XI,subtit.A110102(b),108Stat.1796,1997.3Id.110103.4Id.110105.5SeeActofAug.8,2000,ch.189,10,2000N.Y.Laws2788,2792(J.A.,No.

1436cv,at92330);2001Conn.Pub.Acts01130,1(J.A.,No.14319cv,at94960).Likethefederalstatute,the2000NewYorkstatutealsorestrictedthepossessionofcertainlargecapacitymagazines.

9

provisionsandthusremainedinforceuntilamendedbythestatutes1atissuehere.2

OnDecember 14, 2012, a gunman shot hisway into Sandy3HookElementary School inNewtown,Connecticut andmurdered4twenty firstgraders and six adults using a semiautomaticAR155type riflewith ten largecapacitymagazines.Thisappallingattack,6inadditiontootherrecentmassshootings,providedtheimmediate7impetusforthelegislationatissueinthisappeal.68

II. TheNewYorkLegislation9

New York enacted the Secure Ammunition and Firearms10EnforcementAct (SAFEAct) on January 15, 2013.7 The SAFEAct11expandsthedefinitionofprohibitedassaultweaponsbyreplacing12the prior twofeature testwith a stricter onefeature test. As the13name suggests, thenew testdefines a semiautomatic firearm as a14prohibitedassaultweaponifitcontainsanyoneofanenumerated15list of militarystyle features, including a telescoping stock, a16conspicuouslyprotrudingpistolgrip,athumbholestock,abayonet17mount,aflashsuppressor,abarrelshroud,andagrenadelauncher.818

6SeeDefendantsBr.,No.1436cv,at1011;DefendantsBr.,No.14319cv,at11&n.3.

7ActofJan.15,2013,ch.1,2013N.Y.Laws1,amendedbyActofMar.29,2013,ch.57,pt.FF,2013N.Y.Laws290,389.

8Theprohibitedfeaturesdependonwhetherthesemiautomaticweaponisarifle,pistol,orshotgun,thoughthelistsoverlapsignificantly:

Assaultweaponmeans

10

This statutory definition encompasses, and thereby bans, the1semiautomaticweapon used by themassshooter at SandyHook.2New York law makes the possession, manufacture, transport, or3disposal of an assaultweapon a felony.9 Pursuant to the SAFE4

(a)asemiautomaticriflethathasanabilitytoacceptadetachablemagazineandhasatleastoneofthefollowingcharacteristics:(i)afoldingortelescopingstock;(ii)apistolgripthatprotrudesconspicuouslybeneaththeactionoftheweapon;(iii)athumbholestock;(iv)asecondhandgriporaprotrudinggripthatcanbeheldbythenontriggerhand;(v)abayonetmount;(vi)aflashsuppressor,muzzlebreak,muzzlecompensator,orthreadedbarreldesignedtoaccommodateaflashsuppressor,muzzlebreak,ormuzzlecompensator;(vii)agrenadelauncher;or

(b)asemiautomaticshotgunthathasatleastoneofthefollowingcharacteristics:(i)afoldingortelescopingstock;(ii)athumbholestock;(iii)asecondhandgriporaprotrudinggripthatcanbeheldbythenontriggerhand;(iv)afixedmagazinecapacityinexcessofsevenrounds;(v)anabilitytoacceptadetachablemagazine;or

(c)asemiautomaticpistolthathasanabilitytoacceptadetachablemagazineandhasatleastoneofthefollowingcharacteristics:(i)afoldingortelescopingstock;(ii)athumbholestock;(iii)asecondhandgriporaprotrudinggripthatcanbeheldbythenontriggerhand;(iv)capacitytoacceptanammunitionmagazinethatattachestothepistoloutsideofthepistolgrip;(v)athreadedbarrelcapableofacceptingabarrelextender,flashsuppressor,forwardhandgrip,orsilencer;(vi)ashroudthatisattachedto,orpartiallyorcompletelyencircles,thebarrelandthatpermitstheshootertoholdthefirearmwiththenontriggerhandwithoutbeingburned;(vii)amanufacturedweightoffiftyouncesormorewhenthepistolisunloaded;or(viii)asemiautomaticversionofanautomaticrifle,shotgunorfirearm....N.Y.PenalLaw265.00(22)(emphasissupplied).

9Id.265.02(7),265.10.

11

Acts grandfather clause, however, preexisting lawful owners of1banned assault weapons may continue to possess them if they2registerthoseweaponswiththeNewYorkStatePolice.103

TheSAFEActalsobansmagazines that canholdmore than4ten rounds of ammunition or that can be readily restored or5converted to acceptmore than ten rounds.11AlthoughNew York6had restricted possession of suchmagazines since 2000, the SAFE7Act eliminated a grandfather clause for magazines manufactured8beforeSeptember1994.9

The SAFE Acts largecapacitymagazine ban contains an10additional,uniqueprohibition onpossession of amagazine loaded11withmorethansevenroundsofammunition.12(Forthepurposeof12thisdefinition,aroundisasingleunitofammunition.)Asoriginally13enacted, the SAFE Act would have imposed a magazine capacity14restriction of seven rounds. Because very few sevenround15magazines aremanufactured, however, the lawwas subsequently16amended to imposea tenround capacity restrictioncoupledwitha17sevenroundloadlimit.Thus,asamended,thestatutepermitsaNew18Yorkgunownertopossessamagazinecapableofholdinguptoten19

10Id.265.00(22)(g)(v).11Id.265.00(23)(a).12Id.265.37.

12

rounds, but hemay not fully load it outside of a firing range or1officialshootingcompetition.132

III. TheConnecticutLegislation3

Several months after New York passed the SAFE Act, and4afterextensivepublichearingsand legislativeandexecutivestudy,5ConnecticutadoptedAnActConcerningGunViolencePrevention6and Childrens Safety on April 4, 2013, and later amended the7statute on June 18, 2013.14 Like its New York analogue, the8Connecticutlegislationreplacedthestatestwofeaturedefinitionof9prohibitedassaultweaponswithastricteronefeaturetest,15using10a list ofmilitarystyle features similar toNewYorks, including a11telescopingstock,a thumbholestock,a forwardpistolgrip,a flash12suppressor, a grenade launcher, and a threaded barrel capable of13acceptinga flash suppressoror silencer.16Unlike itscounterpart in14

13Id.265.20(a)(7f).142013Conn.Pub.Act133,asamendedby2013Conn.Pub.Act13220.15Conn.Gen.Stat.53202a(1)(E).16Id.53202a(1)(E),53202b(a)(1),53202c(a).LikeNewYorksSAFE

Act,Connecticutsstatutedifferentiatesamongsemiautomaticrifles,pistols,andshotguns:

Assaultweaponmeans...[a]nysemiautomaticfirearm...thatmeetsthefollowingcriteria:

(i)Asemiautomatic,centerfireriflethathasanabilitytoacceptadetachablemagazineandhasatleastoneofthefollowing:(I)Afoldingortelescopingstock;(II)Anygripoftheweapon,includingapistolgrip,athumbholestock,oranyotherstock,theuseofwhichwouldallowan

13

New York, the Connecticut legislation additionally bans 1831particular assault weapons listed by make and model, as well as2copiesorduplicatesofmostof those firearms.17TheConnecticut3individualtogriptheweapon,resultinginanyfingeronthetriggerhandinadditiontothetriggerfingerbeingdirectlybelowanyportionoftheactionoftheweaponwhenfiring;(III)Aforwardpistolgrip;(IV)Aflashsuppressor;or(V)Agrenadelauncherorflarelauncher;or

(ii)Asemiautomatic,centerfireriflethathasafixedmagazinewiththeabilitytoacceptmorethantenrounds;or

(iii)Asemiautomatic,centerfireriflethathasanoveralllengthoflessthanthirtyinches;or

(iv)Asemiautomaticpistolthathasanabilitytoacceptadetachablemagazineandhasatleastoneofthefollowing:(I)Anabilitytoacceptadetachableammunitionmagazinethatattachesatsomelocationoutsideofthepistolgrip;(II)Athreadedbarrelcapableofacceptingaflashsuppressor,forwardpistolgriporsilencer;(III)Ashroudthatisattachedto,orpartiallyorcompletelyencircles,thebarrelandthatpermitstheshootertofirethefirearmwithoutbeingburned,exceptaslidethatenclosesthebarrel;or(IV)Asecondhandgrip;or

(v)Asemiautomaticpistolwithafixedmagazinethathastheabilitytoacceptmorethantenrounds;or

(vi)Asemiautomaticshotgunthathasbothofthefollowing:(I)Afoldingortelescopingstock;and(II)Anygripoftheweapon,includingapistolgrip,athumbholestock,oranyotherstock,theuseofwhichwouldallowanindividualtogriptheweapon,resultinginanyfingeronthetriggerhandinadditiontothetriggerfingerbeingdirectlybelowanyportionoftheactionoftheweaponwhenfiring;or(vii)Asemiautomaticshotgunthathastheabilitytoacceptadetachablemagazine;or(viii)Ashotgunwitharevolvingcylinder....

Id.53202a(1)(emphasissupplied).17Id.at53202a(1);seealsoPlaintiffsBr.,No.14319cv,at5;Defendants

Br.,No.14319cv,at14.Ofthese183specificallyenumeratedprohibited

14

law makes it a felony to transport, import, sell, or possess1semiautomaticassaultweapons,anditalsocontainsagrandfather2clause permitting preexisting owners of assault weapons to3continue to possess their firearms if properly registered with the4state.185

The June 2013 amendment to the Connecticut legislation6criminalizes the possession of [l]arge capacity magazine[s] that7canhold,orcanbereadilyrestoredorconvertedtoaccept,more8thantenroundsofammunition.19UnlikeitsNewYorkcounterpart,9however, the Connecticut legislation contains no additional load10limitrule.11

IV. ProceduralHistory12

Plaintiffsacombinationofadvocacygroups,businesses,and13individual gun ownersfiled suit against the governors of New14YorkandConnecticutandother stateofficials, first in theWestern15DistrictofNewYorkonMarch21,2013and then in theDistrictof16Connecticut on May 22, 2013. In both actions, plaintiffs sought17declaratory and injunctive relief for alleged infringement of their18weapons,allbutonearesemiautomaticweapons.ThesinglenonsemiautomaticfirearmistheRemingtonTacticalRifleModel7615,apumpactionrifle.DefendantsBr.,No.14319cv,at58.

18Conn.Gen.Stat.53202d(a)(2)(A).19Id.53202w(a)(1).Aswithprohibitedfirearms,prebanownersof

prohibitedmagazinescanretainthemifregisteredwiththestate.Id.53202x(a)(1).

15

constitutional rights. Specifically, plaintiffs contended that the1statutesprohibitionsonsemiautomaticassaultweaponsand large2capacity magazines violate their Second Amendment rights, and3that numerous specific provisions of each statute are4unconstitutionally vague. In the New York action, plaintiffs also5challenged the sevenround load limitasaviolationof theSecond6Amendment.207

Following plaintiffs motions for preliminary injunctions,8parties in both suits crossmoved for summary judgment. On9December31,2013,Chief JudgeSkretnyof theWesternDistrictof10NewYorkgranted inpartanddenied inpartthecrossmotionsfor11summary judgment.21 Specifically, the District Court found that12NewYorksbanonassaultweaponsand largecapacitymagazines13burdenedplaintiffsSecondAmendmentrights,butdidnotviolate14theSecondAmendmentuponapplicationofsocalled intermediate15scrutiny.22TheCourtalsoheld,however,thatthesevenroundload16limitdidnotsurviveintermediatescrutiny.TheCourtfurtherfound17that three specific provisions were unconstitutionally vague, and18

20PlaintiffsbroughtadditionalclaimsforviolationoftheCommerce

Clause(intheNewYorkaction)andtheEqualProtectionClause(intheConnecticutaction).TheDistrictCourtsdismissedtheseclaims,whicharenotatissueonappeal.

21NewYorkStateRifle&PistolAssn,Inc.v.Cuomo(NYSRPA),990F.Supp.2d349(W.D.N.Y.2013).

22SeepostSectionV.dV.eforfurtherdiscussionofintermediatescrutinyanalysis.

16

hencevoid,23butdeniedplaintiffsmotionregardingtheremaining1provisionschallengedforvagueness.24Insum,ChiefJudgeSkretny2upheld as constitutional, upon intermediate scrutiny, the core3provisions of New Yorks SAFE Act restricting semiautomatic4assault weapons and largecapacity magazines, but struck down5certainmarginalaspectsofthelaw.6

On January 30, 2014, Judge Covello of the District of7Connecticutgranteddefendantsmotion for summary judgment in8itsentirety.25LikehiscounterpartinNewYork,JudgeCovelloheld9

23ThethreevoidedprovisionsofNewYorksSAFEActwere(1)theprohibitiononpistolswithadetachablemagazinethatareasemiautomaticversionofanautomaticrifle,shotgunorfirearm,N.Y.PenalLaw265.00(22)(c)(viii);(2)theidentificationofthemisspelledmilitarystylefeaturemuzzlebreak,id.265.00(22)(a)(vi),whichdefendantsconcedehasnoacceptedmeaningandwasintendedtoreadmuzzlebrake,seeDefendantsBr.,No.1436cv,at22;and(3)anerroneousandifclauseappearinginN.Y.PenalLaw265.36,whichtheDistrictCourtfoundtobeincompleteandentirelyindecipherable.NYSRPA,990F.Supp.2dat376.DefendantsdonotchallengeonappealtheDistrictCourtsrulingonthisthird(andif)provision.

24Asrelevanthere,theDistrictCourtdismissedplaintiffsvaguenessclaimsastothefollowingprovisions:(1)theprohibitionofmagazinesthatcanbereadilyrestoredorconvertedtoacceptmorethantenammunitionrounds,N.Y.PenalLaw265.00(23)(a);(2)theprohibitiononsemiautomaticshotgunswithafixedmagazinecapacityinexcessofsevenrounds,id.265.00(22)(b)(iv);and(3)theexclusionfromrestrictionofsemiautomaticshotgunsthatcannotholdmorethanfiveroundsofammunitioninafixedordetachablemagazine,id.265.00(22)(g)(iii).TheCourtalsorejectedfouradditionalvaguenesschallengesthatplaintiffsdonotpursueonappeal.SeeNYSRPA,990F.Supp.2dat37478.

25Shewv.Malloy,994F.Supp.2d234(D.Conn.2014).

17

that the Connecticut legislation burdened plaintiffs Second1Amendment rights, applied intermediate scrutiny, and concluded2that theprohibition on semiautomatic assaultweapons and large3capacity magazines was fully consistent with the Second4Amendment.Healsodismissedallofplaintiffsvaguenessclaims.265

Plaintiffs thereafter appealed. In theNewYork action only,6defendants crossappeal theDistrictCourts judgment insofaras it7invalidated the SAFEActs sevenround load limit and voided as8unconstitutionally vague the SAFE Acts prohibitions on the9misspelled muzzlebreak27 andsemiautomaticversion[s]of an10automaticrifle,shotgun,orfirearm.2811

DISCUSSION12

Theseappealspresenttwoquestions:first,whethertheSecond13Amendment permits the regulation of the assault weapons and14largecapacity magazines at issue here; and second, whether the15challenged provisions of the statutes provide constitutionally16sufficientnoticeoftheconductproscribed.17

26Becausebothjudgesresolvedthepartiesmotionsforsummary

judgment,theysimultaneouslydeniedasmootplaintiffsrespectivemotionsforpreliminaryinjunctions.

27N.Y.PenalLaw265.00(22)(a)(vi);seeantenote23andaccompanyingtext.

28Id.265.00(22)(c)(viii);seeantenote23andaccompanyingtext.

18

Wereviewdenovoadistrictcourtsordergrantingsummary1judgment,construingtheevidenceinthelightmostfavorabletothe2nonmovingparty.29As relevanthere,wealsoreviewdenovo the3district courts legal conclusions, including those interpreting and4determiningtheconstitutionalityofastatute.30PursuanttoFederal5Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a), summary judgment is appropriate6wherethere isnogenuinedisputeas toanymaterial factand the7movantisentitledtojudgmentasamatteroflaw.8

V. SecondAmendmentChallenge9

Weconclude that thecorechallengedprohibitionsofassault10weapons and largecapacitymagazines do not violate the Second11Amendment.Guided by the teachings of the SupremeCourt, our12ownjurisprudence,andtheexamplesprovidedbyoursistercircuits,13we adopt a twostep analytical framework, determining first14whether the regulated weapons fall within the protections of the15Second Amendment and then deciding and applying the16appropriate level of constitutional scrutiny. Only two specific17provisionsNewYorkssevenround load limit,andConnecticuts18prohibition on the nonsemiautomatic Remington 7615are19unconstitutional.20

21

29Delaneyv.BankofAmericaCorp.,766F.3d163,167(2dCir.2014).30UnitedStatesv.Stewart,590F.3d93,109(2dCir.2009).

19

a. HellerandMcDonald1

The Second Amendment provides that [a] well regulated2Militia,beingnecessarytothesecurityofafreeState,therightofthe3people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.31 Our4analysis of that amendment begins with the seminal decision in5DistrictofColumbiav.Heller.32InHeller,theSupremeCourt,basedon6an extensive textual and historical analysis, announced that the7Second Amendments operative clause codified a preexisting8individual right to possess and carry weapons.33 Recognizing,9however, thattherightsecuredby theSecondAmendment isnot10unlimited,Helleremphasizedthattherightwasnotarighttokeep11andcarryanyweaponwhatsoever inanymannerwhatsoeverand12forwhateverpurpose.34 Instead, theSecondAmendmentprotects13only those weapons in common use by citizens for lawful14purposeslikeselfdefense.3515

Havingestablishedthesebasicprecepts,Hellerconcludedthat16the District of Columbias ban on possession of handguns was17unconstitutional under the Second Amendment.36 The Supreme18

31U.S.Const.amend.II.32554U.S.570(2008).33Id.at592(emphasissupplied).34Id.at626.35Id.at624(citingUnitedStatesv.Miller,307U.S.174,179(1939)).36Heller,554U.S.at635.

20

Courtnoted thathandgunsare themostpopularweapon chosen1by Americans for selfdefense in the home, where, the Court2observed,theneedfordefenseofself,family,andpropertyismost3acute.374

Heller stoppedwell short of extending its rationale to other5firearms restrictions. Indeed, Heller explicitly identified as6presumptively lawful such regulatory measures as7prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the8mentallyill,...lawsforbiddingthecarryingoffirearmsinsensitive9places such as schools and government buildings, [and] laws10imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of11arms.38Most importantlyhere,Helleralsoendorsed thehistorical12tradition of prohibiting the carrying of dangerous and unusual13weapons.3914

Aside from these broad guidelines, Heller offered little15guidance for resolving future SecondAmendment challenges.The16Court did imply that such challenges are subject to one of the17standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated18constitutional rights, though itdeclined to saywhich,40 accepting19

37Id.at62829.38Id.at62627&n.26.39Id.at627(internalquotationmarksomitted).40Id.at628.

21

thatmanyapplicationsoftheSecondAmendmentwouldremainin1doubt.412

That doubt persisted after McDonald v. City of Chicago, in3which the SupremeCourt invalidatedmunicipal statutes banning4handguns in the home.42McDonald was a landmark case in one5respectthe Court held for the first time that the Fourteenth6Amendment incorporates the Second Amendment against the7states.43Otherwise,McDonalddidnotexpanduponHellersanalysis8and simply reiteratedHellersassurances regarding theviabilityof9many guncontrolprovisions.44NeitherHellernorMcDonald, then,10delineated the precise scope of the Second Amendment or the11standardsbywhichlowercourtsshouldassesstheconstitutionality12offirearmsrestrictions.13

14

15

41Id.at635.42561U.S.742(2010).See,e.g.,JosephBlocher,NewApproachestoOld

QuestionsinGunScholarship,50TULSAL.REV.477,478(2015)(HellerandMcDonaldprovokedasmanyquestionsastheyanswered,creatingaresultingvoid[that]invitesandpracticallydemandsmorescholarship.).

43SeegenerallyLAURENCEH.TRIBE,AMERICANCONSTITUTIONALLAW1317(3ded.2000)(describingtheprocessbywhichAmendmentsinitiallydesignedtolimitthepowersofthefederalgovernmentcametobeappliedtoactionsofthestates).

44561U.S.at786(opinionofAlito,J.).

22

b. AnalyticalRubric1

LackingmoredetailedguidancefromtheSupremeCourt,this2Circuit has begun to develop a framework for determining the3constitutionality of firearm restrictions.45 It requires a twostep4inquiry.5

First, we consider whether the restriction burdens conduct6protectedbytheSecondAmendment.46Ifthechallengedrestriction7does not implicate conduct within the scope of the Second8Amendment, our analysis ends and the legislation stands.9Otherwise,wemovetothesecondstepofourinquiry,inwhichwe10mustdetermineandapplytheappropriatelevelofscrutiny.4711

This twostep rubric flows from the dictates of Heller and12McDonaldandourownprecedentsinKachalskyandDecastro.48Italso13broadly comportswith the prevailing twostep approach of other14courts, including the Third, Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, Ninth,15Tenth,Eleventh,andD.C.Circuits,49andwiththeapproachusedin16otherareasofconstitutionallaw.5017

45SeeKachalskyv.Cty.ofWestchester,701F.3d81(2dCir.2012);United

Statesv.Decastro,682F.3d160(2dCir.2012).46Kachalsky,701F.3dat93.47Seeid.48Seeantenote45.49SeeGeorgiaCarry.Org,Inc.v.U.S.ArmyCorpsofEngrs,788F.3d1318,

1322(11thCir.2015);UnitedStatesv.Chovan,735F.3d1127,1136(9thCir.2013);

23

c. FirstStep:WhethertheSecondAmendmentApplies1

As an initial matter, then, we must determine whether the2challenged legislation impinges upon conduct protected by the3Second Amendment. The Second Amendment protects only the4sortsofweaponsthatare(1)incommonuse51and(2)typically5possessed by lawabiding citizens for lawful purposes.52 We6considereachrequirementinturn.7

i. CommonUse8

Thepartiescontestwhethertheassaultweaponsatissuehere9arecommonlyowned.Plaintiffsarguethattheweaponsatissueare10owned in largenumbers by lawabidingAmericans.Theypresent11statistics showing thatnearly fourmillionunitsofa singleassault12weapon,thepopularAR15,havebeenmanufacturedbetween198613

NatlRifleAssnofAm.,Inc.v.BureauofAlcohol,Tobacco,Firearms&Explosives,700F.3d185,194(5thCir.2012);UnitedStatesv.Greeno,679F.3d510,518(6thCir.2012);Hellerv.DistrictofColumbia(HellerII),670F.3d1244,1252(D.C.Cir.2011);Ezellv.CityofChicago,651F.3d684,70203(7thCir.2011);UnitedStatesv.Chester,628F.3d673,680(4thCir.2010);UnitedStatesv.Reese,627F.3d792,80001(10thCir.2010);UnitedStatesv.Marzzarella,614F.3d85,89(3dCir.2010).

50Decastro,682F.3dat167;seeHeller,554U.S.at595;Kachalsky,701F.3dat94.

51Heller,554U.S.at627.52Id.at625.Inaddition,theweaponsmustactuallybeusedlawfully.Id.

Becausethelawsatissuerestrictthemerepossessionofassaultweapons,andnothoworwhytheyareused,weneednotconsiderthatadditionallimitation.

24

andMarch 2013.53Plaintiffs further assert that only 7.5percent of1assaultweapon owners are active law enforcement officers,54 and2that most owners of assault weapons own only one or two such3weapons, such that thebanned firearms arenot concentrated in a4smallnumberofhomes,but ratherspreadwidelyamong thegun5owning public.55 Defendants counter that assault weapons only6represent about two percent of the nations firearms (admittedly7amounting to approximately seven million guns).56 Moreover,8defendantsarguethatthestatisticsinflatethenumberofindividual9civilianownersbecausemanyof theseweapons arepurchasedby10lawenforcementor smuggled to criminals,andmany civiliangun11ownersownmultipleassaultweapons.12

Thismuch is clear:Americans ownmillions of the firearms13thatthechallengedlegislationprohibits.14

The same is true of largecapacitymagazines, asdefinedby15theNewYorkandConnecticutstatutes.Thoughfewerstatisticsare16availableformagazines,thosestatisticssuggestthatabout25million17largecapacity magazines were available in 1995, shortly after the18federalassaultweaponsbanwasenacted,andnearly50millionsuch19

53J.A.,No.14319cv,at146.54J.A.,No.1436cv,at162.55PlaintiffsReplyBr.,No.1436cv,at67.56SeeJ.A.,No.1436cv,at1091;J.A.,No.14319cv,at2251.

25

magazinesor nearly two largecapacity magazines for each gun1capableofacceptingonewereapprovedforimportby2000.572

Even accepting themost conservative estimates citedby the3parties and by amici, the assault weapons and largecapacity4magazinesat issueareincommonuseas that termwasused in5Heller. The D.C. Circuit reached the same conclusion in its well6reasoneddecisioninHellerII,whichupheldtheconstitutionalityofa7DistrictofColumbiaguncontrolactsubstantiallysimilartothoseat8issuehere.589

To be sure, as defendants note, these assault weapons and10largecapacity magazines are not as commonly owned as the11handgunsatissueinHeller,whichwerethemostpopularweapon12chosenbyAmericansforselfdefenseinthehome.59Butnothingin13Heller limited its holding to handguns; indeed, the Court14emphasized thattheSecondAmendment extends,prima facie, to15all instruments that constitute bearable arms, not just to a small16subset.6017

18

57J.A.,No.14319cv,at578.58HellerII,670F.3dat1261(findingthattheAR15andmagazineswith

capacitiesexceedingtenroundswereincommonuseasdefinedbyHeller).59Heller,554U.S.at629.60Id.at582(emphasissupplied).

26

ii. TypicalPossession1

Wemustnextdeterminewhetherassaultweaponsandlarge2capacitymagazinesaretypicallypossessedbylawabidingcitizens3for lawful purposes.61 While common use is an objective and4largelystatisticalinquiry,typical[]possess[ion]requiresustolook5intobothbroadpatternsofuse and the subjectivemotivesofgun6owners.7

The parties offer competing evidence about these weapons8typicaluse.Plaintiffssuggestthatassaultweaponsareamongthe9safest and most effective firearms for civilian selfdefense.6210Defendants disagree, arguing that these weapons are used11disproportionatelyinguncrimes,ratherthanforlawfulpursuitslike12selfdefenseandhunting.6313

Even ifdefendantsarecorrect,64however, thesamecouldbe14said for the handguns inHeller. Though handguns comprise only15about onethird of the nations firearms, by some estimates they16

61Id.at625.62J.A.,No.14319cv,at75366(declarationofballisticsresearcher).63SeeDefendantsBr.,No.14319cv,at3846;seealsoJ.A.,No.14319cvat

136574,16991715(affidavitsofchiefsofpoliceopiningthatassaultweaponsmaynotbewellsuitedforselfdefense,especiallyinanurbanenvironment);J.A.,No.14319cv,at13951413.

64Plaintiffstakeissuewiththeresearchmethodology,andpointtostudiesunderminingtheconclusionofdisproportionateuse.SeePlaintiffsReplyBr.,No.1436cv,at1517;seealsoJ.A.,No.1436cv,at46465,48990.

27

accountfor71percentto83percentofthefirearmsusedinmurders1and 84percent to 90percentof the firearmsused inotherviolent2crimes.65 That evidence of disproportionate criminal use did not3prevent the Supreme Court from holding that handguns merited4constitutionalprotection.5

Lookingsolelyataweaponsassociationwithcrime, then, is6insufficient. We must also consider more broadly whether the7weapon is dangerous and unusual in the hands of lawabiding8civilians.Hellerexpresslyhighlightedweaponsthataremostuseful9in military service, such as the fully automatic M16 rifle, as10weapons that could be banned without implicating the Second11Amendment.66 But this analysis is difficult tomanage in practice.12Because the AR15 is the civilian version of the militarys M1613rifle,67 defendants urge that it should be treated identically for14SecondAmendmentpurposes.ButtheSupremeCourtsverychoice15ofdescriptor for theAR15the civilian versioncould instead16imply thatsuchgunsaretraditionallyhavebeenwidelyaccepted17aslawful.6818

65PlaintiffsReplyBr.,No.1436cv,at1518;seealsoHeller,554U.S.at698

(Breyer,J.,dissenting)(discussingsimilarstatisticssuggestingthathandgunsappeartobeaverypopularweaponamongcriminals).

66554U.S.at627(internalquotationmarksomitted).67Staplesv.UnitedStates,511U.S.600,603(1994).68Id.at612.

28

Ultimately, then,neither theSupremeCourts categoriesnor1theevidence in therecordcleanlyresolves thequestionofwhether2semiautomatic assault weapons and largecapacity magazines are3typicallypossessedbylawabidingcitizensforlawfulpurposes.694Confrontingthisrecord,ChiefJudgeSkretnyreasonablyfoundthat5reliableempiricalevidenceoflawfulpossessionforlawfulpurposes6waselusive,70beyondownershipstatistics.71Weagree.7

IntheabsenceofclearerguidancefromtheSupremeCourtor8strongerevidenceintherecord,wefollowtheapproachtakenbythe9DistrictCourtsandby theD.C.Circuit inHeller IIandassume for10the sake of argument that these commonly used weapons and11magazinesarealsotypicallypossessedby lawabidingcitizensfor12lawful purposes.72 In short, we proceed on the assumption that13theselawsbanweaponsprotectedbytheSecondAmendment.This14assumption is warranted at this stage, because, as explained post15Section V.e, the statutes at issue nonetheless largely pass16constitutionalmuster.7317

69Heller,554U.S.at625.70NYSRPA,990F.Supp.2dat365.71Onasubstantiallysimilarrecord,JudgeCovellooftheDistrictof

Connecticutcametothesameconclusion,findingonlythattherelevantweaponswerepresumably[]usedforlawfulpurposes.Shew,994F.Supp.2dat246(emphasissupplied).

72SeeHellerII,670F.3dat126061(quotingHeller,554U.S.at625).73Thoughweassumewithoutdecidingthatthebulkofthechallenged

legislationisentitledtoSecondAmendmentprotection,wedecideasmuchwith

29

d. SecondStep:LevelofScrutiny1

Having concluded that the statutes impinge upon Second2Amendment rights, we must next determine and apply the3appropriate level of scrutiny.74 We employ the familiar levels of4respecttoConnecticutsprohibitionoftheRemingtonTactical7615,anonsemiautomaticpumpactionrifle.SeeDefendantsBr.,No.14319cv,at58.

HelleremphasizesthatthetheSecondAmendmentextends,primafacie,toallinstrumentsthatconstitutebearablearms.Heller,554U.S.at582.Inotherwords,itidentifiesapresumptioninfavorofSecondAmendmentprotection,whichtheStatebearstheinitialburdenofrebutting.SeeEzell,651F.3dat70203([I]fthegovernmentcanestablishthatachallengedfirearmslawregulatesactivityfallingoutsidethescopeoftheSecondAmendment...thentheanalysiscanstopthere....(emphasissupplied));cf.Virginiav.Black,538U.S.343,369(2003)(Scalia,J.,concurringinpart,concurringinthejudgmentinpart,anddissentinginpart)(definingprimafacieevidenceasthatwhich,ifunexplainedoruncontradicted,issufficienttosustainajudgmentinfavoroftheissuewhichitsupports(quotingBlacksLawDictionary1190(6thed.1990)).BecausetheState,focusedonsemiautomaticweapons,seepostnote112,hasfailedtomakeanyargumentthatthispumpactionrifleisdangerous,unusual,orotherwisenotwithintheambitofSecondAmendmentprotection,thepresumptionthattheAmendmentappliesremainsunrebutted.

Tobesure,HelleralsonotedthatcertainpresumptivelylawfulregulatorymeasuresostensiblyfalloutsideoftheSecondAmendmentsprimafacieprotections.Id.at627n.26.Nonetheless,liketheD.C.CircuitinHellerII,weconcludethattheseparticularrestrictionsarenotentitledtoapresumptionofvalidity.HellerII,670F.3dat1260(emphasissupplied).

WeemphasizethatourholdingwithrespecttotheRemington7615atbothstepsofouranalysisreflectstheStatesfailuretopresentanyargumentatallregardingthisweaponorotherslikeit.Wedonotforeclosethepossibilitythatstatescouldinthefuturepresentevidencetosupportsuchaprohibition.

74Plaintiffsefforttoavoidthetwostepframeworklaidouthereisunavailing.Theyarguethattheapplicationofmeansendsscrutinyinthiscase

30

scrutinyanalysisintroducedinthefamousFootnoteFourofUnited1Statesv.CaroleneProductsCo.,75andbeginbyaskingwhich levelof2judicialscrutinyapplies.3

Though Heller did not specify the precise level of scrutiny4applicable to firearms regulations, it rejected mere rational basis5reviewas insufficient for the typeof regulation challenged there.766

wouldbeanexerciseinfutility.PlaintiffsBr.,No.1436cv,at13(quotingKachalsky,701F.3dat89n.9);PlaintiffsBr.,No.14319cv,at12(same).Werejectthatargument.Asplaintiffsthemselvesconcede,thisCourtmadeveryclearinKachalskythatHellersreluctancetoannounceastandardofreviewshouldnotbeinterpretedasasignalthatcourtsmustlooksolelytothetext,history,andtraditionoftheSecondAmendmenttodeterminewhetherastatecanlimittherightwithoutapplyinganysortofmeansendscrutiny.701F.3dat89n.9.Onthecontrary,HellerindicatedthatthetypicalstandardsofscrutinyanalysisshouldapplytoregulationsimpinginguponSecondAmendmentrights,butthatD.C.shandgunbanwouldfail[u]nderanyofthestandardsofscrutiny.554U.S.at628.

75304U.S.144,152n.4(1938);seeHeller,554U.S.at628n.27.76554U.S.at628n.27.Atthesametime,Hellersapprovalofcertain

presumptivelylawfulregulatorymeasures,id.at627n.26,hasbeenconstruedbysometoruleoutstrictscrutinyaswell.Indeed,JusticeBreyersdissentstates,withoutoppositionfromtheCourtsopinion,thatthemajorityimplicitly,andappropriately,reject[ed]th[e]suggestion[toapplystrictscrutinytogunregulations]bybroadlyapprovingasetoflaws...whoseconstitutionalityunderastrictscrutinystandardwouldbefarfromclear.Id.at688(Breyer,J.,dissenting).ChiefJudgeSkretnycitedthisinterpretationwithapprobation.NYSRPA,990F.Supp.2dat366.Uponcloserinspection,however,wethinkitlikelythattheHellermajorityidentifiedthesepresumptivelylawfulmeasuresinanattempttoclarifythescopeoftheSecondAmendmentsreachinthefirstplacethefirststepofourframeworkbutnottointimateaviewastowhetherstrictscrutinyappliesinthesecondstep.

31

Atthesametime,thisCourtandoursisterCircuitshavesuggested1thatheightenedscrutiny isnotalwaysappropriate. Indetermining2whether heightened scrutiny applies,we consider two factors: (1)3how close the law comes to the core of the SecondAmendment4rightand(2)theseverityofthelawsburdenontheright.77Laws5that neither implicate the core protections of the Second6Amendmentnor substantiallyburden theirexercisedonot receive7heightenedscrutiny.8

i. TheCoreoftheRight9

By their terms, the statutesat issue implicate thecoreof the10Second Amendments protections by extending into the home,11where the need for defense of self, family and property ismost12acute.78 Semiautomatic assault weapons and largecapacity13magazinesarecommonlyownedbymany lawabidingAmericans,14andtheircompleteprohibition,includingwithinthehome,requires15ustoconsiderthescopeofSecondAmendmentguaranteesattheir16zenith.79Atthesametime,theregulatedweaponsarenotnearlyas17popularly owned and used for selfdefense as the handgun, that18

77SeeEzell,651F.3dat703.78Heller,554U.S.at628.Thisconclusionispredicatedonourearlier

assumptionthatthecommonlyusedfirearmsatissuearealsotypicallyusedforselfdefenseorotherlawfulpurposes,andthustheprohibitionsimplicatetheSecondAmendmentright.SeeanteV.c.ii.

79Kachalsky,701F.3dat89.

32

quintessentialselfdefenseweapon.80Thusthesestatutesimplicate1SecondAmendmentrights,butnottothesameextentasthelawsat2issueinHellerandMcDonald.3

ii. TheSeverityoftheBurden4

InDecastro,we explained thatheightened scrutinyneednot5applytoanymarginal,incrementalorevenappreciablerestrainton6the right tokeepandbeararms.81Rather,heightenedscrutiny is7triggered only by those restrictions that (like the complete8prohibition on handguns struck down in Heller) operate as a9substantialburdenon theabilityof lawabidingcitizens topossess10andusea firearm for . . . lawfulpurposes.82Our laterdecision in11Kachalsky confirmed this approach, concluding that some formof12heightened scrutiny would be appropriate for regulations that13imposeasubstantialburdenonSecondAmendmentrights.8314

Thepracticeofapplyingheightenedscrutinyonlytolawsthat15burdentheSecondAmendmentrightsubstantiallyis,aswenoted16in Decastro, broadly consistent with our approach to other17fundamentalconstitutionalrights, including thoseprotectedby the18First and Fourteenth Amendments.84 We typically require a19

80Heller,554U.S.at629.81Decastro,682F.3dat166.82Id.(emphasissupplied).83701F.3dat93.84Decastro,682F.3dat16667(emphasissupplied).

33

thresholdshowingtotriggerheightenedscrutinyoflawsallegedto1implicatesuchconstitutionalcontextsas takings,votingrights,and2freespeech.85Thoughwehavehistoricallyexpressedhesitan[ce]to3import substantive First Amendment principles wholesale into4SecondAmendmentjurisprudence,86wereadilyconsultprinciples5from other areas of constitutional law, including the First6Amendment indeterminingwhethera lawsubstantiallyburdens7SecondAmendmentrights.878

Thescopeof the legislative restrictionand theavailabilityof9alternatives factor into our analysis of the degree to which the10challenged law burdens the right.88 No substantial burden11existsand hence heightened scrutiny is not triggeredif12adequate alternatives remain for lawabiding citizens to acquire a13firearmforselfdefense.8914

The laws at issue are both broad and burdensome. Unlike15statutes that merely regulate the manner in which persons may16

85Id.86Kachalsky,701F.3dat91(emphasisinoriginal).87Decastro,682F.3dat167.88UnitedStatesv.Chester,628F.3d673,682(4thCir.2010).89Decastro,682F.3dat168;seealsoHellerII,670F.3dat1262(drawingthe

comparisontoFirstAmendmentspeechrestrictions,wherebysevereburdensthatdontleaveopenamplealternativechannelstriggerstrictscrutiny,whilerestrictionsthatleaveopenamplealternativechannelsaremerelymodestburdensandrequireonlyamildformofintermediatescrutiny).

34

exercise their Second Amendment rights, these laws impose an1outrightbanstatewide.90Theabsoluteprohibitioninstitutedinboth2states thus creates a serious encroachment on the Second3Amendment right.91 These statutes are not mere marginal,4incrementalorevenappreciablerestraint[s]ontherighttokeepand5bear arms.92 They impose a substantial burden on Second6Amendment rights and therefore trigger the application of some7formofheightenedscrutiny.8

Heightened scrutiny need not, however, be akin to strict9scrutiny when a law burdens the Second Amendment10particularlywhenthatburdendoesnotconstraintheAmendments11core area of protection.93 The instant bans are dissimilar from12D.C.sunconstitutionalprohibitionofanentireclassof armsthat13is overwhelmingly chosen by American society for [the] lawful14purpose of selfdefense.94 New York and Connecticut have not15banned an entire class of arms. Indeed, plaintiffs themselves16

90Chovan,735F.3dat1138.91Ezell,651F.3dat705,708.92Decastro,682F.3dat166.Thelegislationatissueisthuseasily

distinguishedfromaNewYorkstatuteimposingagunlicensingfeeof$100peryear,whichwefoundtobenomorethanamarginal,incrementalorevenappreciablerestraintonSecondAmendmentrights.Kwongv.Bloomberg,723F.3d160,167(2dCir.2013).TheregulationinKwonginvolvedneithertheoutrightprohibitionofweaponsincommonusenoranydirectlimitationontheexerciseofSecondAmendmentrightswithinthehome.

93Kachalsky,701F.3dat93.94Heller,554U.S.at628.

35

acknowledge that there is no class of firearms known as1semiautomatic assault weaponsa descriptor they call purely2political innature.95Plaintiffsnonethelessargue that the legislation3does prohibit firearms of a universally recognized type4semiautomatic.96Not so.Rather,bothNewYorkandConnecticut5banonlyalimitedsubsetofsemiautomaticfirearms,whichcontain6one or more enumerated militarystyle features. As Heller makes7plain,thefactthatthestatutesatissuedonotbananentireclassof8arms makes the restrictions substantially less burdensome.97 In9both states, citizens may continue to arm themselves with non10semiautomaticweapons orwith any semiautomatic gun thatdoes11notcontainanyoftheenumeratedmilitarystylefeatures.Similarly,12while citizensmay not acquire highcapacitymagazines, they can13purchaseanynumberofmagazineswithacapacityoftenorfewer14rounds. In sum, numerous alternatives remain for lawabiding15citizens to acquirea firearm for selfdefense.98We agreewith the16

95PlaintiffsBr.,No.1436cv,at17;PlaintiffsBr.,No.14319cv,at16.96PlaintiffsBr.,No.14319cv,at31.97See554U.S.at628.98Decastro,682F.3dat168.Plaintiffsrelatedargumentthatthe

availabilityofunbannedfirearmsisirrelevantunderHeller,seePlaintiffsBr.,No.1436cv,at32restsonamisapprehensionoftheSupremeCourtslogic.Tobesure,Hellerdidindicatethat[i]tisnoanswertosay...thatitispermissibletobanthepossessionofhandgunssolongasthepossessionofotherfirearms(i.e.,longguns)isallowed.554U.S.at629.ButHellerwentontoexplainthathandgunsareprotectedasthemostpopularweaponchosenbyAmericansforselfdefenseinthehome.Id.Ofcourse,thesamecannotbesaidoftheweaponsatissuehere.Hellerexplicitlyendorsedprohibitionsagainstanyweaponsnot

36

D.C.Circuitthattheprohibitionofsemiautomaticriflesandlarge1capacity magazines does not effectively disarm individuals or2substantiallyaffecttheirabilitytodefendthemselves.99Theburden3imposedbythechallengedlegislationisreal,butitisnotsevere.1004

Accordingly,weconcludethatintermediate,ratherthanstrict,5scrutiny isappropriate.Thisconclusioncoheresnotonlywith that6reachedby theD.C.Circuitwhenconsidering substantially similar7guncontrol laws, but alsowith the analyses undertaken by other8courts,manyofwhichhave applied intermediate scrutiny to laws9implicatingtheSecondAmendment.10110

e. ApplicationofIntermediateScrutiny11

Though intermediate scrutiny may have different12connotations in different contexts,102 here the key question is13whether the statutes at issue are substantially related to the14typicallypossessedbylawabidingcitizensforlawfulpurposes,including,forexample,shortbarreledshotguns.Id.at625.OurconsiderationofavailablealternativesforselfdefensethussquareswithHellersfocusonprotectingthatcorelawfulpurposeoftheSecondAmendmentright.Id.at630.

99HellerII,670F.3dat1262.100Seeid.101See,e.g.,Chovan,735F.3dat1138;NatlRifleAssnofAm.,700F.3dat

207;Chester,628F.3dat683;Reese,627F.3dat802;Marzzarella,614F.3dat97.102ErnstJ.v.Stone,452F.3d186,200n.10(2dCir.2006)(notingthat

intermediatescrutinycarriesdifferentmeaningsdependingontheareaoflawinwhichitarises,andthenapplyingthesamedefinitionofintermediatescrutinyusedhere).

37

achievementofanimportantgovernmentalinterest.103Itisbeyond1cavil that both states have substantial, indeed compelling,2governmentalinterestsinpublicsafetyandcrimeprevention.104We3need only inquire, then, whether the challenged laws are4substantially related to the achievement of that governmental5interest.Weconcludethattheprohibitionsonsemiautomaticassault6weaponsandlargecapacitymagazinesmeetthisstandard.7

i. ProhibitiononAssaultWeapons8

To survive intermediate scrutiny, the fit between the9challenged regulation [and the government interest] need only be10substantial,notperfect.105Unlike strict scrutinyanalysis,weneed11not ensure that the statute is narrowly tailored or the least12restrictive available means to serve the stated governmental13interest.106Moreover,wehaveobservedthatstateregulationofthe14right tobeararmshasalwaysbeenmore robust thananalogous15regulationofotherconstitutionalrights.107Solongasthedefendants16

103Kachalsky,701F.3dat96.104Id.at97;seealsoSchallv.Martin,467U.S.253,264(1984)(The

legitimateandcompellingstateinterestinprotectingthecommunityfromcrimecannotbedoubted.(internalquotationmarksomitted)).

105Kachalsky,701F.3dat97(internalquotationmarksomitted).106Id.107Id.at100.Statesarepermittedtorestricttherighttobeararmsby

felonsandthementallyill,whileequivalentrestrictionsontherighttospeechorreligiousfreedomsamongthosepopulationswouldunquestionablybeunconstitutional.Id.

38

produce evidence that fairly support[s] their rationale, the laws1willpassconstitutionalmuster.1082

In making this determination, we afford substantial3deference to the predictive judgments of the legislature.109 We4remain mindful that, [i]n the context of firearm regulation, the5legislature is far better equipped than the judiciary to make6sensitive public policy judgments (within constitutional limits)7concerning the dangers in carrying firearms and the manner to8combat those risks.110 Our role, therefore, is only to assure9ourselves that, in formulating theirrespective laws,NewYorkand10Connecticuthavedrawnreasonableinferencesbasedonsubstantial11evidence.11112

Bothstateshavedonesowithrespecttotheirprohibitionson13certainsemiautomaticfirearms.112Atleastsincetheenactmentofthe14

108CityofLosAngelesv.AlamedaBooks,Inc.,535U.S.425,438(2002)

(plurality).109Kachalsky,701F.3dat97(quotingTurnerBroad.Sys.,Inc.v.Fed.

CommcnsCommn,520U.S.180,195(1997)(bracketsomitted)).110Kachalsky,701F.3dat97(quotingTurnerBroad.Sys.,Inc.v.Fed.

CommcnsCommn,512U.S.622,665(1994))(opinionofKennedy,J.)).111TurnerBroad.Sys.,520U.S.at195.112ThoughConnecticutsbanonsemiautomaticfirearmspasses

intermediatescrutiny,itsprohibitionofasinglenonsemiautomaticweapon,theRemington7615,doesnot.Focusedasitwasontherationaleforbanningsemiautomaticweapons,ConnecticutfailstosetforththerequisitesubstantialevidencewithrespecttothepumpactionRemington7615.Id.at195;seealso

39

federal assaultweaponsban, semiautomatic assaultweaponshave1beenunderstoodtoposeunusualrisks.Whenused,theseweapons2tendtoresultinmorenumerouswounds,moreseriouswounds,and3more victims.113 These weapons are disproportionately used in4crime,andparticularlyincriminalmassshootingsliketheattackin5Newtown.114 They are also disproportionately used to kill law6enforcementofficers:onestudyshowsthatbetween1998and2001,7assaultweaponswereusedtogundownat leasttwentypercentof8officerskilledinthelineofduty.1159

The record reveals that defendants have tailored the10legislationatissuetoaddresstheseparticularlyhazardousweapons.11Thedangersposedbysomeofthemilitarystylefeaturesprohibited12by the statutessuch as grenade launchers and silencersare13manifest and incontrovertible.116 As for the other enumerated14antenote73.Accordingly,weholdthatthissingularprovisionofConnecticutslegislationisunconstitutional.

113SeeDefendantsBr.,No.1436cv,at48(quotingJ.A.,No.1436cv,at73334).

114Seeid.at49(citingJ.A.,No.1436cv565,727,729).115SeeJ.A.,No.1436cv,at1261(citingViolencePolicyCenterstudy).116Indeed,plaintiffshavenotseriouslyattemptedtoargueeitherhereor

beforetheDistrictCourtthatsuchfeaturesareprotectedbytheSecondAmendmentatall,muchlessthattheirprohibitionshouldfailintermediatescrutiny.SeeNYSRPA,990F.Supp.2dat36970(PlaintiffsdonotexplicitlyarguethattheActsregulationoffirearmswith[grenadelaunchers,bayonetmounts,orsilencers]violatestheSecondAmendment.);cf.Nortonv.SamsClub,145F.3d114,119(2dCir.1998)(Issuesnotsufficientlyarguedinthebriefsareconsideredwaivedandnormallywillnotbeaddressedonappeal.);United

40

militarystyle featuressuch as the flash suppressor, protruding1grip, and barrel shroudsNew York and Connecticut have2determined, asdid theU.S.Congress, that the net effectof these3militarycombatfeaturesisacapabilityforlethalitymorewounds,4moreserious,inmorevictimsfarbeyondthatofotherfirearmsin5general, including other semiautomatic guns.117 Indeed, plaintiffs6explicitly contend that these features improve a firearms7accuracy, comfort, and utility.118 This circumlocution is, as8Chief Judge Skretny observed, amilder way of saying that these9featuresmaketheweaponsmoredeadly.11910

The legislation is also specifically targeted to prevent mass11shootings like that in Newtown, in which the shooter used a12semiautomatic assault weapon. Plaintiffs complain that mass13shootingsareparticularlyrareeventsandthus,evenifsuccessful,14the legislation will have a minimal impact on most violent15

Statesv.Amer,110F.3d873,879(2dCir.1997)(findingthatdefendantforfeitedoneofhisconstitutionalargumentsbyfailingtoraiseitbeforetheDistrictCourt).

117J.A.,No.1436cv,at73334.118PlaintiffsBr.,No.1436cv,at20;PlaintiffsBr.,No.14319cv,at1920.119NYSRPA,990F.Supp.2dat368.

41

crime.120Thatmaybeso.Butguncontrollegislationneednotstrike1atallevilsatthesametimetobeconstitutional.1212

Defendants alsohave adduced evidence that the regulations3will achieve their intended end of reducing circulation of assault4weapons among criminals.122 Plaintiffs counterwithout record5evidencethat the statutes will primarily disarm lawabiding6citizensandwill thus impair theverypublicsafetyobjectives they7weredesignedtoachieve.123Giventhedearthofevidencethat law8abidingcitizenstypicallyusetheseweaponsforselfdefense,seeante9Section V.c.ii, plaintiffs concerns are speculative at best, and10certainlynotstrongenoughtoovercomethesubstantialdeference11weowe to predictive judgmentsof the legislatureonmattersof12public safety.124 The mere possibility that some subset of people13intentonbreakingthelawwillindeedignorethesestatutesdoesnot14makethemunconstitutional.15

120PlaintiffsBr.,No.1436cv,at4849;PlaintiffsBr.,No.14319cv,at48

49.121NatlRifleAssnofAm.,700F.3dat211(quotingBuckleyv.Valeo,424

U.S.1,105(1976)).122SeeDefendantsBr.,No.14319cv,at7175(citing,interalia,research

byProf.ChristopherS.Koper,evaluatingtheimpactofthefederalassaultweaponsban,J.A.,No.14319cv,at1404).

123PlaintiffsBr.,No.1436cv,at4546;PlaintiffsBr.,No.14319cv,at4546.

124Kachalsky,701F.3dat97(quotingTurnerBroad.Sys.,520U.S.at195(bracketsomitted)).

42

Ultimately, [i]t is the legislatures job, not ours, to weigh1conflicting evidence and make policy judgments.125 We must2merely ensure that the challenged laws are substantiallyeven if3notperfectlyrelated to thearticulatedgovernmental interest.The4prohibitionofsemiautomaticassaultweaponspassesthistest.1265

ii. ProhibitiononLargeCapacityMagazines6

The same logic applies a fortiori to the restrictions on large7capacity magazines.127 The record evidence suggests that large8capacitymagazinesmaypresentevengreaterdangerstocrimeand9violencethanassaultweaponsalone,inpartbecausetheyaremore10prevalentandcanbeandareused...inbothassaultweaponsand11nonassault weapons.128 Largecapacity magazines are12disproportionately used in mass shootings, like the one in13

125Id.at99.126Cf.HellerII,670F.3dat1263([T]heevidencedemonstratesabanon

assaultweaponsislikelytopromotetheGovernmentsinterestincrimecontrol....).Again,ourholdingislimitedinsofarasitdoesnotapplytoConnecticutsprohibitionofthenonsemiautomaticRemington7615.

127AmiciarguethatlargecapacitymagazinesareentirelyoutsideofSecondAmendmentprotectionfortheindependentreasonthatsuchmagazinesconstitutefirearmaccessoriesratherthanprotectedarms.SeeBr.ofAmiciCuriaeLawCenterToPreventGunViolenceandNewYorkersAgainstGunViolence,No.1436cv,at813;Br.ofAmiciCuriaeLawCenterToPreventGunViolence,ConnecticutAgainstGunViolence,andClevelandSchoolRemembers,No.14319cv,at1014.Becauseweconcludethattheprohibitionoflargecapacitymagazineswouldsurvivetherequisitescrutiny,weneednotreachthemeritsofthisadditionalargument.

128J.A.,No.14319cv,at1400.

43

Newtown, in which the shooter used multiple largecapacity1magazinestofire154roundsinlessthanfiveminutes.129Likeassault2weapons, largecapacity magazines result in more shots fired,3persons wounded, and wounds per victim than do other gun4attacks.130 Professor Christopher Koper, a firearms expert relied5uponbyallpartiesinbothstates,statedthatitisparticularlythe6banon largecapacitymagazines thathas thegreatestpotential to7preventandlimitshootingsinthestateoverthelongrun.1318

We thereforeconclude thatNewYorkandConnecticuthave9adequately established a substantial relationship between the10prohibition of both semiautomatic assault weapons and large11capacitymagazines and the importantindeed, compellingstate12interest in controlling crime. These prohibitions survive13intermediatescrutiny.14

iii. SevenRoundLoadLimit15

Thoughthekeyprovisionsofbothstatutespassconstitutional16musteronthisrecord,anotheraspectofNewYorksSAFEActdoes17not: the sevenround load limit, which makes it unlawful for a18

129DefendantsBr.,No.14319cv,at11,3839.130HellerII,670F.3dat1263(internalquotationmarksomitted);seealso

DefendantsBr.,No.1436cv,at5960.131J.A.,No.14319cv,at1410.

44

person toknowinglypossessanammunition feedingdevicewhere1suchdevicecontainsmorethansevenroundsofammunition.1322

Asnotedabove,thesevenroundloadlimitwasasecondbest3solution. New York determined that only magazines containing4sevenroundsorfewercanbesafelypossessed,butitalsorecognized5thatsevenroundmagazinesaredifficulttoobtaincommercially.Its6compromisewastopermitgunownerstousetenroundmagazines7iftheywereloadedwithsevenorfewerrounds.1338

On the recordbeforeus,wecannotconclude thatNewYork9has presented sufficient evidence that a sevenround load limit10would best protect public safety. Here we are considering not a11capacityrestriction,butratheraloadlimit.NothingintheSAFEAct12will outlaw or reduce the number of tenround magazines in13circulation. It will not decrease their availability or in any way14frustratetheaccessofthosewhointendtousetenroundmagazines15for mass shootings or other crimes. It is thus entirely untethered16fromthestatedrationaleofreducingthenumberofassaultweapons17and largecapacitymagazines incirculation.134NewYorkhasfailed18to present evidence that themere existence of this load limitwill19convince any wouldbe malefactors to load magazines capable of20holdingtenroundswithonlythepermissibleseven.21

132N.Y.PenalLaw265.37;seeantenotes1213andaccompanyingtext.133SeeDefendantsBr.,No.1436cv,at1516.134Seeid.at55.

45

Tobe sure, themerepossibilityof criminaldisregardof the1laws does not foreclose an attempt by the state to enact firearm2regulations. But on intermediate scrutiny review, the state cannot3get away with shoddy data or reasoning.135 To survive4intermediate scrutiny, the defendants must show reasonable5inferences based on substantial evidence that the statutes are6substantiallyrelatedtothegovernmentalinterest.136Withrespectto7theloadlimitprovisionalone,NewYorkhasfailedtodoso.8

VI. VaguenessChallenge9

WeturnnowtoplaintiffssecondchallengetotheNewYork10andConnecticut lawstheir claim thatprovisionsofboth statutes11are unconstitutionally vague. The New York defendants cross12appealChiefJudgeSkretnysrulingthattwoprovisionsoftheSAFE13Actarevoidbecauseofvagueness.14

a. LegalStandards15

Grounded in due process principles, the voidforvagueness16doctrine provides that [n]o onemay be required at peril of life,17liberty or property to speculate as to the meaning of penal18statutes.137 The doctrine requires that a penal statute define the19

135AlamedaBooks,535U.S.at438.136TurnerBroad.Sys.,520U.S.at195(emphasissupplied).137Crampv.Bd.ofPub.Instruction,368U.S.278,287(1961);seealsoCunney

v.Bd.ofTrusteesofVill.ofGrandView,N.Y.,660F.3d612,620(2dCir.2011).

46

criminaloffensewithsufficientdefinitenessthatordinarypeoplecan1understandwhat conduct isprohibitedand inamanner thatdoes2notencouragearbitraryanddiscriminatoryenforcement.138Statutes3carrying criminal penalties or implicating the exercise of4constitutional rights, like the ones at issue here, are subject to a5more stringent vagueness standard than are civil or economic6regulations.139However, thedoctrinedoesnotrequiremeticulous7specificity of statutes, recognizing that language is necessarily8markedbyadegreeofimprecision.1409

Because plaintiffs pursue this preenforcement appeal10before they have been charged with any violation of law, it11constitutes a facial, rather than asapplied, challenge.141Under12the standard set forth by the Supreme Court in United States v.13Salerno, to succeed on a facial challenge, the challenger must14establish that no set of circumstances exists under which the Act15

138Kolenderv.Lawson,461U.S.352,357(1983).139Vill.ofHoffmanEstatesv.TheFlipside,HoffmanEstates,Inc.,455U.S.489,

49899(1982).140Thibodeauv.Portuondo,486F.3d61,66(2dCir.2007)(quotingGrayned

v.CityofRockford,408U.S.104,110(1972)).141SeeRichmondBoroGunClub,Inc.v.CityofNewYork,97F.3d681,68586

(2dCir.1996).

47

would be valid.142 As a result, a facial challenge to a legislative1enactmentisthemostdifficultchallengetomountsuccessfully.1432

Seekingtoavoidthisprohibitivelyhighbar,plaintiffsurgeus3to follow the different approach that a plurality of the Supreme4CourttookinCityofChicagov.Morales.144Inthatcase,threeJustices5held that a criminal law lacking a mens rea requirement and6burdeningaconstitutionalrightissubjecttofacialattack[w]hen7vaguenesspermeatesthetextofsuchalaw.145ThisCourt,however,8has determined that, because the test set forth by the Morales9pluralityhasnotbeenadoptedbytheSupremeCourtasawhole,we10are not required to apply it.146 We have previously declined to11specifyapreference foreither test,147andweneednotdo sohere,12becausethechallengedprovisionsaresufficientlycleartosurvivea13facialchallengeundereitherapproach.14

15

16

142481U.S.739,745(1987)(emphasissupplied).143Id.144527U.S.41(1999);seealsoPlaintiffsBr.,No.14319cv,at5254;

PlaintiffsBr.,No.1436cv,at5256.145527U.S.at55.146UnitedStatesv.Rybicki,354F.3d124,13132(2dCir.2003)(enbanc).147Id.at132n.3.

48

b. Application1

i. Canbereadilyrestoredorconvertedtoaccept2

Both theNewYorkandConnecticut statutes criminalize the3possessionofmagazines thatcanbereadilyrestoredorconverted4to accept more than ten rounds of ammunition.148 In both suits,5plaintiffsallegethatthephrase isunconstitutionallyvaguebecause6whetheramagazinecanbereadilyrestoredorconverteddepends7upon the knowledge, skill, and tools available to the particular8restorer,andthestatutesaresilentonthesedetails.1499

This statutory language dates at least to the 1994 federal10assaultweaponsbanandlaterappearedinNewYorks2000law.As11Chief Judge Skretnynoted, there isno record evidence that ithas12givenrise toconfusionatany time in thepast twodecades.150This13Courtfoundasimilarphraseinanothergun lawmayreadilybe14convertedto be sufficiently definite as to provide clear[]15warn[ing] of itsmeaning.151 Plaintiffs reliance on a SixthCircuit16

148N.Y.PenalLaw265.00(23),265.02(8),265.36;Conn.Gen.Stat.53202w(a)(1).

149PlaintiffsBr.,No.1436cv,at5859;PlaintiffsBr.,No.14319cv,at5860.

150NYSRPA,990F.Supp.2dat376.151U.S.v.16,179MolsoItalian.22CaliberWinleeDerringerConvertibleStarter

Guns,443F.2d463,46465(2dCir.1971)(rejectingavaguenesschallengeinacivilforfeiturecontext,andfindingthatthephraseclearlymeantagunwhichcanbeconvertedbyarelativelysimpleoperationtakingonlyafewminutes).

49

case that interpretedadifferentphrasemayberestoredwithout1themodifierreadilyisinapposite.1522

Plaintiffs purported concernthat this provision might be3unfairly used to prosecute an ordinary citizen for owning a4magazinethatonlyagunsmithequippedwithtechnicalknowledge5and specialized tools could readily convert153is implausible.6Shouldsuchaprosecutioneveroccur,thedefendantcouldbringan7asappliedvaguenesschallenge,groundedinthefactsandcontext8of a particular set of charges. That improbable scenario cannot,9however,adequately support the facial challengeplaintiffsattempt10tobringhere.11

In sum, we affirm the judgments of both District Courts12findingthatthisphraseisnotunconstitutionallyvague.13

ii. CapacityofTubularMagazines14

TheNewYork plaintiffs contend the SAFEActs tenround15magazine restriction154 is vague insofar as it extends to tubular16magazines,thecapacityofwhichvariesaccordingtothesizeofthe17particularshells thatare loaded.Thischallenge failsasa threshold18matter for thereasonsstatedby theDistrictCourt: theprovision is19

152PlaintiffsBr.,No.1436cv,at58;PlaintiffsBr.,No.14319cv,at5859;seePeoplesRightsOrg.,Inc.v.CityofColumbus,152F.3d522,537(6thCir.1998).

153SeePlaintiffsBr.,No.1436cv,at5859;PlaintiffsBr.,No.14319cv,at5859.

154N.Y.PenalLaw265.00(23).

50

only potentially vague when applied to a specific (nonstandard)1use, and hence is neither vague in all circumstances (as required2under Salerno) nor permeatedwith vagueness (as required by the3Moralesplurality).Moreover,likethereadilyconvertedlanguage,4this capacity restriction was also included in the 1994 federal5assaultweapons ban, without any record evidence of confusion6duringtheensuingdecades.7

iii. CopiesorDuplicates8

Plaintiffs challenge the Connecticut statutes definition of9assaultweapontoincludecertainspecifiedfirearmsandanycopies10or duplicates thereof with the capability of the listed models.15511Theyargue that theprovisionprovides inadequatenoticeofwhich12firearmsinparticularareprohibited.13

Wereviewthestatutorylanguagewithinitscontext,relyingif14necessary on the canons of statutory construction and legislative15history.156Inthecontextofthelegislationasawhole,thiscopiesor16duplicates language is not unconstitutionally vague.All firearms17thatthestatuteprohibitsbymodelnamealsoexhibitatleastoneof18theprohibitedmilitarystylefeatures.157Hence,thestatuteprovides19

155Conn.Gen.Stat.53202a(1)(B)(D).156CommackSelfServiceKosherMeats,Inc.v.Hooker,680F.3d194,213(2d

Cir.2012).157TheConnecticutlegislationprohibitedonlyasinglefirearm,the

Remington7615,whichlackedmilitarystylefeatures.BecausewehavealreadyheldthatConnecticutsbanontheRemington7615isunconstitutional,seeante

51

two independentmeansbywhich an individualmaydetermine if1his firearm isprohibited:hemay consult the listof illegalmodels2and,ifstillconcernedthatthefirearmmaybeanunlawfulcopyor3duplicate, he may crossreference the list of prohibited military4stylefeatures.5

In this manner, the Connecticut legislation avoids the6deficiencyofanassaultweaponsbanstruckdownbyasisterCircuit7as unconstitutionally vague in Springfield Armory, Inc. v. City of8Columbus.158InSpringfield,themunicipalordinanceat issuedefined9assault weapons simply by naming 46 individual models and10extending theprohibition toweaponswithslightmodificationsor11enhancements to the listed firearms. The SixthCircuit explained12thattheordinancewasinvalidbecauseitoutlaw[ed]certainbrand13names without including within the prohibition similar assault14weaponsofthesametype,functionorcapability[and] . . .without15providing any explanation for its selections [of prohibited16firearms].159TheSixthCircuitfounditsignificantthattheordinance17offerednoexplanationfordraftingtheordinanceintermsofbrand18name rather than generic type or category of weapon.160 In the19instant case, by contrast, Connecticut has provided not only an20notes73and112,plaintiffschallengetothecopiesorduplicatesprovisionismootregardingcopiesorduplicatesoftheRemington7615itself.

15829F.3d250,252(6thCir.1994).159Id.160Id.

52

itemizedlistofprohibitedmodelsbutalsothemilitarystylefeatures1test, which functions as an explanation of the generic type or2categoryofweaponoutlawed.3

We therefore agree with Judge Covello that the copies or4duplicate provision of the Connecticut statute at issue here is5sufficientlydefinitetosurviveavoidforvaguenesschallenge.6

iv. Version7

We apply similar logic to our analysis of New Yorks8prohibition of semiautomatic pistols that are semiautomatic9version[s]ofanautomaticrifle,shotgunor firearm.161In thiscase,10Chief JudgeSkretnyheld that theprovisionwasunconstitutionally11vague, reasoning that an ordinary person cannot know whether12anysinglesemiautomaticpistolisaversionofanautomaticone.16213TheDistrictCourt also expressed concern that the lack of criteria14mightencouragearbitraryanddiscriminatoryenforcement.16315

Wedisagree.The SAFEActs terminologyhas beenused in16multiple state and federal firearms statutes, including the 199417federal assaultweapons ban, as well as in government reports,18judicialdecisions,andpublishedbooks.164Plaintiffshaveshownno19

161N.Y.PenalLaw265.00(22)(c)(viii).162NYSRPA,990F.Supp.2dat377.163Id.164DefendantsBr.,No.1436cv,at8183.

53

evidenceof confusionarising from this longstanding formulation.1Though plaintiffs are correct that, as a general proposition,2repetition does not save a vague term, in the particular3circumstances presented hererepeated use for decades, without4evidence of mischief or misunderstandingsuggests that the5language is comprehensible. Further, the SAFE Act provides6additionalnoticeofprohibitedconductbyrequiringthecreationofa7website listing unlawful weapons and containing additional8information.165 If, in fact, as theDistrictCourt fears, this language9results inarbitraryanddiscriminatory enforcement, those charged10under the statutecanand should seek recourse inanasapplied11challenge.Wecannotconclude,however,thattheprovisionisvague12in all circumstances orpermeatedwith vagueness on its face.We13thereforereversesomuchoftheDistrictCourts judgmentasholds14NewYorkPenalLaw265.00(22)(c)(viii)voidbecauseofvagueness.15

v. MuzzleBreak16

Finally, Chief Judge Skretny also struck down as17impermissiblyvagueaprovisionofNewYorksSAFEActthatlisted18amongprohibitedmilitarystyle features suchmuzzle attachments19as a flash suppressor, muzzle break, muzzle compensator, or20threadedbarreldesignedtoaccommodateaflashsuppressor,muzzle21

165N.Y.PenalLaw400.00(16a)(b).TheNewYorkStatePolicealso

maintainsatelephonelinetoanswerthequestionsofgunowners.SeeDefendantsReplyBr.,No.1436cv,at26.

54

break,ormuzzle compensator.166Allparties agree that a muzzle1brake is a firearm attachment that reduces recoil. However, the2SAFEActmisspelledthetermasmuzzlebreak.Onthebasisofthis3misspelling, the District Court held the references to muzzle4breakstobeunconstitutionallyvague,reasoningthatanordinary5person cannot be informed as to what the State commands or6forbids.1677

Thisis,inourview,anoverstatement.Becausethemisspelled8homophone muzzlebreakhasno acceptedmeaning, there isno9meaningful risk thatapartymight confuse the legislatures intent.10Further,itsplacementwithinalistofmuzzleattachmentsmakesthe11misspelled termsmeaningevenclearer.What ismore,becausethe12adjacentstatutorytermmuzzlecompensatorissynonymouswith13muzzle brake, and thus independently covers the prohibited14conduct, this issue is of little moment. Nonetheless, vagueness15doctrinerequiresonlythatthestatuteprovidesufficientlydefinite16warningas to theproscribedconductwhenmeasuredbycommon17understanding and practices.168 This provision has done so.18Accordingly,wereversesomuchoftheDistrictCourtsjudgmentas19holds New York Penal Law 265.00(22)(a)(vi) unconstitutionally20vague.21

166N.Y.PenalLaw265.00(22)(a)(vi)(emphasissupplied).167NYSRPA,990F.Supp.2dat377(quotingCunney,660F.3dat620).168UnitedStatesv.Farhane,634F.3d127,139(2dCir.2011)(internal

quotationmarksomitted).

55

CONCLUSION1

Tosummarize,weholdasfollows:2

(1) ThecoreprohibitionsbyNewYorkandConnecticutof3assaultweapons and largecapacitymagazines do not4violatetheSecondAmendment.5

(a) We assume that the majority of the prohibited6conduct falls within the scope of Second7Amendment protections. The statutes are8appropriatelyevaluatedunder the constitutional9standard of intermediate scrutinythat is,10whether they are substantially related to the11achievement of an important governmental12interest.13

(b) Becausetheprohibitionsaresubstantiallyrelated14totheimportantgovernmentalinterestsofpublic15safety and crime reduction, they pass16constitutionalmuster.17

We therefore AFFIRM the relevant portions of the18judgmentsoftheWesternDistrictofNewYorkandthe19District of Connecticut insofar as they upheld the20constitutionalityofstateprohibitionsonsemiautomatic21assaultweaponsandlargecapacitymagazines.22

(2) We hold that the specific prohibition on the non23semiautomaticRemington7615fallswithinthescopeof24

56

SecondAmendment protection and subsequently fails1intermediate scrutiny.Accordingly,weREVERSE that2limited portion of the judgment of the District of3Connecticut. In doing so, we emphasize the limited4nature of our holding with respect to the Remington57615,inthatitmerelyreflectsthepresumptionrequired6by the SupremeCourt inDistrict ofColumbia v.Heller7that the Second Amendment extends to all bearable8arms, and that the State, by failing to present any9argumentatallregardingthisweaponorotherslikeit,10has failed to rebut that presumption. We do not11foreclose thepossibility thatStates could in the future12presentevidencetosupportsuchaprohibition.13

(3) New Yorks sevenround load limit does not survive14intermediatescrutinyintheabsenceofrequisiterecord15evidence and a substantial relationship between the16statutoryprovisionandimportantstatesafetyinterests.17We therefore AFFIRM the judgment of the Western18District ofNewYork insofar as it held this provision19unconstitutional.20

(4) No challenged provision in either statute is21unconstitutionallyvague.Accordingly,weAFFIRMthe22judgments of the District of Connecticut and the23Western District of New York insofar as they denied24vagueness challenges to provisions involving the25capacity of tubularmagazines, copies orduplicates,26

57

or a firearms ability to be readily restored or1converted.WeREVERSEthejudgmentoftheWestern2District of New York insofar as it found language3pertaining to versions and muzzle breaks to be4unconstitutionallyvague.5