SA030 - Bomb Threats, Suspect Packages and …3.6 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 3.7 Threats to the Railway Network [FOIA – Open] 3. 7.1 Upon receipt of any bomb threat against any

OFFICIAL – Open FOIA – Open

Uncontrolled version copy when printed Force Publication Scheme 06/04/20

Reference No. SA030

Implementation Date 30.01/19

Version Date 06/04/20

Version Number 1.1

Freedom of Information Act Open

Government Security Classifications OFFICIAL – Open

Bomb Threats, Suspect Packages and Scene Management



Table of Contents 1 Policy Section

1.1 Vision of the Strategic Alliance 1.2 Statement of Intent – Aim and Rationale

2 Standards 3 Bomb Threats

3.1 Call Reported Police 3.2 Threat Assessment 3.3 Red Response 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 Threats to the Railway Network 3.8 3.9 Threats to Military Premises 3.10 3.11 Co-ordinated response to multiple bomb threats originally received in the

metropolitan police area 3.12 3.13 Searches 3.14 3.15 General Points

4 Suspect Packages 4.1 Introduction 4.2 Initial Assessment 4.3 HOT Protocol 4.4 Actions On Identifying a Suspect Package 4.5 Requesting EOD 4.6 Suspicious Postal Objects 4.7 Unarmed Response to a Suicide Bomber (PBIED) 4.8 4.9 Illicit Laboratory 4.10

5 Scene Management 5.1 Actions on initial report of an explosion from the public 5.2 Actions on confirmation of an explosion/activation 5.3

Appendix 'A' Bomb Threat Checklist Appendix ‘B’ Appendix ‘C’ 6 Consultation and Authorisation 7 Version Control



1 Policy Section [FOIA – Open]

1.1 Vision of the Strategic Alliance

1.1.1 Working together as it can offer the best opportunity to:

• Develop service delivery to the public. • Ensure delivery against the PCCs’ Police and Crime Plans. • Retain a local policing identity. • Ensure resilience around our Strategic Policing Requirement. • Maximise value for money. • Maximise opportunities for the ongoing personal/professional

development of our staff.

1.1.2 This approach also satisfies the set critical success factors as follows:

• Both forces mitigate/manage their greatest threat, harm and risks. • Both forces achieve their medium term financial strategies. • The strategic policing requirement continues to be met with reducing

resources. • A transformational approach to service delivery. • Both forces adapt and respond to change in an agile/positive way. • Opportunities to invest in new capabilities to meet emerging threats and

technology.

1.2 Statement of Intent – Aim and Rationale 1.2.1 The Devon & Cornwall and Dorset Police forces will endeavour to deter a terrorist

or criminal attack through use of both strategic and tactical intelligence and constant vigilance by all personnel.

1.2.2 If it is not possible to deter or prevent an incident occurring, then the Force will

provide an adequate and proportionate response to that incident. 1.2.3 In the event of an incident occurring, the Force will co-ordinate the response to the

incident in order to:

* Save human lives in conjunction with other emergency services and agencies,

* Save animal life in conjunction with other emergency services and agencies,

* Protect property within limits that are reasonably practicable to achieve, * Contain the scale and nature of the incident, * Protect and preserve the scene, * Investigate any criminal offences which may have been committed.

1.2.4 This Policy provides the framework for the response to bomb threats, suspect

explosive packages, and scene management in respect of terrorist or criminal acts.



1.2.5 If explosive ordnance is found in circumstances where no criminal offence is suspected, then reference should be made to SA041 Abandoned Explosives and Ordnance, Fireworks and Pyrotechnics.

1.2.6 If the suspect package is believed to contain a suspicious substance or a

Chemical, Biological, or Radiological (CBRNe) agent (including white powder incidents) then advice should be sought from a CBRNe Tactical Advisor immediately. D&C Officers can reference Force Policy D240, Suspicious Substances and Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRNe) Agent Incidents

1.2.7 National Decision Model The National Decision Model (NDM) is the primary decision-making model used in

both Dorset Police and Devon and Cornwall Police. Where applied it ensures that ethical (see Code of Ethics), proportionate and defensible decisions can be made in relation to operational and non-operational policing. The latest guidance can be found via this APP link.

1.2.8 Code of Ethics The Code of Ethics underpins every policy, procedure, decision and action in

policing today and staff are reminded of the need to comply with the standards and principles of the Code of Ethics for policing.

1.2.9 Authorised Professional Practice The College of Policing (CoP) offers an online service that provides access to a

consolidated body of guidance for policing called Authorised Professional Practice (APP). This enables officers and staff to access and search for the most up to date approved guidance, replacing a number of previously published NPIA and ACPO documents. APP guidance on bomb threats should be accessed in conjunction with this policy.



2 Standards [FOIA – Open] 2.1 Assessment Compliance This document has been drafted and audited to comply with the principles of the

Human Rights Act. Internal and external Equality and diversity issues have also been considered to ensure compliance with Equality legislation and policies. In addition Data Protection, Freedom of Information, Management of Police Information and Health and Safety issues have been considered. Adherence to this document will therefore ensure compliance with all relevant legislation and internal policies.

2.2 Monitoring This policy is owned by the Alliance Operations Department and will be reviewed

on an annual basis. 2.3 Feedback Feedback relating to this policy can be made in writing or by e-mail to

The Alliance Operations Department Operations Planning Unit



3 Bomb Threats 3.1 Call Reported to Police [FOIA – Open] 3.1.1 On receiving a report of a bomb threat a STORM log must be created. The

making of a bomb threat is in itself a crime and must be recorded as such. 3.1.2 The vast majority of bomb threat warning calls from terrorist groups are made to a

third party, e.g. Samaritans, hospital and newspaper switchboards. It is extremely unlikely that a terrorist warning call would be received directly at the target site.

3.1.3 The receiver of the telephone bomb threat must obtain as much information from

the caller as possible. The person receiving the call should complete the Bomb Threat Checklist to aid this. This is an open source document provided by the government along with advice. The advice and form can be found by conducting an internet search for: “Bomb Threat Checklist”. The website is link here. A copy of the checklist is at Appendix A.

3.1.4 Should a call be made directly to police then the officer or member of police staff

receiving the call should complete the Bomb Threat Checklist. 3.2 Threat Assessment 3.2.1 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 3.2.2 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 3.2.3 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 3.2.4 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 3.2.5 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 3.2.6 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 3.2.7 For all responses the digital recording should be reviewed by either the FIM or a

supervisor in the control room or the officer making the response grading assessment. For further guidance in relation to urgent access to Red Box Recorder in Devon and Cornwall officers should liaise with a Call Handling Supervisor; Dorset officers should liaise with a Control Room Manager or FIM. [FOIA – Open]

3.2.8 [FOIA – Closed S31(1)(a)] 3.2.9 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 3.2.10 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 3.3 Red Response



3.3.1 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 3.3.2 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 3.3.3 The attending Operational Commander always retains the option to evacuate

immediately if considered necessary. [FOIA – Open] 3.3.4 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 3.3.5 Evacuation can include:

a. Internal evacuation to a bomb shelter area.

b. Partial evacuation (where a small device is involved).

c. Full evacuation. [FOIA – Open]

3.3.6 There are inherent dangers in evacuation where the exact location of the device is

unknown as people may be placed in more danger than they were previously. [FOIA – Open]

3.4 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 3.5 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 3.6 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 3.7 Threats to the Railway Network [FOIA – Open] 3. 7.1 Upon receipt of any bomb threat against any aspect of the railway the FIM will

inform the British Transport Police (BTP). Reference should be made to Strategic Alliance working practice DW86 Policing the Railway Environment.

3.7.2 BTP will be responsible for informing Railtrack Control on both a regional and

national basis. 3.7.3 BTP will categorise the threat and formulate a response by determining and

evaluating information supplied:

a. The intelligence received; b. Type of caller, i.e. drunk, youngster believed genuine.

3.7.4 The responsibility for closing railway stations or any part of the railway system is

with Railtrack. 3.7.5 British Transport Police are responsible for all matters relating to the searching of

railway lines and premises.



3.7.6 In the absence of any specific risk to life or limb, no independent action should be taken until the senior BTP officer attending has been consulted.

3.7.7 BTP will inform the Devon and Cornwall Police or the Dorset Police should they be

notified directly of any bomb threat in their police area and may request assistance as required.

3.8 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 3.9 Threats to Military Premises [FOIA – Open] 3.9.1 Threats towards military premises should be treated in the same way as any other

premises. 3.10 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 3.11 Co-ordinated response to multiple bomb threats originally received in the

metropolitan police area [FOIA – Open] 3.11.1 Operation Mercury is recommended as an appropriate response to multiple bomb

threats originally received in the Metropolitan Police area but targeting locations in other force areas. Further procedures and a method for this response is outlined at Appendix 'B'.

3.12 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 3.13 Searches 3.13.1 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 3.13.2 The object of the search is to check the whole building as quickly and effectively

as possible for any suspicious devices. The use of staff to search their own work areas is highly recommended as they will recognise foreign or suspicious items quicker that attending officers. Search areas should be recorded. Larger venues should have a plan (see NACTSO advice). [FOIA – Open]

3.13.3 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 3.13.4 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 3.14 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 3.15 General Points 3.15.1 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 3.15.2 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 3.15.3 At the conclusion of any bomb threat incident, the Tactical Commander will ensure

the following details are forwarded to the Alliance Operations Planning Unit



(AOPU). If there was no Tactical Commander then the Operational Commander will ensure that these details are forwarded to the OPU:

(a) Incident log number and date; (b) Details of incident and description; [FOIA – Open]



4 Suspect Packages 4.1 Introduction [FOIA – Open] 4.1.1 This has been designed as guidance for Police Control Room Staff and all first

responding police and community support officers, hereafter referred to as Police Responders. It is vital that all Police Control Room Staff and Police Responders are fully conversant with these contents

4.1.2 The following procedure has been designed to give clear guidance to Police

Responders who have:

• Been deployed to a suspicious object by their control room, or

• Been alerted by a member of the public or security staff, or

• Discovered a suspicious object directly. 4.1.3 The suspicious object could be anything, including:

• A letter or package

• A bag or suitcase

• A car or lorry

• A powder or canister 4.1.4 Due to the surrounding circumstances either a Police Responder or a member of

the public perceives it to be suspicious. 4.1.5 A terrorist device is designed to create fear and cause harm to people or damage

to property, for example:

• A homemade explosive

• An incendiary device

• A toxic chemical package

• Conventional weaponry 4.1.6 All officers should be in possession of the Terrorism Response aide-memoire.

This has been produced by the College of Policing for Police Responders to have to hand in such incidents.

4.2 Initial Assessment 4.2.1 It is the duty of Police Responders to make an initial assessment of any

suspicious object and to determine if it is and innocent article or further investigation by an LSO is required. [FOIA – Open]

4.2.2 A Police Responder will have to make a visual assessment of whether an object is

innocent or suspicious. The only exception to this is where the circumstances are so compelling that the object is already believed to be a potential terrorist device.

[FOIA – Open]



4.2.3 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 4.2.4 The guidance that follows is intended to be appropriate to any object, device, item,

article or substance in any circumstance. It has been designed to give a clear framework for the assessment, decision-making and resulting actions for that object. [FOIA – Open]

4.2.5 It should not be assumed that every piece of unattended luggage is suspicious.

The assumption should always remain that an object is innocent, unless information, observation, its location and/or intelligence indicate otherwise.

[FOIA – Open] 4.2.6 As soon as any assessment has been completed Police Responders must

immediately inform the Force Control Room and CIM of their decision. If the decision is that the item is suspicious, the CIM will then request an Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) Officer, while Police Responders continue to deal with the incident. [FOIA – Open]

4.3 HOT Protocol 4.3.1 HOT is a protocol devised by British Transport Police for use in the rail

environment (FOIA – Open) 4.3.2 Using HOT means unattended items are dealt with quickly and effectively and

without the need for largescale disruption. Typically, even when dealing with 250,000 bags, this means calling EOD only two or three times a year. (FOIA – Open)

4.3.3 (FOIA – Closed. S31(1)(a)) 4.3.4 By applying the HOT protocols of risk assessment to unattended items, public

safety can be maintained and disruption minimised. It is important to be alert but not alarmed. Remember just because someone tells you that they have found a ‘suspicious item’ it does not automatically mean the item is a terrorist device. If in any doubt seek further advice. [FOIA – Open]

4.3.5 Should you consider that the unattended item you are assessing is obviously

suspicious contact the Force Control Room who will manage the incident and deploy appropriately trained resources. [FOIA – Open]

4.3.6 POLSAs, LSOs and Explo Dog Handlers have received training in terrorist

methods of attack and Improvised Explosive Devices. Where a suspected item cannot be immediately ruled out then a POLSA or LSO will be deployed to conduct the assessment. [FOIA – Open]

4.3.7 A detailed scene report will be completed for assessment by the FIM, EOD and

SO15. [FOIA – Open] 4.3.8 [FOIA - Closed.s31(1)(a)] 4.3.9 [FOIA - Closed.s31(1)(a)]



4.3.10 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 4.3.11 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 4.3.12 [FOIA – Closed S31. (1)(a)] 4.3.13 Remember if there is doubt then the suspect package is to be treated as a real

bomb. [FOIA – Open] 4.4 Actions on Identifying a Suspect Package 4.4.1 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 4.4.2 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 4.4.3 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 4.4.4 Cordon

a. Police powers to implement "authorised" cordons, order evacuations and prohibit or restrict access within a cordoned area are given under the Terrorism Act 2000, Sections 33 - 36. [FOIA – Open]

b. [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] c. [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] d. A Bronze Commander must be appointed as early as possible to be

Cordons Officer: responsible for the effective provision of the cordon. [FOIA – Open]

e. [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] f. Cordons must not be moved, re-positioned or taken down without the

authority of Silver or on the advice of appropriately trained officers. [FOIA – Open]

h. Consideration must be given to informing occupants of buildings near the

cordon points of the incident. If the decision is made not to evacuate, they are to be given instructions, for example to go to the rear of the building, not to stand looking out of the windows, etc. On completion of the incident, inform them of the conclusion, thanking them for their co-operation. [FOIA – Open]

i. Officers on cordon duties must be fully informed of the exact location of

the suspected device and sterile areas. This will assist them in being able to direct other emergency service personnel to the RV point without exposing them to danger. [FOIA – Open]

j. Police officers must consider personal safety. Officers should consider

where they stand. Even if they are around a corner they are still at risk



from blast and flying glass. Blast also travels through buildings. They must think of what may be above them, scaffolding, roofing tiles, more windows. Safety of police officers and public is always paramount. It should be noted that debris can travel further than cordon points, so safe cover is vital. [FOIA – Open]

i. [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] j. [FOIA - Closed.s31(1)(a)] k. [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)]

4.4.5 Control [FOIA – Open] Cordon access must be controlled rigorously and all persons within the immediate

cordon area should also be under the control of the police. The only person to be allowed access to the cordoned area is the EOD operative and cordon powers under S33 Terrorism Act 2000 should be utilised. Reference can be made to the Terrorism Response aide memoire.

4.4.6 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)]. 4.4.7 Officers should be reminded of the need to carefully consider the selection and

use of RV points at a bomb threat incident. Furthermore, it should be re-emphasised that proposed evacuation or RV points must be searched and declared safe before use. [FOIA – Open]

4.4.8 The Alliance trains Police Search Advisers (POLSAs) and Licensed Search

Officers (LSOs) in all aspects of search, IED recognition, bomb threat call response and in dealing with suspect packages and hoax/malicious devices. POLSAs must be consulted when incidents occur, and where possible, prior to any evacuation under consideration. Where available LSOs must be the first response to any such incident. Full search teams should never be deployed or used without consulting a POLSA. [FOIA – Open]

4.4.9 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)]

4.5 Requesting EOD 4.5.1 The Joint Service Explosive Ordnance Disposal Operations Centre (JSEODOC)

co-ordinates the response of specialist teams to deal with explosives. JSEODOC will only respond to an incident within Force areas on request of FIM, through whom all requests will be made. [FOIA – Open]

4.5.2 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 4.5.3 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 4.5.4 In the event of serious difficulty or loss of communications to JSEODOC, Reserve

EOD Report Centres and Naval EOD Report Centres will continue to be available and respond on a regional basis. [FOIA – Open]



4.5.5 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 4.5.6 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)]. 4.5.7 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)]. 4.5.8 Reports should not be delayed by the absence of some of the information. [FOIA – Open] 4.5.9 Once an object has been declared as suspect, it stays suspect until the EOD

officer says otherwise. There is no need for anyone, including supervisors to look at a suspect device before the EOD officer attends. Doing this puts people at risk. All actions will be based upon the information given by first officer or LSO at the scene. [FOIA – Open]

4.5.10 Any stand-off (soak) periods will be implemented at the direction of EOD. [FOIA – Open] 4.5.11 All safety precautions at the scene of the suspect bomb will be strictly adhered to

until expert examination is completed. If the suspicious object proves to be an explosive device, a Senior Investigating Officer will take charge of the investigation. CTPSW FIMU must be notified and kept informed of any developments. [FOIA – Open].

4.6 Suspicious Postal Objects 4.6.1 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)]. 4.6.2 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)]. 4.6.3 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 4.6.4 Upon arrival at the scene flashing lights and sirens should not be used and

vehicles should be left at safe distances from threatened premises. [FOIA – Open]

4.7 Unarmed Response to a Suicide Bomber (PBIED) 4.7.1 [FOIA – Closed s.31 (1) (a)] 4.7.2 An aide memoire has previously been circulated to all staff. It provides

information as to how an unarmed police officer should deal with a report of a suspected suicide bomber. The aide memoire entitled ‘KRATOS’ has been removed from circulation, but the guidance contained within is still valid. [FOIA – Open]

4.7.3 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 4.7.4 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)]



4.7.5 [FOIA – Closed s.31 (1) (a)] 4.7.6 Remember the following

K Keep yourself and others clear of the subject R Report to the control room A Avoid drawing attention to yourself T Take directions from the control room O Observe S Safety First [FOIA – Open].

4.7.7 Any report received of a suspected suicide bomber incident will be made subject

of an incident log, and it will be transferred to the FIM as a matter of high priority for assessment. This may form part of a wider attack and Op PLATO should be considered by the FIM who will be the initial TFC. [FOIA – Open]

4.7.8 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 4.7.9 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 4.7.10 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)]. 4.7.11 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 4.7.12 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 4.7.13 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 4.7.14 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 4.8 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 4.9 Illicit Laboratory 4.9.1 Illicit Laboratories are uncommon but have been found in the Force area. It is

very difficult to assess what is being created in the laboratory without detailed assessment of the equipment and chemicals being used. There are potentially many different explosive and lethal materials within an illicit laboratory which are not readily identifiable. [FOIA – Open].

4.9.2 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)]. 4.9.3 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)]. 4.10 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)]



5 Bomb Scene - Post Explosion/Activation 5.1 Actions on initial report of an explosion from the public [FOIA – Open] 5.1.1 The vast majority of the public are inexperienced with explosions and can mistake

entirely innocent events for an explosion. Therefore, the police must balance the need to respond to reports of an explosion without unnecessarily triggering the deployment of many specialist police and partner agency resources.

5.1.2 The Force Control Room will create a STORM Incident Log on receiving an initial

report. The person receiving the call will gather as much information as reasonably possible from the person reporting the explosion. The FIM or a Control Room Supervisor will the assess the report and direct the appropriate response.

5.2 Actions on confirmation of an explosion/activation 5.2.1 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 5.2.2 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 5.2.3 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 5.2.4 Identify and inform a POLSA. [FOIA – Open] 5.2.5 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 5.2.6 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 5.2.7 Police Responders must remember that the priority is to save life. The bomb may

have only partially exploded, potentially leaving some explosive material. There may well be secondary hazards such as buildings collapsing or leaking bulk fuel containers. Officers should not put themselves in unnecessary danger.

[FOIA – Open] 5.2.8 Officers should treat the scene of an explosion as a confirmed suspect package

and follow the procedures detailed in section 4.4 Actions On Identifying a Suspect Package. [FOIA –Open]

5.2.9 Actions should be undertaken in line with the normal scene management

procedures and in accordance with advice from EOD, POLSA and SO15. [FOIA – Open] 5.2.10 Early advice should be sought from a Regional Forensics Co-ordinator (RFC) or

Crime Scene Manager (CSM). Contact details are held within the Force Control Rooms. [FIO – Open]

5.2.11 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)]



5.2.12 Consider early advice from a CBRNe Tac Ad; this has proved valuable in the past. Contact details are held with the Force Control Rooms. [FOIA – Open]

5.2.13 Consider early advice from the Forensic Explosive Laboratory as to what services

they can provide; contact should be via the RFC/CSM or the Scientific Support Unit. [FOIA – Open]

5.2.14 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 5.2.15 Where large scale fatalities follow any explosion a Senior Identification Manager

(SIM) will lead the process to recover and identify the deceased in accordance with.

APP > Civil Contingencies > Disaster victim identification [FOIA – Open]

5.2.16 Major incidents, especially those concerning terrorism will attract a large number

of media representatives. Advice can be received via the duty press officer from Corporate Communications. [FOIA – Open]

5.3 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)]



Appendix ‘A’ – Bomb Threat Checklist [FOIA – Open]







Appendix 'B' [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] Appendix ‘C’ [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)]



6 Consultation and Authorisation

6.1 Consultation

6.2 Authorisation of this Version

Version No: 1.1 Name Signature Date

Prepared: Policy Officer 06/04/20

Authorised: Matt Lawler 19/03/20

Approved: Head of Ops Planning 25/02/20

7 Version Control

7.1 Review

Date of next scheduled review Date: 06/04/21

7.2 Version History

7.3 Document History Present Portfolio Holder ACC Local Policing & Connectivity

Present Document Owner Alliance Operations

Present Owning Department Alliance Operations

Version No: 1.1 Name Signature Date

Police & Crime Commissioner

Police Federation

Superintendents Association

GMB / UNISON / Unite

Other Relevant Partners (if applicable)

Operations Planning unit 25/04/20

Version Date Reason for Change Created / Amended by

1.0 30/01/19 Initial Document Policy Officer

1.1 06/04/20 Amendments to structure and contact details

Policy Officer

Documents

SA030 - Bomb Threats, Suspect Packages and …3.6 [FOIA – Closed s.31(1)(a)] 3.7 Threats to the Railway Network [FOIA – Open] 3. 7.1 Upon receipt of any bomb threat against any