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A Straussian Question to New Testament Theology

Robert C. Morgan

New Testament Studies / Volume 23 / Issue 03 / April 1977, pp 243 - 265DOI: 10.1017/S0028688500010493, Published online: 05 February 2009

Link to this article: http://journals.cambridge.org/abstract_S0028688500010493

How to cite this article:Robert C. Morgan (1977). A Straussian Question to New Testament Theology. NewTestament Studies, 23, pp 243-265 doi:10.1017/S0028688500010493

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Mew Test. Stud. 23, pp. 243-265

ROBERT MORGAN

A STRAUSSIAN QUESTION TO'NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY'

David Friedrich Strauss died on 8 February 1874. His Lebenjesu of 1835 wassaid by Albert Schweitzer to be ' no mere destroyer of untenable solutions,but also the prophet of a coming advance in knowledge',1 namely eschato-logy. The claims that it 'has a different significance for modern theologyfrom that which it had for his contemporaries '2 and that i t ' marked out theground which is now occupied by modern critical study '3 appear even moretrue in the light of subsequent history of religions and form-critical researchthan Schweitzer himself realized. But as well as marking an epoch in thehistorical critical study of the New Testament, this book, and with it the fateof its author, remains a symbol of something else: the tension between his-torical research and the formation of a systematic or doctrinal theologicalposition. Ecclesiastical authorities have in the meantime learned to live withtheological pluralism and become more tolerant, but the problem itself hasnot disappeared. The investigation and development of Strauss' generallyunappreciated contribution is perhaps an appropriate centenary celebra-tion.4

The book owed its impact and Strauss his short-term infamy and long-termfame to the powerful blow struck for the legitimacy of a radical historicalcriticism of the gospels. The critical conclusions were not particularly originalbut were here made inescapable.5 The historical critical study of the NewTestament now began the period of its revolutionary impact within Christiantheology. Despite possible reservations about Strauss' mechanistic world-view6 the essential points of his critical position have become commonplace.The supernaturalism which he considered impossible in the modern world isno longer a presupposition which guides the historical investigation of thegospels.7 Strauss' classification of the miracle narratives as 'myth' might

1 Von Reimarus zu Wrede (1906), E.T. by W. Montgomery, The Quest of the Historical Jesus (1910),

P- 95-* Ibid. ' P. 84.* A shortened form of this paper was read at the twenty-ninth general meeting of the S.N.T.S. in

Sigtuna on 13 August 1974.* So F. C. Baur, Kirchengeschichte des neunzehnten Jahrhunderts (rp. Stuttgart, 1970), pp. 379 f.;

Kritische Untersuchungen iiber die kanonischen Evangelien (1847), p. 47. Also Schweitzer, op. cit. p. 84.* On the limitations of the principle of analogy, see W. Pannenberg, Basic Questions in Theology 1

(E.T. London, 1970), pp. 40-57.' Van A. Harvey, 'D . F. Strauss' Life of Jesus Revisited', Church History xxx (1961), 191-211,

writes o f ' a common operational assumption of almost all modern critical historiography' (p. 198).Harvey's discussion of Strauss' historical methodology is not mentioned in the treatment by HortonHarris, David Friedrich Strauss and his Theology (Cambridge, 1973).

244 ROBERT MORGAN

appear crude in the light of subsequent anthropological studies, but it stoodthe test of time well because it satisfied the demands of modern historicalconsciousness better than its rivals. Supernaturalism had ignored the prin-ciples of analogy and correlation;1 and rationalism failed to respect theauthors' intentions in determining the meaning of texts. By introducing a newconcept into the discussion, the mythical solution sanctioned the rationalists'refusal to believe that the miracles actually happened but at the same timeavoided contradicting the intentions of the authors for whom the question ofmyth had not been raised.

Strauss' achievement in carrying this solution consistently through, in ad-dition to his annihilation of the harmonizers and his rejection of Schleier-macher's preference for the Fourth Gospel as history, are so familiar as hardlyto warrant the academic reprints industry recalling his ghost.2 But now thathe is recalled Strauss should be allowed to haunt his successors at anotherpoint. They have argued for a further 140 years about the relation ofhistory and theology without taking seriously his particular contribution,even though this was more important to him than his fairly common-sensecritical judgements.

The argument of this essay is as follows.One can draw from the Life of Jesus a theory that historical work has an

essentially negative function within the theological enterprise; and this theoryabout theological method is independent of the particular results reached byStrauss. But the theory is incompatible with a widespread view of New Testa-ment theology which expects this historical discipline to make a more directand positive contribution to Christian theology. By testing it in this area oneof two things should happen: either the theory will be seen to be false, or anargument against that widespread view of the discipline will emerge. Thelatter conclusion is reached in this article, not in the hope that New Testa-ment studies might become less theological but that the theological interpreta-tion of the New Testament should be set free from the obligation to be simplya historical discipline. So long as the theological interpretation of the NewTestament is done as 'New Testament theology' it suffers from the constraintsand limitations of a historical discipline.

Strauss went beyond the historian's brief in order to do theology, and what-ever the quality of his product, he was right to recognize that the subject-matter of theology demands more than ordinary historical work if it is to becommunicated. This conclusion can only be avoided if the scope of historical

1 The terminology is that of Troeltsch, but it reflects Strauss' position, and the classical formula-

tion of the problem by Hume.a The first German edition was reprinted for the Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt,

1969. George Eliot's 1846 translation of the fourth (1840) edition was republished by the ScholarlyPress, Michigan, 1970, and edited by Peter C. Hodgson for the Fortress Press, Philadelphia, andSCM Press, London, Lines of Jesus Series, 1972-3. References are to the SCM edition: The Life ofJesus Critically Examined.

STRAUSS AND 'NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY5 245

work is broadened to include a metaphysical view of God, man and the world(F. C. Baur's solution) or if the theological subject-matter and task are un-duly narrowed (Bultmann's solution). Those who find these moves by the un-doubted masters in the discipline finally unsatisfactory will be forced back toStrauss' theory, no matter how lamentable they consider his actual theo-logical practice.

In the Life of Jesus Strauss separates his proposed theological reconstructionin the concluding dissertation, 'On the dogmatic import of the life of Jesus',from the historical critical analysis of the gospels which forms the body of thework.1 This critical work upon which the author's claim to fame rests standsindependently of his youthful attempt ' to re-establish at the dogmatic levelwhat had been destroyed by historical criticism'.2

For Strauss himself it does in fact have a theological role the critical ornegative role of destroying impossible or untrue theological interpretationsof the text - such as those of supernaturalism or rationalism. This use ofhistorical criticism as an instrument of theological criticism has been commonsince the eighteenth century and needs no defence. Theologians are bound tocriticize other theologians' interpretation of the Christian tradition (especiallysuch an authoritative part of it as the NT) and one natural way to do this in ahistorically conscious age is to argue that they are doing violence to theoriginal intention of the texts to which they appeal.3 This negative use ofhistorical criticism in theology is not in dispute between Strauss and his suc-cessors; they have used it equally skilfully.

But Strauss' procedure suggests that this is the only use of historical work intheology, beyond the preliminary role of clarifying the tradition. He confineshis positive work as a Christian theologian to what is virtually an appendix inwhich he is no longer writing as a historian of the New Testament.4 Combinedwith his implicit thesis concerning the essentially negative function of his-torical criticism in theology5 a claim is being mounted about what is neces-sary for constructive theological interpretation of the Christian tradition:

1 According to his original plan, outlined to Marklin on 6 February 1832 (reproduced by Sand-

berger, David Friedrich Strauss als theologischer Hegelianer (1972), pp. 192-9) what is now almost thewhole work was to constitute the second (negative critical) part and what has here shrunk to a briefsketch the third, constructive part of his 'larger dogmatic plans' (p. 195).

a 'das kritisch Vernichtete dogmatisch weiderherzustellen' (11, 686. Cf. E.T. p. 757).

8 For discussion of this cf. my 'Expansion and Criticism in the Christian Tradition' in M. Pye and

R. Morgan (eds.), The Cardinal Meaning. Essays in Comparative Hermeneutics: Buddhism and Christianity(The Hague, 1973), especially pp. 92101.

4 This is even clearer in Die Christliche Glaubenslehre (1840-1), which has no positive section at all,

and where destructive analysis proves that 'Die wahre Kritik des Dogma ist seine Geschichte' (rp.Darmstadt, 1973,1, 71).

6 The thesis is not uncommon. On 1 January 1916 Barth wrote to Thurneysen, ' . . .ich habe

schon unter dem EinfluS Herrmanns die Kritik immer nur als ein Mittel zur Freiheit gegeniiber derTradition aufgefaBt, nicht aber als konstituierenden Faktor einer neuen liberalen Tradi t ion . . . "(Karl Barth, Gesamtausgabe v, 1 (Zurich, 1973), p. 121).

246 ROBERT MORGAN

namely, that what is required for this is more than what the historian quahistorian can provide. It is true that there is more to historical work thancriticism. Strauss was not interested in this,1 and that was his weakness as a NewTestament scholar.2 We are concerned here, however, not with his merits as aNew Testament scholar but simply with the way he separates historical andtheological work. Although he does not make it explicit, Strauss' thesis is thatthe positive historical descriptive enterprise cannot deliver normative theologi-cal judgements. In the constructive part of the concluding dissertation hetherefore abandons history and writes as a religious philosopher.

As it happens, the result is grotesque. He explicates his own view of theworld and God and associates it with the Christian tradition. The artificialityof the link was clear to Strauss' contemporaries, who rightly concluded thathis theology was very different from their own understandings of the incarna-tion. Quite understandably, granted the ecclesiastical connection of Germantheological faculties, his prospects of an academic career were ruined.3

Strauss' 'key to the whole of Christology' referred the gospels' picture ofthe God-man not to the historical Jesus but to the idea of the human race.4The reason for this aberration is made explicit: ' the idea. . . is not wont tolavish its fullness on one exemplar... '.5 Strauss was not the first idealist tostumble at the scandal of particularity nor the last,6 but this fall constituted aserious break with the Christian tradition.

It is, however, important not to let the clearly heterodox character ofStrauss' own theological conclusions discredit his theory or mode of pro-cedure. We may call this the 'separation model' for theological methodbecause it separates historical criticism (which serves as a vehicle for theo-logical criticism) from the theological interpretation by which the tradition isenabled to communicate its subject-matter in a new intellectual environment.Strauss' theory is better than his practice. His model contains a procedure foridentifying and eliminating unsatisfactory specimens of theological interpre-

1 In a letter to Marklin (22 June 1846) he admitted to being 'kein Historiker' and 'vom dog-

matischen (resp. antidogmatischen) Interesse ausgegangen'. (E. Zeller (ed.), Ausgewdhlte Briefe(1895), p. 183.) Similarly to L. Georgii (2 July 1841) 'Denn von dem rein historischen Interesse...habe ich keinen Blutstropfen in mir' and (1 November 1844), 'Du bist Historiker, ich nicht'. (H.Maier (ed.), 'Briefe von David Friedrich Strauss an L. Georgii', Universitat Tubingen Doktoren-Ver-zeichnis der philosophischen Fakultat tgf>5 (1912), pp. 37, 46.)

2 Correctly emphasized by F. C. Baur, Kanonische Evangelien, pp. 40-76, especially 71 f.; Kir-

chengeschichte, pp. 394-9.3 Most of the furore was caused by Strauss' critical judgements. But Strauss was soon to be vindi-

cated on this, and not even the loss of his (temporary) position as Repetent in the Stift at Tubingenafter the publication of the first half of the work was particularly serious. See Geisser, 'David Fried-rich Strauss als verhinderte (Zurcher) Dogmatiker', .7%.A". LXIX (1972), 217, n. 6. More indica-tively of his future chances of becoming a professor of theology, Credner proposed him for a post atGiessen after the appearance of the first volume but changed his mind when he saw the second. Cf.E. Barnikol 'Der Briefwechsel zwischen Strauss und Baur', Z-K-G- LXXIII (1962), 81, n. 5.

4 P. 780. 6 P. 779.

It is instructive to note how hard Baur struggles to give' the founder' of Christianity a constitu-tive role in his account, and thus to remain orthodox, even though the historical Jesus is scarcelynecessary for his Hegelian interpretation of classical Christian dogma.

STRAUSS AND NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY 247

tation. Its effectiveness can be shown by applying it in criticism of his owntheological sketch.

Strauss had theological objections to the rationalists' mode of interpretingthe miracle-stories of the gospels. It failed to do justice to their religious con-tent. But the form of his theological criticism was successfully to argue at thehistorical level that it failed to do justice to the actual intentions of theauthors. His modernity is evident in the historical critical body of his workfrom the way he differs from Kant1 and allegorical interpretation2 in respect-ing the intentions of the evangelists.

But when in the concluding dissertation Strauss outlines his proposals forinterpreting the mythical narratives he abandons his principle of faithfulness tothe intention of the text and becomes vulnerable to the same kind of theo-logical criticism through historical criticism with which he himself annihi-lated the rationalists.

The failure of Schleiermacher's ' attempt to retain in combination the idealin Christ with the historical'3 had been impressed upon Strauss by his teacherF. C. Baur.4 But unlike Baur he therefore felt driven to a separation model:'these two elements separate themselves'.5 However, instead of producingwhat his own principles demanded - a form of the separation model in whichthe theological interpretation remains subject to critical scrutiny by his-torians and satisfies the canon of modern rationality that interpretationsshould not conflict with the original author's intentions - Strauss at thispoint reverted to the anti-historical stance of Kant and allegorical interpreta-tion. The only difference between his own speculative and Kant's symbolicChristology is that for Strauss the 'idea' which is the subject of christologicalpredication 'has an existence in reality, not in the mind only like that ofKant'.6 Both authors are equally indifferent to the intentions of the biblicalauthors and in consequence produced theological interpretations whoseclaim to continuity with the Christian tradition failed, to satisfy the Church.

This criterion of orthodoxy or valid theological interpretation in theChristian Church - that a new interpretation be able to claim continuitywith the tradition - is notoriously difficult to apply in marginal cases on

1 See Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone (1793): E.T. Harper (i960), p. 3gn.

2 Origen was prepared to abandon the literal meaning where necessary for the sake of'a meaning

worthy of God'. DePrin. iv. 2. 9. E.T. Harper (1966), p. 287. Strauss obscures the issue by comparinghis own historical procedure in applying the category of myth to the Gospels, with the allegorizers'theological interpretation of his material (pp. 39-92). The true parallel to the allegorizers' theologicalinterpretation is of course Strauss' own theological interpretation in the concluding dissertation. Thehistorian's' mythical mode of interpretation' merely sets the stage for this by proposing a classificationof the material which makes possible its subsequent assimilation to the Hegelian Vorstellung-BegrirTscheme. The confusion arises from the ambiguity of the word 'interpretation' which may refer eitherto the historian's general task of making the past intelligible to the present or to the theologian'sspecial interest in making it intelligible in such a way that contemporary Christians recognize it to bea more or less adequate expression of the faith which they hold. * P. 773.

4 Baur's early criticism of Schleiermacher was published in 1827 while Strauss was still his student.

See H. Liebing, 'Ferdinand Christian Baurs Kritik an Schleiermachers Glaubenslehre', .^TA.X". LIV(957). 225-43- 6 P- 773- " P- 780.

248 ROBERT MORGAN

account of the great variety within the tradition.1 But Strauss' was not a mar-ginal case. By making his own understanding of the world normative andtwisting the tradition until it dimly reflected this he produced a re-interpre-tation which any historian could judge to be in conflict with the intention ofthe tradition. His appeal to this was not a serious claim to be interpreting itor saying what it actually means, but an account of how he would have tore-interpret it if it were to have any significance for him.2 The reason forStrauss' re-interpretation is that like the men of the Enlightenment he knowsthe truth of the matter in advance and by his re-interpretation must make thetradition conform to this.3 When the interpreter's prior understanding ismade normative in this way, the possibility of learning from the text is pre-cluded and no concept of revelation on a basis of the Christian traditionpossible.4

The purpose of this discussion is not to repeat that Strauss' own theologicalinterpretation is unsatisfactory, but to indicate that it can be shown to be un-satisfactory by the historian acting as theological critic. Strauss' theory abouttheological method, his 'separation model', can therefore stand on its ownmerits, independently of his actual practice, and shows itself to be effective bythe way it can be operated in criticism of this.

The theory has two aspects. It calls firstly for new theological interpreta-tions by which Christian faith may be communicated in changing situations,and assumes (for reasons which have still to be made plain) that these willinvolve more than historical work. Secondly, it envisages historical criticismoperating negatively to disallow theological interpretations which offendagainst contemporary rationality by doing violence to those parts of thetradition to which they appeal.

The question which such a model poses to the historical critical study of theNew Testament is whether, in consequence, this discipline has not simply anegative role in Christian theology. Apart from its preliminary service in

1 The difficulty has become more acute since historical study has shown that the New Testament

is not a doctrinal unity. If a 'canon' were required for judging interpretations it would have to bedefined more narrowly- a ' canon within the canon'. But in fact a whole variety of criteria is employedin judging an interpretation's fidelity to the tradition. The inadequacy of any one criterion does notmean that the enterprise is hopeless.

8 The distinction between 'meaning' and 'significance' is rightly emphasized by E. D. Hirsch,

Validity in Interpretation (Yale U.P. 1967). Hirsch presents a form of separation model in which theinterpretative 'guess what the author meant' is followed by 'a logic of validation' analogous to thenegative function of history in Strauss: 'While there is not and cannot be any method or model ofcorrect interpretation there can be a ruthless critical process of validation to which many skills andmany hands may contribute. Just as any individual act of interpretation comprises both a hypotheti-cal and a critical function, so the discipline of interpretation also comprises of having ideas andtesting them. At the level of the discipline these two 'moments' or 'episodes' can be separated...'(p. 206).

8 See p. 247, n. 1. David Pailin threatens to follow a similar path:' Authenticity in the Interpreta-

tion of Christianity', The Cardinal Meaning, op. cit. pp. 127-59.* This is Barth's main objection to the Enlightenment thinkers. Bultmann provides a theoretical

framework in which the interpreter's prior understanding may be corrected through encounter withthe text. Whether this happens in his own practice remains a question.

STRAUSS AND 'NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY' 249

clarifying the tradition it operates negatively to disallow theological inter-pretations rather than positively to produce them.1

That it does operate in this negative way is not in question. The issue iswhether this is its only function, apart from preliminary clarification of whatthe tradition says. Most New Testament scholars would deny this and assertthat this historical work has a positive role in theology. The point at whichthis is most apparent is in the discipline called 'New Testament theology';that is one reason for posing the Straussian question there.

'New Testament theology' refers to a historical exegetical activity. But thephrase is used ambiguously: in a 'weak' sense to mean no more than thehistory of early Christian thought;2 and in a 'strong' sense in which the word'theology' is used more appropriately to indicate that the discipline has amore direct theological significance, arising from the special authority ac-corded to the canonical documents within the Christian Church. Howexactly historical exegetical results can be invested with theological authorityis an unsettled question at the heart of theological debate about the canon.3The simmering disagreement on this issue4 is an indication of the deep-seatedmalaise within the ranks of those committed to the strong sense of ' NewTestament theology', as a discipline which combines theological interpreta-tion with historical reconstruction.5

Unless they are prepared to argue in a biblicist way that what the his-torians and philologists show the New Testament authors to have saidautomatically binds them theologically, it is difficult to see what positivetheological role those who accept the weak sense of the phrase see in theirwork. They are content 'merely to do the historical donkey work for thesystematic theologian'.6 This is a consistent position, despite the familiarclaim that there is no such thing as a 'purely historical' study of the NewTestament. There clearly is 'purely historical' work in the sense meant by

1 Strauss' position (ironically!) recalls that of Nietzsche, who in The Use and Abuse of History (1874)

considered how history could serve and how destroy life. Both appreciated the pruning function ofthe 'critical use of history', but considered history alone to be negative and destructive of life. Thequestion is whether historical work alone can adequately perform theology's (or art's) task of inter-preting human existence.

8 William Wrede gave classic expression to this view: Uber Aufgabe und Methode der sogenannten

ncuteslamentlichen Theologie (1897), E.T. SCM Press (London, 1973).3 Cf. E. Kasemann (ed.), Das New Testament als Kanon (Gottingen, 1970).

4 The disagreement between Barth and Bultmann on this issue is reflected in the subsequent de-

bate. Cf. E. Kasemann, 'Konsequente Traditionsgeschichte?' Z-Th-K- txI1 ('965), I37~52.6 Those who, like Bultmann and Kasemann, stress the theological interpretation, achieve greater

Coherence than those who, while remaining theologians, emphasize the historical character of theenterprise. Kummel's account of the unity of the NT, which houses his own theology, sits uncom-fortably upon an admirable historical presentation. See p. 259, n. 2. Conzelmann's formula forcombining the two sides ' by regarding theology not only in general terms, as the interpretation of(the) faith made at a particular time, but in a more special sense as an exegesis of the original textsof the faith, the oldest formulations of the creed' seems inappropriate to most of the New Testamentmaterial. An Outline of the Theology of the New Testament (E.T. London, 1969), p. xv.

8 E. Kasemann, New Testament Questions of Today (E.T. London, 1969), p. 7, where such

' thoroughly misplaced modesty' is attacked.

250 ROBERT MORGAN

those who in the nineteenth century championed the phrase: namely, workthat is not influenced by Christian doctrinal considerations. But this historicalwork is not 'theology' in the usual sense of advocating or expressing a theo-logical position, and it would make for clarity if Wrede's demand for achange of nomenclature were granted.1

Strauss' question is not addressed to this weak sense of the phrase. He is nothimself interested in this task of historical reconstruction,2 but his model doesin fact presuppose it: only by contrast with a more probable historical hypo-thesis or reconstruction can a weaker one be criticized and the theologicalsuperstructure which stands on it be undermined. Strauss' essential point isthat the theological use of history is restricted to this critical function. Thatis to say, he is not interested in developing an alternative historical construc-tion which will carry any theological weight. He prefers to look elsewhere fora vehicle for his own theology.3

There is no need, either, for Strauss to deny that those who engage in thishistorical descriptive task must understand something of theology. Like his-torians of science, art and philosophy they must be familiar with their sub-ject-matter. But the descriptive task is not (or need not be) itself'theology' inthe sense of expressing a theological position. The personal involvement of thehistorian of ideas is a matter for discussion; certainly 'objectivity' in the senseof complete absence of presuppositions is neither possible nor desirable. Buta distinction can and must be made between judgements made on a basis ofone's personal religious belief and those which can be justified in the openforum of historical argument. However, this correct recognition of the needfor historians to be familiar with their subject-matter cannot be extended intoa rationale by which New Testament scholars can answer the question of therelationship between history and theology in New Testament studies. This verynatural move is illegitimate. Many Christian New Testament scholars workingin theological faculties wish to claim a theological role without denying the his-torical character of their work. It was therefore tempting to argue that only abeliever can have a sufficiently intimate acquaintance with the subject-matterto understand and present it historically. As a historical work done by believersNew Testament theology could therefore be said to be essentially theology.

It is true that most of the best work here has been done by believers, andthe crude polemic frequently produced when unbelievers enter the fieldappears to lend support to the argument. But the assertion that unbelieverscannot understand religion and theology well enough to write its history isungrounded and can be challenged by plenty of counter-evidence from'history of religions' study. It is also potentially obscurantist, since the appealto faith as a presupposition for historical work can be used to hinder openrational investigation.

1 Op. cit. E.T. p. 116. 8 Cf. above p. 246, nn. 1 2.

8 Like Nietzsche, he turned to philosophy and art for this.

STRAUSS AND NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY' 25I

The ' weak' meaning of New Testament theology is not vulnerable to thecritique which must be brought against the strong meaning. If it will acceptits purely negative role in theology it can rest in peace, so far as our Straussianquestion is concerned. It is, however, subject to other questions which shouldbe mentioned lest the critique of the strong meaning be misunderstood as aplea for the weak one. The 'purely historical', theologically neutral view ofNew Testament studies needs no such support. It is so well entrenched withan inherited institutional strength that widespread doubt about its relevanceto the life of the Church is often ignored and the threat to its right to exist insecular universities scarcely noticed.1 Theological disinterestedness was anecessary moment in the process of liberating historical study from dog-matics,2 and the price of freedom is eternal vigilance. But the lesson has beenwell learned, and in a secular situation the dangers of a theologically dis-interested study of the New Testament far outweigh the threat of corruptionby doctrinal prejudices.3

It is to the credit of those who take the phrase ' New Testament theology'in the strong sense, that they have not allowed the rising tide of historicalstudies to wash them out of the theological workshop and reduce the status oftheir work to that of a Hilfsdisziplin for systematic theology. They can appealto the history of their discipline4 in support of their instinct that it really istheology that they are wishing to pursue.5 'New Testament theology', like the'biblical theology' out of which it developed, has in fact generally wanted tobe in some sense Christian theology, and not merely the early history ofChristian theology. This is true of its origins in the theological critique ofProtestant orthodoxy by pietists and rationalists, and equally true of itsrevival during the present century. What began in the eighteenth century asa critical impulse from the side of and in the service of theology, soon freeditself from its master. Historical criticism turned out to be a powerful inde-pendent force. Once unleashed it even turned on its master and destroyedbiblical theology's unitary picture of biblical doctrine.

New Testament theology as we know it today bears the marks of its emer-1 Krister Stendahl has argued convincingly that biblical studies will have to be more self-con-

sciously theological if it is to justify its separate existence in departments of religion. See P. Ramseyand J. F. Wilson (eds.), The Study 0/Religion in Colleges and Universities (Princeton, 1970), pp. 23-39,especially p. 28.

1 Cf. J . P. Gabler, Oratio de iusto discrimine theologiae biblicae et dogmaticae regundisque recte utriusque

Jinibus (1787). A German translation is available in O. Merk, Biblische Theologie des Neuen Testamentsinihrer Anfangszeit (Marburg, 1972) andG.Strecker (ed.), Das Problem da Theologie des Neuen Testaments(Darmstadt, 1975).

8 Cf. my argument in 'The New Testament in Religious Studies', Religious Studies x (1974),

385-406.4 Cf. especially G. Ebeling, 'What is "Biblical Theology"?', Word and Faith (London, 1963),

pp. 79-97, H. J . Kraus, Die Biblische Theologie. Ihre Geschichte und Problematik (Neukirchen, 1970) andO. Merk, op. cit.

5 Critical scholars' sarcasm about conservative work in this field for its inadequate treatment of

the history sometimes fails to appreciate its theological aims. Beyschlag, for example, was aware ofquestions for which Wrede had no ear. See my Nature of New Testament Theology, op. cit. pp. 58 f.

17 NTS x x m

252 ROBERT MORGAN

gence out of the often stormy relationship between Christian theology andcritical history. History's proper refusal to be domesticated by theologyreceived classic expression when Wrede changed the name of New Testamenttheology (so-called) to the history of early Christian religion and theology. Inthe next generation Bultmann was able to accept Wrede's historical pointsand yet recover, with the help of the neo-reformation theology of the 1920s,1the strong sense of NT theology as really theology. If this superb synthesis isnow under fire the really urgent question is what will succeed it. When thelast great synthesis of historical reconstruction and theological interpretation,that of F. C. Baur, broke down, New Testament scholarship splintered andretreated into historical detail work. In the classical age of New Testamentcriticism2 that brought a valuable harvest of historical knowledge whichpartly compensated for a day of small things in theology. In the presentsituation it is hard to see that anything will compensate for a similar lack ofgood theological interpretation. It is therefore a matter of some urgency thatChristian theologians whose special field is New Testament studies, and whocan no longer subscribe to the Bultmannian synthesis of historical and theo-logical work in that particular brand of existential interpretation, should findsome other licence for developing theological interpretations of the NewTestament. The alternative is to abandon responsible talk of God altogetherin New Testament scholarship.

The purpose of this essay is to revive consideration of an older proposal forenabling New Testament studies to talk responsibly of God. The Straussianmodel points in another direction. It encourages us to go outside the limitsof historical research for material which will help us to make sense of thetheological subject-matter of the New Testament while still remaining subjectto the negative checks which historians must continue to operate.

11

Before considering the case for separating the 'theological interpretationof the New Testament' component in New Testament theology from thehistorical task of interpretation and reconstruction, it is necessary to justifythe application of Strauss' separation model in an area about which he didnot himself write.

If the theory about theological method derived from his Life of Jesus repre-sents his considered judgement, then Strauss could not have written a NewTestament theology in the strong sense because this would involve combiningthe two elements he preferred to keep separate. But the methodological

1 See especially 'Das Problem einer theologischen Exegese des neuen Testaments' (1925), re-

printed in J. Moltmannn (ed.), Anfange der dialektischen Theologie n (Munich, 19672), 47-72.2 The century from 1831 (F. C. Baur, 'Die Christuspartei in Korinth...') to 1930 may be

claimed as the period in which historical criticism made its most decisive contribution to Christiantheology.

STRAUSS AND NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY 253

problem is similar whether one attempts to write a New Testament theologyor an account of Jesus: can or should the historical reconstruction acquirepositive theological significance? Strauss' separation model in which his-torical work has essentially the negative function of eliminating unsatisfactoryinterpretations of the data is equally applicable in both cases. And althoughStrauss did not in 1835 attempt the constructive historical task of writing a'life of Jesus' he could have done so without offending against his ownprinciples. Even if ' the historians' Jesus' has a mainly negative or criticalfunction within theology it is still necessary for theologians to undertake thequest of the historical Jesus (so-called) in order to defend Christianity againstits critics who claim to have entered the sanctuary and found it empty bydiscovering the ' real' Jesus. But this is still a negative use of history, evenwhen turned against the anti-theologians. Again, all the most obvious thingswhich a historian might say relevant to faith and theology have a negativerather than a positive significance. This is obviously true with respect to thehistorical existence of Jesus but the same applies to many positive statements.The fact that he was a good man who helped people does not distinguish himfrom many others. Only when the reverse is asserted is Christology affected.

How far a theologian considers that historical information about Jesuscould possibly take him towards a satisfactory Christology, even if the evi-dence were much stronger than it is, will depend upon what he expects of aChristology. One of Strauss' few orthodox features is that he did not considerit possible to project an adequate theological content in the form of a historicalpresentation. A great Cambridge theologian who also combined historicalexegetical expertise with a profound theological interest and insight wrote asfollows:A mere analytic treatment of Jesus of Nazareth, difficult in any case to carry out,would not even if successful bring us to our goal. To say that Jesus is Lord andChrist is not and never has been simply another way of recording the direct im-pression of his historic personality. It is a synthetic not an analytic judgement, anaffirmation of faith about God, Man and the world no less than an affirmationabout the historic Jesus of Nazareth himself.1

Strauss' treatment of Christology in the concluding dissertation shows thatunlike many subsequent liberals he would agree with this, even though theconception of God, man and the world which he brought into his ' syntheticjudgement' was less orthodox than Creed's. It was the theological character ofChristology which compelled him to bring more into it than the historian, behe never so constructive, could offer. A 'life of Jesus' could never carrysufficient theological weight. The same issue is at stake in the Straussianquestion to New Testament theology. If God is the reality that determineseverything, the task of interpreting theological texts from another culturemust place a great strain on the interpreter. It may be that at the descriptive

1 Quoted by D. M. MacKinnon in a preface to the Fontana reprint of J. M. Creed, The Divinity

of Jesus Christ (1964), pp. 10 f.17-2

254 ROBERT MORGAN

level at which he is operating the historian can take the strain by applyinghis normal skills. Or it may be that in this case communication will requiremore than ordinary historical reconstruction. That can only be gauged byasking how successfully the authors' understanding and sense of God is in factcommunicated in particular New Testament theologies. If there are groundsfor dissatisfaction with the products of historians at this crucial point it maybe that more attention needs to be paid to the nature of the material, in whichcase historians of early Christian thought will need to pay more attention totheologians in order to deepen their understanding of their subject-matter.

The reason for posing the question on the ground of method in New Testa-ment theology rather than where Strauss himself posed it is in order to say toNew Testament scholarship, tua res agitur. The 'Jesus of history/Christ offaith' debate1 can be passed down the line as essentially a question forsystematic theology. Although New Testament historical scholarship isdirectly involved it is possible for the historian, like Strauss, simply to call thetune and watch those with a care for orthodox Christology dance.2 There isnothing about the historical investigation of the Gospels which compels NewTestament scholars to engage in Christology. The fact that many of them doso reflects their personal commitments. The same commitments account forthe popular rationalization that there is no such thing as a ' purely historical'study of the New Testament. Granted the openness of historical methods andworld views, that claim owes its initial plausibility more to the fragmentarystate of the evidence and uncertainty of results than to any inherent impos-sibility of finding a consensus about what is and what is not permitted tohistorians.

In New Testament theology, on the other hand, those who play the his-torical tune are most likely to be drawn into the theological dance them-selves. It is difficult, though not necessarily impossible, to describe how theNew Testament writers think about God in a way which bridges the culturalgap satisfactorily, without getting caught up in a theological argument. Inpractice, too, many scholars do in fact intend to do Christian theology in andthrough their historical work. Despite the precedents in the history of thediscipline this conflation is open to serious objections. If these can be sus-tained it may be necessary to revert to Strauss' separation model. Their forcecan best be made plain by considering briefly the two greatest attempts atsynthesizing historical and theological interests in a 'New Testamenttheology'.

In the monumental conceptions of both Baur and Bultmann the combina-tion depends upon either the scope of historical inquiry being broadened, or

1 The phrase itself was adumbrated by Strauss in his critique of Schleiermacher's Life of Jesus:

Der Christus des Glaubens und der Jesus der Geschichte (1865).2 In his letter of 6 February 1832 to Marklin he wrote 'Nun ginge aber erst der Tanz los im

zweiten, kritischen Teile'. Sandberger, op. cil. p. 195. (See p. 245, n. 1.)

STRAUSS AND 'NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY* 255

the field of theological concern narrowed, until history is itself theology. Theproject looks hopeful because history like theology is concerned with humanexistence and theology is concerned with the meaning of history. Both Baurand Bultmann are strongly aware of the anthropological aspect of theology1and the theological overtones of history.2 Whether either synthesis will stand,however, is doubtful. If they will not, and no alternative synthesis is forth-coming, it will be necessary to return to Strauss' separation model, with themerely negative significance which this allows to history in theology.3

in

F. C. Baur acknowledged the validity of Strauss' historical criticism butnevertheless sought to overcome this ' negative critical' standpoint by his ownconstructive historical work.4 He worked to provide a positive reconstructionof Christian history on a basis of critical evaluation of the sources. But thishistorical work owed its theological significance to Baur's idealist, and from1834 specifically Hegelian, metaphysical interpretation of history.5 In onerespect, therefore, Baur confirms Strauss' claim. His theological interpreta-tion involves more than what many people would call history. However, itdoes not involve more than what in his view was meant by historical work.In Baur's programme a theological interpretation of the New Testament wasunited to his historical reconstruction of early Christianity through the taskof writing history, and the history laid bare in this activity, being defined ina way that coincided with his theological framework. The finite mind orspirit of the historian was able to detect and reflect the movement of infiniteor absolute Spirit in world history. The question of history's overall meaningreceived an answer in Baur's presentation. His compact unity of historicalreconstruction and theological interpretation was genuinely history andgenuinely theology.

Not even this perfect coincidence of history and theology could justify a'New Testament theology' or theological history that stopped at the boundsof the canon. The development continued beyond these bounds and on thismodel must be included in the theological picture. Baur, the most impressiveof all exponents of ' theology through history', therefore consistently con-tinued his histories of Church and of doctrines right up to his own day -

1 Bultmann praised Baur for this (The Theology of the New Testament, 11 (E.T. London, 1955)

p. 844). Of Baur's interpretation of Pauline theology he wrote: 'diese Interpretation ist getragen vondem WiSen darum, dass den theologischen Begriffen des Paulus, die es zu interpretieren gilt, einebestimmte AuffaSung vom Sein des Menschen zugrunde liegt' ('Zur Geschichte der Paulus-Forschung', Th.R. N.F. 1 (1929), 26-59. See p. 32).

E.g. R. Bultmann, History and Eschatology (Edinburgh, 1957).' Barth gave sharp expression to this view in his debate with Harnack (Answer 14, Anfdnge 1, 329).

Its (temporary) attraction for Bultmann is evident in his 1924 essay on liberal and dialectical theo-logy, E.T. Faith and Understanding (London, 1969), p. 31. * See p. 246, n. 2.

6 As early as 1824, m his first major work, he was strongly influenced by Schelling, and wrote,

'Ohne Philosophic bleibt mir die Geschichte ewig todt und stumm' (Symbolik und Mythologie, 1, xi).

256 ROBERT MORGANwithout ever entertaining the vain deceit that the development was thencomplete. Only the demands of a university curriculum that reflected a datedover-valuation of Scripture1 could result in a self-contained (posthumous)Vorlesungen iiber neutestamentliche Theologie,2 though Baur's mistaken judgementsabout the chronology of early Christian literature allowed him neatly toseparate the first phase of Christian history, contained in the New Testament,from what followed without incurring the suspicion of biblicism present, forexample, in Harnack's periodization.

The difference in this use of Hegel from that of Strauss is clear. Instead ofthe ready-made truth which Strauss found revealed in Hegel's Begriff and intowhich the picture-language of the biblical myth (understood as HegelianVorstellung) must be translated, what Baur found serviceable was a quasi-theological framework within which his historical work could be understood.3Whereas for Strauss the reconstruction of early Christian history was theo-logically irrelevant, Baur's vision demanded a total self-abandonment torigorous historical work-without its conclusions being prescribed in advance.4

But it was precisely Baur's tight-knit unity of the course of history with itsmetaphysical theological interpretation which made his theology extremelyvulnerable and open to falsification through his historical picture being cor-rected. He was rather dismissive of those who quarrelled with matters ofdetail instead of producing a counter-achievement,5 but it was this detailwork which rapidly undermined his synthesis. In doing so it provided furtherevidence for Strauss' view of the negative or critical function of historicalwork within theology.

It should also perhaps have thrown in doubt the attempt to provide arational theological interpretation of the whole course of history. But for aslong as philosophical idealism survived it seemed possible to combine thiswith a more cautious biblical criticism to produce weaker forms of the modelpioneered by Hegel and adopted by Baur. The discredited Hegelian dialecticof history was replaced by a looser belief that the total development madesense; and the progress of the idea was sought inductively rather thandeduced, as it had been by Hegel.6

1 In a letter to Heyd, dated 10 February 1836, he agrees that 'from the time of the Reformation,

as you rightly remark, one has set Scripture in too high a place.. . ' (translated by H. Harris, op. cit.p. 88). 2 1864, rp. Darmstadt, 1973.

8 'Auch Baur verband ja spater die historische Kritik mit der Hegelschen Philosophic, aber eben

nicht mit der Unterscheidung von Vorstellung und Begriff, sondern mit dem dialektischenGeschichtsbegriff', Sandberger, op. cit. p. 152.

4 No doubt the patterning of history which sharpened Baur's eye for contrasts and antitheses also

led him to exaggerate and oversimplify them. But his dialectical framework was itself based uponhistorical analysis of the sources and so too was his positioning of each document within his over-simple framework.

6 Points of detail may be disputed,' but this is not the way to dispose of a comprehensive historical

theory. Such a theory appeals to its broad general truth.. . ' . Paul, the Apostle of Jesus Christ, E.T.(1876), p. 4.

6 The finest exponent of this view is undoubtedly Troeltsch, whose work was suppressed rather

than critically evaluated by the rise of'dialectical theology'.

STRAUSS AND 'NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY' 257

A less persuasive attempt to fuse theological interpretation with a smallpiece of history is found in the 'life of Jesus' theology. Again, subsequentresearch proved its continuing critical potency.1 In the critical wake of Wredeand Wellhausen, Bultmann could ' calmly let the fire burn, for I see that whatis consumed is only the fanciful portraits of Life of Jesus theology '2 - with itsinadequate Christology. His sceptical judgements about the historicity of thegospels are, like Strauss', entirely separable from his own theological pro-posals. They operate critically in Straussian fashion on theologies he wishedto negate.

But Bultmann no more than Baur is prepared to restrict the task of his-torical work in theology to the negative critical function. Baur had definedhistoriography in a way that embraced his theological concerns and Bult-mann does the same, though in a quite different way. They both built uponthe existential character of history, but instead of interpreting the wholecourse of history Bultmann restricted the question of its meaning to thehistoricity of the individual who is called to make decisions. This combina-tion has its attractions. It is compatible with whatever variety of historicaltraditions are contained in the New Testament and cannot easily be em-barrassed by future historical research.3 Theological criticism of Bultmannmust proceed by probing piecemeal the validity of his historical interpreta-tions of his key witnesses rather than by undermining his whole account ofthe historical development.4 This attraction, however, is rather suspect. Itraises the question of how seriously the course of history is being taken here.Is this conception not in fact as a-historical as Strauss' theology? That mayor may not be a damaging criticism of Bultmann's theology. But it certainlyundermines the claim that a real synthesis between historical reconstructionand theological interpretation has been achieved.

Baur was able to take the developing course of history more seriously, sinceworld history provided the framework for his conception of revelation.Whereas what Strauss took from Hegel was a substitute for traditionalChristian content, what Baur took was an understanding of reality withinwhich that content could be appropriately expressed - at least for as long as aHegelian metaphysics of history remained credible. That was not for long,and Bultmann is representative of the theological reaction against locating

1 Even before the new sceptical turn within New Testament scholarship at the beginning of the

century, Martin Kahler could in 1892 use historical scepticism as an instrument of theologicalcriticism against the 'life of Jesus' theology.

8 Faith and Understanding (E.T., London, 1969), p. 132. The essay 'Zur Frage der Christologie' was

first published in 1927.8 It rests on some rather precarious hypotheses about the history of the tradition, especially that

used by the fourth evangelist. But the lack of evidence makes these far more difficult to falsify thanBaur's vulnerable reconstruction.

4 This has been done most persistendy by Kasemann, who has made it very clear that his his-

torical criticisms of Bultmann's exegesis of Paul in particular, and also of Bultmann's position on thequestion of the historical Jesus, carry a theological criticism of existentialist theology's suppression ofthe primacy of Christology.

258 ROBERT MORGAN

revelation in history. One strength of his kerygmatic theology, which seesrevelation as an event which may occur in contemporary proclamation, is thecontinuity which it can claim with such venerable strands of the Christiantradition as Paul and Luther. On the other hand, not even affinities with Pauland Luther are a substitute for solving the problems posed for theology bymodern awareness of history. Hegel and Baur, and later Troeltsch, were ableto take the course of world history seriously without abandoning God-talk,but the eclipse of idealism has dated their solutions. Bultmann's synthesis isnow the best available. But it has certain weaknesses, and if these cannot beovercome it will be necessary, regretfully, to abandon the attempt to identifyhistory and theology in New Testament studies and settle for Strauss'separation model.

The legitimate impulse behind the attempt to combine history andtheology in New Testament theology was the recognition on the one handthat the new historical disciplines could not be denied access to the NewTestament documents, and yet on the other, that the Christian Church mustcontinue to interpret its authoritative tradition theologically. Since bothhistory and theology interpret tradition, using the same methods to under-stand the same texts, it was natural to assume that the tasks could be con-flated. But three specific weaknesses in Bultmann's undertaking indicatewhere the project breaks down.

Firstly, the combination of history and theology in 'New Testamenttheology' has no adequate answer to the objection pressed by Wrede that theidea of the canon is irrelevant to the historian.1 Bultmann does justice toWrede's account of the demands of history by including extra-canonicalmaterial in his reconstruction. But like other neo-Reformation theologianshe pays more attention to the New Testament canon than he can justifyrationally.2

Secondly, there is a major difference between how historians and theolo-gians treat the tradition. This is not to be located in their methods or resultsin understanding it. The professor who lectured four hours a week on his-torical exegesis and a fifth (in a Talari) on 'practical interpretation' broughttheological interpretation into disrepute.3 Both are concerned with the truemeaning of the text. The difference, rather, is located at the level of theinterpreters' personal motivations or attitudes towards the tradition. Thetheologian is committed to a personal advocacy of whatever parts of his tradi-tion he does not submit to theological criticism. The historian is not com-

1 'No New Testament writing was born with the predicate "canonical" attached...', op. cit.

E.T. pp. 70 f.i His brief comment in Anfange 11, 71 that the idea of the canon should preserve the contingency of

revelation is hardly sufficient. On p. 67 he even allows the theoretical possibility of interpretingAugustine, Luther, Schleiermacher (or the Bhagavadgita) in the same way.

8 Barth was caustic about Niebergall's 'practical' interpretation of scripture. The Epistle to the

Romans (E.T., Oxford 1933), p. 9. See Faith and Understanding, p. 158 for Bultmann's view.

STRAUSS AND 'NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY5 259

mitted to this, even if personally he finds what the tradition is saying authen-tic and true. His task is essentially descriptive. This difference becomesvisible at the point where a theologian finds himself compelled to exercisetheological criticism of such tradition as he cannot accept as an adequate ex-pression of Christianity. The criterion for theological criticism is inappro-priate in historical work. A historian may judge that I Cor. xv. 1-11 fallsbelow Paul's normal standard of theological insight and that it conflicts withthe main thrust of the apostle's theology. But the historical Sachkritik in whichhe may then engage is something quite different from the theological Sach-kritik with which Luther criticized James, not on a basis of James' betterthoughts but on the basis of his own understanding of Christianity, derivedfrom other parts of the tradition.1

At the point where interpretation becomes critical interpretation, his-torians and theologians can be seen to obey different rules, and the attempt tocombine their roles breaks down. The combination works for as long as thetheologian approves of the tradition he is interpreting. It provides, too, amode of doing theology which, because it reflects the life of the Church thatlives (in human terms) from interpreting its tradition, is of direct assistance tothe ministry of the word. But since the New Testament contains materialwhich must give pause to even the most catholic advocate of tota scriptura, acomplete 'theology of the New Testament' will run aground upon theSachkritik which Bultmann saw to be inseparable from Sachexegese.2

Thirdly, both history and theology are defined too narrowly when atten-tion is restricted to the historical character of human existence as this isexperienced by an individual. Both history and theology have a social dimen-sion, and theology at least must speak of the future. This is simply to repeatthe doubts already mentioned about the possibility of dealing seriously withhistorical reality as we know it within the framework of an existentialisttheology. In this respect Hegel may provide a more promising starting-pointeven than Luther.

1 Bultmann uses the same word Sachkritik in both contexts, claiming that it is practised by his-

torians but also recalling Luther's theological criticism of the canon. N. A. Dahl questions thelegitimacy of Bultmann's procedure in his important review article, Th.R. N.F. xxni (1955), 21-49.The concept is also discussed in The Nature of New Testament Theology, pp. 42-51.

8 Anfdnge 11, 53 f. In The Theology of the New Testament (E.T. 1974) Kummel offers a pragmatic

solution: 'We can expect to encounter this witness in its purest version in those forms of primitiveChristian proclamation which stand closest in point of time to the historical Christ event' where hefinds 'in spite of all the differences, a common message which can be labelled as foundational and bywhich the message of the rest of the New Testament can be measured' (p. 324). But why should hedraw a line at Paul? And does he find all pre-Pauline theologies equally acceptable? It is betterfrankly to involve one's own understanding of Christianity in making a theological judgement, asimplied by Luther's criterion of 'what preaches Christ' and continued in Bultmann's and Kase-mann's theological interpretation and criticism.

260 ROBERT MORGANIV

The argument so far suggests that 'New Testament theology', conceived assimultaneously a historical and a doctrinal discipline, was the fruit of apremature union between Christian theology and historical criticism. Itshould be replaced by a Straussian separation of the two tasks. Christiantheologians, including the New Testament specialists among them, will thenbe free to continue their proper task of interpreting the tradition theologicallyin new situations, using whatever materials and insights further this aim.1If the results are more startling than what is usual in the history of ideas, thisis because the subject-matter involves the author's total understanding ofreality and existence. To understand and communicate the message of atheological text it is necessary for an interpreter to involve the horizon of hisown experience. Since not all theological interpreters have this pre-packagedin such a firm philosophical conceptuality as Strauss, Baur and Bultmann,their products may bear the marks of a groping and stumbling eclecticism.Whatever his faults, Strauss did justice to the all-embracing character ofGod-talk by being prepared in his interpretation of it to risk drastic innova-tion. He introduced as much of his knowledge of the world, encapsulated inHegelian philosophy, as appeared to him necessary to speak intelligibly andcredibly of the reality which determines everything. He recognized that thegreat changes which have taken place in our modern understanding of theworld must be reflected in any interpretation which is to do justice to theuniversal scope of the biblical witness.2

The problem is clearly an urgent one for all theologians who, like Strauss,cannot simply accept a 'mythical' view of the world. The easy solutions andshort cuts of what a few years ago was fashionable as 'biblical theology' findlittle support now amongst intellectuals.3 The problems of understanding and

1 In his preface to the English edition (1933) of The Epistle to the Romans Barth wrote about 'the

problem, "What is exegesis? " No one can, of course, bring out the meaning of a text (auslegen) with-out at the same time adding something to it (einlegen). Moreover, no interpreter is rid of the danger ofin fact adding more than he extracts. I neither was nor am free from this danger. And yet I should bealtogether misunderstood if my readers refused to credit me with the honesty of, at any rate, intendingto explain the text. I must assure them that, in writing this book, I felt myself bound to the actualwords of the text, and did not in any way propose to engage myself in free theologizing. It goeswithout saying that my interpretation is open to criticism...' (p. ix). The continuation of this pas-sage shows that Barth is thinking of criticism according to historical criteria which could falsify hisinterpretation. He is therefore a good example of the Straussian model. And in his clearest accountof interpretation which illuminates the subject-matter of the text, the preface to the second edition,he asks 'why parallels drawn from the ancient world - and with such parallels modern commentatorsare chiefly concerned - should be of more value for an understanding of the Epistle than the situa-tion in which we ourselves actually are, and to which we can therefore bear witness' (p. 11). Heattacks an (imaginary) commentary in which 'a maze of contemporary parallels did duty for anexplanation' of what modern interpreters find difficult, and asks whether 'such a commentary couldreally be called an interpretation' (p. 12).

1 This concern has been most persistently emphasized by W. Pannenberg.

3 A useful account of this is contained in G. E. Ladd, 'The Search for Perspective', Interpretation,

xxv (1971), 41-62. This conservative movement is of course not to be confused with the far moresophisticated search for 'biblical theology' associated with Von Rad, Kraus, Gese, Stuhlmacher andothers.

STRAUSS AND 'NEW TESTAMENT THEOLOGY5 261

appropriating the witness of past cultures are more generally appreciatedtoday. They have been much discussed within the philosophy of the socialsciences by anthropologists and historians of religion1 and it is worth askinghow much historians of early Christianity may be able to learn from thatdebate, once a Straussian separation of tasks has been achieved. An obviousgap in New Testament studies is a convincing historical treatment of how theauthors thought of God. However little the doctrine(s) of God is (are)thematized, the importance of this basic theme of all theology cannot bedenied, and historical analysis is required. One reason for its neglect may bethat at this point the need for theological interpretation is so pressing that thehistorical task is by-passed. If so, the history of early Christian religion andtheology stands to gain from the Straussian separation of tasks. Its own themewill be more clearly defined and it will be sufficiently detached to be able tolearn from whatever a freer theological interpretation can suggest about thecharacter of the subject-matter. By watching theological interpreters doingthis creative and daring task of venturing to say what religious texts meantoday, sensitive historians may pick up ideas about how to evoke for theirreaders an awareness of what it is all about. Their extraordinarily difficulthistorical task may be illuminated by the tradition of a community whoseclaims to stand in a living continuity with these texts can to some extent betested. For example, the claim that religious texts speak of human existence isa hermeneutical key provided by modern theological interpretation withoutwhich historians will make no sense of the New Testament writings. With itthey can ask how adequately the early Christians' understanding of God in-terpreted the experience of themselves and their world which they sharedwith their contemporaries.

Both sides should gain from a Straussian separation of the two main com-ponents in 'New Testament theology'. Of course the separation is onlypartial.' Reconstruction' in the history of ideas is essentially a matter of inter-pretation, and interpretation of texts requires whatever light reconstruction ofthe history can throw upon the tradition to be interpreted.2 Further, althoughtheological interpretation may bring more to the texts than a historian ofideas would bring, it cannot establish an interpretation which historianswould brand as improbable. That tribute paid to modern historical ration-ality means that in practice historical and theological interpretations will

1 E.g. Bryan R. Wilson (ed.), Rationality (Oxford, 1970); D. Z. Phillips (ed.), Religion and Under-

standing (Oxford, 1967); Robin Horton and Ruth Finnegan (eds.), Modes of Thought. Essays onThinking in Western and Non-Western Societies (London, 1973).

8 Bultmann rightly insists that 'Neither exists, of course, without the other, and they stand con-

stantly in a reciprocal relation to each other' {Theology of the New Testament, 11, E.T. (1955), p. 251).But for him 'interpretation of the New Testament writings' stands 'under the presupposition thatthey have something to say to the present'. The historical task is formulated here in a way that makesroom for the theological interest. But it is equally possible to acknowledge the two sides to historicalwork, interpretation of the evidence and reconstruction of that to which it refers, without makingthis presupposition.

262 ROBERT MORGAN

frequently coincide.1 But the theoretical separation advocated here willfree interpreters from the constraints which prevent the sober and scepticalhistorian from articulating the full meaning and positive significance ofdocuments about which we know so little. It may also encourage Christiantheologians who specialize in NT studies to fly a few kites. They will soon beshot down if they stray beyond the limits of historical plausibility. But insteadof claiming exclusive historical rights for their interpretations of the New Testa-ment they would say: 'This is the sense I make of this authoritative piece oftradition. If anyone finds my interpretation implausible let him falsify it byhistorical argument. That is the means by which all bold new interpretationsmust be tested for their validity.'

The debate between better and worse interpretations goes on. Some inter-pretations of Paul take up central emphases of Pauline theology and havemore right to appeal to him than others - including possibly some otherswhose individual historical exegetical judgements are more often correct.The main lines of theological continuity, visible for example between Pauland Luther, are the most important features of any interpretation. They areconstructed out of individual exegetical judgements, but the mosaic is farmore than the sum of the stones. The artist's arrangement is decisive. Wherethe evidence is as fragmentary as in the case of the New Testament there arevarious possibilities of historical reconstruction, and nobody can claim toproject more than a possible historical sketch.

On this view the historian can claim a high degree of objectivity only for an'identikit' type of outline whose main use is in disallowing portraits that areclearly distortions. Genuine interpretation involves drawing more lines andadding more colours than are to be found in the evidence. One approachesthe material with a prior understanding of its subject-matter and this pro-vides a framework for interpreting it. This may be modified or corrected oreven abandoned in favour of another in the course of correlating it with the(always partially) perceived witness of the texts and other relevant evidence,but the hope is that it will vindicate itself by making sense of such evidenceas we possess.

Recognition of the subjective element of construction in all interpretationconstitutes an argument for declaring one's theological interests in advance.That will not weaken the claim to validity for one's interpretation providedthat this does not strain the evidence. It might even strengthen its claim onthe grounds that someone who stands in the same tradition might well havea better instinct for the author's intention.

Where does this Straussian separation place New Testament scholars?Those who specialize in philology will always command respect and can ifnecessary find a home in departments of classics and oriental languages.Historians also are equipped to survive in profane surroundings. Only theo-

1 As Bultmann indicated: Anfdnge der dialektischen Theologie, n, 68.

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logical interpreters have nowhere to lay their heads in universities except indepartments of theology and religious studies. If they are worth their hire andactually throw some light on the Christian religion, their work is the bestargument for the existence of such departments.

The honour which those who wish to be simply historians can expect ininstitutions of learning does not always extend outside the ivory towers. Tojudge from the reception of Strauss' first volume and the experience of manyother 'consistently historical' students of the New Testament, they can expecta frosty reception from within the Christian Church. That is consistent withthe nature of the discipline whose significance for theology and Church isessentially negative. Franz Overbeck was prepared to accept the logic of hisposition as neither more nor less than an historian. He survived the ambiguityof his personal position in a faculty of Christian theology to become a post-humous hero of those who, after the First World War, wanted to free theologyfrom the Babylonian captivity of'purely historical' research.

But Overbeck's remorselessly critical attitude to theology remains that of a(perhaps prophetic) outsider. Most Christian students of the New Testamentare committed to engaging in theological interpretation. It is important thatthey resist the insidious suggestion that when they take off the historian's hat(or stick a few theological feathers in it) they are guilty of professional mis-conduct. If our study of these documents remains untheological both Churchand university will lose interest. Christians will have reason to feel frustratedthat the specialists who know best the most authoritative parts of their tradi-tion are unwilling or unable to interpret it in ways which have some relevanceto our contemporary knowledge or experience of man, the world and God.And students in secular universities will complain that their investigation ofthe New Testament is not providing the data on Christianity which they hada right to expect from attention to that religion's scriptures.

In practical terms, New Testament specialists cannot assimilate all that isnecessary to do theological interpretation without neglecting their historicalduties, and will therefore depend largely on systematic theologians to mediateand help interpret for them contemporary experience of reality. Systematictheology is as much a Hilfsdisziplin for the theological interpretation of theNew Testament as historical work on the New Testament tradition is aHilfsdisziplin for systematic theology. It would be better to speak of a rela-tionship in which biblical scholar and systematic theologian stimulate, pro-voke and finally assist each other. Gabler's 'correct distinction' betweenbiblical and dogmatic theology was necessary in 1787 to free the historicalstudy of the Bible from the distorting effects of dogmatics' interest in itsresults. Even as late as 1897, Wrede could only preserve the purity of his-torical work by banning the church's theological interests from 'scientifictheology' (so-called). The scientific rigour of historians, especially those ofthe ' history of religions' school (such as Wrede), their intellectual fathers

264 ROBERT MORGAN

(especially Baur) and sons (especially Bultmann), has given the historicalcritical study of the New Testament a place of honour in the study of religion.But Baur and Bultmann were above all constructive theologians who saw astheir goal the theological interpretation of the tradition they analysed. Thepurpose of our Straussian separation of the tasks they conflated is to serve thatsame end. If we lack an idealist metaphysics of history broad enough toinclude a theological programme in its bosom, and are dissatisfied with a viewof theology narrow enough to be fitted into an existentialist account of his-toriography, we shall have to abandon the identification of history andtheology in 'New Testament theology' and feel free to develop new theo-logical interpretations of the earliest and most valued parts of the Christiantradition. These will be subject to the critical scrutiny of historians but willnot be restricted to what historians can produce. It is necessary to look inwhatever diverse directions fragments of meaning and truth are to be found,and dare to involve these in creative new interpretations.1

The theological interpretation of the New Testament, or that element of'New Testament theology' which it has been the purpose of this Straussianquestion to set free from the historians' constraints while insisting it remainsubject to their checks, is the purpose, crown and climax of all specificallyChristian study of the New Testament. Those who engage in it are rightlycalled theologians - Christian theologians, not ' biblical theologians'; that is aphrase loaded with misunderstandings. If the study of the New Testament isnot to become a fringe activity of only secondary interest to Christian studiesand only negative significance within the Church, New Testament scholarsneed to renew their licence to interpret theologically that part of the traditionwhich they know best. Since theology is too important to be left to the dog-maticians it would be disastrous for New Testament scholars to retire fromthe theological workshop and be satisfied with quarrying historical materialfor systematic theology to use. No doubt a division of labour is necessary, andsome will remain historians or philologists and nothing else. These are per-fectly legitimate activities - if only for a gifted minority. What is not accept-able is the suggestion that historical or philological work is the only properbusiness of New Testament studies. This misunderstanding has been nourishedby the fiction that ' New Testament theology' is a purely historical activity.Only when that fiction is destroyed will theological interpretation of the NewTestament revive. Its revival ought not to detract from the dignity andnecessity of historical critical work. That also has an important theologicalfunction, albeit of a negative kind. Its sober criticism will not only check thebolder theological spirits. More interestingly, the examples and successes ofStrauss, Baur and Bultmann show that its strategically placed dynamite may

1 Some scrutiny of what is brought into theological interpretation for its compatibility with the

tradition remains a necessary control. It was faced by those who allowed but controlled the use ofallegorical interpretation, e.g. Aquinas, S.T. 1. 1. 10.

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even eventually dislodge those whose excessive theological conservatism1delays the exodus towards the new theological interpretations needed by athinking Church in a rapidly changing world. New Testament specialistswho see their most urgent task today to be that of developing these newtheological interpretations, and who realize that this will involve being morethan historians, will look back with admiration to the classical age of historicalcriticism and will insist that the great tradition be kept alive. Historical truthis valuable for its own sake, and even where the material is too sparse to allowmore than a relative plausibility to anyone's reconstructions it is often possibleto be fairly certain that some convenient fictions are false. And what is his-torically false cannot be theologically true.

In real life the critical function has neither the first nor the last word, butin a celebration of Strauss' centenary it may be allowed both. Certainly atheology which is not critical should not build tombs for the prophets on thisparticular centenary.

1 See p. 257, n. 2. In the preceding sentence Bultmann speaks of his 'conservative New Testament

colleagues.. .perpetually engaged in salvage operations'.