S tra te g ic D e b rie f O p e ra tio n S u m a clibrary.college.police.uk/docs/appref/strategic-sumac.pdf · S tra te g ic D e b rie f O p e ra tio n S u m a c PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE

Strategic DebriefOperation Sumac

PROFESSIONALPRACTICE

2 Strategic Debrief - Operation Sumac

Contents

Introduction 3

Leadership and Command 11

Expert Support 15

Resources 19

Communications 23

Major Incident Room Procedures 27

During Operation Sumac Suffolk Constabulary recieved considerable help and supportfrom police forces and police organisations throughout the UK. The force is verygrateful for this assistance, and as the contributors are too numerous to thankindividually Suffolk Constabulary would like to take this opportunity to extend theirthanks to all those who were involved.

© National Policing Improvement Agency 2007

STRATEGIC DEBRIEF - OPERATION SUMAC

Introduction

Operation Sumac was a linked series investigation conductedby Suffolk Constabulary into the murders of five womenwhose bodies were found in various locations aroundIpswich during December 2006.

The investigation was short and intense. The time from thediscovery of the first body until a suspect was charged wastwenty days. The scale of the investigation meant that theforce drew in additional resources and staff through mutualaid and, at its peak, these amounted to nearly a quarter ofthe force’s normal police establishment.

Operation Sumac is of interest to police practitioners for tworeasons. First, the inherent difficulty of investigating linkedseries homicides is well known, but these are rare events.Investigators, therefore, have few opportunities to learn

more about the processes involved and how improvementsin investigation might be made. Second, the strategicapproach to linked series homicide has evolved from thefindings of the Byford Report into the investigation of the‘Yorkshire Ripper’ murders, which was published in 1981.Byford was only concerned with ensuring an effectiveoutcome for the investigation. Much has changed in policingsince 1981, and issues such as community reassurance,business continuity, quality assurance and resourcemanagement are now more visible features of the policinglandscape than they once were. As a consequence, strategicmanagement structures must now be capable of delivering amuch broader range of outcomes than detecting the crimes.Suffolk Constabulary’s experience during Operation Sumacoffers a rare opportunity for the service to examine both theprocess of linked series homicide investigation and itsstrategic management.

Strategic Debrief - Operation Sumac 3


The Debrief

Suffolk Constabulary recognised that Operation Sumacprovided an opportunity for the service to learn more aboutthe investigation and strategic management of linked serieshomicide. Consequently they requested the ACPO HomicideWorking Group (HWG) and the National PolicingImprovement Agency (NPIA) Professional Practice Unitcollaborate in debriefing the operation. Many of the issuesthat are of interest remained sub judice at the time of thedebrief but it was felt that lessons learned in a number ofkey strategic areas could be addressed without reference tothe detailed management of the investigation or the materialit gathered. These areas were:

1. Leadership and Command2. Communications3. Resourcing Arrangements4. MIRSAP Functionality:

a. Role and functionality of the CentralResearch Incident (CRI)

b. Role and functionality of MIRWEBc. Role and functionality of the

Message Assessment Centre5. Expert Investigative Support

This briefing paper highlights learning points identified bythe force in each of these areas.

This is not a critical review or an inspection. The focus is onassisting key players in the strategic management of theoperation to reflect on what went well, what they might dodifferently in the future and what they believed other chiefofficer teams may learn from their experience.

The report starts with an overview of linked series homicidesinvestigation in the UK. Some information about SuffolkConstabulary is then provided together with the sequence ofevents as they unfolded in Operation Sumac. The views ofthose debriefed are then presented. These address the fiveareas in the terms of reference and are presented under thefollowing headings:

1. Aspects that worked well2. Issues for Suffolk Constabulary3. Issues for national consideration

The content of the report represents the views of keymanagers involved in the operation. They do not necessarilyreflect policy on any issue or the views of SuffolkConstabulary, ACPO or the NPIA.

Linked Series HomicideInvestigations

The term ‘linked series’, describes investigations where it isbelieved that individual offences have been committed bythe same person(s). It is generally used in relation to linkedseries rapes or homicides.

The Home Office classifies homicide as offences of murder,manslaughter and infanticide. Homicides vary enormously interms of the circumstances in which they occur, themotivation of offenders and the methods used. Many areunplanned. They are the outcome of spontaneous violencewhich, had the circumstances been slightly different, mayhave resulted in non-fatal injuries. Many homicides of thistype are relatively easy to solve and fall into the ACPOcategory C or B (see text box). Where homicide is planned byan offender, or where offenders are able to exercise controlover scenes, witnesses or other sources of information,investigations can be extremely complex and fall into ACPOcategory A or A+.

Some homicides involve a single offender killing multiplevictims. Criminologists have identified three types of multiplevictim homicide:

• Mass murder, when multiple victims are killed at onelocation during a single period of time. In the UK this mostcommonly occurs in domestic circumstances where partners,children and other relatives are killed. Terrorist incidents canalso involve mass murder.

• Spree killings, which are very similar, and occur when anoffender kills multiple victims in different locations during asingle event.

• Serial killings, where multiple victims are killed in differentlocations and where there is a significant “cooling off”period between each of the offences.

Although most forces will have some experience ofinvestigating multiple victim homicides, linked serieshomicide investigations are rare. This is because mostmultiple victim homicides involve mass murder and spreekilling. Such incidents are generally over at the timeinvestigations start and so the number of victims, the scenes,and very often the identity of offenders, are known. As aconsequence, there is no need to link investigations.

Linked series investigations are more likely in the case ofserial killings, but even here it is not always the case.Offences of this type characteristically present the police withtwo scenarios. The first is where offenders prevent thehomicide from coming to the attention of the police eitherby disposing of bodies in ways that mean they are notimmediately discovered, or disguising the fact that thedeaths were homicide. The series only comes to light whenoffenders are investigated because one of the killings isdiscovered. The homicides committed by Brady and Hindley,Shipman, West and Nielson are all of this type. In such casesthe investigation is concerned with identifying the number ofvictims and the evidence connecting offenders to them. It isusually a single investigation rather than a number of linked

Homicide Categories

Category A+A homicide or other major investigation where public concern andthe associated response to media intervention is such that normalstaffing levels are not adequate to keep pace with theinvestigation.

Category AA homicide or other major investigation which is of grave publicconcern or where vulnerable members of the public are at risk,where the identity of the offender(s) is not apparent, or theinvestigation and the securing of evidence requires significantresource allocation.

Category BA homicide or other major investigation where the identity of theoffender(s) is not apparent, the continued risk to the public is lowand the investigation or securing of evidence can be achievedwithin normal force resourcing arrangements.

Category CA homicide or other major investigation where the identity of theoffender(s) is apparent from the outset and the investigation orsecuring of evidence can be achieved easily.

Number of Times HOLMES LinksEstablished 2006-2007

We asked HOLMES managers in 53 forces throughout the UK howfrequently homicide investigations had been linked to another investigationin the preceeding 12 months. Of the 51 that responded, 14 hadestablished links that included at least one homicide. In some cases theselinks were established to share intelligence, for example, due tocommonality of criminal networks, rather than because of evidenceindicative of a single perpetrator.

Within force Cross borderlinks links

33 7

ones. A linked series investigation generally only occurs inthe second scenario. This is where individual bodies arefound in different locations at different times andinvestigations reveal that they may have been killed by thesame person.

The homicides committed by Sutcliffe, who was dubbed the‘Yorkshire Ripper’ by the media, fall into this category.Linking two or more homicides with certainty can beextremely difficult and has significant consequences for theinvestigation. Failing to link killings committed by the sameoffender can lead to the loss of investigative opportunities,but wrongly linking offences committed by differentoffenders can be equally damaging. Once a link isestablished, there is intense pressure on the service to detectthe offences quickly in order to prevent further killings.Failure to do this in the case of the murders committed bySutcliffe led to the Byford Report. The procedures employedin the investigation of linked series homicide today haveevolved from that report and are contained in the ACPO(2005) Guidance on Major Incident Room StandardisedAdministrative Procedures (MIRSAP). There is no centralregister of the number of times these procedures have beenused in the UK, although it is thought to be very few.



Other Key Facts about Suffolk

Recorded crime is relatively low at 77.9 crimes/1000 of thepopulation compared to the national rate of 103.3 crimes/1000 ofthe population.

The average price for a house is £193,312 compared to the nationalaverage of £210,578.

The standard mortality ratio (90) is lower than the English average(100) whilst life expectancy for men and women is higher.

In terms of levels of deprivation, Suffolk as a county is ranked asbeing in the least deprived quarter in England.

Further Information

Suffolk County Council www.suffolk.gov.uk

Suffolk Constabulary www.suffolk.police.uk

Home Office Research Development Statisticswww.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds

Suffolk’s economy is diverse, ranging from agriculture totourism. The biggest economic sectors are publicadministration, distribution, banking and manufacture. Inaddition to the mix of countryside and towns, the Port ofFelixstowe on the east coast is one of the largest containerports in Europe. The county’s employment rate is higher thanthe average for Great Britain.

Suffolk Constabulary employs approximately 1300 policeofficers and 1200 police staff. In terms of numbers of staff,this makes Suffolk Constabulary one of the smallest forces inEngland and Wales. The current Chief Constable is SimonAsh, who joined in June 2007.

The force is divided into three areas: Eastern, Southern andWestern, each of which is commanded by a ChiefSuperintendent. These areas are divided into districts withboundaries matching local district or borough councils.Suffolk Constabulary is in the process of rolling out a total of47 Safer Neighbourhood Teams in these districts. In additionto policing a mix of rural and town locations, the Port ofFelixstowe, Sizewell B Power Station, and major roads suchas the A11, A12 and A14 also fall in the Constabulary area.

Home Office statistics from 2005/2006 show that Suffolk hasthe lowest rate of recorded crime in the Eastern Region, andrates of violent crime lower than the average for Englandand Wales. The British Crime Survey also shows that rates ofburglary, the risk of victimization, and levels of personalcrime are lower than the national average.

Suffolk ConstabularyThe county of Suffolk is part of the East Anglia region ofEastern England. It is bordered by Essex to the south,Cambridgeshire to the west, Norfolk to the north, and theNorth Sea to the east. The county covers an area of 3801square km, and includes rural countryside, large towns and asignificant stretch of coastline. Suffolk has a population of692,100, which gives it a population density lower than theEnglish average. The county town is Ipswich (pop. 118,200),with other significant towns including Bury St Edmunds andLowestoft.

In addition to Suffolk County Council, the county containsthe following district councils:

• Forest Heath;• Babergh;• Ipswich;• Mid Suffolk;• St. Edmundsbury;• Suffolk Coastal;• Waveney.

Suffolk Constabulary - Force Structure


Chief Constable

3 x BCUCommanders

Assistant ChiefConstable

Head of CrimeManagement

Head ofOperations

Director ofCriminal Justice

Support

Procurementand

Administration

Assistant ChiefOfficer

FacilitiesManagement

Finance

Director ofHuman Resources

Deputy ChiefConstable

Director ofKnowledgeArchitecture

Head ofCorporate

Development

ProfessionalStandards


Operation Sumac

In terms of a linked series homicide investigation, thedisappearance and murders of five women in Ipswich duringNovember and December 2006 had a number of uniquefeatures. All of the bodies were found within a smallgeographical area around Ipswich and within a relativelyshort timescale. The victims also shared many commoncharacteristics.

As the investigations developed these similarities highlighteda potential for them to be linked. The force recognised thisand formal linking took place when sufficient informationbecame available in relation to each investigation. Althougheach investigation had its own SIO, MIR, HOLMES accountand an individual operational name, Sumac was the overalloperation name, which involved not only the investigation,but also public reassurance, resource management and themedia response.

The operation can be divided into four phases from theinitial MISPER report through to trial.

Phase One

This phase began on the 1st November with the report ofTania Nicol as a missing person. The report was made by hermother, and was dealt with initially at Area level. After anassessment of Tania’s vulnerability the case was passed to asenior detective for review on the 4th November. As aconsequence of this review an SIO was appointed toinvestigate her disappearance. An MIR and a HOLMESdatabase were established.

On the 15th November, 25 year old Gemma Adams failed toreturn home, and her boyfriend reported her missing to thepolice at 02:55. Following a review of the circumstances, anSIO was appointed to investigate her disappearance and asecond MIR was established.

At a chief officers meeting on the 15th the twoinvestigations were declared to be a critical incident due tothe vulnerability of the MISPERs. A Detective Superintendentwas appointed to oversee and coordinate both investigationsand an initial media strategy was developed.

On the following day a gold strategy was developed.

On the 17th November the HOLMES databases used on thetwo MISPER investigations were linked.This enabled both tobe searched and for information to be shared between theMIRs. This was necessary because although there wasinsufficient information to link both dissapearances ascrimes, both of the women were sex workers, had similarlifestyles, associates, customers and both were drug abusers.The link was intended to avoid information relevant to bothinvestigations being lost.

Phase Two

The discovery of Gemma Adams’ body, marked thebeginning of Phase Two. Gemma’s body was discovered by amember of the public on Saturday 2nd December in BelsteadBrook near Hintlesham, 3 miles west of Ipswich. A postmortem was unable to determine a cause of death, butgiven that the body was discovered naked except forjewellery, a murder investigation was launched.

Six days later a Dive and Wade team searching the brook forGemma’s clothing discovered the body of Tania two to threemiles downstream near Copdock, south west of Ipswich. Shewas also naked except for her jewellery and a post mortemwas again unable to determine a cause of death. A secondmurder investigation was launched.

Both of these investigations continued to use the same SIOsand MIRs as had been used for the MISPER enquiries. Thedeaths of Gemma Adams and Tania Nicols were formallylinked on the 9th December. As media interest was alsoincreasing, a force media spokesperson was identified and astrategy was developed to reassure the community and totry and prevent further deaths.

Suffolk’s resources were further stretched on the 9thDecember, by the unrelated death of a young person shotduring an incident at the Zest Nightclub in Ipswich towncentre. Many of the potential witnesses in the club werefrom South London, which meant that the investigation wasconducted in two force areas.

Phase Three

Phase Three of the operation commenced on Sunday the10th December with the discovery of the naked body of 24year old Anneli Alderton in woodland near Nacton to theeast of Ipswich. Anneli had not previously been reportedmissing. She was also a prostitute who worked in Ipswich.

Later the same day Paula Clennell was reported missing byher boyfriend who last saw her at 22:40 on the 8thDecember. She was one of a number of women reportedmissing during this period, some of whom were known tobe sex workers in Ipswich. Initial inquires were conducted bythe relevant Area teams and each was then risk assessed,with the investigations being escalated where necessary.

On Monday the 11th December Annette Nicholls wasreported missing by her mother.

At 15:02 on the 12th December the naked body of PaulaClennell was discovered close to the Old Felixstowe Roadnear Levington, to the east of Ipswich. Forty minutes later, apolice helicopter flying over the scene spotted a second bodya short distance away, which was later identified as AnnetteNicholls.

On the 15th December all five murders are formally classifiedas a linked series homicide. Four days later Steve Wright wasarrested on suspicion of murder.

Briefing Notes: Advisory Information and Guidelines on Operation SUMMAC 9

Phase Four

Phase Four commenced when Steve Wright was chargedwith five counts of murder on the 21st December. On thefollowing day he was remanded in custody. After furthercourt appearances in January and May 2007 the trial was setto take place in January 2008.

At the time of writing, Operation Sumac was still ongoing.Lines of inquiry were being investigated while casepreparation and disclosure work were being finalised inreadiness for the trial. The five MIRs had been reduced toone, and 64 staff remained on the operation. The lastmutual aid officers returned to their forces at the end ofMay 2007.


Operation Sumac Timeline


The structures for managing linked series homicideinvestigations are contained in ACPO (2005) Guidance onMajor Incident Room Standardised Administrative Procedures(MIRSAP), Section 11, Linking Major Incidents. These haveevolved from the principles first laid out in 1981, in theByford Report. As noted earlier, these structures do not takeaccount of policing priorities such as media management,force business continuity, resources, partnership working andcommunity reassurance. These additional elements oftenrequire a different approach to management than thatoriginally envisaged in the Byford Report.

It is now the practice to overlay the Byford structures withthe leadership and command processes more commonlyassociated with large scale mobilisation events, as describedin ACPO (2006) Guidance on the Police National MobilisationPlan. These are based on the Gold/Silver/Bronze levels ofcommand that have been in use for over twenty years forpre-planned events and spontaneous major incidents. Theyenable police commanders to develop a proportionatestrategic, tactical and operational response, keeping cleardemarcation between the roles and responsibilities of eachlevel of the operation. They provide a clear chain ofcommand, which is not rank specific and which makes theGold commander responsible for the overall outcome ofthe operation.

On the face of it, there appear to be some tensions betweenthe Byford structures and the Gold/Silver/Bronze commandstructure. They are not, however, incompatible, andexperiences such as Operation Sumac may enable the serviceto develop practices which draw on the best of both models.

Leadership and Command

Further Information

ACPO (2005) Guidance on Major Incident Room StandardisedAdministrative Procedures (MIRSAP).

ACPO (2006) Murder Investigation Manual.

ACPO (2007) Practice Advice on Critical Incident Management.

ACPO (2006) Guidance on the Police National Mobilisation Plan.

Byford, Sir Lawrence (1981) The Yorkshire Ripper Case: Review ofthe Police Investigation of the Case by Lawrence Byford, HerMajesty’s Inspector of Constabulary.



Aspects that Worked Well

The strategic command structure for the operation evolvedfrom what can be thought of as routine oversight duringPhase One, when the issues were serious but within normaloperational parameters, through to Phase Three, when abespoke Gold Command structure was implemented. Thestructure which emerged in Phase Three is the one which isof most interest.

By the end of Phase Two, the force was investigating twohomicides as a linked series, which had also been declared acritical incident for the force. The Deputy Head of CrimeOperations was performing the role of Officer in OverallCommand (OIOC) and the ACC Operations was GoldCommander. On the day that Phase Three commenced, theChief Constable called a meeting at which he appointed theACC Operations as the OIOC, with the existing OIOC as herdeputy. The Head of Crime Operations was appointed asmedia spokesperson for the force and the Chief Constablewas to be Gold Commander for the operation.

This structure is entirely in keeping with present guidance inthis area. However, some of those involved felt that it had anumber of disadvantages. The ACC Operations hadexperience of Gold Command but had not managedcomplex crime inquires of this magnitude. The original OIOCwas considered by everyone to be an extremely ableinvestigator who was performing the role well. In addition, itleft the Head of Crime Operations performing a media rolerather than drawing on his skills as an investigative manager.An additional problem was that by performing the role ofGold Commander, the Chief Constable compromised hisindependence in relation to any RIPA authorisations thatwere made on behalf of the investigation.

A review by the ACPO HWG supported these concerns and,as a consequence, the structure was changed to the onethat was used throughout the rest of the investigation.Under this model the ACC Operations resumed the role ofGold Commander, the Head of Crime Operations wasappointed OIOC with the original OIOC as his deputy. TheChief Constable concentrated on the strategic managementof the force as a whole while the Deputy Chief Constableestablished a Gold Logistics Command and oversaw theforcewide response to routine policing. This structure wasthe one which managed the operation through Phase Threeand into Phase Four. As the workload eased in Phase Fourthe structure changed again to provide the ACC Operationswith oversight of case preparation which was managed on aday to day basis by the Head of Crime Operations.

This structure worked well and those involved thought thatthe following contributed to the success of the operation.

Early Problem Identification and Response

The force had invested in a computerised MISPERmanagement system which they believed enabled them toquickly identify the vulnerability of the MISPERs and rapidly

escalate the inquiries. This, and the declaration of a criticalincident, meant that when the first bodies were discovered,a great deal of work had already been done and there was agood platform to work from.

Clear Strategic Objectives

Declaring the two MISPERs as a critical incident led to theearly development of a Gold Strategy for Operation Sumac.The force believed that this brought focus and clarity acrossthe full range of activity that had to be undertakenthroughout the operation.

Suffolk’s Processes, People and Partners

Those involved believe that Suffolk has short lines ofcommunication within the force, a flexible managementstructure, committed and empowered staff, a supportivecommunity and a good network of partner agencies. All ofthese came together to provide an immediate and effectivefocus on the needs of the operation. Wherever possible, theforce used its existing business processes, people andpartners in implementing the Gold Strategy. This had anumber of advantages. It meant that, although theoperation was challenging for everyone, they were operatingwith processes and people they were familiar with. This wasparticularly useful in support services which were quicklyable to expand to accommodate the extra volume of workthat was being put through them.

Gold Strategy -16th November 2006

1. Locate Tania Nicol, or establish, as far as possible,what has happened to her.

2. Locate Gemma Adams, or establish, as far as possible,what has happened to her.

3. Prevent further disappearances of sex workers withinSuffolk.

4. Seek to maintain the trust and confidence of our widercommunity and partners, in particular those specificcommunities affected by these events.

5. Establish if any criminal offences have occured andsecure the convictions of those responsible.

6. Provide sufficient resources, in an effective and efficientmanner, to enable both investigations to proceedappropriately.


Informal Support Networks

The Gold Commander commented on the value of theinformal networks with colleagues in force and with thosewho had attended the same Strategic Command Course.This enabled their experience and support to be drawn onthroughout the operation.

Improvised IAG

At the time of the operation, the force did not have a formalIndependent Advisory Group (IAG). However, they regularlyworked with a number of forums which were representativeof various communities and stakeholders. One of these wasa Vice Steering Group which met to examine issues inrelation to the red light district and vice in the Ipswich area.In the early phases of the operation this was used by theforce as an IAG. As the operation expanded it was felt thatthis group did not represent all interest groups and somembership was widened to include a greater range ofstakeholders. This provided a great deal of support for theoperation.

CPS in the Management Team Post Charge

The CPS were involved in the investigations from an earlystage and post charge they were brought onto the OIOCManagement Team to provide effective strategiccoordination between the CPS and the force.

Return to Difference

The force recognises that an event of this magnitude andintensity is bound to leave a legacy. At the personal level,those involved will have learnt a great many professionallessons that will stay with them for the rest of their service.At the organisational level, the shared experience hasreinforced the feeling of cohesion and commitment that wasalready evident in the force. It has also strengthenedpartnerships with those other agencies and forces that wereinvolved. Questions have naturally been raised as to why, ifsome activities could be suspended or done differentlyduring Sumac, they cannot be done away with altogether ordone differently in the future. The force believe that this is apositive attitude to take and have coined the phrase ‘Returnto Difference’ as a way of fostering debate on how the forcecan capitalise on its experience of Operation Sumac.

Issues for Suffolk Constabulary

The following were raised as issues which the force wishedto consider further in preparing for future operations.

Use of the OIOC as Media Spokesperson

One of the key roles during the operation was that of mediaspokesperson for the force. During Phases One and Two anumber of people carried out press briefings and interviewswith the media. One of these was the Head of CrimeOperations. His role meant that he regularly represented theforce on crime related matters and it was only natural thathe did so during Phases One and Two. At the beginning ofPhase Three, he was initially given the role as lead mediaspokesperson for the operation. He was well able to do this.He had played a prominent role during Phase One and Two,could speak with authority on the issues involved, wasfamiliar to the local media and was accustomed torepresenting the force in that role. However, when thestructure changed he was appointed to the role of OIOC andalso retained his role as the lead media spokesperson. Thereis universal agreement in the force that he performed bothroles well and that there are undoubted advantagesassociated with having the OIOC speaking directly to themedia. However, there is also some concern as to whethertwo such key roles should be performed by the same person.It is recognised that there is no simple answer to this, but itcan easily be imagined how the demands of one or other ofthese two vital roles could become so great as to mean thatthe other was not being adequately done. The same issuesarise in relation to other key roles such as the GoldCommander. In this case the Gold Commander played alarge part in the media strategy and as Phase Threeprogressed was consciously doing more with the media totake pressure off the OIOC.

In operations where media interest is as intense as it was inSumac, ways need to be found of balancing the needs ofthe media strategy with those of operational command at alllevels.

Welfare Debriefs

In line with the approach of using existing systems andprocess to manage the operation where possible, the forcerelied on senior managers to instigate welfare debriefs fortheir staff using the force’s routine processes. However,whilst this has no doubt worked well for those who haveavailed themselves of the service, some have suggested thata more proactive approach may be of benefit. This wouldensure that those who could benefit from a welfare debrief,but who would not normally put themselves forward forone, do not fall through the net.


Issues for National Consideration

There were three issues which those involved thought couldbe usefully considered at a national level.

Gold and OIOC Structure

The Gold Command Structure used during Phase Three ofthe operation has been described above. Those involvedbelieve that it not only played to the strengths of theindividuals involved, it also enabled them to operate withintheir normal business areas. The force thought that this wasparticularly important as the roles of Gold Commander andOIOC now require a high level of technical knowledge that isonly likely to be acquired through substantial experience inrelevant posts. It also spread the workload more evenly thanwould have been the case had the force continued with thetraditional structure first put in place. The force believe thatthe HWG should assess whether this model could form thebasis of the command structure in future linked serieshomicide investigations.

Training for Gold Commanders

Some members of the Command Team felt that there weresignificant differences between the role of Gold Commandin this inquiry and their previous experience of that role.During this incident, they felt that they had little information

upon which to make decisions but, as it was a crime inaction, the consequences of making poor decisions werepotentially fatal. Current command and MLSC training wasan inadequate preparation for this. One did comment on thevalue of the Critical Incident training they had received andof a table top exercise in commanding a kidnap andextortion incident which they had undertaken with SOCAjust prior to the operation. They believe that chief officertraining in command and control of this type of event shouldbe examined to ensure that it meets the needs of GoldCommanders.

The Tyranny of Manuals

There were mixed views about the value of the many policydocuments, standards and guidance that exist in relation toan incident of this type. There was a clear divide betweenthose who valued the support such material gave to theirdecisions, and those who felt that they were inflexible andled to a ‘tick box’ mentality which valued compliance aboveeffectiveness. Someone sympathetic to the latter view coinedthe phrase, ‘the tyranny of manuals ’. There are clearlylessons in this debate for those developing such materialnationally and those involved in training based on it. Policy,standards and guidance are important in ensuring that ahigh quality service is provided by the police. However,policing is a complex process that cannot easily beencapsulated in manuals and room must be left forpractitioners to exercise good judgement over the best wayof delivering a high quality service in individual cases.


Expert Support

Expert support is provided to homicide investigationsthrough Expert Advisers (EA). These are those whosespecialist knowledge or experience allows them to give anopinion on a particular matter, or provide a specialist servicedirectly related to their expertise. EAs may be serving policeofficers or individuals who are independent of the PoliceService.

The NPIA Specialist Operations Centre (SOC), which wasformerly known as NCPE Opsline provides information,advice and support to major crime investigations andmaintains a database of EAs. It does not accredit them butcan identify EAs who have appropriate expertise. Forces arefree to identify their own EAs through:

• The Council for the Registration of ForensicPractitioners (CRFP);

• Personal recommendations from otherinvestigators;

• Academic institutions;• Other professional registers.


During Operation Sumac a number of people falling withinthe definition of an EA were used. These generally fell intofour categories:

• Those with specialist skills: These are people withspecialist training or specialist equipment that the force didnot possess. For example, the Norfolk Dive and Wade teamand the Merseyside ANPR team.

• National police advisers: These are staff with a nationallyapproved remit to provide coordination and advice in relationto a particular area of police practice. They are mainlyseconded to NPIA SOC. They provided services in relation tointerviewing, searching and family liaison.

• Experts: These are people who have relevant skill andknowledge achieved through research, experience orprofessional application within a specific field whichpotentially enables them to give evidence of their opinion incourt. Courts may not recognise them as ‘expert witnesses’in any given case, but they should have the potential to beused in this capacity.

All of the above fall within a broad category that the forcetermed ‘expert’, whose advice was sought and integratedinto the decision making of the operation. Those involvedbelieved that the following contributed to the success of thispart of the operation.

Further Information

ACPO (2006) Expert Advisers Information Pack.


Early and Consistent Use of National Structures

An early decision was made to seek EAs through thefollowing established national structures.

• The NPIA Specialist Operation Centre was involved fromPhase One throughout and provided staff and facilitiespermanently throughout Phase Three.

• The Forensic Science Service (FSS) provided a forensicspecialist adviser (SA) and other forensic services.

• The Homicide Working Group (HWG) provided advice onnational policy and practice.

Sourcing EAs through these national structures workedefficiently for the force and gave it confidence that theadvice given was reliable and had national endorsement.

The Use of Experts in QA Processes

In line with ACPO policy on reviews, the force had arrangedto have the investigation reviewed by Kent Constabulary inJanuary 2007 if it remained undetected. The charging of asuspect in December made this unnecessary but some in theforce felt that one of the advantages of using EAs was thatthey acted as a form of a dynamic quality assurance processfor the investigative strategies. Whilst there is somejustification for this view, others point out that caution isrequired because experts may not be trained in QA processesand may not have the necessary overview of some aspects ofthe investigation needed to make QA judgements. It wasrecognised within the force that the key QA process wasprovided by the independent adviser to the GoldCommander who had a specific brief in this area and hadaccess to the full range of material required (seeIndependent Advice to Gold).

Issues for Suffolk ConstabularyThe following were raised as issues which the force wishedto consider further in preparing for future operations.

Resource Implications of Advice.

The investigation was on the whole given sound andactionable advice which came with a rational explanation asto why a course of action should be followed. However,some in the force felt that EAs frequently offered ‘goldstandard’ advice which took little account of the resourcesrequired to implement it. Whilst understanding that it is therole of individual SIOs and the OIOC to critically appraise thisadvice and accept it or not, they felt that once it had beengiven it was difficult to ignore or modify. They felt that itwould be helpful if EAs were trained to offer a range ofoptions in consultation with the SIO or OIOC, not simply agold standard strategy. Another suggestion was the use of aliaison officer (possibly working within NPIA SOC) who couldeffectively challenge EAs and could act as a conduit betweenthem and SIOs or the OIOC.

Quality Assuring Expert Opinion.

A related problem to the above is one of quality assuring theadvice provided by EAs. By definition, the skills needed to doso do not lie within the force. It is not always clear where toobtain assistance in this area, other than bringing in anotherEA to provide a second opinion. Whilst this may be anoption that can later be used in relation to advice thatbecomes a key piece of evidence at trial, it is not practicalduring the investigation itself. The key appears to lie in thecareful selection of EAs in the first place and guidance onthis can be obtained from NPIA SOC and from ACPO (2006)Expert Advisers Information Pack.


Issues for National ConsiderationThere were two issues which those involved thought couldbe usefully considered at a national level.

Unsolicited Offers of Help

The force is extremely grateful for the help, support andadvice it received from police and other agencies during theoperation. One area they wish to highlight to other chiefofficers are those who became known as ‘tourists’. These areindividuals who provide unsolicited offers of help and advicewhich was not relevant or needed. It would appear that thiswas done as a way of associating themselves with a highprofile investigation. This took many forms, from telephonecalls to the command team commenting on aspects of theinvestigation or the resources being used, to those who selftasked to the incident offering to become involved. Theforce believes that a common understanding throughout theservice that advice and assistance should be routed throughrelevant ACPO portfolio holders or other recognised nationalstructures would go a long way to dissuading ‘tourists’ infuture operations.

Independent Advice to Gold

One aspect of the use of EAs that the force believes shouldbe considered at a national level is the role of anindependent adviser to the Gold Commander. As with alloperations, the Gold Commander in a linked seriesinvestigation requires advice on the technical aspects of theoperation that lie outside their knowledge or experience.This advice is usually provided by specialist tactical advisers,in theory, this is the role of the OIOC in a linked seriesinvestigation.

However, the scale and complexity of a linked serieshomicide investigation means that the Gold Commander hasto critically appraise the OIOCs investigative strategy toensure that it meets the requirements of the operation and iscomplementary to other elements of the Gold Strategy.Furthermore, the Gold Commander is also expected to carryout the quality assurance role described in the ACPO (2006)Murder Investigation Manual. In the Soham enquiry anindependent adviser was brought in to assist the GoldCommander in this respect and Suffolk did the same inOperation Sumac. This proved extremely useful and the forcebelieves that consideration should be given nationally todeveloping this role for use in all such operations.

Force Offender Date VictimGloucester West & West 1967-1990 21+

Humberside Dinsdale 1973-1980 26

West Mercia Neilson 1974-1975 5

West Yorkshire Rowntree 1975-1976 4

West Yorkshire Sutcliffe 1975-1981 13

MPS Maudsley 1978 4

MPS Nilson 1978-1983 12

Leicestershire Pitchfork 1980-1983 2

MPS Bailey, Cooke, Smith & Oliver 1980s 3+

Lothian and Borders Black 1982 3

MPS Duffy & Malcahy 1985-1987 3

MPS Lupo 1986 4

GMP Shipman 1990s 215

MPS Ireland 1993 5

Lincolnshire Allitt 1993 4

MPS Bryan 1993 3

West Yorkshire Grigg-Booth 2001-2003 3

Nottinghamshire Martin 2004-2005 3

Forces with Experience of Investigating Serial Killers


Resources

The investigation of linked series homicide will always makeheavy demands on resources. These are likely to impact onforces before formal linking takes place. In most cases, theindividual investigations will be undetected and will havebeen classified as Category A or A+. They may also havebeen designated as critical incidents.

As a consequence, forces will have already made resourceprovisions above and beyond those they routinely allocate tohomicide investigations. Linking brings with it additionalresource requirements associated with the coordinating roleplayed by the OIOC and the requirements of strategiccommand. The latter will undoubtedly involve strategies topromote public reassurance and crime prevention. Wherethese resource requirements exceed those that a force canmeet, mutual aid can be activated. This takes two forms:local and regional mutual aid arrangements between forces,or national mobilisation through the Police NationalInformation and Coordination Centre (PNICC)

Further Information

Home Office Circular 54/2005 The Police Pension Scheme - NewPolice Pensions Financing Arrangements.

ACPO (2006) Guidance on the Police National Mobilisation Plan.

ACPO (2005) Guidance on Major Incident Room StandardisedAdministrative Procedures (MIRSAP).

The ACPO (2006) Guidance on the Police NationalMobilisation Plan (PNMP) sets out the procedures foractivating mutual aid and for coordinating and deployingresources in complex policing operations such as these.




During Phases One and Two of the operation resourcerequirements were met through the forces’ internalprocesses and from mutual aid arrangements withneighbouring forces. In Phase Three the force activatednational mutual aid through PNICC.

This led to a rapid influx of staff. Within three days, the forcehad acquired and deployed mutual aid staff equivalent tonearly a quarter of its normal police establishment. Thisinevitably made enormous demands on its infrastructure butaccommodation was found for them all, they wereeffectively received into the force, equipped, briefed anddeployed.

In addition to Sumac, heavy demands were placed on theforce by a shooting at a nightclub in Ipswich whichcoincided with Phase Three. Many of the witnesses werefrom London and the force mounted an investigation in bothSuffolk and London which alone, by normal standards,would have been a heavy drain on force resources.

The force believes the following contributed significantly toenabling it to successfully manage the resource requirementsof Operation Sumac.

Gold Logistics Structure

As the result of a major incident exercise the CommandTeam had questioned whether the standard commandstructure for incidents demanded too much of the GoldCommander. As a result, they had already had informaldiscussions around the possibility of making some changes.In Phase Three they built on these ideas and established aGold Logistics Commander who took responsibility foracquiring the resources necessary to deliver the Gold

Commander’s Strategy. This took a great deal of pressure offthe Gold Commander. The DCC attended all Gold Commandmeetings which were immediately followed by a GoldLogistics meeting to consider the best means for acquiringresources. The Gold Logistic meetings included Head ofKnowledge Architecture (IT), Director of HR, Head ofFacilities as well as Logistics Cell Commander and the OIOCor Deputy OIOC.

Logistics Cell

A logistics cell was established to implement the decisions ofthe Gold Logistics Commander and to provide a focal pointfor requests for resources and liaison with national bodiessuch as PNICC. Although not formally part of the logisticscell, a DI worked on behalf of the OIOC coordinating theresources allocated to all five MIRs. This facilitated liaisonwith the logistics cell and allowed for the dynamicmanagement of resources by moving staff to where theywere most needed.

Forward Planning

The force had a major investigations policy document whichoutlined contingency measures in the event of a majorcrime. The chief officers had also discussed the implicationsof the Soham investigation and given some thought to howthe force would respond to such an event. Immediately priorto Operation Sumac the force had run a table top exerciseon crimes in action, which those involved found usefulpreparation.

Mutual Aid

December 2006

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Maintaining Business Continuity

During the course of Operation Sumac the force continuedto provide a full service to the county but some ‘back room’and non-operational activities, such as training, weresuspended. A Business Continuity Officer had beenappointed in June 2006 and this role was found to be veryuseful in focussing on the implications of resource decisionsfor the force. The Command Team had also appointed aChief Superintendent to manage the murder prevention andcommunity involvement strategies. If the inquiry hadcontinued, this officer would have assumed ACCresponsibilities to ease the burden on the Command Teamand allow normal force business to resume.

Use of PNICC

Discussions were held at an early stage with PNICC inanticipation of the force needing national mutual aid. Onceactivated, there were a few early communication problemsand some confusion about the resources the force hadalready acquired from neighbouring forces and local partneragencies. A backlog of requests for resources also built up.These issues were quickly ironed out and the force thoughtthat PNICC worked well. However, they would support anincrease in staff within PNICC, which would enable it torespond more quickly to requests. In addition, it would beuseful for PNICC to provide an information pack to forcesoutlining their procedures and the issues that forces are likelyto encounter during a mobilisation event.

Imaginative Use of Other Resources

The force drew on a wide range of resources to assist in theoperation. These included partner agencies, retired policeofficers and special constables from both Suffolk andsurrounding forces. Local employers were very supportive inreleasing special constables and even paid for some of theirtime.

Staff Commitment

There is universal praise from the command team for thecommitment of all of Suffolk’s staff. They believe that thesuccess of the operation was in large measure due to thisand there are numerous examples of staff going out of theirway to ensure that work was carried out successfully despitethe difficult circumstances. Some point to the success of theforces ‘Suffolk First For You’ campaign in focusing staff onservice delivery.

Suffolk First for You

Suffolk Constabulary started a ‘Suffolk First’ campaign in 2001with the aim of making Suffolk the safest county in the country.

This campaign has subsequently evolved into ‘Suffolk First ForYou’ which aims to make Suffolk Constabulary the best in thecountry.

It contains the following five components, which aim to help theconstabulary meet national government service standards:

• First for Citizens;

• First for Local Service;

• First for Safety;

• First for Staff;

• First for Value.




Second Tier Communication Problems

Although the Gold Logistics Command and the Logistics Cellworked well, there were some early communicationsproblems below these levels. These mainly occurred becausethe investigation was expressing resource requirement interms of roles whilst the Logistics Cell were thinking in termsof competencies, skills, length of deployment, backfilling,etc. This was resolved by the development of a resourcetemplate which made communication much clearer. Afurther problem in the early days arose because some unitsmade requests to PNICC independently of the force logisticscell. This led to mutual aid staff arriving in force without theMutual Aid Reception knowing that they had beenrequested or where to deploy them. This problem wasresolved by ensuring that all requests were routed throughthe logistics cell.

Contingency Planning

The command team realised that the resources allocated tothe investigation were unsustainable over the long term.However, they took the view that the main priority waspreventing further murders by identifying the offender. As aresult, all available resources were used to ensure thatinformation was harvested in the first critical weeks of theinvestigation. Some in the force believed that it was likelythat resource requirements would stabilise as scenes werereleased and early lines of enquiries were completed. Therewas also some indication that the systems and processes putinto place to support Operation Sumac were maturing andbecoming more sophisticated, enabling some staff to bereleased back to normal duties. Whilst many of thoseinvolved were considering these issues, there was no centrallocus where forward planning could be considered inrelation to contingencies such as linked enquiries in otherforces or other bodies being discovered in Suffolk. This wasmainly due to the fact that the Operations PlanningDepartment, who would normally be responsible forcontingency planning, had been utilised as the Logistics Celland had no capacity to carry out any other function. Had theoperation gone on slightly longer there seems no doubt thatthis would have been addressed, possibly by establishing aforward planning post within the Gold Logistics Command.

Financial Control

The force feels that they did not have financial systems inplace quickly enough to cater for the sudden influx of staffand additional expenditure. They are exploring ways ofensuring that systems can be implemented more quickly infuture.


There were four issues which those involved thought couldbe usefully considered at a national level.

National Role Descriptions and Training

It became apparent that there was little national consistencyin role descriptors and training for specialists. This wasparticularly evident in the staff used to support the HOLMESfunctions, where roles such as Indexer and HOLMESManager are subject to wide variations in interpretation byforces. This clearly makes the exchange of staff on mutualaid more difficult and the force believes the issue should beaddressed nationally.

PCSO Contracts

Whilst a wide range of resources were shared by otherforces, it was discovered that PCSOs cannot easily be movedfrom one force to another because their contracts arerestricted to the force which employs them. The forcebelieves this is an issue that should be examined by ACPO.

The Hertfordshire Agreement

The force found the Hertfordshire agreement to beunaffordable and inflexible. They renegotiated some of itsterms directly with the Police Federation and forces, butrecommend a thorough review of its provisions by ACPO.

Financial Model

Financial control and contingency planning have alreadybeen mentioned above. The force believes that an alliedissue is the absence of any financial model that supportsforward planning for incidents of this type. The difficulty ofdeveloping such a model is recognised, particularly in light ofthe fact that such incidents are rare and vary considerably.Nonetheless, a financial model that enabled forces to judgethe expenditure that is likely to be incurred in suchoperations would greatly improve their ability to controlcosts and forward plan.

Communications

Effective communication is an essential component of anyoperation. This is not simply about dealing with the media. Italso includes the many ways in which forces communicatedirectly with their various communities through officercontact, through direct appeals and through their work withpartner agencies, including other police forces. Internalcommunication is also important in providing staff withsufficient information to enable them to do their jobs, tomaintain motivation and to enable them to communicatekey messages to the community.

The Media

Large scale operations, such as Sumac, inevitably generate athirst for information. As a publicly accountable body, thepolice service is committed to openness and accountabilityand the news media plays an important role in achievingthose aims. However, satisfying the demands of the 24/7news culture places a heavy burden on forces. It can also bedifficult to balance the competing and, sometimes,conflicting needs of the media with those of an operation. Itis, therefore, essential to have a well thought out mediastrategy which can be sustained and is capable of meetingthese various demands. Where a Gold Command structurehas been established, the media strategy will be developedand agreed at that level and will generally have three aims:

• Generating information for the investigation;• Providing public information and reassurance;• Promoting confidence in the force and the

wider police service.

Further Information

ACPO (2006) Murder Investigation Manual; Section Three - The Roleof Chief Officers in Major Crime Investigations.

ACPO (2006) Murder Investigation Manual; Section Seventeen -Managing Communication.

ACPO (2003) Media Advisory Group, Guidance Notes.

Home Office (1999) The Effective Use of the Media in Serious CrimeInvestigation; Policing and Resourcing Crime Unit Paper 120.

Direct Engagement with the Local Community

Local communities are widely acknowledged as being themost important source of information for crimeinvestigation. They are also the main recipients ofinformation designed to provide reassurance and to helpprevent crime. Forces routinely communicate directly withtheir local communities in a variety of ways. For example,leaflet drops, public meetings or simply encounters betweenstaff and the public. Partner agencies also play a significantrole in supporting the police and spreading key informationto the public. Whatever form it takes, direct communicationof this sort can be extremely useful in generatinginformation and getting across key messages for theoperation. The basis for direct communication is existingrelationships and good community intelligence. These enablean effective Community Impact Assessment (CIA) to becarried out and the most appropriate communicationsstrategy to be developed.



Internal Communications

Effective internal communications are always anorganisational priority for forces. During operations of thisscale when the situation is changing rapidly, they should becapable of rapidly disseminating information to everyonewithin the organisation. This is not simply so that staff havethe right information to do their jobs. Staff are also a keymeans of getting information to the public, both as part oftheir routine work and when they are off duty. Internalcommunications should therefore play a key role in theoverall communications strategy.


During Phase One of Operation Sumac the local media wereused to publicise the two missing person enquiries. With thediscovery of the first two bodies media interest intensifiedduring Phase Two, but remained mainly local. From thediscovery of the third body until the end of Phase Threemedia interest was intense.

Operation Sumac coincided with the national debate aboutthe size and efficiency of police forces. This meant that, inaddition to the investigation, the media were interested inwhether Suffolk Constabulary could manage a large andcomplex criminal investigation of this type and the mediastrategy had to accommodate this.

Those involved thought that the media strategy was asuccess, and pointed to the following as examples of thingsthat went well.

Following Planned Policies and Procedures.

The force followed pre-planned policies and procedures inrelation to the media and they stayed consistent to these asinterest in the investigation escalated.

The Involvement of Gold Command in theMedia Strategy

Key decisions regarding the media strategy were discussedand endorsed by the Gold Group. The Press Office andPublic Relations functions were involved in the Gold Groupfrom an early stage.

An Open and Consistent Media Strategy

The media strategy aimed to be as open as possible andsought to ensure that information was quickly madeavailable to the media, and was also consistent. The forcearranged a timetable for press briefings and identifiedspokespersons for each stage of the operation.

Providing Media Facilities

The force provided facilities for media organisations. Itallowed them to be based within the force HQ site andarranged catering facilities. This made it easier for the forceto maintain contact with media representatives and toorganise press events. It also facilitated feedback to the forceon areas of media interest and how information was likely tobe reported.

Assistance from Neighbouring Forces andPartner Organisations

As media interest escalated the force initially drew inadditional resources from neighbouring forces and frompartner agencies within Suffolk. The force believed that thishad the advantage of bringing in staff who knew the forceand, more importantly, knew the area and the communitiesinvolved.

Internal Communications

Information was passed on to staff through:

• Daily e-mail intelligence briefings to each SIO sothat they could brief their teams;

• Weekly e-mail briefings from the OIOC to allstaff;

• Verbal briefings to all investigative staff fromSIOs, Deputy OIOC and OIOC;

• E-mail messages to the force from the ChiefConstable.

These measures allowed the command team to update staffon the progress of the investigation and provide relevantinformation.




The Evolving Role of Spokespersons.

Issues relating to the use of the OIOC as spokesperson havealready been discussed in the Command and Leadershipsection.

Managing Media Facilities.

The force believes that there were a number of advantagesgained by providing facilities to media organisations andthese have been noted above. In the early stages thesefacilities included access to the force canteen. Some staff feltthat the presence of media personnel in the canteen wasintrusive and meant that they could not relax during thelimited time they had for refreshment. The close proximity ofthe canteen to the MIRs also raised fears of compromise.Media access to the canteen ceased when mobile facilitieswere provided elsewhere. Although access was considered tohave been well managed, the issue highlights the need toconsider a range of interests when granting the mediafacilities within police premises during an operation of thisintensity.

The Role of the CPS in Announcing Charges

A national protocol places responsibility for announcingcharges with the CPS. The force felt that this abruptly endedthe role of the force spokesperson and provided noopportunity for the force to exit from its role with the media.Local discussions with the CPS should ensure that this issueis addressed prior to future operations.


There were two issues which those involved thought couldbe usefully considered at a national level.

Media Roles

Considerations around the changing roles of GoldCommanders and OIOCs, should include their roles withinthe media strategy.

Clarification of When Legal Proceedings Commence

The force interpret Schedule 1 of the Contempt of Court Act1981 as meaning that criminal proceedings become ‘active’at the time a person is arrested. This would have the effectof restricting media reporting from that point onwards.However, in this case the media continued to report matterswhich the force believed could be prejudicial to proceedingsafter the first and second suspects were arrested. The ChiefConstable sent letters to media organisations outlining theirinterpretation and the consequences of continued reporting.This had little effect as media organisations stated theirbelief that proceedings only became active when someone ischarged with an offence. The force believes that this is anissue which should be addressed nationally by ACPO.


Major Incident Room Procedures

In the early 1980s the Byford Report identified the absenceof a national system for managing linked series homicide asone of the main problems faced by those investigating theYorkshire Ripper killings. As a consequence the Police Serviceinvested heavily in both the HOLMES computer system andthe Major Incident Room Standardised AdministrativeProcedures (MIRSAP). Between them these systems provide arange of functions for the management of information andthe tasking and co-ordination of investigative activity.

Although they have been subject to considerableimprovement and enhancement since they were firstintroduced, they still provide the platform which enablesforces to manage individual homicide investigations and tolink them to others being investigated elsewhere whennecessary. The effectiveness of these systems is heavily relianton forces keeping up to date with technical developments inHOLMES and ensuring compliance with the latest standards,which are currently set out in the ACPO (2005) Guidance onMajor Incident Room Standardised Administrative Procedures(MIRSAP).


During Phases One and Two, the force established MIRs atforce HQ, which was near to the scenes, and followed itsnormal procedure for staffing and information management.An intelligence cell was established by the OIOC. In PhaseThree, three more MIRs were established at HQ. This was notonly convenient to the scenes but it also provided the OIOCwith easy access to all of the MIRs and assisted thecoordination of the investigation. Those involved believedthat the following contributed to the success of theoperation.

Increasing HOLMES Capacity

The force’s normal HOLMES capacity was exceeded duringthe operation and they worked with PITO and privatesuppliers to upgrade it. This was achieved very rapidly andwith minimum disruption.

Development of the Message Assessment Centre(MAC)

It is normal practice in Suffolk Constabulary to route callsabout an incident directly to MIRs and this was the systemthat was adopted from the outset. However, the nature ofthis incident meant that a great many calls were receivedwhich related to ‘the incident’ rather than to one of the fiveindividual investigations. This, together with the volume ofinformation made the management of incoming materialdifficult. As a consequence, the force established a functionto centrally process information by assessing its priority andallocating it to the MIR most able to action it. This becameknown as the Message Assessment Centre (MAC). Thoseinvolved thought that the system worked well and enabledincoming information to be kept under constant view andprioritised.

Further Information

ACPO (2005) Guidance on Major Incident RoomStandardised Administrative Procedures (MIRSAP).

ACPO (2006) Guidance on the Police National MobilisationPlan.

ACPO (2006) Murder Investigation Manual.

ACPO (2007) Practice Advice on Critical IncidentManagement.

Byford, Sir Lawrence (1981) The Yorkshire Ripper Case:Review of the Police Investigation of the Case by LawrenceByford, Her Majesty’s inspector of Constabulary.



MIRWEB

Directly routing calls to individual MIRs quickly exhaustedtheir capacity to handle the volume and impacted on theirability to focus on investigations. To alleviate this, theMIRWEB facility was activated. This is a HOLMES web-based,front-end application that enables calls to a single number tobe answered by any force in the country and for theinformation to be routed to the force carrying out theinvestigation. Those involved believed that the systemworked well and quickly took the pressure off resources inSuffolk Constabulary.



CRI Functionality

Where investigations are linked, MIRSAP recommends theestablishment of a Central Research Incident (CRI) to supportthe work of the OIOC. In Sumac the force did not establish aCRI when they appointed an OIOC. Four main reasons fornot establishing a CRI are given by those involved:

• Resources: A CRI was not required until Phase Three, bywhich time all MIR and HOLMES trained staff were beingutilised on Operation Sumac and Operation Gable (thenightclub shooting), there simply were not the resourcesrequired to run a CRI.

• Technical Issues: The CRI functionality of HOLMES wasconsidered to be limited. There is some support for this viewin MIRSAP, which states that a CRI is unable to view anumber of areas in any of the incidents it is linked with, butit also states that systems can be put in place to provide theOIOC with a dynamic view of linked incidents.

• Timeliness: The speed with which the operation unfoldedled to the view that a CRI would have difficulty in catchingup with investigative activity and would, in effect, delay thedecision making of the OIOC rather than assist it.

• Silos: Attempts to coordinate the management of nominalsacross MIRs had already proved difficult because each MIRrequired the freedom to act independently (described asworking in silos). It was thought that creating a CRI wouldmake this problem worse.

The absence of a CRI did not prevent the force fromeffectively coordinating the work of the MIRs. During PhaseOne, a joint intelligence cell was established which took onmany of the functions associated with a CRI. Later a

NMAT Telephone Calls

The NMAT telephony system wasactivated on the 11th December2006

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There were five issues which those involved thought couldbe usefully considered at a national level.

Role of the CRI

This has already been discussed above. The low number oflinked-series homicides in the UK, and the high level ofvariation between each of them means that there is verylittle experience upon which to base procedures andpractice. The force believes that current guidance on the roleof the CRI should be reviewed nationally in the light of theirexperience.

Development of MAC

The force believes that the MAC may offer a model thatshould be adopted nationally for future investigations of thistype.

HOLMES Capacity

The force believes that ACPO should consider whetherHOLMES could be networked across forces to improvecapacity in times of high demand.

MIRSAP Compliance

The force believes that the issue of MIRSAP compliance isone that should be considered nationally to ensurecompatibility between forces.

National Inconsistency in Roles and Training

One of the ways in which the variation in MIRSAPcompliance and in HOLMES capability between forces,manifests itself is in role descriptions and training. This hasalso been highlighted in Resources and means that staff senton mutual aid do not always have the skills required or maynot be familiar with processes or procedures in the hostforce. The force believes that this is an issue which can onlybe addressed at the national level by ACPO.

Message Assessment Centre (MAC), discussed above, wasdeveloped to process the large volume of informationreceived by the force. Those involved believed that thesemeasures were effective and meant that a CRI was notrequired. This is self evidently true in this case, but inplanning for future operations, the force wishes to gain abetter understanding of why it did not have a CRI. Was itbecause a better alternative was developed or was thealternative developed because force systems and resourcecould not support a CRI? Furthermore, consideration needsto be given to how the force would link to investigations inother forces using processes and procedures which areunique to Suffolk Constabulary. Clearly, there are nationalimplications to this issue and it may be useful to considerthese in partnership with work already being undertaken bythe HWG in relation to the CRI (see Issues for NationalConsideration).

MIRSAP Compliance

Compliance with MIRSAP is an issue which is best dealt withnationally and as such it is discussed in more detail below.However, there is much that individual forces can do toensure that they are up to date with national developmentsand are as compliant as they can be with MIRSAP.


This publication has been printed on material that is certified by the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). This paper contains fifty-fiveper cent recycled fibres processed by means of totally chlorine-free bleaching (TCF), and pulp which is elemental chlorine free (ECF).Its manufacture also embodies well-managed forestry practices, and responsible waste treatment and energy use.


AcknowledgementsParticular thanks are extended to Suffolk Constabulary for their assistance in producing thisdocument.

The photographs used in this publication are either copyright free or have been reproduced withthe kind permission of Suffolk Constabulary.

Whilst considerable effort has been made to correctly identify the copyright holders, this may not have been possible in all cases. We apologise for any errors oromissions in incorrectly identifying copyright holders for the photographs. Where this is brought to our attention we will remedy this in any future editions.


Documents

S tra te g ic D e b rie f O p e ra tio n S u m a clibrary.college.police.uk/docs/appref/strategic-sumac.pdf · S tra te g ic D e b rie f O p e ra tio n S u m a c PROFESSIONAL PRACTICE