S The IAI Research Papers are brief monographs written by ... · Operationalization of the African Peace and Security ... COMESA Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa COPS

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Edited byNicoletta Pirozzi

in cooperation with:

with the support of the European Parliament

STRENGTHENING THE

AFRICA-EU PARTNERSHIP

ON PEACE AND SECURITY

HOW TO ENGAGE AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

6

STREN

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FRICA-EU P

ARTN

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RITYN

icoletta Pirozzi

15.60 EURO

The IAI Research Papers are brief monographs written by one or more authors (IAI or external experts) on current problems of inter-national politics and international relations. The aim is to promote greater and more up to date knowledge of emerging issues and trends and help prompt public debate.

A non-pro�t organization, IAI was founded in 1965 by Altiero Spinelli, its �rst director.The Institute aims to promote understanding of international politics through research, promotion of political ideas and strategies, disse-mination of knowledge and education in the �eld of foreign policy.IAI main research sectors are: European institutions and policies; Italian foreign policy; trends in the global economy and internationa-lisation processes in Italy; the Mediterranean and the Middle East; security and defence; and transatlantic relations.

The Joint Africa-European Union Strategy (JAES), adopted at the Lisbon Summit in December 2007, was conceived to overcome the unequal partnership between the African and European continents by establishing a framework of cooperation based on shared values and common objectives. In particular, it was designed as an inclusive and people-centred partnership, aimed at involving both institutional and non-institutional actors beyond the Brussels-Addis Ababa axis. However, already during the �rst implementation phase (2008-2010), it became clear that these conditions were far from being fully realized and needed a longer timeframe to display their potential. The Tripoli Summit in November 2010 and the second Action Plan (2011-2013) have tried to address some of these problems, but full implementation of the Joint Strategy is still a work in progress. This study analyses the sub-optimal involvement of two main stakeholders, namely African regional organizations – Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) – and civil society actors, especially non-governmental organizations. It addresses current engagement in and the potential of civil society’s contribution to Africa-EU relations in the �eld of peace and security, by looking at their interaction with institutions on the continent and their added value in sectors such as early warning, crisis management, mediation and training. Finally, it o�ers some policy recommendations for the future implementation of the Joint Strategy, in particular on the issues of dialogue, capacity-building and funding.

NICOLETTA PIROZZI is Senior Fellow in the European A�airs Area at IAI.

IAI Research Papers

N. 1 European Security and the Future of Transatlantic Relations, edited by Riccardo Alcaro and Erik Jones, 2011

N. 2 Democracy in the EU after the Lisbon Treaty, edited by Ra�aello Matarazzo, 2011

N. 3 The Challenges of State Sustainability in the Mediterranean, edited by Silvia Colombo and Nathalie Tocci, 2011

N. 4 Re-thinking Western Policies in Light of the Arab Uprisings, edited by Riccardo Alcaro and Miguel Haubrich-Seco, 2012

N. 5 The transformation of the armed forces: the Forza NEC program, edited by Michele Nones and Alessandro Marrone, 2012

N. 6 Strengthening the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security, edited by Nicoletta Pirozzi, 2012

ISSN 2239-2122

9788861348875_106_FM_3

www.nuovacultura.it

SEGUICI SUI SOCIAL NETWORK

IAI Research Papers

Strengthening the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security:

How to Engage African Regional Organizations

and Civil Society

Edited by Nicoletta Pirozzi

in cooperation with


Edizioni Nuova Cultura

AcknowledgementsThisstudyhasbeenconductedbyIAIintheframeworkoftheproject“StrengtheningtheAfrica‐EUpartnershiponpeaceandsecurity:howtoengageAfricanregionalorganisa‐tionsandcivilsociety”, commissionedby theBrussels‐basedFoundation forEuropeanProgressiveStudies FEPS withthesupportoftheEuropeanParliament.SeriesEditorNatalinoRonzitti _________________________ First published 2012 by Edizioni Nuova Cultura For Istituto Affari Internazionali (IAI) Via Angelo Brunetti 9 - I-00186 Roma www.iai.it Copyright©2012EdizioniNuovaCultura‐RomaISBN:9788861348875Cover:bytheauthorGraphicComposition:bytheauthor Theunauthorizedreproductionofthisbook,evenpartial,carriedoutbyanymeans,includingphotocopying,evenforinternalordidacticuse,isprohibitedbycopyright.

5

Table of Contents

ListofContributors........................................................................................................................7ListofAbbreviations.....................................................................................................................9Introduction....................................................................................................................................13ExecutiveSummary.....................................................................................................................19 1. TheAfrica‐EUPeaceandSecurityPartnershipandAfricanRe‐

gionalOrganizations......................................................................................................23 KaiSchaefer

1. RelationsbetweentheAfricanUnionandregionalorganizationsinthefieldofpeaceandsecurity...........................................................................25

2. AfricanregionalorganizationsintheframeworkoftheJointAf‐rica‐EUStrategy...........................................................................................................28

2.1. Politicaldialogue......................................................................................................292.2. Operationalization of the African Peace and Security

Architecture(APSA).................................................................................................353. TheEuropeanUnion’sfinancialsupporttoAfricanregionalor‐

ganizations.....................................................................................................................454. ThecasesofCOMESAandSADC...........................................................................494.1. TheCommonMarketforEasternandSouthernAfrica

(COMESA).....................................................................................................................494.2. TheSouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunity(SADC)..........................51

2. The Africa‐EU Peace and Security Partnership and the Role of

CivilSociety.......................................................................................................................55 ValérieVickyMiranda

1. Whatiscivilsociety?..................................................................................................562. TheEuropeanUnionandcivilsociety................................................................593. TheJointAfrica‐EUStrategyandcivilsociety................................................653.1. Civilsociety’sparticipationintheJointAfrica‐EUStrategy....................683.2. CivilsocietyandthePeaceandSecurityPartnership.................................71

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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4. Challenges to civil society’s participation in the Joint StrategyandthePeaceandSecurityPartnership...........................................................86

4.1. CSOs’capacity.............................................................................................................874.2. Mechanismsofparticipation................................................................................894.3. Funding.........................................................................................................................91

PolicyRecommendations..........................................................................................................93ValérieVickyMiranda,NicolettaPirozziandKaiSchaefer

1.Dialogue,coordinationandoutreach...................................................................93 2.Capacitybuilding...........................................................................................................96 3.Sustainablefunding......................................................................................................97 Annex:Listofinterviews...........................................................................................................99References.....................................................................................................................................101

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List of Contributors

GIANNI BONVICINI, expert in European issues and foreign policy, is cur‐rentlyExecutiveVice‐PresidentoftheIstitutoAffariInternazionali IAI .He is visitingprofessor at theFaculty of Political Science atRomaTreUniversity,aswellasacolumnistforvariousscientificpublications,pro‐fessionaljournalsandnewspapers.PostsheldduringhiscareerincludeDirector of IAI; President of theTrentoCultural Institute; andVisitingProfessorinInternationalRelationsattheJohnsHopkinsUniversity,Bo‐lognaCenter 1981‐2000 . KAISCHAEFERisaConsultantatIAI.Previously,heworkedasProgrammeManager at theEuropeanCommission DGDEVCO inBrussels andasAssociate Information Analyst/Associate Political Affairs Officer at theUnitedNations UN DepartmentofPeacekeepingOperations DPKO inNewYork,aswellasintheUNMissionintheDRC MONUC .HeholdsaMaster’sdegreeinPoliticalSciencefromFreieUniversitätBerlin,andisamemberoftheboardofEIRENEInternational. VALÉRIEVICKYMIRANDAworkedasa JuniorResearcherat IAI,whereshedealtwithEU‐fundedprojectsontheEU’sexternalaction,crisismanage‐ment, the Africa‐EU Partnership and peace and security‐related issues.ShealsoworkedattheItalianMinistryofForeignAffairs,andasanaca‐demic assistant on EU security and development cooperation policies.WithaMaster’sdegreeinInternationalRelations,sheisnowaPhDcan‐didateinEuropeanandInternationalStudiesatRomaTreUniversity.

LIST OF CONTRIBUTORS

8

NICOLETTA PIROZZI is Senior Fellow in theEuropeanAffairs area at IAI.ShewaspreviouslyaSecondedNationalExpertattheEuropeanExter‐nal Action Service, Crisis Management and Planning Directorate, Re‐searchFellowintheEuropeanForeignandSecurityPolicyStudiesPro‐gramme,VisitingFellowattheEUInstituteforSecurityStudiesinParisand Project Officer responsible for the Responding to Conflict pro‐grammeareaat the International Security InformationService ISIS ‐EuropeinBrussels.

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List of Abbreviations

ACP Africa,CaribbeanandPacific countries AMU ArabMaghrebUnionAPF AfricanPeaceFacilityAPSA AfricanPeaceandSecurityArchitectureAPSTA AfricanPeaceSupportTrainers’AssociationASF AfricanStand‐byForceAU AfricanUnionAUC AfricanUnionCommissionAUPG AfricanUnionPartnersGroupCEN‐SAD CommunityofSahel‐SaharanStatesCEWS ContinentalEarlyWarningSystemCIDO AfricanCitizensandDiasporaDirectorateCIS Inter‐ServiceConsultationsCMD ConflictManagementDivisionCMI CrisisManagementInitiativeCOMESA CommonMarketforEasternandSouthernAfricaCOPS PoliticalandSecurityCommittee EuropeanUnion CPN ConflictPreventionNetworkCPP ConflictPreventionPartnershipCSOs CivilSocietyOrganizationsDCI DevelopmentCooperationInstrumentDGDEVCO Directorate‐GeneralDevelopmentCooperation‐EuropeAidDPCs DistrictPeaceCommitteesEAC EastAfricanCommunityEASF EastAfricanStand‐byForceECCAS EconomicCommunityofCentralAfricanStatesECOSOCC Economic,SocialandCulturalCouncil AfricanUnion

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

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ECOWAS EconomicCommunityofWestAfricanStatesEEAS EuropeanExternalActionServiceEIDHR EuropeanInitiativeforDemocracyandHumanRightsEP EuropeanParliamentEPLO EuropeanPeacebuildingLiaisonOfficeEU EuropeanUnionFES FriedrichEbertStiftungICGLR InternationalConferenceontheGreatLakesRegionIfP InitiativeforPeacebuildingIfS InstrumentforStabilityIGAD IntergovernmentalAuthorityonDevelopmentIOC IndianOceanCommissionIPSS InstituteforPeaceandSecurityStudiesIT ImplementationTeamJAES JointAfrica‐EUStrategyJCC JointCoordinationCommitteeJEGs JointExpertGroupsLAs LocalAuthoritiesMoU MemorandumofUnderstandingNARC NorthAfricanRegionalCapabilityNGOs Non‐GovernmentalOrganizationsNSAs Non‐StateActorsNSC NationalSteeringCommitteePAP Pan‐AfricanParliamentPbP PeacebuildingPartnershipPoW PaneloftheWisePSC PeaceandSecurityCouncil AfricanUnion PSD PeaceandSecurityDepartmentPSOs PeaceSupportOperationsRECs RegionalEconomicCommunitiesRIPs RegionalIndicativeProgrammesRMs RegionalMechanismsSADC SouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunitySALW SmallArmsandLightWeaponsSWP StiftungWissenschaftundPolitikUN UnitedNations

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

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UNECA UnitedNationsEconomicCommissionforAfricaWACSOF WestAfricaCivilSocietyForumWANEP WestAfricaNetworkforPeacebuilding

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Introduction

TheJointAfrica‐EuropeanUnionStrategy JAES ,adoptedattheLisbonSummitinDecember2007,canbeconsideredthecapstonedoctrineofrelationsbetweentheEuropeanUnion EU andAfrica,consolidatedinaboutfiftyyearsoftradeanddevelopmentcooperationandsubstantial‐lyrevisitedinthelastdecade.TheEUisstillthelargesttradingpartnerfor African countries and the largest donor to the African continent.However,newaspectsoftherelationshiphaveassumedanincreasinglyimportantrole,rangingfromcrisismanagementandgovernancetore‐gionalintegration,fromenergytoclimatechange,andfrommigrationtoscienceandtechnology.

TheJointStrategyanditsfirstActionPlan 2008‐2010 tookstockofthisdevelopmentandidentifiedeightprioritiesforcooperationorpart‐nerships,thefirstofwhichconcernspeaceandsecurity.

Securityhasbecomea central issue forbothAfricaand theEU: theeventsofthelastdecadehaveconfirmedtheneedforachangeofpriori‐ties in relationsbetween the two continents,making security the coresubject.Besides,recentdevelopmentsinNorthernAfricaandthepersis‐tence of growing instability in theHorn of Africa,Mali andNigeria, tomention just someof themostchallengingsituations,haveraisednewdoubtsabouttheconsistencyoftheeffortsmadebytheEUandtheAfri‐canUnion AU torenewtheirrelationshipinpeaceandsecurity.

During its first phase, the implementation of the Africa‐EU Part‐nership on Peace and Security was undermined by a number of pro‐blems that jeopardized European efforts to promote stability on theAfricancontinent.An in‐depthanalysisof theseshortfallsandareflec‐tiononpossible improvementsarethebasis forevaluatingthecurrentimplementationofthesecondActionPlan 2011‐2013 ,adoptedinTri‐

INTRODUCTION

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poli inNovember2010,andforadvancingpolicyrecommendationsforfurtherimprovements.

PreviousassessmentsoftheoperationalizationoftheAfrica‐EUPart‐nershiphaveshownatendencytoinstitutionalizedialogueandtocrys‐tallize practices of cooperation along the well‐established Brussels‐AddisAbaba axis,while efforts to engagewithother crucial actors re‐maintosomeextentlimited.Thishasresultedinsub‐optimalconsidera‐tionandinvolvementoftwopillarsoftheAfricanPeaceandSecurityAr‐chitecture APSA andtheAfrica‐EUdialogueonpeaceandsecurityres‐pectively,namely:

‐African regional organizations – Regional Economic CommunitiesRECs andRegionalMechanisms RMs –and

‐AfricanandEuropeancivilsocietyactors– including,amongothers,non‐governmentalorganizations,academiaandthinktanks,commu‐nity and religious organizations, women’s groups, political partiesandfoundations.

Theaimofthisstudyistwofold:

‐ to identify the strengths andweaknesses ofAfricanREC/RMs’ con‐tributiontotheoperationalizationofAPSA,andtoproposenewwaysofengagementwithboththeAUandtheEUintheframeworkofthePartnershiponPeaceandSecurity;

‐ toinvestigateboththecurrentandthepotentialroleofcivilsocietyactors in theAfrica‐EUpoliticaldialogueonpeaceandsecurityandits related implementationactivities,withparticular regard to theirinvolvementinconflictanalysisandearlywarning,capacitybuildingandmediation.

Astothefirstaim,ourstartingpointhasbeentoassesstheinvolvementofREC/RMsincrisismanagementinitiatives,whichstillremainslimitedduetoseveralfactors.Amongotherthings,REC/RMssufferfromagapincommunication,coordinationandharmonizationwithAUstructuresand organs, notwithstanding their participation in some importantcomponents ofAPSA, such as thePeace andSecurityCouncil PSC ortheAfricanStand‐byForce ASF .Inthisstudywemeasuretheseshort‐fallswithreferencetothreemainaspects:theinvolvementofREC/RMsin the political dialogue within the JAES Partnership with regards to

INTRODUCTION

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both theAUand theEU; the rationalizationof the triangular consulta‐tionamong the threeactors;andthecoherenceandconsistencyof theEU’sapproachtotheregionalandcontinentallevels.

The analysis shows an excessive proliferation of mechanisms andprocedureswhichweresupposedtoansweragrowingneedforcoordi‐nationamongthethreelevels,butwhichonthecontraryhaveincreasedthedegreeofbureaucratizationand the lackof transparency.Thishashadanegativeimpactontheeffectivenessandcredibilityof thewholePartnership,andshowstheneedfortheEUandtheAUtodevelopgoodpracticesonhowtoengagemoreandbetterwithREC/RMs.

Evenmorecomplexistheissueoftheinvolvementofcivilsocietyor‐ganizations CSOs .Itrepresentsanoldandstillunresolvedproblema‐tique,whichEuropeanshaveexperiencedindifferentcrisis theatres inthepost‐ColdWarperiod:thedifficultyofcombiningtheeffortsofoffi‐cialinstitutions,nationalorinternational,withthepresenceinthesamefieldofnon‐governmentalorganizationswilling tohelp localpeople torestoreconfidenceandstability.Asweknow,CSOsmaymakeasignifi‐cantcontributionintermsofdialogue,earlywarning,capacitybuildingandmediation.Nevertheless,theiractionsmaysometimesconflictwithparallelinitiativesundertakenbyinstitutions,particularlythemilitary.

InthecaseofAfrica,thisissueisevenmorecomplexanddifficultduetodifferencesinculture,perceptionandstructurebetweenAfricanandinternationalCSOs,andtothelackoftransparencyintherelationshipsamongtheEU/AU,REC/RMsandCSOs. In thiscase, too, the lackofdi‐rectchannelsofcommunication,theabsenceofawell‐structuredpoliti‐caldialogueandthe“unfriendly”proceduresforaccesstoEUfundsareallobstaclestoabetteruseofCSOs’proximitytotherealneedsofsuffe‐ringpopulations.

Asthestudyindicatesinitsconclusions,muchcanbedonetoimpro‐vethepresentlyunsatisfactorysituation.Muchunexpectedprogresshasbeen achieved since the adoption of the JAES, but there is still urgentneedforimprovement.ItisintheinterestsofEuropeandAfricatoad‐dressthisissueinamoreconsistentandeffectiveway.Ourstudyrepre‐sents a small contribution to this process, andwewould like to raiseawarenessof theneedto furtherdevelopEuro‐Africanrelations in thepeaceandsecuritysector.

INTRODUCTION

16

Itbenefitsfromacombinationofconceptualelaboration,policyanalysisandfieldresearch.Tothisend,differentprimaryandsecondarysourceshavebeenexploited,i.e.EUandAUinstitutions’officialdeclarationsandreports, AU and RECs needs assessment, etc. Field research relied onstructured and semi‐structured interviews of relevant stakeholders intheAUandEUinstitutions,REC/RMsliaisonofficerstotheAU,andrep‐resentativesofEuropeanandAfricancivilsocietyorganizations,inbothAddisAbabaandBrussels.

Theanalysiscombinesverticalandhorizontalapproaches.As farasREC/RMsareconcerned,verticalcoordinationandcooperationwiththeAU institutions as well as horizontal coordination between REC/RMsthemselvesareassessed.Inthesamevein,civilsociety’scontributiontotheAfrica‐EUdialogueandrelatedimplementingactivitiesinthefieldofpeaceandsecurityisexaminedthroughthedegreeofcoordinationwithandimpactonbothEuropeanandAfricaninstitutionalactors,aswellastheextentofCSOs’horizontalnetworking.

Thepreliminaryfindingsofthestudywerepresentedatthe“CalltoEurope”conferenceheld inBrusselson21‐22June2012,whichgathe‐redofficials frominstitutions,civilsocietyrepresentatives,AfricanandEuropeanpolicy‐makersandexperts fromboth sidesof the JAES.Thisfinalversionofthestudyresultsfromthefruitfuldiscussionsheldattheworkshop,andincludesitsoutcome.ThestudyoriginatedfromanumberofactivitiesthattheIstitutoAffariInternazionali IAI ofRomehas carriedout over recent years on thissubject.

In2009‐2011,IAIledaresearchprojectentitled“EnsuringPeaceandSecurity in Africa: Implementing the newAfrica‐EU Partnership”, con‐ductedbyaconsortiumofEuropeanandAfricaninstitutionswithlongs‐tanding experience in security issues. The project was carried out incooperationwith theParis‐basedEU Institute forSecurityStudies EUISS and ChathamHouse in London. African partners included resear‐chersandpractitionersfromvariousAfricancentres,suchastheCentredeRechercheetFormationsurl’EtatenAfrique CREA inAbidjan,Côted’Ivoire; the Africa Governance Institute AGI in Dakar, Senegal; andtheKofiAnnanInternationalPeacekeepingTrainingCentre KAIPTC ,in

INTRODUCTION

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Accra,Ghana.ThemergingofexpertisefromEuropeanandAfricaninsti‐tuteswasaimedatbalancingtheprojectbyaddressingbothEuropeanandAfricansecurityconcernsandbyofferinga two‐sidedapproachtotheresearch.

Inthecontextofthisproject,IAIpublishedtwostudiesin2010:

‐EnsuringPeaceandSecurityinAfrica:ImplementingtheNewAfrica‐EU Partnership http://www.iai.it/pdf/Quaderni/Quaderni_E_17_selection.pdf ;and

‐ConsolidatingAfricanandEUassessmentsinviewoftheimplemen‐tationofthepartnershiponpeaceandsecurity http://www.iai.it/pdf/Consolidating‐African‐and‐EU‐assessments.pdf .

Three international conferences were organized in Rome October2009 , London October 2010 and Brussels October 2011 . Theseevents brought together participants from Europe and Africa, notablyofficialsfromtheEU,theAUandtheUnitedNations UN ,governmentofficials and diplomats from Africa and Europe, research institutionsandcivilsocietyorganizations.

Since2011, IAIhasbeenamemberof theObservatoirede l’Afriquehttp://www.obsafrique.eu/ ,anetworkofEuropeanandAfricaninsti‐tutesandexpertsonpeaceandsecurityissuesinAfrica.

ThisnewstudyistheresultofresearchcarriedoutbyaIAIteamin2012,undertheleadofNicolettaPirozzi,seniorfellowatIAIandeditorofthisvolume,andofmyself,withtheparticipationoftwoexternalex‐perts,ValérieVickyMirandaandKai Schaefer.Thewhole exercisehasenjoyedthesupportoftheFoundationforEuropeanProgressiveStudiesFEPS ofBrussels.

GianniBonviciniRome,September2012

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Executive summary

Thestudyiscomprisedoftwomainchapters.Onthebasisoftheprovi‐sions contained in official AU, REC/RMs and EU documents, the firstchapterbyKaiSchaeferinvestigatesthecontributionofREC/RMsto Af‐ricanPeaceandSecurityArchitecture APSA ,identifyingstrengthsandweaknesses.

AsfarasREC/RMsareconcerned,anumberofreportsmaintainthatthemost significant gaps lie in communication, coordination and har‐monizationwiththeAfricanUnionorgans,whichhasonlybeenpartiallyimprovedby theappointmentofREC/RMs liaisonoffices to theAU. Inthesamevein,mainlydue to theslowpaceof theregional integrationprocess and the well‐known overlapping memberships of African re‐gionalorganizations,REC/RMsthemselvesfaceanumberofchallenges,which negatively impact on coordination between them in terms ofmandates,visionsandpolicypriorities.Thisisparticularlyrelevantforthe composition and functioning of some components of APSA: in thecaseoftheAfricanStand‐byForce,thedivisionoflabourbetweenRECsand the newly created RMs, such as the East African Stand‐by ForceEASF ,remainsunclear.Inaddition,itmustberecalledthattheAUre‐cognizeseightREC/RMswithamandateinpeaceandsecurity,whileot‐herregionalgroupingsremainoutsidethisframework.

The first chapterassesses thevarious interactions vertical interac‐tionsbetweentheAUandregionsandhorizontalinteractionsamongre‐gions withreferencetotheAPSAcomponents–thePeaceandSecurityCouncil,theContinentalEarlyWarningSystem CEWS ,thePaneloftheWise PoW ,and theAfricanStand‐byForce– inwhich theREC/RMsare involved. Particular attention is devoted to achievements and cha‐llenges in the implementation of the second JAES Action Plan. To this

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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end, tworelevantcasestudieshavebeenchosen: theCommonMarketfor Eastern and Southern Africa COMESA and the Southern AfricanDevelopment Community SADC , which well epitomize the varianceamong REC/RMs’ mandates, visions and policy priorities, and includealsoalinguisticelement.

ThesecondchapterbyValérieVickyMirandaisfocusedontheinvol‐vementofcivilsocietyintheAfrica‐EUdialogueandimplementationac‐tivitiesinthefieldofpeaceandsecurity.

With regard to civil society, the JAES was conceived as a people‐centred strategy, at least on paper. However, despite formal commit‐ments,ithasnotyetliveduptoexpectations.Firstly,civilsocietyactorsarenotabletofindadequateroomtoexpressthemselvesandtohaveanactual impact on institutional stakeholders and the decision‐makingprocess. Second, significant differences exist between the two sides ofthestrategy,withAfricancivilsocietyorganizationslaggingbehindEu‐ropeanones,intermsofhumanandeconomicresourcesandorganiza‐tional andnetworkingabilities.Thedifficulties experiencedbyAfricanandEuropeanCSOsinadvancingdialogueandundertakingjointinitiati‐vesareaconsequenceofthis.EuropeanandAfricanCSOsarealsoham‐pered by a lack of adequate funding, which they increasingly ackno‐wledgeasoneof themainobstacles totheiractualandeffective invol‐vement in the JointStrategy. Similar remarksapply to thePartnershipon Peace and Security, where, according to CSO representatives, thecontribution of civil society has not been adequately accommodated.Andyet, this isasectorwherecivil societycouldprovideaddedvalue,forexampleinconflictpreventionandpeacebuildingactivities,situationanalysis,training,etc.Someexamplesarealreadyevident forexampletheWest Africa Network for Peacebuilding WANEP and the AfricanPeaceSupportTrainers’Association APSTA ,butthepotentialofcivilsocietyhasyettobefullyexploited.

Startingfromtheso‐called“entrypoints”ofcivilsocietyintotheJAESincluding mechanisms for closer cooperation with the parliamentaryorgans of both the EU and the AU;mapping of existing European andAfricancivilsocietynetworks;andparticipationintheJAESMinisterialTroikameetingsandJointExpertGroups ,thechapterinvestigatestheiractual implementation inorder to assesshowand towhat extent civil

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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societyactorscontributetothePartnership,andwhatgapsshouldins‐teadbefilled.NotonlydoesthechapterconsiderCSOs’directcontribu‐tionto,andconnectionwith,institutionalactors,butitalsolooksatthepotentialsupporttheycanprovideinactivitiessuchasmediation,earlywarning and conflict analysis, thus contributing to the achievement oftheStrategy’sobjectives.

Againstthisbackdrop,thestudyfinallyidentifiessomeselectedpoli‐cyrecommendationstoEUpolicy‐makers,withthefinalaimofputtingforwardpossiblewaysofengagementofregionalandcivilsocietyactorsand further improvements to the existing strategic framework of EU‐Africarelations.

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1. The Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership and African Regional Organizations

Kai Schaefer

The changes in the nature of violent conflicts in Africa over the lastdecadesrequireadaptationandincreasedcapacityonthepartofcon‐flict management actors to provide security and political stability toStatesandtheircitizens.ThischapterdealswiththeroleofAfricanre‐gionalorganizationsinconflictprevention,managementandresolutionwithintheJointAfrica‐EUStrategy,atopicthatstillremainsanunder‐researchedsubject,1while regionalorganizations “areplayinganevermore important role in securing peace and security”2 on the Africancontinent.

The African Union officially recognizes eight Regional EconomicCommunities and two Regional Mechanismswith amandate in peaceand security,3 while other regional groupings remain outside thisframework.4Duetothechangingnatureofviolentconflicts,particularly

1FredrikSöderbaumandRodrigoTavares,“ProblematizingRegionalOrganizations

inAfricanSecurity”,inFredrikSöderbaumandRodrigoTavares,RegionalOrganizationsinAfricanSecurity,LondonandNewYork,Routledge,2001,p.4.

2FriedrichEbertStiftung FES ,OverstretchedandOverrated?ProspectsofRegionalSecurityPolicyinAfricaanditsEuropeanSupport,Berlin,FES,2011,p.3.

3 These are the Economic Community ofWest African States ECOWAS , the Eco‐nomicCommunityofCentralAfricanStates ECCAS ,theSouthernAfricanDevelopmentCommunity SADC , the CommonMarket for Eastern and Southern Africa COMESA ,the East African Community EAC , the Intergovernmental Authority onDevelopmentIGAD ,theCommunityofSahel‐SaharanStates CEN‐SAD andtheArabMaghrebUnionUMA ,aswellastheEastAfricanStand‐byForce EASF andtheNorthAfricaRegionalCapability NARC .

4Suchas the IndianOceanCommission IOC andthe InternationalConferenceon

KAI SCHAEFER

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inAfrica,thatcanonlybeunderstoodanddealtwithinaregionalcon‐text,5manyoftheREC/RMshaveprogressivelyaddedpeaceandsecuri‐tyinitiativestotheiroriginal mostlyeconomic purpose.6Nevertheless,fundamental differences of outlook and style among the REC/RMs re‐sulting fromdifferent perceptions of security threats, historical legacyandculturalbackgroundcanbeseentoplayapartintheformulationofstrategiesforconflictprevention,managementandresolution.7

Source: EU.

Figure 1. A geographical representation of REC/RMs.

Often,REC/RMsareconsideredtohavelargecomparativeadvantagesinthis regard in terms of cultural understanding, geographical closeness

theGreatLakesRegion ICGLR .ForthetimebeingthelatterisinvitedtothemeetingsbetweenAUandREC/RMs.

5FredrikSöderbaumandRodrigoTavares,“ProblematizingRegionalOrganizationsinAfricanSecurity”,inop.cit.,p.5.

6BenediktFranke,“CompetingRegionalismsinAfricaandtheContinent’sEmergingSecurityArchitecture”,inAfricanStudiesQuarterly,Vol.9,No.3,Spring2007,p.46.

7FredrikSöderbaumandRodrigoTavares,“ProblematizingRegionalOrganizationsinAfricanSecurity”,inop.cit.,p.3.

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andpersonal links. Inaddition,astheregionaldimensionofmanyvio‐lent conflictshas adirect impactonneighbouring countries,REC/RMshavea legitimateandvital interest tobeat the forefrontof peaceandsecurityinitiatives.8ItisalsotimelytofocusontheroleofREC/RMsinpeaceandsecurityaspectsontheAfricancontinent,as2012istheyearofsharedvaluesfortheAU.Hence,theAUagendaisfocusedonconsti‐tutionalism, governance and transparency, specifically with regard toREC/RMsandcivilsocietyorganizations.9

Thischapterisstructuredtoprovide1 anoverviewofrelationsbe‐tweenREC/RMsand theAfricanUnionconcerningpeaceandsecurity;2 an analysis of the REC/RMs’ contributions to the Joint Africa‐EUStrategy, with a particular focus on the objectives of the partnership,namely political dialogue and operationalization of the African PeaceandSecurityArchitecture;3 anassessmentoftheEuropeanUnion’sfi‐nancialsupporttoREC/RMs;and4 apresentationoftwocasestudiesonCOMESAandSADCasillustrationsofthedistinctworkingsoftwooftheREC/RMswithinthePartnership.Thechapterarguesforarationali‐zationandprioritizationof relationsbetween theEUandREC/RMs tomakethePartnershipmoreeffectiveandmeaningful.

1. RELATIONS BETWEEN THE AFRICAN UNION AND REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE FIELD OF PEACE AND SECURITY

TheAfricanUnion is increasinglyactive in the fieldof conflictpreven‐tionandcrisismanagement.AnimportanttenetofitspeaceandsecurityapproachisembeddedinArticle4oftheAUConstitutiveAct,whichrec‐ognizes,togetherwiththeprinciplesofsovereignty,territorialintegrityandindependence,therightoftheUniontointerveneinaMemberState“in respect of grave circumstances, namely war crimes, genocide and

8Ibid.,p.7.9JakkieCilliers… etal. ,AfricanFutures2050,Pretoria,InstituteforSecurityStud‐

ies ISS ,2011,p.64.

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crimesagainsthumanity”.Thisshiftfrom“noninterference”to“nonin‐difference”isatthebasisalsoofthedevelopmentofanAfricanarchitec‐turetoaddresspeaceandsecuritychallengesinthecontinent.10

IntheinteractionsbetweentheAUandtheREC/RMs,thecontinentallevel isexpected to takea leadershiprole inprovidingorientationsonpolicydirectionsand the implementationofprogrammes that concernboththecontinentalandregionallevels.AlthoughtheexistenceofmanyRECspredatestheconstitutionoftheAUin2002,suchahierarchicaldi‐visionisnowgenerallyaccepted,albeitsometimeswithreluctance.Thequestion iswhen toact,whogoes firstandwho takeswhat role.HeretheAUandREC/RMsdonotnecessarilyspeakwithonevoice,as illus‐tratedbytheAfricanresponsestothecoupinMaliat thebeginningof2012.WhiletheEconomicCommunityofWestAfricanStates ECOWAS swiftlycondemnedthecoupandsuspendedthecountries’membershipin the organization inMarch2012, it took theAUonemoremonth tocometothesameconclusion.

The Peace and Security Council Protocol, in force since December2003,outlinesinitsArticle16therelationshipbetweentheAUCommis‐sion and REC/RMs,11 recognizing the imperative role of REC/RMs inconflict prevention, management and peacebuilding on the continent,without however describing the operationalmodalities of this type ofrelation.12

ThisrelationisregulatedbyaMemorandumofUnderstanding MoU governingtherelationshipbetweenAUandREC/RMsthatwasconclud‐edinJanuary2008.13AllREC/RMshavesignedtheMoU,withtheNorth

10NicolettaPirozzi,EUsupporttoAfricansecurityarchitecture:fundingandtraining

components, EuropeanUnion Institute for Security Studies EU ISS Occasional PaperNo.76,February2009,p.10,http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/op76.pdf.

11AfricanUnion,TheProtocolRelatingtotheEstablishmentofthePeaceandSecuri‐tyCounciloftheAfricanUnion,AddisAbaba,AfricanUnion,2002,Art.16.

12 JoaquimChissano,“AfricanProblemsandtheirAfricanSolutions– Is theAfricanPeaceandSecurityArchitectureSuitedtoAddressCurrentSecurityThreatsinAfrica?”,inFES,OverstretchedandOverrated?ProspectsofRegionalSecurityPolicyinAfricaanditsEuropeanSupport,op.cit.,p.13.

13UlfEngelandJoaoGomesPorto,“TheAfricanUnion’sNewPeaceandSecurityAr‐chitecture:TowardanEvolvingSecurityRegime?”, inFredrikSöderbaumandRodrigoTavares,RegionalOrganizationsinAfricanSecurity,op.cit.,p.20.


27

AfricanRegionalCapability NARC beingthelasttodosoinSeptember2011.IntheframeworkofthisMoU,theAUandREC/RMsholdregularmeetings,jointmissionsandconsultationsthattakeplaceatthelevelofseniorofficialstwiceayearandatchiefexecutivelevelonceayearonarotatingbasisintheregions.

Especially over recent years, the information flow between the AUandREC/RMshasincreasedintermsoftheexchangeofexperienceandjointneedsassessmentsintheregions.Concerningday‐to‐dayworkingrelations,itisthetaskoftheREC/RMsliaisonofficestotheAUtoensuretheexchangeofinformationbetweentheAUandREC/RMs.

However, despite the progress achieved so far, we can still note anumberofweaknessesconcerningtheroleofREC/RMswhenitcomestoconflictprevention,managementandresolution,asfollows:

‐Onthepoliticallevel,thereisnotsufficientwillonthepartofMem‐ber States to empower the REC/RMs to carry out the tasks, whichthey have been mandated to fulfil. Then there is the problem thatMemberStatesdonotnecessarilyhavethesamepriorities,withna‐tionalintereststakingaprominentroleoncertainpeaceandsecurityissues. These major issues are only solvable if the leaders of theMemberStatesseetheREC/RMsachievingpositiveresults.

‐Financiallyspeaking,itappearsthatMemberStatesdonotgivesuffi‐cientemphasistotheregionallevelinpeaceandsecurityissuesandtherefore do not provide the necessary funds. Therefore, a greaterinvestmentbyMemberStates,togetherwithbetterinstitutionalma‐chineryatREC/RMslevelwhenitcomestoabsorbingexternalfund‐ing,isrequired.

‐There is still a certain degree of overlap between the differentREC/RMs,notonlyintermsofmembership,butalsowithregardtomandates,mostnotably inEasternAfrica.Overlappingmembershipcanbeexplainedinpoliticalandstrategictermsasawaytomaximizethebenefitsof integrationbybeingamemberofmorethanonere‐gionalgrouping.14Thequestion iswhodoeswhat?Whenthisques‐

14AtienoNdomo,RegionalEconomicCommunities inAfrica:AProgressOverview,

Nairobi,GesellschaftfürTechnischeZusammenarbeit GTZ ,2009,p.12.

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tionisclarifiedintermsofadivisionoflabour,therecouldalsobeagreaterinvolvementoftheREC/RMsinthePartnership.

‐SomeREC/RMsareatpresentnotabletofulfiltheirmandateonac‐countofregionalcrises.ThisisespeciallythecasefortheCommunityof Sahel‐Saharan States CEN‐SAD and the North African RegionalCapability NARC inNorthAfrica.

‐ Inaddition,varyingdegreesinthepaceandset‐upofregionalinte‐grationcanbenoted.Forinstance,theEconomicCommunityofWestAfricanStates ECOWAS ,withitstwenty‐yearexperienceinconflictprevention,managementandresolution, ismoreadvancedthanforexample the Economic Community of Central African States EC‐CAS ,whichwas considered relativelyweak by some of our inter‐locutors.

2. AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS IN THE FRAMEWORK OF THE JOINT AFRICA-EU STRATEGY

TheJAES leitmotivof “treatingAfricaasone” isdifficult to translate inthefieldofpeaceandsecurity,becauseitnecessitatesdifferentregionalinterpretations,despiteitscontinentalapproachandthecentralroleoftheAU.ThishasmadetheinvolvementoftheREC/RMsinthePartner‐shipdifficult,andshouldbeoneofthecentralthemesforfuturesupport.So far, theEUandotherpartnershaveconcentratedon theAU.At thelastconsultativemeetingbetweentheAU,theEUandREC/RMs,whichwasheldinNovember2011inZanzibar,“itwasagreedtofosterthein‐volvementoftheRECsintheJAESanddeepeninteractionsbetweentheregionalandcontinentallevels”.15ItisworthnotingthatthePartnershipisstillnotnecessarilyperceivedasarelationshipbetweenequalsbyallAfricanpartners.Hence,itremainsdifficulttopersuadetheREC/RMstofullyparticipate in apartnership that appears tobedominatedon the

15AfricanUnionandEuropeanUnion,AfricaEUJointTaskForceMeeting,Brussels,

March2012,http://www.africa‐eu‐partnership.org/news/14th‐africa‐eu‐joint‐task‐force‐meeting‐8‐9‐march‐2012‐brussels.


29

continentallevelbytheAUandtheEU.OnewaytosolvethisproblemisthroughAPSA,whichallowstheEUtobringtheREC/RMsclosertoit.

TheREC/RMshaveacrucialroletoplayintheformulationofthepol‐icies of the Partnership and the implementation of the second ActionPlan 2011‐2013 . The Partnership also helps REC/RMs in the imple‐mentationof therespectiveprogrammes,as itoffers thema chance tocooperateonalargescale,facilitatedbyEUfunding.Theimportanceofthis cooperation in the frameworkof thePartnership is recognizedbyallstakeholders,butallsidesshouldgofurtherandlookatthedevelop‐mentoftheREC/RMsintermsoftheobjectivestobeachievedoverthenextdecade.Therefore,iftheEUexpectssomeleverageoutofthePart‐nership,itisnecessarytopaymoreattentiontotheregionallevel,astheREC/RMsaretheoperationalkeyforitssuccess.

The followingsectionsof thischapterprovideanassessmentof theinteractionsbetweentheAU, theEUandREC/RMswithinthePartner‐ship,focussingon:1 politicaldialogue;and2 theoperationalizationofAPSAanditscomponents.

2.1. Political dialogue

ThepoliticaldialoguebetweentheEUandRECsintheCotonoucontext16isnotsufficient,asitdoesnotprovideforalinktopeaceandsecurity,anddoes not involve Regional Mechanisms. The Africa‐EU Partnership onPeaceandSecurityoffersthisroute,butitspoliticaldialogueneedstobereactivated and improved to bemeaningful. During the past two years,theAfrica‐EUdialoguehasbeennegativelyaffectedbytheEU’sfatigueinsetting up a fully‐functioning European External Action Service EEAS ,andrelatedactivitieshavebeenreduced,particularlysincetheAfrica‐EUTripoli Summit of November 2010, followingwhich very fewmeetingshavebeenorganizedintheframeworkofthesecondActionPlan.

LookingattheimplementationofthefirstandsecondActionPlans,anumberofchallengesfortheAfrica‐EUpoliticaldialoguecanbeidenti‐

16TheCotonouAgreementregulatestheEU’srelationswiththeAfrican,Caribbean

andPacific States ACP oneconomic, social and culturaldevelopment cooperation. Itwassignedon23June2000foraperiodof20yearsandmayberevisedeveryfiveyears.

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fied.Firstofall,thereistheissueofmutualunderstanding.Onthesideof theAUandREC/RMs, there isnotsufficientclarityas tohowBrus‐sels functions in terms of its inter‐institutional arrangements. On theotherside,EUMemberStatesdonotshowacommonknowledgeofthePartnership’shierarchyandofhowtodealwiththeAUandREC/RMs,whiletheEUseemstofocusmuchmoreonfundingratherthaninvest‐ing in thepromotionofdialogue.Moreover, thisdialoguesuffers fromthecomplexityofthedecision‐makingprocessontheEuropeanside,asall topics first need to be agreed amongMember States so that oftenpre‐cooked answers are presented to the African counterparts onwhichitisdifficulttonegotiate.Furthermore,Africanstakeholderscrit‐icizethefactthatsomeEUMemberStatesoftencomewithprefabricat‐ed mind‐sets due to special bilateral relations with certain Africancountries. Both European and African stakeholders also highlight theimportanceoffactorslinkedtotheattitudeoftheactorsinvolvedinthedialogue.WhiletheEuropeansconsidertheAfricansidetobeemotion‐alandover‐reactive,forexampleduringmeetingsrelatedtotheLibyancrisis, theEuropeansareblamedby theirAfricancounterparts forbe‐ingtoopushyandnottakingenoughtimetolisten,reflectanddiscuss.17Despitealltheregularinteractions,theLibyancrisiswasatellingeventfor theassessmentof thePartnership,as the twosides failedtoagreeonacommonapproachandtheAfricanactorsfelt isolated.Itexposedthedifferences inopinionsbetween thepartnersandprovedthat it isstilldifficulttodefinethesharedvaluesofthetwocontinents,despitethefactthattheyareenshrinedintheJAES.Thiswasamissedoppor‐tunityforboththeEUandtheAU.

InthetraditionalEUnarrativeofthePartnership,politicaldialogueiswhere progress is made with the AU, but not necessarily with theREC/RMs somewouldevengosofarastostatethatwithregardtopo‐litical processes, the REC/RMs are absent in the Partnership, whichseems dominated by Addis Ababa and Brussels‐based diplomats . Atthisstage,experienceofthePartnershiphasdemonstratedthelimitsofthe continental level, and brought about the realization that the

17InterviewwithREC/RMLiaisonOfficer,AddisAbaba,22February2012.


31

REC/RMshaveapolitical role inpeaceandsecurity.One issueof con‐cern is for instance a clashof interests between theAUandREC/RMsoverquestionsof senioritybetweenorganizations.TheREC/RMshavedifficultiesinenteringintoapoliticaldialogue,astherelevantquestionsconcerningtheirownagendasmightvaryfromtheagendaoftheAU,asdemonstratedby theexampleofmaritimesecurity in theGulfofAdenandtheGulfofGuinea.While inbothcasestheissueatstake ispiracy,thisphenomenonhasdifferentcausesandrequiresdifferentresponsesinthetworegionsconcerned,whichunderlinesthefactthattherecan‐notbeacontinentalblueprinttodealwiththisissue.Hence,onthispoli‐cy issue the AUmight be best served by developing a regional policyjointlywiththerelevantregion.Ideally,“ t herelationshipbetweentheAUand theRECs is supposed tobehierarchicalbutmutually reinforc‐ing:theAUharmonizesandcoordinatestheactivitiesoftheRECsinthepeaceandsecurityrealm”.18Oneofthebiggestcoordinationchallengesis todeterminewhat takespriority, especiallywhennational intereststrumpregional interests,which inturnraisesquestionsaboutpoliticalwill.Inaddition,atbothregionalandcontinentallevelthesamethemesaredeveloped, inrelationtosuchissuesasforexamplesecuritysectorreforms. In theory, regional and continental strategies should enhanceeachother,butthisisnotalwaysthecase.ForthePartnershiptofunc‐tioncorrectly,instrumentsfordialogueneedthereforetobeadapted.

Withaviewtofavouringdialogue,effortsareunderwaytorational‐izetheJAESprioritiesfollowingthelastAfrica‐EUSummit,butthepro‐cesscentresverymuchondiscussionsinBrusselsandlessonadebatewith the AU and REC/RMs on how thiswouldwork best. As a conse‐quence,suchaprioritizationexercisehasnotledtoconcreteresults,asshownbythebroadarrayofissuesincludedinthesecondActionPlan.ThesequestionswerealreadyjointlyexaminedinApril2012atministe‐rial level, and the proposals were very clear: “channel efforts and re‐sourcesintoareasandinitiativeswhichareworkingand/orattractingacriticalmassofactors,resourcesandjointEuro‐Africanresolve;allocate

18PaulWilliams,TheAfricanUnion’sConflictManagementCapabilities,NewYork,

CouncilonForeignRelations,2011,p.6.

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thepolitical,humanandfinancialresourcesneededonbothsidesofthepartnershiptonewinitiativesiftheyarepromisingandofmutualinter‐est. Focus on levels of cooperation andquestions,whichhave a conti‐nental/regionalandglobalscopeandaddedvalue.Speakprogressivelywithonevoiceona largernumberof issuesin international forums”.19For the time being, however, the JAES seems to be a process ownedmostlybyEurope.Inaddition,thereisaperceptionthattheEUtendstofocusonEuropeanexpertiseintheimplementationofpeaceandsecuri‐typrogrammes,andtherearepitfallstosuchanapproach.TheEUSecu‐ritySectorReform SSR mission inGuineaBissau,aimedatprovidingadvice andassistance to the local authorities, is anexampleof this, asthe lead European experts were totally disconnected from the imple‐mentationprocessand lacked familiaritywith thesocio‐economiccon‐text.20Thisalsocreates issuesconcerningtheconceptof“Africanown‐ership”. In theparticular caseofGuineaBissau, the increased involve‐mentofECOWASshouldhavebeenensuredsoastobringaboutasuc‐cessfuloutcome.Onequestionweoftenheardwas,“WhataretheEU’spriorities inAPSA?”TheEUhasnever carriedout suchan internal re‐flection,whichwouldmaybealsoleadtheAUandREC/RMstorepriori‐tizetheirobjectives,sothattherecouldbepoliticaldialogueasanentrypointforsupport.

Rationalizationisalsoneededasfarastheinstitutionalset‐upiscon‐cerned.At present, the various instruments for dialogue either do nothavepeaceandsecurityissuesattheircentre,suchastheCommission‐to‐Commissionmeetingsbetween theAUand theEU, or leaveout theREC/RMs from the deliberations, as is the case for the meetings be‐tweentheAUPeaceandSecurityCouncil PSC andtheEUPoliticalandSecurityCommittee COPSinitsFrenchacronym .Further,thesemeet‐ingsonlytakeplaceonceortwiceayear.21

19Ibid.,p.6.20InterviewwithEUofficial,Brussels,27April2012.21AdmoreKambudzi,“Effortswithin,complementaryprocessesandproblemsofcol‐

laborationinaddressingsecuritychallengesin21stcenturyAfrica:CaseoftheAUandtheEU”, inCasaAfrica,EuropeanandAfricanResponsetoSecurityProblemsinAfrica,Madrid,CasaAfrica,2010,p.81.


33

With regard to PSC‐COPSmeetings, there are a number of technicaldifficulties,suchas the issueofchanging interlocutors themembershipof thePSC is rotating,whereasallEUMemberStatesarealwayspartofCOPS ,aswellasthedifferentapproachesoftherespectivePresidencies.The Partnership, with itsmachinery of meetings, is quite formalized, afactwhichhasnotsignificantlychangedsincetheLisbonTreatycameintoforce,butitisdifficulttomoveforwardinaparticularprocessifthereisnocontinuityinthepeopleinvolvedduetostaffturnover.Someofourin‐terlocutors alsopointed out that the agendas of thesemeetings are toolongandveryambitious, andasaconsequencemeetingsare rushed, astheyonlylastoneday.Duetothis,therecanbenoin‐depthdiscussionnorcommonanalysis,butonlydiplomatictourism.Moreover, this isexacer‐batedduetopoliticalsensitivitiesoncertainissues.

ThemainforumofinteractionofthePartnershipistheso‐calledJointExpertGroups JEGs ,where representatives from theAU, theEUandMemberStatescometogethertwiceayeartotakestockofthePartner‐ship.Accordingtotheactorsinvolved,theJEGsarenotwellstructured,andtheroleoftheparticipantsisunclear.Inaddition,usuallyveryfewattendees speakout.22What is the valueof such a format? Ideally, theJEGshouldbeusednotonlytoshareinformationbutalsotoformadis‐course.However,theyhavefailedtoachievethislastobjective.Moreo‐ver, it seems that no checking or tracking of activities is conducted.Therefore,otherstructuresshouldbeconsideredbymeansof internalbrainstorminginordertoreshapetheJAESarchitecture.

SimilarissueshavebeenidentifiedintheworkofthePeaceandSe‐curity Implementation Team in Brussels, which brings together EUMember States, the European Commission and the European ExternalActionService,whichchairstheTeaminanefforttosteertheEuropeanside of the partnership and exchange information on the various pro‐grammes,includingthoseconductedbybilateralpartners.

CoordinationatEUDelegationlevelisalsoveryimportant,inparticu‐lar in terms of information exchange and ensuring a common assess‐mentwith African counterparts. On a positive note, itmust be recog‐

22InterviewwithEUofficial,Brussels,27April2012.

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nizedthat,sincetheEUhasincreaseditsrepresentationinAddisAbaba,individualcountriesandotherorganizationshavealsoopeneddedicat‐edrepresentationstotheAU.InthisregardtheEUwasatrend‐setter,asitwasalsowithitssupportfortheopeningofREC/RMsliaisonofficesinAddisAbaba,whichwerecreated to improveday‐to‐dayworkingrela‐tionsbetweentheAUandREC/RMs.

The EU also chairs the AUPartnersGroup AUPG in AddisAbaba,which includesall themaindonors to theAU.TheAUPG, towhich theREC/RMsliaisonofficesareinvited,playsacentralrole,asitmakesin‐formationavailable,holdsspecificmeetings,forinstanceonpeacesup‐portoperations,andallowsforthealignmentofworkplansandbudg‐ets.TheAUPG isnotaseffectiveas it couldbe,as itdoesnothaveau‐thorityover itsmembersandsomepartnersdonotalwayswant tobecoordinated, especiallywhen it comes to funding issues. Furthermore,theMemberStates’representativespresentarenotreallyworkingwiththeAUbutareaccreditedtothehostcountryEthiopia,withtheexcep‐tionofsome,andratherextractinformationthanshareit.

AllREC/RMsliaisonofficestotheAUinAddisAbaba, fundedundertheAfricanPeaceFacility APF ,23arenowinplace,withtheexceptionof CEN‐SAD, which is currently on minimal operational capacity. TheREC/RMs liaison offices are one of the success stories of the Partner‐ship,buttheirroledependslargelyontheefficiencyoftherelevantof‐ficer,especially in termsof informationexchange.Overall, theyensurecloser linksbetweentheAUandRECs,andcontributetothecoordina‐tionofactivities.Once thenewbuilding for theAUPeaceandSecurityDepartment PSD is finished, it isexpectedthattheliaisonofficeswillbe collocated therewithAUstaff.The lastAU‐REC/RMsMemorandumofUnderstandingmeetingalsoagreedonanextendedmandate fortheliaisonofficesbesidestheiroriginalfocusonpeaceandsecurity.TheIn‐ter‐GovernmentalAuthority onDevelopment IGAD and theCommonMarketofEasternandSouthernAfricahavealreadysentadditionalstafftocoverthisextendedmandate,inordertoavoidpeaceandsecurityis‐sues being side‐lined in future. As those liaison offices are completely

23AfricanUnionandREC/RMs,MemorandumofUnderstanding,Algiers,AfricanUn‐

ion,2008.


35

fundedby theAPF, thequestionof their sustainabilitymustbe raised.TheestablishmentofAUliaisonofficesattheRECsisalsounderprepa‐ration,andstaffpositionshavebeenadvertised.TheRMsandCEN‐SADhavebeenleftoutsofar,mainlyduetoausteritymeasuresandthecrisisinNorthAfrica.

In short, a void exists between all the already‐existing meetingswhichcouldbe filledbyenhancingtheregionaldimensionof thePart‐nership while including the AU, as was demonstrated by the positiveoutcomeof the joint sessionswith theEU in the context of the imple‐mentationmeetingsof theAU‐REC/RMsMoU.These joint sessions ledtotheso‐calledAkosomboprocess namedafterthefirstmeetingplaceinGhana ,whichsinceNovember2010hasbroughttogethertheAU,theEUandREC/RMsonpeaceandsecurityissuesatthelevelofsenioroffi‐cialsandchiefexecutives.TheAkosomboprocesshasimprovedworkingrelations among thepartners, especially in termsof coherenceof pro‐grammesupport.Theseniorofficials’meetingsareagoodopportunityforcooperationintermsofhorizontalandverticalcoordination.Inaddi‐tion,theAkosomboprocesshasallowedsomelighttobeshedonthere‐spective roles of the national, regional and continental levels in peaceand security. The Akosombo process thus provides a useful referencefor the better integration of political dialogue into the Partnership,whichisaroutethatneedstobefurtherexplored.Suchimprovedpoliti‐caldialoguewillnotcomebyitself.Inparticular,itshouldbemademoreoperational and effective, and more high‐level contacts with theREC/RMs,besidesthecurrenttechnicalexchanges,shouldbepromoted.

2.2. Operationalization of the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

TheREC/RMsarealsoembeddedintheAPSA.“ThecreationofAPSAin2002 is perhaps themost importantdevelopment in the security fieldduringthepastdecade.24“TheAPSAaimstogivetheAUandREC/RMsthenecessaryinstrumentstofulfilthetasksofprevention,management

24FredrikSöderbaumandRodrigoTavares,“ProblematizingRegionalOrganizations

inAfricanSecurity”,inop.cit.,p.3.

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andresolutionofconflictinAfrica,assetoutintheAUConstitutiveActand thePSCProtocol”.25With a relativelyhigher degree of integrationcomparedtothecontinentallevel,while“developingathighlydifferingpacesanddepths”,26thereisnotonlyastrongjustificationfortheexist‐enceoftheREC/RMs,buttheyarealsoneededbydefaulttoprovidethenecessary resourcesandexpertise toAPSA, inwhich theyhaveanun‐contested role toplay.27 In fact,APSA is conceived in such away that,withregardtomostofitscomponents,theREC/RMscanbeseenasthepillarsofthearchitecture.

AdescriptionofAPSAisoutsidethescopeofthisstudy,28butanillus‐trationofitsstructureispresentedhereforreference:

Source: Nicoletta Pirozzi, EU support to African security architecture: funding and training com-ponents, European Union Institute for Security Studies (EU ISS) Occasional Paper No. 76, Feb-ruary 2009, http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/op76.pdf.

Figure 2. A map of APSA.

25 EuropeanCommission, APSA Support ProgrammeDescription of theAction, op,

cit.,p.1.26 Julian Junk, “OverstretchedandOverrated?ProspectsofRegionalSecurityPolicy

inAfricaanditsEuropeanSupport”,inFES,OverstretchedandOverrated?ProspectsofRegionalSecurityPolicyinAfricaanditsEuropeanSupport,op.cit.,p.28.

27Ibid.,p.28.28 See for instance Nicoletta Pirozzi, EU support to African security architecture:

funding and training components, European Union Institute for Security Studies EUISS OccasionalPaperNo.76,February2009,http://www.iss.europa.eu/uploads/media/op76.pdf.


37

The challenges in involving the REC/RMs aremanifold. Some parts ofAPSAare functional,buttheAPSAcomponentsareprogressingslowly.Inthiscontext,theelaborationofanAU‐REC/RMsAPSARoadmap,asaresultof the triangularconsultationscarriedoutduringtheAkosomboprocess,hasbeenan importantdevelopment.TheAPSARoadmapwasadopted by the AU and REC/RMs in January 2012. It has helped theREC/RMs in improving their coordination andworkingmethodswiththeAU,andhasbeenproventherightroadtochooseinthatithasestab‐lished a joint document anddoctrine thatprovides theREC/RMswiththepoliticalcloutandcoverageoftheAU.TheAPSARoadmapistoguideall futuresupportbypartners,withtheEUalreadymobilizing itscom‐plete engagement and support accordingly, but it still lacks prioritiza‐tionandbenchmarks.Itactuallyoverburdensthepartnerswithawiderangeofsubjects,withtheAUandtheREC/RMshavingdifficultiesinre‐sponding to all the demands coming from international partners. It issuggested that, insteadof focussingon allAPSAaspects, theRoadmapshould focus on three or four key areas per REC/RM, as some toolsmight not be needed everywhere experience shows that thoseREC/RMswithaclearfocusonactivitiesgenerallyseemtoperformbet‐ter– for instancetheCommonMarket forEasternandSouthernAfricaCOMESA ortheEastAfricanStand‐byForce EASF .AprioritizationoftheAPSARoadmapisthereforeabsolutelynecessary,especiallyiftheAUandREC/RMsareexpectedtoaligntheirstrategicplanstoit.

Inthisstudy,wefocusonthefollowingAPSAaspects:1 earlywarn‐ing;2 peaceandsecuritygovernance;3 mediation;and4 crisisman‐agement.

a.Earlywarning

RECs form an integral part of the Continental Early Warning SystemCEWS .ThePSCProtocolstatesthat“CEWSshallconsistoftheobser‐vationandmonitoringunitsoftheRegionalMechanismstobelinkeddi‐rectly through appropriatemeans of communications to the SituationRoom,whichshallcollectandprocessdataandtransmitthesametotheSituationRoom”.29TherelationshipestablishedundertheAU‐REC/RMs

29AfricanUnion,TheProtocolRelatingtotheEstablishmentofthePeaceandSecuri‐

tyCounciloftheAfricanUnion,op.cit.,Art.12.

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MemorandumofUnderstandingalsogovernsearlywarning,inparticu‐lar the provisions on information exchange, staff exchanges and jointprogrammes.

SeveralRECsalreadyhaveestablishedtheirearlywarningsystemstovarying degrees:30 ECOWAS, IGAD, ECCAS, SADC, COMESA. The lattertwo havemade themost progress in recent years.While in particularECOWASandIGADarequiteadvanced,ECCAS is laggingbehind.Espe‐ciallySADC,COMESAandtheEastAfricanCommunity EAC engageininformationsharingwiththeAU.COMESAhasthemostprogressiveap‐proach to the involvementof civil societyorganizations inearlywarn‐ing,asthereexistaccreditationrules,includingwiththeprivatesector.ThuscivilsocietyorganizationshaveaninsidetrackintheCOMESAear‐lywarningsystem.Theexistingoverlapintermsofstructuresandpostsamongsomeregionalearlywarningsystems,especiallyinEastAfrica,ismainlyduetooverlappingmembershipofsomeRECs.

Onthecontinentallevel,theearlywarningmeetings,attendedbyallearlywarning specialists in the AU and the REC/RMs andwhich tookplace formerlyonaquarterlybasis,nowtakeplace twiceayear, inanefforttorationalizemeetings,butalsoduetotheAUausteritymeasuresputinplace.Thesemeetingshaveservedasanimplementationandco‐ordination mechanism for three years. They are also used to discussbestpracticesandshareexperience,andforjointtrainings.

Thereisaneffortunderwaytoharmonizemethodologiesandtocoor‐dinate the different elements of the early warning system, despite thevaryingmandatesandlegalconstraintsoftheRECs,anddifferentpercep‐tionsofconflictprevention.ACEWSportalforinformationexchangebe‐tweenRECsand theAUhasbeensetup,and theRECsand theAUpostrelevant information in a true two‐wayexchange.TheAU isdevelopingtoolsfortheintegrationofdatafromtheRECsthroughtheCEWSPortal.31

However,itmustberecalledthatCEWSindicatorsaresetbyMemberStates,andincluderedflagsnottobecrossedintermsofearlywarning

30SeeforinstanceIGADwww.cewarn.organdECOWASwww.ecowarn.org.31UlfEngelandJoaoGomesPorto,“TheAfricanUnion’sNewPeaceandSecurityAr‐

chitecture:TowardanEvolvingSecurityRegime?”, inFredrikSöderbaumandRodrigoTavares,RegionalOrganizationsinAfricanSecurity,op.cit.,p.18.


39

signals.Understandably,nocountrywantstobeonawatchlist.There‐fore, each REC is developing its early warning system with varyingmethodologies,andinterconnectivityisyettoberealized,operationallybut also technically.32 Assessment missions to all RECs, starting withECOWASandEAC, areplanned for the comingmonths to address thiscrucialissue.ThesemissionsarealsosupportedbytheEU.“ForCEWStosetmeaningfulandusefulstandardshowever,itwillrequireinteroper‐abilityandadivisionoflabouramongtheRECs”.33

Earlywarning has to be strengthened, as the challenge has alwaysbeentheanalysisofdataandhowto feed it todecision‐makersontheregionalandcontinental levelssothatearlywarningcanbecomeearlyaction.Duetoalackofanalysts,ithasbeendifficultsofartoengagede‐cision‐makers. However, a strategic conflict assessment methodologyhasbeendevelopedtobetterenabletheAUtomonitorandanalysedatarelated toviolent conflictson the continent in the formof stand‐alonereportsonceacrisishaserupted.Forthetimebeing,therearefiveana‐lystsattheAUSituationRoominAddisAbabacoveringthewholeconti‐nent, and more high‐quality capacity and capabilities are required toprovide adequate analysis of open sources and intelligence for peacesupportoperations.Herefurthersupportisneededatalllevels.

b.Peaceandsecuritygovernance

The AU Peace and Security Council PSC is at the heart of APSA andpeaceandsecuritygovernance inAfrica. Itsmembership isbasedonaprinciple of regional representation and rotation of all regions on theAfricancontinent.WithinthePSC,theseregionalgroupingsplayanim‐portantrolewhenitcomestothecoordinationofissuestanceswithinaregion,orwhenregionalclusterstaketheleadinformulatingpoliciesonspecificissues.34“InadditiontoinvitingtheconcernedRECstocontrib‐utetoitsmeetingsonspecificconflicts,thePSCmayleaddiscussionson

32PaulWilliams,TheAfricanUnion’sConflictManagementCapabilities,op.cit.,p.9.33El‐GhassimWane… etal. ,“TheContinentalEarlyWarningSystem:Methodology

andApproach”,inUlfEngelandJoaoGomesPorto,Africa’sNewPeaceandSecurityAr‐chitecture,Ashgate,Farnham,2010,p.109.

34PaulWilliams,TheAfricanUnion’sConflictManagementCapabilities,op.cit.,p.7.

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thebasis of recommendationsmadebyRECs”.35AtPSCmeetingson aspecificcountryorregion,theRECandtheMemberStaterepresentingthechairofthatRECareinvited.IfaspecificconflictisaddressedinthePSC,thechairambassadoroftheRECconcernedwouldbrief,whiletheRECliaisonofficecanattendasanobserver.

With regard to the relationsbetweenPSC and its regional counter‐parts, implementation of the provisions in the PSC protocol is laggingbehind, as nomeetings between the PSC and equivalent bodies in theRECshavetakenplacesofar.Forthetimebeing,ECOWASandSADCaretheonlyRECswithsimilarPSCbodiesat theregional level.Therefore,thePSCengageswithRECs,butnotwiththeappropriateregionalorgan.QuestionsthatneedtoberesolvedinthisregardarehowtoengagetheotherRECsinapoliticalprocessspecifictoeachregion,andwhatformatthisengagementshouldtake,forexampleintheformofbilateralorjointcontinent‐widemeetings.There isalsoaneedforgreatercoherence inapproaches between the different bodies in the AU and the RECs, asdemonstratedbythecaseofNiger,whereECOWASmadeastrongpro‐nouncementfollowingthecoupd’étatinFebruary2010,whiletheAU’sreactionwasmoretimid.

c.Mediation

Mediation issues in the frameworkofAPSAaremainly referred to thePanel of theWise PoW . “Therehasbeen a significantdelaybetweentheadoptionofthePSCProtocolandtheestablishmentandoperational‐ization of the Panel, especially if one compares it with the advancedstagesofoperationalizationoftheotherstructures”.36ThePoWwassetupin2008,andthePSCProtocolprovisionrelatedtoit Article11 doesnotspecifymediationaspartofitsmandate,butspeaksinsteadofcon‐flictpreventionanddiplomacy.Whilesomewouldarguethatthespiritisthesame,othersclaimthatthePoWisnotcarryingoutitsmandateinaccordancewiththePSCProtocol.

35KathrynSturmanandAïssatouHayatou,“ThePeaceandSecurityCounciloftheAf‐

ricanUnion:FromDesign toReality”, inUlfEngeland JoaoGomesPorto,Africa’sNewPeaceandSecurityArchitecture,op.cit.,p.69.

36JamilaElAbdellaoui,ThePaneloftheWise,AddisAbaba,ISS,2009,p.2.


41

Atthesametime,someconsiderthePoWtobethemostsuccessfulpartofAPSA,duetobothitsmembership,witheachregiondesignatinganeminentperson,anditsactivities,withastrongemphasisonworkingonalleviatingelection‐relatedviolence,asshownrecentlybythePoW’sactivitiesintheDemocraticRepublicofCongo.Inaddition,thePoWhasestablishedmediationguidelinesfortheAUandRECs,andtherewillbea review of the continental conflict prevention framework during thesecondhalfof2012.Everymediationprocessisdocumentedintermsoflessons learned, interaction with partners and integration of specificthemesintotheworkofthePoW,suchasgenderissues.

Recently,thePoWhasbeentryingtointegrateearlywarningspecial‐istsmoreintoitswork,asithasaneedforanalyticalreports.Thesere‐ports also legitimize thePoW’s action, and theaim is tohaveanearlywarninganalyst inchargeof eachPoWmission,aswas thecasewhenthePoWwasdeployedfortheelectionsinTunisiainOctober2011andSenegalinFebruary2012.Infact,despitethemoralweightepitomizedbytheeminentpersonalities itcontains, thePoWalsoneedsdedicatedstaffwithsufficientphysicalcapabilitiesinordertobeoperational.

With regard tomediation however, there is still limited use of theAPSAframework,37astheAUreliesinsteadonad‐hocinitiatives,suchasthe High Level Panel on Sudan.38 Towhat extent the decision‐makingprocessisinformedthroughAPSAstructuresisanothermatter.IntermsofverticalAPSAcoordination,thePoWworksmostlywiththeContinen‐talEarlyWarningSystem,butthereisapoliticalgapbetweenthePeaceandSecurityCouncilandthePoW.ThereisaneedforcleardeliberationonwhatthePoWandthead‐hocHigh‐LevelPanelscreatedbytheAUoritsMemberStatesshouldandcando.Theformerconsistsofmembersofa certain age,whoare able to support long‐termmediationprocesses,while the latter should work more on an ad‐hoc basis by identifyingstock‐takingopportunitiesortakinganadvisoryrole,asforinstanceintheSomalipeaceprocessorinSudan.

37ManfredÖhm… etal. ,EntfremdungzwischenEuropaundAfrikanischerUnion?,

Berlin,FES,2011,p.3.38MehariMaru,“TheFirstTenYearsofAUandItsPerformanceinPeaceandSecuri‐

ty”,inISPIPolicyBrief,No.218,Milano,InstituteforInternationalPolicyStudies ISPI ,2012,p.5.

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TheEUwants amorepronounced role inmediation, but it is best‐placed to support in the background, as exemplified by its support toboth the PoW and its regional counterparts, as well as to the ad‐hocHighLevelPanelsoftheAU.

Forquitesometime,theonlyregionalbodysimilartothePoWexist‐edwithinECOWAS.TheECOWASCounciloftheWise,createdin1999,“isnotastandingstructure,buttakestheformofalistofeminentper‐sonalities,who,onbehalfofECOWAS,canusetheirgoodofficesandex‐periencetoplayaroleofmediators, conciliatorsand facilitators”.39 In‐terestingly,“theestablishmentof thePanel of theWise drewinspira‐tionfromECOWAS”.40SADCestablisheditsgroupin2011,whichisalsosimilartothePoW.ThesameholdstrueforCOMESA.Forthetimebeing,cooperation between these various bodies occurs on an ad‐hoc basis,governedbytheAU‐REC/RMsMoU,butitisenvisagedthatadedicatedarrangementwillbefinalizedinthecomingmonths.Asthesegroupsdonothavethesamelevelofexperience,theAUencouragesthemtoworktogether.RECssystematicallyparticipateinPoWmeetings,whereexpe‐rienceandlessonsareshared.RECsalsoparticipateinPoWmissions,aswasthecaseofthegoodofficesdeploymentofthePoWtoTunisiaandEgyptpriortotheelectionsinbothcountriesin2011and2012respec‐tively. COMESA participated in the latter, and the report and recom‐mendationstotheAUPeaceandSecurityCouncilwerepreparedjointly.ThedeploymentfortheDRCelectoralprocessattheendof2011includ‐edfiveRECs,whichgavemorestrengthandcredibilitytotheoutputofthemission.Mostrecently,atthebeginningofJune2012,aretreattookplace in Burkina Faso, regrouping the PoW and its regional counter‐parts, where electoral‐related violence and mediation prospects werediscussed. In general terms, the issue around mediation is one of se‐quencingandtheallocationofresponsibilitybetweenRECsandtheAU.Whoshouldtakethe lead?Thisquestionhasbeenraisedasaresultof

39 ECOWAS, Protocol Relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Manage‐

ment,Resolution,PeacekeepingandSecurity,Abuja,ECOWAS,1999,Article20,http://www.iss.co.za/af/regorg/unity_to_union/pdfs/ecowas/ConflictMecha.pdf.

40TimMurithiandCharlesMwaura, “ThePanelof theWise”, inUlfEngelandJoaoGomesPorto,Africa’sNewPeaceandSecurityArchitecture,op.cit.,p.85.


43

thedifficultiesencounteredbyRECsindealingwiththeprotractedpolit‐icalcrisesinMadagascar 2009‐2012 andCôted’Ivoire uptotheendof2011 ,whenSADCandECOWASactivitiesweretakenoverbytheAU.

d.Crisismanagement

TheAfricanStand‐byForce ASF hasnotyetreachedfulloperatingca‐pability,andwillmostlikelynotdosobefore2015.Whileprogresshasbeenmadeinseveralareas,forinstanceincommonpolicydevelopmentandtrainingcooperation,theAUlackstheMemberStatebuy‐inandthestaffneededtomaketheASFconceptareality.41Additionally,complexconflictsinsomeregionshavemadeitdifficulttobringtheASFintobe‐ing.CriticsoftheASFcouldarguethatitonlyexistsonpaper,andthatitlackssoldiers,equipmentandcommunication,as therearenonationalcapabilities to standby,whileAUMember States contribute toUnitedNationspeacekeepingoperationsatthesametime.

Notwithstanding theMemorandum of Understanding signed be‐tween AU and REC/RMs on their general relationship, there isnothingthatspecificallyregulatestheirrespectiverolesandpow‐erswithrespect to theuseandauthorisationofASFcapabilities.TheAUshouldprovideguidancetoRECs/RMstoensurethatthedifferentbrigadesadhere to thesamestandardsandachieve thesamelevelofreadiness.42

TheleadershiproleoftheAUwillthusbecrucialforthesuccessoftheASF.CooperationontheoperationallevelamongthedifferentREC/RMsandtheAUison‐going,andculminatedintheadoptionofASFRoadmap3,whichprioritizesthechallengesconfrontingtheestablishmentoftheASF:politicalprocess,legalframework,training,logisticsandcommuni‐cation.Thequestionofinteroperabilityisparticularlypronouncedinthecommunicationssector,whereitisnotclearwhosesystemistobeused.

41AfricanUnion,AfricanStand‐byForceRoadmap III,AddisAbaba,AfricanUnion,

2011,p.1.42SolomonDersso,TheroleandplaceoftheAfricanStand‐byForcewithintheAfri‐

canPeaceandSecurityArchitecture,AddisAbaba,ISS,2010,p.16.

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Trainingsneed tobe standardized, also in termsof curricula.TheASFlogisticsbasealsoremainsanunresolvedquestion.

ThegeographicalconfigurationoftheASFfollowstheAbujaTreatyof1991thatdividedAfricaintofiveregions.However,thisset‐uponlypar‐tiallyfollowsthesystemoftheeightrecognizedRECswithamandateinpeaceandsecurity.Hence,theEasternregion,composedofthreeRECsEAC, COMESA and IGAD , established a regional coordinatingmecha‐nism,theEastAfricanStand‐byForce EASF , tomanagethis“creativechaos”.43ThusespeciallywithregardtotheASF,“harmonizingoverlap‐pingmembershipsand regionaldecision‐making structurespresents achallenge”.44 Similarly tootherAPSAcomponents, the readinessof thefivestand‐bybrigadesvariesgreatly.

ProbablythemostadvancedistheEASF,forwhichonlytheciviliancomponentand the stand‐by rosterhaveyet tobeestablished.Otherelementsareinplace,suchasframeworkdocumentsincludingaMem‐orandumofUnderstandingwiththethreeRECsoftheEasternregion,astand‐byforceplanningelementandabrigadeheadquarters.Further,training institutions have been identified and EASF Member Stateshave pledged units for the regional brigade.45 The EASF sent its firstdeploymentofeightstaffofficerstotheAUpeacesupportoperationinSomaliain2011.ThisdemonstratesthattheASFcannotbeunderstoodasabigbangchange,butasanevolvingprocessinwhichelementsareusedoncetheybecomeoperational.Inaddition,theEASFwasthefirstcaseinwhichaREC/RM,onbehalfoftheAU,pilotedthecoordinationofstandardoperatingproceduresforthedeploymentofpeacesupportoperations. This is an example of how delegating certain actions toREC/RMscouldalleviatesometensionsbetweentheregionalandcon‐tinentallevels.

43AnthonivanNieuwkerk,“TheregionalrootsoftheAfricanpeaceandsecurityar‐

chitecture: exploring centre‐periphery relations”, in South African Journal of Interna‐tionalAffairs,Vol.18,No.2,August2011,p.185.

44PaulWilliams,TheAfricanUnion’sConflictManagementCapabilities,op.cit.,p.10.45UlfEngelandJoaoGomesPorto,“TheAfricanUnion’sNewPeaceandSecurityAr‐

chitecture:TowardanEvolvingSecurityRegime?”, inFredrikSöderbaumandRodrigoTavares,RegionalOrganizationsinAfricanSecurity,op.cit.,p.20.


45

As for theother regions, “the regionalbrigades forWestAfricaandSouthernAfrica areworks inprogress. In contrast, theECCASBrigadeexistsonlyinarudimentarywayandNARCisembryonicatbest”.46TherecentconflictinMaliillustratesthatthereisthepoliticalwilltodeployECOWASforces,47buttheinitiativeislackingeverythingfromsoldierstoequipment.Furthermore,ECCASisleadingaregionalpeacekeepingop‐erationintheCentralAfricanRepublic.Hence,theASFisslowlyadvanc‐ing to an African rhythm, and an assessment of the regions will takeplacethisyear,startingwithSADC.

3. THE EUROPEAN UNION’S FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

ThemostintensedialoguebetweentheEUandRECstakesplaceundertheCotonouAgreement,whichisastrongframeworkduetoitslinksbe‐tweendialogue, financial instrumentsandasanctionsregime. “TheEUremains the most important development partner of Africa’s regionalintegration”,48 and there is a great deal of interaction between the EUandREC/RMsthatgoesbeyondpeaceandsecuritywithintheCotonouframework, as the African continent’s strategic and geopolitical im‐portanceforEuropeasaneighbourisparamount.49

FortheEU,theAUhasbeentheforemostinterlocutorwithregardtopeaceandsecurityissuesontheAfricancontinentoverthelastdecade,and the EU is the biggest donor to AU peace and security activities.50

46Ibid.,p.20.47 FrankfurterAllgemeineZeitung,Ecowas schicktTruppennachMali, Frankfurter

AllgemeineZeitung,Frankfurt,28April2012,p.7.48 JulianKitipov, “AfricanLocal IntegrationandMultilateralism:TheRegionalEco‐

nomicCommunitiesandTheirRelationshipwiththeEuropeanUnion”,inMERCURYE‐paper,No.16,November2011,p.13,http://www.mercury‐fp7.net/fileadmin/user_upload/E‐paper_no16_r2011.pdf.

49GerritOlivier, “FromColonialism toPartnership inAfrica‐EuropeRelations?”, inTheInternationalSpectator,Vol.46,No.1,March2011,p.53.

50KaiSchaefer,“L’UnioneAfricanadopoGheddafi”, inAffariInternazionali, January2012,availableathttp://www.affarinternazionali.it/articolo.asp?ID 1952.

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However,theEUhasalsoinvestedheavilyinawiderangeofREC/RMs.Overall,EUfinancialsupportintheareaofpeaceandsecurityontheAf‐ricancontinenttotalsEUR1billionfortheperiod2008‐2013.51

Themainchallenge in therelationshipbetween theEUandRECs isoftenexpressedintermsofabsorptioncapacity,thatisanorganization’sabilitytouseallthefundsprovidedbyadonorinagivenperiodfortheimplementationofitsprogrammes,butthequestioncouldalsobeaskedif the entry points identified by the EU are the right ones. There aremany types of funding instruments,which are confusing and cumber‐some for staff of REC/RMs, which in turn makes access to the fundsmoredifficult.For thesereasons, the levelofendorsement forEUsup‐portonthepartofREC/RMsisblurredduetothecomplexprogrammedesign of EU assistance. The REC/RMs do not necessarily understandtheEUsystemandhowtheEUprogrammingcycleworks,mainlyduetothelackofacoherentpictureacrosstheEUbetweenHeadquarters,theDelegationtotheAUandtheregionalDelegations.Thisisfurthercom‐plicatedby the fact thatEUHeadquartershas to clearallprogrammeswithMemberStates,thelatteralsooftenhavingtheirownprogrammesintheAfricanregions.HarmonizingandstandardizingvariousnationalandEuropeanprogrammes isa central issueof coordination, inwhichtheEUsofarinternallyhasnotexcelled.

In thepast, themaindonorshaveworked in competition ratherthanincollaborationwithoneanother,aidedbyatendencyonthepart of the AU to accept all proposals andmodes of support, asMember Stateswere pursuing bilateral programmes, largely de‐terminedbythedemandsoftheirdomesticconstituencies.52

FortheEUithasbecomemoreandmoredifficulttogiveacoherentandconsistentmessage,especiallyintheregions.

51PhilippeDarmuzey,“LastratégieconjointeAfrique‐UE”,inEuropafricae‐bulletin,Ju‐

ly2010,p.2,http://europafrica.files.wordpress.com/2010/07/p‐darmuzey‐europafrique‐interview‐francais‐final.pdf.

52JoaoGomesCravinho,“RegionalOrganizationsinAfricanSecurity:APractitioner’sView”, in Fredrik Söderbaum and Rodrigo Tavares, Regional Organizations in AfricanSecurity,op.cit.,p.135.


47

ThegenericEUfinancinginstrumentforcooperationwiththeRECsistheRegionalIndicativeProgrammes RIPs thataremanagedbytheEUDelegations. With regard to peace and security, each RIP includes acomponentonpoliticalregionalintegrationthatvariesfromRECtoREC.Forinstance,theECOWASRIPallocatesEUR120millionforpoliticalin‐tegration,includingpeaceandsecurityactivities.Attheregionallevel,itseemsthattheEUhasalmostaskedtoomuchoftheREC/RMsbyoffer‐ing all this support, as the capacity to absorb this assistancewas notthere.Hence, thepoliticalregional integrationcomponentsof theRIPs,includingconflictprevention,needtobestructurally improved, includ‐ing in terms of implementation, which some stakeholders at presentwouldqualifyascatastrophic.Thisisalsoduetothefactthat,ontheEu‐ropeanside, thenumberofstaff in theregionalDelegationswithdedi‐cated peace and security expertise is limited. Furthermore, RIPs areprepared insilosand therefore thequestionofhowthey interlinkandarelinkeduptosupportatthecontinentallevelisrarelyaddressed theECCASpeaceandsecuritycomponentof itsRIPbeinganotableexcep‐tion to this rule . In addition, the implementation of funds is dividedfrom the political discussions, which represents an institutional hitchbetweenEU institutions–mostnotablytheEuropeanCommissionandtheEuropeanExternalActionService–andMemberStates.Atpresentnotenoughattentionispaidtotheseissues,andtheEUstilllacksasys‐tematicapproachastohowthecontinentallevelistakenintoconsidera‐tion in the preparation of RIPs, while respecting the capacities of thepartnerstoimplementtheprogrammes.

TheAPFisthemainfinancialinstrumentfortheAPSA.53WithoutEUassistancethroughtheAPF,APSAanditspotentiallyveryimportantca‐

53ResourcestoimplementAPSAcontinuetobedrawnfromexternaldonors,espe‐

cially the EU. There clearly is a discrepancy between the ownership rhetoric and thecontinuingdependenceonexternalsupport.Forthetimebeing,theAUPeaceandSecu‐rityDepartmentisfundedtoabout80%byexternalsources.Overall,thedependencyoninternationalaidisincreasingwithregardtoAPSA.AtpresenttheAUPeaceFundrepre‐sents7%oftheAUbudget,butevenattheenvisagedlevelof12%itwouldnotbeabletocover anyof theAUpeace supportoperations. In addition, contributions to thePeaceFundbyAfricancountrieshavedecreasedduetothecrisis inNorthAfrica.Althoughacommitteeonalternativesourcesoffundinghasbeensetup,chairedbyformerNigerian

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pabilitieswouldprobablynothave seen the lightofday.54 Since2004,theAPFhassupportedtheoperationalizationofAPSAatthecontinentalandregionallevelstoatotalamountofEUR100million.55Accordingtoa lessons‐learnedexercisebetween theAU, theEUandREC/RMs, “theprogrammeshadbeenveryhelpfulforenhancingstafflevelsandbuild‐ingcapacitiesinkeyareassuchasmediation,earlywarning,training,in‐formationsharing,exchangevisitsandsupporttorelevantstructures.ApositiveaspectoftheprogrammedesignwastheAUleadershiproleandthattherehadbeenanincreaseinmutualtrustandunderstandingbe‐tweentheAU,EUandREC/RMs,butitwasobservedthattheAUleader‐shiproleneedstobe furtherstrengthened”.56The interactionbetweentheEUandREC/RMsis improvingthankstotheroleoftheAPFasthemain financing instrument of the Partnership and its important pro‐grammesthatarechannelledthroughtheAU.“WithcontinuedEUfund‐ingbeingmadeavailablefortheoperationalizationofAPSA,strengthen‐ingofcoherenceandcomplementarityaswellasdevelopmentofsyner‐gies becomes increasingly important. EU support should be deliveredthrough one comprehensive framework mirroring AU and REC/RMsstrategic objectives and priorities, adapted to different stages of pro‐gress,fillinggapsandenablingallactorstofulfiltheirtasksandrespon‐sibilities”.57 Such a consolidatedprocess is now spelled out in theAU‐REC/RMsAPSARoadmap, that serves as a reference document for allfuturepartnersupporttoAPSA,andagainstwhichEUsupport is tobechecked.ThisprocesshastobedrivenbytheAUinitscontinentallead‐

PresidentObasanjo,notmuchmovementonthis issue isnotablewithinAU.TheAUisalsoworkingonastrategyforfundingfromtheprivatesector e.g.theConfederationofAfrican Football, airline companies and non‐traditional partners such as China andTurkey.AkindofAPFfundedbyChinaisbeingconsideredforthefuture,butapossibletriangulardialoguebetween theAU, theEUandChinaon this issuehasnotbeenpur‐sued.

54JakkieCilliers… etal. ,AfricanFutures2050,op.cit.,p.10.55EuropeanCommission,TheAfricanPeaceFacilityAnnualReport2011,Brussels,

Directorate‐GeneralDevelopmentCooperation DGDEVCO ,2012,p.15.56EuropeanCommission,APSASupportProgrammeDescriptionoftheAction,Brus‐

sels,Directorate‐GeneralDevelopmentCooperation DGDEVCO ,2012,p.2.57EuropeanCommission,TheAfricanPeaceFacilityAnnualReport2011,op.cit.,

p.24.


49

ershiprolevis‐à‐vistheREC/RMs.Previously,therewaslessinteractionamongtheREC/RMsthemselves,despiteageneralwillingnesstointer‐actandtocoordinate,buttheAPFbroughtthethreeorganizationallev‐els EU‐AU‐REC/RMs togetherthroughitsprogrammesaswellasAPF‐relatedmeetingsandconsultations.

TheEuropeanExternalActionServiceistryingtobringsomecoher‐encebyworkinghand‐in‐handwiththeEuropeanCommission,especial‐ly onhow theAPF is used, andbyproviding apolitical reading of thevarious financial instruments tobetter shapeEUsupport.Still, compe‐tencies on theEU side are in theprocess of being established andde‐finedmoreclearly.Theissueofconsistencybetweensupportatthere‐gionaland thecontinental levels isoneof theareas intowhich theEUneedstoputmoreeffortinordertocoordinateitsseveralstrategiesandinstruments,suchastheAPFandtheRIPs.Forexample,theAPFteamoftheEuropeanCommissionisrarelyconsultedonthisissueduringinter‐serviceconsultations CIS ,thatistheprocessbywhichqualitycontrolbyall relevantserviceswithin theEuropeanCommission isensured inthe preparation of future programmes. For the time being, coherencebetweentheAPFandRIPsworksonlyonanad‐hocbasisthroughper‐sonalcontacts.ThePan‐AfricanUnit in theEEASshouldcoordinateonthis issue, but this has not happened so far due to the slow establish‐mentofthenewinstitution.Forthe futurefinancial frameworkthis is‐sue shouldbe remediedandcoherencebetweenRIPsand theAPFen‐sured,possiblythroughthedeploymentofAPFexperts intheprepara‐tionofRIPs.

4. THE CASES OF COMESA AND SADC

4.1. The Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA)

TheCommonMarketforEasternandSouthernAfricastartedoff inthe1980sasapreferential tradearea,workingontrade liberalizationandtariffreduction.Fromafreetradeareaitmovedtowardsacustomsun‐ion with the objective of a common market. For COMESA, the 1990s

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weremarkedbytheviolentconflictsinBurundi,RwandaandtheDemo‐cratic Republic of Congo, which have been called “Africa’s first worldwar”.Asaconsequence,COMESArealizedthatitcouldnotmovefurtherin negotiations if peace and security were not dealt with. In 1999,COMESAundertookastudyontherootcausesofconflict,whichcametotheconclusionthatconflictwascausedinthemainbybadgovernance,linked toeconomic issuessuchas theallocationof resourcesandpov‐erty.Accordingtothisstudy,themisallocationofresourcesandtheab‐senceofgovernancespreadconflict,evenaffectingneighbouringcoun‐triesthroughtheillegalexploitationofresourcesbyneighbouringforcesandthepoorperformanceofpublicgoodsmanagement,corruptionandcorridorsoffreemovementofarmedgroups.Consequently,theneedfora legal framework for formal trade relationships was recognized, andthe concept of “trading forpeace”wasdeveloped.Thiswas thebegin‐ningofCOMESA’speaceandsecurityactivities,whichweremanagedbytheDepartmentofLegalAffairs.AForeignMinistersCouncilandaPeaceandSecurityCommittee,composedofthePermanentSecretariesoftheForeignMinistries,werecreated,whichcurrentlymeettwiceayear.In2004,COMESAalsocalledonmembersofparliamentfromitsregiontobe involved in peace and security activities, as theyhave an oversightoverthosemattersintheircountries,atleastonpaper.Thisledtocon‐sultationsonapeaceandsecurityprogrammein2006,withafocusonpreventionandsecuritysectorreform.

With regard to APSA, COMESA is part of the second group ofREC/RMs to establish its early warning system, which is based on astructuralvulnerabilitylong‐term 10years analysis,withabout80in‐dicators, such as economicmarginalisation and resource allocation. ItwascloselydevelopedincooperationwiththeAU,ECOWAS,SADCandIGAD,and invitesallREC/RMstoget involved.Theearlywarningcon‐ceptandindicatorshavebeenadopted,andcurrentlythemodalitiesofhowtofeedthedataandanalysisintothedecision‐makingprocessarebeing developed. It is the view in COMESA that earlywarning shouldservepreventionandmediationpurposes.Therefore,accordingtothatview,earlywarningandmediation structures shouldbe closely linkedso that the latter can benefit from timely and relevant information.COMESA is one of the fewREC/RMs beside ECOWAS that already has


51

mediationstructures.ItsregionalequivalentofthePaneloftheWiseisits Committee of Elders three out of the ninemembers arewomen .Theirtaskistoanalyseandmapneedsformediation,withtheobjectiveofdeploymentshouldacrisisarise.TheCommitteeofEldershasalreadybeeninvolvedbytheAUinconsultationsandjointelectoralobservationmissionsintheDemocraticRepublicofCongoandEgypt.Thejointchar‐acter in particular of these initiatives has been much appreciated byCOMESA.

ThereareseveralconsultationsandforaacrosstheAUandtheEUtowhichCOMESAisnotprivy.However,theAPFinparticularhashelpedtocreatealinkbetweenCOMESAandtheEUintheAPSAcontext,albeitnotatapolicy‐making level.COMESAhas reliedon thecapacityof theAUtocoordinateinteractiononAPSAwiththeEU.Mostimportantly,theconsultations in the frameworkof theAkosomboprocesshaveprovencrucialinenhancingrelationswiththeEU,includingintermsofabetterunderstanding of the comprehensive EU support offered through theAPFandRIPs.

4.2. The Southern African Development Community (SADC)

ThepeaceandsecuritychallengesfacingthesouthernAfricanregionarelargelypolitical, socialandeconomic innature.58Following theregimechangeinSouthAfrica,theregionestablishedtheSouthernAfricanDe‐velopmentCommunity SADC in1992.Withgrowingmembershipandchangingobjectives fromsocio‐economiccooperationtointegration ,59SADCincludedbodiesdealingwithpeaceandsecuritycooperationinitsstructureandactivities.BasedontheSADCTreatyandtheProtocolonPolitics,DefenceandSecurityCooperationasthekeypolicyframeworksguidingdecision‐making,thosebodiesaretheSADCSummitandtheOr‐


chitecture: exploring centre‐periphery relations”, in South African Journal of Interna‐tionalAffairs,Vol.18,No.2,August2011,p.180.

59 Julian Junk, “OverstretchedandOverrated?ProspectsofRegionalSecurityPolicyinAfricaanditsEuropeanSupport”,op.cit.,p.29.

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ganonPolitics,DefenceandSecurityCooperation.60WiththeOrganhav‐ingarelativelysmalladministrativestructureandcapacity, itdependstoalargeextentonMemberStates’politicalinstructions.Putdifferently,theOrganisessentiallyanimplementationbody.61ThecrucialquestionishowtocascadethePeaceandSecurityPartnership intotheregionalplans, such as the SADC Security and Defence Policywith its regionalpeaceandsecuritystrategy.Toaddress this issue,SADChasstartedtomakereferencestoAUpolicydocumentsattheregionallevel,suchasitsstrategic plan for theOrgan, in order to increase consistencywith AUpolicy and to avoiddissonancewithinAPSAat the continental and re‐gionallevels.

For SADC, APSA is an alternative route for things that otherwisecouldnotbedone.TheAPSAunderstanding inSADCis that it isa top‐downstructure,whichshouldbedemand‐driven.Oneofthemostdiffi‐cult issues for SADC within APSA is the area of early warning. APSAforesees a continental earlywarning systembased on open‐source in‐struments,but theSADCearlywarningsystemisaclosed intelligence‐basednetwork,andthereforecooperationwithitscontinentalandotherregionalearlywarningcounterpartscanonlybelimited.Asregardsme‐diation structures, APSA follows the African practice of respecting theelders,andthereforetheSADCmediationpaneliscalledthePaneloftheElders.Nevertheless,recentexperiencesintheSADCregioninthisarearepresent bad lessons for the coordination of mediation support be‐tweenthecontinentalandregionallevels,asexemplifiedbythemedia‐tion efforts inMadagascar in 2011,where themediationwas delayedduetoquarrelsoverwhichorganizationshouldtakethelead.Intermsof crisismanagement, SADChad peacekeeping stand‐by arrangementswellbeforeAPSA.Therefore,theAfricanStand‐byForceisahighlysen‐sitiveissuewithinSADC,asitsbrigadehastointegratepolicies,exercis‐esandtrainingdevelopedbytheAUinordertofitintothecontinentalcontext.


chitecture:exploringcentre‐peripheryrelations”,inop.cit.,p.181.61Ibid.,p.182.


53

TherearechallengesintheinteractionbetweentheEUandSADC,butfortunatelyAPSAprovidesaframeworkfordialoguetoovercomethesechallenges. The good news is that the Partnership has built amarkedconfidencebetweenthetworegions.Thereisafrankpoliticaldialogue,andannualmeetingstakeplacebetweentheEuropeanCommissionandSADC,includingintheareaofpeaceandsecurity,whichalsoserveasaninterfacewithMember States. However, policymakers are largely ab‐sent fromthisprocess.Further,as regards thepoliticaldimension, theEUusesparallelprocesses,suchasactivitiesrelatedtoCotonouandtheJAES.Asregardsthetechnicalaspect, theEUisnothomogenousinthesupportitprovidesthroughtheRIPandtheAPF,whereprojectprepara‐tion, design and accountability issues are not aligned. In addition, thechallenge of harmonizing EU and Member State support persists, asSADC also entertains bilateral relations with EU Member States thatmightofferlessstringentpoliticalandtechnicalconditionsthantheEU.OnecrucialissuethatwillhavetobetackledisthatofputtingthePart‐nershiponatrulyequalfooting.OneSADCproposalistodeployEUex‐pertstoassisttheAfricansidetounderstandhowtheEUsystemworks.

55

2. The Africa-EU Peace and Security Partnership and the Role of Civil Society

Valérie Vicky Miranda

TheJointAfrica‐EUStrategywasmeanttobeapeople‐centredpartner‐ship.1Fiveyearsafteritsadoption,however,itseemsthatdespitegoodintentionsithasnotliveduptoexpectations.ItiscommonopinionthatintermsofobjectivesachievedthePeaceandSecurityPartnershipisthemost successfulof theeightPartnerships identified in the JAES.But towhat extent is civil society actually involved in the implementation ofthe Partnership? What added value could civil society organizationsCSOs bring to peace and security activities in the relations betweentheEUandAfrica?HowcouldtheJAEStakeadvantageofthem?

Theseare someof thequestionsonwhich this chapteraims to shedlight.Todoso,itwillfirstprovideabriefoverviewoftheconceptofcivilsocietyaswellasoftheEU’sapproachtowardsit.ItwillthenlookmorecloselyattheJAES,investigatingcivilsociety’sparticipationmechanismsandactualcontributiontotheimplementationofthePartnershiponboththeEuropeanandtheAfricansides.Bytakingintoaccountfourbroadar‐eas of engagement on peace and security issues, namely dialogue onpeaceandsecurity,earlywarning,trainingandcapacitybuildingandme‐diation, itwillshowwhatcivil society’saddedvalue in the implementa‐tionofthePeaceandSecurityPartnershipcouldbe.Onthesegrounds,ex‐istingchallengeswillbeidentifiedandwillprovideabasisforpolicyrec‐ommendations,whichareputforwardinthefinalchapter.

1CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,TheAfrica‐EUStrategicPartnership‐AJointAfrica‐

EUStrategy, 16344/07 ,Lisbon,9December2007,http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/er/97496.pdf.

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Finding updated information on civil society’s involvement in theJAES is not an easy task.Open sourcematerial and literature are verylimited on this topic. Interviews with relevant institutional and non‐statestakeholders,conductedinAddisAbabaandBrussels,madeupforthis absenceandproved crucial in getting asobjective anoverviewaspossible.

1. WHAT IS CIVIL SOCIETY?

Civilsocietyisafluidandchangingconceptwhichcoversdifferentreali‐ties, depending on the period and the geographical areas considered.Despiteevolution in itscompositionovertime,civilsocietyhasalwaysbeena forceopposingtheexcessiveconcentrationandabuseofpowerbypublicauthorities.

Givingauniqueand clear‐cutdefinitionof civil societywouldbe toosimplistic.Nevertheless,itispossibletoidentifywithcertaintywhatcivilsocietyisnot.CivilsocietyisneithertheStatenorthepublicauthorities,nor themarketas,differently fromthe latter, it isnotsteeredbyprofit.Generally speaking, itmight be conceived of as a plurality of organizednot‐for‐profit actors includingcitizens themselves inawidermeaning whichpursuethepublicgoodandsocialeconomy‐relatedvalues.Howev‐er,boundariesbetweenthesethreecategories theState,themarketandcivil society are blurred and continuously evolving. One could for in‐stancethinkofprivatefoundations,universitiesorresearchcentres,thatmightliebetweenthepublicandprivatesectorsandcivilsociety.

It isalsoworthnotingthat in itsdevelopment legislation, theEuro‐peanUnionpromotestheuseoftheconceptofNon‐StateActors NSAs .This conceptwas introduced for the first time by the Cotonou Agree‐ment 2000 , referring to all social structures other than the govern‐ment.Itisbuiltaroundthreecomponents:theprivatesector,socialandeconomic partners unions and employers and civil society organiza‐tions.Inanycase,onlythoseNSAsthatoperateinanot‐for‐profitman‐nerareeligibleforEUfinancing.

Alongside theCotonouAgreement, thenew legal basis fordevelop‐mentcooperationlaiddownin2007betterspecifiestheEUconceptof

THE ROLE OF CIVIL SOCIETY

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Non‐State Actors, which include various organized actors such asNorthernandSouthernNon‐GovernmentalOrganizations NGOs ;tradeunionsandemployerorganizations;cooperatives;grass‐rootcommuni‐ties;consumers,youthandwomen’sorganizations;universitiesandre‐searchcentres;publicandprivatefoundations;culturalandsportsasso‐ciationsandthemedia;networksofassociations,platformsandconfed‐erations; and religious associations. 2 Inclusion in one category or an‐other is susceptible to change according to the specific economic andpoliticalcontext.

Source: EU.

Figure 3. The multiple components of civil society

Dependingontheextentoftheirinstitutionalisation,CSOshavedifferentlevelsoforganization.Wecandistinguish:1 localandgrass‐rootinitia‐tives,i.e.informalgroupsofpeoplethatdecidetogathertoproposecre‐

2 The CIVICUS Civil Society Index project adopts a similar wide approach, under‐

standing by the term civil society “the arena, outside of the family, the state and themarket,whichiscreatedbyindividualandcollectiveactions,organizationsandinstitu‐tionstoadvancesharedinterests”.SeeCIVICUS,CivilSociety2011,Johannesburg,April2012.


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ativesolutionstolocalproblems health,education,etc. ;2 morestruc‐tured and intermediary organizations working for the benefit of thepopulation, suchas foundations,NGOsorotherorganizationsadvocat‐inghumanrights’protection;3 coalitionsoforganizations,e.g.,coordi‐nating bodies, networks and federations that decide to come togetherandcooperatesystematicallyona thematicand/orgeographicalbasis;4 platforms,thatisassociationsofrepresentativenetworksinvarioussectors,workingastrueforumsfordialogueandconfrontingthepublicauthorities. In practice, horizontal and vertical exchanges and connec‐tionsbetweenthefourlevelsoftenoccur,thusrenderingthesedistinc‐tionsnotsoclear‐cut.

Source: IAI elaboration from EU data.

Figure 4. The organization of civil society

Despitetheirdifferences,CSOshaveacommonfeaturewhichrepresentsone of their main added values, i.e. an extensive knowledge of localcommunitiesandnetworkswhichallowsthemtoeasilyreachthem.

Forthepurposesofthepresentwork,weunderstoodcivilsocietyinitsbroadestmeaningincluding,asdescribedabove,awiderangeofac‐tors such as non‐governmental organizations, private foundations,women’sassociations,tradeunions,etc.However,particularattentionispaidtotheworkofNGOsandrelatednetworks,whosecontributiontothepeaceandsecuritysectorhasbeenconfirmedasextremelyvaluablebytherelevantstrategicandpolicydocumentsandbythestakeholdersinterviewed.


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2. THE EUROPEAN UNION AND CIVIL SOCIETY

The historical and political development of the European Union’s ap‐proachtowards,andengagementwith,CSOshasprogressedthroughasetofkeymilestones.3

ThefirstformalpartnershipbetweentheEuropeanCommissionandEuropeanNGOswasestablishedin1976withthecreationofanNGOCo‐financingbudgetline 2.5millionECUs tosupportinnovativeprojects,suchasthestruggleagainstapartheidinSouth‐Africaorthepromotionoffairtrade.Atthattime,however,theparticipationofcivilsocietywasstilllimited,astheprevailingmodelofdevelopmentattributedaleadingroletotheState.Furthermore,attentionwaspaidalmostexclusivelytoEuropeanorganizations.

In 1999, the launch of the European Initiative for Democracy andHuman Rights EIDHR marked an important step, as the EU’s focusbroadenedtoincludethedevelopmentofdemocracy,theruleoflawandrespect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. This entailed afirstwideningofthebeneficiariesofEUfinancingtoincludegroupsandindividualswithinCSOsfightingfordemocracyandfreedom.

The true turning point in the EU’s approach to civil society washowever the signature of the CotonouAgreement in 2000.4With theobjectivesofpromotingandacceleratingeconomic,socialandculturaldevelopment in the African, Caribbean and Pacific ACP countries,contributingtopeaceandsecurityandpromotingastableanddemo‐cratic environment, the Cotonou Agreement was the first legally‐binding document to recognize Non‐State Actors, and laid down thebasisfortheso‐calledparticipatoryapproachasa“fundamentalprin‐

3EuropeanCommission,BackgroundDocument‐Overviewoftheprocessandover‐

all context, StructuredDialogue for an efficient partnership inDevelopment, Brussels,March2010.

4EuropeAid,ConsolidatedVersionoftheACP‐ECPartnershipAgreement,signedinCotonouon23June2000,revisedinLuxembourgon25June2005andrevisedinOua‐gadougou on 22 June 2010, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/where/acp/overview/documents/cotonou‐consolidated‐fin‐ap‐2012_en.pdf.


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ciple”ofACPcooperation.TheAgreementindeedrecognizeddevelop‐ment cooperationas aparticipatoryprocess,wheregovernments arejustoneof theactors involved. In this regard,Article2of theAgree‐ment explicitly states that NSAs’ actions complement those of theState,andthattheyshouldnolongerbeseenasmereserviceprovid‐ersbutasfully‐fledgedactorsinallstagesofthedevelopmentprocess,fromtheconsultationphasetomonitoringandevaluation.5Thepartic‐ipatoryapproachwas later formalized in2002 in theEuropeanCom‐mission’s Communication on the Participation of non‐state actors intheEuropeanCommunitydevelopmentpolicy.6

Thisshiftinparadigmwasconfirmedinallkeydocumentsandtoolsof development delivery endorsedby the EU in the second half of the2000s.The2006EuropeanConsensusonDevelopmentforinstancerec‐ognized the important role of civil society actors understood in theirbroadestmeaning ,andcommittedtheEUtobuildingtheircapacitiestoallowthemtofullyparticipateinthedevelopmentprocess.

Inthesamevein,thenewfinancialarchitecturewhichreplacedexist‐inginstrumentsfrom2007onwardscontainedspecificprovisionsdeal‐ingwiththeroleofNSAsindevelopment.Amongstthem,theDevelop‐ment Cooperation Instrument DCI included a new thematic pro‐gramme for non‐state actors and local authorities in development, re‐

5Theprincipleof“participatorydevelopment”wasreaffirmedinthe2001WhitePa‐

peronEuropeanGovernanceaswellasinotherpolicydocuments seeEuropeanCom‐mission,EuropeanGovernance,Awhitepaper, COM 2001 428 ,Brussels,25July2001,http://eur‐lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/com2001_0428en01.pdf .TheWhitePaperunderlinestheneedtostrengthendialoguewithnon‐governmentalactorsin third countrieswhendeveloping policy proposalswith an international dimension.See alsoEuropeanCommission,BackgroundDocument ‐Overviewof theprocess andoverallcontext,op.cit.

6 European Commission, Communication on the Participation of Non State ActorsNSA in EC Development Policy, COM 2002 598 , Brussels, 7 November 2002,http://eur‐lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2002/com2002_0598en01.pdf. In2004, theCommission issuedadocument entitled “GuidelinesonPrinciples andGoodPractices for the Participation of Non‐State Actors in the development dialogues andconsultations”.For internaluse, thedocumentprovidesconcreteoperationalguidanceforEUDelegationsonhowtoengagewithCSOs.


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placing the previous NGO Co‐financing and decentralized cooperationbudgetlines.7

Buildingonpastdebatesandreflections,inMarch2010theEurope‐anCommissionlaunchedtheStructuredDialogue,conceivedofasacon‐sensus‐building mechanism for inclusive discussion together with theEuropeanParliament,EUMemberStatesandCSOs plusLocalAuthori‐ties ‐ LAs of how to improve the latter’s involvement in the develop‐mentprocess.8

StartingfromthecommitmentsmadeintheStructuredDialogue,theAgenda forChange,proposedby theEuropeanCommission inOctober2011 as the new framework for EU development policy,while payinggreater attention to human rights, democracy and governance‐relatedissues,acknowledged,onceagain,theneedfortheEUto“strengthenthelinkswithCSOs,socialpartnersandlocalauthoritiesthroughregulardi‐alogueand theuseofbestpractices”9, aswell as to support theemer‐genceofanorganizedcivilsocietyabletoactasawatchdog.

Atthetimeofwriting,asa furtherstep in itsengagementwithcivilsociety,theEuropeanCommissionisworkingonacommunicationenti‐tled “Civil SocietyOrganizations inDevelopmentCooperation”. In light

7TheCommissionhasrecentlyadoptedthe2012AnnualActionProgrammeforthis

thematicprogramme.SeeEuropeanCommission,ImplementingDecisionontheAnnualActionProgramme2012for thethematicprogramme“NonStateActorsandLocalAu‐thoritiesinDevelopment”tobefinancedunderthegeneralbudgetoftheEuropeanUn‐ion, C 2012 1986 , 29 March 2012, http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/documents/aap/2012/aap_2012_dci‐nsa_en.pdf.

8SeeEuropeanCommission,PreparingtheCommunicationonCivilSocietyOrgani‐zationsinDevelopment,presentationatworkshopinBrussels,April2012,andEurope‐anCommission,StructuredDialogue first follow‐upmeeting,Brussels,9‐10November2011.Inanutshell,themainconclusionsofthefinalconference Budapest,May2011 andof the first follow‐upmeeting Brussels,November2011 werea commitmentonthepartoftheEUtopromoteanenablingenvironmentinpartnercountriesbywayofthestrategic involvementofCSOs/LAs;an inclusivemulti‐stakeholderdialogue;bettercoordinationatthelocallevel;animprovedpartnershipbetweenEuropeanandSouth‐ern CSOs; and better networking, including by means of the EU Delegations on theground.

9EuropeanCommission,IncreasingtheimpactofEUDevelopmentPolicy:anAgendafor Change, COM 2011 637 , Brussels, 13 October 2011, http://eur‐lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri COM:2011:0637:FIN:EN:PDF,p.6.


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of recent international events, such as theArab Spring,whichprovidenewareasforreflection,thecommunicationismeanttoofferanewpo‐litical and strategic framework for the Commission’s partnershipwithCSOs,aswellastoproposefinancialtoolsinthenewMultiannualFinan‐cial Framework 2014‐2020 for its operationalization namely overallsupport to CSOs through geographic funds and a new thematic pro‐grammeonCSOsandLAs .Moreparticularly,thecommunicationwouldpromote strategic engagementwith CSOs, placing particular emphasisonlocalCSOsandgovernance‐relatedroles.

WhathasbeensaidsofarreferstothegeneralprinciplesunderlyingtheEU’sapproachtowardscivilsocietyorganizations,regardlessoftheparticulardomainandgeographicalareaofengagement.

Asfarasthesecuritysectorisconcerned,however,relevantEUstra‐tegicdocumentsmakereferencetocivilsociety’spossiblecontributiontoactivitiesinthisdomain.AlthoughnoexplicitmentionofCSOsiscon‐tained in the2003EuropeanSecurityStrategy, the2008Reporton itsimplementation acknowledges the “vital role civil society and NGOsmightplayasactorsandpartners” inbuildingamoreeffectiveandca‐pable Europe, especially in conflict‐affected or fragile countries.10 In asimilar vein, the EU Internal Security Strategy refers to CSOs as im‐portantactorsinrunningpublicawarenesscampaigns,inthiswaycon‐tributingtothepreventionandanticipationofthreats.11Theaddedval‐ueNGOsandCSOscanbringinthefieldassourceofinformationforear‐lywarningpurposesor tobetterknowthecontextofoperationsorasactors in mediation processes has been widely recognized by institu‐tionalstakeholdersincrisismanagement.12

10CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,ReportontheImplementationoftheEuropeanSe‐

curity Strategy ‐ Providing Security in a ChangingWorld, S407/08 ,Brussels, 11De‐cember 2008, http://www.eu‐un.europa.eu/documents/en/081211_EU%20Security%20Strategy.pdf,p.9.

11Councilof theEuropeanUnion,Draft InternalSecurityStrategy for theEuropeanUnion:“TowardsaEuropeanSecurityModel”, 5842/2/10 ,Brussels,23February2010,http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st05/st05842‐re02.en10.pdf,p.12.

12CounciloftheEuropeanUnion,DraftReviewofRecommendationsforenhancingcooperationwithNon‐GovernmentalOrganizations NGOs andCivilSocietyOrganiza‐tions CSOs intheframeworkofEUCivilianCrisisManagementandConflictPrevention,10114/08 ,Brussels,29May2008.


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Inthisregard,theEUhaslongandwide‐rangingexperienceofcoop‐erationwithNGOsandCSOsthroughoperationalworkandestablishedpartnershipsintheareaofcrisismanagementandconflictprevention.13BeyondtheJointAfrica‐EUStrategy,thedialoguebetweentheEUinsti‐tutions, namely the European Commission, and non‐state actors onpeacebuilding and conflict prevention issues dates back to the late1990s.

Inthoseyears, thefirstConflictPreventionNetwork CPN ofEuro‐pean institutes and non‐governmental organizations was launched onthe initiative of the thenDGRELEX, and hosted by a Germanpoliticalfoundation,StiftungWissenschaftundPolitik SWP ,toestablishapoolofexpertiseable toprovideanalysis‐basedpolicyadvice in the fieldofconflictprevention.AftertheconclusionoftheCPNin2001/2002,somefollow‐upinitiativeswerelaunched.BetweenSeptember2005andSep‐tember 2006, the European Peacebuilding Liaison office EPLO 14, theInternational Crisis Group lead partner , International Alert and theEuropeanPolicyCentreestablishedtheConflictPreventionPartnershipCPP to improve theEU’scapacity forconflictprevention, crisisman‐agement andpeacebuilding through thepublicationof studies on con‐flict‐relatedissues,whichincludedpolicyrecommendationstodecision‐makers.15In2007,theInitiativeforPeacebuilding IfP ,16aconsortiumledby InternationalAlert,was launchedwith the samerationale.Con‐cluded in December 2010, itwas followed by the Initiative for Peace‐building‐EarlyWarning.17

13Ibid.,p.5.14TheEPLO isaplatformgatheringEuropeanNGOs,networksofNGOsand think‐

tanksactiveinthefieldofpeacebuildingandinterestedinpromotingsustainablepeace‐buildingpoliciesamongEUdecision‐makers,www.eplo.org.WithintheJAESframework,EPLOis thecurrentcontactpoint forEUCSOs inthe JAESPeaceandSecurityPartner‐ship.

15 See EPLO, Conflict Prevention Partnership, 2005‐2006, http://www.eplo.org/conflict‐prevention‐partnership.

16Seehttp://www.initiativeforpeacebuilding.eu.17 Sarah Bayne and Patrick Trolliet, Stocktaking and scoping of the Peacebuilding

Partnership,StudyfortheEuropeanCommissionDGRELEXA2,August2009,pp.18‐19.Seealsohttp://www.ifp‐ew.eu.


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Currently, themain framework for dialogue onpeace and security‐relatedmattersbetween theEU institutionsandEuropeanCSOs is thePeacebuildingPartnership PbP ,establishedby theEU in2007underArticle4.3oftheInstrumentforStability IfS ,crisispreparednesscom‐ponent.ThePbPaimsto

provide support for long‐term measures aimed at building andstrengthening the capacity of international, regional and sub‐regional organizations, state and non‐state actors in relation totheir efforts in: promoting early warning, confidence‐building,mediation and reconciliation, and addressing emerging inter‐community tensions; and improving post‐conflict and post‐disaster.

Asoriginallyenvisagedinthe2007IfSStrategyPaperandrecentlycon‐firmedinthe2012‐2013IfSStrategyPaper,thePbPisakeytoolfortheimplementation of one of the three overall objectives of IfS long‐termactions,namely

the strengthening of the international capacity and the regionalcapacitytoanticipate,analyse,preventandrespondtothethreattostabilityandhumandevelopmentposedbyviolentconflictandnatural disasters, as well as to improve post‐conflict and post‐disasterrecovery.18

Among theprojects recently fundedunder thePbP is theCivil SocietyDialogueNetwork,establishedin2010andmanagedbytheEPLOinas‐sociationwithothernon‐governmentalorganizations.TheCivilSocietyDialogueNetwork, tobe fundedalso in2012‐2013,aimstoestablishaforum for debate in order to foster a robust dialogue mechanism onpeacebuildingissuesbetweencivilsocietyandtheEUinstitutions.19

18EuropeanCommission,CommissionImplementingDecisionadoptingtheThemat‐

icStrategyPaper2012‐2013forassistanceinthecontextofstableconditionsforcoop‐eration under the Instrument for Stability, C 2012 1649 , 19 March 2012, p. 20,http://eeas.europa.eu/ifs/docs/ifs_2012_13_strategy__annex_en.pdf.

19 EPLO, Civil Society Dialogue Network, 2010, http://www.eplo.org/civil‐society‐dialogue‐network.html.


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3. THE JOINT AFRICA-EU STRATEGY AND CIVIL SOCIETY

InaspeechdeliveredinOctober2011,NicholasWestcott,ManagingDi‐rector forAfrica at theEuropeanExternalAction Service, outlined thenewframeworkforEUrelationswithAfricafollowingtheestablishmentof theEEAS.Thecentralmessageofhis speechwas that “theEUmustputtheAfricanpeopleattheheartofitspolicyinAfrica”.20Inhiswords,this principle should be put in practice in three ways: by promotingpeace and security throughout Africa, by supporting its economicgrowthandbystrengtheningtheEU’spartnershipwiththecontinent.

Theoverarchinglong‐termframeworkforrelationsbetweentheEUand Africa is provided by the 2007 Joint Africa‐EU Strategy JAES .Based on equality and shared interests and values, the JAES encom‐passesallareasinwhichthetwocontinentsarebuildingtheirpartner‐shipandprovidescommongoalsforaction.

ThefourthandfinalobjectiveoftheJAESis“tofacilitateandpromoteabroad‐basedandwide‐rangingpeople‐centredpartnership”.21 In thisvein,acknowledgingthat“theJointStrategyshouldbeco‐ownedbyEu‐ropean and African non‐institutional actors”, and willing tomake it a“permanentplatformfor information,participationandmobilisationofabroadspectrumofcivilsocietyactors”,22AfricaandtheEUcommittedtothefollowing:

‐ … promoting the development of a vibrant and independentcivilsocietyandofasystematicdialoguebetweenitandpublicauthoritiesatalllevels;

20NicholasWestcott,AnewFrameworkforEuropeanrelationswithAfrica,speech

delivered to theEU ISS– IAI–ChathamHouseconferenceonEU‐Africa foreignpolicyafter Lisbon, 18 October 2011, available at http://eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2011/181011_en.htm.

21EuropeanUnionandAfricanUnion,TheAfrica‐EUStrategicPartnership,A JointAfrica‐EU Strategy, Lisbon, 9 December 2007, http://europafrica.files.wordpress.com/2006/10/africa‐eu‐strategic‐partnership.pdf,p.3.

22Ibid.,p.22.


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‐makingeffectivecommunicationwithnon‐institutionalactorsapriority … and encouraging their active involvement in theimplementationandmonitoringoftheJointStrategyanditsAc‐tionPlans;

‐ … promoting and expanding twinning arrangements in rele‐vantsectors;

‐ ensuring that Members of Parliament, civil society organiza‐tions and European and African research institutes and thinktanks participate in dialogue mechanisms and initiatives andplayakeyroleinmonitoringtheimplementationofAfrican,Eu‐ropeanjointpoliciesandcommitments.23

FollowingtherenovatedinclusivenessoftheEU’sapproachtodevelop‐ment,theJAESpledgestocreatetheconditionstoallowcivilsocietytoplay a more active role in the formulation and implementation of EUpolicies.Compared to the2000CairoDeclaration thatonly recognizedCSOsasimportantactorsinthedevelopmentprocess,theStrategygoesastepfurtherbylayingdownthebasisfortheirintegrationintoformaland informal dialogue, which is due to take placemainly through thepresenceofexpertsintheImplementationTeam IT meetingsandtheJointExpertGroups JEGs .Foreachof theeightPartnerships, the for‐merbringtogetherrepresentativesfromtheEuropeanCommission,theEuropeanExternalActionServiceandtheMemberStates,aswellasthecivil society’s contact point, and monitor, as their name suggests, theimplementationoftheJointStrategy.Thelatterareinformalandopen‐ended groups that, again for all the eight JAES thematic partnerships,gatherthoseAfrican,Europeanandinternationalactors,CSOsincluded,whichhaveexpertiseontheissuestheyaddressandarewillingtoworkon the priority action concerned. In any case, they are not allowed totake formal decisions or undertake policy initiatives. They provide in‐steadaspacewhereexpertscandiscusstheimplementationandfinanc‐

23 Ibid.,p.22.Pleasenotethat,asstated in the JAES, theterm“non‐stateactors” is

understood as comprising: 1 the private sector; 2 economic and social partners, in‐cludingtradeunionorganizations;and3 civilsocietyinallitsformsinaccordancewithnationalcharacteristics.


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ingoftheparticularpriorityactionsconcerned.24ItisinterestingtonotethatasaresultofCSOs’participation intheJEGs, theirrepresentativesareno longerseen justas “watch‐dogs”butasexperts thatcanofferarealaddedvalue.

Generally speaking, with regards to the Strategy’s implementation,civilsocietyplaysakeyroleinthreebroadareas:

1. Dialogueandpolicyformulation,bybringingtotheforetheinputofthegrassroots;

2. Monitoring, by acting as a watchdog and demandingmore trans‐parencyintheimplementationoftheJAES;

3. Awareness‐raising, by conducting advocacy initiatives at the levelof international and local communities thanks to its long‐establishedpresenceontheground.

Taking into account the institutional architecture and implementationmodalitiesfortheJAES,sixentrypointsforCSOshavebeenthenidenti‐fied,asfollows:25

1. Establishing mechanisms for closer cooperation and dialogue be‐tween thePan‐AfricanParliament PAP and theEuropeanParlia‐ment EP ,aswellasbetweentheAUEconomic,SocialandCulturalCouncil ECOSOCC and the European Economic and Social Com‐mittee EESC andlocalauthorities;

2. EstablishingamappingofexistingEuropeanandAfricancivilsocie‐tynetworks;

3. Establishing a platform for European and African research insti‐tutesandthinktankstoprovideindependentpolicyadvice;

4. Creating a web portal to facilitate consultationswith civil societyorganizationsaheadofkeypolicydecisions;

5. InvitingrepresentativesfromEuropeanandAfricancivilsocietytoexpressthemselvesaheadofMinisterialTroikameetings;

24Africa‐EUMinisterialTroika,The Implementationof theAfrica‐EUStrategicPart‐

nership‐GuidelinesforJointExpertsGroups,20‐21November2008.25EuropeanCommission,EntryPointsforcivil‐societyorganizationsinterventionin

theimplementationandmonitoringoftheJointAfrica‐EUStrategy,2008.


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6. Establishing informal joint expert groups on all priority actionsidentifiedintheActionPlaninwhichCSOscanparticipate.26

3.1. Civil society’s participation in the Joint Africa-EU Strategy

Inordertoassesstheextentandimpactofcivilsociety’sparticipationinthe JAES, it isworthbrieflyoutlininghow thishasbeen structuredonboth theEUandAfricansides.Aswewill see, theapproachesadoptedbythetwopartnersareratherdifferent.

InthecaseoftheEuropeanUnion,civilsociety’sparticipationintheJAESdoesnottakeplaceviaformalEUbodies,suchasforinstancetheEuropeanEconomicSocialCommittee.27ItisinsteadstructuredaroundanEUCSOSteeringGroup,whichgathersmembersfromabroadarrayofnon‐statesectorsandnetworksinterestedoractiveintheimplemen‐tationoftheStrategy.It isaself‐selectedgroupthatwasestablishedinan informalway following a request by theEU institutions.28 EUCSOsthenidentifiedonecontactpointperthematicpartnershipandsubmit‐teddetailedproposalsfortheirparticipationintheEUImplementationTeamsandtheJointExpertsGroups.Relyingessentiallyonitsmembers’will,suchaninformalsystemhastheadvantage,accordingtosomeex‐perts,ofavoidingbureaucraticandlengthyprocedures.Nevertheless,ithas serious difficulties in providing continuity due to turn‐over in itsmembersandalackofresources.Moreover,asitreliessubstantiallyonitsmembers’will tobeactivelyengaged, it risksbeing somewhatdys‐functionalandineffective,withoutclearandorganizedguidance.29

26AfricanUnion‐EuropeanUnion,FirstActionPlan 2008‐2010 fortheimplemen‐

tationoftheAfrica‐EUStrategicPartnership,Lisbon,9December2007.27DifferentlyfromwhathappensintheAU,theEuropeanEconomicSocialCommit‐

teehasnoformalrolewithintheJAES.Moreover,althoughitisbasedonprinciplessimi‐lartothoseoftheAUECOSOCC,itiscomposedmainlyofsocialandeconomicinterest‐relatedgroups.

28CarmenSilvestre,EU‐AUrelations:Whatroleforcivilsociety?,OpenSocietyInsti‐tute,Brussels,9April2009.

29Interviewwithpolicyofficer,EPLO,Brussels,1March2012.


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Contrariwise, CSOs’ participation on the African side ismuchmorestructured.Firstandforemost,theinvolvementofAfricancivilsocietyintheJAESdrawsontheformalcommitmentenshrinedintheAfricanUn‐ion’sConstitutiveActtobasetheUniononapartnershipbetweengov‐ernmentsandallsegmentsofcivilsociety.30Tothisend,in2008theAUestablishedtheEconomic,SocialandCulturalCouncil ECOSOCC asanofficial advisory body. As provided for in its Statute Art. 3 , theECOSOCC includes but is not limited to social groups such as thoserepresentingwomen, children, the youth, the elderly and peoplewithdisabilities;professionalgroups i.e.associationsofdifferentgroupsofworkers, business organizations, private sector interest groups, etc. ;non‐governmentalorganizations;community‐basedandculturalorgan‐izations;andsocialandprofessionalgroupsintheAfricandiasporaor‐ganizations.31 More specifically, the ECOSOCC’s General Assembly iscomposedof150representatives fromCSOs,dividedas follows Art.4of theStatute : two fromeachMemberStateof theAfricanUnion; tenoperatingatregionallevelandeightatcontinentallevel;20fromtheAf‐ricanDiaspora; and six nominatedby theCommission, in consultationwithMember States, based on special considerations. In addition, theECOSOCCisorganizedaroundeightSectoralClusterCommittees,align‐edtotheDepartmentsoftheAfricanUnionCommission AUC tomakecooperation easier. These committeeswere established as operationalmechanismsandmeant toprovidetheAUwithadhoc inputandopin‐ionsonspecificissues Art.11oftheStatute .

AtthetimeoftheJAES’inception,theAUdecidedthattheECOSOCC,through the African Citizens and Diaspora Directorate CIDO of theAUC, acting as its secretariat, would be the only channel for the in‐volvement of African civil society in the Strategy. In this vein, theECOSOCC chairs an AU Civil Society Steering Committee, composed ofsixCSOrepresentativesselectedbytheECOSOCC,sixotherschosenbyCSOsoutsidetheECOSOCCframework,andtheeightchairpersonsofthe

30AfricanUnion,TheConstitutiveAct,Lomé,11July2000,Art.4,http://www.africa‐

union.org/root/au/aboutau/constitutive_act_en.htm.31AfricanUnion,StatutesoftheEconomic,SocialAndCulturalCouncilofTheAfrican

Union,http://www.africa‐union.org/ECOSOC/STATUTES‐En.pdf.


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ECOSOCCClusterCommittees workingintandemwiththecorrespond‐ing thematic areas of the Partnership , plus a representative of CIDO.Withinthisframework,consultationsbetweentheAUandCSOsshouldtakeplaceonceayear,butthelastconsultationsforwhichinformationandreportsarepubliclyavailable tookplace inNairobi inMarch2009followingthefirst,heldinMaliin2008 .

Source: ECDPM, Presentation by the facilitators on the JAES, Africa-EU Civil Society Intercon-tinental Forum on the Joint AfricaEU Strategy, 810 November 2010, Cairo, Egypt.

Figure 5. The organization of the CSO Steering Groups AsobservedbyanAfricanexpert,thecreationofECOSOCCmightrepre‐sent inprinciple a significant achievement for the involvementof civilsocietyinAUpolicyprocessesandtheimplementationofarealpartici‐patoryandpeople‐centredapproach.However,inpractice,theextenttowhichithasactuallysucceededininvolvingCSOs,andtheimpactofthatinvolvement,arestilltobeassessed.32Controversialopinionshavebeenexpressedinthisregard.ManyEuropeanandAfricanCSOshaveindeedexpressed concern at such a degree of formalization, which, in theiropinion, jeopardizesthetransparentparticipationof localCSOsaswell

32Interviewwithseniorexpert,InstituteforSecurityStudies,AddisAbaba,23Feb‐

ruary2012.


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ascontinent‐to‐continentdialogue.33Fromtheirperspective,thisequal‐ly limits theAU‐CSOsdialogue,which in the lastyearhassubstantiallybeen non‐existent due to the cumbersome election process for theECOSOCCGeneralAssembly,whichstartedinNovember2011.34Inanycase, reality still lags behind commitments on paper. CIDO itselfacknowledgesthatECOSOCCisstillfacinganumberofchallengeswhichpreventitfromplayinganeffectiveroleandensuringactiveCSOspartic‐ipation inAUpolicyprocessesandbeyond.35For instance,cooperationwith other AU organs, such as the African Human and People RightsCommissionorthePan‐AfricanParliament,hassofarconsistedonlyinexchanges of reports. Similarly, cooperation between the ECOSOCCPeaceandSecurityClusterCommitteeandtheAPSAcomponentsisstilllimited.Withregardstotheengagementofcivilsociety,alackoffundinghascauseddelaysinthemappingofAfricanCSOs,althoughthisiscru‐cialfortheeffectivenessoftheJAESaswellasfortheworkoftheAUin‐stitutions.Besides,CIDOacknowledgesquiteopenlythelimitedvisibil‐ityofitsinitiatives,whichpreventsitfromproperlyreachingCSOsanddialoguingeffectivelywithinternationalpartners.Inthisvein,thereisastrongperceptionthatabetteroutreachstrategyisrequired.36

3.2. Civil society and the Peace and Security Partnership

Althoughaslowpaceof theimplementationprocesshassofarcharac‐terized all eight Partnerships of the JAES, experts maintain that the

33 Criticisms concern in particular the ECOSOCCmembership procedure, whereby

eachcandidatemustshowthatatleast50%oftheresourcesoftheorganizationderivefromcontributionsofitsmembers defactolimitingECOSOCCmembershiptothoseor‐ganizationswhosemembersarefinanciallydependenttolessthan50%onexternaldo‐nations .SeeonthisMartaMartinelli,EU‐AUrelations: thepartnershiponDemocraticGovernanceandHumanRightsoftheJointAfrica‐EUStrategy,OpenSocietybriefingpa‐per,2010,p.11.

34 Interview with senior officer, United Nations Economic Commission for AfricaUNECA ,AddisAbaba,20February,andwithpolicyofficers,FES,AddisAbaba,23Feb‐ruary2012.

35 Interview with senior officer, Citizens and Diaspora Organizations DirectorateCIDO ,AddisAbaba,22February2012.

36Interviewwithseniorofficer,CIDO,AddisAbaba,22February2012.


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PartnershiponPeaceandSecurityhasbeenthemostsuccessful,mainlythankstothestrongercommitmentofinstitutionalactorsandthegreat‐eravailabilityoffunds.Itisthereforeinterestingtoassesswhethersuchinitialsuccesshasalsocharacterisedcivilsociety’sinclusioninthePart‐nership,andtowhatextent.

The three priority objectives of the Peace and Security Partnershipareasfollows:1 toenhancedialogueonpeaceandsecuritychallenges;2 toachievethefulloperationalizationoftheAfricanPeaceandSecuri‐ty Architecture; and 3 to ensure predictable funding for Africa‐ledPeaceSupportOperations.ThePeaceandSecurityActionPlanexplicitlymentions research centres, training centres, think tanks and relevantcivilsocietyorganizationsamongsttheimplementingactorsforthefirstandsecondobjectives.

Table 1. Civil society’s contribution to the Peace and Security Partnership.

CSOs’ main tasks

Objectives of the JAES Action Plan on P&S

Dialogue on P&S

Operationalization of the APSA

RECs PSC CEWS ASF PoW Peace Fund

Policy Formulation X X X

Dialogue/networking X X X X

Conflict analysis X X X X X

Raising Awareness X X X X

Capacity build-ing/training

X X X

Mediation/conflict resolution

X X X

Monitoring X

Outreach X

Source: IAI elaboration.

As shown in table 1,wherewematchedCSOs’main traditional func‐tionstospecifictaskspertainingtothepeaceandsecuritydomainandthe Partnership’s objectives,we found that CSOs could contribute tothe implementation of the JAES Peace and Security Partnership in a


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numberofways,fromconflictprevention37toconflicttransformation38andresolution39.

Ifweconsiderthecharacteristicsofcivilsocietyorganizations,itbe‐comes clear where the systematic involvement of civil society actorscouldprovideaddedvalue.40InrelationtoPriority1,thisisthecaseforagreedactivitiesconcerning for instance theholdingofsystematicandregulardialogueonallissuesrelatedtopeaceandsecurity,includingthesecurity‐development nexus, and the enhancement of the sharing ofanalysesandreportsoncrisesandconflictsituations.ThisisconnectedtoanotheractivityagreedunderPriority2,namelyempoweringconti‐nent‐to‐continent networks capable of supporting peace and securityactivities.Here,theEUandtheAUcouldcertainlytakeadvantageofthepresence on the ground of local CSOs, think tanks and research insti‐tutesandtheirexpertiseinanalysingandassessingtherootcausesanddriversofconflict.Thiswouldultimatelybenefitearlywarningactivitiesanddirectly feed intooneof thepillarsof theAPSA,namelytheestab‐lishmentofcontinentalandregionalearlywarningsystems.

Anotherway inwhichCSOscouldsupport theoperationalizationoftheAPSAisbycontributingtocapacitybuildingandthetrainingoftheAfrican Stand‐by Force, regional brigades included. Civil society’s in‐volvementcouldconcernspecificsectorsalreadyidentifiedbyPriority1of thePartnership, i.e. SmallArmsandLightWeapons SALW ,Explo‐siveRemnantsofWarandAntipersonnelLandmines,orthefightagainstillicit trafficking, and could be useful in complementing the predomi‐nantly military training with an equally important civilian dimension.Training could also cover other areas, such as mediation and conflictresolution, and could as such address another pillar of the APSA, thePaneloftheWise.

37SeeonthisAfrica‐EUCivilSociety IntercontinentalForumonthe JointAfrica‐EU

Strategy,8‐10November2010,Cairo,Egypt,p.5.38SeeonthisalsotheEuropeanEconomicandSocialCommittee,Opinionontherole

oftheEuropeanUnioninPeacebuildinginexternalrelations:bestpracticeandperspec‐tives, REX/326‐CESE156/2012 ,Brussels,19January2012.

39InterviewwithCSOsrepresentatives,AddisAbaba,Brussels,FebruaryandMarch2012.

40AfricanUnion‐EuropeanUnion,FirstActionPlan 2008‐2010 fortheimplemen‐tationoftheAfrica‐EUStrategicPartnership,opcit.


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Whathasbeensaidso fardoesnotcoverall the facetsofCSOs’en‐gagement in the peace and security domain,which, due to space con‐straints,cannotbereferredtoandexhaustivelyexaminedhere.Never‐theless,withreferencetofourbroadareas,i.e.dialogue,earlywarning,capacitybuildingandmediation,wefounditusefultoselectanumberofrelevantcasesthatepitomisehowcivilsocietyonboththeAfricanandEuropean sides is involved in peace and security activities andmightthuscontributetotheimplementationofthePartnership.ThishelpedusidentifyexistingchallengesandputforwardpolicyrecommendationstotheEUinstitutions.

3.2.1.Dialogueonpeaceandsecurityissues

As far as dialogue on peace and security issues between institutionalstakeholdersandcivilsocietyorganizationsisconcerned, includingbe‐yond the JAES framework, theAfricanUnion is,at least inprinciple,attheavant‐garde.Indeed,Article20oftheProtocolRelatingtotheEstab‐lishment of the AU Peace and Security Council provides that “the PSCshallencouragenon‐governmentalorganizationstoparticipateactivelyin the efforts aimed at promoting peace, security and stability inAfri‐ca”.41To thisend, from4 to5December2008, thePeaceandSecurityCouncilheldaretreatinLivingstone,Zambia,toconsidertheappropri‐atemechanisms for interactionwithCSOs.As a result, it endorsed theso‐called Livingstone Formula. According to this formula, civil societyorganizations,ifcalleduponbythePSC,mayorganizeandundertakeac‐tivitiesintheareasofconflictprevention earlywarning,reportingandsituationanalysis ,peacemakingandmediation,peacekeeping,humani‐tarian support and post conflict reconstruction, provision of technicalsupport, training, monitoring and impact assessment of peace agree‐ments, etc.42 The results of such activities are supposed to feed infor‐

41 African Union, Protocol relating to the establishment of the Peace and Security

Council of the African Union, 9 July 2002, http://www.africa‐union.org/rule_prot/PROTOCOL‐%20PEACE%20AND%20SECURITY%20COUNCIL%20OF%20THE%20AFRICAN%20UNION.pdf.

42“CivilSocietyOrganizationsmayprovidetechnicalsupporttotheAfricanUnionbyundertaking early warning reporting, and situation analysis which feeds information


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mationintothedecision‐makingprocessofthePSC.Inanycase,thelat‐terremainsthemasterofitsprocedures,andtheECOSOCC,asthecon‐sultativeorganresponsibleforcoordinatingtheparticipationofcivilso‐cietyintheworkoftheAU,inthiscaseviaitsPeaceandSecurityClus‐ter,isthefocalpoint,andplaysaconsultativeroleintheinteractionbe‐tween CSOs and the PSC. It isworth noting that only CSOs complyingwithECOSOCC’seligibilitycriteriaareallowedtointeractwiththePSC.43According to some civil society representatives, only a very limitednumber of CSOs would satisfy this test, thus reducing in practice thenumberthatwouldhaveaccesstothePSC.Thissaid,thereisstillagapbetween commitments on paper and reality. Indeed, the LivingstoneFormulahasyettobeimplementedonaregularbasis.ThesameappliestotheannualmeetingsbetweentheAUandCSOsthatshouldtakeplacewithinitsframework.Sofar,mostinteractionsbetweentheAUinstitu‐tions thePSC, theAUCommission andCSOshaveoccurredonanadhocbasis,takingadvantageof“bilateral”connections,intheformforin‐stanceofMemorandumofUnderstandingsorFrameworkAgreements,between the AU bodies and the largest and best‐connected CSOs. ThePSCinvitesCSOstoitsmeetingstoprovidetheiropiniononlyoccasion‐allyandonspecificissues,suchaswomen,armsandtraffickinginchil‐drenin2010,ortheupheavalinNorthAfricaanditsimpactontheAPSAin2011.44Accordingtoinstitutionalactorsandexperts,themainlimitson the implementationof theLivingstoneFormulahavebeena lackofeconomicresources,theslowdowninECOSOCCactivitiesduetothere‐centelectionofCSOsrepresentatives,45andanuncleardivisionoflabourbetween theAU institutionsas towho should take the lead in the im‐

intothedecision‐makingprocessofthePSC”.SeeAfricanUnion,Conclusionsonmecha‐nismsfor theinteractionbetweenthePeaceandSecurityCouncilandCivilSocietyOr‐ganizationsinthepromotionofpeace,securityandstabilityinAfrica, PSC/PR/ CLX ,ConclusionsofaRetreatofthePSConamechanismofinteractionbetweentheCouncilandCSOs,4‐5December2008,http://europafrica.files.wordpress.com/2009/04/retreat‐of‐the‐peace‐and‐security‐council‐of‐the‐au.pdf.

43Seefurtheronthisfootnote93.44ThiswaslimitedtotheISS.45Interviewwithseniorofficer,CIDO,AddisAbaba,22February2012.


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plementationoftheFormula.46ItseemshoweverthatthefirstinitiativesdesignedtoimplementtheFormulashouldbeundertakenthisyear,fo‐cussingonhowtoboostnetworkingbyAfricanCSOs.47

OntheEUside,beyondtheJAESframeworkandasoutlinedearlier,the Peacebuilding Partnership has been working as a channel of dia‐loguebetweenEUbodiesdealingwithsecurity issuesandcivil society.In away similar to that foreseen by the AU Livingstone Formula, alt‐houghina lessregularandstructuredframework,theEUPoliticalandSecurityCommitteeinvitestoitsmeetingsexpertsfromCSOsinordertohaveopinionsfromthegroundonspecificcountriesandregionsonanad‐hocbasis.

Inlinewithpreviouscommitments,the2012AnnualActionPlanforactionsintheframeworkofthePbP,recentlyadoptedbytheEuropeanUnionwithatotalbudgetofEUR22million,identifiedasmainstrandsofactionthefollowing:improvingthecapacityofnon‐stateactors;pro‐moting early warning capabilities; climate change, natural resourcesand international security; and re‐enforced co‐operation on buildingpre‐andpost‐crisiscapacitywithEUMemberStates i.e.thetrainingofcivilianexperts forcrisismanagementandstabilizationmissions .ThePbBhasalwaysbeenconsideredbyCSOstobeanimportantopportuni‐ty fordialoguewith institutional stakeholders, allowing greaterdemo‐cratic accountability of the EU decision‐making process and the im‐provementofEUpoliciesandprogramming.Nevertheless, takingstockoftheinitiativesfundedsofar,CSOsfeelthatthereisstillroomforim‐provement.Generallyspeaking,itshouldbeensuredthatthePbPisnotconsideredtobeamerefactoryforservicecontracts,butratheratooltofundgrantswithclearcommitmentsandobjectives.Thiswouldbecru‐cialinordertoaddvaluetootherexistinginitiativesbyenhancingsyn‐ergies and producing a catalytic effect. To this end, first, dialogue be‐tween CSOs and institutions should becomemore structured and sys‐tematic,andinvolveconsultationfromtheearlystagesonbothstrategicdocuments and policy or geographical issues. Second, dialogue should

46Interviewwithseniorexpert,ISS,AddisAbaba,23February2012.47Interviewwithseniorofficer,CIDO,AddisAbaba,22February2012.


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bebroadened to includeotherkeyactorsboth inside theEU, first andforemost theEUDelegations,andoutside, i.e. internationalpartneror‐ganisations.48 Enlarging the network of interlocutors would also in‐crease awareness of what the PbP actually does and how it does it,whichisoftenmisunderstood.If,ontheonehand,itisnotalwayseasytoassesstheimpactandsuccessofPbP‐fundedinitiatives,ontheother,awareness should be raised, especially among Member States, whoseopinionsarecriticalastheyhavethefinalsayoverIfSfunding.Onthesegrounds, in lightof theon‐goingelaborationof thenew IfSRegulationfor the next multiannual financial framework 2014‐2020 , the EPLOhasrecentlyexpressedconcernat thecontinuedabsenceofanexplicitreference to the PbP from the Commission’s proposal. Besides, it hasaskedforanincreaseintheproportionofthefinancialenvelopeallocat‐edtomeasuresfallingunderthiscomponentoftheIfS,whichiscurrent‐lylimitedto5%oftotalIfSfunding.49

WithintheJAESframework,dialoguebetweenCSOsandinstitutionalstakeholderstakesplacemainlywithintheImplementationTeamsandthe JEGs,whichare supposed tohelp civil society address theirpolicysuggestions and requirements up toministerial level. However, aswewill seebelow in section4, civil society representatives expressmanyconcernsabouttherealeffectivenessofsuchdialogue,whichtheyper‐ceiveas limitedandhamperedbyanumberof factorsonbothsidesofthePartnership.

3.2.2.Earlywarning

Earlywarningiscrucialinanyattempttopreventcrisesorviolentcon‐flictsfromerupting.

Sinceitsinception,oneofthepillarsoftheAfricanPeaceandSecurityArchitecturehasbeentheestablishmentofaContinentalEarlyWarning

48 Sarah Bayne and Patrick Trolliet, Stocktaking and scoping of the Peacebuilding

Partnership,op.cit.,pp.28‐36.49 European Peacebuilding Liaison Office EPLO , EU funding for peacebuilding:

EPLO’s recommendations for reforming the EU’s external co‐operation programmes,April 2012, http://www.eplo.org/assets/files/2.%20Activities/Working%20Groups/FfP/EPLO_Statement_EU%20funding_for_peacebuilding.pdf.


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SystembasedonearlywarningmechanismssetupatREClevel seealsoChapter2.2paraaofthisstudy .

AsacknowledgedbybothpartiestotheJAES,civilsocietycouldpro‐videarealaddedvalue inthisdomainbytakingadvantageof its long‐establishedpresenceonthegroundaswellasexpertiseinunderstand‐ingtherootcausesanddriversofconflicts.Withreferencetothelatter,think tanks, universities and research centres could really play an im‐portantrole.50

Afewcentresofexcellenceareactiveinthefieldofconflictanalysisandpeaceandsecurity ingeneral. Inorder for themtoprovideacon‐cretecontributiontoAUearlywarningactivitiesatboththecontinentaland the regional levels, a regular and formalized dialogue and infor‐mation exchange with institutional actors and decision‐makers, alongwiththepoliticalwilltousethefindingsofCSOs,areurgentlyrequired.Itiscommonopinion51thatasignificantexampleinthissense,aswellasintermsofcivilsocietynetworking,isprovidedbytheWestAfricaNet‐workforPeacebuilding WANEP .52

Foundedin1998asaresponsetothecivilwarsthatdevastatedWestAfrica in the 1990s,WANEP now gathers over 500member organiza‐tions across West Africa relying on national networks established ineveryMember State of ECOWAS. At the continental level,WANEP is amemberofECOSOCC’sPeaceandSecurityClusterrepresentingWestAf‐rica.WANEP implements its programmes at both thenational and theregionallevelsacrossavastrangeofsectors,fromearlywarning,capac‐itybuildingandtraining,tocivilsocietynetworking,research,monitor‐ingandevaluation,andondifferentissuesrelatedtoconflictpreventionandpeacebuilding.Amongst them, themost relevant for our purposesare the Civil Society Coordination and Democratic Governance pro‐grammeandEarlyWarningandEarlyResponseProgram WARN .Theformerprovides an integratedplatform for engagementwith differentstakeholders to closelymonitor and possiblymitigate election‐relatedconflictsandthereforepromotepeacefuldemocratictransition,conflict‐

50Interviewwithpolicyofficers,GIZ,AddisAbaba,23February2012.51Interviewwithseniorexpert,InternationalAlert,AddisAbaba,22February2012.52SeeWANEP,http://www.wanep.org/wanep/about‐us‐our‐story/about‐us.html.


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resolvinggovernance,etc.53ThelatterisextremelyrelevantintheJAESPeace and Security Partnership and the APSA framework.54 In 2002WANEP signed a Memorandum of Understanding with ECOWAS55 forthe implementation of a regional early warning and response systemECOWARN asanobservationandmonitoringtoolforconflictpreven‐tion and decision‐making.56 WANEP started this implementation in2003inordertoprovideup‐datedreporting,analysisandcommunica‐tiontoregionalintervenersinordertoplan,preventormitigatetheim‐pactofviolentconflictsintheregion.ThesystemisnowoperationalandwillgobeyondtheECOWASleveltobelinkedtotheAUContinentalEar‐lyWarningSystem.

AsdemonstratedbyECOWAS,RECscouldreallyactasanentrypointforCSOsintheearlywarningdomain.Whereascivilsociety’sstrongestengagementappearstobeinWestAfrica,ontheothersideoftheconti‐nent aswell, under IGAD’s coverage, organizations on the ground areused to provide timely information, and also foster different forms ofdebateinthemedia/civilsociety.57Inaddition,theCommonMarketforEasternandSouthernAfrica COMESA andtheEastAfricanCommunity

53SeeWANEP,http://www.wanep.org/wanep/programs‐our‐programs/cspap.html.54AnotherinterestingexampleofanetworkofNGOsworkingonpeaceandsecurity‐

related issues inWestAfrica isprovidedbyWACSOF, theWestAfricaCivilSocietyFo‐rum. This is a networkof civil society organizations from throughout the 15MemberStates of ECOWAS. The Forummembersmeet annually, with an executive committeemeetingonaninterimbasismorefrequently,todeliberateonissuesofpeaceandhumansecurityandtointeractwiththeECOWASsecretariatwiththegoalofstrengtheninghu‐mansecuritymechanismsinWestAfrica.

55AmongtheAfricansub‐regionalorganizations,ECOWAShasachievedremarkableresultsininvolvingCSOsinitscoreactivities,includingtheminaninstitutionalizedway,asexemplifiedbyECOWARN.

56 ECOWAS, Protocol relating to the Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Manage‐ment,Resolution,PeacekeepingandSecurity,December1999,http://www.iss.co.za/af/regorg/unity_to_union/pdfs/ecowas/ConflictMecha.pdf.

57 See on this Kenya’s example of the District Peace Committees and the 2010UWIANO initiative as mechanisms providing the national authorities and IGAD withtimelyinformationintheeventofcrisis forinstanceduringelections ,usingabottom‐upapproach.SeeSébastienBabaudandJamesNdung’u,EarlyWarningandConflictpre‐ventionbytheEU:Learninglessonsfromthe2008post‐electionviolenceinKenya,IfP‐EWCluster:ImprovingInstitutionalCapacityforEarlyWarning,March2012.


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EAC providegoodexamplesofproceduresregulatingCSOsandofpri‐vatesectorparticipation,withparticularreferencetotheeligibilitycri‐teria and the related process that do not allow any interference byMemberStates.

Inpractice,theeffectiveinvolvementofcivilsocietyislimited,bothinAfricaandEurope,by theobstacles the institutionalactors face inmap‐ping those CSOs dealing with security‐related issues and therefore inidentifyingreliableinterlocutorsandpartners.Thismightmakeitdifficulttoestablishaclimateofgoodcooperationandtoknoweachotherwell.Asaconsequence,afeelingofmutualmistrustmighttendtoprevail.58

OntheEUside,CSOs’potentialcontributiontoearlywarningactivi‐ties issimilartothatontheAfricanside. Informationandanalysiscol‐lected through civil society actors can for instance feed intoEU open‐source intelligence platforms, such as Tariqa 3.59 In addition, Europe‐basedCSOscanalsoprovidemorespecificorup‐dated informationbytaking advantage of their large in‐country networks. A leading role inthisfieldisforinstanceplayedbytheInternationalCrisisGroup,anin‐ternationalNGOfoundedin1995.Committedtopreventingandresolv‐ingdeadlyconflicts,andrelyingonaworldwidenetworkoflocaloffices,it works as source of analysis and provides regular advice to govern‐mentsand internationalorganizations, like theUnitedNationsand theEuropeanUnion.60Lastbutnotleast,thankstoothernetworkinginitia‐tivessuchastheabove‐mentionedCivilSocietyDialogueNetwork,CSOscanfacilitatecommunicationandinformationexchangebetweenEUin‐stitutionalactorsandlocalnon‐governmentalinformationsources,withtheultimateaimofsupportingearlywarningactivities.61

58Interviewwithofficer,CEWS,AfricanUnion,AddisAbaba,22February2012.59Originally developedby theEuropeanCommission’sDirectorate‐General forEx‐

ternalRelations,Tariqa isnowmanagedbytheEEAS.Tariqa isanopensource intelli‐gence platform supported by amultimedia content databasewith the ultimate aimofprovidingreal‐timesupportforearlywarningandresponse.Seeforfurtherinformationhttp://joinup.ec.europa.eu/software/tariqa/description.

60SeeInternationalCrisisGroup,http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/about.aspx.61TerryBeswick,EUearlywarningandearlyresponsecapacityforconflictpreven‐

tion in the post‐Lisbon era, IfP‐EWCluster: Improving Institutional Capacity for EarlyWarning,January2012.


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3.2.3. Trainingandcapacitybuilding

Education and training are commonly perceived as crucial for theachievementoforganizationaltransformation,developmentandpeace.Here, civil society could certainly have an added value, and indeedmanyEuropeanandAfricanCSOsareengaged,jointlyorautonomously,inthisfield.

Education programmes might be co‐owned by a research instituteandAfricanUnion institutions, as is the case of theAfrican Peace andSupportProgram, launched in2010asa joint initiativeof the InstituteforPeaceandSecurityStudies IPSS ,AddisAbabaUniversity,and theAfricanUnion Commission, Peace and SecurityDepartment.62 In othercases, CSOs provide training courses on specific peace and security‐relatedissues,whichtheyaddresstotherepresentativesofAfricangov‐ernmental AUinstitutions,RECs andnon‐governmentalorganizations.ArecentcaseinpointistheinternationaltrainingprogrammeonpeaceandsecurityrunbyAccord anAfricannon‐governmentalorganization andco‐managedwithaEuropeanuniversityandaconsultancy.63

Bymeansoftraining,CSOscanalsodirectlyparticipateintheimple‐mentationofoneof theprioritiesof the JAESPeaceandSecurityPart‐nership,namelytheoperationalizationoftheAfricanStand‐byForce,ashappensforinstancethroughtheAfricanPeaceSupportTrainers’Asso‐ciation APSTA .Thiswaslaunchedin2002astheAfrican“pillar”oftheInternationalAssociationofPeacekeepingTrainingCentresandgathersresearch centres and NGOs as well as governmental and non‐govern‐mentaltrainingcentresfromalltheAfricanregions.Itwasconceivedofas aplatform to ensure the regular exchange of best practices and in‐formationorresearchamongitsmembers.Itsobjectivesalsoincludefa‐cilitatingeffortstoharmonizethedoctrine,training,curriculaandsoonofitsmembers;toserveasadepositoryofferingadvisoryservicestotheAfricanUnion theCommissionandthePeaceandSecurityCouncil on

62 See Institute forPeace andSecurity Studies IPSS , http://apspaddis.wordpress.

com/ipss/.63SeeACCORD,http://www.accord.org.za/news/91‐training/964‐accord‐hosts‐4th‐

phase‐of‐international‐training‐programme‐on‐peace‐and‐security. See section3.2.4 asregardsspecifictrainingonmediation.


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peacesupportoperationsissues;andtoactasasoundingboardfortheAUCommissiononpeacesupportoperationsconcerningrelationswithdonors. Its ultimate purpose is therefore to support the developmentandoperationalizationoftheAfricanStand‐byForceandtheworkoftheAUandRECs/RMsintheareaoftrainingforPeaceSupportOperationsPSOs personnel, aswell as the development of doctrine and lessonslearned.Over time,however,APSTAhas lost its initial impetus,mainlydue to fundingproblemsandmisperceptions amongpartners. Expertsbelievethat,takingintoaccountitsusefulroleasameansofstandardi‐zationoftrainingcurriculaandinprovidingastructuredengagementatthecontinentallevel,itshouldperhapsberevitalized.64

Inaddition to the trainingprovidedbyEUcentres tocivilians tobedeployed on international missions, including those led by the AU,throughactivities suchasEurope’sNewTraining Initiative forCivilianCrisis Management ENTRi 65, the European Commission recently de‐cidedtocommitEUR11,4million fromtheAPF2011‐2013 forthepe‐riodFebruary2012to January2014to furtherstrengthenthetrainingofpolice,civilianandmilitarypersonneltobedeployedinAfricanPSOsin the framework of the ASF.66 To this end, 17 training centres havebeen identified which will provide specific standardized and harmo‐nizedtrainingasrequestedbyAfricanRECs.TheywillbecoordinatedbytheAfricanUnionCommission.Nomentionwasmadeof theAPSTA inthePressMemo.It isthereforenotclearwhetheritwillbe involvedinanyway. However, it seemsmore likely that the training centreswillparticipateonanautonomousbasis.

3.2.4. Mediation

Alongside earlywarning and crisismanagement,mediation is an inte‐gralpartofconflictpreventionandresolution.

64Interviewwithseniorexpert,ISS,AddisAbaba,23February2012.65 See Europe’s New Training Initiative for Civilian Crisis Management: http://

www.entriforccm.eu/.66EuropeanCommission,CommissionDecisiononanactiontobefinancedunderthe

AfricanPeaceFacilityfromthe10thEuropeanDevelopmentFund–SupporttotheAfricanTrainingCentresinPeaceandSecurity, C 2012 1479 ,Brussels,12March2012.


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Asprovidedforinthe2002ProtocolRelatingtotheEstablishmentofthePeaceandSecurityCounciloftheAfricanUnion,theAUhasaformalmandate to engage inmediation as a form of peace‐making see alsoChapter2.2paracof thisstudy .TheProtocol indeedrefers tomedia‐tionasoneofthespecificfunctionsoftheAfricanPeaceandSecurityAr‐chitecture Art. 6.3 . Nevertheless, specific processes andmechanismsofmediationhaveyettobeconsolidated.Themainlimitthathasbeenidentifiedinthisregardisalackofhumancapacity,financialresourcesandadequatetoolswithintheAU.Thishasoftenmeantthatmediationprocesseshavetendedtofollowanadhocorreactiveapproach,ratherthananinstitutionalizedone.67

Similarly towhathappens in theareasassessedabove, civil societycanalsoplayakeyrole inmediationbybothsupporting the improve‐mentoftheAU’smediationcapacitiesandparticipatinginthemediationprocessitself.

Asforthefirstaspect,agoodcaseinpointistheAfricanUnionMedi‐ationSupportCapacityproject,jointlyimplementedbytheAU’sConflictManagementDivision CMD ,Accord,andaEuropeanNGO,CrisisMan‐agementInitiative CMI fundedbytheFinnishMinistryofForeignAf‐fairs . Accord has overall responsibility for the capacity‐building andtrainingcomponentoftheproject,aimingtodeveloptrainingcurriculaincluding anAUmediation handbook and training courses to be ad‐dressedtovariouscategoriesofstaffidentifiedforAUmediationinter‐ventions.68 CMI provides support on specific thematic issues of rele‐vancetomediationontheAfricancontinent.Thetwoorganizationsalsocontribute to the development of themediation component of the AUCMDPeaceandSecurityRoster,whichshouldultimatelyhelptheAUtoquickly identify experts available to support its mediation interven‐tions.69 In thesamevein,CMI isalsoworking tocreateanAfricannet‐

67KruschenGovender,TowardsEnhancingtheCapacityoftheAfricanUnioninMe‐

diation, report based on a seminar organised by theAfricanUnion AU Commission,AddisAbaba,Ethiopia,15‐16October2009,ACCORD,2009.

68 See ACCORD, http://www.accord.org.za/our‐work/peacemaking/au‐mediation‐support‐project.

69 See CrisisManagement Initiative, http://www.cmi.fi/africa/au‐mediation‐support‐capacity‐project.html.


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workofmediationpractitionersthatcanlinkAfricanorganizationswiththeAfricanUnionandRECs.

Inadditiontonationalstatesandregionalorganizations,civilsocietycanalsohaveanimportantroleinconflictresolution,70asisthecaseforinstanceoftheCommunityofSant’EgidioinMozambique,oranumberofwomen’sassociationsintheManoRiverBasin.71

Non‐StateActorshaveengagedandtriggeredanumberofpeacepro‐cessesontheAfricancontinent.TheirroleandpracticeatboththeTrackIandTrackII72 levelshaveprovedcrucialtoprovidingavoicetomar‐ginalized groups, such as women, in official peace processes. At thesametime,theycancontributetofillinggapsinconflictresolutionwhenstateactorsarenotabletodecisivelyengagethepartiesinconflictreso‐lution.

The UN Secretary General’s report entitled “Enhancing mediationanditssupportactivities”identifiesmanyadvantagesthatNGOspossessinthefieldofmediation.Forexample,theycanmobilizeresourcesandactquickly,theymaybeperceivedaslessthreateningtotheconflictpar‐ties,theycanhelpfacilitateinformalprocessesthatcanfeedintoofficialmediation efforts, and they may possess expertise on thematic issueswhichcanbeusedtoassistthemediatorsortheconflictingparties.73

AmongtheAUorgans,thePaneloftheWise,establishedtosupportthePSCandtheCommissioninconflictprevention,makeseffortstoin‐volve civil society actors in its activities. Again, regular dialogue takesplacewithAccordandCMIand,generallyspeaking,everyPoWmeeting

70Interviewwithseniorexpert,ISS,andwithFES,AddisAbaba,23February2012.71 For a complete overview of the several CSOs involved, see International Peace

Academy IPA ,CivilsocietyperspectivesfromtheManoRiverUnion,CivilSocietyDia‐logueReport,NewYork,2002,http://www.arts.ualberta.ca/~courses/PoliticalScience/474A1/documents/IPACivilSocietyPerspectivesManoRiverUnion.pdf.

72TrackIdiplomacyreferstoofficialinitiativesledbyinstitutionalandgovernmen‐tal actors. Contrariwise, Track II diplomacy is conducted by non‐governmental actorsincludingforinstanceacademics,NGOsandpublicfigures ,withtheaimofconfidence‐buildingandprovidingsupporttoconflictresolution.

73 United Nations Security Council, Report of the Secretary‐General on enhancingmediation and its support activities, S/2009/189 , 8 April 2009, http://daccess‐dds‐ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N09/278/78/PDF/N0927878.pdf?OpenElement.


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tends to be extended to CSOs in order to discuss peace and security‐related issues and their involvement in those activities in the regionsconcerned.74 Inorderto identifythebest interlocutors for institutionalstakeholders, the CMI’s efforts tomap the African CSOswith relevantexpertise in themediationdomainarecommendable,andhaveprovedcrucialinlinkingtheworkofthoseCSOswiththatoftheAUbodiesandincreatingpositivesynergies.

Beyond taking part in formalmediation processes under the AU’saegis,CSOscanalsoprovekeyactors in local conflicts.This is for in‐stancethecaseoftheso‐calledInfrastructureforPeace,whichAfricanleaderscommitted tosupportasof2002.An Infrastructure forPeaceengagesallthemainstakeholdersinagivencountry fromcivilsocietytogovernmentlevel toparticipateinaco‐operative,problem‐solvingapproach toconflictbasedonnegotiationandnon‐violence.National,DistrictandLocalPeaceCouncilsarepartofsuchaninfrastructure.ApracticalexampleisprovidedbytheDistrictPeaceCommittees DPCs establishedinKenyainthe1990sasawidelyacceptedmechanismforbothmediationandearlywarning,undertheauthorityoftheNationalSteeringCommittee NSC onPeacebuildingandConflictManagement,an interagency committee sitting in the Office of the President, andwiththeactiveinvolvementofCSOs.Originallyestablishedasameansofsolvingtensions,conflictsandviolenceamongpastoralistcommuni‐ties,theDPCs’coveragewasthenextendedtoalldistrictsofKenyaintheaftermathofthe2007post‐electionviolence.Whilethereisdiver‐sityinperformancebetweenoneDPCandanother,insomecasesDPCshaveproven tobevaluable interface structuresbetween theGovern‐ment, community leaders, andCSOswhen responding to conflict andsecuritysituations.75

74Interviewwithseniorofficer,PaneloftheWise,AddisAbaba,22February2012.75SébastienBabaudandJamesNdung’u,EarlyWarningandConflictpreventionby

theEU:Learninglessonsfromthe2008post‐electionviolenceinKenya,op.cit,p.22.


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4. CHALLENGES TO CIVIL SOCIETY’S PARTICIPATION IN THE JOINT STRATEGY AND THE PEACE AND

SECURITY PARTNERSHIP

Asdescribedabove,the2007LisbonSummitDeclarationputemphasisontherealparticipationofcivilsocietyactorsintheJAES,beyondtheirmereassociationwithitsinitiatives.ThismeansthatCSOs’engagementintheAU‐EUdialoguehastobeverticalandhorizontalbothwithinandacrosscontinents.76

Takingstockofsuchashiftinparadigmandoftheattentionpaidtothepeople‐to‐peopledimensionof theAfrica‐EUrelations,civil societyorganizationswelcomedtheStrategy.77However,fiveyearsafteritsen‐dorsement,a feelingofdisappointmentas to theextent towhichCSOsareactuallyinvolvedinitsimplementationiscommonamongcivilsoci‐etyrepresentatives.

ItseemsthatsofartheJAEShasnotliveduptoitspromises.Evenifthiscouldappearquiteunderstandableinthefirstphaseofitsimple‐mentation,whenanew institutional frameworkhad tobesetupandmechanisms for civil society’s engagement had to be thought of andputintoplace,limitedachievementshavebeenattainedalsointhese‐condphase.

Opinionscollectedthroughoutthecourseofthisstudyrevealedthatmostof theremarksmadeon the JAES firstActionPlan 2008‐2010 still apply today, asnomajor shifthasoccurred in the secondActionPlan 2011‐2013 .TheStrategy’soverarching framework is felt tobetoobureaucratic78,andbothAfricanandEuropeanCSOsfeelthattheyhavebarelyleftafingerprinton,orhadanyinfluenceover,theinstitu‐tions’ agenda. A common remark from CSOs is that, although theyacknowledgebeing consulted especiallyon theEuropeanside , they

76AfricanUnion,SecondAU‐CSOsconsultationontheimplementationoftheAfrica‐

EuropePartnership,3‐5March2009,Nairobi,Kenya,p.6.77Africa‐EUCivilSocietyIntercontinentalForumontheJointAfrica‐EUStrategy,op.

cit.,p.2.78Interviewwithpolicyofficer,EPLO,Brussels,1March2012.


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feelthatthishappensjusttoallowofficialstoticktheCSOsbox.TheymaintainthatconsultationsarenotsystematicandareheldonlyonadhocbasiswithoutactuallytakingintoaccountCSOs’opinionsinshap‐ingpolicy.79Inthisregard,itisfairtounderlinethatdifferentpercep‐tionsexistbetweenCSOsandinstitutionalstakeholders.Ontheirside,EUinstitutionalactorsindeedobservethatCSOstendtointerveneandto activelyparticipate indialogueonlywhen certain issues, i.e. fund‐ing,areatstake.80

Eitherway,civilsociety’shopeforastrongerrole inAfrica‐EUrela‐tionsfollowingtheadoptionoftheJAESfirstActionPlanhasnowalmostdisappeared,andhasbeenreplacedbyageneral feelingofdisappoint‐menttowardstheStrategyandbyattemptstorevitalizeit.Civilsocietyorganizations, even those thatmost contributed to the formulation oftheStrategyafewyearsago,arenowmoreandmorefrustrated–alsoasaconsequenceoftheperceivedhesitancyonthepartofinstitutionalactors – and are turning their attention to other activitieswhere theyfeeltheycanhaveagreaterimpact.81

Againstthisbackdrop,andlimitingtheanalysistotheinvolvementofEuropean andAfrican CSOs in the JAES and the implementation of itsPeaceandSecurityPartnership,themaincausesofsuchafailingcanbeallocatedtothreemaincategories: i CSOs’capacity; ii mechanismsofparticipation;andiii funding.

4.1. CSOs’ capacity

Asfarasthefirstpointisconcerned,effectivedialogueandjointinitia‐tivesarehamperedprimarilybytheunevendegreeofengagementofcivilsociety intheJAES,withAfricanactorsstill laggingbehind.EventhoughthedegreeofinvolvementofEuropeanCSOsvariessomewhat,it relies on long‐established structures and dialoguewith EU institu‐tions.This isnot thecase for theAfricanside.Controversialopinions

79JointAfrica‐EUStrategy,JointCSOSteeringGroupMeeting,ITUC,Brussels,10May

2011,pp.1‐3.80Interviewwithseniorofficer,EuropeanCommission,Brussels,25April2012.81Interviewwithpolicyofficer,Saferworld,Brussels,12April2012.


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existastotheextenttowhichlocalorganizationslackorotherwisethecapacitytocontributetotheJAES.WhereasinanumberofcaseslocalNGOsandassociationshaveprovedessentialinpreventingconflictsorresolvingdisputes,itwouldbefairtorecognizethatitisoftendifficultforthemtoenterformalinstitutionalframeworks,toestablishregulardialoguewithinstitutionalactorsandtoactivelyparticipateinformalcontinent‐to‐continent activities, such as those foreseen by the JAES.Thismainlystemsfromtwodifferentfactors:thedifferentproceduresfortheengagementofAfricanCSOs,andAfricanCSOs’youngage,withmost of them still in the process of organizing themselves in perma‐nentnetworks.82

Asforthefirstfactor,wehaveseenthatECOSOCCistheonlychannelthroughwhichAfricanCSOscanbeinvolvedintheJAES.Inthisregard,AfricanCSOs and their European counterparts complain about the ex‐cessivebureaucratizationandlengthofprocedures,whichforceAfricanCSOs toalwayscheckwith their constituenciesbeforeattendingmeet‐ings,aswellasaboutalackoftransparencyintheselectionoflocalor‐ganizationstoparticipateintheGeneralAssembly,withtheresultthatsmaller and more independent CSOs are often underrepresented.83However,differentperceptionsexist, again, betweenCSOsand institu‐tional actors.According toCIDO,difficulties in theengagementof civilsocietymainlyderive frompoor cooperation among local CSOs,whichhampersdirectdialoguewiththem.84WithregardstojointAfrica‐EUin‐itiatives, CIDO observes that it is exactly the different formal set up,namely the limited institutionalization of European CSOs, which pre‐ventsthetwopartnersfrom“speakingthesamelanguage”andfromful‐lyunderstandingandrecognizingeachother.

Beyond formal procedures, the organization of joint initiatives ismoreandmoredifficultalsoduetoasubstantialdisparitybetweenthe

82Seesection4.2forexamplesofnetworksinthePeaceandSecurityfield.83Interviewwithpolicyofficers,FES,AddisAbaba,23February2012,andwithpoli‐

cyofficer,EPLO,Brussels,1March2012.84CSOsobservethatfullconsistencyisimpossibletoachieve,ascivilsocietyisitself

theplace fordebate,confrontationanddiscussion interviewwithpolicyofficers,FES,AddisAbaba,23February2012 .


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twosidesintermsofavailableandaccessiblecapacity.Thismeansthatinmostcases,directengagement is limited to “multinational”NGOs tothedetrimentoflocalones.Whatismore,thehighturnoverofperson‐nelinCSOs,commontobothsides,makesitdifficulttokeepthemomen‐tumup,tomaintaintheflowofknowledgeandtheexpertisealreadyac‐quiredandtoensurecontinuityandcoherenceinjointactivities,includ‐ing those on peace and security, and in engagementwith institutionalstakeholders.85A“victim”ofsuchadisparity–andofotherfactorssuchasthe lackof funding–wasfor instancetheAfrica‐EUCivilSocietyIn‐tercontinentalDialogueForum.Originallyplannedtotakeplaceannual‐ly, according to the available information, it has so far been held onlyonce end of 2010 . The next Forum is planned for 2013, to coincidewiththeEU–AUSummit.WithintheJAES,thetwoSteeringGroupsareinstead supposed to meet more regularly, in principle three times ayear.Thisideahoweverwasalwaysunrealistic,duetothelackoffinan‐cial resources and capacity. The lastmeeting tookplace inBrussels inJuly2011.Therehavebeendiscussionsaboutameetingin2012,butnodatehasasyetbeenset.86

4.2. Mechanisms of participation

MechanismsofparticipationrepresentanotherchallengetotheimpactofcivilsocietyontheJAES.Inprinciple,thetwomainchannelsallowingCSOstoactivelyparticipateintheStrategyandmaketheirvoiceheardaretheImplementationTeams ITs andtheJointExpertGroups JEGs .Bothhoweverhaveprovensomewhatineffective.EUITmeetingswithinthePeaceandSecurityPartnershiphavebeendescribedas“soulsearch‐ing”meetings,witha structure thathas remainedunchangedover thelasttwoyears,andworkmoreasa‒vague‒information‐sharingplat‐formwhichdoesnotsetcommonobjectivesforaction.87Fortheirpart,

85Interviewwithseniorexpert,ISS,AddisAbaba,23February2012,andMartaMar‐

tinelli,EU‐AUrelations:thepartnershiponDemocraticGovernanceandHumanRightsoftheJointAfrica‐EUStrategy,op.cit.,p.16.

86Emailexchangewithpolicyofficer,EPLO,May2012.87Interviewwithpolicyofficer,EPLO,Brussels,1March2012.


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JEGs,despitetheirname,donotinmostcasesgathertechnicalexperts,andremainthereforeonamorepoliticallevel.88Inmostcasestheyarecomposedofpoliticalofficers fromnational embassies inBrusselsandAddisAbabawhomaynotnecessarilybeexpertsinthespecificpartner‐shipareaforwhichtheyaremembers.89Suchimbalancesapplytorep‐resentativesfrombothsides,butareparticularlytrueoftheAfricansidedue,eithertolimitedlocalexpertiseortodifficultiesinswiftlyidentify‐ingexistingexpertise.Moreover,civilsocietyrepresentativesarenotin‐vited to JEGsor toothermeetings, suchas the JointTaskForces, onaregularbasis,anddelaysininformingandinvolvingCSOsarequitefre‐quent.90ThisappliesalsotothePeaceandSecurityPartnership,where,according toCSOs,dialoguewith institutional stakeholdershasslowedon account, inter alia, of the internal reorganization on the Europeanside after the establishment of the European External Action Service.NowtheEEASchairstheJAESPeaceandSecurityPartnershiponbehalfoftheEU,whiletheEuropeanCommission–DGDevelopmentCoopera‐tion DEVCO –is inchargeoftheimplementationandmanagementofitsmainfinancialtool,theAfricanPeaceFacility APF .91Asforcivilso‐ciety’sparticipationinthePeaceandSecurityPartnership,thereisnotadedicatedcontactpoint,asthereferencepoint intheEEAScoverscivilsociety’sengagementacrossall theeight JAESPartnerships. In this re‐

88Interviewwithpolicyofficers,GIZ,AddisAbaba,23February2012.89AfricanUnion,SecondAU‐CSOsconsultationontheimplementationoftheAfrica‐

EuropePartnership,op.cit.,p.4.90Ibid.91ItisrelevanttonotethattherightofinitiativetoaskforEUfundingundertheAf‐

ricanPeaceFacilitypertains to theAUandAfricanregionalorganizationswithaman‐dateinpeaceandsecurity.ThescopeoftheAPFbeneficiarieshasbeenrecentlybroad‐enedtoincludetrainingcentresandotherCSOs.Nonetheless,thelattercanonlyreceivefundingindirectly,i.e.iftheAUoraRECaskstheAPFtofundaprojectwhoseimplemen‐tationcan involveCSOs.As for thenear future, itwouldbedifficult forcivil society tobecome a direct beneficiary of APF funding, as itwould require adequate capacity todealwiththecumbersomefinancialandmanagementproceduresoflargescaleprojectssuchasthosefundedundertheAPF.SeeonthisEPLO,TheAfricanPeaceFacility,EPLOBriefingPaper03/2012,Brussels,p.8,http://www.eplo.org/assets/files/4.%20Members%20Area/FfP/EPLO_Briefing_Paper_3‐2012_African_Peace_Facility.pdf.


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gard,civilsociety feels that there isstill roomfor improvementandtomakeinstitutionalengagementmoreactive.92Inanycase,difficultiesindialoguing with external stakeholders can be considered as part of awiderproblemtheEUfaceswithoutreachactivities,underlinedbyCSOrepresentativesandalsoacknowledgedbyEUactors.93Althoughthesit‐uationhasimprovedwiththeestablishmentofanEUDelegationtotheAfricanUnion, theJAESisstillunknowntothemajorityofcivilsocietyorganizations,includingatcountrylevel.94

4.3. Funding

Lastbutnotleast,fundinghasbeenamajorissuesincetheinceptionofthe JAES95. As of 2009, after the endorsement of the first Action Plan,CSOsaskedthatadequateresourcesbeaddressedtotheirparticipationin the Strategy.Whereas anEU budget line exists for non‐state actorsandlocalauthoritiesunderotherEUfinancialinstruments,untilrecent‐ly the JAES has not been provided with a similar financial envelope.AheadofcomplaintsaboutthescarcityofresourcesavailableundertheJAES,whichfromtheperspectiveofCSOsnegativelyimpactsalsoontheorganizationofmeetingsandontheeffectivenessoftheJEGs,theEUin‐stitutions, in agreement with the African institutions, started discus‐sionsonaCSOsfundingmechanismfortheJAES,theso‐calledSupportProgramme. Either way, the issue at stake does not concern only theavailabilityoffunds,butalsothecapacityofCSOs,namelyAfricanCSOs,tohaveaccesstothem.96Thisisparticularlytrueforthesmallerorgani‐zationsthatarenotfamiliarwithEUmechanismsanddonothaveade‐

92EmailexchangewithEPLO,May2012.93Interviewwithseniorofficer,EUDelegationtotheAfricanUnion,AddisAbaba,21

February2012.94Africa‐‐EUCivilSocietyIntercontinentalForumontheJointAfrica‐EUStrategy,op.

cit.,p.3.95 In this regard, it isworthmakingadistinctionbetween fundingavailableunder

theEUNon‐StateActorsprogrammeandotherheadingsstrictlyrelatedtotheJAES.96Interviewswithseniorofficer,UNECA,AddisAbaba,21February2012,withpolicy

officer,EPLO,Brussels,1March2012,andwithpolicyofficer,Saferworld,Brussels,12April2012.


92

quatehumanresourcestodealwithwhathavebeendefinedas“civilso‐cietyunfriendly”procedures.97

Source: IAI elaboration.

Figure 6. Limits to the impact of CSOs on the JAES/PSP.

97Interviewwithseniorexpert,InternationalAlert,AddisAbaba,22February2012.

93

Policy Recommendations

Valérie Vicky Miranda, Nicoletta Pirozzi and Kai Schaefer

Againstthisbackdropandwithreferencetothemajorchallengesidenti‐fiedbythestudyfortheeffectiveinvolvementofAfricanregionalorgan‐izationsandcivilsocietyactorsintheJointAfrica‐EUStrategy,particu‐larly in itsPeaceandSecurityPartnership,wecan identify threemainareasrequiringimprovement,asfollows:1 dialogue,coordinationandoutreach;2 capacitybuilding;and3 funding.Onthisbasis,wecanputforward some policy recommendations aimed at an improved imple‐mentationoftheStrategy.

1. DIALOGUE, COORDINATION AND OUTREACH

While there seem to be almost toomany coordinationmechanisms intheframeworkoftheJointStrategy,bothREC/RMsandcivilsocietyac‐torshaveyettobeproperlyinvolvedinthePeaceandSecurityPartner‐ship,andstillhavelimitedimpactontheelaborationofpoliciesandtheimplementationofactions.Inthisregard,inourviewbothpartieshavethefollowingprecise“duties”.

Promotingdialogue:

‐BoththeAfricanUnionandtheEuropeanUnionshoulddevelopgoodpracticesonhowtoengagemorewithREC/RMs.Ifaninclusivepart‐nershipisreallyapriority,thenpoliticalleadershavetoprovidetheinstruments to engage the REC/RMs, in particular with regard toprogramming.Thingshavetostartatthestrategiclevel,orotherwise

VALÉRIE VICKY MIRANDA, NICOLETTA PIROZZI, KAI SCHAEFER

94

operationalizationwillremaina“lettremorte”.Itisworthhighlight‐ingthattheAUintendstoundertakemoremissionstoREC/RMs.ItisalsosuggestedthatthejointassessmentmissionsbytheAUandtheEU in post‐conflict countries include the participation of concernedREC/RMsonaregularbasis,astheyareclosertotheparticularcon‐flictandcouldofferabetterunderstandingoftherelevantdynamics.

‐LinkingupdifferentPartnershipsoftheJAES,particularlyPeaceandSecuritywithHumanRightsandGovernance,isnotonlyappropriatein order to enable the Partnership to face today’s challenges, butmightalsogiveCSOsan increasedrole.OnboththeAfricanandtheEuropean sides, thiswould require a change inworking culture. Inthesamevein,AUandEU institutionsmust improve theiroutreachand promote more occasions where civil society can comment on,andfeedinto,officialpolicies.OpportunitiesalreadyexistoutsidetheJAESframework.Onemightthink, forexample,ofthePeacebuildingPartnershipontheEuropeansideorofthedirectaccessguaranteedto some African NGOs to the African Commission and the AfricanCourtonHumanandPeople’sRights.Itwouldthereforebeuseful,al‐soforthesakeofconsistencyamongEUpolicies,toestablishformallinksandsynergiesbetweenon‐goinginitiativessothattheybenefitfromeachother.

‐At the same time, a more proactive role for both civil society andREC/RMsiscrucial.TheymustcontinuetoapproachAUandEUinsti‐tutions in order to express their interest in the Strategy and thePeaceandSecurityPartnership, inquiringaboutprogressmadeandinforming the institutionsof theactivities theycarryout in relationtotheimplementationoftheActionPlans.CSOsshouldalsoregularlypresenttopolicy‐makerssolidrecommendationsintheirareaofex‐pertise, either by means of direct submissions to officials, or bymeansofpublicstatementsoradvocacycampaignsassideeventstoofficial meetings. The recommendations provided by the EuropeanPeacebuildingLiaisonOfficeforthesecondActionPlanofthePeaceand Security Partnership are a good example of this process. AsshownbyWestAfrica,aswellasbyconstantimprovementsinotherregions,theroleofRECsiscrucialinordertoinvolveCSOsmoresub‐stantiallyand toconnect thecontinentaland the local levels.Either

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way,afundamentalstepwouldbetosetajointagendawithclearob‐jectivesandbenchmarks for the civil society sector, for instanceontheprioritiesandrelatedactivitiesformulatedintheJAESsecondAc‐tionPlan.

Ensuringinstitutionalcoordination:

‐ThelinksbetweeninstitutionalrepresentativesintheEUandtheAUontheonesideandstakeholdersinREC/RMsandcivilsocietyontheother could be further strengthened, as they remain high‐level andselectiveinnature.Interactionatexpertlevelshouldbeencouraged,and there should be more context‐ or theme‐specific interactions.Thiswouldhelpavoidthe“talkshopeffect”thatiscommoninhigh‐levelpoliticalmeetings,andwould improvetheoutcomeofexistinggatherings,suchastheJointExpertGroupsinEuropeandAfrica,ortheAfricanUnionPartnersGroupinAddisAbaba.

‐Asanalternative,aPeaceandSecurityJointCoordinationCommitteeJCC couldbecreatedtoreplaceallexistingtechnicalmeetings.Thiswould allow such a JCC to have a visible role, would ensure moreregularparticipationbyREC/RMs, andwould cleanup someof theothermeetings,asthereislimitedactivityandengagementinthem.Seminarswithpoliticians,expertsandcivilsocietyrepresentativesinthe context ofmeetings between the Peace and Security Council oftheAUandthePoliticalandSecurityCommitteeoftheEUcouldalsobe planned. For instance, a one‐day seminar or a one‐day formalmeetingformorein‐depthdiscussionofissuesofcrucialimportancetobothsidescouldbeorganised.Inaddition,differentgatheringfor‐mats “à géométrie variable” could be promoted, such as regionalmeetingsbetween theAU, theEUandREC/RMsormeetingswithageographicalorthematicfocusinvolvingallinterestedactors,includ‐ingtherelevantREC/RMsandlocalcivilsocietyorganizations.

Enhancingoutreach:

‐OneoftheweaknessesofthePartnershipisoutreach.Notenoughin‐formation is communicated about the results achieved. Specifically,theEUcoulddomoretopublicizewhat itdoesintheframeworkoftheJAES,andcouldbemoreambitiousinthefieldofcommunication,


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withakeyroletobeassignedtotheEuropeanCommissionandtheEuropean External Action Service. The JAES cannot be confined toBrusselsandAddisAbaba,butneedstobeownedbyallthekeyinter‐locutors,includingREC/RMs,AUandEUMemberStates,andAfricanandEuropean civil society actors: in short, thePartnershipneedsacommunicationplan.ItistobehopedthattheJAESSupportMecha‐nismcoulddomoreinthisregard.Thisshouldalsohelptotacklethecurrentgaps in informationbetweenBrussels,AddisAbabaandtheEU Delegations in the African continent. EU Delegations should bemoreengagedinthePartnership,forwhichtheyneedpeaceandse‐curity capacity andexpertise todeliver effective follow‐up. In addi‐tion,communicationbetween theEUDelegations, theEEASand theEuropeanCommissionneedstobeimproved.

2. CAPACITY BUILDING

AnothermajorissuepreventingtheactiveparticipationofREC/RMsandCSOs is uneven and sometimes limited local capacity, or difficulties inaccessing formal and structured frameworks of cooperation. This re‐mainsaseriousconcern,especiallyontheAfricanside.

TheEUisthebiggestdonortotheAfricanPeaceandSecurityArchi‐tectureand thebiggest support to capacitybuilding.On theonehand,coordinated efforts between institutional actors are strongly recom‐mended.InAfrica,akeypartnerfortheEUcouldbetheUnitedNationsEconomic Commission for Africa UNECA , especially its Governanceand Public Administration Division, which is extremely active in thisfield, and benefits from awell‐rooted presence on the ground. On theother, the AU andREC/RMsmight have a differentmodel to propose,andtheEUshouldtakeintogreateraccountthecompetitiveadvantageoftheofferfromtheAfricanside,withacrucialroletobeplayedbyre‐gionalorganizations.

Capacitybuildingneedsalong‐termpoliticalcommitmenttoachieveitsgoals,with,forinstance,a15‐yearperspective,insteadofthecurrent3‐yearprogrammesestablishedintheActionPlans.Duringthisperiod,there is a need for political and financial backing and for staying the

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course.WhencooperatingwiththeAUandREC/RMs,theEUshoulddi‐rectcapacitybuildingtosomeselectedareas,insteadofcoveringthefulllistofthePartnership.TheEUshouldalsoworkmorecloselywithsomeREC/RMs ‒ not necessarily all of them ‒ to engage in‐depth in somespecificsectorsthatmightnotbeuniformeverywhere.Thisengagementshouldbedeepenedbeyondthepeacekeepingandfinancialaspects.

Asfarascivilsocietyisconcerned,capacitybuildingisanareawherejointEuropean‐Africaninitiativesaremorevaluablethanever,andthisisapaththatmanyEuropeanCSOshavebeguntotake,includinginthepeaceandsecuritysector.Manyprogrammesexistinthefieldofmedia‐tion or conflict resolution and transformation inwhich CSOs could beengagedmoreactively.Themainchallengeistomakethemsustainableinthelongrun.Inthisregard,ownershipandtrainingarekeywords.

A constructive approach would be to involve CSOs on real issuesclosertothefieldstheyareworkingin,includingbylookingatsuccessstoriesandlocalexamplesofengagementthatcouldserveasinspirationorbeadapted,with somechanges, toother contexts.Onemight think,forinstance,oftheKenya’sDistrictPeaceCommitteesandtheroletheyplayedintheaftermathofthe2007post‐electionviolence.

StrongerparticipationofCSOsentailsbetterandmorestructuredor‐ganizationinmostcases.Networkscouldproveusefultothisend,withthebiggerandlonger‐establishedorganizationsbeingthedrivingforcebehindtheothers.ThenetworkingprocessamongCSOsisstillatanear‐lystageinAfrica,butsomerelevantexamplesalreadyexist‒inWestAf‐ricaforinstance‒withafocusonearlywarningandmediationissues.NetworksarealsoavaluablemeansofaccessingREC/RMsinaneasier,but formal,way.TheWestAfricaNetwork forPeacebuilding WANEP or theWestAfricaCivilSocietyForum WACSOF andtheirstructuredcooperationwithECOWASarecasesinpoint.

3. SUSTAINABLE FUNDING

TheAfricanPeaceFacility,asthemainfinancinginstrumentofthePeaceand Security Partnership, and the political integration components ofthe Regional Indicative Programmes ensure the significant availability


98

offundingforstrengtheningREC/RMs’involvementinthePartnership.Whilewell‐knownchallengesontheAfricansidepersistintermsofhu‐man resources, communication, IT equipment and infrastructure, andon the European side in terms of internal coordination and the slowpaceofthedisbursementoffunds,itisunlikelythatprocedureswillbe‐comeanyeasier,moreflexible,fasterorbetter.TheEU,therefore,hastothinkthroughwhatitsrelationshipwiththeREC/RMsshouldbe,noton‐ly in termsofdialoguebutalsowithregardtoalternativeentrypointsforitssupport.TheEUshouldthereforereviewitsoverallAfricastrate‐gyonthebasisofwhathasbeendoneregardingtheSahelandtheHornofAfrica,andapplythelessonslearntfromthosestrategiestotheJAESand its instruments, i.e. theAfricanPeaceFacility, theRegional Indica‐tiveProgrammesandtheInstrumentforStability,wherestrongersyn‐ergies should be created. Through a rationalization of the JAES withclearerobjectives,theEUshouldtrytofocusitsengagementwiththeAUandtheREC/RMs,whichinturnwouldhelptheAfricansidetoprioritizeitsobjectives.Thiskindofreflectionontheprudentapplicationof lim‐itedresourcesshouldtakeplaceinboththeEEASandDGDEVCOattheEuropeanCommission.

Local CSOs need to be supported in order to acquire expertise onhowtoobtainaccesstofunding,whichisperceivedasoneofthemainobstaclestotheireffectiveparticipationintheJAES.Therecently‐creat‐ed Support Mechanism could be used to enhance CSOs’ participationand engagement in the Strategy. At first sight and in accordancewithwhathasalreadybeencommittedtoonpaper,theSupportMechanismcouldfacilitatetheorganizationofjointmeetingsandinitiatives,aswellastheprovisionofrealtechnicalexpertiseinJEGsorothervenues,mak‐ingupforthelackof fundsthathasbeenidentifiedasoneofthemaincausesofthefailureofthepeople‐centredapproachandthesuccessfulimplementationofcivilsociety’sentrypointsintotheJAES.Asfarasdia‐loguewith theAU is concerned, theLivingstoneFormula is a valuabletoolthat,sofar,hasnotreceivedtheattentionitdeserves.Awareofitsimplications,theAUinstitutionsattributeitslimitedorscantimplemen‐tationtoalackoffunds.Thismayindeedbeanimportantobstacle,butitisalsocrucialtoseebeyondthefinancialissueandtoavoidusingitasanexcuse for anabsenceofpoliticalwill.Work is thereforeneeded inbothdirections.

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Annex: List of Interviews

Organization Department Date of Interview

European Union Delegation to the African Union

Political and Policy Section 21-23 February 2012

Peace and Security Section 20 February 2012

African Union Headquarters AU Commission 21-22 February 2012

ASF 22 February 2012

CEWS

Peace and Security Council

Panel of the Wise

CIDO

RECs – Liaison officers COMESA 22 February 2012

SADC

NARC

United Nations Economic Com-mission for Africa

Civil Society and Post-Conflict Section of Governance and Pub-lic Administration Division

20 February 2012

United Nations Liaison Office with the African Union (UNLO-AU)

20 February 2012

Institute for Security Studies APSTA Secretariat

23 February 2012

Die Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ)

23 February 2012

Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (FES) 23 February 2012

International Alert 21 February 2012

European Commission DG DEVCO (E4 - A5) 25-27 April 2012

European External Action Service Pan-African Affairs 27 April 2012

European Parliament Directorate-General for External Policies - Policy Department

26 April 2012

European Peacebuilding Liaison Office

1 March 2012

Saferworld 12 April 2012

101

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Finitodistamparenelmesediottobre2012contecnologiaprintondemand

pressoilCentroStampa“NuovaCultura”p.leAldoMoron.5,00185Roma

www.nuovacultura.it

perordini:[email protected]

Int_ 9788861348875_17x24col_LM04

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Edited byNicoletta Pirozzi

in cooperation with:


STRENGTHENING THE

AFRICA-EU PARTNERSHIP

ON PEACE AND SECURITY

HOW TO ENGAGE AFRICAN REGIONAL ORGANIZATIONS

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icoletta Pirozzi

15.60 EURO

The IAI Research Papers are brief monographs written by one or more authors (IAI or external experts) on current problems of inter-national politics and international relations. The aim is to promote greater and more up to date knowledge of emerging issues and trends and help prompt public debate.

A non-pro�t organization, IAI was founded in 1965 by Altiero Spinelli, its �rst director.The Institute aims to promote understanding of international politics through research, promotion of political ideas and strategies, disse-mination of knowledge and education in the �eld of foreign policy.IAI main research sectors are: European institutions and policies; Italian foreign policy; trends in the global economy and internationa-lisation processes in Italy; the Mediterranean and the Middle East; security and defence; and transatlantic relations.

The Joint Africa-European Union Strategy (JAES), adopted at the Lisbon Summit in December 2007, was conceived to overcome the unequal partnership between the African and European continents by establishing a framework of cooperation based on shared values and common objectives. In particular, it was designed as an inclusive and people-centred partnership, aimed at involving both institutional and non-institutional actors beyond the Brussels-Addis Ababa axis. However, already during the �rst implementation phase (2008-2010), it became clear that these conditions were far from being fully realized and needed a longer timeframe to display their potential. The Tripoli Summit in November 2010 and the second Action Plan (2011-2013) have tried to address some of these problems, but full implementation of the Joint Strategy is still a work in progress. This study analyses the sub-optimal involvement of two main stakeholders, namely African regional organizations – Regional Economic Communities (RECs) and Regional Mechanisms (RMs) – and civil society actors, especially non-governmental organizations. It addresses current engagement in and the potential of civil society’s contribution to Africa-EU relations in the �eld of peace and security, by looking at their interaction with institutions on the continent and their added value in sectors such as early warning, crisis management, mediation and training. Finally, it o�ers some policy recommendations for the future implementation of the Joint Strategy, in particular on the issues of dialogue, capacity-building and funding.

NICOLETTA PIROZZI is Senior Fellow in the European A�airs Area at IAI.

IAI Research Papers

N. 1 European Security and the Future of Transatlantic Relations, edited by Riccardo Alcaro and Erik Jones, 2011

N. 2 Democracy in the EU after the Lisbon Treaty, edited by Ra�aello Matarazzo, 2011

N. 3 The Challenges of State Sustainability in the Mediterranean, edited by Silvia Colombo and Nathalie Tocci, 2011

N. 4 Re-thinking Western Policies in Light of the Arab Uprisings, edited by Riccardo Alcaro and Miguel Haubrich-Seco, 2012

N. 5 The transformation of the armed forces: the Forza NEC program, edited by Michele Nones and Alessandro Marrone, 2012

N. 6 Strengthening the Africa-EU Partnership on Peace and Security, edited by Nicoletta Pirozzi, 2012

ISSN 2239-21229788861348875_106_FM_3

www.nuovacultura.it

SEGUICI SUI SOCIAL NETWORK

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