S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 20320725 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE · 2,200 Pakistani rupees (PKR)24 o Saudi passport, number C3570012s o Scraps of paper containing Iranian, UK, and Pakistani

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSEHEADQUARTERS, JOINT TASK FORCE GUANTANAMO

U.S. NAVAL STATION, GUANTANAMO BAY, CUBAAPO AE 09360

JTF-GTMO-CDR 25 luly 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Southem Command, 3511 NW 91st Avenue,Miami , FL33172

SUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) forGuantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-000493DP (S)

JTF-GTMO Detainee Assessment

1. (S//NF") Personal Information:

o JDIMSAIDRC Reference Name: Abdul Bukharyo Aliases and Current/True Name: Abd al-Hakim Abd al-

Karim Amin Bukhari. Abd al-Maqueeb Bukhary. AbuYusef al-Jazzera. Abu Yusef al-Mekki

o Place of Birth: Mecca. Saudi Arabia (SA)o Date of Birth: 13 February 1956o Citizenship: Saudi Arabiao Internment Serial Number (ISN): US9SA-OOO493DP

(U//FOUO) Health: Detainee is in good health.

(U) JTF-GTMO Assessment:

^. (S) Recommendation: JTF-GTMO recommends this detainee for Continued DetentionUnder DoD Control (CD). JTF-GTMO previously assessed detainee as Continued DetentionUnder DoD Control (CD) on22 July 2006.

b. (S//NF) Executive Summary: Detainee is assessed to be a long-time member of al-

Qaida since its inception. Detainee is a veteran jihadist, having participated in the Soviet-Afghan War in the early 1990s, and possibly traveling to Bosnia and considering travel toChechnya. Detainee has acknowledged attending multiple training camps and associatingwith numerous extremists. Detainee was possibly associated with the non-govemmental

CLASSIFIED BY: MULTIPLE SOURCESREASON: E.O. 12958, AS AMENDED, SECTION 1.4(C)DECLASSIFY ON: 2032725

2.

3.

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JTF-GTMO-CDRSUBJECT: Recommendation for Continued Detention Under DoD Control (CD) forGuantanamo Detainee, ISN: US9SA-000493DP (S)

organization Benevolence International Foundation (BIF) and its Saudi Arabia-basedfinancier.' JTF-GTMO determined this detainee to be:

o A HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threat to the US, its interests and allieso A HIGH threat from a detention perspectiveo Of HIGH intelligence value

c. (S//NF) Summary of Changes: The following outlines changes to detainee'sassessment since the last JTF-GTMO recommendation. (Changes in this assessment will beannotated by F next to the footnote.)

o Added reporting of detainee's membership in al-Qaidao Added information about detainee's affiliation with the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan(rMU)o Clarified capture statement

4. (U) Detainee's Account of Events:

The following section is based, unless otherwise indicated, on detainee's own account.These statements are included without consideration of veracity, accuracy, or reliabilify.

a. (S//ND Prior History: Detainee attended nine years of formal schooling. In 1977,hebegan working for Aramco Oil Company on rigs offshore of Saudi Arabia.2 In 1978,detainee traveled to Iran to look for women.' In 1979, detainee traveled to England for twomonths to learn English. Upon his return to Saudi Arabia, detainee assisted his father withthe family property rental business until 1998.* In 1982, detainee traveled to the US, makingstops in Cincinnati, Ohio (OH); Pennsylvania; Daytona Beach, Florida (FL); Orlando, FL;atrd N"* York City, New York (NY).t In 1985 or 1986, while in Jeddah, SA, detainee mettwo members of Jamaat Tablighi (JT)." At some point, detainee traveled with a third JTmember to Amman, Jordan, for 40 days. Seven to 10 days after detainee's return fromJordan, he borrowed money from his father to travel to Lahore, Pakistan (PK). One of the JT

I Analyst Note: BIF is a National Intelligence Priority Framework (NIPF) counterterrorism (CT) Priority 3 Terrorist

Support Entity (TSE). Priority 3 TSEs support entities that are considered to be anti-US but are not included inPriorities I or 2, or organizations that provide witting operational support to Priority 3 terrorist groups.' I IR6 0340399023 ooo+93 srR r4-ocr-2004o IIR 6 034 0399 02t 000+93 sIR l5-AUG-zoos,00493 sIR 07-sEP-20046 Analyst Note: JT is a NIPF CT Priority 2A TSE. Priority 24, TSEs have demonstrated intent and willingness toprovide financial support to terrorist organizations willing to attack US persons or interests, or provide witting

operational support to Priority 2,A, terrorist groups.

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members procured detainee's visa for Pakistan, after which detainee and another Sauditraveled to Lahore. They stayed in Pakistan for a month and then traveled to New Delhi,India (N), where they stayed at JT headquarters in Nizam-e-Alden for a month. While inNew Delhi, detainee was introduced to the leader of the JT and asked to make a lifecommitment to the organization. Detainee told JT that he needed to think about it because hedid not want to commit his life to servitude, pilgrimage, and missionary work. Detaineereturned to Lahore for two weeks and then traveled to Saudi Arabia.' In the late 1980s andearly 1990s, detainee visited Pakistan and Afghanistan.8 While he was in Pakistan, detaineeattended Sada Training Camp outside Peshawar, PK and Formidu, aka (al-Fata), aka (BadrCamp), outside Jalalabad, AF.e In 1994, detainee attempted to travel to Chechnya via Turkeyfor Jihad. Detainee traveled back to Saudi Arabia and later changed his mind about jihad inChechnya.lo In 1998, detainee worked for the Intercontinental Hotel in Taif, SA.r

I In _approximat ely 1999, detainee opened a building contractor company with his brother.12

b. (S//NF) Recruitment and Travel: In August 2001, having decided to travel to Pakistanto obtain laser eye surgery, detainee called Khalid Gulam Baloushi, a veteran jihadist

detainee met during the hajj before the 1991 Gulf War, and asked him about attendingtraining. Khalid told detainee to go to Karachi, PK, and check into the Dubai Hotel, whichdetainee did. However, a short time later detainee checked into the Metropol Hotel becauseof poor conditions at the Dubai Hotel. Based on a doctor referral from the hotel, detaineeobtained eye surgery. I(halid notified detainee to expect a visitor, and two days later AbuOmar came to detainee's room and asked him if he was ready to go to Kandahar, AF.Detainee checked out of the hotel and was taken to a house in a nearby village, wheredetainee selected a kunya (alias) and prepared to travel to Kandahar the next duy.t' The nextday, detainee flew to Quetta, traveled to the Afghan border, crossbd and went on to SpinBoldak, AF. From there, detainee traveled on to Kand ahar.ta In Kandahar, prior to travelingto the al-Faruq Training Camp, detainee resided in the al-Nibras Guesthouse. While detaineestayed at al-Nibras, Usama Bin Laden (UBL) arrived and gave a speech on the importance ofj ihad.'5

' oooqg z MFR 02-AU G -2002, 00049 3 302 04 - AU G -2002t 000+93 sIR 07-sEp-2004,000493 sIR 29-sEp-2004, ooo493 sIR 05-Nov-2004,000493 sIR l2-Nov-2004n Sada Camp referenced in 000493 SIR 14-OCT-2004,000493 SIR 28-OCT-2004; Formidu camp referenced in000493 srR 22-FEB-2005'o ooo493 sIR 22-FEB-2005" ooo493 sIR o9-JLrN-2005tt IIR 6 034 0399 0213 Analyst Note: Detainee chose Abu Yousef ashis kunya during this time.'o IIR 6 034 0688 02tt IIR 4 201 2520 04, Analyst Note: Al-Nibras Guesthouse is also known as Nabras Madafa and the Haji HabashGuesthouse (see also IIR 6 034 0688 02).

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c. (S//NF) Training and Activities: When detainee arrived at al-Faruq in August 2001, hewas requested to surrender his passport.16 Detainee was very sick and stayed at al-Faruq foronly one day and then departed. He traveled to Karachi for surgery for his hemorrhoids andlaser eye surgery before returning to Saudi Arabia.lT Detainee spent approximately twoweeks in Taif and then traveled to Amman to visit the missionaries at the Masjad Alnur,variant (al-Nur Mosque), for spiritual growth. After the events of I I September 2001,detainee heard the call by Afghan officials for all Afghans to wage war against Christianityand the Americans, and decided to travel to Afghanistan to support the Taliban against theAmericans.t8 Detainee traveled to the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, paid an Afghan soldier$500 US to enter Afghanistan, and traveled to Spin Boldak. From Spin Boldak, detaineetraveled to the al-Nibras Guesthouse in Kandahar. Detainee was taken to anotherguesthouse, where he surrendered his passport and the money he was carrying. Detaineetraveled to another guesthouse and remained there for five days before a Yemeni came andadvised that the day "may be the start of the war." Detainee volunteered with nine otherpeople to go to the Kandahar Airport. Detainee arrived at the airport in October 2001 andrernained for approximately four days, standing guard positions around and meeting withindividuals at locations within the perimeter.re

5. (U) Capture Information:

u. (S/A{F) Detainee stated that in October 2001, al-Qaida forces arrested him on suspicionof espionage.'o Al-qaida interrogated and tortured him at an undisclosed location beforeincarcerating him in the Taliban's Sarpooza Political Prison in Kandahar. Detainee was atSarpooza Prison when forces aligned with the Coalition took control and subsequentlytransferred foreign prisoners over to US control.2t Detainee's initial screening by US forcestook place on 24January 2002 lnKandahar.22

'u IIR 4 2ot 2522 04'7 ooo493 sIR o8-sEP-2005't ooo+93 302 I5-AUG-2002'n 000493 302 r5-AUG-2002, IIR 4 2ot 2521 04'oIIR4 20r252304" 000493 MFR I9-FEB-2002, Analyst Note: On 24 November 2001, forces under command of pro-CoalitionAfghan warlord Gul Agha Shirazai encountered fivei Arabs, whom Shirazai's forces suspected of being associatedwith UBL, at a checkpoint outside Takhteh Pol, AF, not far from Kandahar. A firefight ensued, resulting in three ofthe Arabs being killed and two captured. The Arabs captured alive were Salim Ahmed Salim Hamdan, ISNUS9YM-000149DP (YM-la9); and Said Boujaadia, ISN US9MO-000150DP (MO-150). One of the captured Arabswas carrying a passport bearing a name closely matching detainee's: Abd al-Hakim Abd al-Karim BihaminBukhari. The passport contains entry and exit stamps that exactly match detainee's timeline in August andSeptember 2001, including his travel to Pakistan and Jordan (see TD-314/45573-01, TD-314151235-01). It isunclear how detainee's passport ended up with YM-149 and MO-l50 when they were captured." 000493 INITIAL ScREENING 24-JAN-2002

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b. (S) Property Held: None held at JTF-GTMO.

Pocket litter not held bv JTF-GTMOo Money:

. $2,400 us

. 7,000 Saudi riyals (SAR)23

. 2,200 Pakistani rupees (PKR)24o Saudi passport, number C3570012so Scraps of paper containing Iranian, UK, and Pakistani phone numbers andassociated nameso A red notebook, containing only the Pakistani mobile phone number300923096226o Miscellaneous items, including a photo, a watch, letters, papers containingcomputer diagrams and instructions, English language drills''

c. (S) Transferred to JTF-GTMO: 13 February 2002

d. (S//NF) Reasons for Transfer to JTF-GTMO: Detainee's file does not indicate whyhe was sent to JTF-GTMO.

6. (S//NF) Evaluation of Detainee's Account: Detainee admitted that he providedinformation in a deliberately misleading manner in order to receive incentives from hisdebriefers.28 Detainee uses known counter-interrogation techniques in attempts to withholdincriminating information. Detainee has given varying accounts of his medical reasons forentering Pakistan. Detainee has acknowledged his travels, jihadist intentions, and additionalperiods of training, but has failed to detail the level of his exposure to and participation with al-

Qaida and its senior leadership.

7. (U) Detainee Threat:

a. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be a HIGH risk, as he is likely to pose a threatto the US. its interests and allies.

23 Analyst Note: Approximately equivalent to $1,870 US.2a Analyst Note: Approximately equivalent to $34 US." to -3 r 4 r s r23 5 -o r, AFGp-2002-80 1 48 8, AFGp-2002- 9 ooo9226 Analyst Note: This phone number was also found in the pocket litter of YM-149 and,Mo-150 when they werecaptured by Afghan forces on 24 November 2001 (see TD-314/0561 l-02).

,'' TD-314t51235-01'8 ooo+93 sIR l6-AUG-2005

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b. (S//NF) Reasons for Continued Detention: Detainee is assessed to be a long-timemember of al-Qaida. Detainee is a veteran jihadist, having participated in the Soviet-AfghanWar in the early 1990s, and possibly traveling to Bosnia and considering travel to Chechnya.Detainee has acknowledged attending multiple training camps and associating with numerousextremists. Detainee is possibly associated with the BIF and its Saudi-based financier andUS-based director.

o (S/A{F) Detainee is assessed to be a long-time member of al-Qaida.o (S/A{F) Jawad Jabber Sadkhan, ISN US9IZ-000433DP (IZ-433), identifieddetainee as one of the original founders of al-Qaida and noted detainee had previouslyworked with Abdullah Azzam.2eo (S/A{F) Abbas Abed Romi al-Naely, ISN US9IZ-000758DP (IZ-758), stateddetainee was a member of al-Qaida since 1989. Detainee was a leader and one of theadvisors for UBL. Detainee associated with leaders, including Abdullah Azzarn, andAbu al-Khattab, who commanded al-Qaida forces in Chechnya until his death in2001. IZ-758 also stated that detainee had knowledge of the 1 I September 2001attacks in the United States. but mav have heard of them while detainee was in aTaliban prison.3o

. (S/A{F) Detainee acknowledged meeting with UBL in 2001 and discussing aspeech by UBL. Detainee claimed that prior to UBL becoming famous andassuming the role of the leader of the mujahideen, detainee had a meal with himin Peshawar.3l. (S/AIF) Detainee admitted knowledge of UBL's personal operations.Detainee stated that from the beginning (a probable reference to UBL'sparticipation in Afghanistan) a prominent Saudi Arabian shaykh named Shafiraal-Farai did not agree with UBL. Al-Farai gave advice to UBL and told him notto get involved in Pakistan. The shaykh, according to the detainee, also told UBLthat he should take his offices out of Pakistan and put them in Iran, with UBLagreeing to do so in June or July 2001.32 (Analyst Note: While the statements ofUBL agreeing to move his operations from Pakistan to Iran are not deemedcredible, the detainee indicates he has a close association with UBL by providinginsight into the associations and apparent conversations between UBL and Saudireligious figures. Though not conclusive, this, combined withIZ-433's andIZ-

'n 000q33 SIR 02-MAY-2006, Analyst Note: Abdullah Azzam was UBL's mentor. Prior to the establishment of al-Qaida and Azzam's subsequent assassination, Azzam and UBL operated the Maktab al-Khadimat,

"Services

Offices" in Peshawar, for mujahideen traveling to Afghanistan. Al-Qaida was formed following a split betweenUBL and Abdullah Azzam.'o >ooo758 sIR l3-Nov-2006" 000493 sIR 08-ocr- 2004, o0o4g3 sIR 25 -ApR-20053' ooo493 sIR 03-JUN-2005

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758's statements, indicates a potential association with UBL from the early daysof al-Qaida.)

o (S/A{F) Detainee was arrested by al-Qaida forces for suspected espionage andheld in the Taliban's Sarpooza Political Prison.

' (S/AIF) IZ-433 stated UBL put detainee in prison due to a disagreementabout the transfer of money to Taliban commander Jumabay. This transfer wasconducted without the knowledge of UBL who believed it was a plan for a coupagainst him.33 (Analyst Note: Jumabay is assessed to be a phonetic rendering ofthe name Jumaboy Namagani, the leader of the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan(IMU), which is affiliated with al-Qaida and the Taliban. Detainee's handling ofmoney for the IMU indicates a possible leadership position or position of trust.His imprisonment was apparently response to a violation of that trust.)' (S/A{F) Abd al-Rahim Abd al-RazaaqJanko, ISN US9SY-000489DP (SY-489), stated detainee was arrested by the Taliban at the Afghanistan-Pakistanborder on suspicion of being a spy and brought to the Sarpooza Political Prison inKandahar. SY-489 claimed that when detainee arrived at the prison, he had notbeen beaten by al-Qaida and had $100 US in his possession. SY-489 stated thefact detainee had not been beaten was very unusual.3a (Analyst Note: SY-489'sclaim contradicts detainee's own account, in which detainee states that he wastortured before arriving at the Sarpooza Prison.35 If SY-489's statement isaccurate, it may support the assertion that detainee was a long-time, respectedmember of al-Qaida, who was treated differently than other suspected spies.)' (S/A{F) Yasin Muhammad Salih Mazeeb Basardah, ISN US9YM-000252DP(YM-252); Ahmad Saddiq Turkistani Saddiq, ISN US9SA-000491DP (SA-491,transferred); and Aiat Nasimovich Vahitov, ISN US9RS-000492DP (RS-492,transferred), all stated detainee was placed in prison by al-Qaida or the Taliban forsuspicion of being a spy.36 SA-491 and RS-492 were both at Sarpooza Prisonwith detainee.' (S/A{F) Senior al-Qaida facilitator Sharqawi Abdu Ali al-Hajj aka (Riyadhthe Facilitator), ISN PK9YM-00 I 457DP (YM- 1 45 7), photo-identifi ed detainee,stating that detainee aroused suspicion while in Afghanistan because of hisactions and was suspected of being a Saudi Arabian intelligence agent.3l

" 000433 SIR 02-MAY-2006, Analyst Note: The IMU is a NPIF CT Priority 18 CT target. Priority lB targets aredefined as terrorist groups, especially those with state support, countries that sponsor terrorism or countries that havestate organizations involved in terrorism that have demonstrated both intention and capability to attack US personsor interests.to TRRS-04- l 2-0486, 000489 HANDNOTE 29-MAR-200235 ooo493 MFR r9-FEB-200236 000252 FM40 r5-MAR-2005, IIR 6 034 0005 03, IIR 6 034 0728 0237 IIR 6 034 o22o os

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o (S/A{F) According toYM-252, detainee arrived at al-Faruq Training Campunescorted and began asking questions. YM-252 stated that detainee was unknown toanyone at al-Faruq and did not have a facilitator.38 (Analyst Note: It is unlikely thatdetainee could simply arrive at al-Faruq Training Camp, located about 2 hours awayfrom Kandahar, without a facilitator, unless he was familiar with the route and wouldbe recognized enough to be accepted when he arrived. YM-252's statement that thedetainee was unknown may only refer toYM-252's own knowledge.)

o (S/A{F) Detainee traveled for jihad multiple times and received basic and advancedtraining at multiple al-Qaida affiliated cu-ps.'n

o (C//REL TO USA, GCTF) Detainee admitted staying with the IMU in Peshawarfor three weeks sometime in 1985 or 1987. Detainee stated that around that time, theIMU joined with UBL to fight against the Soviets. Detainee stated that there was anIMU training camp near Peshawar.a0

' (S/A{F) Detainee stated that he was in the Konar Province, AF, in 1988 or1989 during the Soviet-Afghan War.ar SY-489 also stated detainee worked withthe Arab mujahideen on his first visit to Afghanistan.a2

o (S/A{F) While in Pakistan in 1992, detainee attended the Sada Training Campoutside Peshawar.a3

' (S/A{F) In the founding minutes of al-Qaida (found in the possession of BIFdirector Enaam Arnaout in the US), UBL and the other members, including AbuUbaydah al-Banshiri, laid the foundations for the establishment of the SadaTraining Camp.|a Detainee has also stated he received training at the Sada campin 1987 or 19884s, which is the approximate time when al-Qaida was created.(Analyst Note: It is unclear whether detainee trained twice at the Sada Camp, orif the differences in dates are detainee's attempt to withhold or confuseinformation.)

o (S//NF) Detainee stated that in approximately 1992, detainee attended training atKhaldan Camp for three weeks. Detainee trained on 82mm mortars, anti-aircraftguns, Uzis, the M16, pistols, and the AK-47 assault rifle. Detainee stated that he met

38 IIR 6 034 1216 033e >IIR 6 034 o27g ojoo >IIR 6 034 ooo4 07ot ooo493 sIR o6-JuN-2006o2 ooo489 HANDNoTE 29-MAR-2002a3 Analyst Note: Sada Camp referenced in 000493 SIR I4-OCT-2004,000493 SIR 28-OCT-2004; Formidu campreferenced in 000493 SIR 22-FEB-2005aa usarnaoutl0603profo5IIR4 20r248304

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Abu Ubaydah at this time, and that Abu Ubaydah transported him and other traineesto training.a6

. (S/A{F) Detainee stated that trainees who were with him in Khaldan traveledfrom there to Bosnia to fight. Although detainee claims to have traveled home toSaudi Arabia after training in Khaldan,aT convicted terrorist conspirator Enaam M.Arnaout stated that an Abdul Hakim (assessed to be detainee) held a position withthe BIF in Bosnia in 1992. Abdul Hakim had previously traveled inside Bosnia atan unspecified time with BIF financier Adel Batterjee. Arnaout stated he knewAbdul Hakim from Pakistan and added that Abdul Hakim had previously beenemployed by ARAMCO in Saudi Arabia.a8 (Analyst Note: Detainee hasacknowledged working for ARAMCO in Saudi Arabia,ae traveled to Pakistan, andreceived training with mujahideen who subsequently traveled to Bosnia,supporting the assessment that he was associated with the BIF in Bosnia in 1992.)

o (S//NF) Detainee stated he attended the Formidu pamp, aka (al-Fata Camp), aka(Badr Camp), outside of Jalalabad in the early 1990s.s0o (S/AIF) Detainee stated that in 1998, he spent about two weeks at an UzbekCamp in the Hayatabab area of Peshawar.5l Detainee stated his group traveled to thenorth of Afghanistan to join the other Uzbek mujahideen on the Uzbek line."o (S/AIF) In March or April of 2001, while at an al-Qaida training camp atKandahar Airport, detainee saw a Yemeni explosives expert teaching a class onimprovised explosive devices.s3o (S/AIF) In August 2001, detainee claimed to have traveled to the al-FaruqTraining Camp and stayed one day. Detainee claimed he became very sick when inAfghanistan and departed al-Faruq and traveled to Karachi for laser surgery andrur:g"ry on his hemorrhoids. Detainee then traveled back to Saudi Arabia.sa (AnalystNote: The passport containing detainee's name that was captured on24 November2001 by Afghan forces contains an entry stamp into Karachi on 5 August, and an exit

nu 000493 SIR 03-JIIN-2005, 000493 SIR 08-OCT-2004, Analyst Note: It is assessed that detainee's associate Abu

Ubaydah is Abu Ubaydah al-Banshiri, a former al-Qaida military commander from Egypt who drowned in Lake

Victoria sometime in the late 1990s. Al-Banshiri is connected to the East African US embassies bombings in 1998.

Detainee noted he last saw Abu Ubaydah in 1999. It is not clear from the report if detainee acknowledged going to

Bosnia, but he has reported on numerous other indivjduals who were in Bosnia.o' 0oo4g3 sIR 03-JUN-2005, 000493 sIR 14-ocr-2004a8 usarnaoutl0603prof, Analyst Note: Batterjee is on a US Treasury list of Specially Designated Individuals,identifying individuals who are tied to terrorist financing activities.nn IIR 6 034 0399 0250 ooo493 sIR 22-FEB-2005tt ooo493 sIR ol-AUG-2005t' ooo493 sIR o4-AUG-200553 ooo493 sIR l9-MAY-2005to ooo493 sIR o8-sEP-2005

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stamp from Karachi on 20 August 2001. This is likely the period when detaineetraveled to al-Faruq.)

' (S/AIF) YM-1457 confirmed that he received detainee in Pakistan andbrought detainee to Afghanistan and that detainee refused to stay at the camp.YM-1457 also had met detainee on another occasion when he facilitateddetainee's travel to Lahore for medical treatment.ss lAnalyst Note: YM-l457'saccount of detainee's travel to Lahore is probably related to detainee's claimedtravel to Karachi for surgery.)

o (S/A{F) Detainee was able to describe the Tarnak Farms camp, aka (Abu

Ubaydah Camp), which was a camp approximately 15 to 20 minutes from the airportthat provided weapons training. Detainee stated other jihadists told him that poisons

and chemical training was also conducted at this camp.'oo (S/A{F) Detainee has employed counter interrogation techniques, including providing

vacillating stories, in a possible atternpt to confuse or hide his ties to other information,activities, and individuals.

o (S/A{F) Detainee gave conflicting dates of his attendance at the Sada Camp.Detainee claimed he stayed a few months in Jalalabad and attended training at theSada Camp.tt Detainee stated that in l994,he againvisited the Sada training camp.In 1995, ditainee left the camp and returned to Saudi Arabia.58 Detainee stated he

trained at Sada Camp in Peshawar for approximately one month.5e As previously

noted, detainee has also stated he received training at the Sada camp in 1987 or1ggg.60o (S/A{F) Detainee has both admitted and denied knowing al-Qaida member named

al-Suri. Detainee identified an individual named al-Suri, stating al-Qaida members

were told to stay away from al-Suri because he did not agree with the tactics used by

UBL. Detainee further stated that al-Suri went to Kabul and formed his own goup.(Analyst Note: This is probably a reference to Abu Musab al-Suri.6t)

. (S/A{F) Detainee also claimed that while attending Sada camp in 1986 and1987, he met Abu Musab al-Suri. Detainee stated that al-Suri was an associate ofIJBL.62 When asked about his past reporting about Abu Musab al-Suri, detaineestated that he never saw him. Detainee further stated that his memory was very

tt rIR 6 034 o22o 0556 000493 SIR 22-SEP-2005, IIR 6 034 0013 06, Analyst Note: The poisons and chemical training camp is probably

a reference to the Tarnak Farm Camp. Tarnak Farm was also called the Abu Ubaydah Camp in memory of Abu

Ubaydah al-Banshiri57 ooo493 sIR o3-JI-IN-2005t8 IIR 6 034 ol36 065e 000493 sIR l4-ocr-2004,000493 sIR 28-ocr-20046oIIR4 20r2483046t IIR 6 034 ot3't 0662 ooo4g3 sIR 24-MAY-2005

1 0




bad, and that he has no recollection of a lot of things he said and did.63 (AnalystNote: Feigning memory problems is a common counter-interrogation technique.)

o (S/A{F) Detainee claimed that in l992,he was with former senior al-Qaidaoperative, Hamza al-Jawfi, in Torkham, AF. Detainee also described al-Jawfi'sassociates, training, as well as missions in which al-Jawfi was involved under UBL'sdirection.6a Detainee later stated he did not have a relationship with al-Jawfi,claiming instead that al-Jawfi only spoke to the high level al-Qaida members at the al-Nibras guesthouse.65o (S/A{F) Detainee stated he traveled to Indonesiain 1991, and in l994he traveledto Turkey because he wanted to go to Chechnya for jihad. He separately claimed thedate of his travel to Turkey as 1999.66

o (S/A{F) Detainee claimed to have traveled to numerous countries, several as amember of JT. (Analyst Note: Detainee claims to have been vacationing; however, it ispossible that the detainee possesses ties to extremists in these countries.)

o (S/AIIF) Detainee claimed traveled to Jordan, Pakistan, and India as a member ofJT.67 (Analyst Note: Affiliation with the Islamic proselytizin g organization JT is afrequent al-Qaida cover story. Al-Qaida used the JT to facilitate and fund theinternational travel of its members.)68o (S/A{F) In 1982, detainee visited the US. He traveled to Pennsylvania; DaytonaBeach, FL; Orlando, FL; New York City, NY; and Cincinnati, OH. In the late 1990s,detainee reportedly visited New York City NY, for a second time.6eo (S/A{F) Detainee claimed to have traveled to Iraq, Egypt, and Syria for personalvacations at undetermined times.70

c. (U//FOUO) Detainee's Conduct: Detainee is assessed as a HIGH threat from adetention perspective. Detainee's overall behavior has been non-compliant and very hostiletoward the guard force and staff. Detainee currently has 145 Reports of DisciplinaryInfraction listed in DIMS, with the most recent occurring on 18 June 2007, when he struck aguard with his water bottle. Detainee has 38 Reports of Disciplinary Infraction for assault,the most recent being the water bottle incident. Other incidents for which detainee has beendisciplined include inciting and participating in mass disturbances, failure to follow guard

63 ooo493 sIR o8-MAR-2006uo IIR 6 034 0013 06, 000493 sIR 22-sEp-2005u' ooo493 sIR r2-ocr-20056u 000493 sIR 09-JUN-2005, 000493 sIR 22-FEB-2005, 000493 sIR 07-ApR-2006u' ooo4g3 FM4o 2l-sEP-200468 IIR 2 227 Ol3l03, Jamaat Tablighi Provides Cover 28-DEC-2005, JITFCT Special Analysis US Jamaat Tablighi,AFOSI Report on Jamaat Tablighi 27-OCT-2004, Jamaat al-Tablighi (JT) Members - TRRS-04-03-1083 10-MAR-2004un 00493 sIR 07-sEp-2004,000493 sIR l5-AUG-2005,IIR 6 034 0288 05to ooo493 302 04- AUG -2002

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instructions and camp rules, threatening guards, damage to govemment property, cross blockcommunications, provoking words and gestures, major and minor assaults, possession offood and both weapon and non-weapon type contraband. Detainee had a total of 22 Reportsof Disciplinary Infraction in 2006, and 38 so far in2007.

8. (U) Detainee Intelligence Value Assessment:

u. (S) Assessment: Detainee is assessed to be of IIIGH intelligence value. Detainee'smost recent interrogation session occurred on 15 May 2007.

b. (S/A[D Placement and Access: Detainee has provided information on a number ofindividuals that are mernbers of al-Qaida and may have had unexploited personal ties toUBL. Detainee is likely able to provide additional information on al-Qaida operations,terrorist individuals, and international extremist networks.

c. (S//NF) Intelligence Assessment: Detainee has provided unique accounts of extremistfacilities. Detainee possibly has information on the al-Qaida orgarization from a high-levelperspective, including recruitment, facilitation, and knowledge of operatives. Detainee hasbeen exploited on a number of issues; however, he can still provide more information ofintelligence value.

d. (S//ND Areas of Potential Exploitation:

o Al-Qaida, Taliban, and IMU leadership, relationships, recruitment, and activitieso Guesthouses and Training Campso Manipulation of JT by extremist groupso Sarpooza Political Prisono Extremist financing through narcotics tradeo Terrorist and foreign fighters training, motivation, leadership, and networkso Foreigt targeting of strategic nuclear assets and WMDo Islamic extremists in Chechnya and Bosniao Radicalizationfactorso Terrorist biographical and psychological informationo Terrorist operations in CENTCOM AOR

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9. (S) EC Status: Detainee's enemy combatant status was reassessed on 22 December 2004,and he rernains an enemv combatant.

MARK H. BUZBYRear Admiral, US NavyCommanding

I Definitions for intelligence terms used in the assessment can be found in the Joint Military Intelligence College

October 2001 guide Intelligence Warning Terminology.

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Documents

S E C R E T // NOFORN I I 20320725 DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE · 2,200 Pakistani rupees (PKR)24 o Saudi passport, number C3570012s o Scraps of paper containing Iranian, UK, and Pakistani