Ruth Weintraub -- What Was Hume's Contribution to the Problem of Induction

7/26/2019 Ruth Weintraub -- What Was Hume's Contribution to the Problem of Induction

1/12

Scots Philosophical Association

University of St Andrews

What Was Hume's Contribution to the Problem of Induction?Author(s): Ruth WeintraubSource: The Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 45, No. 181 (Oct., 1995), pp. 460-470Published by: Oxford University Presson behalf of the Scots Philosophical Associationand theUniversity of St. AndrewsStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2220309.

Accessed: 26/03/2014 16:55

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at.http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of

content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms

of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

.

Oxford University Press, Scots Philosophical Association, University of St. Andrewsare collaborating with

JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to The Philosophical Quarterly.

http://www.jstor.org

This content downloaded from 148.4.225.12 on Wed, 26 Mar 2014 16:55:14 PMAll use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ouphttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=spahttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ustandrewhttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2220309?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/stable/2220309?origin=JSTOR-pdfhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=ustandrewhttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=spahttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=oup


2/12

The

hilosophical

uarterly,

ol.

5,

No.

18i October

995

ISSNoo3I-8o94

WHAT WAS HUME'S CONTRIBUTION TO

THE PROBLEM

OF

INDUCTION?

BY RUTHWEINTRAUB

I

There are veryfewphilosophicalssueswhichare so intimatelyssociated

with one

single philosopher

s is the

problem

of

inductionwith Hume.

Indeed,

as

Kant' terms

t

Hume's

problem',

he

question

broached

n

the

title

may

sound

somewhat

odd.

It is as

if

someone

were

to

ask about

Einstein's

ontribution

o

the

theory

f

relativity.

ut

n

fact,

s

I

shall how

(?II),

the

analogy

is not

apt. Contrary

o received

opinion,

Hume was

neither

he

first

o think nduction

roblematic,

or

the

originator

f the

argument

e adduced

in

support

f the

sceptical) upposition.

xplaining

his

(more modest)

contribution

s

my

next task

(??III-IV).

My primaryconcern,

however,

s not historical.

y considering

ume's contributiono

the

problem

of

induction,

shall

argue,

we

can come to a betterunder-

standing

fthis

ecalcitrant

roblem

??V-VII).

II

Contrary

o

prevalent pinion,

Hume was

not the

first

hilosopher

o

cast

doubt on the form

f

nference

e

call inductive

concluding,

.g.,

on the

basis of

past

sunrises hat the sun rises

every

morning.

n

fact,

Sextus

Empiricus,

heancientGreek

ceptic,

dduces an

argument

n

theform f

a

dilemma,

which

purports

o

set

aside

the

method

f

nduction'2:

when

theypropose

to establish he universal

rom he

particulars y

means of

induction,

hey

willeffecthis

by

a

review ither

f all or of some of the

particular

instances. ut

f

they

eview

ome,

he nduction illbe

insecure,

ince ome

of

the

particulars

mittedn the nduction

ay

ontravenehe

universal;

hile

f

hey

re

to

review

ll,

they

will

be

toiling

t

the

mpossible,

ince

he

particulars

re infinite

nd

indefinite.

'

Prolegomena

o

ny

uture

etaphysics,

rans. .G.

Lucas

(Manchester

P,

I953),

p.

Io.

2

Sextus

Empiricus,

Outlines

f

Pyrrhonism,

rans.

R.G.

Bury

(Loeb edn)

(London:

W.

Heinemann,

1933),

.

283.

?

The Editors f The

hilosophical

uarterl1,

995.

ublished

y

Blackwell

ublishers,

08

owley

Road,

Oxford

x4 JF,

UK,

and

238

Main

Street,

ambridge,

A

2142,

USA.

This content downloaded from 148.4.225.12 on Wed, 26 Mar 2014 16:55:14 PM

All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsphttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp


3/12

HUME'S

CONTRIBUTION

TO

THE

PROBLEM

OF INDUCTION

461

What

Sextus

s

saying

n

his archaic

tyle

an be

couched

n

a

moremodern

terminology:

he

conclusion

f an

inductive

rgument

may

be

false even

while

the

premises

re true.

On

thisbasis he

concludesthat induction

s

invalidated'.

We

see thatHume was

not the

first

o

disparage

nduction.

ut

might

he

grounds

he offers or so

doing

be novel? This

suggestion

ooks

initially

promising,

ecause Hume's

argument3

s

quite

different

rom

that

pro-

poundedby

Sextus:

Concerning

matter f fact nd

existence

..

there

re

no demonstrative

rguments

..

since

t

mplies

o contradictionhat he ourse

f

nature

may

hange

..

and

the rees

willflourish

n

December ... All

arguments

oncerning

xistence

re

founded n the

relation f ause and effect... Our

knowledge

f

hat

elation

s

derived

ntirely

rom

experience... Allourexperimentalonclusionsroceed ponthe uppositionhat he

future ill

be

conformableo the

past.

To

endeavour, herefore,

he

proof

f

this

ast

supposition y

probable arguments,

r

arguments egarding

xistence,

must

be

evidently oing

n a

circle,

nd

taking

hat

for

granted,

hich s the

very

oint

n

question.

Hume's

argument

an

be

briefly

tated.The

justification

f

our

nductive

practice

must be 'derived

entirely

rom

xperience',

because

a

deductive

justification

annotbe

provided.

But

as an

inductive

ustification

n

this ase

is

clearly ircular,

t is illicit.

Thus Hume's

argument gainst

nduction s

quite

differentrom he dilemma

posed

by

Sextus.Whereas Sextus thinks

the

logical

gap

between

premises

nd conclusion suffices

o

vitiate the

inference,

Hume

explicitly

distinguishes

etween

the two

modes of

reasoning,

nduction nd deduction.

nduction,

e

acknowledges,

oes not

yield

the

certainty

f

deduction,

ut

it

may

still

be

reasonable,

being

of a

different,utonomous,

kind:

future

udgement'

must

be

based on

argu-

ments

which are

'probable

nly

..

according

to

the

division' between

'demonstrative

easoning'

nd that

oncerning

matter

ffact nd

existence'

(p. 35,my talics). ut whenhe askswhattheustificationf nductionmight

be,

he

cannotfind

ny.

He thendeclares t unreasonable:

uite

a

different

strategy

rom

hat

dopted

by

Sextus.

This

difference etween

Sextus and

Hume has

been

missed

by

both

followersnd critics

f

Hume,

who

interpret

is

scepticism

bout

induction

as

merely

n

echo of Sextus'.

Consider,

irst,

ome

sympathizers.ccording

to

Lipton,4

t

is 'the under-determination

f

our inferences

y

our

evidence

[which]

provides

the

sceptic

with his

lever'.

In

a

similar

vein,

Popper5

3

Enquiries

Concerning

uman

Understanding,

d. L.A.

Selby-Bigge, 3rd

edn

(Oxford:

ClarendonPress, 978),pp. 35-6.

4P.

Lipton,

nference

o

he est

xplanation

London:

Routledge,

99I),

p.

22;

my

talics.

5

K.R.

Popper,

The

Logic

f

Scientific

iscovery,

th

edn

(London:

Hutchinson,

972),

p.

27;

original

talics.

? The

Editors f

The

hilosophical

uarterlv,

995




4/12

462

RUTH

WEINTRAUB

suggests

hat

any

conclusion rawn

n

this

inductive]

ay may always

urn

out to be false:

no

matter

ow

many

nstances f

white wanswe

may

have

observed,

his oes not

ustify

he

conclusion hat ll swans

re white'.

Now to some ofHume's criticswhoimputehis nductivecepticismoan

assessment f nduction

y

reference

o

deductive

tandards. hus Edwards6

claims that

Hume

...

means

by

reason

a

logically

onclusiveeason and

by

evidence

deductively

onclusive

vidence'. He

goes

on to

suggest

hat a

differenttandard must be

used when

assessing

empirical

predictions:

' reason is not used

in

this sense

when,

in

science or

in

ordinary

ife,

people

claim

to have

a

reason for

prediction'.

hus

Edwards concludes

that

Hume's inductive

cepticism

s

ll

founded.

In

the same

way,

Strawson7

oints

o the

absurdity

f

the demand

that

induction hall be shown to be really kind ofdeduction'.And Hume's

scepticism,

e

claims,

wrongly

ssumes

hat

hedemand s

a

reasonable

ne.

The criticism ffered

y

Edwards

nd

Strawson

s

appropriate

f

directed

against

extus.

For

he does

rest ontent

with

pointing

ut that

some

of

the

particulars

mitted

n

the nduction

may

contravene

he

universal',

n

effect

complaining

hat

nduction

s not

deduction.

But

Hume,

we have

seen,

has

quite

a

differenteasonfor

eing

ceptical

bout

nduction.

So have we discovered

Hume's

contributiono

the

problem

of

induc-

tion'?

f

he

was

not the first

o cast

doubt

on

induction,

id he

at least

provide

new

grounds

or o

doing?

The

answer,

shallnow

argue,

s a firm

'No'.

Let

us recall Hume's

argument gainst

nduction.

nduction,

e

claims,

cannot be

justified

eductively,

nd

the

attempt

o

ustify

t

inductively

s

circular,

nd therefore

mproper.

But,

as we shall

see,

this

argument

s

nothing

therthan

a

special

case

of

the ancient

problem

of

the

criterion,

again

due to Sextus.

In order to

decide

between

opposing

appearances,

Sextus

argues,8

we

need a criterion f truth.But we need, first,o decide betweendifferent

criteria,

nd this choice must either

be

based on

yet

another

criterion,

engendering

vicious

egress,

r on thesame

criterion,

esulting

n

a

vicious

circularity:

Those

who claimfor hemselveso

udge

the

ruthre bound o

possess

criterion

f

truth.

his

criterion,hen,

ithers without

judge's approval

r

has been

approved.

But

f

t s without

pproval,

whence

omes

t that t s

trustworthy?

or

no

matter

f

dispute

s

to be trusted

ithout

udging.

And

if

t has been

approved,

hatwhich

6

P.

Edwards,

Russell's Doubts

about

Induction',

Mind,

68

(I949),

pp.

14I-63

at p.

I5I;

originaltalics.

7

P.F.

Strawson,

ntroduction

o

Logical

heory

London:

Methuen,

952),

p.

250.

8Sextus

Empiricus,

Against

he

Logicians,

rans.

R.G.

Bury (Loeb

edn) (London:

W.

Heinemann,

1935),

.

179.

?

The Editors

f The

hilosophical

uarter)lr,

995




5/12

HUME'S

CONTRIBUTION

TO

THE

PROBLEM

OF

INDUCTION

463

approves

t,

n

turn,

ither as

been

approved

r has notbeen

approved,

nd so on ad

infinitum.

This

is

precisely

he

strategy

ume invokes

gainst

nduction:

t

cannot

be justified, ecause the purported ustification,eing itselfnductive,s

circular.

Hume,

admittedly,

oes

not

appeal

to the existence f

controversy

about

induction,

whereas

Sextus,

both

in

formulating

he

criterion

rgu-

ment,

nd

in

attempting

o

undermine

he

syllogism irectly,

eems

to

rely

on

rife

isagreement

bout

the

criterion f

validity:

we have

no

agreed

est

..

whereby

o

judge

whether he conclusion

follows

he

logical

connexion

formed

y

the

premises'

OutlinesfPyrrhonism

.

249;

my talics).

ut such an

appeal

is

really

nnecessary: nproven

onsensus

s still

ogmatic.

We

now see that

Hume's

argument gainst

nduction s

not

original.

o

whatwashis contribution?

III

As

a

first

tep

to

answering

he above

question,

ote

that

he

problem

f

the

criterion

s

perfectly

eneral:

t

applies

to

deduction,

s well

as induction.

For how

is deduction o be

justified?

ow

do we

know,

for

nstance,

hat

modus

onens

s a

truth-preserving

uleof

nference?

f n

the

soundness

roof

forthe propositional alculus we invoke modusonens,he ustifications

circular,

nd

if

we

use

some other

ule,

how is this ne

to be

ustified?

f

by

reference o modus

onens,

he

ustification

ill,

again,

be

circular;

f

by

reference

o

yet

nother

ule,

we

shallhave

embarked

pon

a

regress

which

must e

either nfiniter

circular,

nd

in

both ases must e

improper.

Hume

does

not

present

he criterion

rgument

gainst

deduction.The

arguments

e does dduce

against

t9

are

quite

different.

e

suggests,

or

instance,

hat

if

any

single

ddition

were

certain,

very

ne

wou'd be

so,

and

consequently

he whole or

total

um;

unless he whole

can be different

from ll its

parts'

Treatise

.

I8I).

Since

long

sums re not

certain,

ven the

simplest

um

('I

+

I

=

2')

must be

(to

some

degree)

doubtful.

In

fact,

ne is inclined o

feel

that

Hume's

scepticism

bout deduction s

half-hearted.

t

is

not

presented

n

the

Enquiries,

he work

Hume 'desires ..

may

alone be

regarded

as

containing

his

philosophical

entiments nd

principles'Enquiries,dvertisement).

Why

does Hume refrain

rom

nvoking

he criterion

rgument gainst

deduction?The

only

rational

reconstructions

that

he

simply

does not

believe the criterion rguments cogent n general: t may be deployed

9

A

Treatise

f

Human

ature,

d.

L.A.

Selby-Bigge,

nd edn

Oxford:

Clarendon

Press,

975),

I

iv

I.

? The Editors f

The

hilosophical

uarterl,,

995




6/12

464

RUTH

WEINTRAUB

against

nduction,

e

thinks,

ut not

against

deduction.

et us

elaborate

little.

When

we think f the

ustification

f a form f

nference,

here

re

three

possibilitieso be considered.First, mode of inference an be basic

justified,

ut not

by

reference

o another.

econd,

ts

ustification

ight

e

mediate.

hird,

t

may

be

unjustified.

y ruling

ut the first wo

possibilities

with

respect

o

induction,

ume

opts

for he third

ossibility,

he

sceptical

one. Induction s not basic. Neither an it

be

justified

nferentially.

his is

because

t

has no deductive

ustification,

hereas

n

inductive

ustification

s

circular,

nd thereforellicit.

Even

in

the case of

deduction,

Hume cannot

countenance he second

option.

A

circular

ustification

s never

dmissible:

The same

principle

annot

be both the cause and effect f another' Treatise . 90). An inductive

justification

s also

impossible,

ince nduction

tself,

ume

thinks,

annot' e

justified.

But since Hume

does

not

adopt

a

sceptical

stance towards

deduction,

we must onclude

by

elimination

hat,

or

him,

ts

ustification

s

basic

in

his

word,

intuitive').

We now have the answer o the

questionposed

in

the

title

f this

paper:

Hume's contribution

o

the

problem

f nduction

as not theformulationf

an

argument gainst

t,

but the

adoption

of

a

novel stance towards

n

existing

rgument.

Whereas

Sextus,

who

originated

he

problem

of

the

criterion,ook tsforce o be

quite

general,

Hume

(implicitly)

laimed hat t

could

be

wielded

against

nduction,

ut not

against

deduction.

Even

our

terminology

s due to

Sextus,

not to Hume. Whereas Hume uses the terms

'experimental'

nd 'causal'

in

discussing

on-deductive

nferences,

extus

uses theGreek

erm

epagoge',

.e.,

induction'.)

IV

We can nowutilize ur

improved

nderstanding

f Hume's contributiono

the

problem

of induction o

shed

light

on

the

(perplexing)

roblem

tself.

Hume has

strongly

ffected ur

thoughts

bout induction. t is not

his

inductive

cepticism

which has

left the

strongest

mark:

there

are

many

philosophers

who think our belief

in

tomorrow's unrise

s

warranted.

Hume's most nfluential

egacy

s the

supposition

hat

the

ustification

f

inductions not

analogous

o

that

f

deduction.

Bonjour?1

s

puzzled

as to how a

basic

empirical

elief is able to confer

justificationn other eliefs.. in pitefbeinzgmpirical... How can a contingent,

empirical

elief

mpart

pistemic

motion

o other

mpirical

eliefs nless

t

'0L.

Bonjour,

The tructure

f

mpiricalnowledge

Harvard

UP,

1985),

p.

30;

my

talics.

?

The Editors f T7he

hilosophical

tarterly,

995




7/12

HUME'S

CONTRIBUTION TO

THE

PROBLEM

OF INDUCTION

465

is itself

n

motion ?

Or,

even more

paradoxically,

ow can such a

belief

epistemically

move

itself?)'.

e seems to confine

he

paradox

of

epistem-

ological

self-moved overs

o

empirical

eliefs:

ogical

truths

nd inference

rules, e assumes, vade it.

The same

predilection

ordeduction

s

manifested

y

Popper.

Since

he

thinks

nduction

annot

be

justified,

e must

expunge

nductive

easoning

from cience. Thus

Popper

attempts

o show that science

proceedsby

the

rigorous esting

f

hypotheses

nd the

rejection

f

those

that

are

refuted.

This

procedure

f

conjecture

nd

refutation,

e

claims,

s

purely

eductive.

Of

course,

Popper's

deductivismmakes

ense

only

f

based on the

presump-

tion hat

deduction,

nlike

nduction,

s

ustified.

Reichenbach shares

Popper's implicit

aith

n

deduction,

ut not his

inductive cepticism.He thinks nductioncan be justified, nd can be

justified eductively.

eichenbach thinks

e can

show that

f

anypredictive

method

will

succeed,

nductionwill succeed too.

If

nature s

uniform,

e

argues,

nduction

will

enable

us

to make veridical

redictions

n

thebasis

of

our observations.

f,

on the other

hand,

nature

s

not

uniform,

o method

will ucceed.Thus he

concludes

hat nduction

s

thebest

predictive

method,

although

t

may

be

quite

poor,

being

dependent

n

nature's

uspiciousness.

This

is a modestdefence f

nduction,

ecause

it

does not aim to show that

induction

must

ucceed,

nor,

indeed,

that it does

in

fact

succeed. But

although

ts conclusion s

modest,

Reichenbach

purports

o establish t

deductively.

o here

we

encounter

gain

the

presupposition

hatdeduction

s

justified;

there would otherwise

be

no

point

in

grounding

nduction

deductively.

We see that

Bonjour, Popper

and Reichenbach share a

discriminating

assumption,

lbeitunstated:whereas nductionwill

only

be

vindicated

when

a

deductive

ustification

or

t

is

given,

deduction

can

eitherbe

given

a

circular

ustification

r

-

being

basic

-

needs none.

V

Should

we

accept

Hume's

assumption

hat

deduction

s

epistemologically

privileged?

n

this section

arguments gainst

the

assumption

will

be

considered.

rguments

or t

will

be examined

n

thenext.

If

Goodman's account of the

ustification

f induction

nd

deduction

s

correct,

hen

the

two forms f nference

re

on

an

epistemological ar.

We

are ustifiedn ourpredictions, oodmanargues,because they onform o

our inductive

ractice.

This

is

analogous

to

the

way

we

justify

deductive

H.

Reichenbach,

The

Theory

f

robabilityUniv.

ofCalifornia

ress,

1949).

? The

Editors f The

hilosophiual

uarterly,

995




8/12

466

RUTH WEINTRAUB

inference:

we show that

it

'conform[s]

o the rules of

logical

inference'.

These

rules,

in

turn,

are

justified

by

their

conformity

ith

accepted

deductive

ractice'.'2

Whenitcomesto thereliabiliyf the modes of nference, oodmansays

nothing

bout deduction.

ut n

the case of

nduction,

e

claims,

we

do not

'know hat

our]

predictions

ill urn ut to be correct'

p.

62),

nor

even

that

they

will

turn

out

to

be correctmore often

han

random

guesses.

This,

I

shall

rgue,

s

a fatal oncession o the

ceptic.

t

vitiates

oodman's

defence

of induction

and,

correlatively,

is

attempt

to

place

it

on the same

(epistemological)ooting

s

deduction.

When

we

reflect bout

ustification,

e realizethat

t

s not

valued for ts

own sake. We wish

our

beliefs o be

true,

nd

the outcomes f actions

hey

guideto be successful.erhaps he ceptic annotbepersuadedhat nduction

is truth-conducive

nd

practically

seful,

ather

han mere

onvention,

ut

we

believe

that t is. We take t that

nductively

erivedbeliefs re at least

more

ikely

o be truethan

randomly

hosen ones. Our inductive

ractice

would otherwise e

arbitrary,

nd

rightly

enigrated y

the

sceptic.

f

it is

notknown

nor

even

reasonably hought)

o

be

morereliable han

ny

other

predictive

method,

f

what

significance

s its

justification'?

nd

why

hould

itbe

adopted?

Similar

considerations

ill

undermine trawson's

ttempt

o show that

the

ustification

f induction s

analogous

to that of

deduction.

He claims

that

the

only

standardwe can invoke

n

assessing

nduction s

induction

itself. To

call

a

particular

belief

reasonable',

Strawson claims

(p. 249),

'is

to

apply

nductive

tandards,

ust

as to call

a

particular rgument

alid

.. is to

apply

deductive tandards'.

Placing

relianceon inductive

rocedures

..

is

what

being

reasonable means'

(p.

257, original italics).

'Induction is

rational',

hen, s

according

o

Strawson

n

analytic

tatement.

Strawson's ccount

of deductive

alidity

s

inadequate.

The term valid'

whenapplied to arguments oes not mean 'conformingo our deductive

practice';

t

means

(as

every

tudent f

logic

is

taught)

truth-preserving'.

And even

f

we do not

dentify

truth-preserving'

ith

valid',

the

mportant

question

to

settle when we

attempt

o assess our deductive

practice

s

whether r

not

our

inference ules are

truth-preserving.

n

affirmative

response

o this rucial

question ertainly

oes not

follow

rom heir

eing

ours.

imilarly,

he

pertinent

uestion oncerning

nduction

s whether

t is

sufficiently

ften

ruth-preserving.

t is the answer o this

uestion

hat

guides

us

in

deciding

whether r not to

reason

nductively,

iven

thatour aim is

truth,

rather han ocialconformity.

12

N.

Goodman,

Fact,

ictionnd

Forecast,

rd

edn

(New

York:

Bobbs-Merrill,

973),

.

63.

?

The

Editors l' he

lllosophical

uarteily,

995




9/12

HUME'S CONTRIBUTION TO

THE

PROBLEM OF

INDUCTION

467

The

point

can

be reinforced

y considering

he

analogy

Strawson

raws

between

nduction

nd the aw. It

makes

no

sense',

he

claims,

to

inquire

n

general

whether

.. the

egal

system

s

a

whole,

s or

is

not

egal.

For to what

legalstandards re we appealing?' p. 257).Analogously, e argues, heonly

standard

by

which nduction

an

be assessed

s

the

one set

by

induction

itself,

nd

relative o

which

t

s

trivially

ustified.

Strawson's

nalogy

misfires.

rue,

there re

no

standards

y

which to

judge

the law

illegal.

ut

in

setting

p

a

legal

system

we have aims

-

the

promotion

f

ustice,public

order,

tc.

And its

egality

otwithstanding,

legal system

an

be assessed

with

respect

o

these,

nd

foundmore or

less

appropriate.

or

instance,

system ncorporating

law

disenfranchising

women

is

legal,

but

unfair.

ubstituteinduction'

or

the

law',

'truth'

or

'justice',and see how Strawson'sdefenceof induction and deduction)

collapses.

Like Goodman and

Strawson,

ummett'3 oes

not

give

epistemological

priority

o

either

form of inference.He does see

important

ifferences

between

nduction

nd

deduction,

ut

these,

he

thinks,

ancel

one

another

out,

so to

speak.

He

claims

first hat circular

ustification

s,

in

principle,

acceptable

n

the case of

nduction.

Not

so

in

the

case

of

deduction,

where

our

only

candidate

for a circular

ustification

a soundness

proof

for

a

deductive

ystem

is

question-begging,roviding,

t

best,

n

explanation

f

deduction's

ole

n

our

anguage.

The second

difference

etween he two forms f

nference,

ccording

o

Dummett,

s that or

nduction,

nlike

eduction,

o

candidate

or

circular

justification

ven

exists. he differences

ancel

one

another

ut,

we

can

now

see: no

(proper)

ircular

ustification

an be

given

ither or

nduction r for

deduction.

Unfortunately,

ummett's

interesting)

osition

s

unargued

or. t is not

clear

why

one shouldbe

persuadedby

the

argument gainst

he

egitimacy

of a circularustificationfdeduction,whileholdingthat in the case of

induction,

e

appear

to have

a

quite

unconvincingrgument

hat here ould

not

in

principle

e

a

[circular]

ustification'

ibid.;

my

italics).

The

second

asymmetry

ited

by

Dummett that there

s a

candidate

for

a

circular

justification

f

deduction

a

soundness

roof)

nd

none for

nduction

is not

only unsupported,

t is

downright

uzzling:

why

does

induction's

past

successnotcount?

13

M.

Dummett,

The

Justification

f-Deduction',

n

Truth

nd

Other

nigmas

London:

Duckworth,

978),

.

295.

? The Editors

f The

hilosophical

uartei)ly,

995




10/12

468

RUTH WEINTRAUB

VI

We have considered

rguments

which

purport

o establish he

symmetry

between

nduction nd deduction.

No one

gives

priority

o

induction,

o it

remains o consider

rguments

n

support

f the

supposition

hat

deduction

is

epistemologically

rivileged,

hat

deductive

rules of inference

an be

circularly

ustified

r need no

justification

t

all,

whereas nductive

nes

must

e

non-circularlyustified.

First,

s there

any

reason for

allowing

circular

ustification

nly

for

deduction? o defend

he

very ossibility

f

circular

ustification,

ne

might

point

out

that,

nitial

ppearancesnotwithstanding,

uch

ustification

s not

necessarily

rivial.

Whereas we

can

always justify'

proposition

f

we can

invoke

t,

hings

re

quite

differenthen the

ustification

f

an

inference

ules

at stake.

f

to

ustify

rule

governing

elief-formation

s to show

that ts

application

s

(sufficiently)

ruth-conducive,

hen we

may

not

succeed

in

justifying

rule

even

f

we are allowed to use

it. Consider he

rule thatone

should

believethe

horoscope.

uccess

n

a reflexive

ustification

f

thisrule

is

certainly

not

guaranteed:

the

horoscope

may

tell

us that

horoscope

predictions

re

very

nreliable.

Similarly,t is quite possiblethat the history f the scientific ethod'

would show t to have been

unreliable,

r ess reliable

han ome alternative.

Indeed,

the

sceptic

ttempts

o invokethe scientific ethod

against

tself,

pointing

out

that

past

scientific heories have

all

been

falsified. his

'pessimistic

eta-induction'14

an

be said

to

support

he conclusion

hat ur

current heories

re also

likely

o be false.

The

sceptical

rgument

an

be rebutted.

he

history

f science

does,

indeed,

upport

he conclusion hatour

present

cientificheories

re

likely

to be

false.

But the

sting

s

(at

east

partly)

aken ut of this onclusion

when

we go on topointout that hehistoryf science lso suggestshat cience s

progressive,

hat our theories

re,

although

false,

loser to the

truth,

etter

predictively

nd more

explanatory

han their

redecessors.

he

important

point,

f

course,

s that

n

attempting

o

provide

reflexive

ustification

e

are

taking genuine

risk. The

application

of the 'scientific

method' to

adjudicate

tsown

adequacy

could have

yielded

n adverse erdict.

If

we are

persuaded

that nference ules can

in

principle

e

circularly

justified,

e

might

akededuction o be

ustified

y

ts oundness

roof.

But

then,

we should also allow

a

reflexive

ustification

f induction.

shall

denoteby ND thefollowingule:

14

See

H.

Putnam,

Meaning

nd theMoral Sciences

London:

Routledge

and

Kegan

Paul,

1978),

p.

25.

?

The Editors f The

hdlosophical

uarterly',

995




11/12


12/12

470

RUTH

WEINTRAUB

induction,

we

must decide whether

r not

deduction

s

epistemologically

prior

o nduction.

Qualms

about nduction re more

ppealing

sychologically.

ut how

much

weight rewe togivethisfact?Might t not be a merebias? When we tried

to

find

warrant or

discriminating

etween nduction nd

deduction,

we

failed: he

arguments

e

considered or he

asymmetry

ere

found

wanting.

We are

leftwith

n

open question.

Hume

may

have discerned

n

important

asymmetry

hich Sextus missed.

But

if,

contra

ume,

the

two forms

f

inference re on an

epistemological ar,

his

deflecting

ur attention rom

the

criterion

rgument

n

its

ull

generality

s

retrograde.

or

if

there

s

no

asymmetry,

ither

oth nduction nd deduction uccumb o

the

argument,

or

both

evade t

n

the same

way.

And

n either

ase

there

s no such

thing

s

'the problem of induction', nothing distinctivelyerplexing about

'experimentaleasoning'.16

TelAviv

niversity

16

I am

indebted o Amnon Levav

forhis

very

seful

omments

nd

suggestions.

?

The

Editors

f

The

hilosophical

uarterll,

995

Documents

Ruth Weintraub -- What Was Hume's Contribution to the Problem of Induction