Russian-Ottoman Borderlands The Eastern Question Reconsidered

Russian-Ottoman Bor der lands


The East ern Ques tion Re con sid ered

Ed ited by Lu cien J. Frary and Mara Ko zel sky

T h e U n i v e r s i t y o f W i s c o n s i n P r e s s

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Li brary of Con gress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Russian-Ottoman bor der lands: the East ern ques tion re con sid ered / ed ited by Lu cien J. Frary and Mara Ko zel sky.

pages cmIn cludes bib lio graph i cal ref er ences and index.ISBN 978-0-299-29804-3 (pbk.: alk. paper)ISBN 978-0-299-29803-6 (e-book)

1. East ern ques tion. 2. Rus sia— Foreign re la tions—Tur key. 3. Tur key— Foreign re la tions—Rus sia. 4. Rus sia—His tory—1801–1917 5. Tur key—His tory—Ot to man Em pire, 1288–1918. I. Frary, Lu cien J., ed i tor of com pi la tion. II. Ko zel sky, Mara, ed i tor of com pi la tion.

D371.R87 2014949.6´03—dc23

2013034802

For our par ents

vii

Con tents

Pref ace ixList of Ab bre vi a tions xi

Intro duc tion: The East ern Ques tion Re con sid ered 3Lu cien J . Frary and Mara Ko zel sky

The Rus sian Pro tec to rate in the Da nu bian Prin ci pal ities: Leg a cies of the East ern Ques tion in Con tem po rary Russian-Romanian Re la tions 35Vic tor Taki

“Dread ful Scenes of Carn age on Both Sides”: The Strang ford Files and the East ern Cri sis of 1821–1822 73Theo phi lus C. Prou sis

Slaves of the Sul tan: Rus sian Ran som ing of Chris tian Cap tives dur ing the Greek Rev o lu tion, 1821–1830 101Lu cien J . Frary

Russia’s Quest for the Holy Grail: Rel ics, Li tur gics, and Great-Power Pol i tics in the Ot to man Em pire 131Jack Fai rey

The Cri mean War and the Tatar Ex o dus 165Mara Ko zel sky

Rus sia, Mount Athos, and the East ern Ques tion, 1878–1914 193Lora Gerd

viii

Contents

“Forty Years of Black Days”? The Rus sian Ad min is tra tion of Kars, Ar da han, and Batum, 1878–1918 221Can dan Badem

The Idea of an East ern Fed er a tion: An Al ter na tive to the De struc tion of the Ot to man Em pire 251John A. Mazis

Squab bling over the Spoils: Late Im pe rial Russia’s Ri valry with France in the Near East 281Ro nald P. Bo broff

The East ern Ques tion in Turk ish Re pub li can Text books: Set tling Old Scores with the Eu ro pean and the Ot to man “Other” 303Nazan Çiçek

Epi logue: Leg a cies of the East ern Ques tion 331Lu cien J . Frary and Mara Ko zel sky

Con trib u tors 347Index 351

ix

Pref ace

The East ern Ques tion touched the lives of mil lions of peo ple and dom i-nated inter na tional re la tions between Eu rope, Rus sia, and the Ot to man Em pire for more than a cen tury. The leg acy of the East ern Ques tion re mains etched in the land scape from the Bal kans to the Cau ca sus and con tin ues to in flu ence peo ple liv ing in these re gions today. In re cent decades, schol ars have de vel oped fresh in sights into the re li gious, cul-tural, eco nomic, and po lit i cal as pects of the East ern Ques tion. Re search in Rus sian and Ot to man archives has par tic u larly chal lenged tra di-tional inter pre ta tions, while new ap proaches have shifted at ten tion from the gov ern ing elite to the sub jects of em pires and the peo ples who lived in the bor der lands. With this vol ume, we seek to high light changes in the field and sug gest new di rec tions for the study of the East ern Ques tion.

The idea to form a col lec tion of ar ti cles de voted to the East ern Ques-tion orig i nated in 2008 at a bi an nual meet ing of the As so ci a tion for the Study of East ern Chris tian His tory and Cul ture, where we, the ed i tors, began dis cuss ing the mean ing and na ture of what we con sider the most im por tant issue of inter na tional re la tions in the nine teenth cen tury. Rig or ous dis cus sions, de bates, and con ver sa tions with each con trib u tor to this vol ume and with nu mer ous schol ars at two sub se quent meet ings of the As so ci a tion for Slavic, East Eu ro pean, and Eur asian Stud ies sharp ened our think ing and wid ened the per spec tive from which we view this his tor i cal phe nom e non. In ad di tion to the con trib u tors, we wish to ex press our grat i tude to the anon y mous read ers for their many ex cel lent sug ges tions. We would also like to rec og nize Theo fa nis G. Stav rou, whose ded i ca tion to this field is a con stant source of in spi ra tion, and David Gold frank, who has been a kind sup porter of our pro ject.

x

Preface

Har vard Uni ver sity and the Cen tral Navy Mu seum in St. Pe ters burg granted per mis sion to re pro duce the map at the be gin ning of Vic tor Taki’s chap ter and the paint ing Ship wreck off Mount Athos by Ivan Ai va-zov sky for the cover, re spec tively. Sam Stuts man of the Uni ver sity of South Al a bama created the map of the Ot to man Em pire used at the be gin ning of the intro duc tion. The chap ter by Theo phi lus C. Prou sis con tains ex cerpts that have ap peared ear lier in his Lord Strang ford at the Sub lime Porte (1822): The East ern Cri sis (I˙ stan bul: Isis Press, 2012). Fi nally, re search grants, as sis tance from inter li brary loan, and other sup port from the Uni ver sity of South Al a bama and Rider Uni ver sity have helped us to ward the com ple tion of this pro ject.

xi

List of Ab bre vi a tions

Archives

AVPRI Ark hiv Vnesh nei Pol i tiki Ros siis kii Im pe rii, Mos cow, Rus sia

AHMAE Archives His to riques du Ministère des Af faires Etrangères, Paris, France

BOA Ba¸sba kanlık Os manlı Ar¸sivi, I˙ stan bul, Tur keyCDA Cen tralen Dyr zha ven Arkhiv, Sofia, Bul gariaGAARK Gos u darsv ten nyi Ark hiv Av tomna Re spu blika Krym,

Sim fer o pol, Cri meaGARF Gos u darst ven nyi Ark hiv Ros siis koi Fed e rat sii, Mos cow,

Rus siaHAA Hay as tani Az gayin Ark hiv, Yere van, Ar me niaHHSA Haus-, Hof- und Staat sar chiv, Vienna, Aus triaOR RNB Otdel ru ko pi sei, Ros siis kaia Natsional’naia Bib lio teka, St.

Pe ters burg, Rus siaRGADA Ros siis kii Gos u darst ven nyi Ark hiv Drev nikh Aktov,

Mos cow, Rus siaRGIA Ros siis kii Gos u darst ven nyi Is tor i ches kii Ark hiv, St.

Pe ters burg, Rus siaRGVIA Ros siis kii Gos u darst ven nyi Voenno-Istoricheskii Ark hiv,

Mos cow, Rus siaSTsSA Sa kart ve los Tsen tra luri Sais to rio, Tbi lisi, Geor giaTNA FO The Na tional Archives, Foreign Of fice, Kew, United

King dom

xii

List of Abbreviations

Archi val and Jour nal No ta tion

f. fond (col lec tion)op. opis’ (in ven tory)d. delo (file)kn. kniga (book)l., ll. list, listy (leaf, leaves)


3

Intro duc tionThe East ern Ques tion Re con sid ered

Lu cien J . Frary and Mara Ko zel sky

As early as 1736, a trea tise by Car di nal Al be roni of Spain, trans lated into En glish and pub lished in Lon don, pro posed a joint ef fort among the Eu ro pean pow ers to con quer and di vide the Ot to man Em pire. The “per fid i ous and vast Em pire of Tur key,” he wrote, has been “in a lan-guish ing State for more than a Cen tury.” Al be roni at trib uted the de cline of the Ot to man Em pire to “a gen eral Cor rup tion and Ve nal ity, scarcely known in the World, since the time of the Ro mans.” He urged “the Princes and States of Chris ten dom” to unite in war against the ar mies of the sul tan “to res cue Fel low Chris tians from the Tyr anny and Bond age of the In fi dels” and to re claim the Holy Lands, thereby “per pet u at ing the Tran quil ity” of the world. Al be roni fur ther char ac ter ized the Ot to-man Em pire as hav ing a basis in “sac ri lege . . . vi o lence, treach ery and op pres sion.”1 In a com pre hen sive de sign an tic i pat ing the Sykes-Picot Agree ment of the twen ti eth cen tury, Al be roni de vel oped a rec om men-da tion for par ti tion ing the Ot to man Em pire among the small and large states of Eu rope.

Note : Map at left depicts the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, Balkans to the Caucasus 18th to 20th c. (map created by Sam Stutsman at the University of South Alabama)

4

Lucien J. Frary and Mara Kozelsky

Al though Eu ro pean ap proaches to the Ot to man Em pire evolved over time, the no tion that Eu rope had po lit i cal and moral ob li ga tions to man age the Ot to man col lapse per sisted for cen tu ries. Po lit i cal lead ers, mem oir ists, travel ers, schol ars, mer chants, and crit ics gen er ated thou-sands of works about the Eu ro pean re sponse to per ceived Ot to man decay and de cline. His to rians nearly matched that vol ume of out put as they ex am ined the re sult ing con flicts based on the lan guage of nineteenth-century dip lo mats, who re ferred to the com plex dy nam ics of Eu ro pean in volve ment in the Ot to man lands as the “East ern Ques-tion.” This East ern Ques tion in volved a pro found power strug gle that pre cip i tated nu mer ous armed con flicts between the Ot to man Em pire, Brit ain, Rus sia, and the other Eu ro pean pow ers and ig nited the pas sions of na tive in hab i tants. At its heart, the East ern Ques tion en tailed the pre-sump tion of West ern Eu ro pean states and Rus sia to man age the af fairs of the Ot to man Em pire.

Pin ning down a con cise defi ni tion of the East ern Ques tion has chal lenged his to rians in the past be cause con tem po rary inter pre ta tions changed ac cord ing to its major epi sodes: the Greek Rev o lu tion (1821– 30), the Cri mean War (1853–56), the East ern cri sis of 1875–78, and the First World War. Inter ven ing smaller-scale con flicts, such as the Russian- Persian War (1826–28), the ten-years’ cri sis (1831–41) evoked by the Egyp tian Pasha Meh med Ali, the Rus sian de feat of Sha mil in the Cau-ca sus (1859), the Young Turk Rev o lu tion (1908), the strug gle for Mac e-do nia, and the Bal kan Wars (1912–13) also gen er ated waves of con tem-po rary spec u la tion. In itially led by Brit ish and French pub li cists and pol i ti cians, Rus sian jour nal ists began ad dress ing the so-called East ern Ques tion in the 1830s, fol lowed by Turk ish crit ics later in the cen tury. Sub ject pop u la tions of the Rus sian and Ot to man Em pires like wise con-trib uted their ver sions of the East ern Ques tion. In short, the East ern Ques tion var ied tre men dously ac cord ing to the in di vid ual who posed it, from one his toric mo ment and actor to the next.

J. A. R. Marriott’s The East ern Ques tion: An His tor i cal Study of Eu ro pean Di plo macy (1917) was the first major work to con cep tu al ize the East ern Ques tion in its en tirety. Until now, it re mains the only de tailed work of syn the sis and the ory. Con ceived as Brit ain mo bi lized for war in 1914 and con cluded while Brit ish troops were still in the trenches, Marriott’s work inter prets the his tory of the East ern Ques tion through the lens of the Great War. A sub se quent ef fort by M. S. An der son, The East ern Ques tion: 1774–1923: A Study in Inter na tional Re la tions (1966), up dated Marriott’s ap proach in a sweep ing syn the sis for uni ver sity stu dents.

Introduction

5

Al though Mar ri ott and An der son in cor po rated some na tive and Rus sian voices, both works prin ci pally an a lyze the East ern Ques tion from a Brit ish dip lo matic and po lit i cal per spec tive. Their work rarely ad dresses the ex pe ri ences of those liv ing in the vast spaces along the Russian- Ottoman bor der lands, from the Bal kans to the Cau ca sus, where pro-posed so lu tions to the ques tion made the great est im pres sion.

Since the pub li ca tion of Anderson’s sur vey, multi ple waves of his tor i-cal schol ar ship have en riched our view of the East ern Ques tion dra mat i-cally, al low ing new per spec tives to emerge. Schol ars have shown, for ex am ple, that Rus sian rul ers were not as de sir ous of ab sorb ing Ot to man ter ri to ries as nineteenth-century Brit ish dip lo mats feared. Re search ers have in ves ti gated re li gious as pects of the East ern Ques tion, as well as the cul tural and com mer cial net works in volved. As new or re vived na tion states in the Bal kans, the Black Sea re gion, and the Cau ca sus find their foot ing, re gional schol ars have begun ex plor ing fresh per spec tives and inter dis ci pli nary ap proaches to con struct their na tional pasts. Post-co lo nial stud ies, more over, have shifted the his tor i cal focus from the de ci sions of the elites to the ex pe ri ences of the sub jects of em pire. Schol ars of Ot to man his tory have brought in no va tive anal y sis of Ot to-man sources to the main stream lit er a ture on the topic for the first time.

In re cent decades, a more bal anced view of the East ern Ques tion has ma te ri al ized. A new, larger cast of players has en tered the scene, and the geo graphic scope has broad ened to en com pass the states of the Black Sea and the Cau ca sus. Sig nifi cantly, his to rians have chal lenged the very foun da tion of the East ern Ques tion, or the under stand ing that the Ot to man Em pire was the “sick man of Eu rope.”2 The Ot to man Em pire, as re cent schol ar ship has shown, was no less stable than the other great em pires that col lapsed dur ing the First World War. In contrast to the “de cline nar ra tive” often evoked by schol ars, his to rians and so cial sci en tists have sug gested that far from wan ing, the Ot to man Em pire was cen tral iz ing and mod ern iz ing to re form and de fend it self on its own terms.3

Our pri mary goal in this vol ume is to high light the changes in the field by draw ing to gether a sam pling of cur rent ap proaches. In contrast to the ma jor ity of tra di tional schol ar ship, which de fines the East ern Ques tion through events or the im me di ate con cerns of nineteenth- century di plo macy, stra te gic de signs, and eco nomic ri valry, this vol ume dem on strates that the East ern Ques tion was a much more com plex phe nom e non.4 For the Ot to man Em pire, the East ern Ques tion was a “West ern Ques tion,” and from the per spec tive of those mil lions of

6


peo ples af fected, it lacked many of the ra tional pur poses that dip lo mats and his to rians have so pains tak ingly at trib uted to it. We de fine the East ern Ques tion as a his tor i cally evolv ing con cept that orig i nated in Europe’s pre sump tion to man age Ot to man af fairs. We em pha size the human and grass roots as pects of the East ern Ques tion as well as its inter na tional frame work in the Russian-Ottoman bor der lands.

Es says in this col lec tion ex plore the East ern Ques tion from the per-spec tive of the Rus sian and Ot to man Em pires and the bor der lands in between. We aim to broaden the scope of the peo ple, ideas, and events in volved. We also hope to il lu mi nate the re cip ro cal re la tion ship between the great pow ers and the mass of pop u la tions af fected by East ern Ques-tion di plo macy. We em pha size that in ad di tion to inter na tional re la-tions, the East ern Ques tion in volved the in flu ences and con se quences of foreign inter ven tion. This in cludes sec tar ian vi o lence and na tion al ist move ments, eco nomic ri valry and dis lo ca tion, mi gra tion and re set tle-ment, co lo nial ad min is tra tion and re gional iden tity. We wish to re veal the real and dev as tat ing con se quences of East ern Ques tion po lit i cal de bates among the peo ples liv ing in the im mense fron tier zones of con flict and inter ac tion. Our es says dem on strate that East ern Ques tion di plo macy and eco nomic pen e tra tion were hardly iso lated to the throne rooms and par lia men tary halls, or even the bat tle fields. Rather, highlevel dip lo matic dis course on the East ern Ques tion af fected the lives of mil lions of peo ple in the lands between the Rus sian and Ot to man Em-pires. Not all this inter ac tion was ma lig nant, how ever. Al though this vol ume tends to high light neg a tive as pects of the East ern Ques tion, we ac knowl edge that cross-cultural ex change and the ex pan sion of knowl-edge had pos i tive as pects as well.5

We fur ther argue that the East ern Ques tion ri vals the rise of Ger-many as the most prom i nent inter na tional prob lem shap ing the course of mod ern Eu ro pean his tory prior to the First World War. The inter-na tional ten sions un leashed by the East ern Ques tion pro duced sev eral cat a clys mic wars from the end of the eigh teenth cen tury through the First World War that en tan gled all of Eu rope, con sumed in cal cu lable state re sources, and cost mil lions of lives. The East ern Ques tion forced mi gra tions of masses of peo ples, pro duced eth nic cleans ing and gen o-cide, and re mapped the Eu ro pean con ti nent in its own image. No other inter na tional issue had the lon gev ity or toll of the East ern Ques tion. The fun da men tal, trans for ma tive role of the East ern Ques tion in Eu ro pean his tory be comes ap par ent by look ing be yond the great cap i tals of the West, Lon don and Paris, and by in cor po rat ing into the main stream

Introduction

7

nar ra tive those cit ies, vil lages, na tions, and em pires on the east ern and south east ern pe riph ery of the con ti nent. When one views Eu ro pean his tory from the per spec tive of those peo ples liv ing in the Bal kans, around the shores of the Black Sea, the Cau ca sus, and in present-day Rus sia and Tur key, the East ern Ques tion fea tures par a mount in shap ing nineteenth-century inter na tional re la tions.

This col lec tion of es says from multi na tional per spec tives dem on-strates that as the East ern Ques tion evolved in En gland, France, and Rus sia, it echoed dif fer ently in the Bal kans, the Black Sea re gion, and the Cau ca sus. Each vi o lent epi sode pro duced count less mass mi gra tions, in clud ing the ex o dus of ref u gee Or tho dox Chris tians from the Ot to man Em pire to Rus sia, the flight of Ot to man Serbs to Habs burg lands, and the mi gra tion of mil lions of Mus lims liv ing in these re gions to the do main of the sul tan. The peo ples who lived along Russian-Ottoman bor ders pro foundly in flu enced the East ern Ques tion with their na tion al ist move ments, cul tures, and be liefs. Sim i larly, ref u gees dis placed by the East ern Ques tion also shaped the inter nal po lit i cal dy namic of their host na tions.

This intro duc tion out lines the his tory of East ern Ques tion schol ar-ship in the nine teenth cen tury as inter preted by Mar ri ott, re vised by An der son, and as it evolves in new di rec tions today. We em pha size the scholarship’s An glo cen tric or i gins and the prom i nent role of the Bal-kans in the inter na tional re la tions of the era. We high light Russia’s grad ual en trance into con tem po rary schol arly spec u la tion fol low ing the Cri mean War, which by the na ture of Rus sian co lo nial ac tiv ity in-cluded spe cial at ten tion to present-day Ukraine, Cri mea, and the Cau-ca sus. Of cen tral inter est is the flour ish ing field of Ot to man his tory, which emerged as a major sub ject of in quiry with its own nar ra tives and theo ret i cal ap proaches after Anderson’s sur vey ap peared in the 1960s. Fi nally, while we re tain the term “East ern Ques tion” in re flec tion of its prom i nence in cen tu ries of inter na tional re la tions dis course, we under-score its for mu la tion in Eu ro cen trism.

Ev o lu tion of the East ern Ques tion in Eu ro pean and Rus sian Thought

Al though per cep tions of Ot to man de cline date to the early eigh teenth cen tury as ev i denced by Alberoni’s pro po sal, when ex actly the “East ern Ques tion” first en tered the lex i con of Eu ro pean di plo macy re mains a mys tery.6 Schol ars have sug gested the term first gained wide cur rency

8


some time between the Con gress of Vienna (1815) and the Con gress of Ve rona (1822) to de scribe the mil i tary weak ness and the ap par ent break down of fi nan cial and ad min is tra tive con trols in the Ot to man Em pire.7 For nearly a cen tury af ter ward, con tem po rar ies and his to rians have pro vided var i ous defi ni tions re gard ing the prob lem, its chron o-log i cal or i gins, and its prin ci pal char ac ter is tics. Even the most cur sory of historio graph i cal sur veys would sug gest that schol ars of the East ern Ques tion have reached no con sen sus on the na ture of the prob lem and its scope.

With ex cep tions, the cur rent con ven tion in the lit er a ture is to date the “East ern Ques tion” to Rus sian ex pan sion into Ot to man ter ri tory dur ing the Russian-Ottoman wars of Cathe rine II. In par tic u lar, the 1768 war and the Treaty of Ku chuk Kai nardji in 1774 served as a turn ing point in Rus sian re la tions with the Sub lime Porte.8 His to rians might also date the or i gins of the East ern Ques tion to the Na pol e onic Wars, when Brit ish stud ies, pamph lets, prop a ganda pieces, and Rus so phobic writ ings out lin ing the causes and course of Ot to man de cline warned mer chants about the pos sible threat of Russia’s con trol of Med i ter ra nean and Black Sea com merce. Al though the term “East ern Ques tion” had not yet been coined, the spec ter of Ot to man de cline pro vided a use ful ral ly ing point for those in the West who saw in Rus sia a po ten tially dan ger ous and hos tile coun try. A range of new fac tors in flu enced sub-se quent Russian-British re la tions, in clud ing the status of the Io nian Is lands and the Da nu bian prin ci pal ities, the con trol of the Dar da nelles, as well as Ot to man ca pit u la tions and com mer cial trea ties.9 Mean while, the Na pol e onic in va sion of Egypt in 1798 in creased the im pe ri al ist threat to the Ot to mans and dis played as pects of East ern Ques tion cul ture, such as at tempts to trans late rev o lu tion ary con cepts from 1789 and af ter-ward into a new po lit i cal vo cab u lary for Mus lim think ers, as well as the schol arly and sci en tific in ves ti ga tions or ga nized by the In sti tut d’Égypte.10

Sig nifi cant ground work for what soon would be come known as the East ern Ques tion first ap peared dur ing the Greek Rev o lu tion, which det o nated in 1821.11 What began as a steady stream soon de vel oped into a wave of works de scrib ing the East ern cri sis of 1831–41, which threat ened the stabil ity of the Ot to man Em pire and en ven omed the ri val ries of Eu ro pean states for con trol of the so-called Near East and the bal ance of power on the con ti nent.12 At this time, the first books to con tain the term in their ti tles, by Théodore Be na zet and Charles Dupin, dis cussed the rise in prom i nence of Pasha Meh med Ali of Egypt and

Introduction

9

the wan ing power of the Ot to mans.13 This genre, com posed prin ci pally by Brit ish and French pol i ti cians, Orien tal ists and ad ven tur ers, dem on-strates West ern am biv a lence about whom to sup port (Rus sia, the na tive peo ples, or the Ot to man Em pire) and the in creas ing stakes in volved. Sec tar ian vi o lence dur ing the Greek re bel lion, such as the mas sa cre at Chios, in which Ot to man sol diers killed thou sands of Greek Chris tians, left many Eu ro peans leery of sup port ing the Ot to man Em pire. Con tem-po rary jour nal ism and po lit i cal de bates re flected this lack of con sen sus, as the lib eral pub lic of West ern Eu rope ral lied be hind the Greek cause. The lively pub lic de bate also re flected Western-centric and Christian- centric views by down play ing or ig nor ing Ot to man Greek atroc ities against Ot to man Mus lims. As the term be came pop u lar on the eve of the Cri mean War, schol ars and pub li cists began retroac tively dat ing the be gin ning of the East ern Ques tion to the Ot to man con quest of Con-stan tin o ple in 1453, the “Time of Ci cero,” or even as far back as the era of Homer.14

Much of the am biv a lence about Europe’s re la tion ship to the Ot to-man Em pire had dis ap peared when the out break of the Cri mean War in 1853 spawned a fresh phase of East ern Ques tion stud ies and pamph let lit er a ture. Dur ing the Cri mean War, Karl Marx com posed a fa mous re flec tion on the East ern Ques tion in a se ries of let ters sub mit ted to the New York Trib une. Marx de scribed the East ern Ques tion as dip lo matic di ver sion from the forces of rev o lu tion at home and de nounced the im pe ri al ist inter ests of the great pow ers. His work, which pre sented a ma te ri al ist inter pre ta tion of the con flict and as cribed the re li gious im-pulses of the war to the ma nip u la tion of elites, in spired sub se quent West ern and So viet stud ies for more than a cen tury.15 Si mul ta ne ously Marx iden tified Rus sia as the hos tile power of the Cri mean War. The con tin u ing ex pan sion of tsar ist in flu ence at the Sub lime Porte sparked a surge of Rus so phobic lit er a ture, de fined in part by the cel e brated travel ac count of the Mar quis de Cus tine and the pro lific work of David Ur qu hart.16 Much larger stud ies began to ap pear, in clud ing the two- volume col lec tion of doc u ments ed ited by A. Ubi cini, ti tled La ques tione d’Oriente in nanzi l’Europa, pub lished in Milan in 1854, which fo cused on the holy places, then (as now) an area of in tense inter na tional con cern. Other books in this first flour ish of se ri ous schol ar ship sur veyed so ci ety, re li gion, di plo macy, mil i tary strat egy, and the econ omy.17 The Cri mean War also in spired a surge of ir re den tist and his tor i cal works among the Bal kan peo ples.18 More broadly, Russia’s on go ing strug gle with Imam Sha mil for the con trol of the north ern Cau ca sus cap tured West ern

10


imag i na tions dur ing the Cri mean War and led to a smat ter ing of books and ar ti cles.19 A few West ern Eu ro pean schol arly stud ies of “Ta tary,” Cri mea, or the Cau ca sus also ap peared at this time, with West ern agents ac tively at tempt ing to in cite na tive re bel lions among Mus lim pop u la tions.20

Until the Cri mean War, Rus sia often per ceived its re la tion ship with the Ot to man Em pire as largely a local issue, an old dance between two ri vals. Prior to the war, Rus sian schol ars worked ac tively on the his tory of the Rus sian con quest of the steppe and other bor der land re gions with the Ot to man Em pire such as the Cri mea and the Cau ca sus, but with out sus tained re flec tion on the regions’ sig nif i cance for greatpower pol i tics. The ap pear ance of En glish and French troops on Rus sian shores in 1854 came as a shock and in spired Rus sian schol ars to join the West ern de bate.21 The semi nal work of Rus sian re search on the East ern Ques tion was N. I. Danilevskii’s Ros siia i Ev ropa, first pub lished in ar ti cle form in 1869.22 The book re flected the in ten sified inter est in the Bal kans and Pan-Slavism among Rus sian read ers, and Russia’s role in the fate of the Or tho dox world. Al though shrouded in ab stract ter mi nol ogy about a his tor i cal strug gle between “cul tural types,” the book gained the inter est of the Rus sian Foreign Min is try, which began to pur sue a more ac tive pol icy in the Bal kans. The East ern Ques tion thus at tracted se ri ous at ten tion from the Rus sian state, as well as the var i ous cir cles in Russia’s ed u cated so ci ety. The keen inter est of in tel lec tu als in the role of Slavs in his tory and in the value of self-determination blended with im por tant stra te gic and eco nomic inter ests of the Rus sian Em pire along its south ern and west ern bor ders.23 After Danilevskii’s pub li ca tion, a wave of work fo cus ing on Rus sian foreign pol icy in the Bal kans began to ex plore myths re gard ing Russia’s his tor i cal mis sion to lib er ate Or tho-dox Chris tians.24 Me moirs of Rus sian par tic i pants in East ern Ques tion con flicts also began to ap pear in print, in clud ing the multi vo lume Russ kie na Bos fore v 1833 godu and Dela Turt sii i Egipta v 1832 i 1833 go dakh by N. N. Murav’ev.25 A val u able col lec tion of trea ties, ed ited and com-mented upon by T. Iu zef o vich, re flected pub lic inter est in Bal kan af-fairs.26 Whereas many Rus sian works, in clud ing an essay by the phi los o-pher and his to rian B. N. Chich e rin, fo cused on the psycho log i cal and re li gious ele ments of Russia’s Bal kan en tan gle ments, V. A. Ulianitskii’s Dar da nelly, Bos for i Cher noe more v XVIII veke of fered a pi o neer ing study of the Russian-Tatar bor der lands and the eco nomic im por tance of the sub ject.27

Introduction

11

The out break of the East ern cri sis in 1875 and the re sult ing Russian- Ottoman War of 1877–78 in spired an other major burst of his tor i cal and jour na lis tic writ ing that marked a re turn to am biv a lence about Eu ro pean states’ re la tion ship with the Ot to man Em pire. Over the next decade, nearly five hun dred ti tles touch ing on ele ments of this East ern cri sis ap peared in the ten most pop u lar monthly jour nals and mag a zines in Great Brit ain alone.28 Per haps the most fa mous works of this pe riod are W. E. Gladstone’s book lets ti tled Bul gar ian Hor rors and the Ques tion of the East and Les sons in Mas sa cre, and the ar ti cles in Fyo dor Dostoevsky’s Dnev nik pis a te lia.29 F. F. Mar tens, a legal ex pert at tached to the Rus sian Foreign Min is try, mir rored Gladstone’s work in semi of fi cial Rus sian pub li ca tions.30 Mar tens at tempted to blend ap proaches by si mul ta ne-ously sup port ing Russia’s “his tor i cal role” as the leader of Or tho dox Chris tians, while under scor ing St. Petersburg’s com mit ment to multi-lat eral inter ven tion. Par allel ing this ap proach, the cel e brated Rus sian his to rian S. M. Solov’ev’s “Vos toch nyi vo pros” (writ ten in 1876) con-sid ered the or i gins of the prob lem to lie “at the mo ment in his tory when Eu ro pean man re al ized the di vi sion between Eu rope and Asia, between the Eu ro pean and the Asian spirit.”31 Inter spers ing dip lo matic nar ra-tive with com men tary on geog ra phy, econ omy, and re li gion, Solov’ev sup plied the ground work for lengthier pub li ca tions to fol low, while sup port ing con tem po rary Rus sian pol icy in Po land and south east ern Eu rope.

Inter pre ta tions that high lighted fun da men tal contrasts between Chris ti an ity and Islam, di vi sions between East and West, and a re li gious call ing to re cover the Holy Land led schol ars like Solov’ev to date the or i gins of the East ern Ques tion to the four teenth cen tury, when “Turks” first pen e trated the Bal kan Pe nin sula. Oth ers looked to the Per sian in-va sion of Greece in the sixth cen tury BC. One of the most im por tant Rus sian works, Ser gei Zhigarev’s two-volume Russ kaia pol i tika v vos toch-nom vo prose, argued that the issue was “a dif fi cult and com pli cated af fair,” in volv ing the ma te rial inter ests of the East and the strug gle of Or tho dox Chris tians for free dom from Turk ish rule.32 Sev eral years later, an in no va tive study by Max Choub lier, ti tled La ques tion d’Orient avant la Traité de Ber lin, found the root of the prob lem in the eighteenth- century “de cline” of the Ot to man Em pire in the Black Sea. Choub lier de vel oped the con cept fur ther by show ing how it enveloped many ques tions, in clud ing the Ot to man pos ses sions in Eu rope, Asia Minor, Syria, and Egypt. He also warned of a pos sible re sur gence of “Mus lim

12


fa nat i cism” in Asia and North Af rica. Mean while, the de vel op ment of Rus sian and Eu ro pean historiog ra phy of the Cau ca sus, Per sia, and Af ghan i stan par alleled that of the East ern Ques tion in gen eral.33 Po lit i cal events, such as Russia’s pen e tra tion of the Cau ca sus, also helped in spire pub li ca tion of the mon u men tal, twelve-volume Akty so bran nye Kav kaz-s koiu ark he o graf ches koiu kom mis siei, among other Rus sian works on the re gion.34

Two great his to rians of the French Third Re pub lic, Ed ouard Dri ault and Al bert Sorel, de voted large por tions of their schol arly ca reers to prob lems of the Ot to man Em pire and the ter ri to ries of what they de-scribed as the Near East.35 Sorel’s La ques tion d’Orient au XVIIIe siècle, first pub lished in 1889, pushed the or i gins of the ques tion to the first par ti tion of Po land. Driault’s well-known study, La ques tion d’Orient, pub lished in 1898 and ap pear ing in its ninth edi tion in 1938, re flected the pop u lar ity of the topic and the pub lic de sire for in for ma tion.36 Dri ault argued that the ques tion emerged from the de cline of Islam in Eu rope and Asia and fo cused fore most on the emer gence of Chris tian Bal kan states and the ad vance of Turkey’s Chris tian neigh bors.

By the be gin ning of the twen ti eth cen tury, nearly all the early work done by West ern Eu ro peans and Rus sians re flected the val ues and inter ests of their so cial mi lieus. Even works by dis si dent Turk ish in tel lec-tu als, who had just begun to enter the de bates on the East ern Ques tion, re it er ated Eu ro cen tric per spec tives.37 Rus sian thought about the East-ern Ques tion rarely en tered West ern stud ies. With few ex cep tions, the way in which the East ern Ques tion in flu enced Mus lim pop u la tions re-mained largely un ex am ined. Largely due to con flict brew ing in the Bal-kan Pe nin sula, schol ars at the turn of the twen ti eth cen tury per pet u ated nineteenth-century es sen tial ist think ing and stereo types of Ot to man de cline, while aban don ing the emerg ing inter est in the East ern Ques- tion’s re la tion ship to the Cau ca sus and the re gion then known as Bes-sa ra bia.38 With the onset of the First World War, Brit ain found it self on op po site sides of the con flict with the Ot to man Em pire as the East ern Ques tion in pub lic and schol arly dis course en tered its final clas sic phase. In Brit ain, pun dits and pol i ti cians as sem bled the most neg a tive strains of Orien tal ist dis course about the Ot to man Em pire to de mon ize it and draw at ten tion to the per se cu tion of sub ject pop u la tions. The work of Vis count James Bryce and Ar nold J. Toyn bee, both of whom were ac tively in volved in pub li ciz ing the Ar me nian gen o cide of 1915, char ac ter ized this late trend. Nei ther man, more over, saw the Ar me nian gen o cide as a new phe nom e non or the in au gu ra tion of a new era of

Introduction

13

vi o lence. In stead, these men under stood the Ar me nian gen o cide as stem ming from vi o lent trends as so ciated with the East ern Ques tion, par tic u larly the Bul gar ian mas sa cres of 1875 and sub se quent mas sa cres of Ar me ni ans in 1895 and 1909.39 Rus sian ro man ti ciz ing of its his toric role in lib er at ing Ot to man Chris tians, mean while, dis solved in the col-lapse of its own em pire. So viet athe ism, the re vi val of Marx’s ma te ri al ist inter pre ta tion of the East ern Ques tion, and Lenin’s focus on na tion al ist move ments in bor der land ter ri to ries emerged to take its place.40

The East ern Ques tion: The Search for New Defi ni tions

The flood of jour na lis tic lit er a ture that poured so freely through out the nine teenth cen tury vir tu ally ceased with the col lapse of the Ot to man Em pire and the crea tion of the League of Na tions man date states in the 1920s. The East ern Ques tion grad u ally be came an ac cepted com po nent of nineteenth-century Eu ro pean his tory. As pub lic at ten tion waned, how ever, sev eral schol arly stud ies that em pha sized the Bal kan states and the Black Sea in the con text of the East ern Ques tion ap peared, un-doubt edly in flu enced by the war un fold ing around them. The most sig nifi cant gen eral work of this era, Marriott’s The East ern Ques tion, be-came the foun da tion for a gen eral nar ra tive on the sub ject until today. This 1917 pub li ca tion (four later edi tions fol lowed) be came the first to har ness all the var i ous mono graphs on the sub ject into one con tin u ous story.41 Be cause Marriott’s sub stan tial tome es tab lished the model for most sub se quent inter pre ta tions of the East ern Ques tion, it is worthy of scru tiny here.42

Mar ri ott opens his book ob serv ing that de spite the tre men dous amount of en ergy ded i cated to dis cuss ing the East ern Ques tion, no over arch ing study has been writ ten. He com ments that “mono graphs exist in plenty on spe cial as pects of the prob lem, and many gen eral His to ries of Eu rope con tain use ful chap ters on the sub ject,” but an a lyt i-cal, com pre hen sive treat ments are lack ing.43 He sets as his task the “sketch ing of the his tor i cal ev o lu tion of a prob lem which has baf fled the in ge nu ity of Eu ro pean di plom at ists in a gen eral sense for more than 500 years, more spe cifi cally and more in sis tently, for about a cen tury.”44

Marriott’s work syn the sizes the vast lit er a ture and makes sense of the var i ous ar tic u la tions of the East ern Ques tion from its or i gins (as de fined by him) to the present day. He traces the mod ern East ern Ques-tion from the early rise of the Ot to man Em pire in the four teenth and

14


fif teenth cen tu ries through the First World War. He also pro vides the first the or iza tion of the prob lem and at trib utes six major prin ci ples to it: the Ot to mans in Eu rope; Bal kan ir re den tism; Black Sea straits; Rus sian as pi ra tions to the Med i ter ra nean; the Habs burg inter est in south east ern Eu rope; and fi nally, “the at ti tude of the Eu ro pean Pow ers in gen eral, and En gland in par tic u lar” to ward the sub jects he iden tifies. To be sure, Marriott’s work was ground break ing. No other scholar had been brave enough to bring the dis par ate works on the East ern Ques tion to gether as a whole, and to the or ize it. It be came the un con tested au thor ity on the sub ject, and con tin ues to frame the field’s under stand ing of the East ern Question’s major phases. Still, his work was very much a prod-uct of its era, im bued with the ten sions of the Great War and the Eu ro-cen tric think ing of his age.

Fore ground ing his work in es sen tial ist think ing char ac ter is tic of his pre de ces sors, Mar ri ott argues that the East ern Ques tion ex isted “from time im me mo rial.” He writes: “Eu rope has been con fronted with an ‘East ern Ques tion.’ In its es sence, the prob lem is un chang ing. It has arisen from the clash in the lands of South East ern Eu rope between the hab its, the ideas, and pre con cep tions of the West and those of the East.”45 For Mar ri ott, Ot to man Turks are “an alien sub stance . . . em-bed ded in the liv ing flesh of Eu rope.”46 It is not sur pris ing, then, that Mar ri ott with few ex cep tions ex presses lit tle inter est in how the East ern Ques tion re lated to Mus lim areas of Eu rope. Over look ing the prob lem for Cri mea and the Cau ca sus, Mar ri ott prin ci pally wove his nar ra tive around Bal kan af fairs.47

Fol low ing Marriott’s vol ume, sev eral archival-based stud ies ap peared in the 1930s, in clud ing those au thored by Har old Tem per ley, R. W. Seton-Watson, and Ver non Pur year, prompt ing the need for a new syn the sis.48 A few decades later, M. S. An der son, pro fes sor of his tory at the Lon don School of Eco nom ics, pub lished a com pre hen sive sur vey on the East ern Ques tion in 1966. With the ex cep tion of tak ing 1774 as his start ing point, con clud ing his work with the First World War, and in te grat ing data from re cent stud ies, his frame work de vi ated lit tle from that of Mar ri ott. Thus, the Bal kan the a ter dom i nates the nar ra tive at the ex pense of Mus lim Eu rope, the chap ter spread de vi ates lit tle from Marriott’s orig i nal con cep tion, and the book re tains a fa mil iar focus on di plo macy. An der son also un crit i cally shares Marriott’s as sump tion that Ot to man “back ward ness” led Eu ro pean pow ers to tan gle in Ot to-man af fairs. While ex pli citly ac knowl edg ing that his work was “not orig i nal ei ther in the in for ma tion or the ideas pro vided,” An der son

Introduction

15

ful filled a need for a new uni ver sity text book, as “no other book ha[d] been writ ten in En glish at a mod er ate length” since Mar ri ott.49 Never con ceived as a field shaper, Anderson’s book has pro vided the gen eral nar ra tive and chron o log i cal scope of the East ern Ques tion for the last sixty years.50

Al though sev eral shifts in the lit er a ture have dated Anderson’s use ful sur vey, no com pre hen sive study of the East ern Ques tion has emerged to take its place. Thus, Nazan Çiçek, whose re cent work ana-lyzes the Turk ish con tri bu tion to the East ern Ques tion, has noted, “even after Said’s pro voc a tive work prompted a change of par a digm in West-ern scholars’ ap proaches to the his tory of the East, the East ern Ques tion mainly re mained a West ern issue, which was an a lyzed ac cord ing to its West ern actors’ think ing and policy-making pat terns.”51 In Orien tal ism, Ed ward Said de scribes the East ern Ques tion as one of the most vis ible and en dur ing of the Orientalists’ “flam boy ant pro jects.”52 With out over stat ing Said’s neg a tive cri tique of Orien tal ists, it is worth not ing that the his tory of the East ern Ques tion has often been told from a West ern per spec tive. The bet ter we under stand the his to ries and mo tives of the Rus sian and Ot to man Em pires, their re la tion to the other em pires, and Russia’s con sis tent re luc tance to ex pand be yond the shores of the Black Sea, the more ap par ent it is that the East ern Ques tion was the prod-uct of per cep tion rather than re al ity. Giv ing the full ben e fit of the doubt to the Eu ro pean dip lo mats of the time, we could at trib ute East ern Ques-tion feuds and cri ses to con sis tent mis com mu ni ca tion and ig nor ant good in ten tions. In a more cyn i cal view, harm ful pol i cies prompted by the East ern Ques tion have their roots in West ern im pe rial am bi tions, greed, and pe ri odic hys teria.

In the last decades, sig nifi cant ad vances have been made in Rus sian, Bal kan, and Ot to man historiog ra phy. Work on the re gional and na tional pasts of the Cau ca sus, Cri mea, the Da nu bian prin ci pal ities, and present- day Ukraine has in creased as well. A grow ing num ber of schol arly ar-ti cles and mono graphs touch on the inter sec tion of the Russian-Ottoman Em pires, forced and vol un tary mi gra tions, and the every day ex pe ri ence of peo ple liv ing along the bor der lands. Some of this work re lates di rectly to the East ern Ques tion, but much re search re mains to be done be fore this his tor i cal phe nom e non se cures its right ful place in the gen eral nar ra tive of mod ern Eu ro pean his tory.53

Among the most im por tant new trends in flu enc ing his tor i cal inter pre ta tion of the East ern Ques tion has been ac tive re search into Ot to man his tory by schol ars using Ot to man sources. Kemal Kar pat

16


re vi tal ized the study of Ot to man his tory for En glish lan guage schol ar-ship, free ing it equally from Eu ro cen tric pre oc cu pa tions with Ot to man de cline and strictly con trolled Turk ish na tion al ist inter pre ta tions.54 Char ac ter iz ing the East ern Ques tion as a “moral and po lit i cal jus tifi-ca tion for par ti tion ing the Ot to man lands,” Kar pat has pointed to the del u sory ef fects of Eu ro pean and Rus sian inter fer ence in Ot to man af fairs.55

In re cent years, nu mer ous mono graphs have ap peared re vis ing stan dard nar ra tives of Ot to man his tory.56 As Nich o las Dou ma nis, Cem Em rence, Isa Blumi, and other spe cial ists have re cently em pha sized, the cul tural sym bi o sis and in te gra tive pol i cies of Ot to man rule helped sus tain con trol over mil lions of peo ples for hun dreds of years. Re li gious tol er ance, ac com mo da tion, and cul tural syn cre tism—and not a pol icy of di vide and rule—help ex plain Ot to man suc cess among a hetero ge ne-ous mass.57 Schol ars have shown that the rel a tively tol er ant na ture of the Ot to man Em pire en a bled the elite at the Sub lime Porte to share au-thor ity with local lead ers, in clud ing spec tac u lar fig ures, such as Ali Pasha of Te pen denli and Meh med Ali of Egypt, who have be come in te-gral to the East ern Ques tion nar ra tive.58 Else where, schol ar ship on Ot to-man his tory has re ex am ined the re la tion ship between the Ot to man Em pire and the West and the role of the East ern Ques tion in Ot to man af fairs, in clud ing Nazan Çiçek’s Young Ot to mans, Can dan Badem’s The Ot to man Cri mean War, and sev eral es says in War and Di plo macy ed ited by M. Hakan Yavuz and Peter Slu glett.59

Work on Russia’s in volve ment with the East ern Ques tion has grown at an even more rapid pace with sub stan tial con tri bu tions made by Theo fa nis Stav rou, who has pi o neered the study of Russia’s East ern Ques tion among schol ars work ing in the United States, and Charles and Bar bara Jel a vich.60 Much of the re cent lit er a ture on Russia’s en gage-ment in East ern Ques tion dis putes has fo cused on the role of re li gion. Tra di tion ally, schol ars work ing from An glo cen tric per spec tives have at trib uted the Russian-Ottoman wars to Rus sian ex pan sion ist aims, de spite the many ex am ples of re li gion as a cau sal fac tor. Sub se quently, a num ber of schol ars, in clud ing Theo phi lus Prou sis, Lora Gerd, Ni ko lai Li so voi, and oth ers, have taken Russia’s com mit ment to pro tect ing the rights of Ot to man Chris tians se ri ously. Col lec tively, they dem on strate that Or tho dox be lief and an Or tho dox re li gious na tion al ism in flu enced Russia’s po lit i cal be hav ior vis-à-vis the East ern Ques tion.61 In flec tions of jihad with each major Russian-Ottoman war, as well as the pil grim-ages of Rus sian Mus lims in equal or greater num bers than Or tho dox

Introduction

17

Chris tian pil grim ages to the Ot to man Em pire, sug gest that Islam also had a role to play in the East ern Ques tion. This sub ject awaits sus tained re search.62

The re nais sance of mil i tary and dip lo matic his tory has brought new archi val re search to tra di tional ac counts of Rus sian in volve ment in the East ern Ques tion.63 For ex am ple, Al ex an der Bitis dem on strates the crit i cal role played by the Rus sian mil i tary in prompt ing Rus sian in-volve ment in the Greek Rev o lu tion, while John Daly’s study of the navy dur ing the same era re veals, among other things, the im por tance of the Cau ca sus to Russia’s East ern Ques tion.64 Vi ta lii She remet has writ ten stud ies fo cus ing on eco nomic com pe ti tion in East ern Ques tion con flicts in the first half of the nineteenth-century based on Rus sian and Turk ish sources.65 Fo cus ing on the next major phase of the East ern Ques tion, David Gold frank has argued that for Rus sia, the Cri mean War in volved both an East ern and a West ern Ques tion, while, more re cently, Gold-frank, Mara Ko zel sky, L. V. Mel’nikova, Jack Fai rey, and Or lando Figes have re in forced the im por tance of re li gion for all bel lig er ent par ties dur ing the Cri mean War.66 Mov ing to ward later pe ri ods, Ro nald Bo broff, Mi chael Re ynolds, and Sean McMee kin have em pha sized that for Rus sia, con flict with the Ot to man Em pire dur ing World War I loomed as large as, or larger than, that with Ger many.67 De spite this re kin dling of inter est in war and the East ern Ques tion, its dev as tat ing re sults in the re gion from the Bal kans to the Cau ca sus re mains an under stud ied area of re search.68 Many vol un teer le gions took up arms against their im pe rial states dur ing East ern Ques tion con flicts (Poles and Ta tars against Rus sia; Greeks, Serbs, Bul gar ians, and Ar me ni ans against the Ot to man Em pire). These groups, which in many ways epit o mize the depth of the dis place-ment caused by the East ern Ques tion, have rarely been the sub ject of fo cused mono graphs.

As the pre ced ing dis cus sion sug gests, we have much to learn about how the East ern Ques tion af fected the bor der land re gions of and be - tween em pires. Sev eral stud ies have dem on strated the im por tance of Greek, Ro ma nian, and Polish lob bies in in flu enc ing inter na tional re la-tions.69 A. D. Pa nesh has con trib uted one of the few works on the East ern Ques tion in Cir cas sia, show ing how the tribes of the north ern Cau ca sus main tained their in de pen dence in the face of Brit ish, French, Ot to man, and Rus sian ef forts to em broil them in var i ous con flicts.70 These works sug gest in tri guing new di rec tions for re search.

Waves of Greek, Bul gar ian, and Ser bian ref u gees from the Ot to-man Em pire mi grated to Rus sia with each con vul sion of the East ern

18


Ques tion. Some thrived, but many per ished upon ar ri val. With few ex cep tions, the ex pe ri ence of these groups re mains rel a tively un known.71 As Bal kan peo ples mi grated to Rus sia, mil lions of Mus lims em i grated from Eu rope to the Ot to man Em pire and present-day Tur key fol low ing the Treaty of Ku chuk Kai nardji and on through the Treaty of Lau sanne (1923).72 All cases of mass mi gra tions (in both di rec tions) were ac com pa-nied by mass vi o lence, whether con nected to wars or mas sa cres. These vol un tary and forced mi gra tions as so ciated with the darker con se-quences of the East ern Ques tion con sti tute part of the same vi o lent pro cess that pro duced the Ar me nian gen o cide and the pop u la tion ex-change between the Greeks and the Turks at the end of the First World War and should be stud ied fur ther.73

Fi nally, de spite the many dis as trous con se quences of the East ern Ques tion, it did in spire well-meaning inter est among many Eu ro peans and Rus sians in the peo ples and tra di tions of the Russian-Ottoman bor der lands. Gary Bass and Davide Ro dogno have shown, for ex am ple, that hu man i tar ian inter ven tion emerged in the East ern Ques tion.74 Art-work and crea tive lit er a ture, busi ness ven tures and sci en tific en ter prises pro duced in the inter ac tion between na tives and inter lop ers at the inter-stices of the East ern Ques tion sim i larly re main sub jects worthy of fur ther re search.

To ward New Di rec tions

The new re search rep re sented in this vol ume on the Rus sian and Ot to-man Em pires and the bor der land re gions in between calls for a re-think ing of the East ern Ques tion, as the next wave of schol ar ship evolves. Each of the con trib u tors to this vol ume has ad dressed some as pect of the East ern Ques tion in his or her re search. The es says take both tra di-tional and non tra di tional ap proaches, re flect ing our be lief that the East ern Ques tion re quires multi ple modes of inter pre ta tion. Be cause the East ern Ques tion left an in del ible mark on each of the na tions and peo ples it inter sected, we have also urged our con trib u tors to con sider, when ap pli cable, today’s on go ing leg a cies.

Vic tor Taki opens the col lec tion with a sweep ing anal y sis of the de-vel op ment of Mol da vian and Wal la chian (mod ern Ro ma nian) na tional con scious ness. An a lyz ing dis cur sive con struc tions of iden tity, Taki shows that the East ern Ques tion in flu enced how fu ture Ro ma nians viewed Turks, Rus sians, and them selves. His work also pro vides an ex cel lent ex am ple of how bor der land pop u la tions—in this case the

Introduction

19

Mol da vians and the Wal la chians—in flu enced de ci sions of the great pow ers. John A. Mazis’s chap ter sim i larly ex plores how the East ern Ques tion prompted de bate over state hood in Greece. In his essay, Mazis shows how a well-known Greek na tion al ist, Ion Dra gou mis, re jected the Meg ali Idea (the Great Idea) in favor of an “East ern Fed er a tion.” Emerg ing out of the Greek War of In de pen dence, the Meg ali Idea, or the Greek de sire to re cover Byz an tine lands lost to the Ot to man Em-pire, si mul ta ne ously en a bled the con sol i da tion of Greek state hood and per pet u ated vi o lent con flict with the Ot to man Em pire. In contrast to Greece’s am bi tious ir re den tist plan, some Greeks, like Dra gou mis, ac-tu ally en cour aged a union with Tur key. Mazis ex plores the East ern Fed er a tion con cept and con sid ers the im pli ca tions should such a union have suc ceeded. Fi nally, Nazan Çiçek ex plores the Turk ish na tion al ist re sponse to the East ern Ques tion in “The East ern Ques tion in Turk ish Re pub li can Text books: Set tling Old Scores with the Eu ro pean and the Ot to man ‘Other.’” By stud y ing rep re sen ta tions of the East ern Ques tion in Turk ish his tor i cal text books, Çiçek ex plains how Turk ish na tion al ists of the twen ti eth cen tury strug gled to free Ot to man his tory from West ern co lo nial pre sump tions.

In ad di tion to a focus on na tion al ism, this vol ume under scores the cen tral role of re li gion in the East ern Ques tion. Through out the eigh-teenth and nine teenth cen tu ries, Rus sia in sisted upon the right to inter-vene on be half of Or tho dox Chris tians liv ing in the Ot to man Em pire, while con flict over the holy places helped bring the great pow ers to war on at least one oc ca sion. Until re cently, schol ar ship has dis missed re li-gion, treat ing it as a smoke screen dis guis ing other im pe rial mo ti va tions. Es says in this vol ume, how ever, begin with the prem ise that re li gious be lief ac tu ally mat tered. Jack Fai rey of fers one of the most co gent ar gu-ments for the im por tance of re li gion in the East ern Ques tion. Through an ex am ina tion of three af fairs in volv ing Ot to man Chris tians, Fai rey shows how Or tho dox be lief and cul ture framed inter na tional po lit i cal be hav ior. With a sim i lar inter est in under stand ing the cen tral ity of re li-gion to the East ern Ques tion, Lora Gerd ana lyzes one of the most mean-ing ful sym bols of Rus sian inter ests in the Ot to man Em pire: Mount Athos. A holy place sec ond only, per haps, to Chris tian sites in Pal es tine, Mount Athos at tracted Rus sian pil grims since me di eval times and be-came one of the major Rus sian spir i tual foun da tions in the Ot to man Em pire, and hence a dip lo matic flash point.

Sev eral chap ters in this vol ume deal with bor der cross ings, in some va riety or other, gen er ated by the East ern Ques tion, whether de pict ing

20


pil grim ages to Athos, the trans fer of holy ar ti facts, or the move ment of dip lo mats. Con tri bu tions by Lu cien Frary, Mara Ko zel sky, and Can dan Badem deal more spe cifi cally with the dis lo ca tion and move ment of peo ples fol low ing each major war caused by the East ern Ques tion in the nine teenth cen tury. A ne glected as pect of Russian-Ottoman con fron-ta tions and the move ments for in de pen dence in the Bal kans is the en-slave ment of pris on ers of war by Ot to man sol diers. Less on er ous than the plan ta tion form of slav ery prac ticed in the Amer i cas, Ot to man slav ery ex isted well into the mid-nineteenth cen tury and often served as pun ish ment for re bel lious re li gious and na tional groups. Frary shows how tales of Ot to man en slave ment of Chris tians in spired hu man i tar ian im pulses in the Rus sian Em pire and sub se quent dip lo matic de bate dur ing and after the Greek Rev o lu tion. Ko zel sky ana lyzes the ex o dus of Cri mean Ta tars fol low ing the Cri mean War as one of the many vi o lent mi gra tions as so ciated with the East ern Ques tion. She ex plores Rus sian ef forts to en cour age mi gra tion and the en su ing cri sis fol low ing the region’s sud den pop u la tion loss. In a sub se quent chap ter, Badem pro-vides one of the first stud ies of Rus sian ad min is tra tion of Kars-Batum, a re gion Rus sia took from the Ot to man Em pire in the war of 1878. Rus sian ad min is tra tors, Badem argues, at tempted to work with pop u lar tra di-tions, and when that failed, per mit ted mass mi gra tion. This re gion, as Badem shows, re mains con tested today by Ar me nian, Rus sian, Kurd ish, and Turk ish na tion al ists.

Dip lo mats began the East ern Ques tion, so dip lo matic his tory plays an im por tant role in this vol ume. Two chap ters that tackle is sues spread more than one hun dred years apart ex plore the East ern Ques tion from var i ous diplomats’ point of view. Theo phi lus Prou sis pro vides a sam-pling of the papers of the Brit ish dip lo mat Lord Strang ford, who lived in I˙ stan bul dur ing the first phase of the Greek re volt, to pro vide a rare win dow into Ot to man af fairs in the early 1820s. Here Prou sis is less inter ested in the po si tions Strang ford ad vo cated for En gland. In stead, he is con cerned with what Strang ford wit nessed: the tur bu lent be gin-ning of the Greek re bel lion and the fraught Ot to man re sponse. These papers offer schol ars and stu dents uniquely val u able in sight into the com plex ity of the East ern Ques tion, in clud ing sec tar ian con flict and the eco nomic back drop.

If Prou sis sheds light on the open ing of the East ern Ques tion, Ro nald Bo broff brings us to its last phase in the con text of European-Ottoman re la tions: the First World War. Through his anal y sis of French and Rus sian dip lo matic ex change on the eve of war, Bo broff ex plores how

Introduction

21

ri valry over pol icy in the Ot to man Em pire nearly dis lodged the Franco-Russian al li ance. He also ex am ines the Rus sian con tri bu tion to the Sykes-Picot Agree ment.

f

As the chap ters in this vol ume sug gest, echoes of the East ern Ques tion con tinue to res o nate. No agree ment re gard ing its final phase has emerged, and sev eral schol ars have sug gested that the trea ties set tling the Ot to man col lapse have marked a path to ward new po lit i cal prob-lems in the Bal kans and the Mid dle East.75

With this vol ume, we hope to open the de bate on the East ern Ques-tion in all its rich man i fes ta tions and thereby en cour age a re think ing of this ever-pertinent his tor i cal phe nom e non in the con text of re cent schol-ar ship and dif fer ent na tional ex pe ri ences. The leg acy of the East ern Ques tion re mains ev i dent today in de bates over Turkey’s entry into the Eu ro pean Union (EU), con tem po rary con flict over Cy prus, and the re-emer gence of Tur key as a for mid able power in the Mid dle East. As we argue in the epi logue to this book, the chang ing po lit i cal al li ances along the Black Sea, the en dur ing Rus sian con cern over naval power and ac-cess to the straits, and the re cur rent eth nic con flict and sub se quent inter na tional cri ses in the Bal kans and the Cau ca sus make re vis it ing the East ern Ques tion more rel e vant, and more im per a tive, than ever.

Notes

1. Car di nal Alberoni’s Scheme for Re duc ing the Turk ish Em pire to the Obe di ence of the Chris tian Princes: And for a Par ti tion of the Con quests. To gether with a Scheme of a Per pet ual Dyet for Es tab lish ing Pub lick Tran quil ity (Lon don: George Faulk ner Book seller, 1736), 1–7. Alberoni’s scheme went through a num ber of re prints on the eve of the First World War, in clud ing a par tial print in the American Jour nal of Inter na tional Law 7, no. 1 ( Jan u ary 1913): 83–107. For Alberoni’s ac cep tance into East ern Ques tion historiog ra phy, see J. A. R. Mar ri ott, The East ern Ques tion: An His tor i cal Study in Eu ro pean Di plo macy (Ox ford: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 1917), 5. Al be roni was an in fluen tial dip lo mat in the early eigh teenth cen tury as well as a car di nal. See Simon Har court Smith, Car di nal of Spain: The Life and Strange Ca reer of Al be roni (New York: Knopf, 1944).

2. Tsar Nich o las I coined this phrase in his fa mous con ver sa tion with the Brit ish am bas sa dor, Sir Ham il ton Sey mour, in 1853. H. W. V. Tem per ley, En-gland and the Near East: The Cri mea (Lon don: Long mans, Green, 1936), 272, points out that the tsar re ferred not to “the sick man” but to the “dying bear.”

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“You may give him musk but even musk will not long keep him alive.” See also R. W. Seton-Watson, Brit ain in Eu rope, 1789–1914 (Cam bridge: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 1937), 305.

3. See, for ex am ple, Carter Vaughn Fin dley, Tur key, Islam, Na tion al ism, and Mod er nity: A His tory (New Haven, CT: Yale Uni ver sity Press, 2010); Isa Blumi, Re in stat ing the Ot to mans: Al ter na tive Bal kan Mod er nities, 1800–1912 (New York: Pal grave Mac mil lan, 2011); idem, Foun da tions of Mod er nity: Human Agency and the Im pe rial State (New York: Rout ledge, 2012); M. Sükrü Han io˘glu, A Brief His-tory of the Late Ot to man Em pire (Prince ton, NJ: Prince ton Uni ver sity Press, 2008); Vir ginia Aksan, Ot to man Wars, 1700–1870: An Em pire Besieged (Har low, En gland: Pear son Long man, 2007); idem, “Find ing the Way Back to the Ot to man Em-pire,” Inter na tional His tory Re view 25, no. 1 (March 2003): 96–107.

4. For con cise defi ni tions of the East ern Ques tion that in di cate the range and rich ness of the con cept, see Theo phi lus C. Prou sis, Lord Strang ford at the Sub lime Porte (1822): The East ern Cri sis, vol. 2 (I˙ stan bul: Isis Press, 2012), 9, 12–13, 355–56; and idem, “East ern Or tho doxy under Siege in the Ot to man Le vant,” Mod ern Greek Stud ies Year book 24/25 (2008/2009): 66.

5. For Rus sia, see David Schim mel pen ninck van der Oye, Rus sian Orien tal-ism: Asia in the Rus sian Mind from Peter the Great to Em i gra tion (New Haven, CT: Yale Uni ver sity Press, 2011); for West ern Eu rope, see Rob ert Irwin, For Lust of Know ing: The Orien tal ists and Their En e mies (Lon don: Allen Lane, 2006).

6. A com plete sur vey of the twists and turns of the East ern Ques tion in Eu-ro pean thought, a sub ject worthy of a sep ar ate mono graph, falls out side the con-fines of this intro duc tion. The goal here, there fore, is to iden tify the major trends of his tor i cal writ ing about the East ern Ques tion in its most sig nifi cant phases.

7. W. A. Phil lips, “East ern Ques tion,” in En cy clo pe dia Bri tan nica, 11th ed. (New York: En cy clo pe dia Bri tan nica, 1910–11), 8:112–18; A. S. Silun, “Vos toch nyi vo pros,” in Bol’shaia so vets kaia ent sik lo pe diia, 3rd ed. (Mos cow: So vets kaia Ent si-k lo pe diia, 1971), 5:408–9; I. S. Dos tian, “Vens kii kon gress (1814–1815) i vos toch nyi vo pros,” Bal kans kie iss led o va niia 18 (1997): 248–58; idem, “Bal kans kii vo pros v pe riod vens kogo kon gressa (1814–1815),” Études bal ka niques 1 (1971): 57–75; Tim Chap man, The Con gress of Vienna: Or i gins, Pro cesses and Re sults (Lon don: Rout ledge, 1998), 71–73, 79–80; Har old Nic ol son, The Con gress of Vienna: A Study in Al lied Unity: 1812–1822 (New York: Har court, Brace, 1946), 243–44; Hu seyin Yil maz, “The East ern Ques tion and the Ot to man Em pire: The Gen e sis of the Near East and the Mid dle East,” in Is There a Mid dle East? The Ev o lu tion of a Geo-po lit i cal Con cept, ed. Mi chael E. Bo nine, Abbas Am a nat, and Mi chael Eze kiel Gas per (Stan ford, CA: Stan ford Uni ver sity Press, 2012), 11–4. See also the the-matic index in Vnesh ni aia pol i tika Ros sii XIX i na chala XX v.: Dok u menty Ros siis kogo mini sterstva in os tran nykh del, 16 vols. (Mos cow: Nauka, 1960–94).

8. The text of the Ku chuk Kai nardji agree ment is pub lished in T. Iu zef o vich, Dog o vory Ros sii s Vos to kom po lit i che ski i tor go vye (St. Pe ters burg: O. I. Bak sta, 1869), 24–41. Im por tant anal y ses in clude Ro deric H. Dav i son, “‘Rus sian Skill

Introduction

23

and Turk ish Imbecility’: The Treaty of Ku chuk Kai nardji Re con sid ered,” Slavic Re view 35 (1976): 463–83; E. I. Dru zhi nina, Kiuchuk-Kainardzhiiskii mir 1774 goda: Ego pod go tovka i zak liu che nie (Mos cow: Nauka, 1955); and Vir ginia H. Aksan, An Ot to man States man in War and Peace: Ahmed Resmi Efendi, 1700–1783 (Leiden: Brill, 1995), 163–69.

9. William Elton, A Sur vey of the Turk ish Em pire (Lon don: T. Ca dell and W. Da vies, 1798); anon y mous, Ob ser va tions on the Com merce of Great Brit ain with the Rus sian and Ot to man Em pires: And on the Pro jects of Rus sia against the Ot to man and Brit ish Do min ions (Lon don: J. De brett, 1801); C. J. Liver pool, A Vin di ca tion of the Con ven tion Lately Con cluded between Great Brit ain and Rus sia (Lon don: J. Wright, 1801); H. W. Williams, Travels in Italy, Greece, and the Io nian Is lands, 2 vols. (Edin burgh: A. Con stable, 1820). See also A. M. Sta nis lavs kaia, Ros siia i Gret siia v kontse XVIII–na chale XIX v.: Pol i tika Ros sii v Ion i ches koi Re spub like, 1798–1807 gg. (Mos cow: Nauka, 1976); and N. E. Saul, Rus sia and the Med i ter ra-nean, 1797–1807 (Chi cago: Uni ver sity of Chi cago Press, 1970).

10. For ref er ence to con tem po rary works on the French ex pe di tion to Egypt, see Dar rell Dyk stra, “The French Oc cu pa tion of Egypt, 1798–1801,” in The Cam-bridge His tory of Egypt, vol. 2, Mod ern Egypt, from 1517 to the End of the Twen ti eth Cen tury, ed. M. W. Daly (Cam bridge: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 1998), 113–38; Juan Cole, Napoleon’s Egypt: In vad ing the Mid dle East (New York: Pal grave Mac mil lan, 2008); J. Chris to pher He rold, Bon a parte in Egypt (New York: Harper and Row, 1962). See also Salah al Din al-Boustany, ed., The Jour nals of Bon a parte in Egypt, 10 vols. (Cairo: Al-Arab Book shop, 1971); ‘Abd al-Rahman al-Jabarti, Na po leon in Egypt: Al-Jabart¯ı ’s Chron i cle of the French Oc cu pa tion, 1798, trans. Shmuel Moreh (Prince ton, NJ: Markus Wie ner, 1993).

11. Among the more im por tant works of this era, see William Wil kin son, An Ac count of the Prin ci pal ities of Wal la chia and Mol da via (Lon don: Long man, Hurst, Rees, Orme, and Brown, 1820); J. M. Ber ton, Les Turcs dans la Bal ance Pol i tique de l’Europe au dix-neuvième siècle ou con sid ér a tions sur l’usurpation et sur l’indépendance de la Grèce (Paris: La Li brai rie Nation ale et Etran gere, 1822); Ed ward Bla quiere, The Greek Rev o lu tion: Its Or i gins and Prog ress (Lon don: G. and W. B. Whit taker, 1824); M. de Pradt, L’Europe par rap port à la Grèce et à la réfor ma-tion de la Tur quie (Paris: Béchet Ainé, 1826); R. L. Green, Sketches of the Greek War of In de pen dence (Lon don: Hurst, 1827); F. Pou que ville, His toire de la ré gén ér a tion de la Grèce, 4 vols. (Paris: Fir min Didot, 1827); Thomas Gor don, His tory of the Greek Rev o lu tion, 2 vols. (Edin burgh: William Black wood; Lon don: T. Ca dell, 1832); Kon stan tin Baz ili, Ark hip e lag i Gret siia v 1830 i 1831 go dakh, 2 vols. (St. Pe ters burg: Tip. N. Gre cha, 1834).

12. See, for ex am ple, Al phonse La mar tine, Vues, dis cours et ar ti cles sur la ques tion d’Orient (Paris: Charles Gos se lin, 1840); A. F. Mar mont, The Present State of the Turk ish Em pire (Lon don: J. Ol livier, 1839); Ni co laòs Steph a nop oli de Comnène, Progrès so cial de l’Europe: Pensées d’un en fant de la Grèce sur les événe mens d’Orient (Paris: Debécourt, libraire-édi teur, 1841); George Gawler,

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Tran quil liza tion of Syria and the East (Lon don: T. and W. Boone, 1845); K. M. Baz ili, Si riia i Pa les tina pod tu rets kim pravitel’stvom v is tor i ches kom i po lit i ches kom ot no-sh e niiakh (Mos cow: Tip. N. Gre cha, 1862).

13. Théodore Be na zet, Ques tion d’Orient (Paris: C. Gos se lin, 1836); Charles Dupin, Dis cours sur la ques tion de l’Orient (Paris: Im prim e rie Panck oucke, 1840).

14. M. N. Pok rovs kii, “Vos toch nyi vo pros,” Bol’shaia so vets kaia ent sik lo pe diia, 1st ed. (Mos cow: So vets kaia Ent sik lo pe diia, 1929), 13:310.

15. His daugh ter and son-in-law gath ered the let ters into the vol ume, Karl Marx, The East ern Ques tion: A Re print of Let ters Writ ten 1853–1856 Deal ing with Events of the Cri mean War, ed. El eanor Marx Av el ing and Ed ward Av el ing (Lon don: S. Son nens chein, 1897).

16. A. de Cus tine, La Rus sie en 1839, 2nd ed., 4 vols. (Paris: Li brai rie d’Amyot, 1843); D. Ur qu hart, Port fo lio, or, A Col lec tion of State Papers, 6 vols. (Lon don: J. May nard, 1836–37); idem, The Spirit of the East, 2 vols. (Lon don: H. Col burn, 1838); idem, Tur key and Its Re sources: Its Mu nic i pal Or gan iza tion and Free Trade (Lon don: Saunders and Otley, 1833); idem, The Sul tan Mah moud and Me hemet Ali Pasha (Lon don: J. Ridg way, 1835); idem, The Edin burgh Re view and the Aff ghan War (Lon don: J. May nard, 1843); G. de Lacy Evans, On the De signs of Rus sia (Lon don: John Mur ray, 1828). See also G. H. Bols over, “David Ur qu hart and the East ern Ques tion, 1833–37: A Study in Pub lic ity and Di plo macy,” Jour nal of Mod ern His tory 8 (1936): 444–67; J. H. Glea son, The Gen e sis of Rus so pho bia in Great Brit ain (Cam bridge, MA: Har vard Uni ver sity Press, 1950); Anta Di alla, I Rosia ap e nanti sta Val ka nia: Ideo lo gia kai pol i tiki sto dev tero miso tou 19ou aiona (Ath ens: Ek do seis Alex an dreia, 2009), 73–89; Ray mond T. McNally, “The Or i gins of Rus so pho bia in France: 1812–1830,” American Slavic and East Eu ro pean Re view 17 (1958): 173–89; and Charles King, “Im a gin ing Cir cas sia: David Ur qu hart and the Mak ing of North Cau ca sus Na tion al ism,” Rus sian Re view 66, no. 2 (2007): 238–55.

17. Emile de Gi rar din, So lu tions de la ques tion d’Orient (Paris: Li brai rie nou-velle, 1853); Ed ward H. Mich el sen, The Ot to man Em pire and Its Re sources, 2nd ed. (Lon don: W. Spooner, 1854); C. L. Graf von Fic quel mont, Die religiöse Seite der orien ta lis chen Frage (Vienna: F. Manz, 1854); Chris tian Frie drich Wurm, Di plom a tis che Ges chichte der orien ta lis chen Frage (Leip zig: F. A. Brock haus, 1858); C. H. Barault-Roullon, Dan gers pour l’Europe: Or i gine, progrès et état ac tuel de la puis sance russe; Ques tion d’Orient au point de vue pol i tique, re lig ieux et mil i taire (Paris: J. Corréard, 1854); M. A. Melik, L’Orient de vant l’Occident (Paris: A. Guyot et Scribe, 1856); A. A. Paton, Re searches on the Da nube and the Adri atic; or Con tri-bu tions to the Mod ern His tory of Hun gary and Tran syl va nia, Dal ma tia and Croa tia, Ser via and Bul garia, 2 vols. (Leip zig: Brock haus, 1861).

18. Ioan nis Sout sos, Apan ti sis El li nos pros An a tol i kon (Ath ens: Ty pois Andr. Kor o mila, 1853); Alex an dros Sout sos, Al i this pha sis tou an a tol i kou zit i ma tos (Ath ens: D. Z. Gazi, 1854); K. N. Do sios, El li nis mos i Ros sis mos (Ath ens: S. K. Vlas tou, 1854); G. D. Pa pan i co las, Strike, but Hear! A New View of the East ern

Introduction

25

Ques tion (Lon don: Ed ward Stan ford, 1856); L. von Ranke, Die ser bis che Rev o lu tion: Aus ser bis chen Pa pi eren und Mit thei lun gen (Ber lin: Duncker und Hum blot, 1844); idem, The His tory of Ser via, and the Ser vian Rev o lu tion, trans. Mrs. Al ex an der Kerr (Lon don: H. G. Bohn, 1847); Barthé lemy-Sylvestre Cu ni bert, Essai his to rique sur les révo lu tions et indépen dance de la Ser bie: De puis 1804 jusqu’à 1850, 2 vols. (Leip zig: F. A. Brock haus, 1855); N. P. Popov, Ros siia i Ser biia: Is tor i ches kii ocherk russ kago pokrovitel’stva Ser bii s 1806 po 1856 god, 2 vols. (Mos cow: Izd. K. Sol da ten kova, 1869); Kon stan ti nos Pa par rig o pou los, Is toria tou el lin i kou eth nous, 5 vols. (Ath ens: Elef the rod a kis, 1860–74).

19. For a re view of the con tem po rary lit er a ture on Sha mil, see Thomas M. Bar rett, “The Re mak ing of the Lion of Dage stan: Sha mil in Cap tiv ity,” Rus sian Re view 53, no. 3 (1994): 353–66.

20. Fredéric Du bois de Montpéreux, Voy age autour du Cau case, chez les Tcher kesses et les Abk hases, en Col chide en Géorgie, en Arménie et en Crimée; Avec un atlas géog ra phique, pit to resque, archéol o gique, géol o gique, etc., 6 vols. (Paris: Li brai rie de Gide, 1839–43); F. H. Müller, Der ugris che Volks stamm; Oder Un ter su chun gen über die Ländergebiete am Ural und am Kau ka sus, in his to ris cher, geo graph is cher und eth nog ra phis cher Be zie hung, 2 vols. (Ber lin: Duncker und Hum blot, 1837–39); F. P. Fon ton, La Rus sie dans l’Asie-Mineure (Paris: Le ne veu, 1840); Frédéric Bo den-stedt, Die Völker des Kau ka sus und ihre Freiheitskämpfe gegen die Rus sen: Ein Bei trag zur neu es ten Ges chichte des Orients, 2 vols. (Ber lin: Decker, 1855).

21. On Tsar Nich o las I’s im per vi ous ness to the anti-Russian ele ments of the East ern Ques tion, see David Gold frank, “Pol icy Tra di tions and the Men shi kov Mis sion of 1853,” in Im pe rial Rus sian Foreign Pol icy, ed. Hugh Rags dale (Cam-bridge: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 1993), 119–58; and idem, “The Holy Sep ul-cher and the Or i gin of the Cri mean War,” in The Mil i tary and So ci ety in Rus sia, 1450–1917, ed. Eric Lohr and Mar shall Poe (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 491–506.

22. Ros siia i Ev ropa: Vzgliad na kul tur nye i po lit i ches kie ot no she niia slav i ans kogo mira k germane-romanskomu (St. Pe ters burg: Iz da nie tov a rish chestva obsh che-st ven naia pol’za, 1871). Dan i levs kii also pub lished one of the first Rus sian stud ies of the Cau ca sus, Kav kaz i ego gors kie zhiteli: V ny niesh nem ikh pol o zhe nii, s ob i as ne niem is to rii, re li gii, ia zyka, oblika, odezhdy, stroe nii vos pi ta nii, prav le niia, zak o-nov, ko ren nykh ob y chaev, nra vov, obraza zhizni, pish chi, obraz o va niia i tor govli khishch nykh gort sev Kav kaza (Mos cow: V. Gote, 1851).

23. Di alla, I Rosia ap e nanti sta Val ka nia; idem, “Rus sian Na tion al ism and the East ern Ques tion: The Case of Pan sla vism (1856–1878),” Mod ern Greek Stud ies Year book 24/25 (2008/2009): 73–91; Jel ena Milojkovic-Djuric, Pan sla vism and Na tional Iden tity in Rus sia and in the Bal kans 1830–1880: Im ages of the Self and Oth ers (Boul der, CO: East Eu ro pean Mono graphs, 1994).

24. Ros tis lav Fa deev, Mne nie o Vos toch nom Vo prose: Po po vodu pos led nikh ret sent sii na voo ru zhen niia sily Ros sii (St. Pe ters burg: Tip. De par ta menta Ude lov, 1870); D. Buk ha rov, Ros siia i Turt siia: Ot voz nik no ve niia po lit i ches kikh mezhdu nimi ot no she nii do Lon dons kogo trak tata 13/25 Marta 1871 g. (St. Pe ters burg: Tip. F. S.

26


Sush chins kogo, 1878; orig i nally pub lished in French in 1877); A. V. Nek liu dov, Na chalo sno she nii Ros sii s Turt siei (Mos cow: Tip. Gatt suka, 1883); F. Us pens kii, Kak voz nik i raz vi val sia na Rusi vos toch nyi vo pros (St. Pe ters burg: Slav i ansk. Blagotvoritel’noe O-vo, 1887).

25. N. N. Murav’ev, Russ kie na Bos fore v 1833 godu (Mos cow: Chert kov, 1869); idem, Dela Turt sii i Egipta v 1832 i 1833 go dakh: Dip lo mat i ches kie sno she niia, 4 vols. (Mos cow: A. I. Ma mon tova, 1870); idem, Voina za Kav ka zom v 1855 godu, 2 vols. (St. Pe ters burg: A. N. Dem i dova, 1877); see also, “Za pi ski grafa A. I. Ribop’era,” Russ kii ark hiv, kn. 4 (1877): 460–506, kn. 5 (1877): 5–36.

26. T. Iu zef o vich, Dog o vory Ros sii s Vos to kom.27. B. N. Chich e rin, “Vos toch nyi vo pros s russ koi tochki zre niia 1855 goda,”

in S. P. Trubetskoi’s Za pi ski kni a zia S. P. Tru bets kogo (St. Pe ters burg: Sir ius, 1906): 123–53 [orig i nally pub lished in Blag o nam e ren nyi, no. 12 (1855), Leip zig, under the pseudo nym Gra nov sky]; V. A. Uli a nits kii, Dar da nelly, Bos for i Cher noe more v XVIII veke (Mos cow: A. Gatt suka, 1883).

28. Nazan Çiçek, The Young Ot to mans: Turk ish Crit ics of the East ern Ques tion in the Late Nine teenth Cen tury (Lon don: I. B. Tau ris, 2010), 1.

29. W. E. Glad stone, Bul gar ian Hor rors and the Ques tion of the East (Lon don: John Mur ray, Albe marle Street, 1876); idem, Les sons in Mas sa cre; or, The Con duct of the Turk ish Govern ment in and about Bul garia since May, 1876 (Lon don: J. Mur ray, 1877); Fyo dor Dos toev sky, A Writer’s Diary, trans. Ken neth Lantz, 2 vols. (Evans ton, IL: North west ern Uni ver sity Press); I. L. Vol gin, “Nravst ven nye os novy pub list sis tiki Dos toevs kogo: Vos toch nyi vo pros v Dnev nike pis a te lia,” Iz ves tiia Ak a de mii nauk SSSR (li ter a tury i iazyk) 30 (1972): 312–24. Two less emo-tional stud ies, by Ed ward Free man, The Ot to man Power in Eu rope; Its Na ture, Its Growth, and Its De cline (Lon don: Mac mil lan, 1877); and Frie drich Gentz, Zur Ges chichte der orien ta lis chen Frage (Vienna: W. Braumüller, 1877), contrast with the vo lu mi nous pamph let lit er a ture. The lat ter in cluded such ti tles as The East ern Ques tion: A Sum mary View of It for Busy Men, by One of Them selves (Har ris burg, PA: C. H. Berg ner, 1876); and E. T. Turnerelli’s The “Sa cred Mis sion” of the Rus sian Wolf among the Chris tian Sheep of Tur key: Ought We to Op pose or Pro mote It? (Lon don: Haugh ton, 1876). See also R. W. Seton-Watson, Dis raeli, Glad stone and the East ern Ques tion: A Study in Di plo macy and Party Pol i tics (Lon don: Mac mil lan, 1935); and Dwight E. Lee, Great Brit ain and the Cy prus Con ven tion of 1878 (Cam-bridge, MA: Har vard Uni ver sity Press, 1934).

30. F. F. Mar tens, “Étude his to rique sur la pol i tique Russe dans la ques tion d’orient,” Revue de droit inter na tional et de lég is la tion com pa rée 9 (1877): 49–77; idem, Die rus sis che Pol i tik in der orien ta lis chen Frage (St. Pe ters burg: H. Schmitz-dorff, 1877).

31. S. M. Solov’ev, “Vos toch nyi vo pros,” in Sob ra nie soch i ne niia S. M. Solov’eva (St. Pe ters burg: Obsh chest ven naia pol’za, 1882), 294.

32. S. Zhig a rev, Russ kaia pol i tika v vos toch nom vo prose, 2 vols. (Mos cow: Uni-ver si tets kaia ti po graiia, 1896), 1:49.

Introduction

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33. N. F. Du bro vin, Is to riia voiny i vlad y chestva russ kikh na Kav kaze, 6 vols. (St. Pe ters burg: Tip. De par ta menta udie lov, 1871–88); V. A. Potto, Kav kaz kaia voina v otdel’nykh ocher kakh, epi sod akh, le gen dakh, i bio graf iakh, 4 vols. (Stav ro pol: Kav kazs kii krai, 1994; first pub lished in Tifl is, 1885–88); anon y mous, Contra dic-tions of Lord Pal mers ton in Ref er ence to Po land and Cir cas sia, et cae tera (Lon don: Hard wicke, 1863); G. D. C. Ar gyll, The East ern Ques tion from the Treaty of Paris 1856 to the Treaty of Ber lin 1878, and to the Sec ond Af ghan War, 2 vols. (Lon don: Stra han, 1879).

34. A. Berzhe, ed., Akty so bran nye Kav kazs koiu ark he o graf ches koiu kom mis siei, 12 vols. (Tif lis: Ark hiv Glav nago up rav le niia na miest nika Kav kazs kago, 1866–1904).

35. The “Near East” (Proche-Orient, Blizh nii Vos tok) is a geo graph i cal term de vel oped by Eu ro pean schol ars and es say ists in the nine teenth cen tury. Many schol ars re tain its use to de scribe the west ern lands of the Ot to man Em pire. For a dis cus sion of this term, see Yil maz, “The East ern Ques tion and the Ot to man Em pire,” 11–35; Nikki R. Ked die, “Is There a Mid dle East?,” Inter na tional Jour nal of Mid dle East ern Stud ies 4, no. 3 (1973): 255–71; and Ro deric Dav i son, “Where Is the Mid dle East?,” Foreign Af fairs 38 (July 1960): 665–75.

36. Ed ouard Dri ault, La ques tion d’Orient, 1918–1937: La paix de la Médi ter-ranée (Paris: F. Alcan, 1938); Al bert Sorel, La ques tion d’Orient au XVIIIe siècle: Le part age de la Po logne et le traité de Kaïnardji (Paris: E. Plon, Nour rit et Cie, 1889).

37. See Çiçek, Young Ot to mans.38. On Bes sa ra bia, see An drei Kushko and Vik tor Taki, with the as sis tance

of Oleg Groma, Bes sa ra biia v sos tave ros siis koi im pe rii, 1812–1917 (Mos cow: Novoe Li ter a tur noe Oboz re nie, 2012).

39. See Bryce’s “Pref ace” to Toynbee’s The Mur der ous Tyr anny of the Turks (New York: George H. Doran, 1917); and Ar nold J. Toyn bee, The Ar me nian Atroc ities: The Mur der of a Na tion (Lon don: Hod der and Stough ton, 1915).

40. See, for ex am ple, V. I. Lenin, “Na tional and Co lo nial Ques tions, for the Sec ond Con gress of the Com mu nist Inter na tional,” http://marx ists.anu.edu .au/ archive/lenin/works/1920/jun/05.htm; and “Events in the Bal kans and in Per sia,” http://www.marx ists.org/ archive/lenin/works/1908/oct/16.htm. Quot ing Marx, Pok rovs kii, “Vos toch nyi vo pros,” 13:309, 321–22, em pha sizes the Ot to man “feu dal yoke,” West ern im pe ri al ism, and the hos tile na ture of tsar ist foreign pol icy.

41. Among the most en dur ing spe cial ized stud ies writ ten around this time are the pub li ca tions of R. W. Seton-Watson, The South ern Slav Ques tion and the Haps burg Mon ar chy (Lon don: Con stable, 1911); idem, The Bal kans, Italy, and the Adri atic (Lon don: Nis bet, 1916); idem, The Rise of Na tion al ity in the Bal kans (Lon-don: Con stable, 1917); see also George Ab bott, Tur key, Greece, and the Great Pow ers: A Study in Friend ship and Hate (New York: M. Mcbride, 1917). Nat u rally, not all works pub lished dur ing the war dealt ex clu sively with the Bal kans. Inter est in Ger many and the East ern Ques tion had arisen as well. See, for

28


ex am ple, Hein rich von Treitschke, Ger many, France, Rus sia and Islam (Lon don: Jar rold and Sons, 1915).

42. Mar ri ott states in his Mem o ries of Four Score Years: The Auto biog ra phy of the Late Sir John Mar ri ott (Lon don: Blackie & Son, 1946), 154, “Few of my books have evoked more cor dial en co miums from those qual ified to bestow them than The East ern Ques tion; quite re cently it was de scribed by an ex pert as a ‘clas si cal work,’ and I think I may, with out im mod esty, claim that it is now ac cepted as the stan dard work on the sub ject with which it deals.”

43. Mar ri ott, East ern Ques tion, 2. The fourth and last edi tion was re printed as late as 1963.

44. Ibid., 203.45. Ibid., iii.46. Ibid., 3.47. Writ ten in the wake of the Ar me nian mas sa cres and the dis as trous

Greek in va sion of An a to lia in 1919–23, Ar nold Toynbee’s The West ern Ques tion in Greece and Tur key: A Study in the Con tact of Civ il iza tions (Bos ton: Hough ton Mif flin, 1922) pro vided the sole anti dote to pro-Western, Balkan-centric ac counts akin to Mar ri ott. The fierce pub lic con tro versy sparked by Toynbee’s vol ume marked a turn ing point in his ca reer and led to his res ig na tion from the Ko raes Chair of Mod ern Greek and Byz an tine His tory at King’s Col lege, Lon don. See Rich ard Clogg, Pol i tics and the Acad emy: Ar nold Toyn bee and the Ko raes Chair (Lon don: Frank Cass, 1986); and idem, Anglo-Greek At ti tudes: Stud ies in His tory (New York: Pal grave Mac mil lan, 2000), 36–59.

48. Tem per ley, En gland and the Near East; Ver non Pur year, En gland, Rus sia, and the Straits Ques tion, 1844–1856 (Berke ley: Uni ver sity of Cal i for nia Press, 1931); idem, Inter na tional Eco nom ics and Di plo macy in the Near East: A Study of Brit ish Com mer cial Pol icy in the Le vant, 1834–1853 (Stan ford, CA: Stan ford Uni-ver sity Press, 1935); R. W. Seton-Watson, Dis raeli, Glad stone and the East ern Ques tion. See also Philip Mos ley, Rus sian Di plo macy and the Open ing of the East ern Ques tion in 1838 and 1839 (Cam bridge, MA: Har vard Uni ver sity Press, 1934); and the work of Puryear’s stu dent Mose Lo fley Har vey, “The De vel op ment of Rus sian Com merce on the Black Sea and Its Sig nifi cance” (PhD diss., Uni ver sity of Cal i for nia, Berke ley, 1938).

49. M. S. An der son, The East ern Ques tion, 1774–1923: A Study in Inter na tional Re la tions (Lon don: Mac mil lan, 1966), ix. An der son pub lished a com pan ion vol ume of doc u ments, The Great Pow ers and the Near East, 1774–1923 (Lon don: Ed ward Ar nold, 1970).

50. Since Anderson’s work, A. L. Mac fie, The East ern Ques tion, 1774–1923 (Lon don: Long man, 1989; rev. ed. 1996) is the only other main stream sur vey in En glish. Also meant for col lege stu dents and one-quarter of the length of Anderson’s work, Macfie’s vol ume is sup ple mented by a se lec tion of pri mary doc u ments.

Introduction

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51. Çiçek, Young Ot to mans, 6.52. Ed ward Said, Orien tal ism (New York: Vin tage, 1979), 73–76.53. A num ber of im por tant works have also ap peared about the East ern

Ques tion from West ern Eu ro pean per spec tives since the pub li ca tion of Anderson’s sur vey, in clud ing Karl A. Roi der, Austria’s East ern Ques tion, 1700–1790 (Prince ton, NJ: Prince ton Uni ver sity Press, 1982); Allan Cun ning ham, Anglo-Ottoman En coun ters in the Age of Rev o lu tion: Col lected Es says (Lon don: F. Cass, 1992); idem, East ern Ques tions in the Nine teenth Cen tury: Col lected Es says (Lon don: F. Cass, 1993); Mat thew Gib son, Dra cula and the East ern Ques tion: Brit-ish and French Vam pire Nar ra tives of the Nineteenth-Century Near East (New York: Pal grave McMil lan, 2006); and Milo†s Kovic’, Dis raeli and the East ern Ques tion (Ox ford: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 2011).

54. Both the Ot to man and the early Turk ish Re pub li can state tightly con-trolled the pub li ca tion of his tor i cal nar ra tives around state inter ests, and only re cently has the state opened up his tory for a much wider pub lic inter pre ta tion. For a good dis cus sion about the re la tion ship between the Turk ish state and its con trol over the past, see Wendy Shaw, “The Rise of the Hit tite Sun,” in Se lec tive Re mem brances: Ar chae ol ogy in the Con struc tion, Com memora tion, and Con se cra tion of Na tional Pasts, ed. Phil lip Kohl, Mara Ko zel sky, and Nach man Ben-Yahuda (Chi cago: Uni ver sity of Chi cago Press, 2008), 163–88. See also Can dan Badem, The Ot to man Cri mean War (1853–1856) (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 1–39.

55. Kemal Kar pat, The Po lit i ci za tion of Islam: Re con struct ing Iden tity, State, Faith and Com mu nity in the Late Ot to man State (Ox ford: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 2001), 14–15; idem, “The Trans for ma tion of the Ot to man State, 1789–1908,” Inter na tional Jour nal of Mid dle East Stud ies 3, no. 3 (1972): 258; idem, So cial Change and Pol i tics in Tur key: A Structural-Historical Anal y sis (Leiden: Brill, 1973); idem, An In quiry into the So cial Foun da tions of Na tion al ism in the Ot to man State: From So cial Es tates to Classes, from Mil lets to Na tions (Prince ton, NJ: Prince ton Uni ver sity Press, 1973); and idem, Ot to man Pop u la tion 1830–1914. Dem o graphic and So cial Char ac ter is tics (Mad i son: Uni ver sity of Wis con sin Press, 1985). For a longer dis cus sion of Karpat’s foun da tional con tri bu tion to Ot to man historiog ra phy, see Aksan, “Find ing the Way Back to the Ot to man Em pire.”

56. Re cent re vi sion ist work in Ot to man his tory in cludes Su raiya N. Fa roqhi, Pil grims and Sul tans: The Hajj under the Ot to mans, 1517—1683 (Lon don: I. B. Tau ris, 1994); idem, Ap proaches to Ot to man His tory: An Intro duc tion to the Sources (Cam bridge: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 1999); idem, Sub jects of the Sul tan: Cul ture and Daily Life in the Ot to man Em pire (Lon don: I. B. Tau ris, 2000); The Cam bridge His tory of Tur key, vol. 3, The Later Ot to man Em pire, 1603–1839, ed. Su raiya N. Fa roqhi (Cam bridge: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 2006); Selim De rin gil, Con ver sion and Apos tasy in the Late Ot to man Em pire (New York: Cam-bridge Uni ver sity Press, 2012). For a good sum mary of trends in the field, see Jun Akiba, “Pre lim i nar ies to a Com par a tive His tory of the Rus sian and Ot to man

30


Em pires: Per spec tives from Ot to man Stud ies,” in Im per i ol ogy: From Em pir i cal Knowl edge to Dis cuss ing the Rus sian Em pire, ed. Kim i taka Mat su zato (Sap poro: Hok kaido Uni ver sity Press, 2007), 33–49.

57. Nich o las Dou ma nis, Be fore the Na tion: Muslim-Christian Co ex is tence and Its De struc tion in Late Ot to man An a to lia (Ox ford: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 2013); Cem Em rence, Re map ping the Ot to man Mid dle East: Mod er nity, Im pe rial Bu reau c-racy, and the Is lamic State (Lon don: I. B. Tau ris, 2012); Blumi, Foun da tions of Mod er nity; idem, Re in stat ing the Ot to mans; Evan ge lia Balta and Meh met Ölmez, eds., Between Re li gion and Lan guage: Turkish-Speaking Chris tians, Jews and Greek-Speaking Mus lims and Cath o lics in the Ot to man Em pire (I˙ stan bul: EREN, 2011).

58. Kathe rine Flem ing, The Mus lim Bon a parte: Di plo macy and Orien tal ism in Ali Pasha’s Greece (Prince ton, NJ: Prince ton Uni ver sity Press, 1999); Khaled Fahmy, All the Pasha’s Men: Meh med Ali, His Army, and the Mak ing of Mod ern Egypt (Cam bridge: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 1997). See also Eu gene Rogan, Fron tiers of the State in the Late Ot to man Em pire: Trans jor dan, 1850–1921 (Cam-bridge: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 1999); Frede rick An scombe, The Ot to man Gulf: The Crea tion of Ku wait, Saudi Ara bia, and Qatar (New York: Co lum bia Uni-ver sity Press, 1997); Dina Rizk Khoury, “The Ot to man Cen tre ver sus Pro vin cial Power-Holders: An Anal y sis of the Historiog ra phy,” in The Cam bridge His tory of Tur key, vol. 3, The Later Ot to man Em pire, 1603–1839, ed. Su raiya N. Fa roqhi (Cam bridge: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 2006), 135–56.

59. See Badem, Ot to man Cri mean War; Çiçek, Young Ot to mans; Cae sar E. Farah, Pol i tics of Inter ven tion ism in Leb a non; 1830–1861 (Lon don: I. B. Tau ris, 2000); M. Hakan Yavuz and Peter Slu glett, eds., War and Di plo macy: The Russo- Turkish War of 1877–1878 and the Treaty of Ber lin (Salt Lake City: Uni ver sity of Utah Press, 2011).

60. Theo fa nis G. Stav rou, Rus sian Inter ests in Pal es tine: A Study of Re li gious and Ed u ca tional En ter prise (Thes sal o niki: IMXA, 1963); Theo fa nis G. Stav rou and Peter Wei sen sel, Rus sian Travel ers to the Chris tian East from the Twelfth to the Twen ti eth Cen tury (Co lum bus, OH: Slav ica, 1986), as well as the jour nal ed ited by Stav rou, The Mod ern Greek Stud ies Year book (1985– present); Bar bara Jel a vich, Russia’s Bal kan En tan gle ments, 1906–1914 (New York: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 1991); Bar bara and Charles Jel a vich, Es tab lish ment of the Bal kan Na tion States, 1804–1920 (Seat tle: Uni ver sity of Wash ing ton Press, 1977); Bar bara Jel a vich, His tory of the Bal kans, 2 vols. (Cam bridge: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 1983).

61. Theo phi lus C. Prou sis, Rus sian So ci ety and the Greek Rev o lu tion (De Kalb: North ern Il li nois Uni ver sity Press, 1994); Lora Gerd, Konstantinopol’skii Pa-tri ark hat i Ros siia 1901/1914 (Mos cow: In drik, 2012); idem, Kon stan tin o pol i Pe ter burg: Tser kov naia pol i tika Ros sii na pra vos lav nom Vos toke, 1878–1898 (Mos-cow: In drik 2006); N. N. Li so voi, Russ koe duk hov noe i po lit i ches koe pri sutst vie v Svi a toi Zemle i na Blizh nem Vos toke v XIX–na chale XX v. (Mos cow: In drik, 2006); idem, ed., Ros siia v Svi a toi Zemle: Dok u menty i ma ter i aly, 2 vols. (Mos cow:

Introduction

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Mezh du na rod nye ot no she niia, 2000); Ste phen K. Ba tal den, Cathe rine II’s Greek Prel ate: Eu ge nios Voul garis in Rus sia 1771–1806 (Boul der, CO: East Eu ro pean Mono graphs, 1982); Greg ory Lynn Bruess, Re li gion, Iden tity and Em pire: A Greek Arch bishop in the Age of Cathe rine the Great (Boul der, CO: East Eu ro pean Mono-graphs, 1997); Derek Hop wood, The Rus sian Pres ence in Syria and Pal es tine, 1843–1914: Church and Pol i tics in the Near East (Ox ford: Cla ren don Press, 1969).

62. On Rus sian hajj, see Ei leen Kane, “Odessa as a Hajj Hub, 1880s–1910s,” in Rus sia in Mo tion: Es says on the Pol i tics, So ci ety, and Cul ture of Human Mo bil ity, 1850 - Present, ed. John Ran dolph and Eu gene Av ru tin (Chi cago: Uni ver sity of Il li nois Press, 2012), 107–25.

63. V. N. Vi nog ra dov, Dvu glav nyi ros siis kii orel na Bal ka nakh, 1683–1914 (Mos cow: In drik, 2010); idem, ed., Vek Ekat e riny II: Dela bal kans kie (Mos cow: Nauka, 2000); E. P. Ku dri avt seva, Ros siia i sta nov le nie serbs koi gos u darst ven nosti, 1812–1856 (Mos cow: Kva driga, 2009); G. A. Georgiev et al., Vos toch nyi vo pros vo vnesh nei pol i tike Ros sii: Ko nets XVIII–na chalo XX veka (Mos cow: Nauka, 1978); I. S. Dos tian, Ros siia i Bal kans kii vo pros (Mos cow: Nauka, 1972).

64. Al ex an der Bitis, Rus sia and the East ern Ques tion, 1815–1833 (Ox ford: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 2006); John Daly, Rus sian Sea power and “The East ern Ques tion,” 1827–1841 (An nap o lis, MD: Naval In sti tute Press, 1991).

65. V. She remet, Voina i biz nes: Vlast’, den’gi i or u zhie; Ev ropa i Blizh nii Vos tok v novoe vre miia (Mos cow: Tekh no log i ches kaia shkola biz nesa, 1996); idem, Os man-s kaia im pe riia i Za pad naia Ev ropa vto raia tret’ XIX v. (Mos cow: Nauka, 1986).

66. David Gold frank, The Or i gins of the Cri mean War (Lon don: Long man, 1994); idem, “The Holy Sep ul cher and the Or i gin of the Cri mean War,” in The Mil i tary and So ci ety in Rus sia: 1450–1917, ed. Eric Lohr and Mar shall Poe (Leiden, The Neth er lands: Brill, 2002), 491–506; L. V. Mel’nikova, Russ kaia Pra vos lav naia Tser kov i Kryms kaia Voina, 1853–1856 gg. (Mos cow: Kuch kovo pole, 2012); Or-lando Figes, The Cri mean War: A His tory (New York: Met ro pol i tan Books, 2011). While not from the Rus sian per spec tive, Win fried Baum gart, The Cri mean War (Lon don: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 2008) has prob ably pro vided the most sub-stan tial re vi sion of the con flict since the pub li ca tion of Anderson’s sur vey.

67. Ro nald Bo broff, Roads to Glory: Late Im pe rial Rus sia and the Turk ish Straits (Lon don: I. B. Tau ris, 2006); Mi chael Re ynolds, Shat ter ing Em pires: The Clash and Crash of Ot to man and Rus sian Em pires, 1908–1918 (Cam bridge: Cam bridge Uni-ver sity Press, 2011); Sean McMee kin, The Rus sian Or i gins of the First World War (Cam bridge, MA: Har vard Uni ver sity Press, 2011). See also An drew Ros sos, Rus sia and the Bal kans: Inter-Balkan Ri val ries and Rus sian Foreign Pol icy, 1908–1914 (To ronto: Uni ver sity of To ronto Press, 1981).

68. The only book de voted to the ci vil ian ex pe ri ence of the Cri mean War, for ex am ple, dates to 1904: Ar se nii Marke vich, Tav ri ches kaia gu ber niia vo vre mia Kryms koi Voiny (1904; repr., Sim fer o pol: Binez, In form, 1994).

69. Radu Flo rescu, The Strug gle against Rus sia in the Ro ma nian Prin ci pal ities (Iasi: Cen ter for Ro ma nian Stud ies, 1997); Rob ert A. Berry, “Czartoryski’s Hôtel

32


Lam bert and the Great Pow ers in the Bal kans, 1832–1848,” Inter na tional His-tory Re view 7, no. 1 (1985): 45–67; and more re cently, Rados¬aw Zuraw ski vel Gra jew ski, Wielka Bry ta nia w “dy plo macji” ksie˛cia Adama Jer zego Czar to rys kiego wobec kry zysu wschod niego (1832–1841) (War saw: Wy dawn. Nauk. Sem per, 1999); Jel ena Mil oj kovic’ - Djuric’ , The East ern Ques tion and the Voices of Rea son: Austria-Hungary, Rus sia, and the Bal kan States, 1875–1908 (Boul der, CO: East Eu ro pean Mono graphs, 2002). For an inter est ing dis cus sion of the or i gins of the East ern Ques tion in Bal kan af fairs, see Zdenko Zla tar, Between the Dou ble Eagle and the Cres cent: The Re pub lic of Du brov nik and the Or i gins of the East ern Ques tion (Boul der, CO: East ern Eu ro pean Mono graphs, 1992).

70. A. D. Pa nesh, Za pad naia Cher ke siia v sis teme vzai mo deist viia ros sii s turt siei, an gliei, i imam a tom sha mii lia v XIXv (do 1864) (Mai kop: Ad y geis kii re spu bli kans kii in sti tut gu man i tar nykh iss led o va nii im. T. M. Ker a sheva, 2007).

71. For dem o graphic anal y ses of Greek move ments dur ing Russian- Ottoman wars, see the foun da tional works of G. L. Arsh, in clud ing “Gre ches koe em i grat siia v Ros siiu v kontse XVIII–na chale XIX v.,” So vets kaia et no gra fia, no. 3 (1969): 85–95; and Et e rists koe dvizhe nie v Ros sii: Osvoboditel’naia bor’ba gre ches kogo na roda v na chale XIX v. i russko-grecheskie svi azi (Mos cow: Nauka, 1970). See also Shte li ian Shte ri o nov, Gert site po Bul garsk ite zemi pres XVIII–XIX vek (do 1878 g.) (Sofia: Faber, 2008); idem, Mi grat sii ata na Grets koto nas e le nia, obit a vashto Bul-garsk ite zemi pres XVIII–XIX vek (do 1878 g.) (Sofia: Faber, 2009); John Mazis, The Greeks of Odessa: Di as pora Lead er ship in Late Im pe rial Rus sia (Boul der, CO: East Eu ro pean Mono graphs, 2004); M. A. Arad zhi oni, Greki Kryma i priazov’ia iz u che niia i is to ri o gra fia et ni ches koi is to rii i kult’tury (80-e gg XVIII v. 90-e gg XX v.) (Sim fer o pol: Simferopol’skii gos. uni ver si tet, 1999); A. Mi kae lian, Na kryms koi zemle: Is to riia ar mi ans kikh pos e le nii v Krymu (Ere van: Izd-vo Aia stan, 1974); Nina Nos kova, Kryms kie bol gary v XIV–na chale XX v.: Is toria i kul’tura (Sim fer o pol: SONAT, 2002).

72. Jus tin McCarthy, Death and Exile: The Eth nic Cleans ing of Ot to man Mus-lims, 1821–1922 (Prince ton, NJ: Dar win Press, 1996); Alan W. Fisher, “Em i gra-tion of Mus lims from the Rus sian Em pire in the Years after the Cri mean War,” Jahrbücher für Ges chichte Os teu ro pas 35 (1987): 356–71; idem, The Rus sian An nex a-tion of Cri mea, 1772–1783 (Cam bridge: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 1970); Bryan Glyn Williams, “The Hijra and Forced Mi gra tion from Nineteenth-Century Rus sia to the Ot to man Em pire: A Crit i cal Anal y sis of the Great Cri mean Tatar Em i gra tion, 1860–1861,” Ca hiers du monde russe 41, no. 1 (2000): 79–108; Mark Pin son, “Dem o graphic War fare—an As pect of Ot to man and Rus sian Pol icy, 1854–1866” (PhD diss., Har vard Uni ver sity, 1970).

73. As the Ar me nian gen o cide un folded, con tem po rary ob serv ers like Mar ri ott and Toyn bee saw this human dis as ter as de vel op ing from the East ern Ques tion and di rectly con nected to the long his tory of sec tar ian vi o lence in the Ot to man Em pire. Thus, for ex am ple, Toyn bee con nected the Ar me nian gen o-cide to the pol i cies of Sul tan Abdülhamid II, whose “Bal kan ex pe ri ence had

Introduction

33

taught him the pol icy of keep ing the races of his em pire in hand by set ting them to mas sa cre one an other.” Post–World War II schol ar ship has as so ciated the Ar me nian gen o cide with later atroc ities of the twen ti eth cen tury. For Toyn bee on the Ar me ni ans, see Toyn bee, Ar me nian Atroc ities, 21. For the ar gu ment that the pop u la tion ex change and the Ar me nian gen o cide were prod ucts of twentiethcentury vi o lence, see Nor man Nai mark, Fires of Ha tred: Eth nic Cleans ing in the Twen ti eth Cen tury (Cam bridge, MA: Har vard Uni ver sity Press, 2001).

74. Gary Bass, Freedom’s Bat tle: The Or i gins of Hu man i tar ian Inter ven tion (New York: Knopf, 2008); and Davide Ro dogno, Against Mas sa cre: Hu man i tar ian Inter ven tion in the Ot to man Em pire, 1815–1914 (Prince ton, NJ: Prince ton Uni ver-sity Press, 2011).

75. Ed ward Knox, The Mak ing of a New East ern Ques tion: Brit ish Pal es tine Pol icy and the Or i gins of Is rael, 1917–1925 (Wash ing ton, DC: Cath o lic Uni ver sity Press, 1981); Carl L. Brown, Inter na tional Pol i tics and the Mid dle East: Old Rules, Dan ger ous Game (Prince ton, NJ: Prince ton Uni ver sity Press, 1984); Harry J. Psom i ades, The East ern Ques tion: The Last Phase; A Study in Greek-Turkish Di plo macy (Thes sal o niki: IMXA, 1968).

Map of Moldavia and Wallachia, 1782. (reprinted with permission from the Pusey Map Collection at Harvard University)

35

The Rus sian Pro tec to rate in the Da nu bian Prin ci pal itiesLeg a cies of the East ern Ques tion in Con tem po rary Russian-Romanian Re la tions

Vic tor Taki

In 1890, the soon-to-be leader of the Ro ma nian Lib eral Party, Dim i trie Alex an dru Sturdza, pub lished a book let ti tled Eu ropa, Rusia si România, in which he pre sented his coun try as the avant-garde force of Eu ro pean civ il iza tion in the up com ing strug gle with the mass of Slavic peo ples mo bi liz ing against Eu rope under the Rus sian scep ter.1 Cit ing dif fer ent sta tis ti cal sources, the bro chure cal cu lated the com par a tive strength of the two op pos ing forces and at tempted to an tic i pate the out comes of the fu ture con fron ta tion between East and West. The maps chart ing the geog ra phy of this con fron ta tion con sti tute per haps the most inter est ing as pect of this small book. The King dom of Ro ma nia to gether with the pre dom i nantly eth ni cally Ro ma nian lands of the Rus sian and the Austro- Hungarian Em pires con sti tuted an “ad vance bas tion” pro trud ing well into the mass of Slavic peo ples and con nected to Sturdza’s “for tress Eu-rope” by the Hun gar ian and Aus trian isth mus. To the north, sep ar ated by the mass of west ern Slavs, lay a flank ram part in the shape of East ern

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Prus sia, the Bal tic prov inces of the Rus sian Em pire, and Fin land. An other bul wark lo cated to the south con sisted, rather un ex pect edly, of Greece and Tur key, which Sturdza did not hes i tate to place to gether de spite the dra matic con fron ta tions that the two had under gone in the nine teenth cen tury, and the even more trau matic ones that were still to come. Sturdza’s im a gined geog ra phy thus split the Eu ro pean con ti nent along a much more en tan gled line than the one Wins ton Church ill drew between Stet tin and Trieste half a cen tury later.

Had Sturdza the pos sibil ity to travel 120 years into the fu ture, he would un doubt edly be happy to see his op ti mis tic ex pec ta tion of “Europe’s” vic tory in its con fron ta tion with Rus sia con firmed. The “fron tier of civ il iza tion” has been pushed well east ward, while the west ern and south ern Slavic peo ples who pre vi ously nearly en cir cled the “Ro ma nian bas tion” have been largely in cor po rated into “the for-tress.” Sturdza’s only pos sible cause for con cern would be the un stable state of the erst while south ern flank, where Tur key cur rently en gages in eco nomic coop er a tion with Rus sia. In the late nine teenth cen tury, the pros pect of a Russian-Ottoman coop er a tion in deed seemed un nat u ral and un re alis tic, but this was (and still is!) even more true of Sturdza’s pro posed idea that Tur key and Greece to gether could form a “ram part” against some ex ter nal as sai lant. The fact that Sturdza was ca pable of iden tify ing such a force in di cates his ten dency to con ceive of the East ern Ques tion as sub or di nate to the issue of Slavic unity and ul ti mately of Russia’s re la tion to Eu rope. Sturdza shared this ten dency with the Rus sian Pan-Slavist writ ers Ros tis lav An dree vich Fa deev and Ni ko lai Ia kov leich Dan i levs kii, whose works he cited and whose vi sions in some re spects con sti tuted a mir ror image of his own ideas.2 The fact that the Rus sian writ ers and the Ro ma nian au thor re inter preted the East ern Ques tion as the prob lem of re la tions between Rus sia and Eu-rope is all the more strik ing if one takes into ac count how dif fer ently the two sides con ceived the re la tions between each other.

In order to ex plain this con junc tion of sim i lar ities and dif fer ences between the au thors, whose mode of think ing still has some in flu ence in con tem po rary Rus sia and Ro ma nia, this chap ter traces the his tor i cal ev o lu tion of Russian-Romanian re la tions and of the ways in which the two na tions per ceived each other in the con text of the East ern Ques tion. The chap ter dem on strates that the mu tual per cep tions of Rus sians and Ro ma nians cor re lated with their evolv ing con cep tu al iza tions of the East ern Ques tion and the role of their re spec tive coun tries in it. In itially de fined by com mon Or tho dox faith, re la tions between Rus sia and the

The Russian Protectorate in the Danubian Principalities

37

Ro ma nian prin ci pal ities of Mol da via and Wal la chia be came con sid er-ably sec u lar ized by the turn of the nine teenth cen tury. With the emer-gence of mod ern na tion al ism, both Ro ma nians and Rus sians be came in creas ingly sen si tive about their eth nic dif fer ences. In par allel, ear lier pro jects plac ing the prin ci pal ities under the Rus sian pro tec to rate gave way to con cerns about the place of Ro ma nians in the pros pec tive union of the Slavic peo ples. In creas ingly neg a tive mu tual per cep tions con sti-tute one of the most sig nifi cant leg a cies of the East ern Ques tion in con-tem po rary Russian-Romanian re la tions. An em pha sis on col lec tive per cep tions helps transcend the tra di tional historio graph i cal treat ment of the East ern Ques tion as the story of di plo macy and war. It re veals an en dur ing rel e vance of the East ern Ques tion for under stand ing present- day inter na tional re la tions on the east ern bor ders of the EU.3

This chap ter also argues for a greater im por tance of the Ro ma nian prin ci pal ities in the Russian-Ottoman en coun ter and the inter na tional re la tions of the eigh teenth and nine teenth cen tury more broadly. Con tacts between Rus sian rul ers and the elites of these two Ot to man trib u tary pol ities were the most im por tant man i fes ta tions of Russia’s in flu ence in the Eu ro pean Tur key that gen er ated the East ern Ques tion as we know it. In an ef fort to se cure the his tor i cal priv i leges of the prin ci pal ities, the Mol da vian and Wal la chian boy ars sug gested to Rus sian foreign-policy mak ers their basic strat egy of inter fer ence in the re la tions between the sul tan and his Chris tian sub jects. Later, the dis course of the Ot to man “ca pit u la tions” to Mol da via and Wal la chia served the Ro ma nian lead ers in play ing Tur key off against Rus sia in order to widen their po lit i cal auton omy. The ac tiv i ties of Ro ma nian lead ers re vealed the lim its of Russia’s in flu ence in the Bal kans, even if they were not the im me di ate cause of the Cri mean War and the sub se quent ab o li tion of the Rus sian pro tec to rate over the prin ci pal ities. The his tory of the Rus sian pro tec-to rate over Mol da via and Wal la chia thus re veals that the stan dard ac counts of the East ern Ques tion have not given to the bor der land elites the at ten tion that they merit.

The Da nu bian Prin ci pal ities and Rus sia

"The light comes to us from Mos cow,” wrote the met ro pol i tan of Mol da-via Do si fei in the late seven teenth cen tury. A major re li gious writer, Do si fei oc cu pies pride of place in the his tory of the Mol da vian Church due to the Ro ma nian trans la tions of the Old Church Sla vonic li tur gi cal books. Printed on a press that he re ceived from the Mus co vite tsar

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Fe o dor Alex ee vich in 1681, these trans la tions made it pos sible to con duct the re li gious ser vices in Ro ma nian.4 Do si fei headed the Mol da vian Church for four teen years, dur ing which on two oc ca sions (in 1674 and 1684) he par tic i pated in nego ti a tions with Mos cow with the goal of bring ing Mol da via under Mus co vite su ze rainty.5 This did not strengthen Dosifei’s cre den tials in the eyes of Moldavia’s Ot to man over lords, and even tu ally he had to leave for Po land in the train of Jan Sobieski’s army re treat ing from Mol da via in 1686. On sev eral oc ca sions dur ing his stay in Polish exile, Do si fei, like many other high Or tho dox cler gy men from the Ot to man Em pire, sent for and re ceived fi nan cial help from Mos cow.6 Al though some ac counts in di cate that Do si fei died in Zol kiev (Po land) in 1696, ac cord ing to oth ers he came to Rus sia that year, was fa vor ably re ceived by Peter the Great, and died in Mos cow in 1701, shortly after being named the met ro pol i tan of Azov.7

Dosifei’s ac tiv i ties il lus trate both the in itial at ti tudes of the Mol da-vian and Wal la chian elites to ward Mus co vite Rus sia and the me di a tory role of the high Or tho dox clergy in the early re la tions between the prin-ci pal ities and the sole sove reign Or tho dox power. They dem on strate that the Chris tian lead ers of south east ern Eu rope quickly rec og nized the op por tu nities re sult ing from the emer gence of Rus sia and the be-gin ning of the Ot to man re treat from Eu rope. Thus, some fifty years ear lier in 1649, the pa tri arch of Je ru sa lem, Pai sios, sent a mes sage to Tsar Alek sei Mik hai lo vich with an in vi ta tion to join the Mol da vian and Wal la chian princes on a cam paign to take I˙ stan bul, “for now the strength of the Turk [was] ex hausted.”8 The Mol da vian met ro pol i tan Gedeon brought the same mes sage from the hos po dars Vas i lie Lupu (1634–53) and Ghe or ghe ¸Stefan (1653–58), who pro posed, re spec tively, an anti- Ottoman al li ance and the ac cep tance of Moscow’s sov e reignty over the prin ci pal ity.9 The Greek clergy prop a gated the idea of an anti-Ottoman strug gle later in the cen tury. Thus, in 1688, the archi man drite Isaiah of St. Paul’s Mon as tery on Mount Athos brought mes sages to Mos cow from a for mer pa tri arch of Con stan tin o ple, Dio ny sios, the Wal la chian prince Serban Can tac u zino, the Mol da vian prince Con stan tine Cante mir, and the Ser bian pa tri arch Arse nije III.10 On their be half, Isaiah sum-moned the young Rus sian tsars Ivan and Peter to a holy war for the lib er a tion of the Or tho dox Church and de clared, “At present the whole Turk ish state has re ceived a harsh pun ish ment from God and the great Mus lim hood [bu sur manstvo] is com ing to utter ruin.”11

Re mark ably, such pleas re veal that the Greek Or tho dox sub jects of the sul tan came to per ceive the Mus co vite tsars as their inter ces sors


39

be fore the lat ter were ready and will ing to adopt such a pos ture them-selves. Thus, de spite agree ing to ac cept Mol da via under his su ze rainty in 1656, Alexei Mik hai lo vich ul ti mately re fused to dis patch to Ia¸si the em bassy that was sup posed to ad min is ter the principality’s oath of loy alty to the tsar.12 Five years later, Alexis or dered the governor of Kiev to de clare to the rep re sen ta tive of the Mol da vian hos po dar Con stan tin ¸Serban that “there [was] an old friend ship” between the sul tan and the tsar and thus the lat ter could not ac cept the former’s sub ject “under his high hand.”13 Alexei Mik hai lo vich was clearly un will ing to an tag o nize the Ot to mans, much like his father Mi khail Fe o dor o vich, who in 1641 re turned to them the Azov for tress cap tured by the Don Cos sacks sev eral years pre vi ously. As a re sult, al most two decades elapsed between Pa-tri arch Paisios’s mes sage to Alexis and the out break of the first Russian- Ottoman War of 1677–81.

In the course of the Russian-Ottoman wars of the late seven teenth and the eigh teenth cen tury, ap peals for pro tec tion and dec lar a tions of loy alty to the tsars be came rou tine in the ad dresses of the hos po dars, boy ars, and high cler gy men. Peter the Great re ceived re quests for a pro tec to rate or an al li ance from one Wal la chian and three Mol da vian princes be fore con clud ing the Lutsk treaty of April 1711 with Mol da-vian hos po dar Dimi trie Cante mir, on the eve of the ill-fortuned Pruth cam paign.14 De feated by the tsar at Pol tava in 1709, the Swed ish king Charles XII fled to the Ot to man for tress Bender on the Dniester, where, with the help of the Cri mean khan and French di plo macy, he man aged to pro voke an other war between Rus sia and the Ot to man Em pire.15 A brief over view of con di tions of the Russian-Moldavian trea ties con cluded up to that his tor i cal turn ing point dem on strates that from the be gin ning the Mol da vian and Wal la chian princes and boy ars were ready to sub-mit under the “high sove reign hand” of the tsar on cer tain con di tions. The lat ter usu ally in cluded inter nal auton omy and the pres er va tion of their tra di tional rights and laws of the coun try. Thus, the treaty of 1656 between Ghe or ghe Stefan and Alek sei Mik hai lo vich stip u lated that the Mol da vian hos po dar al ways be elected from the na tives of Mol da via, re-tain his tra di tional pre rog a tives, and re es tab lish his au thor ity over cit-ies al ien ated into Ottoman-controlled reaya dis tricts.16 Sim i larly, the con di tions on which the Mol da vian boy ars were ready to swear loy alty to Tsar Alexis in 1674 re ferred to the “cus toms of our land” and the “old rights” and stip u lated the right to elect the hos po dar as well as the sec u lar and ec cle sias ti cal of fi cials. The boy ars also asked to re store the ter ri to rial in teg rity of the prin ci pal ity, which, under the in flu ence of Polish po lit i cal

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no tions, they called a com mon wealth (Rech Pos po li taia).17 Fi nally, the di ploma is sued by Peter the Great to Cante mir se cured the latter’s he red i tary rule over Mol da via and as serted the plen i tude of the hospodar’s au thor ity over the boy ars, the cit ies, and the Ot to man re ayas “in ac cor d-ance with the an cient Mol da vian cus tom.”18

For al most a cen tury after the Pruth de ba cle, no Mol da vian or Wal la chian prince wanted or dared to con clude the trea ties of al li ance with or be come a sub ject of the Rus sian tsar.19 Pha nar i ote Greeks, who, after 1711, main tained the thrones of Mol da via and Wal la chia, were too closely con trolled by the Ot to mans. As cul tural foreign ers, they did not enjoy sub stan tial sup port among the largely autoch thon ous boyar class.20 Pha nar i otes were aris to cratic na tives of the Pha nar dis trict in Con stan tin o ple who pro vided im por tant dip lo matic ser vices to the Ot to mans in the post-Karlowitz pe riod. Rooted in the po lit i cal tra di tion of the Byz an tine Em pire, whose re in car na tion they some times se cretly en vi sioned, Pha nar i ote Greeks were gen er ally in im i cal to proto na tion al-ist man i fes ta tions of other Or tho dox sub ject peo ples of the sul tan that were in com pat ible with this Meg ali Idea. The pe riod of their rule in the prin ci pal ities (1711/1716–1821) is char ac ter ized by la tent intra-elite ten sions within the boyar class between the autoch thon ous ele ments and the Greeks who came to the prin ci pal ities in the suites of the Pha-nar i ote princes. For this rea son, the Russian-Ottoman wars of 1735–39 and 1768–74 oc ca sioned the for ma tion of pro-Russian boyar fac tions that per ceived Rus sian rule as a means to con sol i date their hold on the prin ci pal ities.21 In 1736–37, the Wal la chian envoy to Anna Ioan novna, P. Dr˘agu nescu, re ported that the boy ars of the prin ci pal ity “slav ishly re quest[ed] not to leave [them] among other en slaved peo ple, but to de liver [them] and make [them] sub jects of [His] Or tho dox Ma jesty.”22 In Sep tem ber 1739, their Mol da vian counter parts “ac cepted with a great and in ef fable tear ful joy” the au thor ity of the em press and signed with the com mander of the Rus sian army, Burk hard Chris toph von Mün nich, a con ven tion ac cord ing to which Mol da via re lin quished its right to con duct an in de pen dent foreign pol icy and under took to main-tain a twenty-thousand-strong Rus sian army in re turn for inter nal auton omy.23 In 1769, the del e ga tions of the Wal la chian and Mol da vian boy ars ar rived at the court of Cathe rine II with the offer to bring the prin ci pal ities under the Rus sian scep ter. The offer was re ceived fa vor-ably but did not lead to the con clu sion of a for mal treaty be cause of the un will ing ness of the em press to pro voke the Habs burg mon ar chy or other Eu ro pean pow ers.24


41

These at tempts to enact a vi sion of Rus sia as the pro tec tor of the Or tho dox prin ci pal ities cost the Mol da vian and Wal la chian elite dearly, while bring ing noth ing or very lit tle in re turn. For var i ous rea sons, the trea ties of al li ance and su ze rainty signed in 1656, 1711, and 1739 re-mained a dead let ter. The hos po dars, boy ars, and cler gy men who signed these trea ties even tu ally had to em i grate or face se vere pun ish ment from the Ot to mans. A sim i lar fate awaited those who col lab o rated with the Rus sians in the last two wars of the cen tury. Nego ti a tions with the Or tho dox power had their price, as the Mol da vian met ro pol i tan Do si fei had dem on strated.25 More gen er ally, the pro-Russian boy ars could not fail to be come more cau tious, in view of the fact that Rus sian troops aban doned the prin ci pal ities as many times as they oc cu pied them.26

The lead ers of the pro-Russian fac tion started con sid er ing po lit i cal al ter na tives after the elu sive re sponse of Cathe rine II to the Mol da vian and Wal la chian dep u ta tions in 1770 made it clear that the em press would nei ther have the prin ci pal ities “joined to the most happy prov-inces of Rus sia” nor in sist on their in de pen dence (as she did with re spect to Cri mea).27 In par tic u lar, they must have sug gested that, in their nego-ti a tions with the Porte, the Rus sian dip lo mats de mand the rec og ni tion of those “rights and priv i leges that the prin ci pal ities en joyed at the be gin ning of the Ot to man over lord ship.”28 In a strik ing in stance of the “in ven tion of the legal tra di tion,” the leader of the pro-Russian Wal-la chians, Mihai Can tac u zino, pro duced the texts of the Ot to man “ca pit u-la tions” granted to the fifteenth-century Wal la chian princes Mir cea the Old and Laiota Bas a rab.29 These “ca pit u la tions” stip u lated the full auton-omy of the prin ci pal ity, pres er va tion of its faith, the non ac ces sion of the Mus lims in its ter ri tory, the ap point ment of the elected na tives as hos po-dars, the in vi o la bil ity and non tax a tion of the Wal la chians on busi ness in the Ot to man Em pire, and their right to em i grate from the prin ci pal ity.30 In par allel, the Mol da vian boy ars for mu lated the the ory of “ca pit u la-tions” in their mem o ran dum ad dressed to Aus trian and Prus sian rep-re sen ta tives at the Con gress of Foçsani in 1772.31

The final text of the Ku chuk Kai nardji treaty of 1774 con tained a some what dif fer ent ver sion con cern ing the status of Mol da via and Wal la chia within the Ot to man Em pire. Even though the res to ra tion of the tra di tional priv i leges of the prin ci pal ities was an nounced, the text men tioned only the pres er va tion of faith and the right of the in hab i tants to im mi grate to other coun tries. Other as pects of the “ca pit u la tions,” most im por tantly the elec tion of na tive hos po dars, were omit ted.32 Other stip u la tions of Ar ti cle 16 (am nesty for the par tic i pants of war on

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Russia’s side and Russia’s right to make “rep re sen ta tions” on be half of Mol da via and Wal la chia) con sti tuted the new pre rog a tives of the Rom a nov em pire, rather than the an cient “priv i leges” of the prin ci pal-ities. Each of the sub se quent Russian-Ottoman trea ties ( Jassy, 1792; Bu char est, 1812; the Con ven tion of Ak ker man, 1826) would con firm the clauses of Ku chuk Kai nardji, while a spe cial hatt-i sher iff is sued by Selim III in 1802 under Rus sian pres sure fixed the seven-year term of ap point-ment for the hos po dars and made their dep o si tion con di tional upon Russia’s con sent.33

After 1774, Rus sian di plo macy used the “ca pit u la tions” as a means of ap ply ing extra pres sure on the Ot to mans dur ing nego ti a tions as well as an in stru ment of con tin ued inter fer ence in the re la tions between the sul tan and the prin ci pal ities.34 Nev er the less, in the long run, the main ben e fi ci ar ies of the dis course of “rights and priv i leges” were the elites of Mol da via and Wal la chia. By the sec ond or third decade of the nine-teenth cen tury, the lat ter were dis il lu sioned by the ten dency of St. Pe ters-burg to view the prin ci pal ities as bar gain ing chips in nego ti a tions with the Ot to mans. The Rus sian an nex a tion of Bes sa ra bia in 1812 dem on-strated that the tsar was no more com mit ted to the ter ri to rial in teg rity of the prin ci pal ities than were the sul tans, when they al ien ated sub stan-tial por tions of Mol da vian and Wal la chian lands into re ayas, or the Habs burg em per ors, when they an nexed Lit tle Wal la chia and Bu co vina in 1718 and 1774 re spec tively.35 Nev er the less, many of the boy ars still ex pected po lit i cal ben e fits from coop er a tion with Rus sia. Their at ti tude is per haps best ex pressed by the au thor of the anon y mous mem o ran-dum on the prin ci pal ities writ ten in the wake of the Bu char est treaty: “There is a re ceived opin ion that the prin ci pal ities of Mol da via and Wal-la chia are pro-Russian. This opin ion needs to be qual ified. It is true if one under stand this in cli na tion as a ne ces sity, a re quest for pro tec tion. How ever, this opin ion is no longer founded if one under stands it as a de mand to pass under Rus sian dom i nance.”36

The po lit i cal lan guage em ployed by the boy ars in their re la tions with the Rus sian em peror in the early nine teenth cen tury in di cates that the lat ter was for them no longer a cham pion of Or tho doxy, whose sub jects they were “slav ishly re quest ing” to be come, but rather the guar an tor of sec u lar rights and priv i leges that had been granted by the sul tans cen-tu ries ear lier. Thus, in their ad dress to Nich o las I fol low ing the out-break of the war of 1828–29, the Wal la chian boy ars ex pressed con vic tion that the em peror would se cure their “stable and legal ex is tence, guar-an tee the laws and cus toms of [their] an ces tors, their prop erty” and


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re li gion.37 Rus sian vice-chancellor K. V. Nes sel rode re plied that “their des ti nies [were] pro tected from any de sign of con quest” and that the tsar’s goal was “legal order,” “the ben e fits of reg u lar and stable ad min is-tra tion,” and the “in vi o la bil ity of the priv i leges” that they pos sessed.38 Ac cord ingly, the Treaty of Ad ri an o ple of 1829 men tioned “spe cial ca pit u-la tions on the basis of which the prin ci pal ities Mol da via and Wa la chia sub or di nated them selves to the su preme au thor ity of the Sub lime Porte” and con firmed “the rights, priv i leges and ad van tages” granted thereby.39

The pe riod between the Treaty of Ku chuk Kai nardji and that of Ad ri an o ple there fore con sti tuted a new stage in Russian-Moldavian- Wallachian re la tions.40 As al ways, the boy ars sought to build ties with the Rus sian rul ers on a contrac tual basis. How ever, if ear lier the “rights and priv i leges” con di tioned Russian-Moldavian and Russian- Wallachian nego ti a tions and trea ties (as in 1656, 1711, and 1739), from the early 1770s on ward they also af fected the tri lat eral re la tions between Rus sia, the Ot to man Em pire, and the prin ci pal ities. The autoch thon ous elites of Mol da via and Wal la chia now ex pected Rus sia to be the guar an-tor of the “ca pit u la tions” granted by the Ot to mans. Once the Russian- Ottoman trea ties rec og nized the “ca pit u la tions” as au then tic, the boy ars ac quired a legal basis for the de fense of their auton omy. Rus sian pro tec-tion was seen as le git i mate so long as Rus sia per formed the func tions of the guar an tor of the “ca pit u la tions” granted to the prin ci pal ities by the third party. Russia’s abil ity to in stru men tal ize the issue of “rights and priv i leges” would there fore be lim ited as soon as the Ot to man Em pire (or some other great power) de cided to treat the “ca pit u la tions” as se ri ously as did the Mol da vian and Wal la chian elites.41

This be came ob vi ous al ready in 1822, when in the wake of the Greek up ris ing in the prin ci pal ities, the Porte de cided to ap point the new hos po dars from the ranks of autoch thon ous boy ars, thereby end ing a cen tury of Pha nar i ote rule. Al though St. Pe ters burg in sisted for sev eral years on a status quo ante 1821, it even tu ally had to en force the switch to the autoch thon ous princes in the Con ven tion of Ak ker man of 1826. To gether with the am big u ous po si tion of Rus sian au thor ities with re-spect to the Etai reia con spir acy that or ga nized the re bel lion, this intran si-gence pro duced a last ing im pres sion that Rus sia sup ported “the Greeks,” that is, the Pha nar i otes.42 In the mean time, the Ot to mans took credit for re stor ing the main clause of the “ca pit u la tions,” namely, the rule of autoch thon ous princes, with out any Rus sian pres sure, in fact de spite it. Pre dict ably, a con sid er able num ber of boy ars in both prin ci pal ities be came pro-Ottoman.43 As was the case of the some Bul gar ian lead ers

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later in the cen tury, the Tur ko philes within the Mol da vian and Wal-la chian elites proved to be quite ca pable of com bin ing pro fes sions of loy alty to the Ot to mans with an at tempt to at tract the at ten tion of the Eu ro pean pow ers to the status of the prin ci pal ities.44

How ever, the im pli ca tions of the new tri lat eral Russian-Ottoman- Romanian re la tions in formed by “ca pit u la tions” were not im me di ately ob vi ous to the Rus sians. This is clear from their rather cav a lier treat-ment of the clauses of the Ak ker man con ven tion and the Ad ri an o ple treaty. Thus, in 1828 the Rus sian oc cu pa tion au thor ities dis con tin ued the work on the Or ganic Stat utes that was started under the autoch tho-n ous hos po dars in ac cor dance with the con ven tion. The Rus sian Min is try of Foreign Af fairs rec og nized that a legal defi ni tion of re la tions between the princes and the boyar elites was nec es sary in order to over come the po lit i cal cri sis in the prin ci pal ities trig gered by the up ris ings of 1821. Yet the fruits of boyar ef forts to elab orate these Or ganic Stat utes in 1827–28 did not satisfy the Rus sian min is try. Dif fer ent boyar com mit tees, whose mem bers were hand picked from the great boy ars on the in di ca-tions of the Rus sian con sul, started work anew in June 1829.45 Second- and third-rank boy ars crit i cized the com mit tees as too nar row and ol i-gar chic and evoked the an cient laws and cus toms, such as the pas sage of the legal codes by the As sem bly of the Land (Ad u narea Ob¸stea sc˘a).46 The same ap plied to the “Ex traor di nary As sem blies of Re vi sion” con-voked in 1831 to endorse the Or ganic Stat utes.47 An other per ceived vi o la tion of the spirit and let ter of “ca pit u la tions” came with the ap point-ment of the new hos po dars by the Porte on Russia’s sug ges tion, even though the Or ganic Stat ues pre sup posed their elec tion by the Ex traor di-nary As sem blies (Adun˘ari Ob¸ste¸sti Ex traor di nare).

The great est ten sions, how ever, came after the evac u a tion of Rus sian troops in 1834, when the Wal la chian as sem bly was forced, upon the in itia tive of the Rus sian con sul, to vote the no to ri ous “ad di tional ar ti cle” that pro hib ited the as sem blies from chang ing the stat utes with out per-mis sion of the sove reign and the pro tect ing pow ers.48 All three princes who ruled between 1834 and 1848 proved ca pable of frus trat ing the as sem blies, ei ther on their own, as was the case of the Mol da vian hos po-dar Mi chael Sturdza, or under Rus sian pres sure, as was the case of the Wal la chian princes Alex an dru Ghica and Ghe or ghe Bi bescu.49 What-ever the circum stances, the frus trated op po si tion was likely to inter pret such in ci dents as Rus sian in trigues. As a re sult, in 1848 the Wal la chian and Mol da vian rev o lu tion ar ies saw their task as the ab o li tion of the Or ganic Stat utes and Rus sian heg e mony.


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The story of the emer gence of mod ern Ro ma nian na tion al ism in the proc la ma tions and pro grams of “the gen er a tion of 1848” usu ally fo cuses on the “dis cov ery” of the Latin or i gin of the Ro ma nians and the at ten-dant French re pub li can in flu ences.50 How ever, one should not ex ag ger-ate the im me di ate im pact of these de vel op ments on the re la tions of the “young Ro ma nians” with their neigh bors on the east or south. The first im pli ca tion of the “re turn to the or i gins” was an inter nal po lit i cal one. To gether with the cri tique of the lord-and-peasant re la tions, fix a tion on the lan guage and Ro manic rev al or iza tion of his tory were as pects of im a gin ing a mod ern na tional com mu nity over deep so cial and cul tural di vi sions that char ac ter ized Mol da vian and Wal la chian so ci ety. These three fac ets of na tion build ing ac cord ing to Mi ros lav Hroch find their best em bodi ment in the fig ure of Mihai Kog˘alni ceanu, who ad vo cated the ab o li tion of cor vées, cham pioned the Ro ma nian lan guage, and pi o neered the pub li ca tion of his tor i cal sources, in clud ing the texts of the “ca pit u la tions.”51

At the same time, their self-identification as peo ple of Latin or i gin did not im me di ately place the lead ers of the “forty-eighters” in an tag o-nis tic re la tions with the sur round ing Slavic peo ples. Dur ing the 1830s and 1840s, Polish rev o lu tion ar ies found ref uge in the prin ci pal ities, while Wal la chian op po si tion ists, both in the prin ci pal ity and in Paris, were in touch with the leader of the Polish po lit i cal em i gra tion, Adam Czar to ry ski.52 The idea of a Bal kan fed er a tion, which Czar to ry ski first ar tic u lated as a foreign min is ter of Al ex an der I in 1804–6, framed the coop er a tion between the “young Ro ma nians” and the south ern Slavic lead ers. The con scious ness of Latin roots did not pre vent some of the Ro ma nians from par tic i pat ing in the abor tive Bul gar ian con spir a cies in the early 1840s or main tain ing the con tacts with Milos Ob re novic and the Ser bian “con sti tu tion al ist” party, both of which were al ien ated by the Rus sian heg e mony in Bel grade.53 Thus, fear of the “Slavic en cir cle ment” that gripped D. A. Sturdza half a cen tury later was not yet a sig nifi cant com po nent of the anti-Russian sen ti ment that char ac ter ized the younger gen er a tion of the boy ars on the eve of the rev o lu tion of 1848.

Nor should one over es ti mate the role of the pro-French or ien ta tion in the con crete ac tions of the “forty-eighters.” The role of pro gres sive French writ ers and ed u ca tors in shap ing their out look was ad mit tedly par a mount as was the role of the Feb ru ary rev o lu tion in trig ger ing the events in Ia¸si and Bu char est. How ever, the fail ure of the Sec ond Re pub-lic to pro vide more than moral sup port con fined the “young Ro ma nians” to the tra di tional ma neu ver ing between the tsar and the sul tan, which

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made the Wal la chian Rev o lu tion of 1848 an issue of Russian-Ottoman re la tions par ex cel lence.54 These re la tions not only made pos sible both the ac tual out break and the crush ing of the rev o lu tion but also de ter-mined the strat egy of the rev o lu tion ar ies them selves.

This strat egy con sisted in por tray ing them selves as loyal Turk ish sub jects who sought to re store Ot to man le gal ity, order, and ul ti mately sov e reignty over the prin ci pal ities threat ened by the Rus sian in trigues.55 To Su lei man Pasha, the Ot to man rep re sen ta tive dis patched to Wal la chia in spring 1848, the rev o lu tion ar ies sug gested that the sul tan ab ro gate the Or ganic Stat ute in favor of the old “ca pit u la tions,” which the stat ute had sup pos edly vi o lated. In re sponse to the cir cu lar of Nich o las I on 19 July 1848, threat en ing to ex er cise his right of pro tec to rate, the Wal la chian re gency (one of the in car na tions of the rev o lu tion ary govern ment) re-sponded with a lengthy mem o ran dum af firm ing the right of the na tion to reg u late its po lit i cal ex is tence on the basis of the Ot to man “ca pit u la-tions.” The rhet o ric of the rev o lu tion ary mem bers of the re gency also re vealed the char ac ter is tic ten dency of Mol da vian and Wal la chian elites to inter pret Russia’s self-assumed func tion of pro tec tor and guar an tor of the “ca pit u la tions.” In view of multi ple vi o la tions of the “ca pit u la tions” by the Rus sian govern ment in the post-1829 pe riod, the Wal la chian rev o lu tion ar ies could eas ily argue that Rus sia had for feited its status as le git i mate guar an tor.56

This strat egy of ap peal to the Ot to man “ca pit u la tions” as the basis of Ro ma nian self-determinations con tin ued in the early 1850s.57 In dic a tive in this re spect is the case of Ion Ghica, the rep re sen ta tive of the Wal-la chian rev o lu tion ary govern ment in I˙ stan bul and fu ture prime min is ter of Ro ma nia. Ad dress ing the Ro ma nian po lit i cal em i grants as well as the pro gres sive Eu ro pean pub lic at the be gin ning of the Cri mean War, Ghica dis missed as un re alis tic sev eral al ter na tive so lu tions to the Ro-ma nian ques tion: a con fed er a tion of na tional re pub lics in the spirit of Giu seppe Maz zini, Alexandre-August Ledru-Rollin, and Louis Blanc failed to take into con sid er a tion multi ple con flicts between the sub ject peo ples of Aus tria and Tur key; a big Ro ma nian nation-state between the Dniester and the Tisza would not be al lowed by Aus tria and Rus sia, who had an nexed ter ri to ries with the pre dom i nantly eth nic Ro ma nian pop u la tion; a smaller Ro ma nian duchy under a Ger man prince created with Russia’s help would not re ceive an inter na tional guar an tee of its ex is tence, in the ab sence of which it was likely to be come the prey of Russia’s Pan-Slavic de signs. In stead, Ghica sought to re mind the Ro ma-nians that they “were ex is ten tially re lated” to Tur key and that the lat ter,


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in its turn, had no chance to sur vive with out the Ro ma nians. As a “die-hard na tion al ity,” the Ro ma nians could con sti tute the “po lit i cal fron tier” of Tur key that Rus sia would not be able to leap over. All it took to make them such a fron tier was to “ren der to the prin ci pal ities the full ex tent of their rights on the basis of ca pit u la tions.”58

In 1853–56, Ro ma nian rev o lu tion ary lead ers couched their sup port of the Ot to mans in broader gen er al iza tions about Rus sia as an “Asiatic des pot ism,” which were par tic u larly wide spread among the Eu ro pean lib er als and rad i cals in this pe riod.59 Thus, in 1853 Ghica re marked on a trans for ma tion with out prec e dent in his tory, whereby after a centurieslong strug gle, “Chris tian Eu rope” was ready to ally it self with Tur key, whose govern ment “took the in itia tive of re forms and prog ress.” In a state ment that un doubt edly re flected the at ti tude of many of his rev o-lu tion ary as so ciates, Ghica claimed that “the Da nube and the banks of the Bos phorus were to be come the site of the quar rel between auto cratic ab so lut ism and Eu ro pean civ il iza tion.”60

Draw ing on vo lu mi nous nineteenth-century lit er a ture on “the Rus-sian men ace,” the inter pre ta tion of Russian-European re la tions for mu-lated by the Ro ma nian rev o lu tion ary ex iles in the pe riod between 1848 and the end of the Cri mean War proved to have a last ing in flu ence on the Ro ma nian per cep tion of Rus sia.61 The case of Dim i trie Alex an dru Sturdza, con sid ered at the be gin ning of our dis cus sion, dem on strates that the Ro ma nian elites later in the cen tury tended to view con tem po-rary Eu ro pean pol i tics from the per spec tive of the early 1850s, when, with out prec e dent in its pre vi ous or sub se quent his tory, im pe rial Rus sia in deed con fronted a Eu ro pean co ali tion. Ed u cated Ro ma nians could not fail to be deeply im pressed by two things: that the Cri mean War was trig gered by Russia’s oc cu pa tion of Mol da via and Wal la chia in July 1853, and that Russia’s de feat led to the ab o li tion of its pro tec to rate over the prin ci pal ities.

Three basic stages in the ev o lu tion of Mol da vian and Wal la chian per cep tions of the Rus sian pro tec to rate emerge from the ev i dence pre sented thus far. Dur ing the early pe riod, from the mid-seventeenth cen tury to the Treaty of Ku chuk Kai nardji of 1774, the Rus sian pro tec-to rate was seen within the broader frame work of com mon Or tho dox faith. From the ear li est at tempts to trans fer the prin ci pal ities under Rus - sia’s su ze rainty, the princes and the boy ars con di tioned their en trance on the pres er va tion of the an cient laws, rights, and priv i leges of the two coun tries. By the early 1770s, the Mol da vian and Wal la chian elites adopted a sub tler strat egy to se cure their auton o mous status as their

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home lands re peat edly served as the main bat tle ground for Russian- Ottoman wars. With the for mu la tion of the the ory of Ot to man “ca pit u la-tions,” Rus sia be came per ceived as the guar an tor of the “rights and priv i leges” granted by the Ot to man rul ers of the fif teenth and six teenth cen tu ries but vi o lated by their suc ces sors. Fi nally, in the con text of the Greek cri sis of the 1820s, and cer tainly after the Treaty of Ad ri an o ple, the erst while anti-Ottoman im pli ca tions of the dis course of “ca pit u la tions” gave way to the anti-Russian ones. By the 1840s, the younger gen er a tion of Ro ma nian elites viewed the Rus sian pro tec to rate over the prin ci pal-ities as a much greater dan ger to their nation-building pro ject than the in creas ingly for mal Ot to man su ze rainty. In this sit u a tion, the Ro ma nian lead ers found it profi t able to speak of the Ot to man ca pit u la tions as the foun da tions of their na tional in de pen dence and de fend them from Rus-sian en croach ments. An anal y sis of the dis course of ca pit u la tions of fered in this sec tion il lus trates both the role of the Mol da vian and Wal la chian elites in the East ern Ques tion and the im por tance of the lat ter to the emer gence of mod ern Ro ma nia.

The Wal la chian rev o lu tion ar ies of 1848 used the “ca pit u la tions” to leg i ti mize their nation-building pro gram and en cour age the Ot to man govern ment to re sist Rus sian heg e mony in the prin ci pal ities. Russia’s de feat in the Cri mea, which ended its pro tec to rate over the prin ci pal ities and even tu ally made pos sible their uni fi ca tion, also con trib uted to the per sis tent ten dency of the mod ern Ro ma nian elites to con cep tu al ize their re la tions with Rus sia within the frame work of the latter’s “civ il iza-tional” con flict with “Eu rope.” The re main der of this chap ter traces a par allel ev o lu tion of Rus sian per cep tions of Ro ma nians. It con cludes with an ex am ina tion of the leg a cies of the Rus sian pro tec to rate in present-day re la tions between Rus sia, Ro ma nia, and Tur key.

The Dis cov ery of Ro ma nians in Nineteenth-Century Rus sia

As he re flected on the geo graph i cal po si tion of the Ro ma nians in 1828, Rus sian dip lo mat Felix Pet ro vich Fon ton could not con ceal his re gret about “these eight mil lion peo ple foreign to the Slavs [who] had set tled here on the beau ti ful slopes of the Car path ians, draw ing a wedge between the Slavic tribes and pre vent ing their uni fi ca tion.” If in stead of these Ro ma nians, rea soned Fon ton, there had been Serbs or Bul gar ians, “how easy it would have been to solve the East ern, or bet ter to say, the Slavic ques tion.”62 Once he en tered the sub junc tive mood, the young


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Rus sian found it dif fi cult to stop: “If in stead of the trai tor Brâncoveanu and an in dif fer ent peo ple used to op pres sion, Peter the Great in his cam paign had en coun tered here the stout and hon est Bul gar ians or val iant Serbs, the re sult would have been dif fer ent. Then the point of grav ity of Rus sian pol icy would move to the south and then per haps not the ec cen tric, cold, and gran ite St. Pe ters burg, but splen did Kiev would have be come the sec ond cap i tal of our state!”63

This pas sage was part of the “Hu mor ous, Po lit i cal, and Mil i tary Let ters” that Fon ton ad dressed to a friend from the head quar ters of the Rus sian army fight ing against the Ot to mans on the Da nube in 1828–29. The light and joc u lar tone of these let ters writ ten by a youth ful dip lo mat sug gests that the au thor did not take all too se ri ously his ob ser va tions about the fatal role that the Ro ma nians played in Rus sian his tory. Nev er-the less, they in di cate a dis tur bance that the pres ence of the Ro ma nians created on the smooth sur face of the Rus sian im pe rial vi sion. De spite the ten dency of Rus sian au thors to speak of the Bal kan pop u la tion in es sen tial ist terms based on a shared lan guage and re li gion, ed u cated Rus sians were in creas ingly aware of the per ceived and real dif fer ences between par tic u lar Or tho dox sub ject peo ples of the sul tan and in creas-ingly bet ter dis posed to ward some of them than to oth ers. This sen si tiv-ity was the re sult of a sec u lar iza tion of the men tal out look of the Rus sian elites since the late seven teenth cen tury that led to the sep ar a tion of re li gion and eth nic ity in the per cep tion of self and oth ers. With time, the ap pre ci a tion of dif fer ences of his tor i cal or i gin, lan guage, and above all the pu ta tive col lec tive char ac ter led to the “dis cov ery” of par tic u lar na tions within broader pre mod ern re li gious com mu nities.

The main sources of in for ma tion on the Chris tian pop u la tion of the Ot to man Em pire in the six teenth and seven teenth cen tu ries were the Greek Or tho dox prel ates who pe ri od i cally came to Mus covy in the hope of ob tain ing ma te rial sup port for the East ern churches. Under their in-flu ence, the tsars grad u ally as sumed the pos ture of the cham pions of Or tho doxy. This con di tioned the Rus sian per cep tion of the pop u la tion of south east ern Eu rope well into the eigh teenth cen tury. The rhet o ric that sought to win the sup port of the Or tho dox peo ples dur ing the eighteenth-century wars pre dict ably fo cused on what the peo ples of the re gion had in com mon, rather than on their pe cu liar ities. Thus, dur ing the Pruth Cam paign of 1711, Peter the Great is sued a man i festo that ad dressed the pop u la tion of Mol da via and Wal la chia “as well as Greeks, Serbs, Bul gar ians, Slavs, Al ba nians and other Chris tian peo ples” and an nounced the war for the “lib er a tion of the suf fer ing Chris tians

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from the bar bar ian yoke.”64 The par allel man i festo ad dressed by Peter the Great to the prince-bishop of Mon te ne gro like wise spoke about the suf fer ing of the “Chris tian church” and “Chris tian flock” under the rule of the Ot to man “bar bar ians.”65 At the be gin ning of the Russian-Ottoman War of 1768–74, Cathe rine the Great ap pealed to the “Slavic peo ples of the Or tho dox faith,” but the text of her man i festo ap plied this cat e gory in dis crim i nately to the “Chris tian pop u la tion of Mol da via, Wal la chia, Mun te nia [sic], Bul garia, Bos nia, Her zog o vina, Mac e do nia and Al ba-nia.”66 The eth nic cat e go ries were thus still sub sumed under com mon re li gious iden tity, even though the anti-Muslim rhet o ric of Catherine’s man i festo was some what toned down in com par i son with Peter’s ad dress.

The sit u a tion changed in the course of the Russian-Ottoman War of 1768–74, which brought the Rus sians into more di rect con tact with the pop u la tion of the Eu ro pean Tur key. The war, mainly fought in Mol-da via and Wal la chia, led the Rus sians to “dis cover” the Greeks rather than the Slavs or the Ro ma nians. The emer gence of the “Greek myth” in Rus sian cul ture can be ex plained by the West ern iza tion of the Rus sian upper classes and the ap pro pri a tion of the leg acy of the clas si cal an-tiq uity.67 Within the frame work of this myth, Russian-Ottoman ri valry was some times rep re sented as a re in car na tion of the Per sian Wars, and, as a re sult, the Greeks were sin gled out from the mass of Ot to man Chris tians. The “Greek pro ject” of Cathe rine the Great turned tra di-tional cham pion ship of Or tho doxy into the ob jec tive of res to ra tion of the Greek Em pire, which often made Rus sian Phil hel lenes ig nore the ten sions between the Greeks and the non-Greeks of the Bal kans.

The po lit i cal de vel op ments of the French Rev o lu tion and the Na pol e-onic era com pro mised the abil ity of Phil hel len ism to serve as an ideo-log i cal and cul tural binder between the autoc racy and the West ern ized Rus sian elites.68 In the con text of the Europe-wide con fron ta tion between the ab so lu tist re gimes and rev o lu tion ary France, the re pub li can con no ta-tions of Greek an tiq uity ap peared in creas ingly prob le matic to Rus sian rul ers. These con no ta tions were even more at odds with the mys ti cal Chris tian ideol ogy of the Holy Al li ance pro posed by Al ex an der I after the de feat of Na po leon as a way of con sol i dat ing the anti rev o lu tion ary unity of the Eu ro pean mon archs. When Al ex an der Ypsi lanti, the leader of the Phi liki Etai reia up ris ing in Mol da via and Wal la chia in Feb ru ary 1821, asked Al ex an der I, whose for mer aide-de-camp he was, to help the Greeks in their strug gle against the Ot to mans, the emperor’s le git i mist con vic tions super seded his Hel lenic sym pa thies. Of fi cial re pu di a tion of


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the up ris ing fol lowed. De spite the per sis tence of Phil hel len ism among ed u cated Rus sians, the fail ure of the Etai reia up ris ing made many doubt that mod ern Greeks pos sessed the valor of their Athe nian and Spar tan an ces tors. In the mean time, Rus sians were adopt ing in creas ingly crit i cal views of the Pha nar i otes and their op pres sion of the Or tho dox pop u la tion of Eu ro pean Tur key in gen eral and of the prin ci pal ities of Mol da via and Wal la chia in par tic u lar. The early Rus sian de scrip tions of the prin ci pal ities por trayed the local pop u la tion as the vic tim of pred a tory Pha nar i ote princes and the boy ars cor rupted by the latter’s in flu ence.69

The cri sis of the Greek myth in Rus sian cul ture was ac com pa nied by the growth of Pan-Slavism. The first Ser bian up ris ing of 1804–13 made Rus sians in creas ingly aware of the ex is tence of south ern Slavs. This aware ness man i fested it self early on in var i ous po lit i cal vi sions, namely, the pro ject of the Bal kan fed er a tion pro posed to Al ex an der I by his min is ter for foreign af fairs, Adam Czar to ry ski, in 1804–6.70 The Rus sian press of the sec ond and third decades of the nine teenth cen tury por trayed the Ser bian leader George Pet ro vitch as a ro man tic free dom fighter, whose brav ery and cou rage the lead ers of the Etai reia failed to match. By the 1820s, the south ern Slavs were well on the way to re-plac ing the Greeks in the Rus sian dis course of the Bal kans. In the course of the war of 1828–29, the Rus sian army went as far as Ad ri an o ple, which for the first time brought the Bul gar ians to the at ten tion of the young Rus sian of fi cers (like the fu ture Slav o phile Alek sei Ste pan o vich Kho mi a-kov), or of the young dip lo mats, like Fon ton. At this time, Pan-Slavic at ti tudes were still rather vague but nev er the less wide spread enough to make the head of the Rus sian pro vi sional ad min is tra tion in Mol da via and Wal la chia (1829–34), Gen eral Pavel Dmi trie vich Kise lev, pur sue the goal of “the unity of the great Slavic fam ily.”71

Pan-Slavic ideas marked Russia’s pol icy re gard ing the East ern Ques-tion at an early stage, as ev i denced by the pro ject for the gen eral peace writ ten by the Rus sian con sul in Ia¸si, Va si lii Fe o dor o vich Mal i novs kii, and by Adam Czartoryski’s plan for a Bal kan fed er a tion.72 How ever, in such pro jects tra di tional Rus sian inter ven tion on be half of the Or tho-dox co re lig ion ists was still poorly dif fer en tiated from cham pion ship of the Slavic cause. Even more im por tantly, this Pan-Slavism was not con-di tioned by the aware ness of the ex ist ing ten sions in the re la tions between south ern Slavs and their non-Slavic neigh bors, in clud ing the Greeks and the Ro ma nians. Fi nally, while these Pan-Slavic schemes were po-ten tially in com pat ible with the ex is tence of the Ot to man, Aus trian, or

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Na pol e onic Em pires, they still did not have the anti-Westernism char ac-ter is tic of later Rus sian Pan-Slavism. In deed, it is dif fi cult to find a more Eu ro pean thinker and pol i ti cian than Czar to ry ski.

The emer gence of the Slavs from the shad ows of the Greeks was par alleled by a pe riod of un cer tainty about the pop u la tion of Mol da via and Wal la chia. In itially, the Rus sians saw both Ro ma nians and south ern Slavs as vic tims of Ot to man (and Greek) dom i nance. Char ac ter is tic in this re spect was an over view of the Slavic pop u la tion of Eu ro pean Tur key pub lished in 1825 by A. M. Spir i dov, a sec re tary at the Rus sian con su late in Bu char est at the time of the Etai reia up ris ing in the prin ci-pal ities. Spir i dov at trib uted the fail ure of Al ex an der Ypsi lanti to se cure broad sup port on both sides of the Da nube to “a gen eral and un change-able prej u dice [pre du bezh de nie] of all the Slavic peo ples of the Ot to man Em pire to ward the Greeks.”73 Ac cord ing to Spir i dov, these Greeks were no longer “sons of glory . . . who would be ready to die for the moth er-land. Their places were taken by treach er ous cour ti ers, of de bauched mo rals, avid for money grab bing.” After the Ot to man con quest of Con-stan tin o ple, the Greeks of the cap i tal used treach ery and in trigue to sub ju gate val iant Slavs.74 Inter est ingly enough, Spir i dov viewed the Ro ma nians as mem bers of the greater Slavic fam ily, the ex is tence of which was in his opin ion tes tified by “the sim i lar ity of tongues, mores, cus toms, names of per sons, towns, vil lages, riv ers, lakes, set tle ments, and fi nally, by their faith.”75 This pas sage re veals a basic char ac ter is tic of Pan-Slavic dis course that con sisted in under stat ing the dif fer ences between dif fer ent mem bers of the “Slavic fam ily.”

Spir i dov was not the only one to be lieve in the Slavic or i gin of the Ro ma nians. Sim i lar ideas were ar tic u lated in the late 1820s by Iurii Ivan o vich Ven e lin, a Trans car path ian Rusyn, and a self-identified Bul-gar ian in tel lec tual known for his as so ci a tion with the Pan-Slavist his to-rian Mi khail Mik hai lo vich Pog o din, the Slav o phile A. S. Kho mi a kov, and the Ak sa kov broth ers, Kon stan tin Ser gee vich and Ivan Ser gee vich. Venelin’s main goal was to af firm the cen tral ity of Bul gar ians within the emer gent Pan-Slavic his tor i cal nar ra tive.76 In order to link the his tor i cal nar ra tives of south ern and east ern Slavs, Ven e lin was pre pared to re-de scribe the en tire his tory of Mol da via and Wal la chia as the his tory of the Bul gar ians. The pre dom i nance of the Sla vonic ele ment (Slo vene) in Mol da via and Wal la chia, ac cord ing to Ven e lin, could be dem on strated by the prev a lence of Sla vonic top o nyms in the prin ci pal ities as well as the usage of the Sla vonic lan guage by the upper classes and in gov-ern ment cor re spon dence. In his opin ion, the lin guis tic and cul tural


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pe cu liar ity of the Ro ma nians was the re sult of the Ot to man con quest. In order to break the nat u ral con nec tion that ex isted between Rus sia and Mol da via and Wal la chia, the Turks es tab lished Pha nar i ote rule, re placed Sla vonic with the Wal la chian lan guage in churches, and as sim i lated the Bul gar ian no bil ity of the prin ci pal ities through their in ter mar riage with the Greeks.77

The great un cer tainty about the early his tory of Mol da via and Wal-la chia ex plains why the o ries that ap pear ec cen tric in retrospect pos sessed a mini mum plau sibil ity to con tem po rar ies. How ever, in the long run, Ro ma nian lin guis tic and cul tural dis tinc tive ness proved im pos sible to ig nore. By the mid-nineteenth cen tury, broad gen er al iza tion about the or i gins of Mol da vians and Wal la chians gave way to the ac a demic study of the lan guage and lit er a ture of the prin ci pal ities. This helped to dis pel the ear lier super fi cial im pres sion of sim i lar ity between Slavs, on the one hand, and Mol da vians and Wal la chians, on the other. Thus, in 1840, the re cently ap pointed first chair of Ro ma nian at St. Pe ters burg Uni ver-sity, Iakov Da nil o vich Gin ku lov, in his au thor i ta tive Na cher ta nie pra vil mol dov lak hiis koi gram ma tiki found it pos sible to speak of a sin gle Ro ma-nian lan guage and clas sified it as a branch of Latin in terms of the pre-dom i nant vo cab u lary.78

Po lit i cal and cul tural changes in Mol da via and Wal la chia in the sec ond quar ter of the nine teenth cen tury like wise alerted the ed u cated Rus sians to the dis tinc tive ness of Ro ma nians. As they con fronted these changes, some Rus sian ob serv ers of the prin ci pal ities re acted with ex as-per a tion. This was the case of the fa mous traveler Egor Pet ro vich Kov a-levs kii, who passed through the prin ci pal ities in the early 1840s on his way to Mon te ne gro. Pro fess ing Pan-Slavic views, Kov a levs kii could not help won der ing how “this rel a tively small peo ple sur rounded by Slavic tribes and shar ing their faith, per form ing its di vine ser vice and con duct ing its cor re spon dence in the same lan guage, and en ter ing into fre quent and close re la tion ships with them, [was] pres ently so dif fer ent from them in its spirit and its moral di rec tion.”79 The fun da men tal irony of the sit u a tion con sisted in the fact that such an out come was to a large ex tent the prod uct of Russia’s own pol i cies in the prin ci pal ities.

The end of the Pha nar i ote re gime in Mol da via and Wal la chia and a se ries of po lit i cal re forms spon sored by Rus sian oc cu pa tion au thor ities in the wake of the Russian-Ottoman War of 1828–29 stim u lated the cul tural West ern iza tion of the Ro ma nian upper classes and the de vel op-ment of mod ern Ro ma nian na tion al ism.80 The trans for ma tion of cul tural prac tices in volved grad ual re place ment of the Orien tal vest ments by

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Oc ci den tal fash ions and the grow ing cur rency of French in place of Greek as the lan guage of pol i tics and high cul ture.81 An a tole Demidoff’s Voy age dans la Rus sie mér i di o nale et la Cri mee par la Hon grie, la Val a chie et la Mol da vie of 1837 con tains the fol low ing de scrip tion of the Bu char est beau monde on the prom e nade set up dur ing the Rus sian oc cu pa tion of Wal la chia sev eral years pre vi ously: “In the same car riage you would see women im i tat ing Vien nese fash ions and co quetry, young men dressed in Eu ro pean black suits to gether with an old boyar with a ven er able and noble coun te nance, a long, ab so lutely white beard, and mon u men tal head wear intro duced here by Pha nar i otes.”82

The same mix ture of Orien tal traits and west ward in cli na tions char ac ter ized, in the opin ion of Rus sian com men ta tors, the men tal ity and po lit i cal or ien ta tion of Mol da vian and Wal la chian elites.83 Ac cord ing to Ivan Pet ro vich Li prandi, an am a teur Orien tal ist and vet e ran of the Russian-Ottoman War of 1828–29, “the in flu ence of the Pha nar made [them] com pletely dif fer ent from the no bil ity of all other Eu ro pean coun tries” and as a re sult, their na ture “con tain[ed] a sin gu lar in cli na-tion for plots and in trigues.”84 On the other hand, Li prandi de plored the “per ni cious” or “bi zarre” ideas of the Western-educated boy ars of the younger gen er a tion who be lieved “that the Wal la chians were the true de scen dants of the an cient Ro mans, shared a com mon or i gin with West ern Eu ro peans, and there fore should try to im i tate them in every-thing from the lan guage to the way of think ing, mores, govern ment, and even re li gion.” Li prandi noted with re gret that the new Wal la chian writ ers were try ing to se duce away the sim ple peo ple in stinc tively drawn to Rus sia by grad u ally re plac ing nu mer ous Slavic words with Ital ian, French, or Latin ones as well as by Lat i niz ing the Cy ril lic script.85

The new po lit i cal at ti tudes of the Ro ma nian elites and the gen er a-tional change that pro duced them did not es cape the most per cep tive Rus sian ob serv ers of Mol da via and Wal la chia. Thus, at the be gin ning of the Cri mean War in 1853, Petr Vlad i mir o vich Al a bin, an of fi cer in the Rus sian army oc cu py ing the prin ci pal ities, noted, “The ven er able boy ars, who wit nessed our deeds for their father land, those who re-mem ber acutely how we with our own hands broke the yoke, which weighted upon them, how we ex tracted them from the abyss of ig no-r ance and semi sav agery—these ven er able eld ers have ei ther left the po lit i cal life or have passed away alto gether.” This, ac cord ing to Al a bin, left Rus sians with out local sup port. “The ma jor ity of the Mol da vian and Wal la chian in tel li gent sia are hos tile to ward us, for it be longs to the


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new gen er a tion, whose lib eral ideas were frus trated in 1848 be cause of us.” As a re sult, “there is no one to raise a voice for us. What ever good we have done for Mol da via and Wal la chia is for got ten, al though it cost us a lot of blood. Now they re mem ber only that we did not allow the prin ci pal ities to adopt the forms upon which, in their opin ion, de pends the hap pi ness of a coun try.” Al a bin was also aware of the broader po lit i-cal phi lo so phy that under lay the new at ti tude to ward Rus sia. “The rev o lu tion ary party of Mol da vians and Wal la chians,” he ob served, “con sider us to be the en e mies of civ il iza tion, who are not only will ing to sup press the dem o cratic ele ments, upon which they are going to build a new and, in their opin ion, a great struc ture, but also de prive them of their father land by an nex ing the Da nu bian prin ci pal ities.” Un-like some of his comrades-in-arms in the Rus sian oc cu pa tion army, Al a bin re mained un con vinced by the out ward ex pres sions of sym pa thy, loy alty, and love dem on strated by Ro ma nians in 1853, not ing, “If we hap pen to lose this war, they will no longer be con strained by any thing and will try to pay us back for 1848.”86

Whereas a di rect ob server like Al a bin could sense acutely the state of mind of the emer gent Ro ma nian so ci ety, the Rus sian Pan-Slavic vi sion-ar ies in the sec ond half of the nine teenth cen tury tended to under play the im por tance of the at ti tude of the Ro ma nian elites to wards the pros-pect of Pan-Slavic union. Mi khail Pog o din over looked it com pletely when he stated in 1854 that “Mol da via, Wal la chia and Tran syl va nia [would] have to join [the pro jected] union.”87 Oth ers treated the opin ions of the Ro ma nian elites rather dis mis sively as a short com ing of the Ro ma nian na tional char ac ter that their uni fi ca tion with the Slavs would be able to cure. Thus Ni ko lai Dan i levs kii in his fa mous Ros siia i Ev ropa (1869) argued, “[Only] with the sup port of Slav dom, to which they are closely re lated, will the Ro ma nians be able to over come the Gal lo ma nia that con sumes them as well as the im i ta tive ness of their pit i ful in tel li-gent sia.”88 Those for whom the dis tinc tive ness of Ro ma nians was a po ten tial prob lem for Slavic unity viewed it as a re sult of their Orien tal char ac ter (Kov a levs kii), or their in fat u a tion with every thing French (Dan i levs kii) or both (Li prandi).

For Rus sian writ ers of the sec ond half of the nine teenth cen tury, the boyar or i gin of the Ro ma nian po lit i cal class rep re sented per haps the most im por tant marker of dif fer ence between the Ro ma nians and the Slavs south of the Da nube, who lacked aris toc racy in the con ven tional sense of the terms. While the Pan-Slavic writ ers dis liked this fea ture of Ro ma-nian so ci ety, the main con ser va tive critic of Pan-Slavism, Kon stan tin

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Nik o lae vich Leont’ev, found that the ex is tence of a na tive aris toc racy (i.e., the boy ars) pos i tively dis tin guished the Ro ma nians from south ern Slavs. Ac cord ing to Leont’ev, it en a bled Ro ma nia to with stand the per-ni cious in flu ence of Eu ro pean de moc racy bet ter than Ser bia or Bul garia, where the lack of no bil ity only ag gra vated the pop u list ten den cies im-plicit in any na tional lib er a tion move ment.89 In Leont’ev’s scheme, the boyar class in Ro ma nian prin ci pal ities played the same role that Dan i-levs kii at trib uted to Islam for the “Chris tian East” as a whole: both served to pro tect the Or tho dox pop u la tion from the cor rupt ing in flu ence of West ern Chris ti an ity, Romano-Germanic civ il iza tion, and mod ern Eu ro-pean de moc racy.90

Both the Rus sian Pan-Slavist writ ers and their crit ics dur ing the 1860s, 1870s, and 1880s shared the as sump tion that Russia’s con flict with the Ot to man Em pire over the issue of the Or tho dox co re lig ion-ists was ul ti mately sec on dary to the con fron ta tion between Rus sia and the Eu ro pean pow ers in the ques tion of Slavic unity. In the frame work of this vi sion, re la tions with Ro ma nians were no longer an as pect of Russian-Ottoman re la tions for the Rus sian writ ers (as they had been for tsar ist di plo macy) but a func tion of Russia’s re la tions with “Eu rope.” Among the major Rus sian Pan-Slavists, Ros tis lav Fa deev was the one who ex pressed this idea with the great est clar ity. Fa deev en vi sioned Slavic unity as the “en tire group of peo ples con nected to Rus sia by the his tor i cal des tiny of co re lig ion ists and com pa tri ots.”91 He thus in cluded in it the Greeks and the Ro ma nians, “es pe cially the for mer, who [had] grown to gether with Slav dom par tic u larly strongly and [would] have to share its lot.” Ac cord ing to Fa deev, the Ro ma nians were in ca pable of “as sem bling the dis par ate branches of their tribe tram pled just as the Slavs by foreign op pres sion.” Like other Da nu bian peo ples, the Ro ma nians, in Fadeev’s opin ion, faced the his tor i cal choice: to align them selves with Rus sia or to be come Aus trian prov inces with the sub se quent de mo tion of the Ro ma nians to the status of an in fe rior race. He pointed to the Habs burg drive to ward the Bal kans and the lower Da nube, which be came only stronger after Prus sia de feated Aus tria in 1866 in the strug gle for Ger many and started en cour ag ing the Austrian- Hungarian ex pan sion in the south east. The French com mit ment to the Ro ma nian cause was dis proved, ac cord ing to Fa deev, by the French offer of Ser bia and Ro ma nia to the Habs burgs in re turn for their se ces-sion of Gal i cia to sup port the sec ond Polish up ris ing in 1863. With so many false friends around, the Ro ma nians were bound to suc cumb to Mag yar iza tion and Ger man iza tion un less they al lied them selves with


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Rus sia. Fi nally, in a state ment that dem on strates the in debt ed ness of the Pan-Slavic dis course to the rhet o ric of tsar ist man i fes tos, Fa deev claimed that Rus sians were “the only peo ple inter ested in Ro ma nian in de pen dence [samostoiatel’nost’] and the only one that created and sup-ported this in de pen dence.”92

The Rus sian dis cov ery of Ro ma nians in the nine teenth cen tury was a com plex pro cess that in volved grow ing aware ness of the eth nic di ver-sity and eth nic con flicts ex ist ing be neath the com mon re li gious iden tity of the Or tho dox pop u la tion of the Ot to man Em pire. This pro cess was con di tioned by the grad ual sec u lar iza tion of the out look of the Rus sian elites, man i fested, among other things, in the “Greek myth” of the late eigh teenth cen tury and the later Pan-Slavism. At the same time, the Rus sian dis cov ery of Ro ma nians was the prod uct of the trans for ma tions in Eu ro pean Tur key and in par tic u lar of the po lit i cal cri sis of the 1820s, which re vealed with clar ity the ten sions between the Greeks, on the one hand, and south ern Slavs and Ro ma nians, on the other. Post-1821 po lit i-cal and cul tural changes in Mol da via and Wal la chia lim ited the ten dency of early Rus sian Pan-Slavists to dis solve Ro ma nians in the Slavic ocean. As a re sult, the dis tinc tive ness of Ro ma nians be came in creas ingly vis ible against the back ground of Slavic unity con structed by Rus sian writ ers.

As the Pan-Slavist writ ings dem on strate, some ed u cated Rus sians of the sec ond half of the nine teenth cen tury were as likely as their Ro ma-nian counter parts to per ceive Russian-Romanian re la tions as an as pect of Russia’s re la tions with Eu rope. Ob vi ously, the Rus sian and the Ro-ma nian ways of view ing these re la tions were very dif fer ent. As sert ing, as did some Ro ma nian na tion al ists, the ir rec on cil able char ac ter of Russia’s con flict with Eu rope, the Rus sian Pan-Slavists of the 1860s and the 1870s still viewed Ro ma nia as an ally and mem ber of the pros pec-tive Slavic union, de spite the “un healthy” Gal lo ma nia of the Ro ma nian elites. Broad the o ries over looked or under es ti mated the strength of anti-Russian sen ti ment in a small coun try that lay on the way to the Bal kans. In this re spect, one can say that the dis cov ery of the Ro ma nians in nineteenth-century Rus sia re mained in com plete.

The Nineteenth-Century Leg a cies in Cur rent Russian-Romanian Re la tions

It would be er ro ne ous to argue that Fadeev’s and Sturdza’s vi sions of Rus sian re la tions with Eu rope de ter mined Russian-Romanian re la tions in the late nine teenth to early twen ti eth cen tury. At the same time,

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Rus sian Pan-Slavism and the Ro ma nian per cep tions of Rus sia cer tainly pre sented ob sta cles and con straints that the nineteenth-century dip lo-mats of the two coun tries found dif fi cult to over come. The trou bled his tory of Russian-Romanian coop er a tion in 1877–78 amply dem on-strates that on both sides prag matic con sid er a tions were at the mercy of as sump tions about im pe rial honor, in vi o la bil ity of the na tion, and his tor i cally di ver gent under stand ings of Russia’s “pro tec tion” of the prin ci pal ities. It proved very dif fi cult to make the Ro ma nian side sign a mil i tary con ven tion reg u lat ing the pas sage of Rus sian troops through Ro ma nian ter ri tory. Al though sym pa thetic to the idea, the govern ment of Ion C. Br˘a tianu was ap pre hen sive lest Rus sia re es tab lish the pro tec-to r ate and feared for the ter ri to rial in teg rity of the coun try.93 The foreign min is ter Mihai Kog˘alni ceanu, him self an ad vo cate of the con ven tion, faced strong ob jec tions in the Sen ate on the part of Sturdza, who de-fended a Tur ko phile po si tion and ad vo cated neu tral ity.94

After the war, the al lies clashed on the issue of south ern Bes sa ra bia, a ter ri tory that Rus sia had ceded to Mol da via in 1856 and de manded back in 1878 in ex change for Do bro gea.95 In a des per ate de fense of their country’s ter ri to rial in teg rity at the Ber lin Con gress, Ion C. Br˘a tianu and Mihai Kogalni ceanu once again evoked the Ot to man “ca pit u la tions” and Russia’s own trea ties with Tur key.96 For their part, the Rus sian min is ters A. M. Gor cha kov and P. A. Shu va lov pre sented the ex change of south ern Bes sa ra bia for the ter ri to ri ally larger Do bro gea as yet an other man i fes ta tion of tra di tional Rus sian be nev o lence to the prin ci pal ities. They also de scribed Ro ma nian “in grat i tude” for the “Rus sian blood” shed for the lib er a tion of this coun try, an ar gu ment that would find much greater res o nance with Rus sian pub lic opin ion than with Eu ro-pean dip lo mats.97 Re solved in Russia’s favor, this con flict con firmed the ap pre hen sions of the Ro ma nian elites about their im pe rial neigh-bor, and strength ened the anti-Russian sen ti ments that char ac ter ized mod ern Ro ma nian na tion al ism. As for the Rus sians, they found one more pre text to re gret, as did Felix Fon ton in 1828, that God de cided to place Ro ma nians on Russia’s way to ward the south ern Slavs.

With time, the con strain ing in flu ences of na tional per cep tions were bound to in crease, if only be cause of the lib er al iza tion of pol i tics and the con com i tant rise of the power of pub lic opin ion. The pe riod between the out break of the First World War and Romania’s entry into the war on the side of the En tente (and there fore of Rus sia) wit nessed in tense po lem ics between the par ti sans of the En tente and Ger man o philes, in


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the course of which the lat ter used the en tire ar senal of anti-Russian ar gu ments.98 Now, at a time of in creas ingly pop u list pol i tics in both Rus sia and Ro ma nia, per cep tions in her ited from the past are as ca pable as ever of in flu enc ing the re la tions between the two coun tries. The ideas that the na tion al ist in tel lec tu als for mu lated a cen tury and a half ago in quite dif fer ent circum stances dem on strate re mark able te na cious ness in both coun tries at present.

The dra matic events of the twen ti eth cen tury shaped the mu tual per cep tions of Rus sians and Ro ma nians in a more ev i dent, if not nec es-sar ily deeper, way. The back ground of con tem po rary Russian-Romanian re la tions would be in com plete with out the “uni fi ca tion” of Bes sa ra bia with Ro ma nia in the wake of the Bolshe vik take over, the Molotov- Ribbentrop Pact, Romania’s par tic i pa tion in World War II, its sub se quent trans for ma tion into a So viet sat el lite, the re emer gence of na tion al ist dis course under Nic o lae Ceau¸sescu, and fi nally the re open ing of the pros pect of re un ifi ca tion of the Re pub lic of Mol dova with Ro ma nia and the emer gence of the Trans nis tria in the late 1980s and early 1990s. Nev er the less, the basic ways in which present-day Rus sian and Ro ma-nian elites per ceive the re la tion ship between the two coun tries had ar gu ably crys tal lized by the end of the nine teenth cen tury and in fact by the mid-1800s.

Like the Ro ma nian rev o lu tion ary ém i grés in the early 1850s, present- day Ro ma nian pol i ti cians and foreign-policy mak ers per ceive their country’s re la tion with the Rus sian Fed er a tion under the spe cies of the latter’s re la tions with the West. Sim i lar to their nineteenth-century pre de ces sors, they do not see Rus sia as part of “Eu ro pean civ il iza tion” and as sume that ten sions between Rus sia and the West are ir rec on cil-able. In fact, much of Bucharest’s post-1989 foreign strat egy relied on such ir rec on cil abil ity and used its im pli ca tions to fa cil i tate Romania’s entry into West ern po lit i cal or gan iza tions. Al though the spe cial po lit i cal re la tion ship between Ro ma nia and Tur key ceased to exist 130 years ago, there are man i fes ta tions of the Tur ko phile at ti tudes of nineteenth- century Ro ma nian elites today just as there is ev i dence of con tin u ous ap pre hen sion and hos til ity to wards Rus sia. Like Ion Ghica at the out-break of the Cri mean War, Te o dor Ba cons chi, the Ro ma nian foreign min is ter from 2009 to 2012, as sumed Tur key to be part of the West and found it less dif fi cult to im a gine Tur key in Eu rope than do many West-ern Eu ro pean pol i ti cians.99 Hav ing ac quired both NATO and EU mem-ber ship dur ing the first decade of the twenty-first cen tury, Ro ma nian

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foreign-policy mak ers proved much more re cep tive to the idea of Turk ish ac ces sion to the EU than they were to the pros pect of a spe cial part ner ship between Eu rope and Rus sia.

For their part, Moscow’s of fi cials and po lit i cal com men ta tors like-wise sub sume Russian-Romanian re la tions under Russia’s re la tions with the West. On multi ple oc ca sions, do mes tic uses of anti-NATO rhet o ric were deemed more im por tant than the an noy ance that such rhet o ric could cause in Bu char est. On the other hand, the grow ing pop u lar ity of Eu ra sian ism and other anti-Western ideol o gies among the broader Rus sian so ci ety re sulted in the res ur rec tion of the Pan-Slavic ap proaches to Ro ma nia. Under their in flu ence, the rad i cal na tion al ist writ ers have ei ther made strong anti-Romanian jibes or as sumed, even more im plau-sibly than Fa deev and Dan i levs kii, that Ro ma nia can be Russia’s ally in the con fron ta tion with the West. Thus, the no to ri ous Al ex an der Ge lie-vich Dugin es sen tially re pro duced Danilevskii’s ar gu ment when he pressed for Moldova’s uni fi ca tion with Ro ma nia and the latter’s join ing the anti-Atlantic co ali tion led by Rus sia.100 How ever ex trav a gant its source, the idea was re ar tic u lated in June 2004 by a lib eral po lit i cal ob server Sta nis lav Alek san dro vich Bel kov kii as a way of solv ing the Trans nis trian con flict, where upon it re ceived some res o nance with the po lit i cal com men ta tors in Ro ma nia and Mol da via.101

Al though the his tor i cal per cep tions dis cussed in this essay stand in the way of greater prag ma tism in Russian-Romanian re la tions for both sides con cerned, there are im por tant dif fer ences in the way these per-cep tions re late to the pol i cies that the two coun tries pur sue to ward each other. Whereas Rus sia is Romania’s main “other,” the re verse is not true. As a re sult, the role of nineteenth-century Rus sian stereo types about the Ro ma nians in the pop u list foreign-policy rhet o ric of Vlad i mir Putin is nec es sar ily much smaller than the place of tra di tional nineteenth- century cli chés about the “Rus sian dan ger” in the foreign po lit i cal dis-course of the sim i larly pop u list Pres i dent Traian B˘asescu. There fore, ideo log i cal leg a cies that the Rus sians in her ited from the time of the East ern Ques tion at least po ten tially rep re sent less of an ob sta cle for a prag matic Rus sian pol icy to ward Ro ma nia than do sim i lar leg a cies for a prag matic Ro ma nian pol icy to ward Rus sia.

In their pur suit of a more ac tive role in the Black Sea re gion, Romania’s foreign-policy mak ers will most likely con tinue their at tempts to iso late Rus sia through par tic i pa tion in en ergy pro jects like Na bucco, spe cial part ner ships with Geor gia and Azer bai jan, and a fa vor able at ti tude to ward Turkey’s as pi ra tions to EU ac ces sion.102 How ever, the pros pects


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of this pol icy are un clear in view of Romania’s ter ri to rial dis putes with Ukraine as well as the ap par ent strength of the Russian-Turkish part-ner ship, which is more than an out come of Turkey’s frus tra tion on the Eu ro pean front. On the other hand, in view of Russia’s ap par ent readi-ness to pur sue its en ergy pro jects with any of the Black Sea states, in-clud ing Ro ma nia, one can ques tion the wis dom of for mu lat ing the Black Sea prob lem as that of “too much Rus sian pres ence.” Until Ro-ma nia be came a NATO and EU mem ber in 2002 and 2007 re spec tively, the strat egy of in flat ing Russia’s in flu ence helped Ro ma nian foreign- policy mak ers fa cil i tate their country’s entry into these inter na tional or gan iza tions. By the time of the res o lu tion of Romania’s se cur ity and “civ il iza tional” di lem mas, the strug gle between Eu rope and Rus sia as por trayed by Dim i trie Alex an dru Sturdza in 1890, if in deed there was such a strug gle, had been re solved man i festly in favor of the for mer. From that mo ment on ward, con tin ued com mit ment to the past vi sion, which has ful filled its his tor i cal func tion, can only lead Ro ma nian pol icy mak ers to squan der im por tant op por tu nities in the present and the fu ture.

Notes

1. Dim i trie Alex an dru Sturdza, Eu ropa, Rusia si România (Bu char est: Stab i-lim e nul Grafic I. V. So cecu, 1890). For a dis cus sion of Sturdza’s ideas in the con-text of Rus sian and Ro ma nian geo po lit i cal thought of the late nine teenth to early twen ti eth cen tury, see An drei Cusco, “Fron tiers, Geog ra phy, and the Spa tial Lim its of Mod er nity through the Lens of Rus sian and Ro ma nian In tel-lec tu als (Late 19th and Early 20th Cen tury),” in New Eu rope Col lege: Petre Tu¸tea Pro gram Year book, ed. Irina Vai nov ski Mihai (Bu char est: New Eu rope Col lege, 2009), 79–120.

2. R. A. Fa deev, Mne nie o vos toch nom vo prose (St. Pe ters burg: Tip o gra fia De par ta menta Ude lov, 1870); N. Ia. Dan i levs kii, Ros siia i Ev ropa (1869; Mos cow: Bla gos lav le nie. In sti tut Russ koi Tsi vil i zat sii, 2011).

3. The ground break ing study of the role of the dis courses of oth er ness in inter na tional re la tions is Iver B. Neu mann, Uses of the Other: “The East” in Eu ro-pean Iden tity For ma tion (Min ne ap o lis: Uni ver sity of Min ne sota Press, 1999); and idem, Rus sia and the Idea of Eu rope: A Study of Iden tity in Inter na tional Re la tions (Lon don: Rout ledge, 1996).

4. See Dosifei’s re quest for a print ing press ad dressed to the pa tri arch of Mos cow Ioa kim, 15 Au gust 1679, Is tor i ches kie svi azi nar o dov SSSR i Ru my nii v XV–na chale XVIII v.: Dok u menty i ma ter i aly, ed. Ia. S. Gro sul, 3 vols. (Mos cow: Nauka, 1965–70), 3:58.

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5. For the ad dresses of Mol da vian hos po dars and the tsar’s re sponses in 1674 and 1684, see Pol noe Sob ra nie Zak o nov Ros siis koi Im pe rii (here after PSZ), ser. 1, vol. 2, 965–71 and 957–59 re spec tively.

6. See Dosifei’s re quest to that ef fect ad dressed to Ivan V and Peter I, 23 No vem ber 1688, Is tor i ches kie svi azi nar o dov SSSR i Ru my nii, 3:99–100.

7. On Do si fei, see S. N. Che ban, Do si fei, mit ro polit So chavs kii i ego knizh naia deitelnost’ (Kiev: M. T. Mei nander, 1915); I. D. Gre kul, Do sof tei, svet prik hodit iz Moskvy (Kish i nev: Kar tia Mol dov e neaska,1960); Ar se nii Stad nits kii, Iss led o va nia po is to rii mol davs koi tserkvi (St. Pe ters burg: Tip o gra fia Vais berga i Ger shu nina, 1904), 52–56.

8. N. F. Kapte rev, Kha rakter ot no she nii Ros sii k Pra vos lav nomu Vos toku v XVI i v XVII stol e tii akh (Mos cow: Tip. L. F. Sneg i reva, 1885), 262–63. The founder of the Bo goiav lens kii mon as tery, Ar se nii Suk ha nov, who traveled across the Ot to-man Em pire in 1649–53 and again in 1654, added, “All Chris tians are en vi sion ing Alek sei Mik hai lo vich tak ing Con stan tin o ple.” Cited in B. M. Dant sig, Blizh nii Vos tok v russ koi nauke i lit er a ture (Mos cow: Glav naia re dakt sia vos toch noi li ter a-tury, 1973), 32.

9. Dim i trie G. Io nescu, “Trat a tul lui Ghe or ghe Ste fan cu Ru¸sii,” Re vista is tor ica ro mina, no. 3 (1933): 241–46; D. M. Drag nev, ed., Ocherki vnesh nep o lit i-ches koi is to rii mol davs kogo kni a zhestva (pos led niia tret’ IV–na chalo XIX v.) (Kish i-nev: Shtiintsa, 1987), 218–19. See also Sil viu Drag o mir, Con tri bu¸tii priv i toare la rela¸tiile bi se rici rom˘ane¸sti cu Rusia în vea cul XVII (Bu char est: ¸Sosec C. Sfe tea. Libr˘arie Na¸tio nal˘a, 1912).

10. Drag nev, Ocherki vnesh nep o lit i ches koi is to rii, 234. The co rul ers Ivan V and Peter I as well as Tsa revna So fiia re sponded fa vor ably to Cantacuzino’s de sire to be “under the high hand of their tsar ist ma jes ties” and sug gested co or di nat ing the mil i tary ac tiv i ties. For Moscow’s re sponse to Cantacuzino’s re quest, see PSZ, ser. 1, vol. 2, 959–62. How ever, the fail ure of the Cri mean cam paign of 1689 made this al li ance in con se quen tial.

11. Kapte rev, Kha rakter, 271; see also A. A. Ko chiu bins kii, Sno she nia Ros sii pri Petre Per vom s iuzh nymi sla vi a nami i ru my nami (Mos cow: Uni ver si tets kaia tip., 1872), 6–7.

12. Drag nev, Ocherki vnesh nep o lit i ches koi is to rii, 219–20.13. See the cor re spond ing re script in PSZ, ser. 1, vol. 2, 964–65.14. The hos po dars who ap proached the tsar were Con stan tin Brâncoveanu

(1690, 1698) in Wal la chia and Antioh Cante mir (1699), Con stan tin Duca (1701), and Mihai Ra covi¸t˘a (1704) in Mol dova. See Is tor i ches kie svi azi nar o dov SSSR i Ru my nii, 3:114–18, 132–35, 166, and 204–6. On Peter’s re la tions with the hos po-dars prior to 1711, see Ocherki vnesh nep o lit i ches koi is to rii Mol da vii, 240–42; and G. S. Ar de leanu, “Stiri din cor re spon denta lui Petru I,” Stu dii si cer cetari de is to rie medie, no. 1 (1950): 192–208. On the Lutsk treaty, see Ion Foçs eneanu, “Trat a tul de la Lu¸tk ¸si Cam pa nia Taru lui Petru I în Mol dova (1711),” in Stu dii pri vind rela¸tiile romîno-ruse (Bu char est: Ac a de mia Re pu bli cii Pop u lare Romîne, 1963),


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1–55; Ion Ere mia, “Con sid e ra tii privid trat a tul moldo-rus de la 1711,” in Fron-tie rile Spa¸tiului Românesc în Con tex tul Eu ro pean, ed. Sorin ¸Sipo¸s, Mir cea Brie, Florin ¸Spren geu, and Ion Gumenâi (Chi¸sinau: Ed i tura Cart di dact, 2008), 102–20.

15. H. B. Sum ner, Peter the Great and the Ot to man Em pire (Ox ford: B. Black-well, 1949), 37–38; Brian L. Davis, Em pire and Mil i tary Rev o lu tion in East ern Eu rope: Russia’s Turk ish Wars of the Eigh teenth Cen tury (Lon don: Con tin uum, 2011), 159–63.

16. See the “ar ti cles” sub mit ted by the Mol da vian met ro pol i tan Gedeon and log o thete Necul on 12 May 1656, which stip u lated that the Mol da vian hos po dar “re main in the same rank” as his pre de ces sors prior to the Ot to man vas sal age and that his “honor and rank do not get ruined . . . as it was not ruined by the god less ones.” The ar ti cles were con firmed by the tsar on 20 May 1656, after which the Mol da vian rep re sen ta tives swore the oath of loy alty to the tsar. See PSZ, ser. 1, vol. 2, 385–90. The term reaya orig i nally des ig nated the non-mil i tary pop u la tion of the Ot to man Em pire. With time, it was ap plied to the ter-ri to ries ex empt from the ju ris dic tion of the Mol da vian and Wal la chian princes and sub or di nate to the govern ors of the Ot to man for tresses of Turnu, Giur giu, Br˘aila, Reni, and Is mail on the Da nube and Bender and Hotin on the Dniester. The pop u la tion of these ter ri to ries had to sus tain the Ot to man gar ri sons.

17. See “Stat’i pris lan nyie iz Var shavy k tsa riu Alex eiu Mik hal o vi chu ot vo lokhs kikh boyar Ra dula i Pe trashki na ka kikh us lov i akh zhe laiut oni byt’ v ros siis kom pod danstve,” PSZ, ser. 1, vol. 2, 971–72.

18. “Dip lom, dan nyi va kakhs komu kni a ziu Dmi triiu Kan te miru,” PSZ, ser. 1, vol. 4, 659–61.

19. With the ex cep tion of the prince of Mol da via Alex an dru Mav ro cor dat Fir aris (the Fu gi tive), who in 1787 de fected to the Rus sians, the only hos po dar to ac cept Rus sian su ze rainty in the post-1711 pe riod was the Wal la chian prince Con stan tine Ypsi lanti. Ypsi lanti did so at the out break of the Russian-Ottoman War of 1806–12 in the ex pec ta tion of es tab lish ing the dy nas tic rule of the Ypsi-lanti over both prin ci pal ities. See George F. Jews bury, Rus sian An nex a tion of Bes sa ra bia, 1774–1828: A Study of Im pe rial Ex pan sion (Boul der, CO: East Eu ro-pean Mono graphs, 1975), 37–43. Vlad i mir Mis chevca and Per i klis Za vit sa nos, Prin ci pele Con stan tin Ypsi lanti (Chi¸sin˘au: Ci vi tas, 1999).

20. Pha nar i ote rule in Mol da via and Wal la chia con sti tutes a con tro ver sial sub ject in Ro ma nian historiog ra phy. In the nine teenth cen tury, crit i cal eval u a-tions by Mihai Kog˘alni ceanu, L’Istoire de la Dacie, des Va laques Tras dan u biennes et de la Val a chie (Ber lin: Li brai rie B. Behr, 1854), 372; and A. D. Xeno pol, Epoca Fa nar io¸tilor pâna la 1812 (Ia¸si: Ed i tura libr˘ariei sco al e lor Fra¸tii Sa raga, 1896) gave way to more pos i tive ap prai sals by Nic o lae Iorga, By zance après By zance (Bu-char est: L’Institut d’Etudes Byz an tines, 1935); and Florin Con stan ti niu and ¸Serban Pap a cos tea, “Les ré formes des pre miers princes Phan a ri o tees en Mol da-vie et en Val a chie: Essai d’interpretation,” Bal kan Stud ies 13, no. 1 (1972): 89–118.

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For a re cent dis cus sion of the role of the Pha nar i otes in the Ot to man govern-ance, see Chris tine M. Phil liou, Biog ra phy of an Em pire: Gov ern ing the Ot to mans in an Age of Rev o lu tion (Berke ley: Uni ver sity of Cal i for nia Press, 2011), 5–37.

21. E. B. Shul’man, “Pro russ kaia par tia v Va lak hii i ee svi azi s Ros siei, 1736–1737,” in Russko-rumynskie i rumynsko-russkie ot no she nia (Ki shi nau: Shtiintsa, 1969), 7–41. At the time of the Pruth cam paign, there was like wise a pro-Russian party in Wal la chia led by Toma Can tac u zino, whose per sonal ri valry with the hos po dar Con stan tin Bran kov i anu was one of the fac tors be hind the latter’s “betrayal” of Peter the Great. See Vic tor Tvir cun, “Via¸ta ¸si ac tiv i ta tea con te lui Toma Can tac u zino în Rusia (I),” Re vista Is tor ic˘a 21, nos. 5–6 (2010): 501–16.

22. Cited in L. E. Sem e nova, Kni a zhestva Mol da viia i Va lak hiia, ko nets XIV–na chalo XIX vv.: Ocherki vnesh nep o lit i ches koi is to rii (Mos cow: In drik, 2006), 316. On Dr˘agunescu’s mis sion, see E. B. Shul’man, “Mis sia va lashs kogo vor nika P. Dr˘agunescu v Ros siiu (1736–1737 gg.),” in Ve ko vaia druzhba (Kish i nev: Shtiintsa, 1963), 211–39; Drag nev, Ocherki vnesh ne p o lit i ches koi is to rii, 262.

23. See D. F. Mas lovs kii, Stav u chans kii pok hod: Dok u menty 1739 g. (St. Pe ters-burg: Voenno-uchebnyi ko mi tet Glav nogo Shtaba, 1892), 187–88; Drag nev, Ocherki vnesh nep o lit i ches koi is to rii Mol da vii, 271–73.

24. Drag nev, Ocherki vnesh nep o lit i ches koi is to rii Mol da vii, 298–99; Sem e nova, Kni a zhestva Mol da viia i Va lak hiia, 320–21.

25. Al though all Russian-Ottoman trea ties be gin ning with Bel grade (1739) con tained a clause about the non pun ish ment of “the sub jects of both em pires which in the course of war de fected to the op po site side,” there was lit tle or no prac ti cal pos sibil ity to en force this clause, as the con sid er able Ro ma nian im mi-gra tion to Rus sia dur ing the eigh teenth cen tury dem on strates. See A. Vianu, “Cîteva date priv i toare la em i grarea romînilor în sudul Ru siei în sec o lul al XVIII-lea,” in Stu dii pri vind relatiile romîno-ruse (Bu char est: Ac a de mia Re pu bli cii Pop u lare Romîne, 1963), 57–65.

26. It is note worthy that dur ing the war of 1787–92 there were hardly any ap peals on the part of the boy ars to make Mol da via and Wal la chia Rus sian prov inces. In stead, Wal la chian boy ars ad dressed to both Rus sia and Aus tria two mem o randa in which they ef fec tively de manded the end of the Pha nar i ote re gime and the res to ra tion of the his tor i cal auton omy of the two prin ci pal ities under the rule of autoch thon ous princes. By his tor i cal auton omy, the boy ars im plied a res to ra tion of the na tional mi li tia and the ab o li tion of the Ot to man monop oly on foreign trade. See Vlad Georgescu, ed., Mé moires et pro jets de réforme dans les prin ci pautés rou maines, 1769–1830: Réper toire et tex tes inédits (Bu char est: As so ci a tion inter nation ale d’études du Sud-Est Eu ro péen, 1970), 10.

27. Cited in Sem e nova, Kni a zhestva Mol da viia i Va lak hiia, 36.28. Ibid., 38.29. The Mol da vian counter parts of these Wal la chian for ger ies were the

trea ties between Selim I and Bog dan III (1511) and Su lei man II and Petru Rare¸s (1545). There were multi ple edi tions of the ca pit u la tions dur ing the nine teenth


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cen tury. See, for ex am ple, M. Mit i li neu, ed., Co lectiune de trat a tele si con ventiu nile ale României cu pute rile straine (Bu char est: Noua tip o gra fia ale lab o rat o rilor români, 1874), 6, 18, 35, 51. For the French trans la tion of the first two trea ties, see Felix Col son, De l’État pré sent et de l’avenir de prin ci pau tés de Mol da vie et de Val a chie (Paris: A. Pou gin, 1839), 323–25. Most spe cial ists on the sub ject of ca pit-u la tions in di cate that these texts were pre sented by Mihai Can tac u zino to Count Gri go rii Orlov dur ing the Con gress of Fo¸scani in Au gust 1772. See “Me moire ad dressé au Comte Orlov,” 6 Au gust 1772, in Ge nea lo gia Can ta cu zi-nilor, ed. Nic o lae Iorga (Bu char est: In sti tut de Arte gra fice ¸si Ed i tur˘a Mi nerva, 1902), 492–508. For a dis sent ing opin ion, see Sem e nova, Kni a zhestva Mol da viia i Va lak hiia, 31–65.

30. The issue of the Ot to man ca pit u la tions to the prin ci pal ities gen er ated a vo lu mi nous lit er a ture and an un end ing historio graph i cal de bate. The Ro ma-nian his to rians of the twen ti eth cen tury dem on strated that the texts of ca pit u la-tions pub lished by their nineteenth-century pre de ces sors were in fact late eighteenth-century for ger ies (the ear li est ex tant copy is dated 1804). The pre-dom i nant opin ion of present-day Ro ma nian historiog ra phy is that, al though for ger ies, the “ca pit u la tions” were pre dated by the ac tual Ot to man ahd-names and hatti-i sher iffs is sued by the sul tans to the hos po dars in the fif teenth and the early six teenth cen tury, the cop ies of which were later lost. How ever, the texts of these orig i nal hatt-i sher iffs and ahd-names still re main to be dis cov ered in the Ot to man archives. For an over view of the historiog ra phy of “ca pit u la tions,” see Sem e nova, Kni a zhestva Mol da viia i Va lak hiia, 21–31. On the “uses” of ca pit u-la tions by the nineteenth-century Ro ma nian nation-builders, see the dis cus sion later in this chap ter.

31. Con stan tin Giu rescu, Ca pit u latiile Mol do vei cu Poarta Ot to mana (Bu char est: In sti tut de Arte Gra fice Carol Göbl, 1908), 6–11.

32. T. P. Iu zef o vich, Dog o vory Ros sii s Vos to kom (St. Pe ters burg: Tip. O. I. Bak sta, 1869), 32–34.

33. On the lat ter, see G. S. Gro sul, Du nais kie kni a zhestva v pol i tike Ros sii, 1774–1806 (Chi¸sin˘au: Shtiintsa, 1975), 154–65.

34. Apart from the trea ties that Rus sia con cluded with the Ot to man Em pire after 1774, the man i fes tos of the Rus sian rul ers and their gen er als to the pop u la-tion of the prin ci pal ities dur ing the Russian-Ottoman wars also re ferred to local laws and priv i leges. Thus, Peter the Great’s man i festo of 8 May 1711 ad dressed to Mol da vians and Wal la chians, as well as other Chris tians of the Ot to man Em pire, prom ised to “leave each coun try under its old laws” and to “con firm their old rights and priv i leges.” See Is tor i ches kie svi azi nar o dov SSSR i Ru my nii, 3:333. P. A. Rumiantsev’s man i festo to the pop u la tion of Mol da via of 22 Sep tem-ber 1788 an nounced the pres er va tion of “local laws” and con firmed the rights of in hab i tants. See RGVIA, f. VUA, d. 2391, part 2, ll. 383.

35. The name of Bes sa ra bia in itially ap plied only to the lands between the Black Sea lit to ral and lower courses of the Pruth, the Da nube, and the Dniester.

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Al though by the end of the four teenth cen tury Mol da vian princes ex tended their sov e reignty over these ter ri to ries, their hold re mained ten u ous. In the first half of the fif teenth cen tury, these lands tem po rar ily passed under the con trol of the Wal la chian princely fam ily of the Bas sa rabs, which ex plains the or i gin of the top o nym. Fol low ing a pro tracted re sis tance to the Ot to man ad vance, the most not able Mol da vian ruler, Ste phen the Great (1457–1504), even tu ally had to ac cept the status of a sultan’s vas sal and cede the for tresses of Kilia and Ak ker-man with the sur round ing dis tricts to Ba jezed II in 1484. Some fifty years later, Su lei man the Mag nifi cent con sol i dated Ot to man con trol over Mol da via, by con struct ing the for tress of Bender on the Dniester and al ien at ing into reaya a still larger chunk of the ter ri tory between the Dniester and the Pruth. In the mean time, the steppe land between the for tresses (whose num ber was aug-mented by the con struc tion of Is mail and Reni in the early 1600s) be came the abode of the semi no madic Nogai sub jects of the Cri mean khans, them selves vas sals of the Porte. The al ien a tion of the Kho tin dis trict into reaya in 1713 fur ther lim ited the ter ri to ries that were under di rect ju ris dic tion of the Mol da vian princes east of the Pruth. Fol low ing the ex ten sion of the Rus sian bor ders to the Pruth and the Da nube in 1812, the name of Bes sa ra bia, hitherto ap plied only to the south ern part of the Pruth-Dniester mesopo ta mia, came to des ig nate the en tire ter ri tory between the Dniester, the Pruth, the Da nube, and the Black Sea. On the Ot to man re ayas along the Da nube and the Dniester, see Laur en¸tiu Râdvan, At Europe’s Bor ders: Me di eval Towns in the Ro ma nian Prin ci pal ities (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 248–55, 495–97, 516–14, 543–44; on the tem po rary Aus trian an nex a-tion of Ol te nia (Lit tle Wal la chia), see ¸Serban Pap a cos tea, Ol te nia sub stapânirea aus tri aca, 1718–1739 (Bu char est: Ed i tura En cic lo ped ica, 1998). On the Rus sian an nex a tion of Bes sa ra bia, see Jews bury, Rus sian An nex a tion of Bes sa ra bia; and An drei Cusco and Vic tor Taki, with par tic i pa tion of Oleg Grom, Bes sa ra biia v sos tave Ros siis koi im pe rii, 1812–1917 (Mos cow: No voie Li ter a tur noie oboz re nie, 2012).

36. “Mé moire con cer nant le statut inter na tional des Prin ci pau tés, le carac- tère des re la tions de la Mol da vie avec la Tur quie et la Rus sie, ainsi que l’influence de ces re la tions sur les rap ports so ci aux internes,” in Mé moires et pro jets de réforme, 98.

37. “Adresse du Divan de Val a chie à l’empereur de Rus sie,” 4 May 1828, Bu char est, in An nu aire his to rique uni ver sel (Paris: Fan tin, 1829), 89.

38. Ibid.39. Ar ti cle 5 in Iu zef o vich, Dog o vory Ros sii s Vos to kom, 74.40. For this pe riod, see Gro sul, Du nais kie kni a zhestva v pol i tike Ros sii; and

Jews bury, Rus sian An nex a tion of Bes sa ra bia, 7–55.41. Apart from the Mol da vian mem o ran dum on ca pit u la tions ad dressed

to the Prus sian and Aus trian rep re sen ta tives in 1772, the Mol da vian and Wal-la chian boy ars sub mit ted three ad di tional mem o randa on the same sub ject to the Ot to man govern ment in Au gust and Sep tem ber 1774. See Mémoires et pro jets de réforme, 8. In 1790, the Wal la chian divan ad dressed to the Rus sian and


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Aus trian govern ments a mem o ran dum on the inter na tional stat ute of the prin ci-pal ities and the prin ci ples on which their re la tions with the Ot to man Em pire should be based. See N. Iorga, “Via¸ta unui mit ro polit de alt˘adat˘a,” Con vor biri lite rare, no. 11 (1901): 1126–31.

42. See, George F. Jews bury, “The Greek Ques tion: The View from Odessa, 1815–1822,” Ca hiers du monde russe 40, no. 4 (1999): 751–62.

43. I. C. Fi litti, Framântarile pol i tice si so ci ale în Prin cip a tele Române de la 1821 la 1828 (Bu char est: Car tea Româneasca, 1932) re mains one of the best ac counts of this pe riod. See also Anas ta sie Iord ache, Prin cip a tele Romnâne în epoca mod ern˘a, vol. 1, Dom niile p˘a mântene si oc u pa¸tia ru seasc˘a (Bu char est: Al ba tros, 1996).

44. See the mem o ran dum ad dressed to the Brit ish Am bas sa dor in Con stan-tin o ple Lord Strat ford Can ning by Ion ica Tau tul, the leader of the mid dle and lower rank Mol da vian boy ars dur ing the 1820s, in Mé moires et pro jets de ré formes, 170–72.

45. V. Ia. Gro sul, Re formy v du nais kikh kni a zhest vakh i Ros siia (Mos cow: Nauka, 1966), 145–47; Iuliu C. Ciu bo taru, “Lucrari si proecte in ve derea elab or˘arii reg u la men tu lui ob¸stesc al Mol do vei din anul 1827,” in Reg u la men tul Or ganic al Mol do vei, ed. Du mi tru Vitcu and Ga briel B˘ad˘ar˘au (Ia¸si: Ju ni mea, 2004), 77–78.

46. “Re quêtes des mé con tents mol daves,” AVPRI, f. 331, op. 716/1, d. 10, ll. 4–19; “Pro jet d’adresse (en tra duc tion lit té rale) saisi dans les pa pi ers du spa thar Sion,” ibid., ll. 53–57.

47. See re ports of the Rus sian pro vi sional au thor ities on the adop tion of the pro ject of the stat utes by the as sem blies of re vi sion: Kise lev to Nes sel rode, 30 April 1831, Ia¸si, RGIA, f. 958, op. 1, d. 625, “Don e se nia Russ kikh kon su lov iz Bu cha resta i Iass vitse-kantsleru K. V. Nes sel rode ob us troistve kni a zhestv Vlak hii i Mol da vii,” ibid., ll. 90–93, 258–58.

48. Radu Flo rescu, The Strug gle against Rus sia in the Da nu bian Prin ci pal ities, 1821–1854: A Prob lem of Anglo-Turkish Di plo macy (1962; Ia¸si: Cen ter for Ro ma-nian Stud ies, 1997).

49. On Sturdza’s re la tions with the op po si tion, see Ghe or ghe Pla ton, Mol-dova si începuturile re vo lu tiei de la 1848 (Chi si nau: Uni ver si tas, 1993), 110, 122–25. In 1844, Bi bescu pro rogued the as sem bly after it re fused to ap prove the min ing con ces sions to the Rus sian en gi neer Tran dafi lov. See Bar bara Jel a vich, Rus sia and the For ma tion of the Ro ma nian Na tional State, 1821–1878 (Cam bridge: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 1984), 38; Flo rescu, Strug gle against Rus sia, 144.

50. See, for in stance, Nic o lae Iorga, His toire des re la tions entre la France et les Rou mains (Paris: Payot, 1918); John C. Camp bell, French In flu ence and the Rise of Ro ma nian Na tion al ism: The Gen er a tion of 1848 (1830–1857) (New York: Arno Press, 1971); Mihai Dim i trie Sturdza, Românii între frica de Rusia ¸si dra gos tea de Fran¸ta (Bu char est: Roza Vânturilor, 2006).

51. Mi ros lav Hroch, “From Na tional Move ment to the Fully-Formed Na tion: The Nation-Building Pro cess in Eu rope,” in Map ping the Na tion, ed. Gopal Ba lak rish nan (New York: Verso, 1996), 78–97, esp. 79.

52. Camp bell, French In flu ence, 52, 54–55, 115, 117.

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53. Ibid., 69–74. On the Rus sian in flu ence in Ser bia and the re ac tions of Milos Ob re novic and the “con sti tu tion al ists” to it, see Ste van K. Pav low itch, Anglo-Russian Ri valry in Ser bia 1837–1839: The Mis sion of Colo nel Hodges (Paris: Mou ton, 1961); E. P. Ku dri avt seva, Ros siia i Ser bia v 30-kh–40-kh gg. XIX veka (Mos cow: In sti tut Ros siis koi Is to rii RAN, 2002), 52–81, 99–112.

54. The best essay-length dis cus sion of the rev o lu tion is Dan Be ren dei, 1848 în T˘arile Române (Bu char est: Ed i tura Stiin tifica si en cic lo ped ica, 1984); the most com plete treat ment is Cor ne lia Bodea, 1848 la Români, 2 vols. (Bu char est: Ed i tura En cic lo ped ica, 1998); see also Ghe or ghe Pla ton, Ge neza re vo lu tiei române de la 1848: Intro du cere în is toria mod erna a României (Bu char est: Ju ni mea, 1980); and Keith Hitch ins, The Ro ma nians, 1774–1866 (Ox ford: Cla ren don Press, 1996), 231–73.

55. It is note worthy that Con stan tin o ple was the first cap i tal to which the Wal la chian rev o lu tion ar ies dis patched their first foreign rep re sen ta tive, Ion Ghica, in late May 1848, be fore the out break of the rev o lu tion.

56. “R˘aspun sul loco ti nen¸tei dom ne¸sti la cir cu larea ru seasc˘a din 19 iulie, 1848,” in Anul 1848 în Prin cip a tele Romane, ed. Ioan C. Bratianu, vol. 4 (Bu char est: Carl Göbl, 1903), 157–67. Even more ex pli citly, this ten dency to present Wal-la chian rev o lu tion as a re turn to the spirit and let ter of the Ot to man “ca pit u la-tions” can be found in the ac counts of 1848 events writ ten by one of the lead ers of the rev o lu tion ary govern ment and the spir i tual father of the “1848 gen er a-tion,” Ion Hel i ade R˘adu lescu. See J. R., Le Pro tec to rat du Czar (Paris: Comon, 1850); J. El i ade Ra du lesco, Mé moires sur l’histoire de la ré gén ér a tion Rou maine, ou sur l’évènements de 1848 ac com plis en Val a chie (Paris: Li brai rie de la Prop a gande dé moc ra tique et so ci ale Eu ro péenne, 1851).

57. Shortly be fore the rev o lu tion was crushed, one of its lead ers, Alex an dru Go lescu, ad dressed a mem o ran dum to the dem o cratic pub lic in West ern Eu rope that ref er enced the an cient trea ties of the prin ci pal ities with the Ot to man Em pire that had been vi o lated by Rus sia. See “Is tor i cul ul tim e lor even i mente pe tre cute in Prin ci pale, me mo riu de Al. G. Go lescu,” in Anul 1848 în Prin cip a tele Rom˘ane, vol. 4 (Bu char est: In sti tut de Arte Gra fice Carol Göbl, 1903), 634–70.

58. G. Cha noi [Ion Ghica], Dernière oc cu pa tion des prin ci pau tés par la Rus sie (Paris: J. Du maine, 1853), 18–20.

59. An ele ment of the longue durée of Eu ro pean in tel lec tual his tory, the per-cep tion of Rus sia as des potic was par tic u larly strong dur ing the 1830s, 1840s, and early 1850s. See Mar tin Malia, Rus sia under West ern Eyes: From Bronze Horse-man to Lenin’s Mau so leum (Cam bridge, MA: Har vard Uni ver sity Press, 1999); Eze quiel Ad a mov sky, Euro-Orientalism: Lib eral Ideol ogy and the Image of Rus sia in France, 1740s–1880s (Bern: Peter Lang, 2006); Iver B. Neu mann, Rus sia and the Idea of Eu rope: A Study of Iden tity in Inter na tional Re la tions (Lon don: Rout ledge, 1996); and Mar shall Poe, A Peo ple Born to Slav ery: Rus sia in Early Mod ern Eu ro pean Eth nog ra phy, 1476–1748 (Ithaca, NY: Cor nell Uni ver sity Press, 2000).

60. Cha noi, Dernière oc cu pa tion des prin ci pau tés, 12.


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61. On the role of the po lit i cal exile in the Ro ma nian na tional move ment, see An gela Jianu, A Cir cle of Friends: Ro ma nian Rev o lu tion ar ies and Po lit i cal Exile, 1840–1859, Bal kan Li brary Stud ies 3 (Leiden: Brill, 2011).

62. F. P. Fon ton, Vos pom i na nia, vol. 1 (Leip zig: F. Wag ner, 1862), 37.63. Ibid., 38. Con stan tin Brâncoveanu (1688–1716) was a hos po dar of Wal-

la chia, who in the course of the Pruth cam paign failed to sup port Peter the Great de spite a se cret agree ment to this ef fect. Brâncoveanu de cided to ally with the Ot to mans due to his ri valry with Peter’s Mol da vian ally Dim i trie Cante mir, the slow ness of Rus sian prog ress, and the quicker than ex pected mo bil iza tion of the Ot to man troops.

64. Pub lished in Is tor i ches kie svi azi nar o dov SSSR i Ru my nii, 3:331.65. A. L. Na roch nits kii and N. Pet ro vich, eds., Po lit i ches kie i kul’turnye ot no-

she niia Ros sii s iu gos lav i ans kimi zem li ami v XVIII v. Dok u menty (Mos cow: Nauka, 1984), 29–30.

66. See A. N. Pe trov, Voina Ros sii s Turt siei i s pol’skimi kon fe der a tami, 1769–1774, vol. 1 (St. Pe ters burg: Ed u ard Vei mar, 1866), 103–6.

67. A. L. Zorin, Kor mia dvu glav nogo orla: Li ter a tura i gos u darst ven naia ideo lo-giia v Ros sii v pos led nei treti XVIII–per voi treti XIX veka (Mos cow: No voie Li ter a-tur noie Oboz re nie, 2004), 31–61; V. I. Pro sku rina, Mify im pe rii: Li ter a tura i vlast’ v epokhu Ekat e riny II (Mos cow: No voie Li ter a tur noie Oboz re nie, 2006), 149–94.

68. Theo phi lus Prou sis, Rus sian So ci ety and the Greek Rev o lu tion (De Kalb: North ern Il li nois Uni ver sity Press, 1994), 26–53.

69. [ Jo hann Chris tian von Struve], Travels in the Cri mea: A His tory of the Em bassy from St. Pe ters burg to Con stan tin o ple in 1793 (Lon don: S. Ham il ton, 1802), 90, 257; A. F. Lange ron, “Jour nal des cam pagnes faites en ser vice de Rus sie,” in Doc u mente priv i toare la is toria Românilor, supp. 1, vol. 3 (Bu char est: Socec, 1889), 73.

70. George Ver nad sky, “Alex an dre Ier et le problème slave pen dant la première moi tié de son règne,” Revue des Études Slaves 7, nos. 1–2 (1927): 94–111.

71. Kise lev to Bute nev, 19 June 1833, Bu char est, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 469, d. 141, l. 207.

72. On Malinovskii’s pro ject, see I. S. Dos tian, “Ev ro peis kaia uto pia V. F. Mal i novs kogo,” Vo prosy is to rii, no. 6 (1979): 32–46; On Czartoryski’s plans in 1804–6, see Ver nad sky, “Alex an dre Ier,” 94–111; Pa tri cia Grim sted, The Foreign Min is ters of Al ex an der I: Po lit i cal At ti tudes and the Con duct of Rus sian Di plo-macy, 1801–1825 (Berke ley: Uni ver sity of Cal i for nia Press, 1969); and W. H. Zaw adzki, A Man of Hon our: Adam Czar to ry ski as a States man of Rus sia and Po-land, 1795–1831 (Ox ford: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 1993).

73. A. M. Spir i dov, “Krat koie oboz re nie nar o dov Slav i ans kogo ple meni ob i taiush chikh v Ev ro peis koi chasti Tu rets koi Im pe rii,” Se ver nyi Ark hiv, no. 14 (1825): 86.

74. Ibid., 87–90.75. Ibid., 93.

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76. Iu. I. Ven e lin, Drev nie i ny nesh nie Bol gare v po lit i ches kom, na rod o pis nom, is tor i ches kom i re li gioz nom ikh ot no she nii k Ros siai nam, vol. 1 (Mos cow: Uni ver-si tes kaia tip., 1829).

77. Iu. I. Ven e lin, “Zam e cha nia na so chin e nie gos po dina Iak o venko o Mol-da vii i Va lak hii i proch. (per voie pis’mo k iz da te liu Mos kovs kogo Vest nika),” Mos kovs kii Vest nik, no. 15 (1828): 269–71.

78. Ia. D. Gin ku lov, Na cher ta nie pra vil mol dov lak hiis koi gram ma tiki (St. Pe ters-burg: Im pe rial Acad emy of Sci ences, 1840), i–iii. Other use ful works by Ghin ku-lov in clude Sob ra nie soch i ne nii i per ev o dov, v proze i stik hakh, dlia up azh ne nia v valakho-moldavskom ia zyke, s pri sov o ku ple niem slo varia i so bra nia slav i ans kikh per-voo braz nykh slov, up otreb li ae mykh v ia zyke valakho-moldavskom (St. Pe ters burg: Im pe rial Acad emy of Sci ences, 1841); idem, Vy vody iz vlakho-moldavskoi gram ma-tiki (St. Pe ter burg: Im pe rial Acad emy of Sci ences, 1847); idem, Kar man naia knizhka russ kikh voi nov v pok ho dakh po kni a zhest vam Mol da vii i Va lak hii, pts. 1–2 (St. Pe ters-burg: Im pe rial Acad emy of Sci ences, 1854).

79. E. P. Kov a levs kii, “Vos pom i na nia o bere gakh nizh nego Du naia,” Bib lio-teka dlia chte nia 65 ( July 1844): 1; sum mary in Zhur nal Mini sterstva Na rod nogo Pres vi ash che nia 44, nos. 10–12 (1844): 178–79.

80. On the re forms of the early 1830s, see I. C. Fi litti, Prin cip a tele Române de la 1828 la 1834: Oc u pa¸ta ru seasc˘a ¸si Reg u la men tul or ganic (Bu char est: In sti tut de Arte Gra fice “Bu co vina,” 1934); Gro sul, Re formy v du nais kikh kni a zhest vakh; Al ex an der Bitis, Rus sia and The East ern Ques tion: Army, Govern ment, and So ci ety, 1815–1833 (Ox ford: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press for the Brit ish Acad emy, 2006), 426–64; and Vic tor Taki, “Between Pol i zeis taat and Cor don San i taire: Epi dem ics and Po lice Re form dur ing Rus sian Oc cu pa tion of Mol da via and Wal la chia, 1828–1834,” Ab Im pe rio, no. 4 (2008): 75–112.

81. See Neagu Dju vara, Între Or i ent ¸si Oc ci dent: T˘arile române le începutul epo cii mod erne (Bu char est: Hu ma ni tas, 1995); Pom pi liu El i ade, In fluenta fran ceza asu pra spir i tu lui pub lic în România: Orig i nile; Stu diu asu pra sta rii so ci eta tii românesti în vre mea dom niilor fa nar i ote, trans. Au re lia Du mi trascu (1898; Bu char est: Hu-ma ni tas, 2000); idem, La Rou ma nie au XIX-e sie cle, vol. 2, Les trois pres i dents ple ni-p o ten tiaires (1828–1834) (Paris: Hach ette, 1914).

82. An a tole Dem i dov, Voy age dans la Rus sie mér i di o nale et la Cri mée par la Hon grie, la Val a chie et la Mol da vie (Paris: Er nest Bour din, 1840), 108. For a more de tailed treat ment of the Rus sian per cep tion of Mol da via and Wal la chia as fron tiers of civ il iza tion, see Vic tor Taki, “Mol da via and Wal la chia in the Eyes of Rus sian Ob serv ers,” East-Central Eu rope/ L’Europe du Centre-Est 32, nos. 1–2 (2005): 199–224.

83. Some of the more Western-minded Rus sian ob serv ers noted with ap-proval that, sol emn and im mo bile, the bearded Mol da vian and Wal la chian pa tri archs looked not un like the pre-Petrine Mus co vite boy ars. See Filip Vigel, “Zam e cha nia na ny nesh nee sos toia nie Bes sa rabs koi oblasti,” Russ kii Ark hiv 80, no. 1 (1893): 1–34.


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84. I. P. Li prandi, Du nais kie kni a zhestva (Mos cow: Iz da nie Im per a tors kogo Obsh chestva Is to rii i Drev nos tei Ros sis kikh, 1877), 5.

85. Ibid., 6–8.86. P. V. Al a bin, Che tyre voiny: Pok hod nye za pi ski v 1849, 1853, 1854–56,

1877–78 gg., vol. 2 (Sa mara: I. P. Nov i kov, 1888), 43.87. M. M. Pog o din, Istoriko-politicheskie pis’ma i za pi ski v pro dol zhe nie Kryms koi

voiny (Mos cow: Tip. Mos kovs kogo Uni ver si teta, 1874), 120.88. Dan i levs kii, Ros siia i Ev ropa, 486.89. K. N. Leont’ev, “Plody natsional’nykh dvi zhe nii na pra vos lav nom

vos toke,” in his Sob ra nie soch i ne nii, 9 vols. (Mos cow: Izd. V. M. Sa blina, 1912– 13), 6:233.

90. Dan i levs kii, Ros siia i Ev ropa, 380–81.91. Fa deev, Mne nie o vos toch nom vo prose, 52.92. Ibid., 52–53.93. On the com plex nego ti a tions that pre ceded the con clu sion of the con-

ven tion, see Jel a vich, Rus sia and the For ma tion of the Ro ma nian Na tional State, 241–56.

94. “Dis cur sul lui Mihai Kog˘alni ceanu asu pra pol i ti cei ex terne a Românei în con di¸tii cri zei orien tale (¸Sedin¸ta Sen a tu lui României din 17 [29] Ap ri lie 1877),” in Dis cur suri ¸si dez ba teri par la men tare (1864–2004), ed. G. Bu zatu (Bu-char est: Ed i tura Mica Va la hia, 2004), 83–98.

95. Jel a vich, Rus sia and the Emer gence of the Ro ma nian Nation-State, 277–86; Cusco and Taki, Bes sa ra biia v sos tave Ros siis koi im pe rii, 234–60.

96. Les Proto coles du Congrès du Ber lin (St. Pe ters burg: Trenke et Fus not, 1878), 49–50.

97. Ibid., 47–48.98. Vlad len Vi nog ra dov, Ru my nia v gody Per voi Mi ro voi Voiny (Mos cow:

Nauka, 1969), 52–71.99. “Te o dor Ba cons chi: Tur cia are voca¸tia is tor ic˘a si po lit ic˘a de a face parte

din UE,” http://tin yurl.com/ks986mr (ac cessed 13 Jan u ary 2013).100. Alex andr Dugin, Os novy geo pol i tiki (Mos cow: Arctogeia-tsentr, 2000),

220. Dan i levs kii de scribed the uni fi ca tion of Ro ma nia with part of Tran syl va nia, Bu co vine, and part of Bes sa ra bia “with the con sent and coop er a tion of Rus sia, under whose im par tial and pac ify ing in flu ence the Ro ma nians would be able to suc cess fully with stand Mag yar iza tion.” See Dan i levs kii, Ros siia i Ev ropa, 486.

101. Bel kov sky re it er ated his plan more re cently; see http://www.mol dov a nova.md/ru/pub li ca tions/show/280 (ac cessed 9 No vem ber 2011). For the Ro-ma nian re sponses to what came to be termed as the “Bel kov sky Plan,” see http://www.re vista22.ro/ proiectul-belkovski-transnistria-contra-basarabia-977.html (ac cessed 9 No vem ber 2011).

102. On Romania’s coop er a tion with Geor gia and Azer bai jan, see Sa bina Fati, “Mos cova ¸si An kara nu v˘ad cu ochi buni ex tin derea in flu en¸tei mil i tare ¸si ener ge tice preg˘atit˘a la Bu cure¸sti. De ce se tem Rusia ¸si Tur cia de România,”

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April 18, 2011. Avail able at http://www.rom a ni a lib era.ro/ac tu al i tate/map a mond/ de-ce-se-tem-rusia-si-turcia-de-romania-222755.html (ac cessed 11 Sep tem ber 2011). On Romania’s at ti tude to wards Turkey’s EU ac ces sion, see http://www.eu rac tiv.ro/ uniunea-europeana/ar ti cles%7Cdis play Ar ti cle /ar tic leID_12711/.html.

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“Dread ful Scenes of Carn age on Both Sides”The Strang ford Files and the East ern Cri sis of 1821–1822

Theo phi lus C. Prou sis

Lord Strang ford, an ex pe ri enced dip lo matic of fi cial with pre vi ous post-ings to Por tu gal, Bra zil, and Swe den, served as Britain’s am bas sa dor to the Sub lime Porte from 1821 to 1824, an es pe cially tur bu lent time in Ottoman-European en coun ters. As the Ot to man Em pire coped with a se ries of chal lenges, Strang ford sent hun dreds of re ports to the Lon don Foreign Of fice. His cor re spon dence de tailed the state of the sultan’s realm at a tense but pivotal mo ment in the East ern Ques tion, that pre-car i ous web of Eu ro pean power, ri valry, and in trigue in the re mark ably re sil ient Ot to man Em pire, which still pos sessed stra te gic lands and vital wa ter ways in the Le vant, or east ern Med i ter ra nean. Re bel lion broke out in the Da nu bian prin ci pal ities, the Pel o pon nese, and other Greek- inhabited re gions of the Ot to man Em pire. War between Rus sia and Tur key loomed, largely over Ot to man ac tions that ab ro gated Russian- Ottoman trea ties. Ot to man re stric tions dis rupted Eu ro pean trade. Pol i-tics clashed with re li gion. Sec tar ian abuse and vi o lence deep ened the

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Greek-Ottoman di vide. Ad min is tra tive dis or der height ened pub lic un-cer tainty, govern ment fac tions con tested the sultan’s rule, and bor der dis putes sparked hos til ity between Tur key and Per sia.

The vir tu ally un tapped Strang ford treas ure trove, lo cated in the Na tional Archives, Kew, UK, pro vides an in val u able re source on Ot to-man do mes tic and foreign af fairs, Eu ro pean inter ests in the Near East, and Greek stir rings for na tional in de pen dence. The Strang ford files, much like the Dash kov papers in Rus sian archives, hold po ten tial riches

Portrait of Percy Clinton Sidney Smythe, 6th Viscount Strangford, 1820–24. (reprinted with permission from the Trustees of the British Museum)

“Dreadful Scenes of Carnage on Both Sides”

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for schol ars work ing in Ot to man, Med i ter ra nean, bor der lands, and es-pe cially East ern Ques tion his tory.1 Against the back drop of an in ten-sify ing cri sis in the Near East, Strang ford chron i cled a vol a tile sit u a tion from Con stan tin o ple, the epi cen ter of the up hea val. The messy re al ities at the core of this un fold ing cat a clysm fea tured the es ca lat ing cycle of Greek-Ottoman fight ing and re pri sal; the Ot to man mas sa cre of Greek res i dents on Chios; the dis cord among Greek rebels; the de bates among Ot to man of fi cials about mil i tary and ad min is tra tive re form; and the dogged ef forts of Eu ro pean en voys like Strang ford to pac ify the Greek up ris ing and re duce Russian-Ottoman ten sion.2 Britain’s am bas sa dor probed all these ram ifi ca tions, along with the pre dict able mat ter of Brit ish trade in the trou bled Le vant. His com mu ni qués also re counted his per sis tent at tempts to per suade the Porte to evac u ate Ot to man troops from the Da nu bian prin ci pal ities, to ap point new hos po dars or govern ors, and to re move Ot to man im ped i ments against Black Sea and Med i ter ra nean shipping.

Strangford’s de scrip tion of these top ics sharp ens our view of the com plex na ture of the East ern Ques tion in the early nine teenth cen-tury, when the Ot to man Em pire faced inter nal and ex ter nal pres sures spawned by war, re volt, ad min is tra tive break down, and Eu ro pean inter ven tion. Archives and man u scripts like the Strang ford col lec tion widen our ap proach to the East ern Ques tion, from a purely great-power mil i tary, naval, and dip lo matic ri valry to a more var ied and dy namic con test. Eu ro pean stra te gic, com mer cial, re li gious, and other ob jec tives en twined with the un pre dict able circum stances of the Ot to man Em pire. By re lat ing spe cific epi sodes of ja nis sary un rest, Greek se di tion, eco nomic dis lo ca tion, and pub lic in se cur ity, the writ ings of Strang ford elu ci date not just the over lap ping prob lems at the crux of the East ern Ques tion but also the human ele ment at the grass roots, in sti tu tional, and policy- making lev els of Ot to man so ci ety. Rich in tex ture and de tail, these snap-shots de pict com mer cial dis rup tion, sec tar ian strife, ad min is tra tive dis or der, and foreign med dling in the em bat tled Ot to man East.

The Greek rev o lu tion, which erupted in the Da nu bian prin ci pal ities and spread to the Morea, At tica, Thes saly, Mac e do nia, and the Ae gean Ar chi pel ago, trig gered an East ern emer gency with European-wide re per cus sions. The es tab lished order of le git i macy con fronted the prin-ci ples of lib erty and na tion al ity, and the un rest morphed into the pro-longed Greek con flict.3 This strug gle drained Ot to man re sources and rev e nues; stoked dis sen sion among fac tion al ized Greeks; pro voked out side inter ven tion that re sulted in an in de pen dent Greek king dom;

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and in spired in cen di ary out bursts in Eu rope, Rus sia, and the Bal kans. The Greek up ris ing also even tu ally led the Porte to ac cel er ate its pro gram of cen tral iz ing re forms for the pur pose of mod ern iz ing the em pire.4 Al ready in the open ing months of the dis tur bance, Eu ro pean en voys and con suls had to cope with the seem ingly intract able re al ities of the East ern quan dary: the flare-up of sec tar ian strife, the dis lo ca tion of trade, the up surge in pi racy, and the risk of war between Rus sia and Tur key, es pe cially after the Rus sian le ga tion se vered of fi cial ties with the Porte and left Con stan tin o ple in the sum mer of 1821.

In tak ing meas ures to crush the Greek mu tiny, the Porte in fringed on spe cific ar ti cles in Russian-Ottoman trea ties and thus an tag o nized of fi cial re la tions between the two em pires. Re pri sals against the Greeks, most not ably the ex e cu tion of Ec u men i cal Pa tri arch Grig o rios V in April 1821, breached the Porte’s prom ise in the Treaty of Ku chuk Kai nardji (1774) to shel ter the faith and churches of Ot to man Or tho dox Chris-tians.5 Trade ob sta cles seem ingly contra vened Russia’s right of un-im peded mer chant nav i ga tion in the straits, guar an teed by Ku chuk Kai nardji and the Treaty of Com merce (1783). The Porte’s dis mis sal of the hos po dars of Mol da via and Wal la chia, ac cus ing them of abet ting the ag i ta tion, under mined the sultan’s im pe rial de cree of 1802, and sub se-quent stip u la tions in the Treaty of Bu char est (1812), sanc tion ing Rus sian con sent in the ap point ment and dep o si tion of hos po dars. Fac ing strong pub lic clamor for inter ven tion on be half of per se cuted Greeks, and de spite ur gent calls by high-ranking of fi cials for mil i tary ac tion to rec tify broken trea ties, Al ex an der I up held the order of le git i macy. The tsar de plored the re bel lion as a men ace to Europe’s peace and se cur ity and to the prin ci ples of mon ar chi cal sol i dar ity and po lit i cal stabil ity; he also ad vo cated the Porte’s swift sup pres sion of the dis or ders be fore they en gulfed other re gions. At the same time, the tsar ist re gime re quested the strict ob ser vance of trea ties, in tent on using them as in stru ments for ex ert ing pres sure on Tur key.

The Foreign Ministry’s dual ap proach of cen sur ing the re volt but in sist ing on com plete com pli ance with treaty ac cords be came the basis for Rus sian pol icy in 1821. Russia’s am bas sa dor in Con stan tin o ple, Gri go rii Alek san dro vich Strog a nov, re buked the in sur rec tion but re mon-strated for Or tho dox breth ren, pro tested vi o la tions of trade clauses, and coun seled mod er a tion and re straint in Ot to man treat ment of non-in sur gent Greek Chris tians.6 For a host of rea sons, how ever, the Porte strongly sus pected Rus sian com plic ity in the tur moil: Russia’s past wars against Tur key; its self-proclaimed guar dian ship of Or tho dox


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Chris tians under Ot to man rule; its gen er ous sup port of Greek mi gra-tion to south ern Rus sia, in par tic u lar the dis tri bu tion of land grants and tax ex emp tions to Greek set tle ments in re cently an nexed Ot to man ter ri-to ries; and its ex ten sive net work of Greek pro tégés in Black Sea and Ae gean com merce. Fur ther more, Greek mer chants in Odessa par tic i-pated in the na tional fer ment that pro duced the Phi liki Etai reia (So ci ety of Friends), the se cret so ci ety that launched the in sur gence of 1821. Founded in Odessa (1814) and head quar tered in Kish i nev, this con spir a-to rial or gan iza tion re cruited mem bers and mo nies from Greek cen ters in Rus sia and came under the lead er ship of Al ex an der Ypsi lanti, a Greek gen eral in the Rus sian army and an aide-de-camp of the tsar. Also, Rus sia re fused to ex tra dite rebels who fled to Bes sa ra bia, in par-tic u lar the hos po dar of Mol da via, Mi chael Soutso, who joined the Phi liki Etai reia and took part in the Ypsi lanti up hea val.7 Treaty pro vi sos crum bled not just be cause of the Porte’s plau sible, but mis taken, ac cu-sa tions of the Rus sian government’s en tan gle ment in the sub ver sion but also be cause of the out break of sec tar ian rage in Con stan tin o ple, Smyrna, and else where. Iron i cally, trea ties that sought to main tain cor dial ties between Rus sia and Tur key and safe guard Rus sian ac tiv i ties in the Near East did nei ther.

In an ul ti ma tum de livered to the Porte on 6/18 July 1821, Rus sia de manded the evac u a tion of Ot to man troops from the Da nu bian prin ci-pal ities, the res to ra tion of dam aged churches and re li gious prop er ties, the pro tec tion of Or tho dox Chris tians, and the guar an tee of com mer cial rights. If the sul tan did not ac cept these terms, Rus sia would have to offer asy lum and as sis tance to all Chris tians sub jected to “blind fa nat i cism.”8 The ex pi ra tion of the Rus sian note’s pre scribed eight-day dead line with out the Porte’s full com pli ance, fol lowed by Am bas sa dor Stroganov’s de par ture from the Ot to man cap i tal, se vered of fi cial re la tions between Rus sia and Tur key, the two realms most pro foundly af fected by the up roar of 1821. Thus began a strange twi light pe riod of no war yet no peace. Al ex an der I proved re luc tant to act uni lat er ally with out the sanc-tion of the Con cert of Eu rope and dreaded the pros pect of a Russian- Turkish clash that would dis rupt the status quo, in cite re volts else where, and jeop ard ize the bal ance of power in Eu rope. Firmly com mit ted to the Con cert of Eu rope, the tsar sus pected that a Jac o bin di rect ing com-mit tee in Paris had in sti gated trou ble in the Bal kans. Yet the East ern quag mire thick ened, Greek-Ottoman fight ing in ten sified, Russian- Ottoman af fairs fes tered, and treaty vows shat tered amid war and rev o lu tion in the Le vant.

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Brit ain re mained neu tral in the Greek-Ottoman feud of 1821 yet pur sued its own stra te gic, po lit i cal, and com mer cial ends. Above all, Foreign Sec re tary Cas tle reagh re solved to avert war between Rus sia and Tur key, to main tain the Ot to man Em pire as a bul wark against the per ceived peril of Rus sian ex pan sion, to ex tend Brit ish trade in the Le vant, and to safe guard Britain’s pro tec to rate over the Io nian Is lands.9 All these ob jec tives framed Lord Strangford’s re sponses to the East ern pre dic a ment. De spite his con sid er able skill, fi nesse, and en ergy in striv ing to calm Russian-Ottoman an tag o nism and to mol lify the Greek havoc, he re mains a con tro ver sial fig ure. As the chief rep re sen ta tive of Brit ish pol icy in the Near East, he chided Strog a nov for his harsh tone to ward the Porte and falsely im pli cated sev eral tsar ist of fi cials, in clud ing Russia’s am bas sa dor, in the sub ver sive Phi liki Etai reia. Yet Strang ford worked tire lessly with his Eu ro pean and Ot to man counter parts to neu tral ize a dan ger ous sit u a tion, to shield Or tho dox Chris tians, and to re es tab lish tran quil ity in Mol da via and Wal la chia. He be came con vinced that the Porte’s timely res to ra tion of order, most not ably the safe keep ing of sa cred shrines and the evac u a tion of troops from the Da nu bian prin ci-pal ities, would fore stall Russian-Ottoman hos til ities. Through stead fast nego ti a tion, Strang ford and his col leagues sought to pre vent a greatpower war and to de fuse the Greek in sur gency.10

Along with his fore bod ing of a Russian-Ottoman con fron ta tion, Strang ford reg is tered con cern over the im pend ing dan ger of anti-Greek re pri sals—what he termed “atro cious and san gui nary pro ceed ings” and “a spirit of re lent less fa nat i cism.” At tacks against Greek Chris tian prop erty and churches be came all too pal pa ble to the Brit ish envoy, who be moaned “the pro lon ga tion of that system of san gui nary per se cu-tion.”11 Vi o lent in ci dents height ened the mood of dis quiet and trep i da-tion in Con stan tin o ple, es pe cially at Eu ro pean em bas sies, ob vi ously caught off guard when the sul tan or dered the ex e cu tion of Con stan tine Mou rousi, an Ot to man Greek who served as grand drago man (inter-preter or trans la tor) of the Porte. The death of the ec u men i cal pa tri arch and other church hier archs am plified the per ceived sec tar ian char ac ter of the Greek-Ottoman col li sion.12 Strangford’s dis patches por trayed an es ca lat ing East ern flash point, fueled largely by the dan ger of par ti san slaugh ter in the cap i tal and other em bat tled areas. With in del ible im ages and scenes, his writ ing evoked the re li gious wrath and nation alis tic fe roc ity that pro longed, as well as ex em plified, the Greek-Ottoman fight. Ran dom and de lib er ate vi o lence, ret ri bu tion and ex cess, by both Greeks and Turks, took place in Mol da via, Con stan tin o ple, Smyrna,


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Ai vali, and Tri po litsa. A pro gres sion of re tal i a tion and ven geance ex ac er bated the East ern emer gency, mag nified the human cost of the con flict, and made dip lo matic me di a tion all the more dif fi cult and im per a tive.

Per haps the most in fa mous of these out rages oc curred on the is land of Chios. The Chios ca tas trophe epit o mized both the folly and the fury of the Greek rev o lu tion, elic it ing hor rific re min ders of fire and sword me mo ri al ized in Eugène Delacroix’s edgy Mas sa cre at Chios (1824), the ex pres sive paint ing that in spired Eu ro pean sym pa thy and sup port for the Greek cause. Lo cated only five miles from the Turk ish main land, Ot to man Chios en joyed rel a tive auton omy, pros pered ec o nom i cally, and blos somed into a com mer cial hub, per haps the rich est is land in the Ae gean, per fectly sit u ated along the main shipping routes in the Le vant. Re nowned for its phys i cal beauty, mild cli mate, fer tile soil, and re source-ful pop u la tion, and sup pos edly the birth place of Homer, Chios fea tured merchant-funded schools and hos pi tals and a print ing press that pro-duced new edi tions of the an cient Greek clas sics. When a band of mis-guided ad ven tur ers from nearby Samos landed in March 1822 and raised the flag of lib er a tion, most Chi otes re mained skep ti cal; they under stand ably feared that Sam i ote fool har di ness and bra vado might jeop ard ize their cov eted auton omy and pros per ity. Cau tious Chi otes ques tioned the pros pect of suc cess ful re bel lion, given their island’s prox im ity to Tur key and its dis tance from the main Greek naval base at Hydra. Fears be came re al ity when the Ot to man navy ap proached in April 1822. The Sam i ote “lib er a tors” fled to the moun tains or to their await ing boats, leav ing Chios to a bit ter fate of plunder, sav agery, and slav ery. Ot to man reg u lar and ir reg u lar forces ex acted a ter ribly high price in ret ri bu tion, loot ing and burn ing the is land, slaugh ter ing un-armed res i dents, and en slav ing thou sands. Mas sa cre, cap tiv ity, and flight greatly di min ished the island’s Greek pop u la tion, from nearly 120,000 to some 20,000.13

Through out these mount ing pres sures dur ing the open ing two years of the cri sis, Strang ford coun seled re straint and cau tion. He re buffed Ot to man com plaints that the tsar ist re gime stood be hind the Ypsi lanti ex pe di tion. He ad vised the Porte to put its trust in the tsar’s re vul sion of rev o lu tion. He pro tested the ex e cu tion of the pa tri arch. And he re-peat edly tried to as suage the anger and re sent ment that in cited fur ther atroc ities by the bel lig er ents. Far from dis loyal to Strog a nov, he echoed his Rus sian col league on sev eral cru cial is sues yet crit i cized his pro voc a-tive de meanor and lan guage, such as Stroganov’s sweep ing as ser tion

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that Rus sia had the right not just to pro tect the sultan’s Chris tian sub jects but to de nounce the Ot to man Empire’s ex is tence as “in com pat ible with the stabil ity and se cur ity of the Chris tian faith.”14 Al though Strang ford did not suc ceed in thwart ing a rup ture in Russian-Ottoman re la tions, he ex horted the Porte to ob serve the strict let ter of ex ist ing trea ties— by with draw ing Ot to man troops from the Da nu bian prin ci pal ities, by re pair ing dam aged churches, and by pro tect ing Greek Or tho dox sub jects.

The nar ra tives of Strang ford re flect the ad van tages and lim i ta tions of pri mary sources writ ten by Eu ro peans in the Ot to man Is lamic world in the early nine teenth cen tury. Their com men tar ies con veyed con-ven tional West ern views of the Ot to man Em pire, per cep tions that stig ma tized the Ot to man other with oc ca sional dis tor tion, bias, and ex-ag ger a tion. En voys and con suls—and not just Brit ish rep re sen ta tives—de picted Ot to man of fi cial dom in a mostly neg a tive light, ac cent ing epi sodes of op pres sion and abuse by pa shas, ja nis sar ies, and cus toms of fi cers. Many of these au thor ities, por trayed as ra pa cious, cor rupt, and ar bi trary, inter fered in the ad min is tra tion of Eu ro pean dip lo matic and com mer cial con ces sions—the ca pit u la tions—and thus com pli cated European-Ottoman inter ac tions. Through their anec dotes and choice of words, West ern records al luded to com monly ac cepted Eu ro pean im ages of the Ot to man Em pire, fast ap proach ing what be came known as “the sick man of Eu rope” in West ern po lit i cal dis course and pop u lar opin ion.15

Yet the dis patches ex cerp ted here elu ci date some of the es sen tial ben e fits of West ern first hand tes ti mony on the East ern Ques tion. Strang-ford relied on a cir cle of sources, gath er ing in tel li gence from mer chants, travel ers, pro tégés, con suls, and drago mans; from high-ranking as well as re gional Ot to man of fi cials; and from other Eu ro pean en voys. Sift ing through these dif fer ent ac counts, the am bas sa dor chron i cled what he deemed the most crit i cal re al ities in Con stan tin o ple, the geo po lit i cal heart of the Ot to man Em pire, and ad dressed a range of top ics be yond the po lit i cal and dip lo matic fac ets of the East ern cri sis. More over, given Strangford’s ac cess to highly placed au thor ities in the cen tral govern-ment and their pro tracted de lib er a tions, his cor re spon dence sheds light on how Ot to man of fi cial dom per ceived and re acted to the Greek se di-tion. The very spec i fic ity and ur gency of his re ports deepen our under-stand ing of the multi ple is sues, such as sec tar ian fric tion and re li giously tinged Russian-Ottoman ten sion, which marked an age of up hea val in the Ot to man Le vant.


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Doc u ments

These pas sages intro duce read ers to the var i ous con cerns that not only pre oc cu pied Strang ford but char ac ter ized East ern Ques tion di plo macy dur ing the East ern cri sis. Doc u ment 1 sug gests the in trigue and du plic ity that ac com pa nied Eu ro pean deal ings with Ot to man court fa vor ites and in fluen tial ad vis ers of the sul tan. Se lec tions 2 and 3 high light the crux of Strangford’s over arch ing task: to de fuse Russian-Ottoman ten sion and avoid war between Rus sia and Tur key. Doc u ments 4, 7, 8, and 10 dem on strate the prom i nence of com merce in East ern Ques tion nego ti a-tions dur ing this trou bled pe riod, es pe cially in view of the dis rup tion of trade caused by the Greek re volt. Se lec tions 5 and 9 deal with the Chios mas sa cre, while doc u ment 6 fo cuses on the fes ter ing prob lem of or derly govern ance in the Da nu bian prin ci pal ities. All these sources are lo cated in the Foreign Of fice hold ings of the Na tional Archives, Kew (TNA FO).16 When the man u script has a word or phrase under-lined for em pha sis, I have re tained the orig i nal for mat. In most mat ters of word ing, gram mar, punc tu a tion, and ci ta tion of num bers, I have re tained Strangford’s for mat, in clud ing his ar cha isms and in con sis tent spellings. All ex plan a tory ma te rial in brack ets is mine.

1. TNA FO 78/106, ff. 14–16, 10 Jan u ary 1822 (No. 3) (Se cret)

[Strang ford to Cas tle reagh re: the pos sibil ity of in flu enc ing Halet Efendi, the main ad viser and close con fi dante of Sul tan Mah mud II, by a bribe.]17

Among the means which have oc curred to my col leagues and to me, as likely to in flu ence the Turk ish pol icy in the present cri sis, the em ploy ment of a sum of money has more than once been under con sid er a tion.

That Halet Efendi, the sultan’s sole fa vour ite and prin ci pal ad viser, is ac cess ible to cor rup tion, is as cer tain as that his power over his im pe rial mas ter is un bounded. A nego ti a tion of this na ture (sup pos ing it to be pre vi ously au thor ized by Your Lord ship) would of course re quire the ut most del i cacy and circum spec tion. But it does not ap pear to be im prac ti cable, or un likely to be suc cess ful.

The fear of the ja nis sar ies is (con fi den tially) ad mit ted by the Turk ish govern ment as a chief rea son for their delay in com pletely evac u at ing the Prin ci pal ities and in nom i nat ing the hos po dars.

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On this ground, the offer of money might be made to Halet Efendi. He might be told, that im me di ately on or ders being given for the re moval of the troops, and on the pub li ca tion of a de cree ap point ing the hos po dars, a sum would be se cretly placed in his hands, to be ap plied, at his sole dis cre tion, to the pur pose of quiet ing any op po si tion or dis con tent which those meas ures might ex cite among the ja nis sar ies.

Halet Efendi is too wealthy to be tempted by an in con sid er able offer. Per haps one thou sand purses, or between twelve and thir teen thou sand pounds ster ling, though in it self, a large sum, would not be con sid ered by the al lied cab i nets as bear ing any pro por tion to the ex pen di ture of treas ure which a war between Rus sia and Tur key might here after im pose upon the govern ments of Eu rope.

2. TNA FO78/106, ff. 204–12a, 25 Feb ru ary 1822 (No. 27)

[Strang ford to Cas tle reagh re: the Brit ish ambassador’s con fer ence with Ot to man min is ters on the de mands sub mit ted to the Porte by the tsar ist re gime.]

My con fer ence with the Turk ish min is ters took place at the house of the reis efendi [Ot to man foreign min is ter] on Sat ur day the 16th in stant.

It was orig i nally in tended by the Porte that this meet ing should be of a pri vate and con fi den tial char ac ter; but in con sid er a tion of the im por tant inter ests which it in volved, I re quested the Turk ish min is ters to con sent that it should be con ducted in the most for mal and of fi cial way. . . .

Your Lord ship will per ceive that in the ab sence of any late in struc tions from His Majesty’s govern ment, I reg u lated my lan guage ac cord ing to the more re cent in tel li gence which my col leagues had re ceived from their re spec tive courts, founded upon their knowl edge of the in ten tions of Rus sia in case the Porte should not ac cede to her de mands with re gard to the Prin ci pal ities.

The in tel li gence thus re ceived, left no room to doubt that a fur ther re sis tance to the Rus sian de mands would be fol lowed by war; and that the month of March would be the term of the emperor’s for bear ance.

On this point my con fer ence prin ci pally turned—peace, and the ac tive good of fices of the al lies for the fu ture, in case the Divan should ac cede to the Rus sian prop o si tions—war, and the ces sa tion of all friendly inter ven tion on the part of the al lies if it should re fuse, or delay to admit them.


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In plac ing this al ter na tive be fore the Turk ish min is ters, with all pos sible frank ness, though at the same time, with all the con cil i a tory forms of friend ship, I could hardly avoid mak ing use of lan guage which I fully ex pected would have been ill-received by Ot to man pride.

But I was com pletely mis taken. Every thing which I ut tered was placed to its true ac count; the friendly part which En gland was act ing, seemed to be thoroughly and grate fully felt; and on no pre vi ous oc ca sion did I ever ex pe ri ence such marked at ten tion—such per fect amen ity—and such in vin cible, I might say, such pro vok ing good hu mour. It was dif fi cult to avoid en ter tain ing a sus pi cion that they had al ready made up their mind to grant what I de manded—that they were re solved to keep this de ter mi na tion a se cret—and that they were amus ing them selves with the anx iety and ag i ta tion under which they saw me ev i dently la bour ing.

There were none of those of fen sive al lu sions, upon this oc ca sion, with which the lan guage of the Turk ish min is ters for merly abounded— and no in so lent ref er ence was made to the union of the Koran and the sabre, or to the ir re sis tible might of an Em pire armed in de fence of its re li gion.

The re sult of the con fer ence may be summed in a very few words. The Rus sian de mands were ad mit ted in the most un equiv ocal man ner, and a sol emn prom ise to ex e cute them with the least pos sible delay, was given, to gether with a dec lar a tion that the Divan was se ri ously oc cu pied in ac tu ally car ry ing them into ef fect. But no pos i tive term for the ac com plish ment of this en gage ment was ap pointed.

Were we to judge merely from the text of those as su rances, it would cer tainly seem that lit tle real prog ress had been made in the nego ti a tion. But I can not avoid think ing that I have gained much more than ap pears on the face of the proto col. To say noth ing of the tone and man ner of the Ot to man min is ters, and of the var i ous fa vour able in di ca tions which they pre sented, it is quite im pos sible for me to sup pose that such lan guage as that which was held to them, in the name of the king of En gland, can be alto gether with out ef fect. The con fi dence which this govern ment places in His Ma jesty, and in the friend ship of Great Brit ain, is cer tainly greater than that which it is dis posed to shew to wards any other of the al lies; and I have every rea son to hope that such full credit is given to us for the dis inter est ed ness of our ad vice, as will en sure its being fi nally and speed ily ac cepted.

But I have other grounds on which to found these hopes. Pri vate as su rances have been re peat edly sent to me, since the day of my

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con fer ence, by some of the min is ters with whom I am in more con fi den tial re la tions (par tic u larly by the kap u dan pasha [grand ad mi ral of the Ot to man navy]), that all mat ters would be set tled to my satis fac tion—but that I must allow the govern ment to do things in its own way.

3. TNA FO 78/106, ff. 252–55, 25 Feb ru ary 1822 (No. 29)

[Strang ford to Cas tle reagh re: the issue of di rect nego ti a tions between Rus sia and the Ot to man Em pire.]

Your Lord ship will per ceive from the re port of my last con fer ence, that there is no im me di ate hope of in duc ing the Porte to ac cede to the very de sir able prop o si tion of open ing a di rect nego ti a tion with Rus sia. The un con quer able feel ing of Turk ish pride will stand in the way of such an ar range ment, and the pre tence, that, as they were not the first to break the or di nary re la tions between the two govern ments, they are not called upon to be the first to renew them, will, I ap pre hend, be ob sti nately ad hered to. At all times, the re luc tance of the Turks to en gage in nego ti a tion at a dis tance from the seat of their own govern ment, has been no to ri ous, and I do not im a gine that there is any thing in the present ques tion, which will in duce them to re lin quish that system of ha bit ual dis trust which char ac terizes them.

If the vir tual ad mis sion of most of the de mands of Rus sia (which we may con sider as hav ing al ready taken place), and the fair and hon est ex e cu tion of those which yet re main to be ful filled, should be con sid ered by the em peror of Rus sia as suf fi ciently re-establishing the state of things which ex isted pre vi ously to the de par ture of his min is ter, it is only to His Im pe rial Majesty’s mag na nim ity that we can look for the re newal of the di rect of fi cial inter course between the two govern ments. I should de ceive Your Lord ship were I to in di cate the slight est hope that the first step to wards it, would be taken by the Porte. But I think that in still fur ther satis fac tion of His Im pe rial Majesty’s dig nity, it would not be found im pos sible to pro cure from the Porte, if not a pos i tive re quest, at all events, the ex pres sion of a strong wish that a Rus sian min is ter should be sent to Con stan tin o ple. The prin ci pal dif fi culty in the way of a nego ti a tion to ob tain such a dec lar a tion from the Porte, would be the in di vid ual ex cep tion with which they would most prob ably seek to ac com pany it, and which would (per haps with rea son) be con sid ered as of fen sive to the emperor’s dig nity.


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This govern ment has cer tainly man i fested of late, a wish to have it gen er ally under stood that it was on the point of re new ing its of fi cial re la tions with Rus sia, and the lan guage now held upon this sub ject is very dif fer ent from that which pre vailed some time ago. There is a very wealthy and re spect able cor po ra tion of Turk ish mer chants . . . who trade with the Black Sea. These per sons pre sented a me mo rial to the Porte on the 21st in stant, re spect ing a val u able ship be long ing to them, which the crew, com posed of Greeks, had car ried into Odessa, and sold to a Rus sian mer chant there, at the be gin ning of the re bel lion. The kiahya bey [Ot to man min is ter of the inter ior] told them, in reply, to have a lit tle pa tience, and that as soon as mat ters were set tled with Rus sia, their ship would un doubt edly be re stored to them. This as su rance not ap pear ing to satisfy the mer chants, Gia nib Efendi, who was present (and who of all the Turk ish min is ters is the least likely to make any dec lar a tion of a pa cific ten dency), added—“Mat ters are now al most fi nally ad justed. I pledge my self that in one month, or in six weeks at fur thest, a Rus sian min is ter will be here, and the two govern ments will be bet ter friends than ever.”—The satis fac tion with which this in tel li gence was re ceived by the pub lic, among whom it was speed ily cir cu lated, must have proved to the Ot to man min is ters (if in deed they could have had any doubt on the sub ject) the un pop u lar ity of a Rus sian war, and the de sire of all the wealthy and re spect able classes for the pres er va tion of peace with their mighty neigh bour.

4. TNA FO 78/107, ff. 142–44a, 10 April 1822 (No. 47)

[Strang ford to Cas tle reagh re: the steps taken by the Porte to re press the abuses of foreign-flagged ves sels.]18

The Turk ish govern ment con tin ues to em ploy very strict meas ures to re press those abuses of foreign flags which have so long pre vailed here, to the great dis grace of such mis sions as have con verted them into a source of pe cu ni ary profit.

Al though the right of the Porte to in ves ti gate the na tion al ity of the ships which enter and de part from this har bour can not be dis puted, its ig nor ance of Eu ro pean forms and us ages, often leads it into wrong modes of ap ply ing a prin ci ple, oth er wise per fectly jus tifi able in it self. Fre quent dis putes arise in con se quence between the govern ment and cer tain of the foreign min is ters—and it is to be la mented that some of the lat ter should oc ca sion ally for get that they are called upon at this

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mo ment to watch over higher and more im por tant inter ests, and should ex haust their time and their tem per in pal try squab bles, and in seek ing to de fend cases which could not be jus tified ac cord ing to any nav i ga tion code in Eu rope.

The mis sions to which we are in debted for the trou ble and vex a tions now im posed upon our trade, are those of Na ples, Den mark, and Hol land. The char gés d’affaires of these courts have long made a pub lic traf fic of their na tional flags, which be came at length so no to ri ous as to rouse the at ten tion of the Porte, and to in duce her to es tab lish a system of scru tiny, of which the in con ven iences are gen eral in their op er a tion upon all the mis sions at this res i dence, even upon those against which no ac cu sa tion has ever been urged.

Nor is it only with ref er ence to our com merce and nav i ga tion that we have to com plain of the prej u dices which the re spect able part of the corps di plom a tique now suf fer in con se quence of the im proper be ha vi our of the three char gés d’affaires al ready men tioned. The Porte seeks to re trench many of the im mu nities which we have en joyed from time im me mo rial, on ac count of the fla grant abuse of them com mit ted by some of the in di vid u als whom we are un for tu nately com pelled to con sider as our col leagues. I al lude par tic u larly to the right of im port ing wine for the use of our fam i lies. This priv i lege is now a daily sub ject of con ten tion with the Porte, owing to the dis hon our able con duct of M. Na voni, the Nea pol i tan agent, who has made pro dig ious sums of money by lend ing his name to the pub lic ans of Pera, whom he has thus for sev eral years sup plied with liq uors, on a fixed and most profi t able per cent age. The whole con duct of this man is a per pet ual scan dal—and I speak the sen ti ments of every mis sion here, which has the slight est re gard for its own hon our, when I say that it is a dis grace to the court of Na ples that such a per son should be charged with the con duct of its af fairs, and should be per mit ted to pros ti tute the name of a pub lic min is ter, in such a shame ful man ner as we have lately wit nessed.

5. TNA FO 78/107, ff. 227–30, 25 April 1822 (No. 55)

[Strang ford to Cas tle reagh re: the Ot to man at tack on Chios and the re cap ture of that is land by the kap u dan pasha’s fleet.]19

The Turk ish ex pe di tion against Chios has been suc cess ful.


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We are yet with out com plete de tails of this trans ac tion, but from all that can be col lected, it seems to have been pro duc tive of dread ful scenes of carn age on both sides.

On the first ap pear ance of the kap u dan pasha’s for mid able fleet, the Greeks who were sta tioned between Chesme, on the main land, and Chios (to pre vent the troops as sem bled at the for mer place from cross ing over), cut their cables, and ef fected their es cape, leav ing Chios to its fate.

This circum stance en a bled six thou sand of the Chesme troops to join the kap u dan pasha, who, on the 11th in stant pro ceeded to sum mon the in sur gents to sur ren der, of fer ing par don to all who should lay down their arms, and giv ing them eight hours to con sider . . . his pro po sals.

The in sur gents re jected this offer—and in stantly at tempted to carry the cas tle by es ca lade, think ing that they could ef fect that ob ject, and se cure them selves in the for tress be fore the kap u dan pasha could have time to dis em bark his troops. In this they were mis taken—they were vig or ously re pulsed by the gar ri son, and in the mean while, the kap u dan pasha land ing about nine thou sand men, and the for mer mak ing a sor tie, they were en closed between two fires; lost all their ar til lery, amount ing to twenty pieces, which was speed ily turned against them, and after a short and most bloody re sis tance, took to flight, and were pur sued in all di rec tions. It is said that the loss on both sides amounts to fif teen thou sand men. No quar ter was given after the ac tion. Every per son taken with arms in his hands was in stantly put to death. The women and chil dren have been thrown into slav ery. Pre vi ously to the ac tion, and on the first ap pear ance of the fleet, the Cath o lic in hab i tants had shut them selves up in their con vent. They have been pro tected by the kap u dan pasha, who has sta tioned a guard for their se cur ity, and who has re ceived num bers of them on board of his fleet, where they are treated with the ut most kind ness. The Cath o lic Greeks have, as Your Lord ship is aware, never taken any part in the in sur rec tion, and, as well at Chios, as in all the other is lands, have con stantly main tained their al le giance to the sul tan.

The kap u dan pasha has left a con sid er able body of troops on the is land, who will, I fear, pur sue the work of de struc tion to the very ut most. The Sam i ote Greeks, whose un for tu nate ex pe di tion to Chios has been the cause of the ca lam ity which has over whelmed that once happy and flour ish ing is land, took no part in the com bat, and basely fled to Psara,

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hast ily em bark ing on the side op po site to that where the Turk ish troops landed.

The kap u dan pasha is said to have pro ceeded to the Morea, with the in ten tion of at tack ing some of the in sur gent is lands in his way.

I have the hon our to en close a trans la tion of the plac ard which ac com pa nied the ex hi bi tion of heads, stan dards, and other tro phies, sent to the Porte by Vahid Pasha, the governor of Chios.

6. TNA FO 78/108, ff. 50–59, 10 May 1822 (No. 70)

[Strang ford to Cas tle reagh re: the nom i na tion of the new hos po dars and the pro posed changes in the ad min is tra tion of the Da nu bian prin ci pal ities.]20

At the coun cil held on Mon day, . . . [the] ques tion of nom i nat ing the new princes [hos po dars], and of choos ing them from among the na tive boy ars, was pro posed to the us taas [of fi cers] of the ja nis sar ies who were present, and unan i mously ap proved. The slight of fered to the Greek na tion by this se lec tion, has more than any other cause, in duced the ja nis sar ies to ap prove of the nom i na tion of princes being car ried into ef fect. Had the choice of the govern ment fal len upon Greeks, I am con vinced that the ja nis sar ies would have re sisted to the very ut most.

In truth, the pol icy of the Porte seems now to be de cided; and its res o lu tion to re duce the Greek na tion to a state of ab so lute nul lity, may be con sid ered as ir rev o cably fixed. That im pe rium in im pe rio [em pire within an em pire, or state within a state] which had made such si lent but rapid prog ress dur ing the last thirty years, will exist no longer. The great source of Greek in flu ence, and with it, of that hitherto ex er cised by Rus sia, will now be cut off, by the em ploy ment of Turk ish sub jects as the fu ture drago mans of the Porte, and by the se lec tion of na tives to gov ern the two Prin ci pal ities. Some ob ser va tions which were lately made to me on this sub ject by one of the most in tel li gent Turks I have hitherto known, are per haps not un worthy of Your Lordship’s at ten tion.

“What has Rus sia gained,” he asked, “by pre cip i tat ing the Greek af fair? For that it orig i nated in the hopes held out by her min is ters at St. Pe ters burg, and her agents in Tur key, no man who has his eyes and ears, can for a mo ment doubt. How ever, praise be to God, that she acted as she did. But for the con duct of her con suls in the Ar chi pel ago, and the in tem per ance of her min is ter here, in hur ry ing mat ters to an ex trem ity, we should have gone on in a false and fatal se cur ity. The


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Greeks would have, slowly per haps, but surely, ap pro pri ated to them selves, the en tire govern ment of this Em pire. In com merce and in af fairs of state, they were al ready all pow er ful, and no body among us had begun to sus pect the grad ual en crease of their in flu ence. Had this state of things gone on for thirty years more, we should have been lost. Rus sia has done us a great ser vice with out in tend ing it. She held a lever in her hands, with which she could at any time, have shaken this Em pire to the foun da tion. It is now broken. She has (also with out mean ing it) ren dered us an other ser vice. The pow ers of Eu rope have taught her, that she can not make war upon us under flimsy pre tences. I was in the min is try when the Holy Al li ance was pro claimed; and when all my col leagues were fright ened by it, I said, that if the sove reigns of Eu rope acted up to their word, the Holy Al li ance would, one day, be our bar rier against Rus sia. If I am not now in the min is try, it is owing to what I then said, and to the in dig na tion with which it was re ceived. But I was in the right. Had it not been for that al li ance, which has now proved to Rus sia that she is but one, and the other states of Eu rope are many, we should have ere now been fight ing against Rus sia for the pos ses sion of Con stan tin o ple. This re sult was not fore seen by Stro gan off [Strog a nov] when he sought to ex cite his govern ment against us. The Rus sian in flu ence here is no more. She will again seek to exert it, under pre tence of set tling the af fairs of the Prin ci pal ities, and of re stor ing to them the bless ings of peace and good order. But we mean to de prive her of this pre tence. We shall an tic i pate her, by our new ar range ments for the re lief of Wal la chia and Mol da via; and when her min is ter re turns here, he will find that every thing is done, and that he has no ex cuse for med dling in our af fairs.”

Your Lord ship may de pend upon the fi del ity with which the above ob ser va tions are re ported.

7. TNA FO 78/108, ff. 167–69a, 10 June 1822 (No. 85)

[Strang ford to Cas tle reagh re: the Brit ish embassy’s suc cess ful re sis tance against the Porte’s en deavor to search Brit ish ships in the har bor of Con stan tin o ple.]

Your Lord ship is aware that many of the most es sen tial of our com mer cial priv i leges here, do not de pend upon the pos i tive let ter of our trea ties with the Porte, but are de rived from the stip u la tions of those sub sist ing between Tur key and Rus sia, in as much as the

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ar range ment con cluded in 1802, placed us upon the foot ing of the most fa voured na tion.

What ever ad van tages there fore are ac corded to Rus sia by treaty, we have a right to claim, even though they should not be spe cifi cally pro vided for in our own ca pit u la tions.21

Among the new ar range ments es tab lished by the Porte for the pur pose of pre vent ing the abuses in foreign nav i ga tion which have been de tected here, is the prac tice of caus ing ships to be vis ited at the mo ment of their de par ture, by the of fi cers of the Porte, in order to as cer tain whether the car goes cor re spond with the man i fests.

This new reg u la tion has hitherto been ex er cised with great se ver ity, and has been the sub ject of loud and vi o lent com plaints on the part of the foreign mer chants.

By the 55th Ar ti cle of our ca pit u la tions, the right of the Porte to make this visit or search on board of our ships is clearly ad mit ted. But on the other hand, in her treaty with Rus sia, this right is as pos i tively ab ro gated, as far as the nav i ga tion of that power is con cerned.

Con ceiv ing that we are en ti tled, in vir tue of the ar range ment of 1802 to every ad van tage pos sessed by Rus sia, I have stren u ously re sisted the claim set up by the Porte, to ex am ine our ships, de mand ing for them, the same ex emp tion which is ac corded to those of Rus sia.

This at tempt on my part was at tended with con sid er able dif fi culty, as all the other mis sions here had yielded to the pre ten sions of the Porte, and had ad mit ted her right of search ing the ships of their re spec tive na tions.

I will not trou ble Your Lord ship with the de tails of a nego ti a tion, which has oc cu pied me al most in ces santly for the last three weeks, and I con fine my self to a com mu ni ca tion of its suc cess ful re sult, as an nounced in the ac com pa ny ing of fi cial re port from my first drago man [Fran cis Cha bert].

The Brit ish nav i ga tion in this port is now placed upon a foot ing quite dis tinct as far as re lates to the right of search, from that of any other na tion. I am very un will ing that we should be ex posed to the jeal ousy likely to arise from this circum stance, but as one of my first du ties here is to as sist our com merce, I can not think that I ought to re ject any ex emp tion from in con ven ience which I may be able to pro cure for it, from a prin ci ple of del i cacy, be cause other mis sions may not have suc ceeded in ob tain ing it for their re spec tive coun tries. If it were [a] ques tion of any pos i tive and ex clu sive fa vour to our com merce, I


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cer tainly should not think it worth being pur chased at the price of the dis con tent of my col leagues, but as the present ar range ment re lates merely to re lief from a great and se ri ous in con ven ience, I con ceive that I am bound to do all that I can in be half of my coun try men, with out any ten der ness for the jeal ous feel ings of mer chants be long ing to other na tions.

8. TNA FO 78/108, ff. 261–64, 25 June 1822 (No. 97)

[Strang ford to Cas tle reagh re: the reis efendi’s con fi den tial pro po sal on com mer cial mat ters.]

I have the hon our to trans mit a copy of an un ex pected com mu ni ca tion which has been made to me by the reis efendi.

After stat ing that the re stric tive meas ures which have lately been adopted by this govern ment with re gard to foreign com merce, are aimed pros pec tively at Rus sia, and des tined to pre vent the nav i ga tion of the Greeks from being car ried on al most ex clu sively under the flag of that coun try—and after re new ing his prom ise that the Brit ish trade should con tinue to be ex empted from the ef fects of the new reg u la tions, the reis efendi ex presses the wish of this govern ment that the com merce of its reaya [tax-paying Or tho dox Chris tian] sub jects, hitherto con ducted under Rus sian pro tec tion, should be trans ferred to Great Brit ain. He adds to this (suf fi ciently ob scure) pro po sal, a re quest that I would con cert with him as to the means of car ry ing the dis po si tions of the Porte into ef fect, in such a way as to be re cip ro cally ben e fi cial to En gland and to Tur key.

Even were this over ture likely to be ad van ta geous to our com merce and nav i ga tion (which it cer tainly is not), I am per suaded that Your Lord ship would not con ceive the present to be a proper mo ment for ac cept ing from the Porte any in vid i ous dis tinc tion in our fa vour.

But while I act in con for mity to what I pre sume will be Your Lordship’s opin ion, by de clin ing to avail my self of the reis efendi’s prop o si tion, I feel per suaded that I am not sac ri fic ing any real ad van tage to the com mer cial inter ests of His Majesty’s sub jects. Their nav i ga tion does not re quire any new stip u la tions to sup port it, for the po lit i cal circum stances of this Em pire have, of them selves, been suf fi cient to place it in a more flour ish ing con di tion, and to give it a greater ex ten sion [than] it ever be fore pos sessed. The Greek car ry ing trade is ex tinct, or

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more prop erly, the greater part of it is now lodged in our hands or in those of the Io ni ans. It seems there fore bet ter to leave mat ters as they are, and to suf fer our com merce to profit by the nat u ral course of events, with out seek ing to fos ter it by new ar range ments between the two govern ments.

In this opin ion, I have de sired M. Cha bert to thank the reis efendi for his com mu ni ca tion; add ing, how ever, that it was only val u able to me as a mark of His Excellency’s con fi dence and of his good-will to wards the na tion with whose inter ests I am charged—but that I did not see how the pro po sal which he had made to me, could be turned to the ad van tage of ei ther coun try. I ob served, more over, that dis cov er ing in this over ture a sin cere proof of his de sire to fa vour our com merce, it would en cour age me, when a proper op por tu nity oc curred, not to make new de mands in be half of it, but to in vite him to de fine and set tle cer tain rights (with ref er ence in par tic u lar to our Black Sea trade) to which we had an un doubted claim, but which had ei ther lapsed into obliv ion, or had never hitherto been rec og nized with suf fi cient pre ci sion by the Ot to man govern ment.

9. TNA FO 78/108, ff. 303–07, 26 June 1822 (No. 101)

[Strang ford to Cas tle reagh re: naval clashes off Chios between Greek and Ot to man ships.]

The [Aus trian] inter nun cio [Ru dolf von Lützow] hav ing de layed the de par ture of the post until this day, I am en a bled to have the hon our of re port ing to Your Lord ship that most un wel come and dis as trous in tel li gence has ar rived from the Turk ish fleet be fore Chios.

On the night of Wednes day last, the Greeks at tacked the kap u dan pasha’s ves sel (a three-decker) and two other ships of the line, with their fire ships. The crews of the two smaller ves sels of the line suc ceeded in ex tin guish ing the flames, but the admiral’s ship was blown up, and the kap u dan pasha per ished, to gether with all his of fi cers and crew. The body of the kap u dan pasha was picked up, float ing on the sea, and was interred at Chios on the fol low ing day.

I sent M. Cha bert to the Porte early this morn ing, to as cer tain from the reis efendi the truth of this in tel li gence, a ru mour of which had reached me last night, but in such a vague man ner that I did not re port it in my dis patches to Your Lord ship. The reis efendi fully con firmed the


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par tic u lars which I have re lated as above; and though deeply af fected with the dis grace thus brought upon the Ot to man arms, en dea voured to as sume an ap pear ance of the ut most in dif fer ence.

The loss of the fin est and larg est ves sel in the Turk ish fleet, and of the only com mander of any skill in naval mat ters whom this govern ment pos sessed, must un doubt edly be a cause of the great est mor tifi ca tion to the Porte—while it will pro por tion ally aug ment the au dac ity of the Greeks. I dread the ex as per at ing ef fect which this af fair may have on the pub lic mind at Con stan tin o ple and Smyrna, and still more those meas ures of bar bar ous pol icy to which this govern ment will too prob ably have re course for the sake of calm ing it. Nor can I look with out ap pre hen sion to the un fa vour able in flu ence which this dis as ter may have on the prog ress of the nego ti a tion, which I had flat tered my self was so near to a suc cess ful ter mi na tion.

10. TNA FO 78/110, ff. 18–25, 3 Sep tem ber 1822 (No. 145)

[Strang ford to Cas tle reagh re: Russia’s de mand for the re trac tion of Ot to man reg u la tions on nav i ga tion in the Black Sea.]

It ap pears that the Rus sian govern ment has in vited the Brit ish and Aus trian mis sions at St. Pe ters burg to pro pose to the inter nun cio and to me, the em ploy ment of our joint ef forts for the pur pose of pro cur ing from the Porte the ab ro ga tion of the system on which she is now act ing with re spect to foreign nav i ga tion.

The Rus sian govern ment, while it ad mits that these reg u la tions are jus tified by the enor mous abuses which have been com mit ted here, and that they con tain noth ing contrary to treaty, dis cov ers in them, not with stand ing, a clear in di ca tion of an un friendly if not a de cid edly hos tile dis po si tion to wards Rus sia, on the part of the Turk ish govern ment.

The reg u la tions of the Porte re spect those na tions which have not ac quired by treaty the right to nav i gate in the Black Sea. The Turk ish min is ters say that this priv i lege was granted to those na tions who enjoy it, ei ther in con se quence of a war, at the end of which the Porte yielded it, or of some am i cable nego ti a tion at which an equiv a lent for it was granted by the other contract ing party—that the Porte is ready to con cede the nav i ga tion of the Black Sea to those pow ers who are will ing to nego tiate, and to grant a fair com pen sa tion for it in some

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shape or other, but that she will not suf fer those pow ers to de fraud the inter ests of the Porte, by sur rep ti tiously avail ing them selves of an ad van tage for which other states have been con tent to pay.

This is the prin ci ple on which the Porte is now act ing. Its at ten tion to the ques tion of foreign nav i ga tion, has been pro voked by the multi plied and scan dal ous abuses of foreign flags which have pre vailed in the chan cer ies of the Dutch, Dan ish, and Nea pol i tan mis sions— abuses, which I am obliged to say, have been equally in ju ri ous to the inter ests of the Porte and dis grace ful to the le ga tions which have prac tised them.

That Rus sia in par tic u lar has no just ground of com plaint against these reg u la tions, may be in ferred both from the fact that since the de par ture of her min is ter, the nav i ga tion of bona fide Rus sian ves sels has been con stantly re spected, and has never been inter rupted, but also from the in dul gence which the Porte, in the very face of those reg u la tions, has ex tended to ves sels which have no right to be con sid ered as Rus sian. In Au gust last, a num ber of Ge noese and Sar din ian ves sels ar rived here under the Rus sian flag, with the in ten tion of pro ceed ing to the Black Sea. Their own ers being ap pre hen sive of a Rus sian war, changed their flag for that of France, which M. de Viella, the French chargé d’affaires, ac corded to them. Under that flag they ac cord ingly pro ceeded to the Black Sea; on their re turn from which, every one of them, on their ar ri val at Con stan tin o ple, was per mit ted by this govern ment to re sume the Rus sian flag, under which they had orig i nally sailed, and to which they were in point of strict right, as lit tle en ti tled as to that of France, or of any other coun try ex cept their own.

I do not there fore per ceive on what ground Rus sia is (at least for the present) jus tified in com plain ing against the new reg u la tions of the Porte; nor how I can charge my self with the of fice of sup port ing these com plaints.

But there is, more over, an other con sid er a tion of which, as long as it shall be my first duty to watch over Brit ish inter ests, I must not per mit my self to lose sight. The re stric tions of the Porte with re spect to the nav i ga tion of other coun tries, have pro duced such a sud den and ex ten sive ef fect in fa vour of that of Great Brit ain, and the Brit ish shipping inter ests in the Le vant have been so greatly ben e fit ted by their op er a tion, and by the ex clu sion of, what may be termed inter lop ers, from the trade of the Black Sea, that I can hardly ven ture to do any thing which may dis turb the prog ress of these ad van tages, with out Your Lordship’s ex press com mands.


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Notes

1. I am com pil ing four vol umes of Strangford’s dis patches from his am bas sa dor ship at the Porte (1821–24). Vol umes 1 and 2 have al ready ap peared: Theo phi lus C. Prou sis, Lord Strang ford at the Sub lime Porte (1821): The East ern Cri sis (I˙ stan bul: Isis Press, 2010); idem, Lord Strang ford at the Sub lime Porte (1822): The East ern Cri sis (I˙ stan bul: Isis Press, 2012). Ex cerpts from these works can be found in Theo phi lus C. Prou sis, “East ern Or tho doxy under Siege in the Ot to man Le vant: A View from Con stan tin o ple in 1821,” Mod ern Greek Stud ies Year book 24/25 (2008/2009): 39–72; idem, “Brit ish Em bassy Re ports on the Greek Up ris ing in 1821–1822: War of In de pen dence or War of Re li gion?,” Archi vum Ot to man i cum 28 (2011): 171–222. For bio graph i cal in for ma tion on Strang ford (1780–1855), see Prou sis, Lord Strang ford at the Sub lime Porte (1821), 326. On the Dash kov col lec-tion in the Rus sian State His tor i cal Archive, St. Pe ters burg, and its im por tance for stud y ing im pe rial Rus sian ac tiv i ties in the Near East, see Theo phi lus C. Prou sis, Russian-Ottoman Re la tions in the Le vant: The Dash kov Archive, Min ne sota Med i ter ra nean and East Eu ro pean Mono graphs, no. 10 (Min ne ap o lis: Mod ern Greek Stud ies Pro gram, Uni ver sity of Min ne sota, 2002). Dmi trii V. Dash kov (1784–1839), an ad viser at the tsar ist em bassy in Con stan tin o ple from 1817 to 1823, in spected Rus sian con su lates in the Le vant, vis ited sa cred sites on Mount Athos and in Pal es tine, and re corded his ob ser va tions on Greek and Ot to man af fairs in a va riety of pro po sals, mem o randa, and dis patches.

2. The East ern cri sis of the 1820s forms part of the larger can vas of inter nal and ex ter nal chal lenges that de sta bi lized and thus re struc tured the Ot to man Em pire in the late eigh teenth and early nine teenth cen tu ries. See Vir ginia H. Aksan, Ot to man Wars, 1700–1870: An Em pire Besieged (Har low, En gland: Pear son Long man, 2007), 180–342; Car o line Fin kel, Osman’s Dream: The Story of the Ot to man Em pire, 1300–1923 (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 289–446; Su raiya Fa roqhi, ed., The Cam bridge His tory of Tur key, vol. 3, The Later Ot to man Em-pire, 1603–1839 (New York: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 2006); Frede rick F. An scombe, ed., The Ot to man Bal kans, 1750–1830 (Prince ton, NJ: Markus Wie ner, 2006); Fik ret Ad a nir and Su raiya Fa roqhi, eds., The Ot to mans and the Bal kans: A Dis cus sion of Historiog ra phy (Leiden: Brill, 2002). Eu ro pean con suls often de scribed the state of the Ot to man Em pire dur ing these un set tled times. See Theo phi lus C. Prou sis, Brit ish Con su lar Re ports from the Ot to man Le vant in an Age of Up hea val, 1815–1830 (I˙ stan bul: Isis Press, 2008); G. L. Arsh, Et e rists koe dvizhe nie v Ros sii: Osvoboditel’naia bor’ba gre ches kogo na roda v na chale XIX v. i russko- grecheskie svi azi (Mos cow: Nauka, 1970); 29–76; Eleu the rios Pre vel a kis and Kal lia Kal li a taki Mer tik o pou lou, eds., Epirus, Ali Pasha, and the Greek Rev o lu tion: Con-su lar Re ports of William Meyer from Pre veza, 2 vols., Mon u ments of Greek His tory, no. 12 (Ath ens: Acad emy of Ath ens, 1996).

3. On the Greek rev o lu tion, see Aksan, Ot to man Wars, 285–305; David Brewer, The Greek War of In de pen dence: The Strug gle for Free dom from Ot to man

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Op pres sion and the Birth of the Mod ern Greek Na tion (Wood stock, NY: Over look Press, 2003); Pe tros Pi zan ias, ed., The Greek Rev o lu tion of 1821: A Eu ro pean Event (I˙ stan bul: Isis Press, 2011); Doug las Dakin, The Greek Strug gle for In de pen dence, 1821–1833 (Lon don: Bats ford, 1973). For a re cent Rus sian per spec tive on the Greek awak en ing, based largely on Rus sian and Greek sources, see Olga E. Pet ru nina, Gre ches kaia nat siia i gos u darstvo v XVIII–XX vv.: Ocherki po lit i ches kogo raz vi tiia (Mos cow: KDY, 2010), 100–222. The Greek re volt ex erted a pro found im pact on great-power pol i tics and di plo macy in the Near East. For this Eu ro-pean, in clud ing Rus sian, per spec tive on the East ern quag mire of the 1820s, see M. S. An der son, The East ern Ques tion, 1774–1923 (Lon don: Mac mil lan, 1966), 1–77; Paul Schroeder, The Trans for ma tion of Eu ro pean Pol i tics, 1763–1848 (Ox ford: Cla ren don Press, 1994), 614–21, 637–64; idem, Metternich’s Di plo macy at Its Ze nith, 1820–1823 (Aus tin: Uni ver sity of Texas Press, 1962), 164–94, 223–25; A. V. Fa deev, Ros siia i vos toch nyi kri zis 20-kh godov XIX veka (Mos cow: Nauka, 1958); G. L. Arsh and V. N. Vi nog ra dov, Mezh du na rod nye ot no she niia na Bal ka nakh 1815–1830 gg. (Mos cow: Nauka, 1983), 127–295.

4. With the ben e fit of Ot to man archives, sev eral schol ars have ex am ined the ef fect of the Greek up ris ing on Ot to man re forms of ad min is tra tive and mil i tary in sti tu tions and on the rul ing hierarchy’s ex po sure to such sec u lar con cepts as na tion, cit i zen, lib erty, and na tional in de pen dence. See the stud ies by Hakan Erdem: “‘Do Not Think of the Greeks as Ag ri cul tu ral Labourers’: Ot to man Re sponses to the Greek War of In de pen dence,” in Cit i zen ship and the Nation-State in Greece and Tur key, ed. Faruk Bir tek and Thalia Dra go nas (New York: Rout ledge, 2005), 67–84; idem, “The Greek Re volt and the End of the Old Ot to man Order,” in Pi zan ias, Greek Rev o lu tion of 1821, 257–64. Also see Nikos Theo to kas and Nikos Ko tar i dis, “Ot to man Per cep tions of the Greek Rev o lu-tion,” in Pi zan ias, Greek Rev o lu tion of 1821, 265–73; Vi ta lii She remet, “The Greek Rev o lu tion of 1821: A New Look at Old Prob lems,” Mod ern Greek Stud ies Year-book 8 (1992): 45–55.

5. The land mark Treaty of Ku chuk Kai nardji (1774) ended Ot to man heg e-mony over the Black Sea re gion and marked im pe rial Russia’s emer gence as a Near East ern power. In ad di tion to the com mer cial, con su lar, and ter ri to rial con ces sions granted to Rus sia, the treaty stip u lated that the sul tan would pro tect Or tho dox Chris tians in the Ae gean Ar chi pel ago, the Da nu bian prin ci pal ities, and west ern Geor gia. The tsar ist govern ment sub se quently, and spe ciously, de clared that this pledge gave Rus sia lev er age to inter fere in Ot to man af fairs on be half of all Or tho dox Chris tians. On this sig nifi cant but con tro ver sial treaty, see Prou sis, Russian-Ottoman Re la tions in the Le vant, 5–7, 142; Aksan, Ot to man Wars, 157–60; Jacob C. Hure witz, ed., The Mid dle East and North Af rica in World Pol i tics: A Doc u men tary Record, 2nd rev. ed., 2 vols. (New Haven, CT: Yale Uni ver sity Press, 1975), 1:92–101; Ro deric H. Dav i son, Es says in Ot to man and Turk ish His tory, 1774–1923: The Im pact of the West (Aus tin: Uni ver sity of Texas Press, 1990), 29–59. On the treaty’s im pact on the Greek na tional awak en ing,


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see the essay by G. L. Arsh, “Gret siia posle Kiuchuk-Kainardzhiiskogo mira,” in Is to riia Bal kan: Vek vo sem nadt satyi, ed. V. N. Vi nog ra dov (Mos cow: Nauka, 2004), 445–66.

6. On Russia’s of fi cial pol icy to ward the Greek up ris ing of 1821, in par tic u lar the tsar’s del i cate bal anc ing act between up hold ing le git i macy and inter ven ing on be half of Greek co re lig ion ists, see Theo phi lus C. Prou sis, Rus sian So ci ety and the Greek Rev o lu tion (De Kalb: North ern Il li nois Uni ver sity Press, 1994), 26–30, 185–87; idem, Russian-Ottoman Re la tions in the Le vant, 25–27; Bar bara Jel a vich, Russia’s Bal kan En tan gle ments, 1806–1914 (New York: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 1991), 49–75; I. S. Dos tian, Ros siia i bal kans kii vo pros (Mos cow: Nauka, 1972), 196–238; Fa deev, Ros siia i vos toch nyi vo pros, 36–91; V. I. She remet, Voina i biz nes: Vlast’, den’gi, i or u zhie; Ev ropa i Blizh nii Vos tok v novoe vre mia (Mos cow: Tekh no log i ches kaia shkola biz nesa, 1996), 218–86; Al ex an der Bitis, Rus sia and the East ern Ques tion: Army, Govern ment, and So ci ety, 1815–1833 (Ox ford: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 2006), 104–21, 161–67.

7. On these var i ous con nec tions between Rus sia and the Greeks, see Prou sis, Rus sian So ci ety and the Greek Rev o lu tion, 3–24; Arsh, Et e rists koe dvizhe nie v Ros sii, 129–76, 200–222, 245–96; G. L. Arsh, Gre ches kaia kul’tura v Ros sii XVII–XX vv.: Sbor nik sta tei (Mos cow: In sti tut sla vi a nov e de niia RAN, 1999); Iu. D. Pri ak hin, Greki v is to rii Ros sii XVIII–XIX vekov: Is tor i ches kie ocherki (St. Pe ters-burg: Ale teiia, 2008); I. Ni kol o pu los, Greki i Ros siia XVII–XX vv.: Sbor nik sta tei (St. Pe ters burg: Ale teiia, 2007). Pre cisely be cause of these deep-seated Russian- Greek ties, the Ot to man govern ment sus pected Russia’s di rect in volve ment in the Greek ag i ta tion.

8. The tsar ist ul ti ma tum of 6/18 July 1821 ap pears in print in Mini sterstvo in os tran nykh del SSSR, Vnesh ni aia pol i tika Ros sii XIX i na chala XX v.: Dok u menty Ros siis kogo mini sterstva in os tran nykh del, 17 vols. (Mos cow: Nauka, 1960–2005), 12 (1980):203–10. The old-style Ju lian cal en dar, used in Rus sia until 1918, lagged twelve days be hind the new-style Gre go rian cal en dar in the nine teenth cen tury.

9. On Brit ish pol icy under Foreign Sec re tary Cas tle reagh to ward the Greek in sur gence and the larger East ern cri sis in 1821–22, see Charles Web ster, The Foreign Pol icy of Cas tle reagh, 1815–1822: Brit ain and the Eu ro pean Al li ance, 2nd ed. (Lon don: G. Bell, 1934), 349–86; Charles W. Craw ley, The Ques tion of Greek In de-pen dence: A Study of Brit ish Pol icy in the Near East, 1821–1833 (Cam bridge: Cam-bridge Uni ver sity Press, 1930; repr., New York: H. Fer tig, 1973), 17–42; V. N. Vi nog ra dov, Vel i kob ri ta niia i Bal kany: Ot Vens kogo kon gressa do Kryms koi voiny (Mos cow: Nauka, 1985), 31–55, for a Rus sian view of Castlereagh’s pol icy.

10. On Strangford’s ef forts at the Porte, see the essay by Allan Cun ning ham (“Lord Strang ford and the Greek Re volt”) in Allan Cun ning ham, Anglo-Ottoman En coun ters in the Age of Rev o lu tion: Col lected Es says, ed. Ed ward In gram (Lon don: Frank Cass, 1993), 188–232; Radu R. Flo rescu, The Strug gle against Rus sia in the Ro ma nian Prin ci pal ities: A Prob lem in Anglo-Turkish Di plo macy, 1821–1854 (Ia¸si: Cen ter for Ro ma nian Stud ies, 1997), 109–12, 123–47; idem, “Lord Strang ford

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and the Prob lem of the Da nu bian Prin ci pal ities, 1821–24,” Sla vonic and East Eu ro pean Re view 39, no. 93 (1963): 472–88; Craw ley, Ques tion of Greek In de pen dence, 17–22; W. David Wri gley, The Dip lo matic Sig nif cance of Io nian Neu tral ity, 1821–1831 (New York: Peter Lang, 1988), 156–62, 166–69, 177–86; Irby C. Nich ols Jr., “Hel las Scorned: The Af fair of the Am bas sa do rial Ad dress to the Greeks, 1821,” East Eu ro pean Quar terly 9, no. 3 (1975): 279–92. For a more nu anced and com-plete pic ture of Strangford’s ob ser va tions and nego ti a tions, see the first two vol umes of my Strang ford com pen dium, cited above in note 1.

11. Prou sis, Lord Strang ford at the Sub lime Porte (1821), 68–69, 77–78.12. On the ex e cu tions and other ex cesses in Con stan tin o ple, see Brewer,

Greek War of In de pen dence, 103–11; Chris tine M. Phil liou, Biog ra phy of an Em pire: Gov ern ing Ot to mans in an Age of Rev o lu tion (Berke ley: Uni ver sity of Cal i for nia Press, 2011), 71–73, 85–86, 91, 210–13; Rob ert Walsh, A Res i dence at Con stan tin o ple, 2 vols. (Lon don: F. Westley and A. H. Davis, 1836), 1:308–20.

13. On the Chios dis as ter, see Brewer, Greek War of In de pen dence, 154–67, largely based on the con tem po rary dip lo matic ac counts, in clud ing some of Strangford’s writ ings, pub lished in Philip P. Ar genti, ed., The Mas sa cres of Chios De scribed in Con tem po rary Dip lo matic Re ports (Lon don: John Lane, 1932). Also see William St. Clair, That Greece Might Still Be Free: The Phil hel lenes in the War of In de pen dence, 2nd rev. ed. (Cam bridge: Open Book, 2008), 78–81, 227; Helen Long, Greek Fire: The Mas sa cres of Chios (Bris tol, En gland: Abson Books, 1992), 9–113; Da vide Ro dogno, Against Mas sa cre: Hu man i tar ian Inter ven tions in the Ot to man Em pire, 1815–1914; The Emer gence of a Eu ro pean Con cept and Inter na tional Prac tice (Prince ton, NJ: Prince ton Uni ver sity Press, 2012), 66–72; Gary J. Bass, Freedom’s Bat tle: The Or i gins of Hu man i tar ian Inter ven tion (New York: Knopf, 2008), 67–75. Philip Man sel, in Le vant: Splen dour and Ca tas trophe on the Med i ter-ra nean (Lon don: John Mur ray, 2010), 50, writes: “Chios was the first Le van tine par a dise to be de stroyed. The Greek is land which least wanted in de pen dence suf fered most be cause of it.”

14. Prou sis, Lord Strang ford at the Sub lime Porte (1821), 137–41.15. On the views of Eu ro pean travel ers, con suls, and other vis i tors who

re corded their ob ser va tions of the Ot to man Le vant in the eigh teenth and nine-teenth cen tu ries, see Allan Cun ning ham, East ern Ques tions in the Nine teenth Cen tury: Col lected Es says, ed. Ed ward In gram (Lon don: Frank Cass, 1993), 72–107; Prou sis, Lord Strang ford at the Sub lime Porte (1821), 43–44, 335. On Brit ish lit er ary and travel ogue de scrip tions of the Ot to man Em pire in par tic u lar, see Ge rald Macl ean, The Rise of Orien tal Travel: En glish Vis i tors to the Ot to man Em pire, 1580–1720 (New York: Pal grave Mac mil lan, 2004); idem, Look ing East: En glish Writ ing and the Ot to man Em pire be fore 1800 (New York: Pal grave Mac mil lan, 2007); Filiz Tu rhan, The Other Em pire: Brit ish Ro man tic Writ ings about the Ot to-man Em pire (New York: Rout ledge, 2003); Chris tine Laid law, The Brit ish in the Le vant: Trade and Per cep tions of the Ot to man Em pire in the Eigh teenth Cen tury (New York: Tau ris, 2010). Tsar Nich o las I coined the term “sick man” when


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con tem plat ing the Ot to man Empire’s im mi nent de mise. See Or lando Figes, The Cri mean War: A His tory (New York: Met ro pol i tan Books, 2011), 105; Tre vor Royle, Cri mea: The Great Cri mean War, 1854–1856 (New York: Pal grave Mac mil lan, 2004), 10, 26.

16. See Prou sis, Lord Strang ford at the Sub lime Porte (1822), 27–28, 62–67, 92–93, 105–6, 126–29, 149–50, 166–67, 174–75, 231–33.

17. Strangford’s cor re spon dence in 1821–22 (see the many ref er ences in the first two vol umes of my Strang ford pro ject) made fre quent ref er ence to this prom i nent Ot to man of fi cial. As a close ad viser to Mah mud II, Halet Efendi (Meh med Said) sup ported the sultan’s po lit i cal drive to re store cen tral ized ab so lute rule and to curb the pow ers of ayans, or pro vin cial not ables, in An a to lia and the Bal kans. In or ga niz ing some of the mil i tary ex pe di tions against re gional chief tains, Halet sought to strengthen his own anti re form base among the ja nis-sar ies and their al lies and to elim i nate con tend ers for power in the prov inces. While he ar dently backed the sup pres sion of Ali Pasha’s re volt, he worked against the sultan’s pro posed mil i tary re forms. A tar get of grow ing crit i cism be cause of Ot to man mil i tary set backs in the Pel o pon nese in 1821, Halet Efendi even tu ally fell from favor in the sultan’s inner cir cle. Ex iled from the cap i tal, Halet Efendi was ex e cuted on the sultan’s or ders in late 1822. See Fin kel, Osman’s Dream, 430–31; Aksan, Ot to man Wars, 285–89, 314; Phil liou, Biog ra phy of an Em pire, 43–44, 54–59, 75–77, 96–99, 103; Brewer, Greek War of In de pen dence, 103, 109, 166.

18. The topic of abuses com mit ted by European-flagged mer chant ves sels in the Ot to man East be longs to the larger story of the ca pit u la tions—the cap i tu-la tory agree ments between the Porte and Eu ro pean pow ers, in clud ing the nu mer ous ir reg u lar ities and mis uses that be came part of the cap i tu la tory system in Ottoman-European re la tions. For an over view, with the rel e vant bib liog ra phy, see Maur its H. van den Boo gert, The Ca pit u la tions and the Ot to man Legal System: Qadis, Con suls, and Be rat lis in the 18th Cen tury (Leiden: Brill, 2005); Prou sis, Brit ish Con su lar Re ports from the Ot to man Le vant, 15–22, 103–5, 127–28, 167–68, 229–32.

19. This re port ap pears in Ar genti, Mas sa cres of Chios, 11–12.20. Strang ford made abun dant ref er ence to the status of the Da nu bian

prin ci pal ities dur ing the East ern tur moil, fo cus ing in par tic u lar on the evac u a-tion of Ot to man troops and the ap point ment of new hos po dars. The dis tur bances of 1821 prompted the sul tan to re place Greek Pha nar i ote govern ors with hos po-dars drawn from na tive boy ars in Mol da via and Wal la chia. See Phil liou, Biog-ra phy of an Em pire, 65–104; Flo rescu, Strug gle against Rus sia in the Ro ma nian Prin ci-pal ities, 124–42.

21. On Brit ish ca pit u la tions in the Ot to man Em pire, see Hure witz, Mid dle East and North Af rica, 1:34–41, 189–91.

The Aurut Bazaar, or Slave Market. (lithograph from Thomas Allom, Constantinople and the Scenery of the Seven Churches of Asia Minor, Illustrated. In a Series of Drawings from Nature by Thomas Allom. With an Historical Account of Constantinople, and Descriptions of the Plates, by the Rev. Robert Walsh [London: Fisher, Son, 1838], vol. 1)

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Slaves of the Sul tanRus sian Ran som ing of Chris tian Cap tives dur ing the Greek Rev o lu tion, 1821–1830

Lu cien J . Frary

The peo ple of Rus sian lands were in volved in the Cri mean Tatar and Ot to man slave trade from at least the sec ond half of the fif teenth cen-tury.1 By the six teenth cen tury, Cri mean Ta tars, No gais, Kal myks, and Ka zakhs raided Rus sian ter ri to ries an nu ally, with the goal of en slav ing as many Rus sians as they could take away. Dis putes over ran som prices, con flicts re gard ing fu gi tives, haz ard ous ex changes of plunder and mil i tary cap tives, ban dit raids, and ter ri to rial ri val ries were com-mon re al ities in the shared Russian-Ottoman fron tier.2 Com mer cial con nec tions and cul tural inter ac tions, in fused at times by re li gious an-tag o nism, guar an teed close, if dis cor dant, con tacts between the peo ple liv ing along the mar gins of em pires. De spite fresh inter est in bor der-land stud ies and the rel a tively large lit er a ture de voted to the Russian- Ottoman wars, the fates of the men and women cap tured and en slaved in the bor der land con flicts of the eigh teenth and nine teenth cen tury re main an un ex plored av e nue of schol ar ship.3 In deed, the study of war cap tives in gen eral is a ne glected field, not only in the con text of the East ern Ques tion but also in the his tory of the mod ern world be fore the

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Lucien J. Frary

twen ti eth cen tury. De tailed stud ies of the op er a tional, stra te gic, and dip lo matic as pects of the Russian-Ottoman wars exist, but few Eu ro-pean schol ars and Rus sian spe cial ists have at tempted to de ter mine the fate of war cap tives, even though archi val sources are per haps more ac cess ible to re search ers in Eu rope and Rus sia than to their Turk ish col leagues.4 This chap ter at tempts to un cover a small por tion of this ex pe ri ence, by fo cus ing on the Chris tians en slaved by Ot to mans dur ing the Greek Rev o lu tion and the Rus sian Empire’s at tempt to re deem them.5 The Rus sian re sponse to the sec tar ian vi o lence that ac com pa nied the tak ing of slaves is an im por tant sub theme of this chap ter. The vi o-lence was so se vere that many Rus sian of fi cials de scribed the Ot to man re sponse to the Greek Rev o lu tion as a “war of ex ter mi na tion.”

In the early months of 1821, when the Sub lime Porte re ceived news of the Greek re volt, the Is lamic au thor ities called on all faith ful Mus lims to avenge the ac tions of the Chris tian in sur gents. Sub se quently, Ot to man sol diers stormed the set tle ments of Or tho dox Chris tians through out the Ae gean Is lands, the Pel o pon nese, and the Greek-speaking main-land, cap tur ing, pil lag ing, and en slav ing en tire pop u la tions. Thou sands of the reaya (Ot to man tax-paying sub jects) ended up as slaves in Mus lim house holds and farms, where they began new lives as ser vants, la bor ers, and, in some cases, com pan ions of their Mus lim mas ters. Of course, the en slave ment of pris on ers was in no re spect the monop oly of the Ot to mans. This prac tice was typ i cal and, at times, of fi cially sanc tioned by Eu ro pean pow ers, at least until the eigh teenth cen tury.6 Al though his to rians have often under scored the harsh re pres sion of the Ot to-man govern ment and Mus lim ci vil ian pop u la tion against the Chris tian Or tho dox, part of the vi o lence can be ex plained by the ac tions of the Greek in sur gents in the open ing phase of the con flict. As the in sur rec-tion spread, Greek rebels rounded up, en slaved, sold, and slaugh tered Mus lims and Ot to man civil ser vants (es pe cially tax of fi cials) in Ar ca dia, Mo nem va sia, Nav a rino, Ka lam ata, Tri po litza, and else where. The spot-light here is on one side of this phe nom e non: in di vid u als who began their lives as free Ot to man Chris tians, but who be came sub ject to slav ery once the re volt against the sul tan per mit ted their cap ture ac cord ing to Is lamic law (sharia).

Re search for this chap ter draws prin ci pally from Rus sian con su lar archives.7 By the early nine teenth cen tury, Rus sia main tained per ma nent con su lar posts at the most sig nifi cant cen ters of trade and stra te gic in-flu ence in the “Chris tian East” (i.e., the ju ris dic tion of the Ec u men i cal Pa tri ar chate, from the Bal kans to Egypt).8 The du ties of Rus sian con su lar

Slaves of the Sultan

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agents in the major towns and cit ies of the Ot to man Em pire ranged widely. Con suls were ex pected to keep de tailed records of the eco nomic con di tions within their sphere of ju ris dic tion, which made them well ac quainted with com mer cial routes and car gos. Agents were re quired to gather in for ma tion on mil i tary af fairs and naval ex er cises and com-pose sum mary re ports on pol i tics and so ci ety for their super i ors in Con stan tin o ple and St. Pe ters burg. On the eve of the out break of the Greek Rev o lu tion, Rus sia had posts (often staffed by non-Russians, es pe cially Greeks) at I˙ stan bul, the Dar da nelles, Alex an dria, Smyrna, Ath ens, Pa tras, San to rini, Cy prus, and other re gions in the east ern Med i ter ra nean and the Bal kans. Largely un tapped sources from em bassy and con su lar posts, such as I˙ stan bul (Gri go rii Strog a nov, Mat vei Min-chaki), Smyrna (Spy ri don De stu nis), the Ae gean ar chi pel ago (Ioan nis Vlas so pou los), the Dar da nelles and Thes sal o niki (An ge los Mus tok sidi), and north ern Greece (Ioan nis Pa par rig o pou los) present abun dant first-hand tes ti mony on the Greek re volt, the sec tar ian vi o lence com mit ted on both sides of the con flict, and the ri val ries among Eu ro pean pow ers in the Near East.

Rus sian foreign min is try archives also con tain scores of pe ti tions for tsar ist help from dis tressed rel a tives of cap tives. Fam ily mem bers and friends of the Chris tian pris on ers of war made im me di ate ef forts to re deem them. In di vid u als, as well as en tire fam i lies, were re lo cated to places as dis tant as east ern An a to lia, the Rho dope moun tains, and Egypt. Hun dreds of peo ple faced tragic di lem mas and searched for the means and meth ods to lo cate rel a tives. As Or tho dox Chris tians (often with con nec tions in di as pora cen ters in south ern Rus sia), many in jured par ties nat u rally sought the pro tec tion of the Rus sian Em pire. Greek sup pli cants of Con stan tin o ple were per haps the most vo cif er ous. Grie vances, pri vate let ters, even poems and songs found in files at the Archive of the Foreign Pol icy of Im pe rial Rus sia con tain fas ci nat ing sto ries of scores of slaves.9 Writ ten or transcribed in amaz ingly di verse or thog ra phy in Rus sian, Ital ian, Greek, French, and Turk ish by rich and poor, lit er ate and il lit er ate in di vid u als, these un tapped sources pro vide a rare glimpse into life dur ing un cer tain times. Fur ther more, Rus sian archi val ma te ri als shed fresh light on the Ot to man ju di cial pro ce dure, eth nic cus toms, Mus lim and Chris tian gen der roles, and the func tion ing of slav ery as an in sti tu tion. Fi nally, Rus sian con su lar re ports re veal one of the first state-driven hu man i tar ian inter ven tions of the nine teenth cen tury and probe the roots of hu man i tar ian move ments and govern-ment re sponses in the nineteenth-century Ot to man Em pire.10

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Ot to man Re sponses to the Out break of the Greek Rev o lu tion

The Greek Rev o lu tion began in Feb ru ary 1821 when Al ex an der Ypsi-lan tis, a dash ing lieu ten ant gen eral in the Rus sian army, led an army of a few thou sand vol un teers across the Pruth into Mol da via and an nounced a Balkan-wide up ris ing against the sul tan. Is su ing a proc la ma tion sum mon ing Greeks to par tic i pate in “the fight for faith and moth er-land,” Ypsi lan tis sent writ ten ap peals to the tsar for aid.11 Al though Ypsilantis’s forces in the Da nu bian prin ci pal ities (Mol da via and Wal-la chia) failed to achieve suc cess, a se ries of un re lated re bel lions broke out in the Pel o pon nese and on the Greek main land in the fol low ing weeks. Mean while, the Greek mer chant ma rine began at tack ing Ot to-man ves sels in the Ae gean, while smaller re volts against con tin gents of Ot to man sol diers erupted in At tica, Thes saly, and Epirus. A decade of war fare en sued that laid waste to vast ter ri to ries and de stroyed count-less lives. The Greeks, dis or ga nized, prone to in fight ing, and typ i cally low on funds, often stood near com plete de feat. Atroc ities oc curred on both sides, as re li gious and so cial an tag o nisms ex ac er bated eth nic ten sions.12

From the be gin ning, the Greek-Ottoman con fron ta tion was fought with in cred ible bru tal ity.13 Per haps based more on re li gious than na tion-al ist dis tinc tions, re cent schol ar ship has pointed to the wider array of mo ti va tions be hind the pat tern of ex cesses and atroc ities, in clud ing cal cu lated po lit i cal strat egy, fam ily feuds, ter ri to rial dis putes, and eco-nomic dis crim i na tion. In the ter rible open ing months of the rev o lu tion, scores of thou sands of Turks and Greeks died, while only a small por tion of them lost their lives to ac tual com bat. In Ka lav ryta and Ka lam ata, Greek ir reg u lars mas sa cred the Mus lim pop u la tion, de spite prom ises of spar ing them. In in nu mer able vil lages, the Chris tians slaugh tered en tire Mus lim pop u la tions, in clud ing at least fif teen thou sand (of a pop u la tion of forty thou sand) in the Pel o pon nese alone.14 Per haps the most in fa mous Greek mas sa cre of Mus lims oc curred at Tri po litza in Oc to ber 1821, when the ca pit u la tion of the besieged Ot to man gar ri son turned into a chaotic as sault as no to ri ous as the worst atroc ities of the twen ti eth cen tury.15 Mus lim male and fe male in hab i tants of all ages were an ni hi lated, their stone build ings de stroyed, their farm houses burned. In Mis so lon ghi, in west ern Greece, en tire fam i lies were ex ter-mi nated, and women were en slaved by wealthy Greek fam i lies.16 In Pa tras, the rel a tively well-organized Greek in hab i tants ral lied be hind


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the ban ner of their arch bishop, Ger ma nos, who in formed the Rus sian con sul Ioan nis Vlas so pou los of their “firm res o lu tion to die be fore sub-mit ting to the yoke.”17 In late March, some five thou sand armed Greeks stormed the town’s cit a del, lay ing waste to Mus lim dwell ings. In re-sponse, Vlas so pou los la mented, “the in tim i dated Turk ish govern ment” was read y ing a large group of troops from Ru me lia to put down the in sur gents in Pa tras with out mercy. “The Turks, un set tled by their be lief of an im pend ing eman ci pa tion,” were no longer in a state to lis ten to rea son. “De spair ing of my in abil ity to ef face this vul gar spirit, and the im pres sions mo ti vated by de cep tion, per ver sity, and prej u dice,” Vlas so-pou los warned, “the dis rup tion of order in this coun try ap pears all too im mi nent.”18 On Palm Sun day, 3 April, in re tal i a tion for Greek ex cesses, an Ot to man force under Ius suf Pasha at tacked the city, sur pris ing the rebels and forc ing them to take flight.

In the wake of the Ot to man mil i tary vic tory at Pa tras, Ot to man sol diers took re venge on the Greeks for their ear lier bru tal ity by set ting their houses on fire. The troops went ber serk, be head ing forty Greeks, des e crat ing their corpses, and turn ing the once-bustling com mer cial port into a waste land. Rev er end Rob ert Walsh, the chap lain of the Brit ish em bassy, re ported a rumor cir cu lat ing in I˙ stan bul that “cer tain sacks filled with two thou sand five hun dred pair of ears cut off from the slain [were] sent as a present to the sul tan by the pasha, as vouch ers for his vic tory.” Ex hib ited be fore the gate of the Se ra glio in piles, “the ears were gen er ally per fo rated, and hang ing on strings. The noses had one lip and a part of the fore head at tached to them, the chins had the other, with gen er ally a long beard; some times the face was cut off whole, and all the fea tures re mained to gether.”19

Vlas so pou los was forced to de part after his home was set on fire by a Mus lim mob.20 He at trib uted the in sur rec tion to the Greek’s de sire to “es cape from the yoke of slav ery” and “de liver them selves from the evils of des pot ism.” Much to his dis may, Vlas so pou los learned that the Rus sian con su lar agent in Nav a rino had been killed.21 The Rus sian vice con sul on Zante, An toine F. San drini, es ti mated total losses of the Chris-tian com mu nity at Pa tras, at 180 mil lion pi as tres.22

Par tic u larly vi o lent con fron ta tions between Chris tians and Mus lims took place in Con stan tin o ple, Smyrna, and Samos.23 Per haps the most con spic u ous ex am ple of bla tant vi o lence against the in no cent oc curred when, on Easter Sun day, an urban mob in I˙ stan bul ex e cuted the eighty- year-old ec u men i cal pa tri arch, Grig o rios V, and other prom i nent mem bers of the clergy. The Ot to mans dis played his corpse, with those

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of five bish ops, on a gate in the Greek quar ter with a fetva (re li gious rul ing) ac cus ing him, pinned to his body. Rev er end Walsh re corded that the rab ble of the city rev eled in de fil ing the patriarch’s body and cast it into the har bor.24

The ex e cu tion and de file ment of the pa tri arch created one of the most in tense con fron ta tions in the dip lo matic his tory of the East ern Ques tion. Claim ing that the vi o lence against Or tho dox churches and clergy vi o lated the Treaty of Ku chuk Kai nardji (1774), the Rus sian gov-ern ment at tempted to inter vene, put ting for ward hu man i tar ian mo tives. The Rus sian am bas sa dor to the Sub lime Porte, Gri go rii Strog a nov, sought a col lec tive state ment on be half of the Eu ro pean pow ers, con-demn ing the ex e cu tion of the pa tri arch and the mas sa cres of in no cent Chris tians. Strog a nov argued that a “spec ter of re li gious war” was threat-en ing the Near East, warn ing of the “re li gious fa nat i cism of the Turks” against the Chris tians.25 He com plained bit terly: “The blood of our broth ers flows all around, and the in no cent are ex ter mi nated in the street to avenge a few of the guilty,” and claimed that “if the Turks con tin ued ex ter mi nat ing the Greek na tion [les Turcs con tin u ent, s’ils ne ten dent qu’à ex ter miner la na tion grecque],” Rus sia would have to inter vene.26 After months of nego ti a tions, the Ot to man divan re fused to ac cept a Rus sian ul ti ma tum re gard ing the se cur ity of Or tho dox Chris tians and their churches. In late July, Strog a nov for mally broke re la tions and de parted from the Ot to man cap i tal, barely es cap ing im pris on ment by Ot to man au thor ities him self.27

The pub lic ex e cu tion of the ec u men i cal pa tri arch, to gether with the atroc ities against nu mer ous bish ops and clergy, set the tone for fu ture Russian-Ottoman re la tions. News re ports re gard ing the mas sa cres of Chris tians and the en slave ment of women and chil dren sparked an in tense re ac tion from the Rus sian pub lic. The de file ment of the corpse of the pa tri arch sym bol ized the Ot to man at ti tude to ward East ern Or-tho dox Chris tians in gen eral and turned the Greek re bel lion into a sa-cred na tional cru sade. The re li gious di men sion of the con flict fueled what Rus sian of fi cials in creas ingly per ceived as a war of ex ter mi na tion (guerre d’extermination) against in fi dels, an un wel come proto type of the “eth nic cleans ing” of the fol low ing cen tury.28 By 1826, Rus sian foreign min is ter Karl V. Nes sel rode warned of “the ex ter mi na tion of the Greeks of the Morea and their re place ment with Egyp tians” and called for a “me di a tion to inter pose in favor of the Greeks be fore the Egyp tian Pasha [would] con quer the re gion and ex ter mi nate the in hab i tants.” Om i nously, Nes sel rode con jured the image of “an ex ist ing plan, or


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some sort of con ven tion between the Pasha of Egypt and the Porte that [had] as its goal the ex ter mi na tion of the Greeks [qui au roit pour but l’extermination des grecques].”29 Eu ro pean ob serv ers re sponded with out-rage; hun dreds of vol un teers flooded into Greece with their ro man tic fan ta sies and heady dreams of free dom and in de pen dence, in what his to rians have later de scribed as the Phil hel lenic move ment.30 Mean-while, Eu ro pean cab i nets and the Rus sian Foreign Min is try strug gled to main tain the status quo and pre vent the Greek re bel lion from ig nit-ing a gen eral con fla gra tion of the East ern Ques tion.31

The Greek in sur gency created a ter rify ing threat to Eu ro pean peace. Whereas the ac tions in I˙ stan bul were com mit ted in plain sight and in front of Eu ro pean ob serv ers, other atroc ities were com mit ted in a less pub lic venue, far from jour na lis tic eyes. In June 1821, the Mus lim au-thor ities and ci vil ians of the pros per ous com mer cial port of Smyrna plundered the Greek quar ter of the city and mur dered hun dreds of Chris tians. Un ruly ja nis sar ies to gether with ran dom vi o lence between Chris tians and Mus lims caused sec tar ian fric tion, so cial chaos, and a com plete break down of trade. Writ ing from Smyrna in July, Rus sian con sul Spy ri don De stu nis re corded the fol low ing im pres sions in his diary: “Throngs of armed ja nis sar ies roamed about the city in the morn ing and com mit ted var i ous out rages. They killed Greeks, both men and women, whom ever they hap pened to come across. It was a ter rify ing, un for get table day! They re sem bled hunt ers pur su ing peo ple as their prey! To see de fense less, un armed Chris tians fall ing like sheep from the bul lets and sword blows of these hard-hearted crim i nals!”32 Of Greek ex trac tion, De stu nis sym pa thized with the Chris tians in volved. The sev er ance of Russian-Ottoman re la tions forced him to aban don his post.33 Out of hu man i tar ian con cern for the Chris tian pop u la tion, the Rus sian Foreign Min is try pre pared plans for mil i tary inter ven tion. Uni-lat eral inter ven tion, how ever, was not an op tion, as Tsar Al ex an der set inter na tional col lab o ra tion above hu man i tar ian mo tives.

Of all the major trad ing cen ters of the Ae gean, the is land of Chios be came the focal point of par tic u larly vi cious Ot to man ven geance. In the years pre ced ing the Greek Rev o lu tion, no area of the em pire was more blessed by good for tune. West ern in flu ences were strong due to cen tu ries of inter mit tent oc cu pa tion by Ital ian city-states. The is land ers had en riched them selves through com merce and the pro duc tion of cot-ton, silk, and cit rus fruit. Besides a few hun dred sol diers in the gar ri son of the har bor of Chora, the island’s cen tral town, the Muslim-Turkish pres ence was mini mal. A light tax bur den and a high de gree of local

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auton omy brought pros per ity to the Chi otes. The Brit ish army of fi cer Thomas Gor don de scribed the Chi otes be fore the Greek in sur rec tion as “mild, gay, lively, acute, in dus tri ous, and pro ver bi ally timid, they suc ceeded alike in com merce and lit er a ture; the fe males were noted for their charms and grace, and the whole peo ple, busy and con tented, nei ther sought nor wished for a change in their po lit i cal con di tion.”34 Un for tu nately for the is land ers, their Greek-speaking rel a tives held vi sions of in de pen dence that were more am bi tious.

When news of the up ris ing reached Chios, the na tive lead er ship pro fessed their loy alty to the sul tan and prom ised to ab stain from ac tion. The ar ri val of rebel mes sen gers from Hydra, led by Ly kour gos Lo goth e tis, and ap prox i mately fif teen hun dred ref u gees from Samos ended the island’s tran quil ity. This Greek horde looted Mus lim ware-houses, de famed mosques, and filled their ves sels with treas ure. In April 1822, the Ot to man gar ri son ex changed can non fire with a con tin-gent of Greeks. The clash re sulted in the dis patch ing of a pow er ful Ot to man fleet under the kap u dan pasha Kara Ali with more than four thou sand Mus lim in fan try. When they ar rived, these troops in flicted hor ren dous re pri sals on the Chris tian in hab i tants.35 Ac cord ing to Gor-don, “Mercy [among the Ot to mans] was out of the ques tion, the vic tors butch er ing in dis crim i nately all who came in their way; shrieks rent the air, and the streets were strewed with the dead bod ies of old men, women, and chil dren; even the in mates of the hos pi tal, the mad house, and the deaf and dumb in sti tu tion, were in hu manely slaugh tered.”36 Eu ro pean ob serv ers con cur that thou sands of per sons of every age and sex were mas sa cred at the storm ing of the is land.37 Thou sands were en slaved and more than twenty thou sand hanged, starved, or tor tured to death.

As ref u gees and asy lum seek ers clus tered to gether for safety in num-bers, the Ot to man sol diers turned from mas sa cre to the more profi t able busi ness of en slave ment. Gor don es ti mated that by the end of May 1822, forty-five thou sand Chi otes had been dragged into slav ery.38 Al-though the Ot to man kap u dan pasha Kara Ali at tempted to ban the ex-port of slaves, he thought oth er wise upon learn ing that the sol diers were ex e cut ing their pris on ers in stead.39 Ships laden with cap tives soon ap peared in the slave marts of Con stan tin o ple, Egypt, and the Bar bary Coast. The slave mar ket at Smyrna at tracted Mus lim buy ers from all parts of Asia Minor. The flood of fresh cap tives brought prices down, and cap tives from Chios were being sold for as lit tle as fifty Turk ish kuru¸s (i.e., two bits).40


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Rev er end Walsh had dif fi culty con vey ing the scope of atroc ities when he vis ited Chios a few months after its de struc tion. Ac cord ing to his es ti mate, the orig i nal pop u la tion of seventy thou sand had been re duced to less than half. Towns had been at tacked, houses de stroyed, and lives wasted. “If you think the ruins of Chios like any other ef fects of mod ern war, you are en tirely de ceived,” he wrote. “We met noth ing that had life, in the coun try no more than in the city; the very birds seemed to have been scared away by the carn age.”41 He went on to de scribe ter rified young girls in the slave mar ket who had lost all chance of re demp tion. In Eu rope and Rus sia, the events on Smyrna and Chios swayed pub lic opin ion over whelm ingly in favor of the Greeks.

In the wake of the Chios mas sa cre, Eu ro pean and Rus sian news-papers began re port ing the de tails of the atroc ities, par tic u larly the tak ing of slaves. Ac counts of atroc ities com mit ted by Mus lims against Chris tians clearly out ranked the mem ory of the mas sa cres of Mus lims in Phil hel lene and West ern press ac counts.42 In France, Eugène De lac roix painted his gi gan tic oil Les Scènes des Mas sa cres de Scio, which created an im mense im pres sion on the pub lic when it was un veiled. In the cen ter of the work stands a naked Greek woman in the ropes of slav ery, as well as a woman being raped by a Turk in a fez. An other De lac roix paint ing, La Grèce sur les ruines de Mis so lon ghi, is an al le gory of van quished Greece im plor ing Eu ro pean as sis tance.43 These works of art fueled pub lic de-bate al ready kin dled by the Phil hel lenic move ment and var i ous phil an-thropic or gan iza tions. Res cu ing the Greeks from slav ery and de struc tion be came a com mon theme of Eu ro pean and Rus sian art and jour nal ism as the move ment for ab o li tion of slav ery gained mo men tum.

The dra ma ti za tion of the Greek-Ottoman cat a clysm by De lac roix and other con tem po rar ies has dom i nated the his tor i cal nar ra tive ob-scur ing a more ac cu rate view. As the Phil hel lenes con tin ued to en gage in “free dom fight ing,” the Ot to man army re mained firmly com mit ted to put ting down the re volt. Fur ther more, the sultan’s pol icy to ward en-slaved war cap tives was not al ways ma li cious.44 For ex am ple, in Bursa in Au gust 1822, some Ot to man sol diers and of fi cials wanted to sell some of the boys and girls that had been en slaved on Chios, but the au thor ities inter vened and or dered the re turn of these slaves to their homes be cause they were mem bers of par doned vil lages. A fetva was is sued in di cat ing that it was contrary to the sharia to en slave par doned reaya. The Ot to man govern ment dealt care fully in cer tain cases of un law-ful en slave ment of Chris tians and in ves ti gated sce nar ios that ap peared contrary to the re li gious law.45

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De spite the pub lic furor, the Eu ro pean pow ers re mained re luc tant to inter vene. In the years fol low ing the out break of the rev o lu tion, thou sands of Chris tians in the Greek prov inces were rounded up by Ot to man troops and re tailed to Mus lims who had the means to ac quire them. Ot to man slave trad ers reg u larly sold in di vid u als in pub lic slave mar kets to the high est bid der. Eu ro pean ob serv ers, rather hypo crit i-cally, were ap palled by the phe nom e non. Rus sia, as the tra di tional pro tec tor of Or tho dox Chris tians, re sponded by launch ing a na tion wide re lief cam paign to re deem the Chris tian cap tives.

Ot to man En slave ment of Chris tian Cap tives: The Rus sian Re sponse

As the only in de pen dent Or tho dox na tion in the world, the Rus sian state and so ci ety re acted with de ter mi na tion against Ot to man anti- Christian re pri sals. Lead ing of fi cials in the Rus sian Min is try of Foreign Af fairs, the Holy Synod, the War Min is try, and other eche lons of the state ap pa ra tus launched a na tion wide re lief ef fort. This re mark able act of phi lan thropy led to the col lec tion of hun dreds of thou sands of ru bles from the Rus sian peo ple and the im pe rial fam ily. The pro cess began in No vem ber 1822, when the Rus sian Holy Synod is sued an ukaz call ing for do na tions. “The gen e ros ity of the Rus sian church con sists, as al ways, as an en er getic par a digm of the ex ploits of love for Chris ti an ity.” The stated goal was the ran som ing and re set tling of “Greeks taken into cap tiv ity as slaves by Ot to man sol diers in Sidon, Kas san dra, and on the is land of Chios.”46 In the fol low ing months, Rus sian con suls and their agents ex tended their search to en com pass the whole Near East.

Al though a thorough sur vey of the Ot to man system of slav ery lies out side the con fines of this chap ter, some com ments may help clar ify the con di tions and pro cess of en slave ment that the Greek cap tives en dured. Dis tinct from the form of slav ery im posed by Eu ro peans on plan ta tion field work ers in the New World, the Ot to man system of slav ery was not based on the need for human labor, nor was the Ot to man system ar gu ably as on er ous as the serf dom im posed on the pea santry of East ern Eu rope dur ing the same pe riod. Gen er al iza tions of this sort are a chancy busi ness, but the “com par a tively mild char ac ter” of Ot to-man bond age was due, in part, to the fact that own ers did not es teem their slaves pri mar ily for their eco nomic use ful ness. Al though en slaved peo ple in Ot to man do mains typ i cally did not want to re main in a con-di tion of bond age, the Ot to man system of en slave ment tended to


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ex hibit a sense of “at tach ment” or “mode of be long ing” to a so cial unit or group, such as a fam ily or a house hold and brought cer tain eco nomic and psycho log i cal ad van tages.47 Al though schol ars in the past two decades have begun to chal lenge per cep tions re gard ing the “good treat ment” of Ot to man slaves, the com bi na tion of Ot to man laws and so cial guide lines that af fected the lives of slaves de serves our at ten tion, if not ap pro ba tion.48

In all pre mod ern Is lamic so ci eties, pri vate in di vid u als could own slaves. Islam sanc tioned slav ery as long as the cap tive in di vid u als were not al ready Mus lim and had not sub mit ted to a Mus lim ruler through the tra di tional cap i ta tion tax. Whereas many so ci eties de vel oped forms of slav ery, few ex hib ited such a di verse and strat ified system of human bond age as did the Ot to man so ci ety. There were many types of Ot to-man slaves, in clud ing elite military-administrative slaves and fe male con sorts or wives, non elite ag ri cul tu ral and in dus trial slaves, and me nial bonds men and bonds women.49 The back bone of the Ot to man mil i tary ma chine (the ja nis sary corps) was founded on the dev shirme (“gath er ing” or “hand pick ing”)—a type of en slave ment. Under the dev shirme, Ot to-man of fi cials took male Chris tian chil dren, usu ally rang ing in age from seven to eigh teen, from Chris tian fam i lies (pri mar ily in the Bal kans) at an inter val of sev eral years and trained them in the mil i tary and ad min is-tra tion.50 Many cap tives from con quered lands also per formed do mes tic tasks in Ot to man house holds. Slaves were used to satisfy the de sires of Ot to man not ables for pres tige; con spic u ous con sump tion played a part in elite house holds. Fur ther more, Ot to man mag nates often em ployed large and well-armed slave house holds for the pur poses of per sonal safety and po lit i cal power. Pre cau tion and prag ma tism im pelled Ot to-man dig ni tar ies to re gard their slaves with at least a mod i cum of re spect, if not kind ness, es pe cially since they could be well armed, dis ci plined, and trained.

When the Ot to mans were in a po si tion of mil i tary su pre macy, most of the en slaved peo ple of the em pire were pris on ers of war, ac quired through con quest in Eu rope, the Black Sea, and the Med i ter ra nean. By the eigh teenth cen tury, most peo ple be came slaves through com merce rather than war fare. This was mainly due to the slow ing pace of mil i tary con quest as well as the shift ing na ture of the glo bal slave trade. After the great pe riod of Ot to man ex pan sion, the orig i nal sources of slaves, based on mil i tary suc cess, shifted to a system of net work ing in human bond age. Cri mean Tatar mer chants pro vided the bulk of sup ply for the Black Sea trade until the mid-eighteenth cen tury; nu mer ous towns and

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cit ies of North Af rica served as mar kets for the de mand of Med i ter ra-nean, In dian Ocean, and Per sian Gulf con su mers. I˙ stan bul and Cairo, the two larg est cit ies of the em pire, con sti tuted the prin ci ple des ti na tion points for mar kets deal ing in slaves. Es ti mates re gard ing the quan tity of slaves in di cate that ap prox i mately six teen thou sand to eigh teen thou sand men and women were trans ported into the Ot to man Em pire from Af rica per year dur ing most of the nine teenth cen tury.51

It is im pos sible to know how many Chris tians the Ot to mans took into slav ery dur ing the Greek Rev o lu tion or from where. Rus sian archives con tain pe ti tions from lo ca tions such as Treb i zond, Smyrna, Crete, and Mis so lon ghi, which rep re sented ad di tional tar gets of Chris tian en slave-ment. Re mote areas such as Mo nem va sia, Sa moth race, and the is land of Psara fig ure large in the tally of Greek Chris tian slaves.52 Over all, most cap tives ap pear to have been women and chil dren. If en tire fam i lies were cap tured, often the re ports say noth ing more than, for ex am ple: “Ste pha nos the Greek merchant’s fam ily was taken cap tive on the is-land.” That the Ot to man mar ket was still flooded with slaves five years after hos til ities ceased serves as one in di ca tor of the vol ume of human traf fick ing. For ex am ple, while in the ba zaar in Con stan tin o ple in 1834, Kon stan tin Baz ili, a well-known Rus sian dip lo mat, traveler, and au thor, ob served that “at trac tive fe male slaves were val ued from 15 to 25,000 pi as tres (5 to 5,000 ru bles); but if she [was] really beau ti ful and of a good height, the value could rise to 40,000 or 50,000 pi as tres.”53

The high est eche lons of Rus sian of fi cial dom could not re sist the temp-ta tion to inter vene. The en slave ment of Greek-Christians gen er ated a se ri ous, sus tained ef fort to ran som the cap tives, on be half of the Rus sian state and so ci ety, in volv ing no bles as well as peas ants, even serfs(!).54 Thou sands of un named Rus sians, in ad di tion to mem bers of the im pe-rial fam ily, do nated sub stan tial sums. A spe cial com mis sion was formed in Con stan tin o ple to lo cate the cap tives. This risky busi ness in volved a hand ful of the tsar’s most loyal Greeks.

Al though the paper trail ex tended from ob scure Ae gean is lands, Black Sea ports, St. Pe ters burg, and be yond, the main under tak ing of slave man u mis sion re sided with Rus sian con suls and their agents in Ot to man ter ri to ries. Rus sian con suls served as the prin ci ple me di a tors in ran som ing Chris tian cap tives. The governor of Nov o ros siia and Bes sa-ra bia, Mi khail S. Vo ront sov, who pro posed that the Rus sian state be come more in volved, trig gered con crete ac tion. He had need for con cern, for Odessa, the wealthi est Greek cen ter in Rus sia, was being flooded by thou sands of ref u gees. Greek com mu nities also set an ex am ple by


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con trib ut ing pledges to as sist those flee ing hos til ities as soon as the rev o lu tion broke out. Im pres sive per sonal of fer ings came from prom i-nent merchant-philanthropist fam i lies.55

In June 1824, Vo ront sov or dered Mat vei Min chaki (Min ciaky), the chargé d’affaires of the Rus sian em bassy in the Ot to man cap i tal, to em-ploy the sig nifi cant re sources now at his dis po sal (one hun dred thou-sand Ot to man pi as tres) to lo cate and ran som Chris tian slaves.56 Vo ron-t sov wrote, “Since the dis as ters at Chios in 1822, a sub scrip tion has been opened in Rus sia for the ran som ing of the un for tu nate Greeks who have fal len into slav ery. This sub scrip tion has pro duced con sid er able funds. A com mit tee com posed of the prin ci ple ref u gee bish ops of Bes-sa ra bia has been in charge of col lec tion.” Ac knowl edg ing the dif fi cul ties em bed ded in the task, Vo ront sov ad vised him “to ac quire in for ma tion about nu mer ous in di vid u als [they knew had] been en slaved.”57 He also in structed Min chaki to form a com mis sion of peo ple of in teg rity who would as sist him. Ot to man reg u la tions on the slave trade were to be fol lowed punc til iously. Vo ront sov in cluded a spe cial short list of about a dozen Greeks who had fal len into slav ery: Aspa sia Sil via (the niece of a Rus sian naval of fi cer); two daugh ters of Ar tietu At a li o tissa (a Greek mer chant), now re sid ing in Bursa and I˙ stan bul; Zanni, son of An to nio Ev mor fo pou los (a Greek mer chant in I˙ stan bul); Mi chael and Coco Pa-rem bli, from Smyrna; Stam a tis and Nik o risi, sons of An dreas Ja lussi of I˙ stan bul; and sev eral oth ers.58

Not long after re ceiv ing his in struc tions, Min chaki dis cov ered that the two At a li o tissa daugh ters were going to be sold in the pub lic mar ket-place in Con stan tin o ple. Since time was of the es sence, he em ployed a Greek from Smyrna named Psaki to ver ify the girls’ iden tity. Upon con fir ma tion, he gave the mother 4,500 pi as tres (2,565 ru bles) to ran som her daugh ters.59 Al though be gin ning in rather piece meal fash ion, this sort of en deavor pro vided Min chaki and his agents with the ex pe ri ence to con tinue on a larger scale.

By Jan u ary 1825, Min chaki had suc ceeded in form ing a spe cial com mis sion ded i cated to ran som ing Chris tian slaves. Vorontsov’s in-struc tions re gard ing how he was to em ploy the one hun dred thou sand pi as tres were clear: first, the com mis sion was not to dis solve until the slaves men tioned were lib er ated; sec ond, agents in volved were to en sure the cred ibil ity of the trans ac tions and ob tain re ceipts; third, they were to col lect as much in for ma tion as pos sible about other slaves; and fourth, a cer tain Mr. Pezer, a mer chant from Smyrna and Con stan tin o pol i tan, was to act as the pri mary nego tia tor. No money was to be ex changed

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until the name, owner, lo ca tion, and price was es tab lished. An ap pen dix to the in struc tions con tains a list of more than two hun dred fam i lies from Smyrna and An a to lia as well as the names of cap tives taken on Chios.60 The list high lights the range of in di vid u als, in clud ing slave num ber 52: a cer tain Marie, wife of Hadji Ni ko las Chav i ara with two of his daugh ters, two sons, and an other young woman with two in fants. Taken from the vil lage of Thera near Smyrna, the fam ily had be come sep ar ated: the two boys were being held in Scala Nuova; the two girls were in a vil lage near Od e missi, “but noth ing [was] known about the oth ers.” Slave num ber 92 on the list: “Theo do roula, wife of Batty of Odessa,” was being held in Per ga mum with four teen mem bers of her fam ily, “of whom [they had] heard noth ing.” Ac cord ing to Vorontsov’s list, nearly sixty slaves were being held in Per ga mum alone.61

The lead ing mem bers of Minchaki’s spe cial com mis sion in cluded the hon orary coun se lor Baron Kon stan tin Hubsch; the Swiss na tional and Rus sian agent Jacques Dantz (also a mer chant of the first guild in Odessa); Zak haria Zak ha rov, a Greek mer chant of the third class in Ta gan rog; and Kon stan tin Val sa maky, a Greek mer chant of Odessa, third class (the latter’s sig na ture is par tic u larly prom i nent on the sales’ re ceipts).62 These in di vid u als for warded their re ports to the Rus sian em bassy in Con stan tin o ple, which passed them on to St. Pe ters burg. Vo ront sov praised Min chaki for the “very agree able list of rep re sen ta-tives” that he nom i nated for the ran som ing of slaves. “The zeal that the com mis sion has not ceased to dem on strate since it has been ac ti vated,” Vo ront sov added, “will be well rec om pensed.” In deed, Vo ront sov noted that he would send a spe cial re port on the mat ter di rectly to the tsar.63

By the sum mer of 1825, Rus sian ef forts came to frui tion, and the com mis sion dis cov ered that many in di vid u als had al ready been ran-somed for between 500 and 3,000 pi as tres. In Au gust and Sep tem ber, Min chaki re ported that seventy-three slaves had been pur chased for 51,546 pi as tres. De tailed sales re ceipts in clud ing the names of the cap-tives, the own ers, the inter pret ers and no tar ies in volved, as well as the price and place were for warded to Rus sian au thor ities in Odessa and St. Pe ters burg. Mean while, St. Pe ters burg began to pur sue more-concrete meth ods to pac ify the re gion, in clud ing nego ti a tions with Great Brit ain (which cul mi nated in the St. Pe ters burg Proto col) and dis patch ing a large naval force to the Ae gean. In No vem ber, Vo ront sov had to cau tion Min chaki not to ex hibit excès de zèle in his op er a tions but to con fine his agents to ran som ing the cap tives des ig nated on the lists. He also


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warned against mak ing these lists known to the pub lic, for that would ap pear tact less and of fen sive and might raise the ask ing price.64

The Rus sian state re acted swiftly when the lives and faiths of Chris-tians were threat ened, since in di vid u als, who in their ten der years be-came mem bers of Mus lim house holds, of ten times as sim i lated to their local en vi ron ment and con verted to Islam. At times the mem bers of the com mis sion en coun tered in stances of apos tasy. For ex am ple, after lo cat ing two chil dren from the fam ily of Al ex an der Lou kou, Baron Hubsch was in formed by local mer chants (Ales san dro Ska navi and Etienne Kou mela) that both Ni ko las and Fran gouli Lou kou had “gone Turk” and there fore did not war rant fur ther con sid er a tion.65 Many more ex am ples of the aban don ment of in di vid u als who had apos ta tized exist in Rus sian Foreign Min is try archives. Often for merly Chris tian slaves rose to po si tions of prom i nence in Ot to man af fairs. For ex am ple, one of the chil dren (re named Ib ra him Edhem) taken from the Greek is land of Chios in 1822 be came grand vi zier in 1877–78.66 An other youth en slaved dur ing the Greek re volt, Georgios Stav rol a kis, even tu ally be came prime min is ter of Tunis more or less con tin u ously from 1837 to 1873.67

As the tra di tional pro tec tor of the Or tho dox world, the Rus sian state ex pended great en ergy to pre vent young peo ple from “going Turk” or aban don ing their Chris tian faith. Re ports of ap par ent Is lam iza tion from local au thor ities meant an end to Rus sian re lief aid, al though at times not be fore ju di cial in quiry. Legal cases were often needed to clearly es tab lish a person’s con fes sional status. For ex am ple, in 1826 the father of a girl ran somed with Rus sian aid was ar rested by Turk ish au thor ities and for cibly de tained, be cause his daugh ter had re port edly con verted to Islam. After a Rus sian agent inter vened, a tri bu nal led by the local imam and four Turks tes tified that the girl had not em braced Islam. She was al lowed to re turn with her father to Chios, al though the trans ac tion cost the Rus sian govern ment extra.68 Some times cer tain fam ily mem bers con verted, while oth ers re sisted; the rea sons why are strong sub jects for com par a tive anal y sis. In re cent years, Ot to man ists have con vinc-ingly dem on strated that forced Is lam iza tion was rare; most con verts did so vol un tar ily.69 Yet ac cord ing to Rus sian re ports from the 1820s, the maxim “There is no com pul sion in re li gion” (Sura II, the Quran) was not al ways re vered.

The search for slaves con tin ued in March 1826, and Vo ront sov for warded the com mis sion an other 65,000 pi as tres, fol lowed by yet an other 60,000 in Oc to ber.70 In Au gust 1826, Min chaki re ported that 231

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slaves had been ran somed for 170,721 pi as tres and asked the Rus sian govern ment for an ad di tional 100,000 pi as tres.71 In deed, just as Rus sia formed a co ali tion with Great Brit ain and France to pac ify the re gion, the ef forts to ran som slaves began to suc ceed. The com mis sion mem bers were re warded for their ef forts: Hon orary Coun se lor Hubsch re ceived the Cross of St. Vlad i mir, the Swiss na tional Dantz was pro moted to coun se lor of com merce, and Zak haria Zak ha rov and Kon stan tin Val-sa maky were given gold med als.72 The awards were ac com pa nied with 10,000 ru bles that the em peror des ig nated for the vic tims of Mis so lon ghi.

In the doc u men ta tion of the pe riod, one finds many in di vid ual cases that il lus trate the plight of the en slaved. For in stance, Ioan nis Vlas so-pu los, now the Rus sian con sul on the is land of Poros, for warded a pe ti-tion to the em bassy in Con stan tin o ple from a cer tain Jean Ar giri, na tive of the is land of Poros, who sought to re deem his daugh ter, Marie, who had been ab ducted in 1827. The girl, four teen years old, was sold into Ot to man slav ery, and the father did all he could to ob tain her re lease. Ev i dently a well-off in di vid ual, Ar giri wrote a let ter (in Ital ian) in 1829 in which he claimed, “Since the de struc tion of Psara by the Turk ish army I have been fa tally dis graced by the loss of my only daugh ter named Marie.”73 After months of search ing, he had at last found her with a Turk ish fam ily in Con stan tin o ple. “Since re la tions between Rus sia and the Porte have be come stable,” Ar giri wrote, “ar tic u lated by the glo ri ous peace of Ad ri an o ple [end ing the Russian-Ottoman War of 1828–29], I thought that in the glo ri ous name of the mon arch of Rus sia, the lov ing father and mag nan i mous ben e fac tor of the Greek na tion, you would end my bit ter ca lam ity by send ing a mis sion to Con stan tin o ple to lib er ate my only daugh ter.” Ac tion was im me di ately nec es sary, in-sisted Ar giri, lest the poor girl aban don her re li gion and be come Mus-lim (e per dens nella mao met tana). Un for tu nately, it proved im pos sible to de ter mine the name of the girl’s mas ter, and Vlas so pu los was un able to re cover Argiri’s daugh ter.74

Hun dreds of what we may call eman ci pa tion sales re ceipts found their way into Rus sian archives. These quit tances are par tic u larly inter-est ing sources. An ex cerpt from one reads as fol lows: “The under signed Kat e rigno, daugh ter of Gior gos Ar konty, Sciote, find ing my self a slave in pos ses sion of the Tar tar Mah mud Aga, de clare to have re ceived from Mr. Zak haria Zak ha rov of this vil lage the sum of 1,500 pi as tres, which serves for my ran som from the afore men tioned Mah mud Aga, in faith of which I have been re leased.” An other sales re ceipt states: “The under signed An to nin, son of George Tri knoeti, aged eight years and a


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na tive of Psara, slave under the own er ship of Meh met Hoza who lives in Gin zirli han [sub urb of Con stan tin o ple], de clares to have re ceived from the Rus sian agent Zak haria Zak ha rov two thou sand pi as tres for the pur pose of my re pur chase from the hands of the above said Meh met, in faith of which I will at test.” The young An to nin signed with an “X,” and sev eral eye wit nesses cer tified the doc u ment in Ital ian and Greek.75 The names of the peo ple in volved (most were il lit er ate) in these quit-tances under score eth nic and lin guis tic di ver sity: So foula Bou la zenna, Ni colo Zo lota, Michel Ba raki, Basil Schina, Theo do ros Be naki, and Maria La dakia.

In an other ex am ple, a slave trader named Halif Ka dine from the Sul tan Meh med dis trict of Con stan tin o ple sold four slaves to the Rus-sian spe cial com mis sion. Ac cord ing to the con su lar re port, Mil tiades, aged four from Mis so lon ghi; Marie, the wife of Con standi Chris to-dou los of the Pel o pon nese with her son The mis to kles; and a girl named De spina cost the Rus sian com mis sion three thou sand Turk ish pi as tres.76 Al though ran somed, De spina was tor mented by the mem ory of her ab duc tion; she re port edly had lost “her sense of strength of mind.”77

As the Greek Rev o lu tion reached its final phase, Rus sian foreign min is ter Nes sel rode had rea son to be pleased. He sin gled out Count F. P. Pah len (the tem po rary act ing governor of Nov o ros siia and Bes sa-ra bia) for his ardor in ran som ing Greek slaves. He con grat u lated Min-chaki and spurred on the other Rus sian agents as well.78 By the sum mer of 1827, the Rus sian re lief aid had led to the eman ci pa tion of 360 in di-vid u als for 290,000 pi as tres.79 Al though the num ber of in di vid u als lib er-ated did not re flect the total of those en slaved, the pro cess in di cates the care with which the Rus sian state em ployed its funds and the re spect it showed to ward Ot to man laws and cus toms, even dur ing times of war.

In 1826, the Rus sian Foreign Min is try sent Al ex an der I. Ribop’er (Ri beau pierre) as the pri mary plen i po ten ti ary (he soon be came am bas-sa dor) to the Sub lime Porte. Ribop’er wrote co pi ous mem o randa on the Greek re volt based on in tel li gence from agents through out the Ae gean, the Morea, and the Io nian Is lands. Min chaki stepped down as chargé d’affaires. The out break of war between the Ot to mans and the Rus sians a few months later, how ever, ended the ran som ing ef forts. Min chaki must have had mixed feel ings when re flect ing upon the many in di vid-u als still in cap tiv ity as well as those who had apos ta tized. The em bassy took over the few thou sand pi as tres re main ing from the re lief drive.80

Nev er the less, the Russian-sponsored ef fort to ran som Chris tian slaves did not end im me di ately. In 1830, the govern ment of the newly

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formed in de pen dent Greek state in Naf plion (the first Greek cap i tal) ac quired suf fi cient stabil ity and rec og ni tion to plea for foreign inter ces-sion. The ap peal, writ ten by Ia ko vos Rizos-Neroulos, a tal ented lit er ary scholar and Greece’s first foreign min is ter, was signed by Pres i dent Ioan nis Kap o dis trias, the well-known dip lo mat and for mer Rus sian foreign min is ter. It reached Vik tor N. Panin, the Rus sian rep re sen ta tive in Naf plion in Jan u ary. Ac com pa ny ing the of fi cial let ter for inter ven-tion were the lists of more than five hun dred fam i lies taken cap tive and held at Smyrna, Gal ata, Alex an dria, Bursa, Mag ne sia, and else where. The Greek govern ment stated that it was pre pared to issue new pass-ports and cer tifi cates of travel if Rus sia would per suade the Sub lime Porte to re lease the vic tims and com pen sate their own ers.81 Panin for-warded the mes sages to Am bas sa dor Ribop’er and com plained of for-mid able ob sta cles due to Mus lim prop erty rights. “Yet I don’t doubt Your Ex cel lence will try, in the inter ests of hu man ity and re li gion to re lease the un for tu nate cap tives.”82 He tried to as sure Kap o dis trias of Russia’s zeal ous in ten sions and en cour aged the Greek govern ment to re lease Turk ish pris on ers of war.83

Ribop’er in turn began to pres sure the grand vi zier to end the en slave ment of war cap tives in gen eral. Cit ing Is lamic law, the Porte re plied that the slaves were pri vate prop erty and the just fruits of war. Ribop’er ob served, “The Turks al ways con sid ered the Greeks their slaves and their prop erty, by the right of war.”84 The most fre quently cited text was Quran 47:4: “When you meet the un be liev ers, smite their necks; then, when you have made wide slaugh ter among them, tie fast the bonds. Then set them free, ei ther by grace or ran som, till the war lays down its load.”85 Thus with moral and ma te rial back ing, Ot to man sol diers, often under paid and over ex posed to dan ger, took mat ters into their own hands by ei ther kill ing or en slav ing the “in fi dels” they en coun tered. Nev er the less, Ribop’er did not cease to track down en-slaved Chris tians. For ex am ple, pres sur ing the Porte to re spond to re-peated com plaints from the fam i lies of en slaved in di vid u als who felt com pelled to adopt Islam, but claimed to have done so for prag matic rea sons, led to an of fi cial proc la ma tion from the Ot to man govern ment. The Ot to man no tice ad dressed “to the kadis, voi vodes, and oth ers, res i-dent in the re gions com pris ing the three di vi sions of Asia and the three di vi sions of Eu rope,” pro claimed that the cap tives who have em braced Islam “but never ceased to de sire their home land . . . and [had] con-stantly tried to es cape . . . [were] no longer of util ity to their pro prie tors or pa trons.” These in di vid u als “should be sent back to their coun tries.”


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The state ment praised the patron-masters for their com pas sion, as sur ing them of fu ture ben e dic tions.86

Ribop’er was not alone in his ef forts to re deem Chris tian slaves on be half of the Rus sian Em pire. The Rus sian vice con sul in Thes sal o niki, An gelos Mus toksidi, was one of the most en er getic ex po nents of the cause of Greek Chris tians en slaved dur ing the War for In de pen dence.87 His strong re la tions with Ot to man au thor ities and tire less ef forts on be half of Chris tian cap tives led to the eman ci pa tion of hun dreds of in-di vid u als. When he ar rived at his post in Thes sal o niki soon after the end of hos til ities, Mus tok sidi was ap palled at the large num ber of Chris tian slaves in Epirus, Thes saly, and Mac e do nia. He noted, “The Turks don’t wish to be de prived of their slaves, par tic u larly those who are young and good look ing, but they are will ing to sell them for a profit.” Mus tok sidi com plained of forced con ver sions, the de bauch ery of young women, and ter rible acts of in jus tice.88 In re sponse to let ters of protest from Greek fam i lies, Mus tok sidi pe ti tioned the Ot to man govern ment. His nego ti a tions with the governor of the re gion, Meh med Re¸sid, per mit ted sev eral hun dred fam i lies to set tle in the Greek king dom.89 Mus tok sidi pro vided his per sonal funds to as sist the fam i lies in unit ing with their com pa tri ots.90

Well over a year after the Greek-Ottoman war ended, while on a spe cial mis sion in 1831 in Al ba nia and Epirus (lands still under Ot to man con trol), the Rus sian con sul in north ern Greece, Ioan nis Pa par rig o-pou los, re peat edly com plained of the wretched plight of Chris tian slaves in Turk ish cus tody. Their fam i lies still sought Rus sian inter ces-sion, and Pa par rig o pou los was eager to oblige. In a let ter (co au thored by the Brit ish con sul in Pre veza, William Meyer) Pa par rig o pou los beseeched Meh med Re¸sid, now the grand vi zier, to de liver a bou jouli (of fi cial re script) to all the pa shas and muf tis in the area to eman ci pate all the cap tives and allow them to re turn to their homes. The in volve-ment led to of fi cial or ders from the Sub lime Porte to grant the safe pas sage of all cap tives and all in di vid u als who once were slaves and had since been set free. Pa par rig o pou los was im pressed that “even after years of mis ery they [had] re fused to give up the re li gion of the fathers.”91

Nev er the less, some ev i dence sug gests that not all the peo ple taken cap tive were un happy with their new lot in life. For ex am ple, when Ottoman-Egyptian forces began evac u at ing the Morea in 1828, many Greek fe male hos tages wished to board ves sels bound for Egypt. A French ob server was puz zled by their res o lu tion to openly re nounce

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the land (pa trie), re li gion, and re gions of their birth, es pe cially when bound for a coun try where sick ness, fear, and death would promptly greet them.92 Such im ages add nu ance and com plex ity to the Ot to man system of slaves, Eu ro pean inter ven tions, and the life and times of peo ple in the east ern Med i ter ra nean dur ing the tu mul tu ous open ing decades of the nine teenth cen tury.

When Greece at last be came in de pen dent in 1830, the new govern-ment under Pres i dent Kap o dis trias pe ti tioned Rus sian agents to in ves-ti gate slav ery and exert fur ther pres sure on the Porte to free Chris tian cap tives. Greek agents com piled ex ten sive de tailed lists of slaves’ names, lo ca tion upon cap ture, and status in side Turkish- and Arabic- speaking lands. In di vid u als and fam i lies re mained far from their home-lands. Un for tu nately for the fam i lies of the en slaved, the Ot to man gov-ern ment con sid ered the in di vid u als in volved to be the pri vate prop erty of their own ers and con cluded that for cible eman ci pa tion was il le gal.93 Ac cord ing to Gia nib Efendi, the Ot to man chi aus bashi (head of the sultan’s pal ace po lice), the cap tives “were con demned to slav ery by Mus sul man laws and re li gion—which not only per mit ted, but en joined such a dis-po sal of the wives and chil dren of their en e mies. . . . Why do not the Chris tian sove reigns inter fere to pre vent the em peror of Rus sia from send ing his sub jects to Si be ria?”94 It should be noted that many cap tives be came in te grated into Ot to man so ci ety and may not have ex pe ri enced ter ribly op pres sive lives as slaves of the sul tan.

Ot to mans gave up the prac tice of en slav ing pris on ers after the 1828–29 war with Rus sia. The launch ing of the Tan zi mat (Re struc tur ing), by Sul tan Abdülmecid I (1839–61), spelled the be gin ning of the end of the Ot to man slave system, al though the pro cess was grad ual and no dis tinct ab o li tion de cree was is sued (as in the case of the United States and the West In dies).95 Sol diers were obliged to re turn “kid napped” Chris tians to the Rus sians dur ing the next major war in the Cri mea.96 Al though the penal code of 1858 im posed pun ish ments for kid nap ping and en slav ing peo ple, com plete ab o li tion did not occur until the early twen ti eth cen tury and the found ing of the Turk ish Re pub lic.

More re search into the system of Ot to man slav ery needs to be con ducted be fore we can fully under stand its place in the East ern Ques-tion. Pre lim i nary con clu sions based on re search pre sented here sug gest that, at the very least, Rus sian ef forts suc ceeded in re unit ing hun dreds of fam i lies. Rus sian inter ven tion also raised aware ness about Ot to man slav ery in dip lo matic cir cles and per haps even prompted some re flec tion on Russia’s own system of coerced labor. More over, it is clear that the


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system of slav ery oc cu pied a cen tral con cern of Rus sian di plo macy with the Porte, which con tin ued through the Cri mean War. Rus sia, as dem on-strated by the ef forts to free slaves, did have real, press ing con cerns about Ot to man treat ment of Chris tian pop u la tions, while ref u gees in the Rus sian Em pire, such as the Greeks liv ing in Odessa, com pelled Rus sian of fi cials to take stands on sen si tive po lit i cal is sues.

Notes

1. The major stud ies of Rus sian slav ery are Rich ard Hel lie, Slav ery in Rus sia, 1425–1725 (Chi cago: Uni ver sity of Chi cago Press, 1982); idem, “Rus sian Slav ery and Serf dom, 1450–1804,” in The Cam bridge World His tory of Slav ery, vol. 3, AD 1420–AD 1804, ed. by David Eltis and Stan ley L. En ger man (Cam bridge: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 2011), 275–95; idem, “Slav ery among the Early Mod ern Peo ples on the Ter ri tory of the USSR,” Ca na dian American Slavic Stud ies 17 (1983): 454–65; and idem, “Mi gra tion in Early Mod ern Rus sia, 1480–1780s,” in Coerced and Free Mi gra tions: Glo bal Per spec tives, ed. David Eltis (Stan ford, CA: Stan ford Uni ver sity Press, 2002), 292–323. Ot to man spe cial ists in Rus sia have yet to ex am ine the system of Ot to man slav ery based on Rus sian or Ot to man archi val sources. For a sur vey of Rus sian historiog ra phy on slav ery, see Rich ard Hel lie, “Re cent So viet Historiog ra phy on Me di eval and Early Mod ern Rus sian Slav ery,” Rus sian Re view 35, no. 1 ( Jan u ary 1976): 1–32; and idem, “Mus co vite Slav ery in Com par a tive Per spec tive,” Rus sian His tory 6, no. 2 (1979): 133–209. See also, Liu bov Kurtynova-D’Herlugnan, The Tsar’s Ab o li tion ists: The Slave Trade in the Cau ca sus and Its Sup pres sion (Leiden: Brill, 2010).

2. Mi chael Kho dar kovsy, Where Two Worlds Meet: The Rus sian State and the Kal myk No mads, 1600–1771 (Ithaca, NY: Cor nell Uni ver sity Press, 1992); idem, Russia’s Steppe Fron tier: The Mak ing of a Co lo nial Em pire, 1500–1800 (Bloom ing ton: In di ana Uni ver sity Press, 2002); Dan iel Brower and Ed ward Laz ze rini, Russia’s Or i ent: Im pe rial Bor der lands and Peo ples, 1700–1917 (Bloom ing ton: In di ana Uni ver-sity Press, 1997); Wil lard Sunder land, Tam ing the Wild Field: Col o ni za tion and Em pire on the Rus sian Steppe (Ithaca, NY: Cor nell Uni ver sity Press, 2002).

3. On the Russian-Ottoman wars, see V. N. Vi nog ra dov, Dvu glav nyi ros siis kii orel na Bal ka nakh, 1683–1914 (Mos cow: In drik, 2010); Al ex an der Bitis, Rus sia and the East ern Ques tion: Army, Govern ment, and So ci ety, 1815–1833 (Ox ford: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 2006); and Vir ginia Aksan, Ot to man Wars, 1700–1870: An Em-pire Besieged (Har low, En gland: Long man/Pear son, 2011). On the Rus sian and Ot to man mil i tary, see J. L. H. Keep, Sol diers of the Tsar: Army and So ci ety in Rus sia, 1462–1874 (Ox ford: Cla ren don Press, 1985); and Rhoads Mur phy, Ot to man War-fare, 1500–1700 (Lon don: UCL press, 1999).

4. For an intro duc tion to the sub ject of pris on ers of war in the Ot to man Em pire, see Su raiya Fa roqhi, The Ot to man Em pire and the World around It (New York: I. B. Tau ris, 2007), 119–36. On the Habs burg Em pire, see Karl A. Roi der,

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Austria’s East ern Ques tion, 1700–1790 (Prince ton, NJ: Prince ton Uni ver sity Press, 1982), 16; and the pub lished doc u ments about free ing slaves, in Karl Jahn, Türkische Freilassungserklärungen des 18. Jah rhun derts (1702–1776) (Na ples: Is ti tuto Uni ver sit a rio Orien tale di Nap oli, 1963).

5. Of vital im por tance, ac a demic and pub lic inter est in the study of en slave-ment in the Ot to man and other Is lamic so ci eties has ex hib ited an im pres sive surge in the past two decades or so. See the rel e vant chap ters in The Cam bridge World His tory of Slav ery, vol. 3. For de tailed ac counts of the Ot to man slave system, see Ehud Tol e dano, As If Si lent and Ab sent: Bonds of En slave ment in the Is lamic Mid dle East (New Haven, CT: Yale Uni ver sity Press, 2007); idem, Slav ery and Ab o li tion in the Ot to man Mid dle East (Seat tle: Uni ver sity of Wash ing ton Press, 1997); idem, The Ot to man Slave Trade and Its Sup pres sion (Prince ton, NJ: Prince ton Uni ver sity Press, 1982); Y. Hakan Erdem, Slav ery in the Ot to man Em-pire and Its De mise, 1800–1909 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996); Su raiya Fa roqhi, Stud ies of Ot to man Men and Women: Es tab lish ing Status, Es tab lish ing Con trol (I˙ stan bul Eren, 2002); Halil In al cik, “Ser vile Labor in the Ot to man Em pire,” in Stud ies in Ot to man So cial and Eco nomic His tory (Lon don: Var i orum, 1985), vii; Yaron Ben-Naeh, “Blond, Tall with Honey-Colored Eyes: Jew ish Own er ship of Slaves in the Ot to man Em pire,” Jew ish His tory 20, no. 3/4 (2006): 315–32. See also Geza David and Pal Fodor, eds., Ran som Slav ery along the Ot to-man Bor ders: Early Fif teenth–Early Eigh teenth Cen tu ries (Bos ton: Brill, 2007); Dan iel Pipes, Slave Sol diers and Islam (New Haven, CT: Yale Uni ver sity Press, 1981); Shaun E. Mar mon, ed., Slav ery in the Is lamic Mid dle East (Prince ton, NJ: Prince ton Uni ver sity Press, 1999); Alan Fisher, A Pre car i ous Bal ance: Con flict, Trade, and Di plo macy on the Russian-Ottoman Fron tier (I˙ stan bul: Isis Press, 1999), 27–46, 77–138; Ber nard Lewis, Race and Slav ery in the Mid dle East (Ox ford: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 1990); and William G. Clarence-Smith, Islam and the Ab o li tion of Slav ery (Ox ford: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 2006).

6. Ev i dence ex ists for Ot to man pris on ers being used as slaves in south ern Italy and France in the early 1800s. See Sal va tore Bono, Schi avi mu sul mani nell’Italia mod erna: Gal e otti, vu’ cumpra’, do mes tici (Na ples: Ed i sioni Scien ti fiche Ital iane, 1999).

7. The doc u ments in this essay come from the AVPRI, spe cifi cally fondy 133 (Kant sel i a riia MID), 159 (For mu li ar nye spi ski), 165/2 (Afiny-missiia), 180 (Posol’stvo v Kon stan tin o pole); and RGADA. The document’s place of com po si-tion and date (the Ju lian cal en dar used by Rus sia fol lowed twelve days be hind the Gre go rian cal en dar in the nine teenth cen tury) is fol lowed by the archi val ref er ence. Se lected Rus sian archi val re ports dur ing these years are pub lished in Mini sterstvo In os tran nykh Del Ros siis koi Fed e rat sii, Vnesh ni aia pol i tika Ros sii XIX i na chala XX v.: Dok u menty Ros siis kogo mini sterstva in os tran nykh del, 16 vols. (Mos cow: Nauka, 1960–94), here after VPR.

8. The first dur able dip lo matic sta tions were founded in the eigh teenth cen tury. On the Rus sian con su lar system dur ing this era, see Lu cien J. Frary,


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“Rus sian Con suls and the Greek War of Independence (1821–31),” Med i ter ra nean His tor i cal Re view 28, no. 1 (June 2013), 46–65. For the broader back ground, see G. L. Arsh, Al ba niia i Epir v kontse XVIII–na chale XIXv (Mos cow: Ak a de mii Nauk, 1963); I. S. Dos tian, Russ kaia obsh chest ven naia mysl’ i bal kans kie nar ody: Ot Ra dish cheva do de ka bris tov (Mos cow: Nauka, 1980); Con stan tin Pa pou li dis, “À pro pos de l’œuvre des em ployés grecs du Ministère des Af faires Étrangères de la Rus sie im pér i ale aux XVIIIème, XIXème et XXème siècles,” Bal kan Stud ies 35 (1994): 5–14; idem, “K vo prosu o deiatel’nosti gre kov, slu zhiv shikh v MID Ros siis koi Im pe rii v XVIII–XX vv.,” in Gre ches kaia kul’tura v Ros sii, XVII–XX vv., ed. G. L. Arsh (Mos cow: Nauka, 1999), 44–50; Ioan nis Ni kol o pu los, “Ioan nis Pap a rig o pu los—et er ist, ros siis kii kon sul, gre ches kii zem lev lade lets,” in Greki i Ros siia XVII–XX vv. (St. Pe ters burg: Ale teiia, 2007), 120–48; and Theo phi lus Prou sis, Russian-Ottoman Re la tions in the Le vant: The Dash kov Archive, Min ne sota Med i ter ra nean and East Eu ro pean Mono graphs, no. 10 (Min ne ap o lis: Uni ver sity of Min ne sota, 2002).

9. An elab orate mes sage to the tsar com posed by more than a dozen Greek not ables is con tained in AVPRI, f. 133, op. 468, d. 8192.

10. Two re cent stud ies em pha size the East ern Ques tion as the cru cial fac tor lead ing to mod ern the o ries and tech niques of hu man i tar ian inter ven tion: Gary J. Bass, Freedom’s Bat tle: The Or i gins of Hu man i tar ian Inter ven tion (New York: Al fred A. Knopf, 2008); and Da vide Ro dogno, Against Mas sa cre: Hu man i tar ian Inter ven-tions in the Ot to man Em pire (Prince ton, NJ: Prince ton Uni ver sity Press, 2012).

11. A con tem po rary Rus sian trans la tion of Ypsilantis’s proc la ma tion ap pears in Russ kii ark hiv (1868): 294–97. Rus sian of fi cial pol icy and the en su ing War of In de pen dence is cov ered in Theo phi lus Prou sis, Rus sian So ci ety and the Greek Rev o lu tion (De Kalb: North ern Il li nois Uni ver sity Press, 1994), 26–83; Al ex an der Bitis, Rus sia and the East ern Ques tion: Army, Govern ment, and So ci ety, 1815–1833 (Ox ford: The Brit ish Acad emy, 2006), 98–121; Bar bara Jel a vich, Russia’s Bal kan En tan gle ments (1806–1914) (Cam bridge: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 1991), 49–75; and Olga E. Pet ru nina, Gre ches kaia nat siia i gos u darstvo v XVIII–XX vv.: Ocherki po lit i ches kogo ras vi tiia (Mos cow: KDU, 2010), 147–93. The rel e vant doc u-ments from the Rus sian Foreign Min is try for the pe riod 1821–30 are pub lished in VPR, vols. 12–16. The much ne glected Ot to man per spec tive is pro vided by H. ¸Sükrü Il i cak, “The Re volt of Alex an dros Ip si lan tis and the Fate of the Fa nar i ots in Ot to man Doc u ments,” in The Greek Rev o lu tion of 1821: A Eu ro pean Event, ed. Pe tros Pi zan ias (I˙ stan bul: Isis Press, 2011), 225–39.

12. Three ex cel lent stud ies of the War of In de pen dence exist in En glish: David Brewer, The Greek War of In de pen dence (Wood stock, NY: Over look Press, 2001); Doug las Dakin, The Greek Strug gle for In de pen dence, 1821–1833 (Berke ley: Uni ver sity of Cal i for nia Press, 1973); George Fin lay, His tory of the Greek Rev o lu-tion, 2 vols. (Lon don: William Black wood and Sons, 1861); see also the historio-graph i cal sur vey in N. P. Di aman dou ros, ed., Hel len ism and the Greek War of Lib er a tion (1821–1830) (Thes sal o niki: IMXA, 1976), 193–230. On atroc ities

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against the Mus lim com mu nity, see Jus tin McCarthy, Death and Exile: The Eth nic Cleans ing of Ot to man Mus lims, 1821–1922 (Prince ton, NJ: Dar win Press, 1995), 1–22.

13. Maria Ef thy miou, “Con ti nu ities and Rup tures in a Rev o lu tion: Prac tices, Mo rals, Ideol o gies and Vi o lence in the Greek Rev o lu tion of 1821,” in La so ci été grecque sous la dom i na tion ot to man: Écon o mie, iden tité, struc ture so ci ale et con flits, ed. Maria Ef thy miou (Ath ens: Hêr o do tos, 2010), 259–324.

14. Dakin, Greek Strug gle, 59; Fin lay, His tory of the Greek Rev o lu tion, 1:172, 179, 181–82, 184–88, 199–203; Thomas Gor don, His tory of the Greek Rev o lu tion, 2 vols. (Lon don: William Black wood and T. Ca dell, 1832), 1:149, 168–69.

15. Dakin, Greek Strug gle, 66–67; idem, Brit ish and American Phil hel lenes dur ing the War of Greek In de pen dence, 1821–1833 (Thes sal o niki: IMXA, 1955); 28– 30; Ed ward Bla quiere, Re port on the Present State of the Greek Con fed er a tion, and on Its Claims to the Sup port of the Chris tian World (Ath ens: Is to riki kai Eth nol o gike Etairia tis El lado, 1974), 11; idem, The Greek Rev o lu tion: Its Or i gins and Prog ress (Lon don: G. and W. B. Whit taker, 1824), 153; W. Al i son Phil lips, The War of Greek In de pen dence, 1821–1833 (New York: Smith Elder, 1897), 60–61; Gary J. Bass, Freedom’s Bat tle, 64–66.

16. Ro dogno, Against Mas sa cre, 65; McCarthy, Death and Exile, 11–2.17. Arch bishop Ger ma nos of Pa tras, Bishop Pro co pius of Kal a vyta, An dreas

Zai mis, An dreas Lon dos, and Ven e ze los Ruf fos to Vlas so pou los, 26 March 1821, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517, d. 1221 (1821), ll. 45–47.

18. Vlas so pou los to Strog a nov, Pa tras, 13 March 1821, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517, d. 1221 (1821), ll. 45–47.

19. Rob ert Walsh, A Res i dence at Con stan tin o ple, 2 vols. (Lon don: Frede rick Westley and A. H. Davis, 1836), 1:335–37. On the frenzy of fight ing in Pa tras, see Brewer, Greek War of In de pen dence, 70–78; Gor don, His tory of the Greek Rev o-lu tion, 1:145–49, 154–57, 233, 297–301; Fin lay, His tory of the Greek Rev o lu tion, 1:186–87; Theo phi lus C. Prou sis, Lord Strang ford at the Sub lime Porte (1821): The East ern Ques tion (I˙ stan bul: Isis Press, 2010), 27–28.

20. Strog a nov sup ported his “to tally mer ited” de par ture and com mended Vlas so pou los for “fol low ing in struc tions with pru dence and loy alty.” Strog a-nov to Vlas so pou los, Pera, 3 May 1821, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517, d. 1221 (1821), ll. 71–72.

21. Vlas so pou los to Strog a nov, Pa tras, 4 March 1821; Vlas so pou los to Strog a-nov, Pa tras Bay, 27 March 1821; Vlas so pou los to Strog a nov, Ithaca, 20 April 1821, VPR, 12:47–48, 86–88, 126–27; Vlas so pou los to Kap o dis trias, Ithaca, 29 April 1821; Vlas so pou los to Pou que ville, Ithaca, 26 April 1821, RGADA, f. 15, op. 1, d. 326, ll. 204–8, 215; Strog a nov to Vlas so pou los, Pera, 9 May 1821, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517, d. 1221 (1821), l. 68.

22. San drini to Nes sel rode, Zante, 18 April 1821, VPR, 12:123.23. Eye wit ness ac counts in clude Walsh, Res i dence at Con stan tin o ple; and

Theo phi lus Prou sis, “Smyrna 1821: A Rus sian View,” Mod ern Greek Stud ies Year book 7 (1991): 145–68.


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24. Walsh, Res i dence at Con stan tin o ple, 1:311–20; Charles Fra zee, The Or tho-dox Church and In de pen dent Greece, 1821–1852 (Cam bridge: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 1969), 22–35; Prou sis, Rus sian So ci ety and the Greek Rev o lu tion, 28, 55–56.

25. Strog a nov to Nes sel rode, Con stan tin o ple, 10 April 1821, VPR, 12:113–16.26. Strog a nov to Nes sel rode, Con stan tin o ple, 28 May 1821, VPR, 12:162–65;

C. W. Craw ley, The Ques tion of Greek In de pen dence: A Study of Brit ish Pol icy in the Near East, 1821–33 (Cam bridge: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 1931), 18; Ro dogno, Against Mas sa cre, 68.

27. VPR, 13:113–19, 132–33, 154–59, 162–68, 176–78, 203–10, 224–27, 637–48; Prou sis, Rus sian So ci ety and the Greek Rev o lu tion, 37–38; idem, Russian-Ottoman Re la tions in the Le vant, 27; idem, Lord Strang ford at the Sub lime Porte (1821), 97–102, 109–111, 120–21, 124, 145, 161–62, 169.

28. The phrase “guerre d’extermination” ap pears in the dis patches and draft po si tion papers of the Rus sian am bas sa dor to Great Brit ain, Chris to pher Lie ven, as early as 1824. On the Rus sian nego ti a tions with the Brit ish cab i net (more than six thou sand man u script pages), see “Pac ifi ca tion de la Grèce,” AVPRI, f. 133, op. 468, d. 12960–67; see also V. N. Vi nog ra dov, “Les dis cus sions sur la Grèce à Lon dres,” in Les re la tions gréco-russes pen dant la dom i na tion turque et la guerre d’indépendance grecque (Thes sal o niki: IMXA, 1983), 133–60; and C. A. Va cal o pou los, “L’attitude de la Rus sie face à la ques tion de l’indépendance grecque con sid é rée par l’Ambassadeur russe Lie ven (mai 1829),” in Les re la tions gréco-russes pen dant la dom i na tion turque et la guerre d’indépendance grecque (Thes-sal o niki: IMXA, 1983), 160–69.

29. Nes sel rode to Min chaki, St. Pe ters burg, 3 March 1826; Nes sel rode to Lie ven, St. Pe ters burg, 10 June 1826; Nes sel rode to Lie ven, Mos cow, 17 Sep tem-ber 1826, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 468, d. 12960, ll. 174, 332, 374.

30. On the Phil hel lenic move ment, see Rode rick Bea ton, Byron’s War: Ro-man tic Re bel lion, Greek Rev o lu tion (Cam bridge: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 2013); William St. Clair, That Greece Might Still Be Free: The Phil hel lenes in the War of In de pen dence, 2nd ed. (Cam bridge: Open Book, 2008); Denys Barau, La cause des Grecs: Une his toire du mouve ment phil hel lene (1821–1829) (Paris: Édi tions Cham pion, 2009); Dakin, Brit ish and American Phil hel lenes; and C. M. Wood-house, The Phil hel lenes (Lon don: Hod der and Stough ton, 1969).

31. The hawks in the Rus sian Foreign Min is try at tempted to con vince Tsar Al ex an der I to inter vene. Torn between his de sire to main tain the Eu ro pean co ali tion and his com mit ment to pro tect Chris tians under threat, Tsar Al ex an-der failed to de velop a clear-cut pol icy in re la tion to the Greek re bel lion. Alexander’s contra dic tory stance en a bled the Greek strug gle to re main a mostly inter nal Ot to man af fair in the early 1820s. See Prou sis, Rus sian So ci ety and the Greek Rev o lu tion, 26–83.

32. Prou sis, “Smyrna 1821,” 156.33. For the Brit ish per spec tive, see Rich ard Clogg, “Smyrna in 1821:

Doc u ments from the Le vant Com pany Archives in the Pub lic Record Of fice,” Mik ra sia tika Chro nika (1972), 15:313–71; for the French view, see Henri Ma thieu,

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La Tur quie et ses dif fer ent peu ples (Paris: E. Dentu, 1857), 311. See also Ro dogno, Against Mas sa cre, 66–68; Bass, Freedom’s Bat tle, 56, 57.

34. Gor don, His tory of the Greek Rev o lu tion, 1:351.35. The mas sa cre on Chios has been the sub ject of sev eral re cent stud ies:

H. Long, Greek Fire: The Mas sa cre of Chios (Bris tol: Abson, 1992); Ro dogno, Against Mas sa cre, 68–70; Bass, Freedom’s Bat tle, 67–75; Brewer, Greek War of In de-pen dence, 154–67. For ad di tional de tail, see S. G. Vios, ed., I sphagi tis Hiou eis to stoma tou Hia kou laou (Chios: Ome reio Pnev ma tiko Ken tro Dimou Hiou, 2006); Apos to los Va kal o pou los, Is toria tou neou el li nis mou, 6 vols. (Thes sal o niki: n.p., 1973–82), 6:65–124; Philip Ar genti, ed., The Mas sa cres of Chios De scribed in Con-tem po rary Dip lo matic Re ports (Lon don: John Lane, 1932); idem, Bib liog ra phy of Chios from Clas si cal Times to 1936 (Ox ford: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 1940), 415– 34. The dis patches of the Brit ish am bas sa dor to the Porte, Lord Strang ford, con-sti tute an in val u able record of the in ci dent. See Theo phi lus C. Prou sis, Lord Strang ford at the Sub lime Porte (1822): The East ern Ques tion (I˙ stan bul: Isis Press, 2012), 81–258, 334–71.

36. Gor don, His tory of the Greek Rev o lu tion, 1:358.37. See the re ports in Prou sis, Lord Strang ford at the Sub lime Porte (1822); and

Ar genti, Mas sa cres of Chios.38. Gor don, His tory of the Greek Rev o lu tion, 1:361.39. Brewer, Greek War of In de pen dence, 162. Ac cord ing to Lord Strang ford,

the kap u dan pasha “re deemed with his own money a vast num ber of the wretched women and chil dren whom the Turk ish trips had sold as slaves.” See Prou sis, Lord Strang ford at the Sub lime Porte (1822), 123.

40. Erdem, Slav ery in the Ot to man Em pire, 26.41. Walsh, Res i dence at Con stan tin o ple, 1:398–409, 2: 6–10. The pe ri od i cal

Vest nik Ev ro pii, no. 9/10: 152–54, no. 13/14: 156–59 re ported on the mas sa cre. See also Prou sis, Rus sian So ci ety and the Greek Rev o lu tion, 61–62.

42. Jean Dim a kis, La guerre d’indépendance Grecque vue par la presse française (pér i ode de 1821 à 1824) (Thes sal o niki: IMXA, 1968); R. L. Green, Sketches of the War in Greece (Lon don: Hurst, 1827); F. Pou que ville, His toire de la re gen er a tion de la Grèce, 4 vols. (Paris: Fir min Didot, 1827); Ro dogno, Against Mas sa cre, 69–70; Bass, Freedom’s Bat tle, 67–75.

43. Nina Athanassoglou-Kallmyer, French Im ages from the Greek War of In de-pen dence, 1821–1830: Art and Pol i tics under the Res to ra tion (New Haven, CT: Yale Uni ver sity Press, 1989), 30–31.

44. Ro dogno, Against Mas sa cre, 72–78; Bass, Freedom’s Bat tle, 47–151. For the Ot to man view of the war, based pri mar ily on Ot to man archives, see Erdem, “‘Do Not Think of the Greeks as Ag ri cul tu ral Laborers’: Ot to man Re sponses to the Greek War of In de pen dence,” in Cit i zen ship and the Nation-State in Greece and Tur key, ed. Faruk Bir tek and Thalia Dra go nas (New York: Rout ledge, 2005), 67–84; idem, “The Greek Re volt and the End of the Old Ot to man Order,” in The Greek Rev o lu tion of 1821: A Eu ro pean Event, 260–63; Chris tine Phil liou, Biog ra phy


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of an Em pire: Gov ern ing Ot to mans in an Age of Rev o lu tion (Berke ley: Uni ver sity of Cal i for nia Press, 2011), 65–81.

45. Erdem, Slav ery in the Ot to man Em pire, 20–26.46. Ukaz of the Holy Synod, 29 No vem ber 1822, VPR, 12:605–6. For an as sort-

ment of sup pli ca tions from the fam i lies of the vic tims and the Rus sian re sponse, see AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 2614 (1824–27). Com pi la tions of sta tis tics and yearly otch ety are avail able in VPR, 12:605–6, 14:18, 217–18, 333, 711–12, 718–22, 741–43, 774–76.

47. On fam i lies and house holds in the Ot to man Em pire, see Alan Duben and Cem Behar, Is tan bul House holds: Mar riage, Fam ily, and Fer til ity, 1880–1940 (Cam bridge: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 1991); Su raiya Fa roqhi, Sto ries of Men and Women: Es tab lish ing Status, Es tab lish ing Con trol (I˙ stan bul: Eren, 2002); Made line C. Zilfi, “Ser vants, Slaves, and the Do mes tic Order in the Ot to man Mid dle East,” Hawwa 2, no. 1 (2004): 1–33. See also Tol e dano, “En slave ment in the Ot to man Em pire,” 34–38.

48. See the gen eral dis cus sion in Tol e dano, “En slave ment in the Ot to man Em pire,” 31–34. See Zilfi, “Ser vants, Slaves, and the Do mes tic Order,” on how man u mit ted slaves, es pe cially women, be came a form of cheap labor.

49. See Metin Kunt, All the Sultan’s Ser vants: The Trans for ma tion of Ot to man Pro vin cial Govern ment, 1550–1650 (New York: Co lum bia Uni ver sity Press, 1983); Su raiya Fa roqhi, “The Rul ing Elite between Pol i tics and ‘the Econ omy,’” in An Eco nomic and So cial His tory of the Ot to man Em pire, 1300–1914, ed. Halil Inl cik and Don ald Qua taert (Cam bridge: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press), 564–636; H. Sa hil lio˘glu, “Slaves in the So cial and Eco nomic Life of Bursa in the Late 15th and Early 16th Cen tu ries,” Tur cica 17 (1985): 43–112; Erdem, Slav ery in the Ot to-man Em pire, 11–17.

50. The prin ci ple works on the dev shirme in clude V. De met ri ades, “Some Thoughts on the Or i gins of the Dev¸sirme,” in The Ot to man Emi rate (1300–1389), ed. Eliz a beth A. Zach a ri a dou (Re thym non: Uni ver sity of Crete, 1993), 67–76; V. L. Mén age, “Side lights on the Dev shirme from Idris to Sa’duddin,” Bul le tin of the School of Orien tal and African Stud ies 18 (1956): 181–83; idem, “Some Notes of the Dev shirme,” Bul le tin of the School of Orien tal and African Stud ies 18 (1964): 64–78; J. A. B. Palmer, “The Or i gin of the Ja nis sar ies,” Bul le tin of the John Ry lands Li brary 35 (1952–53): 448–81; Ba si like Paou lis, Ur sprung und Wesen der Kna ben lese im os ma nis chen Reich (Mu nich: R. Ol den bourg, 1963); R. C. Repp, “A Fur ther Note on the Dev shirme,” Bul le tin of the School of Orien tal and African Stud ies 31 (1968): 137–39; S. Vryo nis, “Is i dore Gla bas and the Turk ish Dev shirme,” Spec u lum 31 (1956): 433–43; idem, “Sel juk Gu lams and Ot to man Dev shirme,” Der Islam 41 (1965): 224–52; Eliz a beth A. Zach a ri a dou, “Les ‘janissaires’ de l’empereur byz an-tine,” in Stu dia Tur co log ica me mor iae Alexii Bom baci dic ata (Na ples: Herder, 1982), 591–97. For ac cess ible syn the ses, see Colin Imber, The Ot to man Em pire, 1300–1650 (New York: Pal grave, 2002), 128–43; and Bruce Mas ters, “dev¸sirme,” in En cy clo pe dia of Ot to man His tory (New York: Facts on File, 2009), 183–85.

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51. Tol e dano, “En slave ment in the Ot to man Em pire,” 26; Ralph Aus ten, “The 19th Cen tury Is lamic Slave Trade from East Af rica (Swa hili and Rea Sea Coasts): A Ten ta tive Cen sus,” Slav ery and Ab o li tion 9 (1988): 21–44; idem, “The Med i ter ra nean Is lamic Slave Trade out of Af rica: A Ten ta tive Cen sus,” Slav ery and Ab o li tion 13 (1992): 214–48; see also Paul E. Love joy, Trans for ma tions in Slav ery: A His tory of Slav ery in Af rica, 2nd ed. (Cam bridge: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press), 135–59. Spe cial ists have yet to pro vide es ti mates re gard ing the total vol ume of coerced mi gra tion from the Black Sea shores and the Cau ca sus, a pre cise cal cu la tion of which is most likely im pos sible. In bor der land re gions like the Cri mea, rea son able es ti mates sug gest that a sub stan tial por tion of the pop u la tion con sisted of slaves of for mer slaves. On num bers of slaves in the early mod ern pe riod, see Hel lie, Slav ery in Rus sia, 679–89. On the Cri mean Tatar traf fic, see Fisher, Pre car i ous Bal ance.

52. Much of the pop u la tion of Psara was en slaved or mas sa cred. Ac cord ing to George Fin lay, about seven thou sand peo ple lived on the is land be fore the rev o lu tion. See Fin lay, His tory of the Greek Rev o lu tion, 2:152.

53. K. M. Baz ili, Ocherki Kon stan tin o po lia, 2 pts. (St. Pe ters burg: N. Grech, 1835), pt. 2, 158. The term “pi as tre” or “pi aster” comes from the Ital ian pi as tra, or “thin metal plate.” Pi as tre was an other name for kuru¸s, the stan dard unit of cur rency in the Ot to man Em pire until 1844. It was sub di vided into forty para, each of three akçe. For de tails on the ex change rate, see Sevket Pamuk, “Money in the Ot to man Em pire, 1326–1914,” in Inl cik and Qua taert, Eco nomic and So cial His tory of the Ot to man Em pire, 945–80.

54. For the con text of Greek re lief aid, see Prou sis, Rus sian So ci ety and the Greek Rev o lu tion, 55–83.

55. Ibid., 69.56. Se lected ma te rial from the writ ings of Min chaki are pub lished in VPR,

vols. 13–16. Rus sian agents re ported to him from Za kyn thos (Anton San drini), Corfu (S. P. Po pan do poulo), My ti lini and Syros (S. L. Svi larch), San to rini (B. Mar che sini), Naxos (K. Raf to pou los), Samos (G. Svo ro nos), My ko nos (Pie tro Kor dia), Tinos (Ivan Dzhani), Cy prus (Mario Santi), and else where. See, “Delo ob uch rezh de nii konsul’stv,” AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 78 (1829); AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 163 (1831).

57. Vo ront sov to Min chaki, Odessa, 2 June 1824, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 2614, ll. 1–2.

58. Ibid., 2.59. Min chaki to Vo ront sov, Con stan tin o ple, 27 Au gust 1826, AVPRI, f. 180,

op. 517/1, d. 2614, ll. 79–80.60. “Liste d’esclaves à rach eter à Smirne et aux en vi rons, ainsi que dans les

au tres par ties de la Anat o lie,” “Liste d’esclaves à rach eter dans l’île de Chio,” Jan u ary 1825, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 2614, ll. 8–18.

61. Ibid., ll. 11, 13.62. Vo ront sov to Min chaki, Odessa, 20 Oc to ber 1826; Min chaki to Vo ron t sov,


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Buy uk dere, 25 Sep tem ber 1826, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 2614, ll. 55–56, 134–35.

63. Vo ront sov to Min chaki, Odessa, 20 Oc to ber 1826, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 2614, l. 55.

64. Min chaki to Vo ront sov, Buy uk dere, 4 Oc to ber 1825; Vo ront sov to Min-chaki, Odessa, 14 Au gust 1825; Vo ront sov to Min chaki, Odessa, 21 No vem ber 1825, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 2614, ll. 102, 19–39, 45.

65. Hubsch to Min chaki, Pera, 2 Au gust 1825, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 2614, ll. 166–68.

66. Erdem, Slav ery, 26.67. Ma gali Morsy, North Af rica, 1800–1900: A Sur vey from the Nile Val ley to

the At lan tic (Lon don: Long man, 1984), 185.68. Hubsch to Min chaki, Pera, 4 Au gust 1826, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1,

d. 2614, ll. 194–200.69. An to nina Zhel yaz kova, “Is lam iza tion in the Bal kans as a Historio-

graph i cal Prob lem: The Southeastern-European Per spec tive,” in The Ot to mans and the Bal kans: A Dis cus sion of Historiog ra phy, ed. Fik ret Ad a nir and Su raiya Fa roqhi (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 223–66; Selim De rin gil, “‘There Is No Com pul sion in Religion’: On Con ver sion and Apos tasy in the Late Ot to man Em pire, 1839–1856,” Com par a tive Stud ies in So ci ety and His tory 42, no. 3 (2000): 547–75; Colin Hey wood, “Bos nia under Ot to man Rule, 1463–1800,” in The Mus lims of Bosnia- Herzegovina: Their His toric De vel op ment from the Mid dle Ages to the Dis so lu tion of Yu go sla via, ed. Mark Pin son (Cam bridge, MA: Har vard Uni ver sity Press, 1994), 22–53.

70. Vo ront sov to Min chaki, Odessa, 12 March 1826; Vo ront sov to Min chaki, Odessa, 4 Oc to ber 1826, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 2614, ll. 48, 54.

71. Min chaki to Vo ront sov, Buy uk dere, 4 Au gust 1826, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 2614, ll. 127.

72. Vo ront sov to Min chaki, Odessa, 20 Oc to ber 1826, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 2614, ll. 55–56.

73. Jean Ar giri to Vlas so pulo, Poros, 3 Jan u ary 1830, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1228 (1830), l. 4.

74. Vlas so pulo to Ribop’er, Poros, 4 Jan u ary 1830, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1228 (1830), l. 3.

75. Con stan tin o ple, 17 Sep tem ber 1826, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 2611 (1825–26), l. 126.

76. Con stan tin o ple, 12 No vem ber 1826, AVPRI, f. 180, op 517/1, d, 2611 (1825–26), l. 211.

77. Ibid.78. Nes sel rode to Pah len, St. Pe ters burg, 22 March 1827, AVPRI, f. 180, op.

517/1, d. 2614, l. 67.79. Min chaki to Pah len, Buy uk dere, 10 May 1827, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1,

d. 2614, ll. 155–56.

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80. Ribop’er to Hubsch, Pera, 16 No vem ber 1827, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 2614, l. 252.

81. Kap o dis trias and Rizos-Neroulos to Panin, Naf plion, Jan u ary 1830; Rizos-Neroulos to Panin, Naf plion, 2 May 1830, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1796 (1830), ll. 40–52, 261.

82. Panin to Ribop’er, Na ples de Ro mani, 3 Feb ru ary 1830, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1796 (1830), l. 39.

83. Panin to Kap o dis trias, Naf plion, 5 Feb ru ary 1830, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1796 (1830), l. 62.

84. Ribop’er to Panin, Buy uk dere, 24 Feb ru ary/8 March 1830, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1796 (1830), ll. 343–44.

85. Cited in Clarence-Smith, Islam and the Ab o li tion of Slav ery, 25. On de tails re gard ing the Ot to man eman ci pa tion of slaves, see Erdem, Slav ery in the Ot to man Em pire, 152–84.

86. Ribop’er to Panin, Buy uk dere, 16 July 1830, AVPRI, 165/2, op. 507, d. 40 (1828), ll. 246–48.

87. On Mus tok sidi, see Lu cien J. Frary, “Rus sian Inter ests in Nine teenth Cen tury Thes sal o niki,” Med i ter ra nean His tor i cal Re view 23, no. 1 ( June 2008): 15–33.

88. Mus tok sidi to Rik man, Thes sal o niki, 15 De cem ber 1830, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1294 (1830), ll. 108–11.

89. Mus tok sidi to Panin, Thes sal o niki, 12 Feb ru ary1831, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 154 (1831), ll. 140–42; for a pe ti tion from Greek cap tains ad dressed to Mus tok sidi, see, ll. 143–44.

90. The Rus sian govern ment re im bursed him twenty-five thou sand pi as tres to save Greek slaves. See “Mus tok sitsi, An zhelo Arsen’evich,” AVPRI, f. 159, op. 464, d. 2343.

91. Pa par rig o pou los and Meyer to Meh met Re shid Pasha, Och rid, 27 July 1831, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 163 (1831), l. 56. A full sum mary of the nego ti a-tions with the grand vi zier is con tained in Pa par rig o pou los to Rik man, Naf plion, 25 Au gust 1831, AVPRI, f. 165/2, op. 507, d. 163 (1831), ll. 38–45.

92. J. Man geart, Souve nirs de la Morée (Paris: Ig on ette, 1830), 41.93. Ribop’er to Panin, Buy uk dere, 24 Feb ru ary 1830, AVPRI, f. 180, op.

517/1, d. 1796 (1830), ll. 343–46.94. Prou sis, Lord Strang ford at the Sub lime Porte (1822), 133–34.95. Dur ing this pe riod, en slaved peo ple used the govern ment de crees as

tools to achieve their free dom. See Tol e dano, Ot to man Slave Trade; idem, “Ot to-man Con cep tions of Slav ery in the Pe riod of Re form, 1830s–1880s,” in Break ing the Chains: Slav ery, Bond age and Eman ci pa tion in Mod ern Af rica and Asia, ed. Mar tin A. Klein (Mad i son: Uni ver sity of Wis con sin Press, 1993), 37–63; Erdem, Slav ery in the Ot to man em pire; Clarence-Smith, Islam and the Ab o li tion of Slav ery, 104–18; Lewis, Race and Slav ery in the Mid dle East, 78–81, 160–61.

96. Tol e dano, Ot to man Slave Trade, 24–26; Erdem, Slav ery in the Ot to man Em pire, 29–33, 44–45, 196.

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Russia’s Quest for the Holy GrailRel ics, Li tur gics, and Great-Power Pol i tics in the Ot to man Em pire

Jack Fai rey

A de vel op ment com mon to all the so cial sci ences since the end of the Cold War has been a re newed ap pre ci a tion for the so cial and po lit i cal power of re li gion.1 In keep ing with this trend, a grow ing num ber of his to rians have self-consciously sought (in the words of Philip Gor ski) “to bring re li gion back in” to the writ ing of mod ern po lit i cal and so cial his tory. In Eu ro pean his tory, the re sult ing “re li gious turn” has yielded val u able in sights on a range of top ics from the or i gins of West phal ian sov e reignty to the rise of na tion al ism, the pub lic sphere, and the mod ern state.2 His to rians of the Ot to man Em pire, sim i larly, have paid in creas ing at ten tion to the po lit i cal his tory of re li gion and re li gious in sti tu tions, es pe cially as these af fected the inter nal co he sion of the em pire and the for ma tion of those mod ern states and na tions that would even tu ally re-place it.3

The im pact of Ot to man re li gious af fairs on mod ern inter na tional re la tions, how ever, has been less stud ied. One strik ing ex am ple of this

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ne glect is the his tory of the Cri mean War between Rus sia and the Ot to-man Em pire, Brit ain, and France in 1853–56. The Cri mean War is not nor mally treated as “a re li gious con flict,” yet its or i gins were in ex tri cably bound up with re li gious ac tors and is sues. The dis pute was, for ex am ple, the last major Eu ro pean war in which a com bat ant cited ex pli citly re li-gious fac tors as a casus belli. In 1853, the Rus sian govern ment based its en tire case for war on its claim that the Ot to man govern ment was car ry ing out a de lib er ate cam paign of inter fer ence in Or tho dox re li-gious af fairs. The pur pose of this cam paign, St. Pe ters burg de clared, was to under mine the po lit i cal and so cial po si tion of the Or tho dox Church in the Near East and thereby to strike at Rus sian in flu ence through out the re gion.4 In June 1853, Tsar Nich o las I an nounced that all his ef forts to bring the sul tan to rea son on the issue had failed; the sole al ter na tive that re mained was a re sort to force. Holy Rus sia had no choice but to “march to the de fense of the Or tho dox Faith.”5

Chan cel lor Karl Vasil’evich Nes sel rode en larged upon his sov- ereign’s ac cu sa tions re gard ing the re li gious causes of the con flict in a mem o ran dum, dated 2 March 1854. This mem o ran dum, though

View of Constantinople by Evening Light by Ivan Aivazovsky. (reprinted with permission from the Peterhof Museum, Russia)

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os ten sibly for inter nal use, was clearly aimed at a wider au di ence. “For a long time now,” the chan cel lor com plained, “all the acts of the Turk ish Govern ment to ward us, as to ward the East ern Church in Tur key, have born an ev i dent stamp of hos til ity.” As ev i dence, Nes sel rode cited a long list of of fenses com mit ted by the Sub lime Porte against the Or tho-dox Church, in clud ing:

di rect inter fer ence in inter nal [ec cle sias ti cal] af fairs . . . con stant ir reg u lar ities in the elec tion of the pa tri archs; . . . ob sta cles of every sort placed in the way of the de vel op ment of the Bul gar ian and Bos nian Churches, of the in struc tion of the in dig e nous clergy, and of the re li gious ed u ca tion of the pop u la tion . . . ; pro hi bi-tion or par tial lac er a tion of sa cred texts or dered by the Greek-Slavic clergy from Rus sia for their own use, . . . ; a thou sand things, in other words, which, taken sep ar ately have only a rel a tive im por tance, but which, taken all to gether, have proven to us for some years past the well-developed in ten tions of the Turk ish govern ment to con trib ute to the in crease of other sects, in order to di min ish, along with our au thor ity, the num ber of those whom it en vis ages to be ad her ents of Rus sia.6

The tsar and his min is ters were con vinced, more over, that the Porte had not ar rived at these pol i cies in de pen dently: the Brit ish, French, and Aus trian em bas sies had in cited the Ot to mans to adopt an inter ven tion ist course. Rus sian states men con cluded that the fu ture of Or tho doxy it self was under threat in the Near East, and that a bind ing en gage ment from the Ot to man sul tan was nec es sary to pre serve the re li gious status quo from such a hos tile con stel la tion of forces. In order to se cure a com pre-hen sive guar an tee of Or tho dox rights in the Near East, Nich o las I was pre pared— though re luc tant—to set the en tire re gion ablaze.

The Ot to man, Brit ish, and French govern ments each vig or ously de nied these al le ga tions. The Ot to man dec lar a tion of war in Oc to ber 1853, for ex am ple, cat e gor i cally re futed the tsar’s com plaints: there had been no cam paign of inter fer ence in Or tho dox af fairs, and the Ot to man govern ment had no in ten tion of com pro mis ing the rights and priv i leges of the Or tho dox Church in any way. The tsar’s de mands for a for mal guar an tee were there fore un nec es sary and lit tle more than “a pre text for war.”7 The Brit ish Foreign Sec re tary, Lord Cla ren don, sim i larly claimed to be mys tified by Nesselrode’s ref er ences to a con certed po lit i-cal cam paign against Or tho doxy in the East. The Porte, he con ceded, had mis man aged the dis pute between Cath o lics and Or tho dox over the holy places in Pal es tine, but this was an iso lated prob lem and it had, in any case, been re solved in the spring of 1853 to the satis fac tion of all sides. “Where then,” Cla ren don de manded rhe tor i cally, “are the causes

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which Count Nes sel rode, ap peal ing to im par tial Eu rope, as sumes will jus tify the po si tion now taken by Rus sia?”8

Re jec tion of the Rus sian government’s casus belli left Eu ro pean and Ot to man states men with only two al ter na tives: ei ther the tsar was act ing from mis placed zeal, or he had ag gres sive de signs against the Ot to man Em pire. Most con tem po rar ies fa vored the lat ter con clu sion. Lord Pal mer-s ton, for one, in sisted in par lia ment that what Rus sia de manded from the sul tan was an in ju ri ous pre ten tion to “stand between the Sul tan and his sub jects—that if those sub jects should feel ag grieved they should go to St. Pe ters burg in stead of to Con stan tin o ple for re dress, and that they should apply for the pro tec tion of the Czar in stead of ap peal ing to the jus tice of the Sul tan.”9 Rus sia, in other words, was mak ing false charges of re li gious per se cu tion in order to leg i ti mize its claim to a pro tec to rate over Ot to man Chris tians.”10 The ul ti mate pur pose of that pro tec to rate, in turn, was to re duce Sul tan Abdülmecid to “a mere vas sal of the [Rus-sian] Em peror.”11

His to rians since have tended to per pet u ate this false di chot omy by leav ing the Rus sian government’s cen tral charges un ex am ined. Stud ies on the or i gins of the Cri mean War have in stead fo cused ei ther on the “big pic ture” of inter-European im pe rial ri val ries, per sonal am bi tions, and eco nomic com pe ti tion or on the de tails of how di plo macy failed to pre vent the ca tas trophe.12 In ei ther case, with out a re eval u a tion of Russia’s claims, its govern ment and auto crat must come off poorly, as their intran si gence seems oth er wise the prod uct of in com pe tence, mad ness, or over ween ing am bi tion.

In the nine teenth cen tury and for the first half of the twen ti eth, the abun dance and ac cess ibil ity of En glish dip lo matic sources and me moirs en cour aged his to rians to place the bur den of guilt for the con flict on Rus-sia. As Bri son Gooch con cluded in his 1956 sur vey of the historiog ra phy of the Cri mean War, the most com mon under stand ing of the con flict at its first cen ten ary was that it had been “fought in de fense of the Ot to man Em pire . . . for the status quo and against Rus sian en croach ment.”13 His to rians of Rus sia under mined these as sump tions over the last sev eral decades by pre sent ing ev i dence that the tsar har bored no se cret de signs on the Ot to man Em pire and that Rus sian con cern over mis treat ment of the Or tho dox Church was gen u ine.14 This ev i dence, how ever, has not led to a re ex am ina tion of Nesselrode’s cen tral ac cu sa tion re gard ing the ex is tence of a long-standing and system atic cam paign of inter fer ence in Ot to man Or tho dox af fairs.15 In stead, most mod ern writ ers have merely up graded Rus sian mo tives from ag gres sion to in com pe tence, on the


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con tin u ing as sump tion that com plaints about the af fairs of the Or tho-dox com mu nity were ex ag ger ated or, if true, in con se quen tial.

This chap ter takes a contrary view and pro vides three con crete ex am ples of pre cisely the sort of “di rect inter fer ence” in Or tho dox af fairs dur ing the decade lead ing up to 1853 that Nes sel rode com plained of and that other govern ments de nied ex isted. The first ex am ple is an at tempt by Ot to man and Brit ish states men in 1852 to inter fere in the cus to dian ship of an Or tho dox relic known as the Ayion Po tir ion (Holy Grail) of Vla tades mon as tery. The sec ond ex am ple is a spo radic cam-paign waged by the Brit ish em bassy over three decades to have the Ot to man govern ment cen sor Or tho dox li tur gi cal prayers. The final ex-am ple con sists of a se ries of at tempts by Ot to man and West ern dip lo-mats dur ing the 1840s and 1850s to se cure the ap point ment or dis mis sal of high-ranking Or tho dox cler gy men.

It is note worthy that in each of these cases the Ot to man, Brit ish, and French foreign min is tries—no less than the Rus sian— treated dis par ate and ap par ently triv ial in ci dents as symp toms of a larger inter na tional con test over Ot to man Chris tian af fairs. Dip lo mats on all sides agreed, more over, that this con test was un prec e dented, that it touched upon vital po lit i cal and eco nomic inter ests, and that it showed a wor ry ing, up ward tra jec tory. For at least a decade lead ing up to the Cri mean War, in other words, dip lo mats had com mented on the in creas ing in volve-ment of Eu ro pean states in Ot to man Chris tian af fairs and the like li hood that these in trigues would lead to se ri ous inter na tional com pli ca tions.

The cases de scribed here thus both sub stan tiate Rus sian com plaints and il lus trate the many stra te gic func tions of re li gion in the his tory of the East ern Ques tion. Re li gion was much more, for ex am ple, than just a mo ti vat ing and or ga niz ing prin ci ple for com pe ti tion that pit ted Or-tho dox Rus sians and “Greeks” [Rum] against Cath o lic French men, Mus lim Turks, and Prot es tant En glish men. Re li gious in sti tu tions in them selves pro vided an im por tant venue for po lit i cal com pe ti tion, as states at tempted to pro ject “soft power” not only along con fes sional lines but across them. The fear that so ex er cised Rus sian states men in 1853 was pre cisely that other states were learn ing to poach sup port ers from pro-Russian re li gious con stit u en cies like the Or tho dox Church more ef fec tively. Hitherto the prin ci ple way of at tract ing the po lit i cal sym pa thies of East ern Chris tians had been to con vert them to a dif fer-ent re li gion; by the 1850s it seemed pos sible to achieve many of the same goals by re cast ing Or tho doxy it self as some thing that could be “pro- Ottoman,” “pro-British,” “pro-French,” and so on. The re sult ing ef forts

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of the pow ers to in vest re li gious sites, ob jects, and in sti tu tions with their own dis tinc tive po lit i cal stamp meant that dis putes over ob scure de tails of re li gious life quickly be came bound up with wider strug gles for as cen dancy in the Near East. In re sponse, all the great pow ers felt a new com pul sion to mon i tor the inter nal af fairs of Ot to man Chris tians and to take pos i tive steps to counter act the bale ful in flu ences that they sup posed their ri vals were ex er cis ing in man i fold, sub tle ways under the aus pices of re li gion. The fol low ing three cases il lus trate the in ten sity of this sur veil lance and its un for tu nate ef fects.

The Ayion Po tir ion of Vla tades

On 8 Oc to ber 1850, Charles Blunt, Brit ish con sul in Thes sal o niki and a long-time res i dent of the Ot to man Em pire, sent an ag i tated dis patch marked “Con fi den tial” to his super ior in I˙ stan bul, Lord Strat ford Can-ning de Red cliffe. He was con cerned, he ex plained to the am bas sa dor, about events then oc cur ring at the Or tho dox mon as tery of Vla tades [Çavu¸s Ma nas tir], a Byzantine-era es tab lish ment sit u ated high on the heights of the acrop o lis over look ing the port of Thes sal o niki. Among the many rel ics pre served at the mon as tery, Blunt noted, “there ex ists de pos ited part of a drink ing cup made out of the skin of a dried gourd, such as may be seen used, at the present day by the peas ants in Tur key. This cup, or rather re mains of one, is said to be (al though there are no tra di tion ary [sic] doc u ments in sup port of the as ser tion) the same used by Our Sa vi our at the ‘Last Sup per!’”16

The or i gins of the relic known in Greek as the Ayion Po tir ion or Ay i a koupa were con ven iently lost in the mists of time. A vis it ing Rus-sian pil grim, An drei Nik o lae vich Murav’ev, spec u lated in 1849 that it had been the em per ors of Con stan tin o ple who first en cased the relic in sil ver and that they had later given it to the Ba gratid kings of me di eval Geor gia as part of some marriage-alliance.17 The Ba grat ids, in turn, were sup posed to have brought the cup to the Geor gian mon as tery of Iv i ron on Mount Athos at some point dur ing the Mid dle Ages. Dur ing Byzantium’s de clin ing cen tu ries, Iv i ron lost con trol of the cup and it some how passed into the hands of the monks of Vla tades. In the late eigh teenth cen tury, the cup lost its orig i nal form when mu ti nous ja nis-sar ies pil laged Vla tades and broke the relic into pieces to fa cil i tate the pro cess of strip ping away the sil ver chas ing.18 The monks de cided to re make the rel i quary as three sep ar ate sil ver cups that could be ei ther nested one within the other or used sep ar ately. The Ay i a koupa en joyed


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con sid er able re nown in the Bal kans for its mi rac u lous pow ers, and the monks of Vla tades often took it on cir cuits of the coun try side to bless the pop u lace.

In the late 1840s, the relic came to the at ten tion of a mem ber of the Rus sian im pe rial elite, Gen eral Ivan Sav vich Gor goli, a sen a tor of Greek or i gins al though both he and his par ents had been born and raised in Rus sia.19 Gor goli be came in trigued and he sent a mes sage to the Rus sian vice-consul in Thes sal o niki, an Io nian Greek by the name of An ge los Mus tok sidi, re quest ing the latter’s as sis tance in se cur ing a pri vate pur chase of the relic. As this re quest came from a privy coun cilor to the tsar, Mus tok sidi gave the re quest his full at ten tion. The vice-consul seems also to have pri vately con sid ered the ac qui si tion a worthy goal, so he was not de terred when the mon as tery re jected his first re quest for one of the three cups. Mus tok sidi knew that the ex arch of Vla tades, Bishop Ve ni a min Ka ry po glou of Ser via and Ko zani, ap proved of his pro po sal. The vice-consul there fore con tin ued to nur ture “the hope of one day pro cur ing for Rus sia a por tion of this pre cious relic.”20

In the spring of 1850, Mus tok sidi con vinced Bishop Ve ni a min to raise the issue again with the monks and the com mit tee of local lay not ables who as sisted with the man age ment of the monastery’s af fairs. This time, the guar dians of the Po tir ion proved more amen able. Their change in at ti tude does not seem to have been rooted in fi nan cial con-sid er a tions, as Mus tok sidi noted that the mon as tery had no press ing debts or needs at the time.21 In stead, the breth ren had re al ized that Mustoksidi’s re quest might open up much wider vis tas for the mon as-tery than a sim ple, one-time pur chase by a Rus sian no ble man. The mon as tery, they an nounced, was still not inter ested in sell ing the Ayion Po tir ion to Sen a tor Gor goli, but it was will ing to make a vol un tary gift of the larg est of the three sil ver ves sels to the em press of Rus sia, Alex an-dra Fed o rovna. This gift would be con tin gent, how ever, on the Rus sian and Ot to man govern ments grant ing the mon as tery per mis sion to send its own del e ga tion to St. Pe ters burg to present the relic in per son to the tsa rina.22

This counter of fer was a deft move on the part of the mon as tery that en tirely trans formed the na ture of the trans ac tion. Whereas orig i nally, Mus tok sidi had of fered to bro ker a pri vate pur chase that would have linked the mon as tery to Rus sia tan gen tially, the monks were pro pos ing to in itiate a pub lic and po lit i cally charged re la tion ship with the Rus sian im pe rial fam ily. In a sense, they would be put ting the tsa rina in their debt. It was not un known for hier archs to show their ap pre ci a tion for

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Rus sian sup port by send ing small relic frag ments as gifts, but few or di-nary mon as ter ies had ever made such a sig nifi cant do na tion to the im pe-rial fam ily.23 So dif fer ent was the na ture of the new ar range ment that at first Mus tok sidi balked and told the monks that their pro po sal went be-yond his in struc tions. Mus tok sidi sent a let ter on 5 June to his super i ors re quest ing in struc tions and en clos ing a for mal let ter from the mon as tery of fer ing the tsa rina the relic.

Bishop Ve ni a min, in the mean time, urged Mus tok sidi to take cus tody of the relic until a clear de ci sion was made. Mus tok sidi agreed, and the Po tir ion was con ducted through the city from Vla tades to the Rus sian con su late with great fan fare. The mon as tery, con fi dent that its gift would be ac cepted, pro ceeded with the se lec tion of an emis sary to con-vey the Po tir ion to St. Pe ters burg. Veniamin’s arch dea con, also named Ve ni a min, was cho sen for this pur pose. The com mu nity de cided to en-hance the gra vi tas of their envoy by el e vat ing Arch dea con Ve ni a min to the rank of archi man drite in a cer e mony at the Or tho dox ca the dral of St. Dim i trios.24

The pub lic cel e bra tions that at tended the ap point ment and el e va tion of the new Archi man drite Ve ni a min at tracted neg a tive at ten tion to the monastery’s plans. In par tic u lar, the cel e bra tions aroused the sus pi cions of the Brit ish con sul, Charles Blunt, who wanted to know what all the com mo tion was about. Blunt’s in ves ti ga tions led him to a dif fer ent under stand ing of events than we find in the let ters of Mus tok sidi. Blunt re ported that the mon as tery had never al tered its in itial re fu sal to sell the Po tir ion. He claimed that the Rus sian con sul had tricked the monks into giv ing up con trol of the relic by ask ing them to bless the Rus sian con su late with holy water sprin kled from the chal ice. Once the relic was within the walls of the con su late, Mus tok sidi was sup posed to have re quested that it be in stalled tem po rar ily in the con su lar chapel so that he and his staff might enjoy its con tin ued bless ings. In Blunt’s words: “The Cup was brought . . . the Con su late pur ified, but the relic never left.”25 With this achieved, Mus tok sidi had then sup pos edly “in duced” the local Or tho dox com mu nity “to present this Relic to the Em peror of Rus sia” by prom ises of im pe rial lar gesse. The dif fer ences between Blunt’s char ac ter iza tion of events and Mustoksidi’s are ob vi ous and fun da men tal. Whereas Mus tok sidi as cribes the in itia tive to local Chris tians, Blunt de picts the lat ter as dupes ma nip u lated by a Rus sian agent act ing on or ders from St. Pe ters burg.

At first glance, Blunt’s pre oc cu pa tion with the in ci dent seems odd. Cer tainly, the event was cu ri ous, but one would hardly have thought


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that it re quired se ri ous dip lo matic at ten tion ei ther from the Brit ish con su late or from his super i ors. Blunt saw things in a very dif fer ent light. “I take the lib erty of re port ing the de tails to Your Ex cel lency,” Blunt pref aced his re port, “under the im pres sion that they may be inter-est ing; the more so, I ven ture to add . . . as the whole af fair leads me to think, that Rus sian Pol icy, in this in stance, aims at some hold upon the fa nat i cal feel ings of the Chris tians of the Greek Church, in these dis tricts, as the de pos i tary of Sa cred Rel ics of the Orien tal Church.”26 Rus sia, in other words, was steal ing a march on the other Eu ro pean pow ers in the race for the hearts and minds of Chris tians in the Near East. Not only was this new ad di tion to “Holy Russia’s” stock pile of rel ics likely to give it height ened pres tige and an added aura of sanc tity in the Or tho-dox world, but the ex change would open a new re la tion ship between the Rus sian govern ment and one of the most im por tant mon as ter ies in the re gion. “It may be easy to sup pose,” he com plained, what sort of im pres sion the up com ing visit to the glit ter ing court of St. Pe ters burg would make on the mind of which ever “ig nor ant dea con, from the wilds of Mac e do nia” was tasked with con vey ing the relic to Rus sia, “and what would be that individual’s re port upon his re turn, re spect ing not only the mag nan i mous clem ency of the [tsar], but also of [the Rus sian emperor’s] at tach ment to his co-religious breth ren in Tur key!”27

Not all was lost, how ever, since Blunt had good rea son to hope that the deal could still be scut tled. Ru mors that the local reaya were about to send their own spe cial emis sary (i.e., Archi man drite Ve ni a min) to the im pe rial court in St. Pe ters burg had raised hack les not only at the Brit ish con su late but also among the Mus lim com mu nity of Thes sal o-niki. One prom i nent not able, Ahmed Kasım Efendi, had com plained vig or ously to the governor of Thes sal o niki, Yakub Pa¸sa Ka ram a no˘glu, that the do na tion should not be per mit ted.28 Yakub Pa¸sa was re luc tant to get in volved, but Ahmed Efendi threat ened that he would com plain to the Porte if the governor failed to keep the pre ten tions of local Chris-tians in check. As a re sult, when the Rus sian le ga tion in I˙ stan bul fi nally ap proved the do na tion and Archi man drite Ve ni a min ap plied to the governor’s of fice in early Sep tem ber 1850 for the nec es sary travel papers [yol tes kere], his re quest was de nied. Yakub Pa¸sa jus tified the de ci sion by not ing that the Po tir ion was a val u able an tiq uity. Under the terms of re cent de crees pro hib it ing the ex port of ar chae o log i cal treas ures, it could not be re moved with out the ex press ap proval of the Ot to man foreign min is try.29 Mus tok sidi made the nec es sary ap pli ca tion and waited for a re sponse.

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From Sep tem ber 1850, the ac counts of Blunt and Mus tok sidi sep ar ate ir rec on cil ably. Ac cord ing to Blunt, the Rus sian con sul first tried bul ly ing the governor and then re sorted to de cep tion:

The Rus sian Con sul . . . called upon Yacoub Pasha, and used every ef fort to con-vince his Ex cel lency, that he was in jur ing the inter ests of the Mon as tery, for the Em peror of Rus sia would richly endow it, when in pos ses sion of this Sa cred Relic. Yacoub Pasha was proof against all the ef forts of the Rus sian Con sul, tell ing him that this Relic, he con sid ered as prop erty of the Sul tan and that he could not allow its ex trac tion with out a spe cial order from the Porte—The Rus sian Con sul how ever, did not re turn the Relic to the Mon as tery but sent it off to Con stan tin o ple by the last Steamer! His Ex cel lency Yacoub Pasha is highly in dig-nant at this dou ble deal ing of Mr. de Mus tox idi, and sent for the Arch Bishop of Sa lon ica de mand ing . . . a full de tail of all the pro ceed ings of this af fair. . . . The Pasha has al ready re ported this case to the Porte, but there is a meet ing of the Coun cil today es pe cially called to draw up a Bas mata [sic] of all the facts re lat ing to this sin gu lar case.30

Blunt was sure the Rus sian con su late would use all its wiles to get around this ban. The out come of the af fair would there fore de pend on whether the cen tral govern ment in I˙ stan bul sup ported the governor in his at tempts to frus trate Rus sian de signs. Blunt clearly ex pected that Am bas sa dor Can ning would use his in flu ence to stiffen the Porte’s re solve and en sure that the Grail—all of it—re mained in Thes sal o niki.

The cor re spon dence of Mus tok sidi shows no trace of the de lib er ate de cep tion Blunt al leges. On the contrary, what is most strik ing about the nu mer ous let ters between Mus tok sidi and the Rus sian le ga tion in I˙ stan bul dur ing the fall of 1850 is their naive op ti mism.31 Mus tok sidi was mys tified by Ot to man ob jec tions to the do na tion, and he ap pears en tirely un a ware of the role being played be hind the scenes by the Brit ish con su late. He found the of fi cious inter fer ence of the Ot to man au thor ities all the more strange, in that “the Turks” tra di tion ally stayed out of such mat ters. Mus tok sidi ex plained away these anom a lies by plac ing the blame squarely on two no to ri ous “trou ble mak ers” on the mu nic i pal coun cil, Gav ril Za kadi and Ahmed Kasim, who had forced the governor’s hand. He con fi dently pre dicted that the whole thing would soon blow over and that the Porte would soon grant Archi man-drite Ve ni a min his travel per mit.

As it be came clear, how ever, that the ob jec tions of the Ot to man govern ment were not going away, the vice-consul be came in creas ingly in dig nant. The Ot to man govern ment, he fumed, had no busi ness in volv-ing it self in such af fairs. The ob ject in ques tion was, after all, not some anti quar ian objet d’art but a re li gious relic. It was the legal prop erty of


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Vla tades, and the mon as tery was within its rights to do nate it to whom-ever it wished. He fur ther noted that am a teur ar chae ol o gists had been loot ing the East of an tiq ui ties for years with or with out for mal per mis-sion. It there fore seemed all the more ar bi trary for the governor to in-voke the law on an tiq ui ties in this par tic u lar in stance. Be yond these con sid er a tions, Mus tok sidi wor ried that the Ot to man govern ment was es tab lish ing an un set tling prec e dent for ig nor ing the lib er ties and priv i-leges not just of Vla tades but of the Or tho dox Church gen er ally. In his opin ion, the Rus sian govern ment should not per mit the Porte thus to “en croach on the rights of the church.”32 Mus tok sidi there fore in sisted on re tain ing the relic, even after the Rus sian em bassy warned him in De cem ber 1850 that it did not look as if the nec es sary ap proval would ever be forth com ing.33

The out come of the story is un cer tain. Ac cord ing to the mem ory pre served at Vla tades it self, Mustoksidi’s per sis tence won out, and the Ot to man govern ment fi nally per mit ted the mon as tery to send one of the rel ics to Rus sia in De cem ber 1856.34 The spe cific des ti na tion of the relic in Rus sia, how ever, was not re corded, and the pre cious ves sel seems to have im me di ately dis ap peared from view. The fact that the Rus sian govern ment do nated a large sil ver cru ci fix and a gilded evan ge-lion to the mon as tery soon there af ter sup ports this ver sion of events, as does the tsar’s de ci sion in 1852 to present Mus tok sidi with the Cross of St. Anne for his part in the af fair.35 Mus tok sidi thus seems to have sent some thing to Rus sia, but it is dif fi cult to see how this could have been one of the orig i nal chal ices. A cat a log of the rel ics held at Vla tades dat ing from 1821 records three cups, Mus tok sidi in his re ports states clearly that there were only three, and the num ber held today at Vla tades is ex actly three.36 Where did the mon as tery sud denly find a fourth Grail? It is also dif fi cult to credit that such a rare and ven er able relic could have ar rived at St. Pe ters burg with out fan fare or that the Rus sian Church could some how have lost track of it sub se quently. It is tempt ing to hy poth e size in stead that ei ther the monks or Mus tok sidi de cided to circum vent the ob jec tions of the Porte by send ing a rep lica. It is cer tainly sug ges tive that in 1850 Mus tok sidi re ported send ing Sen a tor Gor goli “exact mod els of the three cups and the pieces con tained in each.”37 It may well be that is all Mus tok sidi ever sent.

Prayer Books and Li tur gi cal Com memora tions

Brit ish ef forts to dis rupt re li gious ties between Rus sia and Ot to man Chris tians were not lim ited to the con trol of rel ics like the Po tir ion.

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Brit ish dip lo mats also showed a sur pris ingly keen inter est in the con-tents of Sla vonic, Greek, and Ar me nian li tur gi cal books, many of which were printed in Rus sia but des tined for use in the Ot to man Em pire. In par tic u lar, the Brit ish em bassy sus pected Rus sia of using li tur gi cal prayers to sow po lit i cal dis loy alty among Ot to man Chris tians.

Brit ish agents noted with dis ap proval, for in stance, that Or tho dox cler gy men gen er ally did not men tion ei ther Sul tan Abdülmecid or the Ot to man dy nasty by name in the inter ces sory prayers of the lit urgy known as lit a nies [ek te nia/syn apti]. Whereas ser vice books pub lished in Rus sia and Ser bia con tained spe cific ref er ences to the reign ing sove r eign, Ot to man ser vice books re ferred only vaguely to “our kings” [vas i leis] with out spec ify ing whether this meant all mon archs or only Or tho dox Chris tian rul ers.38 Ot to man texts of the lit urgy of St. John Chry sos tom thus com memorated “our most pious and God-protected kings and all those in pal ace and camp.”39 Other inter ces sory prayers were more spe cific, how ever, in vok ing di vine as sis tance for “the mighty and holy Or tho dox em peror [Or tho doxou Af tok ra to ros]”—a for mu la tion that after the fall of By zan tium could refer only to the tsar of Rus sia.40

Tacit li tur gi cal ref er ences to the Rom a novs be came more ex plicit in the early nine teenth cen tury as Rus sian in flu ence in the Ot to man Em pire grew. By the 1840s, for ex am ple, churches under the Pa tri ar chate of Je ru sa lem were read ing the fol low ing prayers in the part of the Great Ek te nia for merly re served for “our most pious kings”:

[Of fi ciant] For our most pious, most auto cratic Great Lord Nich o las Pav lo vich, em peror of all Rus sia, and for his spouse the most pious Lady and great Em press Alex an dra Fed o rovna let us pray to the Lord.

[Con gre ga tion] Lord, have mercy.[Of fi ciant] For the Crown Prince, pious Lord Tsare vich and Grand Duke Al ex an-

der Nik o lae vich and his spouse the pious Lady Tsa revna and Grand Duch ess Maria Alex an drovna let us pray to the Lord.

[Con gre ga tion] Lord, have mercy[ fol lowed by inter ces sions for the var i ous grand dukes and duch esses of the Rom a nov

dy nasty]41

To Brit ish ears, such prayers smacked of trea son.Or tho dox cler gy men could at least ex cuse them selves on the grounds

that their lit urgy had al ways com memorated “our most pious and Christ-loving em per ors”—what ever that phrase was taken to mean; in the case of the Ar me nian Ap os tolic (Gre go rian) Church, on the other hand, li tur gi cal links to Rus sia were all the more prob le matic for being


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quite re cent.42 Prior to the 1800s, Rus sia had meant lit tle to Ot to man Ar me ni ans, who re garded the Mus co vites—when at all—as a re mote coun try peo pled by here tics. This dis inter est changed over the first decades of the nine teenth cen tury as Rus sia ex panded rap idly into the Cau ca sus, ac quir ing Ar me nian lands from Per sia by the Treaty of Turk-men chai (1828) that in cluded Ech mi ad zin, the seat of the su preme pa tri-arch and ca thol i cos of all Ar me ni ans. The Rus sian govern ment was keen to ex pand its in flu ence fur ther in the Near East, and as Paul Werth has shown, it im me di ately per ceived the po ten tial of the Cath o lic o sate as a means “to pro ject im pe rial Rus sian power across the south ern fron tier and to max imize its lev er age in ma nip u lat ing neigh bour ing states.”43 Al ready in March 1829, Nich o las I was or der ing his min is ters to in ves-ti gate how Rus sia might use the rel ics held at Ech mi ad zin of St. Greg ory the Il lu mi na tor to at tract the sym pa thies of Ot to man Ar me ni ans.44 In order to con vert the Ar me nian Church into a more ser vice able and re li-able in sti tu tion, Nich o las is sued a stat ute [po lozh e nie] in 1836 re or ga niz-ing the Cath o lic o sate. The stat ute spec ified, for ex am ple, that the tsar would hence for ward ap point all cath o li coi at his pleas ure. “All li tur gi cal ser vices con ducted in Ar me nian churches” were to com memorate “His Im pe rial Ma jesty and His Au gust Dy nasty”—and to do so be fore the prayers for the ca thol i cos and his clergy.45

The Rus sian govern ment also began to use its po lit i cal in flu ence to pro mote the ca non i cal au thor ity of the Cath o lic o sate among Ar me ni ans out side the Rus sian Em pire. In I˙ stan bul, for ex am ple, the Rus sian le ga-tion called for nor mal iza tion of re la tions, which had been in sus pen-sion for many years, between Ech mi ad zin and the var i ous branches of the Ar me nian Church in the Ot to man Em pire. Spe cifi cally, the le ga tion wanted all Ot to man Ar me ni ans to com memorate the ca thol i cos in their lit ur gies, re ceive Holy Chrism [muron] from him, and ac cept the pres ence of a per ma nent nun cio, or vekil, to rep re sent the ca thol i cos in the Ot to man Em pire.46 The Sub lime Porte was rightly sus pi cious of Russia’s sud den inter est in Ar me nian ec cle sias ti cal af fairs, but it nev er-the less al lowed the le ga tion to bro ker an agree ment in 1838 re stor ing the nom i nal su pre macy of Ech mi ad zin over Ot to man Ar me ni ans. Rus-sia only achieved this, how ever, by con ced ing de facto in de pen dence to the Ar me nian Pa tri ar chate of Con stan tin o ple and prom is ing that the ca thol i cos would ap point no per ma nent rep re sen ta tive to rep re sent it in the Ot to man cap i tal.47

The new ar range ment pleased no one. On the one hand, it fell far short of the ec cle sias ti cal in te gra tion that the Rus sian govern ment had

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hoped for, while on the other, it was much more than the Sub lime Porte could ac cept. The Porte al lowed the agree ment to stand, but it sur rep ti-tiously en cour aged fac tions within the Ar me nian Church that were hos tile to Rus sia.48 In Lon don, the Brit ish Foreign Of fice con sid ered even the nom i nal sub mis sion of Ot to man Ar me ni ans to Ech mi ad zin dan ger ous, and it vig or ously op posed any rap proche ment between the var i ous branches of the Ar me nian Church. In April 1836, for ex am ple, Am bas sa dor John Pon sonby ex pressed strong con cerns in his dis patches to Lon don about the for mal links that the Rus sian govern ment was forg ing with the Ot to man Ar me nian com mu nity. These ties would, he pre dicted, pro duce “evil con se quences” for the Ot to man Em pire and its friends. The foreign sec re tary of the day, Lord Pal mers ton, agreed and he in structed Pon sonby to ad vise the Porte that it should in sist on total sep ar a tion between the churches of Con stan tin o ple and Ech mi a-d zin. Pal mers ton spe cifi cally urged the Porte not to per mit any spe cial com memora tions of ei ther the tsar or the ca thol i cos.49

The Brit ish em bassy in I˙ stan bul never rec on ciled it self to these var i ous li tur gi cal re min ders of Russia’s “spe cial re la tion ship” with Ot to man Chris tians, and it would pe ri od i cally renew its ob jec tions. In 1850, for ex am ple, the Chi ote jour nal ist and au thor Ia ko vos Pit zi pios sub mit ted a com pre hen sive mem o ran dum on Ot to man Chris tian af fairs to the Brit ish em bassy that helped re vive the inter est of Blunt’s super ior, Am-bas sa dor Strat ford Can ning. Most of Pitzipios’s pro po sals to counter-act Rus sian in flu ence were wildly im prac ti cable, but he struck a chord in the am bas sa dor with his ar gu ment that re li gion was “the prin ci pal organ of [Russia’s] pro jects” in the Near East and that the other Eu ro-pean pow ers must fight fire with fire.50 As an ex am ple of the need to use re li gious means to com bat Rus sian in flu ence, Pit zi pios sin gled out the fact that the Ot to man govern ment took no inter est in the prayers read in Or tho dox churches. This lack of cen sor ship, he argued, was a stra te gic over sight that al lowed Rus sia to intro duce all sorts of in ap pro-pri ate prayers.51

The pri vate jour nals of William Palmer, an An gli can dea con vis it ing I˙ stan bul in the sum mer of 1850, show that these ar gu ments made an im pres sion on the Brit ish am bas sa dor. Dur ing an em bassy din ner, Can-ning ex pounded to his guest on the dan ger ous sit u a tion that the Porte had created by its neg li gence of East ern Chris tian af fairs. Palmer noted in his diary:

Sir Strat ford Can ning as serted very strongly that the Rus sian Govern ment caused to be printed at Mos cow and then cir cu lated through out the East books


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de signed to ex cite in the Chris tian sub jects of the Porte a spirit of dis af fec tion to their Govern ors. Such books had been brought to him, and though he could not read them him self, the places had been marked for him, and the more im por tant pas sages trans lated into French. I ex pressed some cu ri os ity to see the books: so he took me aside into an other room and pro duced a copy of the Psal ter in Sla-vonic and an other of the Treb nik or Book of Of fices. At the be gin ning of each was a no ti fi ca tion: that “This book is printed at Mos cow, in such a year, to the glory of Al mighty God, by the com mand of H. I. M. the Em peror Nich o las Pau lo-vich of all the Rus sias etc. etc. and by com mand of the M. H. Synod.” . . . Then in the mat ter at the end among the daily prayers and inter ces sions to be said by monks and oth ers there is one to this ef fect: “The in fi del and abom i na ble em-pire of the Hag a renes do Thou o God speed ily de stroy, and trans fer it to Or tho-dox Sove reign; and lift up the horn of Chris ten dom and sub due our en e mies under our feet.” While in the of fice book there was a form for the re cep tion of Turks etc as pros e lytes wherein the pros e lyte is made to re nounce “the im pi ous Koran of Ma homet and all the un clean and wicked doc trines of Ma hom e tan ism.” What [con cluded Can ning] could be plainer?52

Palmer—an ad mirer of the East ern Churches—dis agreed. He argued that the prayers in ques tion were an cient and there fore long pre dated any Rus sian de signs on the Turk ish Straits. He was sure, more over, that the Rus sian am bas sa dor could cull doz ens of sim i lar state ments from An gli can prayer books. Palmer’s ob jec tions made no im pres sion on the am bas sa dor. Can ning in sisted that the in clu sion of these par tic u lar prayers in a book printed in Rus sia for cir cu la tion in the Ot to man Em pire must have an om i nous sig nifi cance. It was, he in sisted, “most rep re hen sive” of the Rus sian govern ment to “coun te nance such in tol er-ance . . . and must shew a po lit i cal de sign.” Can ning ad mit ted that he had been urg ing the Porte pri vately to order the sup pres sion of all such lit a nies and spe cial prayers com memorat ing the Rom a novs, whether among the Or tho dox or the Ar me ni ans.53

Ap point ment and Re moval of Hier archs

Eu ro pean at tempts to inter vene in the ap point ment and dis mis sal of Or tho dox cler gy men pro vide fur ther ev i dence of the in creas ing po lit i ci-za tion of Ot to man Chris tian af fairs dur ing the 1840s and 1850s. Such in volve ment was not en tirely new for Rus sia, which had ex er cised some in flu ence on the elec tion and re moval of Or tho dox pa tri archs since at least the early 1700s and over the elec tion of the cath o li coi of Ech mi ad zin since 1800. Rus sia had ex erted this in flu ence through in for mal chan nels and sub si dies, how ever, rather than by more overt means. In par tic u lar,

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Rus sia had cul ti vated a net work of friends and cli ents among the Ot to-man Chris tian elites who dom i nated the af fairs of their re spec tive com mu nities. Pow er ful mem bers of these elites had then pro moted or re moved cler gy men based on a con ver gence of inter ests with those of the Rus sian le ga tion, rather than sim ply at the di rec tion of the lat ter. Rus sian in volve ment in Near East ern ec cle sias ti cal pol i tics had thus been ef fec tive, but dif fused and sub sumed within its broader “spe cial” re la tion ship with Ot to man Or tho dox so ci ety.

Rep re sen ta tives of the other Eu ro pean pow ers, and es pe cially Brit ain, began to chal lenge this in for mal Rus sian monop oly over Ot to man ec cle-sias ti cal af fairs in the late 1830s for po lit i cal, hu man i tar ian, and stra te gic rea sons.54 As a mat ter of good govern ance, the Eu ro pean dip lo matic corps were vir tu ally unan i mous that the ex ten sive tem po ral pow ers en-joyed by the upper clergy in the Ot to man Em pire ought to be cur tailed. In prac ti cal terms, more over, the close as so ci a tion between Rus sia and the Or tho dox faith made it seem in ev i ta ble that the pow ers of the clergy would al ways be used to pro mote Rus sian inter ests at the ex pense of all other states. As the French am bas sa dor to I˙ stan bul in the late 1850s ob served to his super i ors re gard ing the sit u a tion that con fronted French di plo macy prior to the Cri mean War: “The power of the [Or tho dox] clergy was at the same time a cause of their own de base ment and the strong est ob sta cle to the in flu ence of West ern ideas among the pop u lace. It served as a spe cies of ram part that sep ar ated the Chris tians of the East not only from the Turks but also from Eu rope and de livered them over, as if in a closed field, to the ex clu sive ac tiv ity of Rus sia. What ever fu ture is re served for the Ot to man Em pire . . . our po lit i cal inter ests re quire the top pling of that bar rier.”55

West ern states men were rarely so forth right in enun ci at ing a for mal pol icy to ward the Or tho dox Church, but they en gaged in a clear pat tern of inter fer ence over the course of the 1840s. West ern dip lo mats began, for ex am ple, to call for the cen sure and re moval of in di vid ual hier archs they con sid ered abu sive. The Brit ish em bassy blazed the way in 1840 by be com ing the first Eu ro pean state pub li cally to de mand that the Porte re move a reign ing Or tho dox pa tri arch of Con stan tin o ple. Grig o-rios VI Four tou ni a dis had re peat edly courted trou ble by crit i ciz ing the Brit ish co lo nial ad min is tra tion on the Io nian Is lands ex ca the dra. Most dar ingly, in 1839 the pa tri arch called on Chris tians to dis obey re cent changes to the Io nian law code that vi o lated Or tho dox canon law. Rather than treat the pa tri arch as a con scien tious ob jec tor, the Brit ish govern ment in sisted that the pa tri arch had com mit ted a po lit i cal of fense,


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and that the Porte must ei ther pun ish him or share in his guilt. Am bas-sa dor John Pon sonby ac cused the pa tri arch of “se di tion,” “im proper and crim i nal con duct,” and of “creat ing dis cord and con fu sion in a friendly state under the pre text of Re li gion.” After sev eral months of such of fi cial com plaints, the Sub lime Porte fi nally agreed to re move Grig o rios.56 Over the next decade, the Brit ish em bassy would apply var y ing de grees of pres sure on the Ot to man govern ment to re move two other pa tri archs of Con stan tin o ple, An thi mos IV and Yer ma nos IV. It also inter vened in at least three other pa tri ar chal elec tions to en sure that the Porte pre vented the se lec tion of can di dates Brit ain deemed ob jec tion able.57

In the prov inces of the Ot to man Em pire, Brit ish, French, and Aus trian con suls all began dur ing the 1840s and 1850s to com plain in the strong est terms about the gen eral char ac ter of the Or tho dox clergy and to call for the re moval of bish ops they deemed unfit for of fice.58 In Thes sal o niki, for ex am ple, Con sul Blunt was a par tic u larly vo cif er ous critic of the local hier ar chy; he sin gled out for cen sure at least ten in di vid ual bish ops in his re ports over the decade. Blunt re peat edly ex pressed the opin ion dur ing his long stint as Brit ish con sul in Thes sal o niki, from 1835 to 1856, that the op pres sions car ried out by the Or tho dox epis co pate were “far more on er ous to the Ray jahs [i.e., or di nary Chris tians] than any acts of the Turks.”59 The first act of a new bishop, he com plained in a re port from 1839, “after his ar ri val at his post, is plunder! I be lieve My Lord that I do not ad vance what can be sub ject to the slight est tax a tion as to ve rac ity, when I state that the present System of the Greek Church does far more in jury to the Ray jahs, then all the real and sup posed op pres-sions of the Turk ish Au thor ities.”60

In Lar naca, Con sul Niven Kerr com plained so bit terly and re peat edly about the pri mate of the Church of Cy prus, Ioan ni kios II, that the Brit ish em bassy re quested that archbishop’s re moval in 1847 on the fol low ing grounds: “[He is] ig nor ant in the ex treme, de praved, li cen tious, and void even of the ex ter nal de cency and de co rum which is ex pected from the min is ters of re li gion, he only makes use of his sa cred trust to pil lage and im pose upon the super sti tious and priest rid den Rayah pop u la-tion.”61 When the Porte re fused to com ply, the Brit ish em bassy in sisted that the Ot to man govern ment must at the very least ap point a spe cial com mis sioner to in ves ti gate Kerr’s com plaints against Ioan ni kios.62

West ern crit i cism of the Or tho dox clergy did not stop at in di vid ual hier archs but led di rectly to calls for a sweep ing re form of the struc ture and pow ers of the Or tho dox Church. Con suls like Blunt re it er ated in

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their com mu ni ca tions with both Ot to man of fi cials and their own supe-r i ors in White hall that pun ish ment of in di vid ual cler gy men would change noth ing so long as the over all struc ture of Ot to man Chris tian so ci ety re mained the same. “If the Porte is sin cere,” Blunt wrote in 1843, “in its in ten tions to wards the Chris tian Sub jects of the Sul tan, it would be greatly to their ad van tage, for the Porte to take the con duct of the Greek Bish ops in gen eral [em pha sis in the orig i nal] into its most se ri ous con sid er a tion, and put some check upon their well known ra pac ity.”63 By the early 1850s, Brit ish, French, and Aus trian states men also gen er ally agreed on the spe cific meas ures nec es sary to ef fect such a re form: the Porte should limit or abol ish the tem po ral pow ers of the clergy, it should re place the ex ist ing system of tithes and fees with reg u lar cler i cal sal a ries, and it should es tab lish a more ef fec tive and strin gent system of state super vi sion over re li gious af fairs gen er ally.

Two com mon threads thus ran through vir tu ally all West ern pol i-cies to ward the Or tho dox Church in the 1840s and 1850s. The first was a de sire to dis place Rus sian in flu ence over Ot to man Chris tians. The sec ond was a con vic tion that the Ot to man govern ment must take a more ac tive and inter ven tion ist role in Chris tian re li gious af fairs. Both con sid er a tions pointed to the need for a systemic re form of the non- Muslim com mu nities and churches. In Sep tem ber 1840, for ex am ple, the chargé d’affaires of the French Em bassy rec om mended that his govern-ment ac tively en cour age the Porte to carry out a whole sale re or gan iza-tion of the Or tho dox com mu nity. A re duc tion in the pow ers of the Or-tho dox clergy, he argued, would hob ble Rus sian in flu ence and clear the way for French and Cath o lic ex pan sion in the re gion. “In order for the new order of things to be a suc cess for France,” he con cluded, “it must inter vene in the reg u la tion of these [ec cle sias ti cal] ques tions.”64

The re form ing fac tion within the Ot to man bu reau cracy as so ciated with Mus tafa Resid Pasa was most likely to coop er ate in such a re cast ing of re li gion. Even with out West ern prompt ing, Re¸sid and his cir cle had al ready con cluded by the 1830s that the en tire system of cler i cal priv i-leges had out lived its use ful ness. In cen tu ries past, it had been con-ven ient for the Ot to man state to share its pow ers and re spon sibil ities with a range of inter me di ar ies, from tax farm ers and cler gy men to local war lords. Under Mah mud II and Abdülmecid I, how ever, the Ot to man ad min is tra tion had begun to re-create it self along mod ern Eu ro pean lines. This meant an am bi tious pro gram of re claim ing the pow ers and re spon sibil ities that in the past it had de volved onto oth ers. Re form ist proc la ma tions such as the Hatt-ı ¸Serif of Gülhane, drafted by Mus tafa


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Re¸sid in 1839, looked for ward to a state that ruled di rectly and equally over all its sub jects. Clearly, the ex ist ing pow ers and in de pen dence of the Or tho dox clergy fit awk wardly with such plans.

Ot to man states men were also just as con cerned as their Brit ish and French counter parts about the spe cial ties between Rus sia and the sultan’s East ern Chris tian sub jects. In 1846, for ex am ple, the Aus trian inter nun cio noted that Re¸sid Pa¸sa was “not very happy with the Rus-sian Mis sion,” re gret ting in par tic u lar “the con stant in flu ence that the Rus sians [sought] to ex er cise over all that con cern[ed] the Greek sub-jects of the Porte and the ex er cise of their cult.”65 The fol low ing year, Re¸sid com plained to Sul tan Abdülmecid that every time the Porte had a dis pute with the Or tho dox Pa tri ar chate of Con stan tin o ple, the lat ter sought to em broil the Rus sian le ga tion. Re¸sid con sid ered such re li ance on the sup port of a foreign power un ac cept able, and he warned the sul tan that the Or tho dox upper clergy would be come com pletely un-man age able if the govern ment did not act. The Or tho dox clergy must be taught, he con cluded, “that they can not make laws for them selves in this coun try.”66

Re¸sid Pa¸sa con tem plated meas ures as early as the sum mer of 1840 to re duce the sec u lar pow ers of the clergy and to re place ec cle sias ti cal fees and taxes with a reg u lar sal ary paid by the state. Mathurin-Joseph Cor, whose tes ti mony is all the more val u able for his hav ing worked pre vi-ously as Re¸sid’s per sonal sec re tary, hailed the news:

The ac tual state of Chris tians and their ad min is tra tion will soon be mod ified. Force of circum stances will make the Turk ish Govern ment take meas ures to intro duce the most com plete re li gious lib erty be fore long, such as the adop tion of a system of fixed sal a ries for the mem bers of the clergy and the nom i na tion of lay chiefs for the ad min is tra tion of the tem po ral af fairs of the di verse non- Muslim com mu nities and their re la tions with the Ot to man Govern ment, etc. etc. . . . This di vi sion of the tem po ral from the spir i tual had never be fore ap-peared, in the ory, a good meas ure to rec om mend; but today it is a profi t able idea, and this is what makes me think that it will not be long be fore it is taken in hand.67

Ru mors that the Porte was con sid er ing such re forms spread quickly to the prov inces. In Thes sal o niki, for ex am ple, Blunt re ported with ob vi-ous ap proval in 1841 that it was widely re ported the Porte in tended “to take under its im me di ate con sid er a tion the state of the Greek Clergy, and that they [would] hence forth have fixed sal a ries.” These re ports ap par ently caused panic among the local Or tho dox hier ar chy, who

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raised their fees sharply in order to reap the max i mum profit while they still had the abil ity to do so.68

Between 1843 and 1853, the Porte made sev eral at tempts to in itiate a for mal pro cess of re form within the Or tho dox and Ar me nian com mu-nities. A con flu ence of circum stances, how ever, in clud ing the de ter mined re sis tance of the Or tho dox clergy and dis agree ments within the Ot to-man po lit i cal elite, de layed these re forms until the end of the Cri mean War. The sin gle most im por tant fac tor in this delay, how ever, was the well-founded fear among Ot to man states men that any at tempt to im-pose re forms on the Or tho dox and Ar me nian com mu nities would lead to a se ri ous con fron ta tion with Rus sia. In the spring of 1843, for ex am ple, the Grand Vi zier Meh med Emin Rauf Pa¸sa re ported to the sul tan that he wished to re move the cur rent pa tri arch, Yer ma nos IV, and that con crete steps were ur gently needed to rec tify the dis or dered state of Or tho dox af fairs.69 In a very tell ing ad mis sion, how ever, Rauf tem pered this call for ac tion by not ing that his govern ment had to pro ceed with ex treme cau tion be cause of the jeal ous vig i lance that Rus sia ex er cised over all such ques tions. The Porte there fore could not re move Yer ma nos im me di ately; it would have to wait for a cred ible ex cuse. Sim i larly, the Ot to man govern ment be lieved it had to intro duce changes to the struc-ture of the Or tho dox com mu nity sur rep ti tiously and piece meal or risk a di rect con fron ta tion with Rus sia.

The re sult ing Ot to man pol icy of chip ping away at the power and in de pen dence of the Or tho dox clergy was wholly un suc cess ful, fail ing ei ther to bring about the de sired changes or to avoid an im bro glio with Rus sia. On the contrary, the Rus sian le ga tion ex pressed mount ing anger over the Porte’s clumsy at tempts to med dle in pa tri ar chal af fairs—and the ap pear ance of West ern con ni vance in those at tempts. In 1845–46, for ex am ple, the pa tri ar chal throne changed hands three times in rapid suc ces sion. Each time there was clear ev i dence of ir reg u lar inter fer ence by the Ot to man state. The Porte had first pres sured Yer ma nos IV into sub mit ting his “vol un tary” ab di ca tion and had then is sued di rec tives il le gally ex clud ing sev eral Rus so phile hier archs from stand ing for elec tion.70 In the elec tions of De cem ber 1845, the Porte fur ther sought to in tim i date the synod by adopt ing the in no va tion of send ing the drago-man of the Porte, Meh met Fuad Pa¸sa, to at tend its meet ings as an “of fi-cial ob server.” What lit tle le git i macy re mained to the electo ral pro cess was de stroyed by the rev e la tion that the win ning can di date, An thi mos VI, had pur chased his vic tory at the cost of an enor mous bribe (re port-edly five mil lion pi as tres) to the sultan’s cham ber lain.71


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The Rus sian min is ter, Vlad i mir Pav lo vich Titov, an grily con demned these pro ceed ings in his re ports to St. Pe ters burg as “tu mul tu ous, dis-or derly, and scan dal ous.” What was worse was that in each case the Porte seemed to have inter vened ex pli citly to side with Russia’s en e mies. It was no to ri ous, for ex am ple, that the ma jor ity of the Or tho dox faith ful de sired the re elec tion of Grig o rios VI, but that the Brit ish em bassy had warned the Porte it would take the res to ra tion of this pious, pop u lar cler gy man as an in sult. The Porte had there fore re sorted to il le gal ex clu-sions, in tim i da tion, in trigues, and brib ery to bring about the el e va tion of a can di date ac cept able to its Brit ish al lies.72 It was ur gent, Titov in-sisted in his re ports, that Rus sia protest against such abuses, or they would pro life rate “in a man ner at once im pu dent and dan ger ous.”73 Tsar Nich o las I agreed with this eval u a tion and or dered Titov to ad dress a for mal note of com plaint to the Ot to man govern ment.74 In the re sult ing let ter, dated 6 March 1846, Titov com plained at length of “the abuses that ac com pany the elec tions of the ec u men i cal pa tri arch” and of “the grave in con ven iences that re sult from the fre quent chang ing of the per son ages in vested with that high ec cle sias ti cal dig nity.”75 Re cent de vel op ments, he added in an un char ac ter is ti cally men ac ing tone, had pro foundly trou bled the tsar and the lat ter could not “view such a state of af fairs with in dif fer ence.” The min is ters of the sul tan must take steps, Titov con tin ued, “to pre vent the rep e ti tion in the fu ture of sim i lar ir reg u-lar ities and of such de plor able mal ver sa tions. The elec tion of the pa tri-arch must be com pletely free and the Porte, far from inter ven ing, must avoid in di cat ing any pref er ences or ex clu sions, which ac cord nei ther with canon law nor with the free dom of ac tion that con sti tutes . . . one of the im mu nities ac corded to the [Or tho dox] na tion and the clergy.”76 The tra di tional rights and priv i leges of the church were, Titov con cluded, “the es sen tial and in var i able pre con di tion” upon which the loy alty of the Sultan’s Or tho dox sub jects was based. The Porte in vited per i lous po lit i cal con se quences “by per mit ting these priv i leges to be vi o lated or evaded.”77

f

The cases re viewed here dem on strate the in ti mate con nec tions that had de vel oped between the East ern Ques tion and Ot to man Chris tian re li-gious af fairs by the mid-nineteenth cen tury. By 1853, mat ters such as the pos ses sion of a relic, the el e va tion of a hier arch, or con trol over a shrine in the Ot to man Em pire were no longer purely do mes tic or spir i tual

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af fairs. They had in stead ac quired a dis tinctly inter na tional di men sion as mat ters di rectly af fect ing Brit ish, Rus sian, or French inter ests in the re gion. Po lit i ci za tion and inter na tion al iza tion of the res sa crae of the East was most ob vi ous in Pal es tine, where one might ex pect Eu ro pean states to take an inter est in shrines com mon to all Chris tians. In most other cases, how ever, West ern states men in vested con sid er able en ergy in in-flu enc ing the reg u la tion of re li gious mat ters that the gen eral pub lic in Lon don or Paris con sid ered em bar rass ingly ob scure and in ap pro pri ate.

In part, the height ened po lit i ci za tion of Chris tian re li gious life in the Ot to man Em pire was a prod uct of the struc ture of Ot to man so ci ety it self. In par tic u lar, the di vi sion of Ot to man sub jects into a hier ar chy of con fes sional com mu nities en cour aged non-Muslims to im prove their status by iden tify ing with pow er ful foreign co re lig ion ists. At the same time, the system re warded Eu ro pean states that cul ti vated these con-nec tions and put at their dis po sal all the ex ten sive pow ers wielded by the non-Muslim clergy. In a sense, re li gion be came the site of a stra te gic ex change as Ot to man Chris tians and Eu ro pean states at tempted to trade pat ron age for en trée into Ot to man do mes tic af fairs. The Ot to man govern ment under wrote this ex change by ac cept ing the prin ci ple that foreign states could le git i mately ex er cise ju ris dic tion over in di vid u als, places, and re li gious groups or or gan iza tions within Ot to man im pe rial space on the basis of lit tle more than a shared re li gion and out dated ca pit u la tions.

Given these fea tures of Ot to man rule, it was only nat u ral that states al ready pos sess ing rec og nized pro tec to rats re li gieuses like France, Spain, and Aus tria would seek to ex pand their scope. As it seemed un likely that Ot to man Chris tians would ever con vert to Ca thol i cism en masse, these states sought new means of cul ti vat ing cli ents across sev eral re li-gious com mu nities. Why, as Éd ouard Thouve nel ob served, should France set tle for a pro tec to rate over just Cath o lics when it might multi ply its in flu ence many times over by pos ing as the “so lic i tous and be nev o-lent pa tron of the Chris tian sub jects of the Sul tan, with out con sid er a-tion of rite”?78 States like Rus sia and En gland that did not enjoy clear- cut legal rights of re li gious pro tec tion just as nat u rally sought par ity with those that did. Rus sia at least had the ad van tage of being able to claim a re li gious pro tec to rate over the Or tho dox Church on the basis of the 1774 Treaty of Ku chuk Kai nardji and long-standing eco nomic, re li-gious, and cul tural ties with the “Or tho dox East.” In pri vate, the upper clergy and the Rus sian le ga tion often had their dif fer ences, but to the rest of the world the two sides pre sented an ap pear ance of mono lithic


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pan-Orthodox sol i dar ity.79 Rus sia thus en joyed a de gree of in flu ence over the larg est non-Muslim com mu nity in the em pire that was the envy of other Eu ro pean states and of the Porte it self. Like France, how-ever, Rus sia saw no rea son to limit it self to a spe cial re la tion ship with just one com mu nity. As Ei leen Kane, Rob ert Crews, Paul Werth, Dan iel Brower, and oth ers have dem on strated, the Rus sian state was also eager to be con sid ered guar dian of the Ar me nian Cath o lic o sate, of the Ethi opian and Syr iac Or tho dox churches, and of the many thou sands of Jews and Mus lims who traveled from the Rus sian Em pire to the Holy Land as em i grants or pil grims.80

Brit ain had been dealt the worst hand in any con test for re li gious in flu ence as it pos sessed nei ther sub stan tial num bers of Ot to man co-re lig ion ists nor any treaty rights of pro tec tion. This left the Brit ish em-bassy in I˙ stan bul with only two cards to play: it could claim a du bi ous “nat u ral guar dian ship” over the small com mu nities of Ot to man Prot es-tants, Jews, and Druze, or—more prom is ingly—it could seek to level the play ing field by under min ing the po lit i cal sig nifi cance of re li gion alto gether. As Ann Pot tinger Saab has ob served, circum stances dic tated that Brit ain must seek as much as pos sible to sec u lar ize the struc ture of Ot to man so ci ety in order “to mini mize the im por tance of re li gious ties ex cept as a purely per sonal at trib ute, and to re place the cor po rate struc-ture of the Ot to man state with an in di vid ual, strictly po lit i cal bond between Sul tan and sub ject.”81

By the 1850s then, Brit ish, Ot to man, French, and Aus trian states men were sep ar ately mov ing to ward a sim i lar con clu sion: that the Porte should carry out a thorough re or gan iza tion of the re li gious and com-mu nal life of Ot to man Chris tians. The nec es sary re forms ought to curb the ar bi trary power of the clergy, en cour age civic equal ity, and make the var i ous com mu nities more re spon sive to cen tral state con trol. These de vel op ments, in turn, would under mine Rus sian in flu ence and open the East ern Chris tian com mu nities up to greater West ern in flu ence. As in so many other areas of Ot to man life, one of the major ef fects of the East ern Ques tion on Ot to man so ci ety was thus to en cour age the dis so lu-tion of es tab lished mo nop o lies and priv i leges—in this case by mak ing the non-Muslim com mu nities of the em pire into some thing of an open mar ket for great pow ers in search of cli ents.

The open ing up of Ot to man re li gious af fairs to foreign com pe ti tion pro duced an ap pre ciable es ca la tion in ten sions both inter na tion ally and within the em pire. The cases ex am ined here il lus trate this trend and pre fig ure many of the fatal dy nam ics that would re ap pear in 1852–53

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dur ing the holy places dis pute and the Men shi kov mis sion. Mustoksidi’s un com pre hend ing re ac tion to the “Grail af fair,” for ex am ple, was symp to matic of the larger fail ure of Rus sian di plo macy to de fuse the sus pi cions that its spe cial re la tion ship with Or tho dox Chris ten dom aroused in rival states. Mus tok sidi clearly under stood that ac qui si tion of the Po tir ion would be ad van ta geous for Rus sia, yet he was strangely obliv i ous to how his ef forts might be inter preted by Ot to man and Brit ish ob serv ers. In a pat tern that would be re peated by other Rus sian dip lo-mats, Mus tok sidi acted within what he con fi dently as sumed were the nat u ral and le git i mate bounds of Russia’s spe cial re la tion ship with Or-tho dox Chris tians, only to be non plussed by ac cu sa tions that his ac tions rep re sented new and dan ger ous pre ten tions.

In the eyes of the Rus sian govern ment, any sug ges tion that it was dis rupt ing the status quo was lu di crous. Russia’s rul ers saw them selves as par a gons of con ser va tism and they could not under stand how any-one could mis con strue their so lic i tude for East ern Chris tians. What Rus sia claimed, as Nes sel rode pro tested dur ing the cri sis of 1853, was noth ing more than the “re li gious pat ron age . . . that [they had] al ways ex er cised in the East.”82 Nor did the Rus sian govern ment be lieve that it de manded any thing rad i cally dif fer ent from the sort of re li gious pro tec to rates ex er cised by other pow ers or even by the Ot to man sul tan him self, given the latter’s stand ing claim to be ca liph of Sunni Mus lims every where.83

While the Rus sian min is try thus ex cused its own inter ven tions in Or-tho dox af fairs, it re acted with fury to any at tempt by the Ot to man govern-ment or its West ern al lies to do the same. Rus sia par tic u larly ob jected to the Porte’s pro jects for re form ing the non-Muslim com mu nities, be liev-ing that these changes were in tended to under mine Rus sian in flu ence in the re gion. In truth, there were good rea sons for think ing this. In 1847, the Rus sian chargé d’affaires in I˙ stan bul glumly re ported that his spies had inter cepted doc u ments es tab lish ing be yond any rea son able doubt the grand aims of Brit ish and French foreign pol icy in the east ern Med i ter ra nean. These two pow ers in tended, he de clared, “if not openly, then at least by all the under handed means in their power . . . to sap as much as pos sible and every where among the Chris tian pop u la tions of the Ot to man Em pire their an cient and pro found sen ti ments of de vo tion to Rus sia, in order to re place them with contrary dis po si tions of hos til ity and mis trust.”84 In Rus sian eyes, then, the Brit ish and French em bas sies were will fully lead ing the min is ters of the Ot to man Porte down dan ger-ous by ways to pro mote their own inter ests. They did so at the ex pense


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of Rus sia, of Or tho doxy, and—ul ti mately— against the best inter ests of the Ot to man Em pire it self. There was thus a grow ing sense of grie vance among Rus sian dip lo mats in the early 1850s at the emerg ing pat tern of system atic inter fer ence in Or tho dox re li gious af fairs.

The mount ing sen si tiv ity of the Rus sian govern ment on this point is crit i cal to under stand ing its re ac tions to the re newal of Cath o lic claims at the holy places dur ing the early 1850s. No to ri ously, the de bate over who owned or had prec e dence at the most sa cred shrines in Chris ten-dom had limped along for cen tu ries with out en gag ing the inter ests or en er gies of Eu ro pean govern ments. Cer tainly, no one had been will ing to go to war over the issue since the Mid dle Ages. This im passe ac quired fresh po lit i cal sig nifi cance in 1850, when the French govern ment de cided to throw the full weight of its in flu ence be hind Cath o lic claims, and the Ot to man govern ment ap peared ready to ac quiesce. As Nes sel rode in-sisted to his am bas sa dor in Paris in the sum mer of 1853, it had be come clear to the tsar that the weak ness of the Porte in this case was not an iso lated event but rather the cul mi na tion of “a se ries of sim i lar acts, which dem on strate[d] a system atic ma lev o lence on the part of the Turk ish Govern ment against the rite [Rus sians] pro fess[ed] and an ob vi ous par tial ity for the other Chris tian com mun ions.”85 The tsar had no choice, the chan cel lor added, but to ar rest a trend that be came “day by day more pro nounced” and that threat ened the peace of Eu rope and the do mes tic stabil ity of the Ot to man Em pire. Rus sia could tol er ate no more at tempts on its in flu ence ei ther in the Near East or on the Or tho dox Church.

When Nich o las I dis patched Prince Alek sandr Ser gey e vich Men shi-kov to I˙ stan bul as his spe cial envoy in the spring of 1853, it was there-fore with in struc tions to re solve all am bi gu ities and to re trace in bold the lines that the Porte and its West ern pro voc a teurs had blurred. In par tic u lar, Men shi kov was to se cure for mal en gage ments from the sul-tan rec og niz ing Russia’s spe cial re la tion ship with Ot to man Or tho doxy and draw ing a pro tec tive bar rier around the inter nal af fairs and priv i-leges of the church.86 Among the long list of re lated ob jec tives, Prince Men shi kov was spe cifi cally di rected not only to re ject Cath o lic claims at the holy places but also to de mand such tell ing con ces sions as the re-in state ment of Pa tri arch Grig o rios VI—the same hier arch who had been re moved in 1840 and barred from re elec tion there af ter at Brit ish in sis-t ence. In order to pre vent fu ture scan dals, Abdülmecid was to sign a for mal agree ment prom is ing that all pa tri archs would hence for ward “re main ir re mov ably at their posts for life.”87 The Porte was also to do

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some thing about the man ner in which Or tho dox li tur gi cal books were “ar rested, con fis cated, and lac er ated [i.e., by re moval of the prayers for the im pe rial fam ily, anath e mas against Islam, etc.] . . . to such a de gree as to ren der them com pletely un suit able for their pur pose.”88

These de mands were not triv ial ad denda to Menshikov’s mis sion; rather, they were its very es sence and most con ten tious as pect. As Nich o las and Nes sel rode had feared, the Porte proved ready to give com plete satis fac tion re gard ing the holy places but stub bornly re fused to pro vide bind ing guar an tees for the rights and in de pen dence of the Or tho dox Church. When Men shi kov an nounced the for mal ter mi na tion of his mis sion on 18 May 1853, he sin gled out the Porte’s fail ure to give any mean ing ful guar an tees as the issue that had dis rupted Russian- Ottoman re la tions. This fail ure, he de clared, proved that the Rus sian govern ment was right to have “se ri ous ap pre hen sions . . . for the se cur ity and main te nance of the an cient rights of the East ern Church.”89

The ev i dence pre sented here is in suf fi cient to vin di cate all of Russia’s com plaints in 1853, but it does jus tify a se ri ous re eval u a tion of them. As Blunt’s let ter of 8 Oc to ber and many other ex am ples show, the Porte and the West ern pow ers were in deed inter ven ing to an un prec e dented ex tent in Or tho dox re li gious life. They did so, more over, with a de lib er-ately anti-Russian agenda. The pol i cies of the Porte and its West ern al lies could also be con strued as broadly anti-Orthodox in as much as they sought to under mine the po si tion of the clergy and to sub or di nate it as thoroughly as pos sible to Ot to man state con trol. The ev i dence con tained in Ot to man, Brit ish, and French state archives make it dif fi cult to es cape the con clu sion that these govern ments were—at best— ill-informed about the ac tions of their own agents when they is sued for mal de ni als of Russia’s com plaints in 1853–54. Strat ford Can ning, whose of fi cious med dling in Or tho dox af fairs over the pre vi ous decade had done so much to ag gra vate the sit u a tion, tac itly ad mit ted in a let ter to Cla ren don that his cen tral ob jec tion to Rus sian de mands was not that they re quired any thing new. It was pre cisely that they would have fro zen in place a status quo that the Brit ish em bassy found ob jec tion able and was work-ing to over throw. “In Tur key,” he ex plained, “the dig ni tar ies of the Greek or Or tho dox church ex er cise in some de gree the pow ers of civil mag is trates. . . . The abuses of the Greek hier ar chy, as well in the ex er-cise of civil au thor ity as in the man age ment of tem po ral ities, are no to ri-ous; but if the pre ten sions of Rus sia were placed under the sanc tion of inter na tional law, all pros pect of im prove ment would be lost [em pha sis added]. Priv i lege and abuse would be bound up to gether in scan dal ous per pe tu ity.”90


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Russia’s failed at tempts to ob tain a frag ment of the Grail, to pre vent the “lac er a tion” of Or tho dox prayer books, and to safe guard the in de-pen dence of Or tho dox pa tri ar chal elec tions were thus sep ar ate in stances of a larger prob lem. To gether, they re veal a pat tern of de lib er ate chal-lenges to Rus sian heg e mony over the Or tho dox com mu nity dur ing the 1840s and 1850s as Eu ro pean im pe rial ri val ries were trans lated into an es ca lat ing en gage ment in the mi nu tiae of Ot to man Chris tian re li gious life. This com pe ti tion reached its tragic de noue ment in 1853 when Russia’s claim to be the cham pion of Or tho doxy was forced from the realm of rhet o ric and onto the bat tle field. The frus tra tions of Rus sian states men in each case were symp to matic of a wider fail ure to pre vent Or tho doxy, os ten sibly Russia’s great est ad van tage in the Near East, from be com ing its Achilles heel—a source of trib u la tion, em bar rass-ment, and ul ti mately of na tional dis as ter. Whether or not the ail ing and re cently wid owed Alex an dra Fed o rovna ob tained her frag ment of the Ayion Po tir ion in 1856, the fig ura tive holy grail of a stable and rec og-nized heg e mony in the Near East con tin ued to elude her adopted coun try.

Notes

1. Tim o thy Sam uel Shah and Dan iel Phil pott, “The Fall and Rise of Re li gion in Inter na tional Re la tions: His tory and The ory,” in Re li gion and Inter na tional Re la-tions The ory, ed. Jack Synder (New York: Co lum bia Uni ver sity Press, 2011), 24.

2. Philip Gor ski, The Dis ci pli nary Rev o lu tion: Cal vin ism and the Rise of the State in Early Mod ern Eu rope (Chi cago: Uni ver sity of Chi cago Press, 2003), 158. For some ex em plars of what is now a very ex ten sive body of work, see Dan iel Phil pott, Rev o lu tions in Sov e reignty: How Ideas Shaped Mod ern Inter na tional Re la-tions (Prince ton, NJ: Prince ton Uni ver sity Press, 2001); Adrian Has tings, The Con struc tion of Na tion hood: Eth nic ity, Re li gion and Na tion al ism (Cam bridge: Cam-bridge Uni ver sity Press, 1997); Ar mando Sal va tore, The Pub lic Sphere: Lib eral Mod er nity, Ca thol i cism, Islam (New York: Pal grave Mac mil lan, 2007); Derek Beales, Pros per ity and Plunder: Eu ro pean Cath o lic Mon as ter ies in the Age of Rev o lu-tion, 1650–1815 (Cam bridge: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 2003); Ivan Stren ski, Con test ing Sac ri fce: Re li gion, Na tion al ism and So cial Thought in France (Chi cago: Uni ver sity of Chi cago Press, 2002); Ste ven Mer ritt Miner, Stalin’s Holy War: Re li gion, Na tion al ism and Al li ance Pol i tics, 1941–1945 (Chapel Hill: Uni ver sity of North Car o lina Press, 2003); Rob ert Alvis, Re li gion and the Rise of Na tion al ism: A Pro fle of an East-Central Eu ro pean City (Sy ra cuse: Sy ra cuse Uni ver sity Press, 2005).

3. For ex am ple, see Marc D. Baer, Hon oured by the Glory of Islam: Con ver sion and Con quest in Ot to man Eu rope (New York: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 2008); David D. Com mins, Is lamic Re form: Pol i tics and So cial Change in Late Ot to man

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Syria (New York: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 1990); Selim De rin gil, The Well- Protected Do mains: Ideol ogy and the Le git i ma tion of Power in the Ot to man Em pire, 1876–1909 (Lon don: I. B. Tau ris, 1999); idem, Con ver sion and Apos tasy in the Late Ot to man Em pire (New York: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 2012); Su raiya Fa roqhi, Der Bektaschi-Orden in An a to lien: Vom späten fünfzehnten Jah r hun dert bis 1826 (Vienna: Ver lag des In sti tutes für Orien ta lis tik der Universität Wien, 1981); Kemal Kar pat, The Po lit i ci za tion of Islam: Re con struct ing Iden tity, State, Faith, and Com mu nity in the Late Ot to man State (New York: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 2001); Us sama Mak disi, The Cul ture of Sec tar ian ism: Com mu nity, His tory, and Vi o lence in Nineteenth-Century Ot to man Leb a non (Berke ley: Uni ver sity of Cal i for nia Press, 2000); idem, Ar til lery of Heaven: American Mis sion ar ies and the Failed Con quest of the Mid dle East (Ithaca, NY: Cor nell Uni ver sity Press, 2009); Dim i tris Sta mat o pou los, Metar ryth misi kai en kos mi kefsi: Pros mia an a syn thesi tis is tor ias tou Oi kou men i kou Pa tri ar cheiou ton 19o aiona (Ath ens: Alex an dreia, 2003); Itz chak Weis mann, Taste of Mod er nity: Su fsm, Sal a fyya, and Ar ab ism in Late Ot to man Da mas cus (Leiden: Brill, 2000).

4. See the proc la ma tions of 14 June and 26 Sep tem ber [OS] in Jour nal de Con stan tin o ple, 9 Oc to ber 1853, 1. All dates in this chap ter ac cord ing to the Gre go rian cal en dar, ex cept for those iden tified in square brack ets as ei ther [OS]—Old Style/Ju lian cal en dar—or [AH]—anno Heg i rae/Hijri cal en dar.

5. Mos kovs kiia Ved o mosti, 18 June [OS] 1853, 1.6. Cab i net Mem o ran dum, 18 Feb ru ary [OS] 1854, in Le Nou veau Port fo lio:

Ques tion d’Orient; Doc u ments (Ber lin: F. Schnei der, 1854), 4–6.7. Jour nal de Con stan tin o ple, 9 Oc to ber 1853, 1.8. Cla ren don com plained to the Brit ish am bas sa dor in St. Pe ters burg in

July 1853: “Rus sia claims for her ‘co-religionnaires’ in the East the strict status quo, and the main te nance of the priv i leges they have en joyed under the pro tec-tion of their Sove reign; but Count Nes sel rode en tirely omits to show how that status quo has been dis turbed, how those priv i leges have been cur tailed, what com plaints have been made, what grie vances re main with out re dress?” G. F. W. Vil li ers, Earl Cla ren don to Ham il ton Sey mour, 16 July 1853, TNA FO 352/61, folder 5.

9. From the House of Com mons de bates of 20 Feb ru ary 1854, in Hansard’s Par lia men tary De bates (Lon don: Han sard, 1854), 1037.

10. Jour nal de Con stan tin o ple, 9 Oc to ber 1853, 1. For a sim i lar ra tion al iza tion, see the Brit ish dec lar a tion of war in A. L. Mac fie, The East ern Ques tion, 1774–1923 (Lon don: Long man, 1989), 97–100.

11. Cla ren don to Sey mour, 15 June 1853, in Cor re spon dence re spect ing the Rights and Priv i leges of the Latin and Greek Churches in Tur key (Lon don: Har ri son and Sons, 1854), 288.

12. For a rep re sen ta tive (but hardly ex haus tive) sam ple of historiog ra phy on the or i gins of the war, see Al ex an der King slake, The In va sion of the Cri mea: Its Or i gin, and an Ac count of Its Prog ress down to the Death of Lord Rag lan (Lon don:


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Black wood, 1863); Alek sandr Gen rik ho vich Jo mini, Étude di plom a tique sur la guerre de Cri mée (1852 à 1856) par un an cien dip lo mate (Paris: Ch. Tan era, 1874); Ed mond Bapst, Les or i gines de la guerre de Cri mée (Paris: C. De la grave, 1912); Ver non J. Pur year, En gland, Rus sia, and the Straits Ques tion (Berke ley: Uni ver sity of Cal i for nia Press, 1931); Har old Tem per ley, En gland and the Near East: The Cri mea (Lon don: Long mans, 1936); M. S. An der son, The East ern Ques tion, 1774–1923: A Study in Inter na tional Re la tions (Lon don: Mac mil lan, 1966); Paul Schroeder, Aus tria, Great Brit ain, and the Cri mean War: The De struc tion of the Eu ro pean Con cert (Ithaca, NY: Cor nell Uni ver sity Press, 1972); Ann Pot tinger Saab, The Or i gins of the Cri mean Al li ance (Char lottes ville: Uni ver sity Press of Vir ginia, 1977); Nor man Rich, Why the Cri mean War? A Cau tion ary Tale (Han over, NH: Uni ver sity Press of New En gland, for Brown Uni ver sity, 1985); David Wet zel, The Cri mean War (Boul der, CO: East Eu ro pean Mono graphs, 1985); Win fried Baum gart, The Cri mean War, 1853–1856 (Lon don: Ar nold; New York: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 1999).

13. Bri son D. Gooch, “A Cen tury of Historiog ra phy on the Or i gins of the Cri mean War,” American His tor i cal Re view 62, no. 1 (1956): 33.

14. See John Shel don Cur tiss, Russia’s Cri mean War (Dur ham, NC: Duke Uni ver sity Press, 1979); David Gold frank, The Or i gins of the Cri mean War (Lon-don: Long man, 1994); Mara Ko zel sky, Chris tian iz ing Cri mea: Shap ing Sa cred Space in the Rus sian Em pire and Be yond (De Kalb: North ern Il li nois Uni ver sity Press, 2010); Or lando Figes, The Cri mean War: A His tory (New York: Met ro pol i tan Books, 2010).

15. As Can dan Badem notes in The Ot to man Cri mean War (1853–1856) (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 65, it re mains a com mon place among his to rians out side Rus sia “that the ques tion of the holy places was no more than a pre text for the Cri mean War.”

16. Charles Blunt to Strat ford Can ning, 8 Oc to ber 1850, TNA FO 195/293.17. An drei N. Murav’ev, Pis’ma s Vos toka v 1849–1850 go dakh, 2 vols. (St.

Pe ters burg: V Tip o gra fii III Ot de le niia Sob. E.I.V. Kant sel i a rii, 1851), 1:389.18. Angel Mus tok sidi to Vlad i mir Titov, 7 June [OS] 1850, AVPRI, f. 180,

op. 517/1, d. 1315, ll. 90–92. Pic tures, his tor i cal dis cus sion, and a de tailed de scrip tion of the rel ics are in Yeo ryios Stoy i o glou, Mon as tiria tis Mak e don ias: A’ Mon as tiria tis Thes sa lon i kis (Thes sal o niki: Ek do ti kos Oikos Adel fon Ky ri a kidi, 1990), 139–49.

19. S. Z. Bai ku lova, Ia. Iu. Mat veeva, and A. L. Bau man, Ru ko vo diteli Sankt-Peterburga (St. Pe ters burg: Neva/Olma Press, 2003), 198–99.

20. Mus tok sidi to Titov, 24 May [OS] 1850, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1315, l. 79. For the biog ra phy and ca reer of Mus tok sidi, see, Lu cien J. Frary, “Rus sian Inter ests in Nineteenth-Century Thes sal o niki,” Med i ter ra nean His tor i cal Re view 23, no. 1 (2008): 15–33.

21. Mus tok sidi to Titov, 7 June [OS] 1850, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1315, l. 92.

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22. Mus tok sidi to Titov, 24 May [OS] 1850, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1315, ll. 79–80.

23. When Grand Duke Kon stan tin Nik o lae vich vis ited Je ru sa lem in 1858, for ex am ple, he wrote in his diary that Pa tri arch Ky ril los show ered the im pe rial party with Holy Land souve nirs. At the end of one mass in the Holy Sep ul cher, “the pa tri arch called us to the altar, where he cut off and gave us [frag ments of] the rel ics of: 1) Em peror Con stan tine, 2) Em press Alex an dra (for Zhin kov and Mama), 3) Basil the Great, and 4) Mary Mag da lene.” See Ni ko lai N. Li so voi, Ros siia v Svi a toi Zemle: Dok u menty i Ma ter i aly, 2 vols. (Mos cow: Mezh du na rod nye Ot no she niia, 2000), 1:134.

24. Mus tok sidi to Titov, 19 Sep tem ber [OS] 1850, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1315, ll. 144–45.

25. Blunt to Can ning, 8 Oc to ber 1850, TNA FO 195/293.26. Ibid.27. Ibid.28. Mus tok sidi to Titov, 27 Sep tem ber [OS] 1850, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1,

d. 1315, l. 154.29. It is not clear to which fr man the governor was re fer ring. For more on

Ot to man pol i cies re gard ing pro tec tion of an tiq ui ties, see Hüseyin Kar a du man, “Belge lerle I˙ lk Türk Asar-ı Atika Ni zam na mesi,” Bel geler: Türk Ta rihi Bel geler Der gisi 25, no. 29 (2004): 73–92. I am in debted to Mi chael Walsh for this ref er-ence. See also Zai nab Bah rani, Zey nep Çelik, and Edhem Eldem, eds., Scram ble for the Past: A Story of Ar chae ol ogy in the Ot to man Em pire, 1753–1914 (I˙ stan bul: SALT, 2011); and Iz a bella Don kow, “The Eph e sus Ex ca va tions 1863–1874, in the Light of the Ot to man Leg is la tion on An tiq ui ties,” An a to lian Stud ies 54 (2004): 109–17.

30. Blunt to Can ning, 8 Oc to ber 1850, TNA FO 195/293.31. For ex am ples of Mustoksidi’s let ters on the mat ter to Titov, see 6 Sep-

tem ber [OS] 1850, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1315, l. 141; 2 Sep tem ber [OS] 1850, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1315, ll. 150–51; 27 Sep tem ber [OS] 1850, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1315, l. 154; 17 Oc to ber [OS] 1850, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1315, l. 161.

32. Mus tok sidi to Titov, 27 Sep tem ber [OS] 1850, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1315, l. 154.

33. Mus tok sidi to Titov, 13 De cem ber [OS] 1850, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1315, l. 177.

34. Stoy i o glou, Mon as tiria tis Mak e don ias, 145.35. Ibid., 143–45.36. Ibid., 139; Mus tok sidi to Titov, 7 June [OS] 1850, AVPRI, f. 180, op.

517/1, d. 1315, ll. 90–92.37. Mus tok sidi to Titov, 7 June [OS] 1850, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 1315,

l. 91.


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38. In Rus sia, com memora tion of the reign ing prince dated from at least the twelfth cen tury. John Mey en dorff, By zan tium and the Rise of Rus sia: A Study of Byzantino-Russian Re la tions in the 14th Cen tury (Crest wood, NY: St. Vladimir’s Semi nary Press, 1989), 255. For a con crete Ser bian ex am ple of prayers from the 1830s men tion ing “our pious Lord and Prince Milosˇ [Ob re novic],” see Kniga si˛e Treb nik (Bel grade: Typ. Kn˛e zhesko-Serbskoı, 1836), l. 16v.

39. Eu cho loy ion to Mega, en o Per i echon dai kata Taxin ai ton Epta Mys tir ion Ak o lou thiai (n.p.: Pa tri ar cheio tis Kon stan ti nou po leos Typ., 1803), 36. For other ex am ples of the same text, see Jacques Goar, Eu cho lo gion sive Rit u ale Grae corum Com plec tens Ritus et Or dines Div i nae Li tur giae (Ven ice: B. Jav a rina, 1730), 52; Eu cho loy ion to Mega (Ven ice: Ni ko laos Gly kis, 1767), 39.

40. Eu cho loy ion to Mega (1803), 388.41. “Typos peri tou pos pre pei na mni mon e von dan ta tis Af tok ra tor i kis

Oi koy e neias onom ata eis tas Ieras Ak o louth ias,” Prince ton Uni ver sity Li brary, Con stan tin o ple Records of the Or tho dox Pa tri ar chate of Je ru sa lem, C0692, box 3.

42. From the priestly prayers dur ing the Holy Anaph ora of St. John Chry sos-tom. Eu cho loy ion to Mega (1803), 50.

43. Paul Werth, “Im pe rial Rus sia and the Ar me nian Ca thol i cos at Home and Abroad,” in Re con struc tion and Inter ac tion in Slavic Eur asia and Its Neigh bor ing Worlds, ed. Ieda Osamu and Uyama Tom o hiko (Sap poro: Slavic Re search Cen ter, Hok kaido Uni ver sity, 2006), 204. See also Ei leen Kane, “Pil grims, Holy Places and the Multi-Confessional Em pire: Rus sian Pol icy to wards the Ot to man Em pire under Tsar Nich o las I, 1825–1855” (PhD diss., Prince ton Uni ver sity, 2005), chap. 5.

44. Kane, “Pil grims, Holy Places and the Multi-Confessional Em pire,” 128.45. See the let ter of the vice roy of the Cau ca sus, Baron Gre gor von Rosen

[Rus sian: Gri go rii Vlad i mir o vich Rozen] to Coun se lor Dmi trii Nik o lae vich Blu dov, dated 27 July [OS] 1833, and Ar ti cle 21 of the Po lozh e nie in Rus sia and the Ar me ni ans of Trans cau ca sia, 1797–1889: A Doc u men tary Record, ed. and trans. George A Bour nou tian (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 1998), 330, 353.

46. Von Rosen to Apol li na rii Pet ro vich Bute nev, 28 June 1834, in Rus sia and the Ar me ni ans of Trans cau ca sia, 344.

47. Werth, “Im pe rial Rus sia and the Ar me nian Ca thol i cos,” 208.48. Kane, “Pil grims, Holy Places and the Multi-Confessional Em pire,”

145–46.49. See the ex changes between John Pon sonby and Pal mers ton of 22 April

and 13 June of 1836, TNA FO 197/6.50. “Mé moire sur la pol i tique Russe dans l’Orient,” Ia ko vos Pit zi pios to

Strat ford Can ning, 18 July 1850, TNA FO 352/33B, folder 9, 44–46.51. Jour nal entry for 30 Sep tem ber 1851, Palmer Jour nals, Lamb eth Pal ace

Li brary, MS 2829, Palmer Papers, 391.

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52. Jour nal entry of 5 June 1850, Palmer Jour nals, Lamb eth Pal ace Li brary, MS 2826, Palmer Papers, 94–96. It is dif fi cult to iden tify pre cisely the pub li ca-tions that Palmer cites, but he ap pears to be par a phras ing from a copy of the Great Eu cho lo gion (Ve li kii Treb nik), which con tains an inter ces sory ser vice (mo le ben) for “the Re lease of Those under Bond age and Cap tiv ity to the Hag a-renes, and for the De struc tion of These Christ-hating Au thor ities” as well as a for mula for con verts from Islam to re nounce “the Im pi ous Wick ed ness of the Sar a cens, that is to say, Turks.” See Treb nyk My trop o lyta Petra Mo hyly: Kyiv 1646, 3 vols. (Kyiv: Informatsiyno-Vydavnychyi Tsentr Ukrains koi Pra vos lav noi Tserkvy, 1996), 1:93; 3:116–35.

53. Jour nal entry for 30 Sep tem ber 1851, Palmer Jour nals, Lamb eth Pal ace Li brary, MS 2829, Palmer Papers, 391.

54. There were prec e dents for this be hav ior in as much as West ern em bas sies had inter fered force fully in Or tho dox af fairs be fore the 1800s. See Gun nar Her ing, Ökumenisches Pa tri ar chat und europäische Pol i tik, 1620–1638 (Wies ba den: Franz Steiner Ver lag, 1968); and George A. Had ji an ton iou, Prot es tant Pa tri arch: The Life of Cyril Lu caris (1572–1638) Pa tri arch of Con stan tin o ple (Rich mond, VA: John Knox Press, 1961).

55. Éd ouard Thouve nel to Alex an dre Co lonna Wa lew ski, 21 Feb ru ary 1856, AHMAE, Cor re spon dance Pol i tique, Tur quie, vol. 324.

56. For a more thorough ac count, see Jack Fai rey, “‘Dis cord and Con fu-sion . . . under the Pre text of Religion’: Eu ro pean Di plo macy and the Lim its of Or tho dox Ec cle sias ti cal Au thor ity in the East ern Med i ter ra nean,” Inter na tional His tory Re view 34, no. 1 (2012): 19–44.

57. Jack Fai rey, “The Great Game of Im prove ments: Eu ro pean Di plo macy and the Re form of the Or tho dox Church” (PhD diss., Uni ver sity of To ronto, 2004), 166, 262.

58. Pal mers ton to Can ning, 13 April 1849, TNA FO 78/769, l. 26.59. Blunt to Pon sonby, 11 Sep tem ber 1840, TNA FO 195/176.60. Blunt to Pon sonby, in Bri tan ski Dok u menti za is to rij ata na Mak e dons kiot

Narod, 2 vols., ed. Hristo Andonov-Poljanski (Skopje: Arhivna Ma ked o nija, 1968), 1:287.

61. Niven Kerr to Henry Welles ley, Earl Cowley, 22 No vem ber 1846, TNA FO 78/677. A copy of Kerr’s charges can also be found in the BOA, Har i ciye Nez a reti Siyasi Kısım, Gömlek, 6.

62. Cowley to Pal mers ton, 15 Jan u ary 1847, TNA FO 78/677; and Kerr to Cowley, 31 De cem ber 1847, TNA FO 78/715.

63. Blunt to Can ning, 2 Sep tem ber 1842, TNA FO 195/176. For sim i lar ob-ser va tions by Blunt’s col league at the French con su late, see Ed ouard Grasset to Quai d’Orsay, 24 De cem ber 1850, AHMAE, Cor re spon dance Pol i tique, Tur quie, Con su lats Div ers, Sal o nique 1841–47, 1848–59, fols. 22–23.

64. Cor to Pon tois, Sep tem ber 1840, AHMAE, Mé moires et Do cu mens, vol. 56, l. 119.


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65. Baron Bartholomäus von Stürmer to Prince Cle mens von Met ter nich, 23 Sep tem ber 1846, HHSA, Staa te nab tei lun gen Türkei VI, Kar ton 95, l. 243v.

66. Resid Pasa to Sul tan Abdülmecid, 20 June 1847, BOA, Mesail-i Mühimme I˙ rade, 922.

67. Cor to de Pon tois, Sep tem ber 1840, AHMAE, Mé moires et Do cu mens, vol. 56, fols. 108, 117–18.

68. Blunt to Pon sonby, 15 March 1841, TNA FO 195/176.69. Meh med Emin Rauf Pa¸sa to Sul tan Abdülmecid. The doc u ment is un-

dated and un signed, but inter nal ev i dence in di cates the spring of 1843. BOA, Mesail-i Mühimme I˙ rade, 916.

70. For the ab di ca tion of Yer ma nos, see Can ning to Aber deen, 17 May 1845, TNA FO 78/597. For the ir reg u lar ex clu sions, see Vez ieral buy u ruldu to the Pa tri ar chal Synod, 14 Zil hicce 1261 [AH], en closed in Titov’s re port to Count Ivan Il lar i on o vich Vorontsov-Dashkov, 4 De cem ber [OS] 1845, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 192, ll. 313–15.

71. Titov to Vorontsov-Dashkov, 24 De cem ber 1845 [OS], AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 192, l. 363.

72. Titov to Vorontsov-Dashkov, 4 De cem ber [OS] 1845, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 192, l. 311.

73. Titov to Nes sel rode, 12 De cem ber [OS] 1845, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 192, l. 338.

74. In struc tions of Titov to Prince Hand jery [Til e ma chos Chat ze ris], 22 Feb-ru ary [OS] 1846, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 194, l. 148; Titov to Vorontsov- Dashkov, 24 Feb ru ary [OS] 1846, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 194, l. 147.

75. Titov to Re¸sid Pa¸sa, 22 Feb ru ary [OS] 1846, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 194, ll. 149–51. A copy ex ists in BOA, Har i ciye Nez a reti Siyasi Kısım, Dosya 1786, Gömlek 3.

76. Ibid.77. Ibid.78. Thouve nel to Wa lew ski, 8 No vem ber 1855, AHMAE, Cor re spon dance

Pol i tique, Tur quie, vol. 323.79. For a dis cus sion of these prob lems, see Ni ko lai N. Li so voi, Russ koe

duk hov noe i po lit i ches koe pri sutst vie v Svi a toi Zemle i na Blizh nem Vos toke v XIX–Na chale XX v. (Mos cow: In drik, 2006), 309–11.

80. See D. Brower, “Rus sian Roads to Mecca: Re li gious Tol er ance and Mus lim Pil grim age in the Rus sian Em pire,” Slavic Re view 55 (1996): 567–84; R. Crews, For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Em pire in Rus sia and Cen tral Asia (Cam-bridge, MA: Har vard Uni ver sity Press, 2006), 50–51, 71–74, and 325; and Kane, “Pil grims, Holy Places and the Multi-Confessional Em pire,” chap. 2.

81. Saab, Or i gins of the Cri mean Al li ance, 6.82. Cir cu lar of Nes sel rode to all Rus sian min is ters and dip lo matic agents,

20 June 1853, in Jour nal de Con stan tin o ple, 19 July 1853.83. When Rus sia an nexed the Cri mean kha nate in the late 1700s, for ex am ple,

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the Ot to mans had in sisted on writ ing into the terms of the 1774 Treaty of Ku chuk Kai nardji that the sul tan would con tinue to act as ca liph and su preme re li gious leader of Cri mean Mus lims. The Treaty of Con stan tin o ple on 8 Jan u ary 1784 would later re scind this clause. See the third ar ti cle of the Treaty of Ku chuk Kai nardji in Trea ties, &c. between Tur key and Foreign Pow ers, 1535–1855 (Lon don: HMP, 1855), 465.

84. Mi khail Mik hai lo vich Us ti nov to Nes sel rode, 20 Jan u ary [OS] 1847, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/1, d. 197, l. 83.

85. Dis patch from Nes sel rode to Ni ko lai Dim i trie vich Kise lev, 1 Au gust 1853, in Le Nou veau Port fo lio: Ques tion d’Orient; Doc u ments (Ber lin: F. Schnei der, 1854), 56–58.

86. Tsar Nich o las I to Sul tan Abdülmecid I, 24 Jan u ary [OS] 1853, in A. M. Zaionch kovs kii, Vos toch naia Voina 1853–1856 gg. v svi azi s sov re men noi ei po lit i-ches koi ob sta nov koi, 2 vols., 3 suppl. (St. Pe ters burg: Ek spe dit siia Zag o tov le niia Gos u darst ven nykh Bumag, 1908), 1:386; and Nesselrode’s in struc tions to Men-shi kov, 28 Jan u ary [OS] 1853, in Zaionch kovs kii, Vos toch naia Voina 1853–1856, 1:377.

87. Ar ti cle III, Pro ject d’une Con ven tion avec la Porte Ot to mane, in Zaionch kov-s kii, Vos toch naia Voina 1853–1856, 1:383–84.

88. “No tice sur quelques ques tions spé ciales à traiter avec la Porte,” AVPRI, f. 5, op. A2, d. 523, ll. 443–44.

89. Men shi kov to Re¸sid Pa¸sa, 6 May [OS] 1853, copy an nexed to Klezl’s re port of May 19, 1853, HHSA, PA.XII, kar ton 46.

90. Red cliffe to Cla ren don, 22 May 1853, TNA FO 78/932/57.

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The Cri mean War and the Tatar Ex o dus

Mara Ko zel sky

In the years fol low ing the Cri mean War (1853–56), nearly two-hundred thou sand Cri mean Ta tars fled their na tive pe nin sula en masse to re set tle in the Ot to man Em pire. They aban doned their homes and live stock; sold their prop erty at dev as tat ingly low prices; gave up their pod danstvo, or sub ject hood in the Rus sian Em pire; and bid fare well to the coun try that had been their home for cen tu ries.1 Be gin ning in a steady trickle in 1855, the num ber of ref ugees per year in creased after the Treaty of Paris (1856), which guar an teed Mus lims safe pas sage to the Ot to man Em pire. By the time the em i gra tion ran its course, about two-thirds of Crimea’s na tive pop u la tion had fled their na tive lands. The Cri mean Tatar de-par ture plunged the pe nin sula, al ready wasted from the war, into the deep est cri sis of its his tory since the Rus sian an nex a tion of the re gion in 1783.

With the most con cen trated out-migration oc cur ring in the sum mer of 1860, Crimea’s strug gling post war econ omy came to a stand still. The new tech nol o gies of the steam ship, which could rap idly trans port the Ta tars across the Black Sea to I˙ stan bul, made their de par ture starkly im me di ate and dra matic. Cri me ans mourned the loss of the land scapes of their child hoods and wept as their neigh bors and friends traveled in

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con voys to ships wait ing to carry them to their new lives. Goods waited at the docks for Tatar driv ers and horses that never came. Fruit rot ted on the vine, and wheat with ered on the stalks. Land own ers, many of whom had pre vi ously tor mented the Tatar pop u la tion, pan icked at the ab sence of ag ri cul tu ral la bor ers to gather the har vest. An ob server of the mi gra tion re flected, “Em i gra tion of an en tire pop u la tion al ways im pov er ishes the coun try, and in this case in del ible traces will re main for decades.”2

Mi gra tion of the Cri mean Ta tars con sti tuted one of the larg est inter nal mass mi gra tions of nineteenth-century Eu rope.3 Re cent schol ar ship on mi gra tion dur ing the nine teenth cen tury has tended to focus on West ern Eu ro pean labor move ments and mass ur ban iza tion and as cribe violence- inspired mi gra tion to the prov e nance of the twen ti eth cen tury.4 Re-search ers work ing on the pop u la tion ex changes along the Russian- Ottoman fron tier, how ever, have long rec og nized the role of vi o lence in mi gra tion. So viet his to rians E. I. Dru zhi nina and V. M. Kab u zan, for ex am ple, traced the waves of ref u gees that streamed into New Rus sia after the multi ple Russian-Ottoman wars between 1774 and 1878.

Burning of the Government Buildings at Kertch. (from the personal collection of Mara Kozelsky)

The Crimean War and the Tatar Exodus

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Greeks, Bul gar ians, Serbs, and Ar me ni ans who had taken arms against the Ot to man Em pire sought asy lum in the em pire of the tsars.5 Odessa, a Greek city from its in cep tion, served as a bea con for thou sands of Ot to man Chris tians pre vi ously en gaged in the up ris ings against the sul tan.6 For this rea son, Greeks from ref u gee fam i lies dom i nated the first decades of his tor i cal schol ar ship of New Rus sia, and their work nat u rally em pha sized the re la tion ship between war, ref u gees, and re-gional de vel op ment.7

Fo cus ing on the op po site pat tern of pop u la tion move ment, Kemal Kar pat has ex am ined the waves of mi gra tion into the Ot to man Em pire that ac com pa nied dif fer ent Russian-Ottoman wars in his ground-break ing study of the Ot to man pop u la tion. He es ti mates that mil lions of Mus lims from Rus sia, the Bal kans, and the Cau ca sus im mi grated to the Ot to man Em pire dur ing the nine teenth cen tury through the First World War, in clud ing nearly 1,800,000 Ta tars.8 Ex am in ing the pop u la-tion ex change of Ta tars and Bul gar ians between the Ot to man and the Rus sian Em pire at the end of the Cri mean War, Mark Pin son is one of the few schol ars to ex pli citly por tray the vi o lence in her ent to the pop u la tion ex change and de scribe the phe nom e non as “dem o graphic war fare.”9 Fol low ing the stud ies of Kar pat and Pin son, Alan W. Fisher and Bryan Glyn Williams have em pha sized that vi o lent up hea val and hos tile state pol i cies char ac ter ized the Mus lim mi gra tions from Bal kans and the Rus sian Em pire.10

This chap ter con trib utes to the schol ar ship on the Tatar mi gra tion by ex am in ing local war con di tions that pre cip i tated the Tatar ex o dus as well the local and im pe rial re sponse to Crimea’s sud den pop u la tion loss. Re search based on pre vi ously un tapped archi val ma te ri als, in clud ing Tatar pe ti tions and govern ment re ports at local and im pe rial lev els, sug gest that many Rus sian of fi cials ac tively en cour aged Tatar outmigration.11 Other of fi cials who may have been sym pa thetic to Ta tars, such as Prince Mikhail Gor cha kov, the head of Mil i tary Com mand in Cri mea from 1855, made ad hoc pol icy de ci sions through out the war and re cov ery pe riod that re duced the Tatars’ ac cess to re sources, mak ing sur vi val in Cri mea un ten able. Much worse, Rus sian of fi cials such as the mil i tary governor of Tau ride, Count Ni ko lai Ad ler berg, and his di rect super ior, the mil i tary gen eral governor of New Rus sia, Count An drei Strog a nov, blamed the Ta tars for Crimea’s pre war eco nomic stag na tion and sus pected Ta tars en masse of col lab o rat ing with the enemy dur ing the war. These men en gi neered the for cible re lo ca tion of some ten thou-sand coastal Cri mean Ta tars dur ing the war and called for an eth nic

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cleans ing of the pe nin sula after the war. In this sense, the Cri mean ex o dus should be seen as a forced rather than a vol un tary mi gra tion, a point I have argued else where.12

Al though this chap ter prin ci pally ana lyzes the local causes of the Cri mean mi gra tion, I also argue that the mi gra tion must be under stood fun da men tally as a prod uct of the East ern Ques tion. Thus, the Tatar mi gra tion fol low ing the Cri mean War is the larg est of many mi gra tions con nected to the East ern Ques tion in the nine teenth cen tury. The con-nec tion to the East ern Ques tion is par tic u larly ev i dent in the Al lied in ten tion to stir up Tatar na tion al ism; the holy war rhet o ric that per-meated dis course of all bel lig er ents; and the sanc tion ing of pop u la tion ex change in the Treaty of Paris (1856). In Cri mea, local of fi cials for mu-lated pol icy di rectly in re sponse to inter na tional de vel op ments. The East ern Ques tion, as I argue, trans formed the Cri mean Pe nin sula, both in terms of the de struc tion created by war, and the dem o graphic shift that fol lowed on its heels.

f

The Cri mean War began in Oc to ber 1853 as a lo cal ized dis pute between the Rus sian and the Ot to man Em pire over Rus sian con cerns about the treat ment of Ot to man Chris tians.13 En gland and France joined forces with the Ot to man Em pire against Rus sia in the win ter of 1854, when a Rus sian vic tory over the Ot to man Em pire seemed im mi nent. The war moved to Cri mea in the fall of that same year.14 Al though the siege of Se vas to pol be came the most not able bat tle of the war, apart per haps from the Bat tle of Ba lak lava (bet ter known for the Charge of the Light Bri gade), ten ta cles of vi o lence spread through out the en tire pe nin sula. The Al lies oc cu pied Ev pa toria in the west and en tered the Sea of Azov, bom bard ing Kerch-Enikale and Gen i chesk in the east. Al lied sol diers sort ied into re mote Tatar vil lages nes tled in Crimea’s inter ior moun-tains, con scripted Tatar la bor ers, and stole their goods. Rus sian troops com man deered the heart of the pe nin sula, turn ing houses and pub lic build ings into bar racks and hos pi tals. The pe nin sula be came a war zone; every ci vil ian who did not flee lived the war.

The con di tions of the Tatar ex o dus were thus set on the first day of the Al lied in va sion of Cri mea. From the mo ment that Al lies dis em barked in Ev pa toria on 1 Sep tem ber 1854, con tin u ing through Oc to ber as they ce mented their ad vance in Se vas to pol, the pe nin sula en tered a pe riod of what con tem po rar ies de scribed as “the chaos.” The “chaos” began


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when Prince Al ex an der Men shi kov, the first head com mander of the Rus sian mil i tary, con cen trated forces at Se vas to pol. He pulled all Rus-sian forces from the other re gions of the pe nin sula to post at the naval city, leav ing the long Cri mean coast un de fended. Cri me ans watched in hor ror as Rus sian troops packed up and moved out while enemy war-ships men aced their sea side vil lages.

As Men shi kov fo cused on sup port ing Se vas to pol, Tau ride governor Vlad i mir Ivan o vich Pes tel or dered all govern ment of fices and per son nel to re lo cate into Tauride’s north ern dis tricts.15 As bu reau crats packed up their of fices for trans fer on a day’s no tice, they also de manded the de struc tion of town and vil lage bread re serves that could fall into the hands of the enemy.16 Local bu reau crats com mis sioned car riages and postal sta tions and made no pro vi sions for the evac u a tion of ci vil ians.17 Those peo ple who had the means evac u ated with the clothes on their backs and what small amounts of food they could carry. Many slept in the open air as they made their way north into the inter ior of the pe nin-sula and the Rus sian prov inces.18 Most peas ants, the ma jor ity of whom were Ta tars, could not af ford to leave their homes and so were left, un-pro tected, to face the enemy in va sion and to watch their own govern-ment waste a sup ply of bread that could have car ried them through sev eral years.

Waves of rob bery ac com pa nied the fren zied evac u a tion in the first days of Sep tem ber; peo ples of all na tion al ities, whether Greeks, Ar me-ni ans, Rus sians, Ta tars, or Jews, ran sacked aban doned houses.19 Al lied for ag ers pil laged es tates and vil lages and stole food, live stock, and what ever mov able prop erty they could carry.20 Peo ple were mur dered, some in broad day light.21 Rus sian at tempts to calm the chaos only made it worse. Prince Men shi kov called on ir reg u lar units of Don Cos sacks to re es tab lish order in Cri mean cit ies and vil lages. Cos sacks streamed into the pe nin sula, joined the plunder, and ter ror ized fright ened res i dents al ready suf fer ing under Al lied oc cu pa tion.22 The Cos sacks, along with their Rus sian counter parts, sub jected Ta tars to base less ar rests and cor rupt req ui si tion ing.23

Selim Telersh Oglu, who lived near the Mack en zie foot hills out side Se vas to pol, for ex am ple, tes tified after the war that Cos sack mi li tia ar rested him in Sep tem ber 1854 with out cause. Cos sacks ar rived in his vil lage and asked for in for ma tion about pass ing French troops. Selim Oglu did not per son ally wit ness the troop move ment but was able to lead the Cos sacks on horse back through trails that the French were ru mored to have taken. On their re turn, the Cos sacks pre sented their

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Tatar guide to Prince Men shi kov, who inter ro gated him fur ther. When Selim Oglu could give no ad di tional in for ma tion about French where-abouts, Men shi kov or dered him to be thrown into prison in Sim fer o pol, where he re mained for eight months. Sub se quently, au thor ities re moved him from Kher son in 1855 and then to Vor o nezh, where he re mained until 1859, when he was freed to set tle in Kher son.24 Many Ta tars shared Selim Oglu’s fate. Sto ries like his quickly cir cu lated the pe nin sula, fuel ing Tatar dis trust of the Rus sian govern ment and Cos sacks in par tic u lar.

As Rus sian bu reau crats evac u ated and Rus sian forces streamed into Se vas to pol, Al lies en tered many towns on the Cri mean coast with out any re sis tance at all. They im me di ately oc cu pied Ev pa toria, one of the larger Cri mean cit ies and the busi est port, and used it as a base of op er a-tions through out the war. Thus an other ele ment of “the chaos” in volved con fu sion over the oc cu pa tion of Ev pa toria, en su ing out breaks of sec-tar ian vi o lence between Ta tars and Rus sians in Ev pa toria, and un cer-tainty over whether the Ta tars sup ported the Al lies or were im pris oned by them.

The only two sur viv ing me moirs of this in va sion, both writ ten by Rus sians, de scribe the ar ri val of thou sands of Ta tars from the city and sur round ing vil lages to greet the Al lies on the Ev pa toria quay. These men, a Rus sian bu reau crat, V. S. Rakov, and an Or tho dox priest, whose name is in de ci pher able, lived in Ev pa toria at the time. Both men be lieved that the Al lies ac tively sought to in cite mu tiny among the Ta tars by whip ping up dreams of in de pen dence and na tion al ist sen ti ments.25 The few stud ies that do exist on this topic sug gest that the Al lies did in deed send Ot to man Tatar agents and Polish rebels among Mus lim tribes in Cri mea and the Cau ca sus, but more work needs to be done to fully under stand the level of Al lied in volve ment.26 In any case, by mid- October Rus sian of fi cials es ti mated that four teen thou sand Ta tars liv ing in Ev pa toria and sur round ing vil lages had joined the Al lies.27 Many of these Ta tars im mi grated to the Ot to man Em pire be fore the war’s con-clu sion, and for the pur poses of this chap ter, can be seen as the first wave of mi gra tion.

The pe riod of chaos had run its course by the be gin ning of No vem-ber 1854 as the Al lies and the Rus sians set tled into their bat tle po si tions. As fall turned to win ter and in clem ent weather forced a pause in the fight ing, the im pe rial govern ment changed the peninsula’s rul ing au-thor ities. Count Ni ko lai Ad ler berg, who fought in the Cau ca sus in 1841–42 and served in Hun gary in 1849, be came the mil i tary governor


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of Tau ride and Sim fer o pol, re plac ing Pes tel, who had fal len into dis fa vor for evac u at ing the pe nin sula.28 Count An drei Strog a nov, who had fought in the Na pol e onic Wars and sup pressed the Polish up ris ing of 1831, re placed Prince Mi khail Vo ront sov as the governor gen eral of New Rus sia and Bes sa ra bia, a post he oc cu pied from 1854 to 1861.29 Fi nally, Prince Mi khail Gor cha kov re placed Prince Men shi kov as head com-mander of the Rus sian forces in Cri mea. This change of per son nel meant the im po si tion of mar tial law in Cri mea. As op posed to the out go ing ci vil ian ad min is tra tors, who built ca reers on man ag ing Tauride’s com-plex eth nic and re li gious di ver sity, mil i tary au thor ities were prin ci pally inter ested in man ag ing the war to a suc cess ful con clu sion.30 Thus, Ad ler-berg, Gor cha kov, and Strog a nov worked to ex tract re sources for the Rus sian mil i tary from Cri mea and the sur round ing re gions of New Rus sia. They also set tled so cial un rest through heavy-handed meas ures, in clud ing the exile of Ta tars to the inter ior of the pe nin sula. De spite the fact that the ma jor ity of Ta tars re mained loyal to the state, Men shi kov, Ad ler berg, and Strog a nov par tic u larly blamed the Ta tars for Rus sian losses fol low ing the up ris ing in Ev pa toria.31

Ru mors of govern ment pro po sals to re lo cate the Ta tars en masse dur ing the war be came one of the most im por tant causes of the Tatar mi gra tion. As early as Oc to ber 1854, only one month after the Al lied in va sion, Rus sian mil i tary au thor ities posted in Cri mea, par tic u larly Count Ad ler berg, began to ad vo cate for the re lo ca tion of Cri mean Ta tars to the inter ior of the pe nin sula. The evac u a tion was pu ni tive in na ture, de signed to pre vent the Ta tars from col lud ing with the enemy, shar ing their food and live stock, or pro vid ing in for ma tion about stra te gic points.32 After the ap pear ance of Ta tars sup port ing the Al lies in Ev pa-toria, mil i tary au thor ities placed the whole eth nic group under sus pi cion and viewed “clean ing the shore” of Ta tars as nec es sary to pro tect im pe-rial war aims. They also ar rested groups of Ta tars for betray ing the Rus sian state and dis patched them to Kursk, Kher son, and Ek a ter i-nos lav.33 By May 1855, the Rus sian mil i tary had re lo cated 4,279 men and 3,090 women to Sim fer o pol and Per ekop, where some were given strips of land and re mained until the war’s con clu sion.

Re moved from their sources of food and their live li hood, many of the Ta tars suf fered star va tion dur ing the war and im pov er ish ment af ter-ward. Oth ers found that land lords had seized their es tates dur ing their ab sence. Au thor ities con tem plated a much wider mass re lo ca tion of all those Ta tars liv ing within twenty-five ki lom e ters of the sea in Feb ru-ary 1856. For tu nately, the war came to a con clu sion be fore this larger

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re set tle ment came to pass.34 Still, the re lo ca tion of ten thou sand Ta tars and the con tin u a tion of sim i lar pro po sals made last ing im pres sions on the Tatar pop u la tion.

Con di tions for Ta tars wors ened as the war moved for ward. Prince Gor cha kov, who con sis tently dis cou raged base less ar rests of Ta tars and often op posed re lo cat ing them, nev er the less in sti tuted a re lent-less pol icy of req ui si tion. In the min utes of a post war com mis sion es-tab lished to cal cu late re gional losses, Gor cha kov re vealed that as a mat ter of course, the Rus sian army took what it needed from Tatar vil lages with out fair com pen sa tion. When the mil i tary oc cu pied the vil lage of Tash-Basty (now Bol’shoe Sad o voe) in the fall of 1855, it razed an or chard. Gor cha kov in itially planned to pay the Ta tars fair value for ma te ri als, he said, be cause he rec og nized that “the trees com posed a chief source of in come for the peo ple.”35 A dep u ta tion of cit i zens and of fi cers es ti mated vil lage losses at 30,550 ru bles. As ru mors of the pro-po sal for Tash-Basty spread, how ever, other vil lages came for ward de mand ing fair com pen sa tion for losses they had suf fered at the hands of the Rus sian mil i tary. Gor cha kov con cluded that if the meas ures for Tash-Basty were to be fol lowed, the mini mum com pen sa tion would “be a huge ex pen di ture for the treas ury.” Sub se quently, he re scinded his in itial offer and gave the res i dents from Tash-Basty only 3,000 ru bles to ward the full value of their losses. Gor cha kov prom ised fur ther com-pen sa tion only if their “be hav ior dem on strated sin cere re spect ful at ten-tion to their govern ment.”36 In prac tice, this meant that in the best of circum stances the army com pen sated Ta tars for one-tenth of the es ti-mated value of their losses. In the worst of circum stances, such a pol icy im plied that Ta tars who at tempted even the mild est of re sis tance to army req ui si tion ing would re ceive noth ing dur ing or at the end of the war.37

In ad di tion to harm ful Rus sian pol i cies, wide spread dev as ta tion from bat tle and cease less pil lag ing prompted many Ta tars to aban don their homes. Within a year, most Cri mean cit ies had been bom barded to ruins or com pletely emp tied of con sum able goods. Nearly all pri vate prop erty in Cri mea had been sto len or dam aged by Rus sian and Al lied forces or local pil lag ers. Or chards and vine yards, like those in Tash- Basty, had been cut to the ground. The Ta tars, who com posed the ma jor-ity pop u la tion liv ing along the Black Sea coast, felt the astound ing losses most sorely. The war governor in Cri mea, Count Ad ler berg, re ported, “132 landed es tates and 105 Tatar vil lages have been com pletely ruined, not speak ing of the cit ies and the sur round ings, which were oc cu pied


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by the enemy (Se vas to pol, Ba lak lava, Ev pa toria, and Kerch with En i-kale).” Al lies and Rus sians es tab lished 187 ce me ter ies in ci vil ian gar dens, fields, and pas tures for the bod ies of more than 120,000 men. Only four-teen houses re mained in tact in Se vas to pol, and on the op po site side of the pe nin sula, only 380 of 1,940 homes still stood in Kerch.38 Rus sian of fi cials fur ther es ti mated that by the war’s con clu sion, “not more than one-fourth the work an i mals re main[ed],” and noted that “the fall sow ing of 1855, and the spring of the present year ha[d] been com-pletely de stroyed.”39 The war plunged the en tire pe nin sula into pov erty, and many Cri me ans—Ta tars, Rus sians and Greeks alike—suf fered star va tion.

The gen eral governor of New Rus sia, Count Strog a nov, whose en tire prov ince bore the brunt of war from Iz mail to the Cau ca sus, re peat edly em pha sized that Cri mea suf fered the most sus tained dam age. Cal cu lat-ing the per cap ita losses of the dif fer ent re gions of the em pire dur ing the war based on “a few dif fer ent sources of data,” Strog a nov con cluded that on av er age sub jects in Bes sa ra bia lost 10 ru bles per per son; in the south ern dis tricts of Kher son and Ek a ter i nos lav prov ince up to 15 ru bles per per son; and in “the North ern dis tricts of Tau ride, par tic u larly in Dne provsk, Me lit o pol and Per ekop, up to 25 ru bles per male,” with a total for all three re gions ap proach ing 12,600,000 ru bles in sil ver.40

He could not pro vide a fig ure, how ever, for Cri mea. The mas sive dam age there was un prec e dented in Rus sian his tory, ex ceed ing even that which Rus sia had ex pe ri enced dur ing the Na pol e onic Wars.41 Such wide spread de struc tion made it im pos sible, Strog a nov argued, to cal-cu late “the value of the losses.” Cri mea “was deeply dam aged not only from the ac tiv i ties of the enemy” but also from evac u a tions of res i dents along the sea shore, which meant the ab sence of reg u lar farm labor for more than a year. “Ex treme con ges tion of the mil i tary” created highly un san i tary con di tions, ruined res i dences, and in fected water sup plies. The moun tain ous part of the pe nin sula bet ter sur vived di rect bom bard-ment and oc cu pa tion, but still “many lo cal ities were de stroyed and or chards and vine yards were des o lated.” Res i dences and “all prop-erty,” Strog a nov em pha sized to the cen tral govern ment in St. Pe ters burg to which he had turned for state aid, “suf fered com plete ruin.”42 The dev as ta tion of ag ri cul ture and un san i tary con di tions caused by mil i tary con ges tion and mass graves meant that by 1855, Cri mean Ta tars were suf fer ing ty phus, chol era, dis lo ca tion, and star va tion.

Peace did lit tle to im prove circum stances for the Ta tars, and un fair pol i cies con tin ued. With no end in sight, many Ta tars must have seen

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lit tle fu ture for them selves or their fam i lies in Cri mea. Many Rus sians blamed the Ta tars for losses in the war, and oth ers sought to gain from Tatar mis for tune. Cri mean land lords of Rus sian and Eu ro pean her i tage moved quickly to ab sorb Tatar prop erty into their es tates, in clud ing the prop erty of Ta tars who had been forced into the inter ior of the prov ince. In the vil lage of Chor gun, for ex am ple, more than forty Ta tars pe ti tioned the Sim fer o pol dis trict au thor ities to protest the sei zure of their land by the no ble woman Mavra Mik hai lii dur ing the war. Three years after the war’s con clu sion, she still had not re turned their land. In stead, she had set tled it with Rus sian fam i lies.43

Set tling con fis cated Tatar lands around the war zones with Ger man and Rus sian col o nists quickly evolved into a de facto pol icy sup ported by au thor ities in Tau ride. In his an nual re port for 1855, the mil i tary governor of Sim fer o pol and Tau ride, Count Ad ler berg, argued that “ex pe ri ence ha[d] shown [Ta tars] as in ca pable of being suc cess ful ag ri-cul tu ral ists.” In their place, he rec om mended set tling Ger man and Men non ite col o nists on half of this ter ri tory “due to the real ad van tage they [would] bring to ag ri cul ture in the north ern dis tricts.”44 On the other half, he pro posed set tling vet e rans of the war, who showed “par-tic u lar zeal and de vo tion to the govern ment.”45 The rep re sen ta tive of the no bil ity in Ev pa toria shared Adlerberg’s sen ti ment. In a pro po sal dis cuss ing how to re es tab lish ag ri cul tu ral pro duc tion after the war, the no ble man argued that ag ri cul tu ral es tates not only could be re stored to their for mer value but also could in crease in price fol low ing the de par-ture of the Ta tars. “The trans fer of land from Ta tars to Rus sian own ers will strengthen grain har vest ing,” he wrote, as well as “im prov ing ag ri-cul ture and the rais ing of live stock.”46

Such ra cial ized no tions of labor dated to the era of Cathe rine II, when the state fixed upon Ger man col o nists as a so lu tion to set tling the sparsely pop u lated re gions con quered dur ing the Russian-Ottoman wars. Al ex an der I and Nich o las I ex panded the ra cial ized ap proach to labor by in clud ing Rus sian Old Be liev ers and sec tar ian groups, deemed more pro duc tive and skilled than na tives in col o nized areas.47 In Cri mea, such views also ac quired a re li gious and po lit i cal cast, as many of the foreign set tlers in cluded Chris tian ref u gees from the Ot to man Em pire, who brought their po lit i cal re sent ments with them.48 The Cri mean War had the ef fect of call ing into ac tion the most cyn i cal of ra cial ist set tle ment schemes.

Strog a nov sup ported Adlerberg’s de sire to re place the na tive Tatar pop u la tion with foreign set tlers, and in April 1856, he for warded a


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pro po sal to the Min is try of State Do mains in St. Pe ters burg. Be cause the Min is try of State Do mains over saw the af fairs of state peas ants, in clud ing Ta tars, and had es tab lished law ful prac tice for re lo cat ing state peas ants, Strog a nov sought coop er a tion from this par tic u lar im pe-rial body. De spite its rich nat u ral gifts, he wrote in his pro po sal, Cri mea “re mained for seventy years in the same state of wild er ness, due in large part to the in abil ity of the Mus lim pop u la tion to work hard.” Strog a nov em pha sized the re cent his tory of Tatar mu ti nies, ar guing that “dur ing the war, the Ta tars dem on strated readi ness to do harm” to the Rus sian state. Point ing to Crimea’s sig nifi cant salt in dus try and the im por tance of the Azov Sea to ac cess ing Russia’s inter ior and the Cau-ca sus, Strog a nov as serted that the pe nin sula was too stra te gi cally im-por tant to leave to a non-Russian pop u la tion. He ad vo cated pop u lat ing Cri mea with “pure Rus sian tribes, even with out tak ing Ger man col o-nists.” Strog a nov main tained that such a plan needed to be “at ten tively thought out, founded upon sen si tive study of the de tails of prac ti cal ac com plish ment.”49

In July 1856 the min is try ap proved Stroganov’s pro po sal to set tle Cri mea with Rus sian pop u la tions but rec om mended lim it ing set tle ment to those ter ri to ries from which Ta tars had al ready been ex pelled or whose land had been con fis cated by the state fol low ing proven mu tiny.50 The min is try fur ther sug gested that the state ac quire Tatars’ pri vate prop erty as it came up for sale in the shore re gions, for re sale ex clu sively to Rus sian peas ants. Count Strog a nov re sponded that the “abil ity to clean [ochistit’] Cri mea of Ta tars by de grees through the state ac quir ing pri vate lands for Rus sian set tlers could be suc cess ful,” but such would “re quire sig nifi cant cap i tal.” Pur chas ing lands, Strog a nov com plained, would not hap pen quickly be cause “the lazy and use less Ta tars would not leave Cri mea vol un tar ily.” In stead, one would have to “for cibly evict them.”51 To be sure, the Rus sian pol icy to re lo cate Ta tars in 1856, par tic u larly the em pha sis on “clean ing” the ter ri tory, calls to mind Stalin’s gen o ci dal dep or ta tion of the Ta tars and other eth nic groups in Cri mea nearly one hun dred years later. For the pur poses of this dis cus-sion, it bears em pha siz ing that the 1856 pro po sal for the Tatar re lo ca-tion orig i nated in the con flu ence of East ern Ques tion vi o lence and Russia’s long his tory of ra cial ist set tle ment pol i cies that began in the eigh teenth cen tury with the Rus sian con quest of the north ern Black Sea lit to ral.

The Ta tars left lit tle writ ten record ex plain ing their ex o dus, no lengthy epis tle to the Rus sian govern ment, no state ment re gard ing the

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rea sons for their de par ture. There can be lit tle doubt, how ever, that the ter rible con di tions of war, whether the for cible re lo ca tion of Ta tars into the inter ior, the req ui si tion ing and de struc tion of Tatar prop erty, or ru mors of an im pend ing forced mi gra tion prompted the first wave of em i gra tion. Apart from the mi gra tions of the Ta tars from Ev pa toria, which began with the Al lied oc cu pa tion in Sep tem ber 1854, Rus sian of fi cials first ob served Cri mean Ta tars leav ing their homes in the spring and sum mer of 1855.52 On 30 June 1855, a Sim fer o pol ad min is tra tor re ported to Ad ler berg that a local aris to crat by the name of Ab dulla Murza Dzha niis kii, to gether with thir teen mem bers of his fam ily, gath ered at their prop erty and “went to the enemy [Ot to man Em pire].”53 Later, in De cem ber 1855, forty-six men and fifty women aban doned their homes in the vil lage of Kuchuk-koi.54

Con cerned local of fi cials re ferred the mat ter to re gional au thor ities, who in turn for warded the ques tion of em i gra tion to Tsar Al ex an der II, ask ing whether they should pre vent the fu ture de par ture of Ta tars. Al ex an der II, who had as sumed the throne after Nich o las I died in March 1855, re sponded that there was no rea son to pre vent re lo ca tion of Ta tars, stat ing, “it would be ad van ta geous to rid the pe nin sula of this harm ful pop u la tion.”55 Sub se quently, the tsar’s state ment was for warded to all of Crimea’s dis tricts, in clud ing those most af fected by the war: Per ekop, Yalta, Theo do sia, and Ev pa toria.56 Strog a nov inter preted the tsar’s words strictly and com mu ni cated to re gional of fi cials in Cri mea: “His Im pe rial Highness [had] or dered that it was nec es sary [my em pha sis] to free the re gion of this harm ful pop u la tion.”57 Here under Strog a nov and Tsar Al ex an der II, the state of fi cially en cour aged Tatar em i gra tion, which gath ered speed as the war came to its con clu sion.

On 22 April 1856, 4,500 Ta tars left Ba lak lava for Con stan tin o ple, with their right to leave guar an teed in the Treaty of Paris.58 As in pre vi ous con flicts with the Ot to man Em pire, con quered peo ples of both em pires sided with the enemy. In the Cri mean War, reg i ments of Ot to man Bul-gar ians and Greeks fought for Rus sia, just as Ev pa tor ian Ta tars formed a mi li tia unit to fight for the Ot to mans. To pre vent Rus sia and the Ot to-man Em pire from tak ing re trib u tive meas ures against these groups, the Treaty of Paris pro vided for their safe pas sage. Thus, ac cord ing to point 5 of this treaty, all war ring na tions had to “give full par don to those of their sub jects who ap peared guilty of ac tively par tic i pat ing in the mil i-tary af fairs of the enemy.” The treaty fur ther re quired that “each of the war ring pow ers give full par don to those who served for an other war ring power dur ing the war.”59 In the larger view, such stip u la tions


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pro duced a re li giously tinged pop u la tion ex change, as Mus lim Ta tars fled Rus sia and Chris tian Bul gar ians fled the Ot to man Em pire, tak ing up new res i dence in the state of their co re lig ion ists.

Ta tars con tin ued to trickle out of Cri mea to ward the end of the 1850s. Their num bers re mained suf fi ciently steady and small enough that their de par ture at tracted lit tle at ten tion. Sud denly, how ever, in the fall of 1859, a new, much larger wave of mi gra tion gath ered mo men tum. Stunned Rus sian of fi cials at trib uted their mi gra tion to a re li gious mo ti-va tion, writ ing the cen tral govern ment in St. Pe ters burg that emis sar ies from Tur key had cir cu lated a proc la ma tion ex hort ing Cri mean Ta tars to re lo cate there.60 A trans la tion of the doc u ment at tached to of fi cial cor re spon dence and pre served in Rus sian archives of fers a rare glimpse into Is lamic as pects of the mi gra tion. It states: “God said: ‘my land is wide: where one wants, there one can live.’ And the Prophet said: ‘yes, be with them in peace!’ If you can not freely ful fill the Sharia (the Mus lim law and all its religious-civil prac tices and re li gious civil rit u als) then set tle in an other (Mus lim) coun try, be care ful doing this, not los ing time to re set tle to our coun try. Who does not set tle, then they will be shamed, and will not re ceive help in the fu ture life [ma te rial in pa ren the ses from the Rus sian orig i nal].”61 The proc la ma tion ex horted Ta tars to live under a Mus lim power in order to freely prac tice their faith, to dwell along side their co re lig ion ists. In par tic u lar, the proc la ma tion strongly im pressed upon Crimea’s Ta tars the need to ful fill sharia. Among other things, it is inter est ing that the local Rus sian trans la tor felt the need to de fine sharia for of fi cials in St. Pe ters burg.

Whether re li gion in spired the Tatar mi gra tion re mains an im por tant ques tion in the schol arly lit er a ture. If Ta tars mi grated due to sym pa thies with their co re lig ion ists, such would sug gest that the Ta tars left Rus sia vol un tar ily rather than being pushed out by Rus sian pol icy. For any his tor i cal ques tion, the role of re li gion in mo ti vat ing be hav ior is ex-tremely dif fi cult to as sess and is par tic u larly so in Cri mea when re li gious rhet o ric pen e trated all sides of the con flict.62 Al though his to rians have re cently turned their at ten tion to re li gion in the Cri mean War, they have yet to sift through the rhet o ric and sep ar ate cyn i cal na tion al ist dis course from au then tic be lief. More over, as schol ars of re li gion and vi o lence have noted, sep ar at ing ma te ri al ist con di tions from spir i tual ones can be chal leng ing.63

Ac cord ing to Kemal Kar pat, the Ot to man govern ment did in vite Ta tars to set tle in the Ot to man Em pire and pub lished an of fi cial in vi ta-tion in March 1857 of fer ing po ten tial im mi grants land and tax in cen tives

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in the east ern por tions of the south ern Bal kan Pe nin sula. Kar pat notes, how ever, that Ot to man of fi cials in tended foreign set tle ment to re solve labor short ages and did not aim this offer spe cifi cally at Mus lim pop u-la tions.64 Still, the role of re li gion should not be dis missed out of hand. It is in deed quite pos sible that a de sire to live under a Mus lim govern-ment held an at trac tion for Ta tars, and it is also quite pos sible that liv ing under a state in fused with Or tho dox na tion al ism had grown too bur den-some. In any case, Rus sian of fi cials like Count Strog a nov who al ready ag i tated for push ing the Ta tars out of Cri mea seized the op por tu nity to en cour age Tatar mi gra tion.

Count Strog a nov wrote of fi cials in St. Pe ters burg that in re li gious meet ings and night prayers, “Mus lims were con vinced to leave the land of the un be liev ers” and “were re minded of the ap proach ing Judg ment Day.” Ag i ta tors warned Ta tars that they would not find sal va tion in the land of the Rus sian un be liev ers and ex plained clauses in the Par is Treaty of 1856, which al lowed em i gra tion to Tur key. These Turk ish emis-sar ies prom ised money and live stock upon the Tatars’ re set tle ment in Tur key but first de manded one thou sand sil ver ru bles per per son to “sign up those de sir ing to set tle, to find a seat on the ship, and nec es-sary shel ter in Con stan tin o ple.” Strog a nov argued that the emis sar ies, or as he im plied, char la tans, did every thing they could to in cite Tatar em i gra tion, in clud ing spread ing ru mors that the new dio cese was es tab lished to “Chris tian ize all the Ta tars,” and that the govern ment planned to re set tle all Ta tars in the north ern prov inces.65 Here he de-picted the ru mors of govern ment re lo ca tion to the inter ior as if such were a dark Tatar fan tasy rather than a real prod uct of his own am bi tion. With his prod ding, Rus sian of fi cials de cided to per mit Tatar em i gra-tion to Tur key on the foun da tion es tab lished by Tsar Al ex an der II three years ear lier.66

By Au gust 1860, of fi cials re corded 89,190 peo ple of both sexes who had ei ther left for Tur key or ap plied for pass ports.67 By mid-November 1860, re ports in di cated that 28,000 Nogai Ta tars and 57,000 Ta tars from the steppe and moun tain re gion had al ready im mi grated to Tur key. Of this lat ter group, 13,500 Ta tars lived on state lands, 43,500 lived on es tates and pri vate lands (i.e., were not state peas ants), 12,000 came from the steppe, 23,000 from the moun tains, and 8,800 from the coast.68 The de par ture of nearly 90,000 peo ple in just a few months dra mat i cally changed Cri mean land scapes. Al ready se verely dam aged by war, with an econ omy in tat ters, Cri mea was sent deeper into shock by the sud den pop u la tion loss. Those left be hind feared for Crimea’s total col lapse.


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Pes si mists an tic i pated the total ruin of Cri mean ag ri cul ture with out the ex pe ri enced labor of the Ta tars and an end to Cri mean crafts and in dus try, in clud ing the wool and silk trades, the man u fac ture of Turkish- style car pets, and other hand i work. The col lapse of Cri mean cit ies and post war urban re cov ery seemed im mi nent with out Tatar tax rev e nues and labor for re con struc tion. One ob server wrote, “There is no sad der vi sion than in the steppe part of Cri mea, in which now en tire empty vil lages and fields re main with out work ers and [the land goes] un sown. Deeper in the coun try, the more re mote roads and the sur round ing land scape are com pletely empty; one hears only the howls of de spon-dent packs of Tatar dogs left be hind.”69 It re mains to be de ter mined, the writer con tin ued, “from grain har vest or sow ing, from crafts to fac to ries, what in Cri mea will be touched in con se quence of this ex o dus. How var i ous inter ests will be de feated by this sud den event—what will fall into dis re pair and what will be lost—is much more sig nifi cant than might have been seen at first glance.”70 Bu reau crats, no ble men, landed pro prie tors, towns peo ple, and mer chants en tered into a pro tracted heated de bate about why the Ta tars fled and how to re store the pe nin-sula to a pros per ous course.

Alarm over the rapid Tatar mi gra tion orig i nated in Cri mea and em a nated out ward. Even in Minsk, Kha tib Alek sandr Us ma nov Bog-dan o vich asked the Tau ride Mus lim Spir i tual As sem bly about the em i-gra tion. Lith u a nian Ta tars, he wrote, had heard that “many Cri mean Ta tars . . . had com pletely aban doned their Rus sian es tates to enter Tur key.”71 The Com mit tee of Min is ters in St. Pe ters burg shared Bogda- novich’s con cern. It in itiated an of fi cial in quiry into the Tatar em i gra-tion, which it as signed to the gen eral ad ju tant Prince Vik tor Ilar i an o-vich Vasil’chikov.72 Prince Vasil’chikov had earned dis tinc tion dur ing the siege of Se vas to pol for re es tab lish ing order in the no to ri ously cor-rupt Mil i tary In ten dancy. Im me di ately after the war, Prince Gor cha kov as signed Vasil’chikov to in ves ti gate and pros e cute the cor rup tion.73 Vasil’chikov was thus a log i cal choice for the Com mit tee of Min is ters: he had suc cess fully con cluded a major cor rup tion case and had first-hand ex pe ri ence with Cri mean af fairs. For his as sign ment on the Cri-mean Ta tars, Vasil’chikov gath ered hun dreds of pages of govern ment re ports by local and im pe rial of fi cials and var i ous min is tries as well as Tatar pe ti tions, the lat ter of which are un for tu nately lost.74

Vasil’chikov’s in ves ti ga tion un cov ered a host of dif fer ent causes be-hind the Tatar em i gra tion. In ad di tion to build ing an archive of all sig-nifi cant local and cen tral cor re spon dence on the ques tion, Vasil’chikov

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can vassed Cri mean land own ers for their per spec tives and sent the en gi neer Ed u ard Tot le ben to Tau ride as his per sonal agent to re search the mi gra tion. Tot le ben, one of the most widely cel e brated he roes of the siege of Se vas to pol, or ga nized the re build ing of the bas tions at the height of the bom bard ment. Many cred ited him with Russia’s abil ity to with stand the siege as long as it did, and he held the re spect of the Com mit tee of Min is ters and the Rus sian tsar. Totleben’s damn ing ex-posé of the dis grace ful treat ment of the Ta tars dur ing the war, the pec u-la tion of local land own ers, and the com plic ity of Rus sian bu reau crats pro voked shock when it cir cu lated among St. Petersburg’s min is ters. It be came a cor ner stone of Vasil’chikov’s re port.

The mu tiny of a few Ta tars dur ing the war, Tot le ben argued, con-vinced local au thor ities that “Ta tars as un be liev ers [in overtsy] were harm ful for Rus sia.” Many Rus sians began to be lieve that the Ta tars would en dan ger the suc cess of Rus sian forces and be cause of fa nat i cal re li gious be liefs would for ever stall Cri mean de vel op ment. Such views, Tot le ben im plied, were them selves fa nat i cal, as the Ta tars had “alto gether only weak in flu ence on [Russia’s] lack of suc cess, which as [was] known, re sulted from many other, better-known ex ist ing causes.”75 Harsh war time abuse by Cos sacks and the re lo ca tion of Ta tars into the inter ior of the prov ince had left many Ta tars “afraid of their own govern ment.” Tot le ben also iden tified il le gal and im mo ral Rus-sian ab sorp tion of Tatar lands as an other cause of Tatar mi gra tion. “Not know ing the Rus sian lan guage and not hav ing Rus sian laws trans lated into the Tatar lan guage,” Ta tars had lit tle de fense against self-interested govern ment agents or prop erty own ers. Some Ta tars signed contracts with out fully under stand ing the con tents and quickly lost legal rights to the prop erty that had been in their fam i lies from time im me mo rial.76 The war only ac cel er ated this pro cess as neigh bor ing land own ers seized Tatar land dur ing their exile.

The leader of the no bil ity in Per ekop, Ivan Lamp sei, shared Totleben’s bleak as sess ment of the Tatars’ po si tion on the pe nin sula. Only a peo ple in de spair, Lamp sei argued, would leave their “nat u ral land, the graves of their fathers” to gam ble on a dis tant, un known lo ca tion in an un fa mil-iar coun try. Lamp sei em pha sized the harsh con di tions of war, par tic u-larly the dan ger ous “con vic tion that the Ta tars were a harm ful peo ple for [the Rus sian] govern ment,” and the sub se quent plans to re move Ta tars from the coast. It must have been ter ribly dif fi cult, he wrote, for the Ta tars dur ing the war, “see ing the exile of [their] broth ers in faith to the Great Rus sian Prov inces from where they still [had] not re turned.”77


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Lamp sei also shared many of Totleben’s crit i cism of land lord abuses and pointed out that after the war, when the Ta tars con tin ued to suf fer from ex haus tion and years of poor har vests, land lord ob li ga tions in-creased and Rus sian ad min is tra tors like Strog a nov ag i tated for the Tatars’ re moval.78

After read ing these re ports and oth ers, Vasil’chikov con cluded that re li gion lit tle en tered the equa tion. Rather, “var i ous per se cu tions” and war time prej u dices prompted the Ta tars to leave. Spe cif i cally, Vasil’chikov cited col lu sion between land hold ers and the Min is try of State Do mains to seize Tatar lands after the war, the growth of land- labor re quire ments, and the in crease in state taxes to fund war re cov ery. “Tak ing into ac count that this ver sion of events cor re sponds with the re port sub mit ted by Tot le ben on the af fair of re set tle ment of the Cri mean Ta tars,” the cen tral ized Com mit tee of Min is ters con cluded that the pol i cies of the Min is try of State Do mains and Count Strog a nov con trib-uted to the causes of Tatar mi gra tion.79 The com mit tee pro fessed that it would have or dered an of fi cial re view of Stroganov’s of fice, but “war circum stances” made a for mal re view im prac ti cal.80 In by pass ing the stan dard pro ce dure of the sen a to rial re view, the com mit tee pro posed sev eral changes, in clud ing the dis mis sal of Strog a nov, who left of fice by 1862.

First, the com mit tee tasked the gen eral governor with mov ing Tatar land dis putes more quickly through Rus sian courts. Quite often, Tatar pe ti tions against land lord en croach ment went through pro ce dures at the dis trict, the re gional and the pro vin cial lev els, only to be sent back again to the dis trict, where the pro cess was re peated again. Such a lengthy trial pro cess, the com mit tee noted, served the inter ests of wealthy land lords, who bet ter knew Rus sian laws and had the money and time to wait out poor Tatar peas ants, who were more likely to give up on cases be fore de ci sions had been reached.81

The com mit tee next ad vo cated “com pen sat ing Ta tars” who had suf fered dur ing the war and es tab lish ing a three-member com mit tee to “for mally re search the level of abuse and dis or der of the [Min is try of] State Do mains.” Such a com mit tee would de velop a plan for im prov ing Tatar con di tions and guard against “fu ture abuse and dis or der.”82 The com mit tee was to pay par tic u lar at ten tion to re duc ing the labor debt for spring plant ing and par ing down trans por ta tion ob li ga tions, as cus tom re quired Tatar vil lages to pro vide tran sit for govern ment of fi cials.83 Fi nally, the Com mit tee of Min is ters or dered local of fi cials to pre vent fur-ther mi gra tion as much as pos sible with out vi o lat ing the Treaty of Paris.84

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The Com mit tee of Min is ters acted too late to rec tify con di tions for the Ta tars. The Ta tars con tin ued to mi grate, al beit with a few more ob-sta cles, through the mid-1860s. By 1867, the Tau ride Sta tis ti cal Com mit-tee con cluded that in all, 104,211 men and 88,149 women had em i grated from Rus sia to the Ot to man Em pire.85 They left hun dreds of vil lages com pletely va cant, in clud ing 68 in Ber di ansk, 9 in Me lit o pol, 278 in Per ekop, 24 in Sim fer o pol, 67 in Fe o do sia, and 196 in Ev pa toria. To re solve the pop u la tion cri sis, the local govern ment with the im pe rial government’s per mis sion moved for ward with the foreign and inter nal set tle ment pro gram. Rus sian peas ants con tin ued to set tle va cated lands; more than six teen hun dred fam i lies had been sum moned from Cher-ni gov, Pol tava, Vor o nezh, Kursk, and Tam bov prov inces even be fore the Com mit tee of Min is ters fin ished its re view.86 By 1864, local of fi cials con cluded that 437,327 de sia tin of land were avail able for set tle ment by Mon ten e grins, Greeks, Men non ites, and Bul gar ians, who could set tle in the Rus sian Em pire in ac cor dance with the Treaty of Paris.87 The dreams of those of fi cials who wished to re pop u late Cri mea with Chris-tians had come true, and Rus sians, Ar me ni ans, Greeks, and Bul gar ians soon over whelmed the Tatar pop u la tion that re mained.88

In just ten years, from 1854–63, Cri mea under went dra matic, rapid change. Its land scape was ruined, its build ings de stroyed, and its pop u-la tion deci mated. The mass mi gra tion of Cri mean Ta tars was as mean-ing ful a con se quence of the Cri mean War as the more often dis cussed Rus sian retroces sion of Bes sa ra bia to the Ot to man Em pire or Russia’s re stric tions in the Black Sea. Yet this mo men tous event has re ceived com par a tively short shrift in the lit er a ture. Writ ing 150 years later, Cri mean Tatar au thor and ac ti vist Gul’nara Ab du laeva re flects: “It is not hard to im a gine what prompted the na tive pop u la tion to aban don its home land. Hun ger and ruin ruled to gether. Cri mean Ta tars were of inter est to bel lig er ents only for the abil ity to sup ply pro vi sions, car riages, and port age. Rus sian bu reau crats ran at the be gin ning of the war, leav ing the Ta tars to their fate.”89 As Ab du laeva sug gests, Rus sian pol icy and the war it self created in hos pit able con di tions for Crimea’s na tive pop u la tion.

To a large de gree, Tatar em i gra tion to Tur key stemmed from Rus sian co lo nial ad min is tra tion and war time pol icy, nei ther of which can be said to be mono lithic. In stead, Rus sian pop u la tion pol icy was a fluid pro-cess, a con stant inter play between sub ject and col o nizer, cen ter and pe riph ery, and con flict among in di vid u als with dif fer ent phi los o phies of rule.90 The trend to ward Rus sian ero sion of the Tatars’ po si tion in


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their na tive land was nei ther a uni form nor a con sis tent goal of Rus sian im pe rial govern ance. That said, the no tions that the Tatar mi gra tions, in clud ing the ex o dus of Mus lims from the Cau ca sus, con sti tuted ex cep-tional cases, and that the Rus sian govern ment ac tively sought to re tain its Mus lim pop u la tion, as schol ars have re cently sug gested, can hardly be the case.91 Alan Fisher shows that along with the Cri mean Tatar em i gra tion, sev eral hun dred Cir cas sians left fol low ing the Rus sian cap ture of Sha mil, while Can dan Badem’s essay in this vol ume dem on-strates a con certed Rus sian ef fort to en cour age Mus lim mi gra tion from the Kars-Batum prov ince after the Russian-Ottoman War of 1877–78.92 In other words, Rus sian pol icy to ward Mus lim pop u la tions bor der ing the Ot to man Em pire ap pears con sis tently hos tile.

It is also im por tant to con sider the Cri mean Tatar mi gra tion in re la-tion to the larger pic ture of gen o cide and forced mi gra tions in the Rus-sian Em pire. In his com par a tive anal y sis of twentieth-century gen o-cides, Nor man Nai mark has argued that the level of vi o lence as so ciated with twentieth-century mi gra tions and gen o cide was unique, a prod uct of the mod ern state.93 While the twentieth-century was un usu ally bru tal, the ten dency of schol ars to view forced mi gra tion and gen o cide through the lens of the Sec ond World War ob scures the con ti nu ity of vi o lence between the nine teenth and the twen ti eth cen tury. In this case, the state’s will ing ness to for cibly re lo cate Ta tars at the height of the Cri mean War strikes a res o nant note with later dep or ta tions of Ta tars under Sta lin.94 Most rel e vant for this vol ume, how ever, the em pha sis on twentiethcentury epi sodes of pop u la tion dis place ment ob scures the long his tory of vi o lent mi gra tion between the Rus sian and the Ot to man Em pire. In this sense, the inter na tional po lit i cal cli mate of the East ern Ques tion framed the Tatar mi gra tion as well as Rus sian co lo nial set tle ment pol i-cies. A pat tern of Muslim-Christian pop u la tion ex changes pre dated the Cri mean War and con tin ued well af ter ward. Dur ing the war it self, Al lied oc cu pa tion of Tatar vil lages and con cur rent at tempts to in cite re bel lion made Tatar de par ture in many cases a ne ces sity. Fi nally, the pro vi sions of the Treaty of Paris for pop u la tion ex changes between the Rus sian and the Ot to man Em pire le gal ized the pro cess and set a prec e dent for fu ture pop u la tion ex changes fol low ing the First World War.

Notes

1. Rus sian sources on Tatar mi gra tion fre quently note that Ta tars gave up their pod danstvo, a term today de fined as “cit i zen ship” but more ac cu rately as

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“sub ject hood” for the im pe rial pe riod. For the pos i tive as well as neg a tive ele-ments of “sub ject hood,” see Vale rie Kiv el son, “Mus co vite ‘Citizenship’: Rights with out Free dom,” Jour nal of Mod ern His tory 74, no. 3 (Sep tem ber 2002): 465–89; and Eric Lohr, Rus sian Cit i zen ship: From Em pire to So viet Union (Cam bridge, MA: Har vard Uni ver sity Press, 2012).

2. Anon., “Za piska vy se le nii tatar iz Kryma,” un signed re port ad dressed to S. S. Lans koi, 20 No vem ber 1860, RGIA, f. 1287, op. 6, d. 1710, “O per es e le nii Kryms kikh tatar za gra nitsu i o ko lon i zat sii vla del i ches kikh v Krymu ime nii,” 30 May 1860–16 Jan u ary 1864, l. 70.

3. Spe cifi cally here I am re fer ring to mi gra tion within Eu rope, not the mass out-migration from Eu rope to the United States, Af rica, and Asia.

4. See, for ex am ple, the clas sic mi gra tion study by Les lie Page Moch, Mov ing Eu ro peans: Mi gra tion in West ern Eu rope since 1650, 2nd ed. (Bloom ing ton: In di ana Uni ver sity Press, 1992). Works de voted to war-related mi gra tion in the twen ti eth cen tury are too nu mer ous to count. Re cent stud ies in clude Peter Ga trell, A Whole Em pire Walk ing: Ref u gees in Rus sia dur ing World War I (Bloom ing-ton: In di ana Uni ver sity Press, 1999); Nick Baron and Peter Ga trell, Home lands: War, Pop u la tion and State hood in East ern Eu rope and Rus sia, 1918–1924 (Lon don: An them Press, 2004); Pavel Po lian, Against Their Will: The His tory and Geog ra phy of Forced Mi gra tions in the USSR (Bu da pest: Cen tral Eu ro pean Uni ver sity Press, 2004); and Nor man Nai mark, Fires of Ha tred: Eth nic Cleans ing in Twentieth-Century Eu rope (Cam bridge, MA: Har vard Uni ver sity Press, 2001).

5. See Vlad i mir Mak sim o vich Kab u zan, Za sel e nie Nov o ros sii (Ek a ter i no-s lavs koi i Kher sons koi gu ber nii) v XVIII–per voi pol o vine XIX veka (1719–1858) (Mos-cow: Nauka, 1976); Elena Ioa sa fovna Dru zhi nina, Se ver noe prichernomor’e v 1775–1800 (Mos cow: Nauka,1959); idem, Iuzh naia Ukraina v 1800–1825 (Mos-cow: Nauka, 1970); and Iuzh naia Ukrai nia v pe riod kriz isa fe od a lizma, 1825–1860 (Mos cow: Nauka, 1981). For a more re cent study of the set tle ment of New Rus sia, see Wil lard Sunder land, Tam ing the Wild Field (Ithaca, NY: Cor nell Uni ver sity Press, 2004).

6. For works that pay par tic u lar at ten tion to the East ern Ques tion mi gra-tions between Greece and Rus sia, see Greg ory L. Bruess, Re li gion, Iden tity and Em pire: A Greek Arch bishop in the Rus sia of Cathe rine the Great (Boul der, CO: East Eu ro pean Mono graphs, 1997); John Mazis, The Greeks of Odessa: Di as pora Lead er-ship in Late Im pe rial Rus sia (Boul der, CO: East Eu ro pean Mono graphs, 2004); Theo phi lus Prou sis, Rus sian So ci ety and the Greek Rev o lu tion (De Kalb: North ern Il li nois Uni ver sity Press, 1994); M. A. Arad zhi oni, Greki Kryma i priazov’ia iz u-che niia i is to ri o gra fia et ni ches kii is to rii i kul’tury (88-e gg XVIII v. 90-e gg XX v.) (Sim fer o pol: Amena, 1999); for East ern Ques tion mi gra tions fea tur ing Ar me-ni ans and Bul gar ians, see Vard ges Alek san dro vich Mi kae lian, Na kryms koi zemle: Is to riia ar mi ans kikh pos e le nii v Krymu (Ere van: Ai stan, 1974); Nina Nos kova, Kryms kie bol gary v XIV–na chale XX v.: Is toria i kul’tura (Sim fer o pol: SONAT, 2002).


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7. Rus sian in tel li gent sia of Greek or i gin in clud ing Mi khail Paleo lo gos, Zak ha rii Arkas, and ref u gees from other Eu ro pean areas of the Ot to man Em pire like Alex an dru Sturdza dom i nated the early for ma tion of the Odessa So ci ety of His tory and An tiq uity. See the con trib u tor pages for the jour nal ZOOID (Odessa, 1844–1914).

8. Kemal H. Kar pat, Ot to man Pop u la tion, 1830–1914: Dem o graphic and So cial Char ac ter is tics (Mad i son: Uni ver sity of Wis con sin Press, 1985), 66.

9. Mark Pin son, “Dem o graphic War fare—an As pect of Ot to man and Rus-sian Pol icy, 1854–1866” (PhD diss., Har vard Uni ver sity, 1970).

10. Alan W. Fisher, “Em i gra tion of Mus lims from the Rus sian Em pire in the Years after the Cri mean War,” Jahrbücher für Ges chichte Os teu ro pas 35, no. 3 (1987): 356–71; idem, The Rus sian An nex a tion of Cri mea, 1772–1783 (Cam bridge: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 1987); Bryan Glyn Williams, “The Hijra and Forced Mi gra tion from Nineteenth-Century Rus sia to the Ot to man Em pire: A Crit i cal Anal y sis of the Great Cri mean Tatar Em i gra tion, 1860–1861,” Ca hiers du monde russe 41, no. 1 (2000): 79–108. See also Wil lis Brooks, “Russia’s Con quest and Pac ifi ca tion of the Cau ca sus: Re lo ca tion Be comes a Po grom in the Post–Cri mean War Pe riod,” Na tion al ities Papers 23, no. 4 (1995): 682–83. One of the ear li est stud ies, on which Fisher, Pin son, and Williams based their re search, was com posed by the So viet his to rian Ar se nii Marke vich, “Per es e le niia kryms kikh tatar v Turt siiu v svi azi s dvi zhen nem nas e le niia v Krymu,” Iz ves tiia Ak a de mii nauk SSSR, se riia 8, ot del e nie Gu man i tar nykh nauk, nos. 4–7 (1928): 375–405. For Markevich’s ref er ence to the lim i ta tions of his re search, see “Per es e-le niia kryms kikh tatar v turt siiu,” 395; see also B. M. Vol’fson, “Em i grat siia kryms kikh tatar v 1860 g.,” Is tor i ches kie za pi ski 9 (1940): 186–97; G. I. Le vits kii, “Per esel e nie tatar iz Kryma v Turt siiu,” Vest nik Ev ropy 17, no. 5 (1882): 596–639.

11. Ma te rial from the per sonal fond of Prince Vik tor Ilar i on o vich Vasil’chikov, the man tasked by the Rus sian Com mit tee of Min is ters to in ves ti-gate the causes of Tatar mi gra tion, fig ures cen trally in this anal y sis. The col-lec tion of doc u ments about the Tatar mi gra tion stored in the archives of the Min is try of State Do mains, to which the Rus sian govern ment le gally at tached Tatar state peas ants, of fers ad di tional sources in dis pens able for under stand ing how the war trans formed the pe nin sula and led to the ex o dus of the Ta tars. See RGIA, f. 651, op. 1, d. 468, “O per es e le nii Kryms kikh tatar za gra nitsu”; and RGIA, f. 1287, op. 6, d. 1710, “O per es e le nii kryms kikh tatar za gra nitsu i o ko lo-n i zat sii vla del i ches kikh v Krymu ime nii,” 30 May 1860–16 Jan u ary 1864. Hence-forth these sources will be re ferred to by their fond, opis, and delo num bers only. Vasil’chikov men tions the ex is tence of hun dreds of pages of Tatar pe ti tions, which would have been stored in RGIA, f. 383, op. 17, d. 21728. Un for tu nately, d. 21728 has been marked as “vy bylo” (a word used to de scribe files that have been trans ferred, lost, cen sored or de stroyed) in RGIA records.

12. See Mara Ko zel sky, “Cas u al ties of Con flict: Cri mean Ta tars dur ing the Cri mean War, 1853–1856,” Slavic Re view 67, no. 4 (Win ter 2008): 866–91.

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13. For the most com pre hen sive anal y sis of the causes of the Cri mean War to date, see David Gold frank, The Or i gins of the Cri mean War (New York: Long-man, 1994); and Win fried Baum gart, The Cri mean War: 1853–1856 (Lon don: Ox-ford Uni ver sity Press, 1999). For an anal y sis of re li gious causes of the Cri mean War from the Rus sian side, see the chap ter by Jack Fai rey, this vol ume.

14. The best treat ment of the major events of the Cri mean War re mains E. V. Tarle’s, Kryms kaia voina, 2 vols. (Mos cow: Voen mo riz dat, 1941; repr., 2003).

15. For a brief biog ra phy that in cludes the con tro versy over his evac u a tion of Cri mea, see M. S. Le on i dov, “Pes tel, Vlad i mir Ivan o vich,” in Russ kii bio graf -ches kii slo var (St. Pe ters burg: I. N. Skho rok ho dova, 1902), 13:591–92.

16. The de struc tion of bread re serves, live stock, and other food stuff proved dev as tat ing to the ci vil ian pop u la tion. Multi ple files about the food req ui si tion exist in Rus sian and Cri mean archives. For ex am ples, see “O rask ho dakh na unich tozh e nie zap a sov khleba v Ev pa to rii, pri vtor zhe nii v onuiu ne priia te lia,” RGIA, f. 1287, op. 6, d. 1184, ll. 1–12; “Ob unich to zhen noe ili vyvoz v ot da len-noe ot be rega moria zap a sov drov v Ial tins kom i Fe od o siis kom uez dakh,” GAARK, f. op. 1, d. 19778, ll. 1–28. For req ui si tion ing later in the war, see “O per evozke iz raz nykh punk tov do 63,000 chet ver tei i pro vi anta i fu ra zha dlia voisk . . . ,” GAARK, f. 26, op. 1, d. 20096, ll. 1–32.

17. Ni ko lai Mikhno, “Iz zap i sok chi nov nika o Kryms koi voine,” in Ma ter i aly dlia is to rii kryms koi voiny i ob o rony se vas to po lia: Sbornik’, iz da vaem yii ko mit e tom po us troistvu sevastopol’skago mu zeia, vy pusk III (St. Pe ters burg, 1872), 7; and V. S. Rakov, Moi vos pom i na niia o Ev pa to rii v epokhu Kryms koi voiny, 1853–1856 (Ev pa-toria: Tip. M. L. Mu ro vans kago, 1904), 30–37.

18. Al though Cri mean archives con tain ev i dence re gard ing pil lag ing and plunder dur ing the evac u a tions when au thor ities made ar rests, very lit tle archi val in for ma tion exist about the ex pe ri ence of the evac u ees them selves.

19. On 3 Oc to ber 1854, for ex am ple, the head of fi cer of the Cos sack Ulan di vi sion wrote local au thor ities in Ev pa toria that “Greeks, Ar me ni ans and even a few chi nov niki” robbed aban doned Tatar vil lages; the au thor ities re sponded that Cos sacks were also in volved in the plunder. “O sokh ra ne nii imush chestva os tav len nago tat a rami be zhav shimi k ne pri a te liu,” GAARK, f. 26, op. 1, d. 20024, ll. 1–10; here ll. 2, 4.

20. Abun dant re ports of Cri mean res i dents who lost prop erty to Al lied plunder, fire, and bom bard ment exist in Cri mean archives. The larg est col lec-tions are stored in GAARK, f. 128 and f.165, both with hun dreds of files about losses in the Sim fer o pol and Kerch dis tricts re spec tively.

21. For ex am ple, two Ta tars were im pli cated by local vil lag ers in the mur der of two Ka raim mer chants. “Ob ubiistve bliz der. Ur kusta dvukh Ka rai mov,” GAARK, f. 26, op. 1, d. 20079, ll. 1–15.

22. Cos sacks were also guilty of rob bing land owner es tates. “Po ob’iavleniiu Shtab Rot meis tura Re vel i oti ob og ra ble nii ego v d. kon tu gan Dons kimi


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Kaz a kami,” 27 No vem ber 1854, GAARK, f. 26, op. 1, d. 20065, ll. 1–7; the at tacks on the vil lag ers in creased again as troops pulled out. See also “Po ra portu Simferopol’skogo Zems kogo Is prav nika O bez por i adke pro is ve dav shikh v der. Uppy,” GAARK, f. 27, op. 1, d. 6649.

23. For an order pro hib it ing base less ar rests, see “O vpos presh che nii sol-da tam brat’ pod ar rest Tatar’ bez pri chiny,” GAARK, f. 26, op. 1, d. 19726.

24. “O doz vo le nii Tat a rinu Sel i amet Me mirsh Olgu vozvratit’sia v Krym na vre mia pro da zhi ego imush chestva,” GAARK, f. 26, op. 2, d. 66, l. 16.

25. Rakov, Moi vos pom i na niia, 6. For his in volve ment in Tatar ar rest and exile, see “O Vysyl’ke v Voen no sud nuiu Kom mis siiu tatar, iz me niv shikh Russ komu Pre stolu,” GAARK, f. 26, op. 1, d. 19999, l. 88. The me moirs of the par ish priest about the enemy in va sion of Ev pa toria were writ ten in 1856 and are stored with out title or clear sig na ture in OR RNB, Arch bishop In no ken tii Bor i sov, 1847–1857, f. 313, op. 1, d. 44, ll. 724–40.

26. The Al lied re la tion ship to the Tatar in sur rec tion awaits ex tended re search. One ex cep tion in cludes an ar ti cle by Hakan Ki rimli about the French use of Mus sad Giray (a de scen dent of the Cri mean khans who had been liv ing in the Ot to man Em pire) in Ev pa toria. See “O Kryms kot a tars kikh vois kakh v sos tave Os mans koi armii v pe riod Kryms koi voiny,” Golos Kryma, 31 Oc to ber 2003), 7; idem, “Kryms kie ta tary i Os mans kaia im pe riia vo vre mia Kryms koi voiny,” in Cri mean War 1853–1856: Co lo nial Skir mishes or Re hear sal for World War, ed. Jerzy W. Bo rejsza (War saw: Wy daw nictwo Ne ri ton In sty tut His to rii PAN, 2011), 333–50; and Rakov, Moi vos pom i na niia, 32, which de scribes a Polish in sur-rec tion ist by the name of To kars kii who in cited un rest among the Ta tars. For Al lied ac tiv ity among Mus lim tribes in the Cau ca sus, see A. D. Pa nesh, Za pad naia Cher ke siia v sis teme vzai mo deist viia ros sii s turt siei, an gliei, i imam a tom sha mii lia v XIXv (do 1864) (Mai kop: Ad y geis kii re spu bli kans kii in sti tut gu man i tar nykh iss led o va nii im. T. M. Ker a sheva, 2007).

27. The Min is try of State Do mains to Tau ride Gen eral Governor Pes tel, 14 Oc to ber 1854, “O per es e le nii Ta tary iz Kryma vnu tri Ros sii,” GAARK, f. 26, op. 1, d. 20004, l. 18.

28. He stayed in this po si tion from No vem ber 1854 through May 1856. See anon., “Ad ler berg, Count Ni ko lai Vlad i mir o vich,” in Russ kii bio graf ches kii slo var, 1:78; and anon., “Ad ler berg, Count Ni ko lai Vlad i mir o vich,” in Voen naia Ent sik lo-pe diia (Mos cow: V. F. No vits kago,1911), 1:145.

29. “An drei Grig o rie vich Strog a nov,” Russ kii bio graf ches kii slo var, 19:484–85.30. For an ex tended treat ment of Rus sian pol icy to ward Ta tars be fore the

Cri mean War, see Kelly Ann O’Neill, “Between Sub ver sion and Sub mis sion: The In te gra tion of the Cri mean Kha nate into the Rus sian Em pire, 1783–1853” (PhD diss., Har vard Uni ver sity, 2006).

31. Many Ta tars re ceived com men da tions for their ser vice in Cri mea dur ing the war. See, for ex am ple, “O na grazh de nii Tat a rina [Bey Namer Se lim sha]

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Oglu se reb ri a noiu me da liu,” RGIA, f. 560, op. 38, d. 146, l. 1859; and “Chi nov niki na grazh den se reb ri a noi me da liu dlia sluzhby v Se vas to pole,” GAARK, f. 27, op. 1, d. 6628, l. 50.

32. “O per es e le nii Ta tary iz Kryma vnu tri Ros sii,” GAARK, f. 26, op. 1, d. 20004, ll. 1–40. Be fore the Al lies landed, the Tau ride govern ment had dis cussed the evac u a tion of the shore re gions in July, but such con ver sa tions took a much more om i nous tone in Sep tem ber, after the Ta tars in Ev pa toria mu tin ied. By mid-September, Prince Al ex an der Men shi kov and Tau ride gen eral governor Pes tel ex changed sev eral pieces of cor re spon dence stra te giz ing Tatar evac u a-tion, but other of fi cials, in clud ing those in the Min is try of State Do mains, to which Tatar peas ants were le gally as signed, ob jected and en cour aged Men shi-kov and Pes tel to wait until spring. In March and April 1855, the ques tion of Tatar evac u a tion from coastal re gions re emerged, this time under the mil i tary governor of Tau ride and Sim fer o pol, Ad ler berg, and the new head com mander of the Rus sian mil i tary, Gor cha kov. Under their lead er ship, evac u a tion of Ta tars com menced but was not com pletely car ried out due to ob jec tions from some local land lords, of fi cials in the Min is try of State Do mains, the short age of man-power in the mil i tary to con duct the evac u a tion safely, and Gorchakov’s own res er va tions (ibid., ll. 60–129).

33. Cri mean archives con tain a num ber of files about the ar rest of Cri mean Ta tars. See Ko zel sky, “Cas u al ties of Con flict,” 866–91.

34. M. Murav’ev, un ti tled Min is try of State Do mains re port, no. 2292, 21 No vem ber 1860, RGIA, f. 651, op. 1, d. 468, ll. 144–46.

35. Prior to this point, pro vin cial of fi cials and of fi cers were to issue res i-dents re ceipts for every thing req ui si tioned, for re im burse ment after the war. As fight ing in Cri mea con tin ued and food grew scarce, Gor cha kov im ple-mented the plan in Tash-Basty in part to “in cul cate[e] in the peo ple a trust for the government’s jus tice.” See the lim ited pub li ca tion of meet ing min utes and re ports from the Rus sian Min is try of the Inter ior, De cem ber 1856, no. 1518, Vsop o mozh e niiakh Nov o ros siis komu Kraiu i voobsh che o me rakh k voz stan nov le niu onago posle voinyi (St. Pe ters burg: Mini sterstvo Vnu tren nikh Del/ Khoz i aist ven-nyi otdel, 1857), 13.

36. Ibid., 13–14.37. After the war, the govern ment took sev eral meas ures to aid in Crimea’s

re cov ery, in clud ing the dis tri bu tion of eight thou sand oxen and hun dreds of horses to Cri mean peas ants. This dis tri bu tion met mixed suc cess, with some vil lages fairly al lot ting the live stock and oth ers suf fer ing ex ploi ta tion. See “O vspo mosh chest vo va nii Oby va tel iam Tav ri ches koi Gu ber nii ot kazny 3,000 para volov,” GAARK, f. 26, op. 1, d. 20982.

38. Un ti tled sum mary re port from the meet ing of the Min is try of Inter nal Af fairs, 22 De cem ber 1856, “O dar o va nii po so bii Nov o ros siis komu kraiu i Bes sa-rabs koi oblasti, po slu chaiu ny nesh nykh voen nykh obstoiatel’stv,” RGIA, f. 560, op. 12, d. 346, 1860, l. 159.


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39. Ibid., l. 159.40. Ibid., Count Strog a nov to Al ex an der II, 17 June 1856, RGIA, f. 560, op.

12, d. 346, 1860, l. 55.41. Ibid., ll. 55–56.42. Ibid., Count Strog a nov to Al ex an der II, l. 56. As the Com mit tee of

Min is ters de bated what meas ures to take in order to aid Crimea’s re cov ery, it con cluded that those meas ures es tab lished for the Na pol e onic Wars fell short of the need in New Rus sia and par tic u larly in Cri mea.

43. “O vos presh che nii Po mesh chitse Mav ro mik haili zakh vat y vami os tav-shie sia posle uched shikh za gra nitsu tatar,” GAARK, f. 26, op. 2, d. 52, ll. 1–5.

44. Rus sian ad min is tra tors from the era of Cathe rine II com pared the ag ri-cul tu ral prac tices of Ger mans and Men non ites fa vor ably with those of Rus sian serfs and other eth nic groups. For a good syn op sis of Rus sian at ti tudes to ward Ger man set tlers, see Det lef Brandes, “A Suc cess Story: The Ger man Col o nists in New Rus sia and Bes sa ra bia, 1787–1914,” Acta Slav ica Ia pon ica 9 (1991): 32–46.

45. “Otchet gu ber na tora Sim fer o po lia i Tav ri ches kago Grazh dans kago Gu ber na tora, o sos toia nii Tav ri ches koi gu ber nii za 1855,” RGIA, f. 1263, op. 1, d. 2552, l. 51.

46. Re port about es tab lish ing prop erty prices in Ev pa toria dis trict for mort gage trans fers from the Treas ury, “Ob uch rezh de nii kom i teta po soz da niu zak o nov stoimost’ zemli raz rushen ne priia te lia,” GAARK, f. 327 op. 1, d. 999, l. 13.

47. For a dis cus sion of state set tle ment pol i cies, see Brandes, “Suc cess Story”; Sunder land, Tam ing the Wild Field; Kab u zan, Za sel e nie Nov o ros sii; Dru-zhi nina, Iuzh naia Ukrai nia v pe riod kriz isa fe od a lizma; and Nich o las Brey fo gle, Here tics and Col o niz ers: Forg ing Russia’s Em pire in the South Cau ca sus (Ithaca, NY: Cor nell Uni ver sity Press, 2005).

48. See Mara Ko zel sky, Chris tian iz ing Cri mea: Shap ing Sa cred Space in the Rus sian Em pire and Be yond (De Kalb: North ern Il li nois Uni ver sity Press), 67–78.

49. Murav’ev, un ti tled re port to Min is try of State Do mains, RGIA, f. 651, op. 1, d. 468, ll. 146–47.

50. Most likely, the min is try ex er cised this lim ited cau tion, be cause Prince Gor cha kov had inter vened in ear lier ex changes among local of fi cials about what to do with Tatar land va cated dur ing war time. When Yalta and Ev pa toria dis trict of fi cials rec om mended re as sign ing va cant Tatar land to the state in 1855, Gor cha kov warned of fi cials first to de ter mine whether the “empty lands” be longed to mu ti nous Ta tars, Ta tars who had been for cibly evac u ated, or Ta tars who had been taken cap tive. See RGIA, f. 1263 op. 1, d. 2552, l. 51.

51. Murav’ev, un ti tled re port to Min is try of State Do mains, RGIA, f. 651, op. 1, d. 468, l. 148.

52. The fol low ing two par a graphs about Tatar mi gra tion con sist of mod ified ma te rial from Ko zel sky, “Cas u al ties of Con flict,” 884–86.

53. GAARK, f. 26, op. 4, d. 1495, 1. 11.54. GAARK, f. 26, op. 4, d. 1579, l. 4.

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55. “O tat a rakh per edaut sikh sia taino ne priia te liu i vye zhant siikh za gra-nitsu,” GAARK, f. 26, op. 4, d. 1605, l. 1.

56. Ibid., l. 3.57. “O os vo bozh de nii iz pod aresta iz ot suda lits zam e chenn nykh v sno-

she nii s ne priia te lem,” GAARK, f. 26, op. 4, d. 1685, l. 65.58. Win fried Baumgart’s mono graph on the Peace of Paris, the only full-

length study in En glish, does not dis cuss the ref u gees from the war, a ques tion that was in fact very im por tant in the peace pro cess and the war’s after math. See Baum gart, The Peace of Paris, 1856: Stud ies in War, Di plo macy, and Peace mak ing, trans. Ann Pot tinger Saab (Ox ford: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 1981).

59. “Trak tat zak lu chenyi v pa rizhe 18 (30) Marta 1856,” in Tarle, Kryms kaia voina, un pag i nated ap pen dix.

60. Un ti tled re port in the Min is try of State Do mains, 21 No vem ber 1860, no. 2401, RGIA, f. 651, op. 1, d. 468, l. 150.

61. Un ti tled re port in the Min is try of State Do mains, 12 No vem ber 1859 (orig i nal date) and 15 De cem ber 1860 (copy), no. 2401, RGIA, f. 651, op. 1, d. 468, l. 3.

62. For an ex plo ra tion of Chris tian re li gious rhet o ric about the Cri mean War, see Ko zel sky, Chris tian iz ing Cri mea; for Ot to man jihad rhet o ric, see Can-dan Badem, The Ot to man Cri mean War (1853–1856) (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 91–100. For a sweep ing syn the sis of re search on re li gion and the Cri mean War, see the first two chap ters of Or lando Figes, The Cri mean War: A His tory (New York: Met ro pol i tan Books, 2011).

63. The theo ret i cal lit er a ture on re li gion and vi o lence is quite large. Prin-ci ple works in clude Re gina Schwartz, The Curse of Cain: The Vi o lent Leg acy of Monothe ism (Chi cago: Uni ver sity of Chi cago Press, 1997); Mark Juer gen smeyer, Ter ror in the Mind of God: The Glo bal Rise of Re li gious Vi o lence (Berke ley: Uni ver sity of Cal i for nia Press, 2000); J. Har old El lens, ed., The De struc tive Power of Re li gion: Vi o lence in Ju da ism, Chris ti an ity and Islam, 4 vols. (West port, CT: Praeger, 2004); Charles Kim ball, When Re li gion Be comes Evil (San Fran cisco: Harper Col lins, 2003); and Charles Se leg nut, Sa cred Fury: Under stand ing Re li gious Vi o lence (Lan-ham, MD: Al ta mira, 2003).

64. Kar pat, Ot to man Pop u la tion, 62.65. The Gen eral Governor of New Rus sia and Bes sa ra bia to the Min is ter of

Inter nal Af fairs from 10 Au gust 1859, re port no. 7704, RGIA, f. 651, op. 1, d. 468, l. 235.

66. From the Min is try of State Do mains, RGIA, f. 651, op. 1, d. 468, ll. 9–10.67. New Rus sian and Bes sa ra bian Gen eral Governor to the Min is ter of State

Do mains, Sep tem ber 9, 1860, f. 1287, op. 6, d. 1710, l. 4.68. Anon y mous re port to the Min is ter of the Inter ior S. S. Lans koi, RGIA,

f. 651, op. 1, d. 468, l. 161.69. “Za piska vy se le nii Tatar iz Kryma,” un signed and un dated, RGIA,

f. 1287, op. 6, d. 1710, l. 70.


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70. Ibid.71. RGIA, f. 651, op. 1, d. 470, “Ra port— musul’manskogo svi ash che nos lu-

zhit e lem Alek sandr Us ma nov Bog dan o vich v Tav ri ches koe Ma gom e tans koe Duk hov noe Prav le nie o zap ro som o prich i nakh per esel e nie tatar Kryms koe po lus trove v Turt siiu,” June 1860, l. 1. RGIA files have pre served only Bogdano- vich’s re quest, and not the an swer.

72. “O vy se le nii Tatar’ iz Kryma,” an un signed re port from the Min is try of the Inter ior, stored in the Min is try of State Do main files, 22 No vem ber 1860, RGIA, f. 1287, op. 6, d. 1710, l. 83.

73. The Vasil’chikov fam ily col lec tion in RGIA con tains multi ple files about V. I. Vasil’chikov’s in quiry into the in ten dancy. See, for ex am ple, “Per episka po delu o zlou pot re ble niia v in ten dantstve iuzh noi armii,” RGIA, f. 651, op. 1, d. 416.

74. The Com mit tee of Min is ters or dered that the Tatar pe ti tions gath ered by Vasil’chikov be trans ferred to the Min is try of State Do mains. These re ports ap pear to have been stored in RGIA, f. 383, op. 17, d. 21728, which ac cord ing to RGIA records, no longer ex ists.

75. Ed u ard Tot le ben to Prince Va si lii An dree vich Dol gor u kov, 15 No vem ber 1860, RGIA, f. 651, op. 1, d. 468, ll. 106, 112. Totleben’s notes were pub lished three decades later in Russ kaia Sta rina, and this chap ter draws from both the archi val and the pub lished form. See Ed u ard Tot le ben, “O vy se le nii tatar iz Kryma v 1860 gody,” Russ kaia sta rina 78 (1893): 531–50.

76. Tot le ben, “O vy se le nii tatar iz Kryma v 1860 gody,” 535.77. Ivan Lamp sei to Vik tor Il i ar i on o vich Vasil’chikov, RGIA, f. 651, op. 1,

d. 471, “Za piska per ekops kogo uezd nogo pred vod i te lia dvor i anstva Sim- feropol’,” in “O prich i nakh per es e le niia Kryms kikh tatar v Turt siiu (1861),” Feb ru ary 1861, l. 2.

78. Spe cifi cally, Lamp sei at trib uted the Tatar ex o dus to the pil lag ing of bread re serves as well as the gen eral abuse of vil lages dur ing the war by the po lice and the local Min is try of State Do mains. After the war, Ta tars lost in the re dis tri bu tion of land and live stock, the lat ter of which was in tended to help the poor est of Cri mean vil lag ers but often went to the wealthi est. After the war, the tax bur den in creased for Ta tars, who as the ma jor ity pop u la tion on the pe nin sula, paid for the peninsula’s re build ing and for the sus te nance of the Cri mean Tatar Squad ron. Fi nally, Lamp sei pointed to the gen eral cor rup tion that per vaded local govern ment dur ing and after the war. Lamp sei to Vasil’chikov, Feb ru ary 1861, RGIA, f. 651, op.1, d. 471, l. 3.

79. Ko mi tet Mini sterstva, “Za pi ski iz zhur nala Kom i teta Mini sterstva,” 30 May, 6 and 20 June 1861, “ RGIA, f. 1287, op. 6, d. 1710, ll. 104–23, esp. 104–5.

80. For anal y sis of the im por tance of sen a to rial re views for re stor ing order to pro vin cial ad min is tra tion, see A. N. Biktasheva’s Ka zans kie gu ber na tory v di alog akh vlas tei: Per vaia pol o vina XIX veka (Kazan: Natsional’nyi muzei re spu bliki Ta tar stan, 2008). Bik ta sheva argued in her study of sen a to rial re views of the

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Kazan prov ince that of fi cial re views typ i cally re sulted in the dis mis sal or dis ci-plin ing of re gional govern ors.

81. Ko mi tet Mini sterstva, “Za pi ski,” ll. 107–8.82. Ibid., l. 110.83. Ibid., ll. 113.84. Ibid., ll. 115–23.85. Ko zel sky, “Cas u al ties of Con flict,” 889.86. Let ter from Act ing State Coun cilor Gen gros to the Min is ter of State

Do mains, 15 Sep tem ber 1860, GAARK, f. 1287, op. 6, d. 1710, ll. 8–10.87. “Vy so chaishe ut verzh den noe pra vila o za sel e nie Kryma i Tav ri ches koi

Gu ber nii Russ kii i in os tran nymi per es e lent sami 1860,” GAARK, f. 26, op. 1, d. 24129, ll. 63–64.

88. Ko zel sky, Chris tian iz ing Cri mea, 152–55.89. Gul’nara Ab du laeva, “Kryms kie ta tary v Vos toch noi (Kryms koi)

voine,” Advet, 22 Jan u ary 2007, 11.90. Ko zel sky, “Cas u al ties of Con flict,” 889.91. See Rob ert D. Crews, For Prophet and Tsar: Islam and Em pire in Rus sia and

Cen tral Asia (Cam bridge, MA: Har vard Uni ver sity Press, 2006), 300–311; and James Meyer, “Im mi gra tion, Re turn, and the Pol i tics of Cit i zen ship: Rus sian Mus lims in the Ot to man Em pire, 1860–1914,” Inter na tional Jour nal of Mid dle East ern Stud ies 39 (2007): 15–32.

92. Fisher, “Em i gra tion of Mus lims from the Rus sian Em pire,” 356. See also Can dan Badem’s chap ter in this vol ume.

93. See Nai mark, Fires of Ha tred.94. Some Tatar his to rians have thus de scribed the dep or ta tion of Ta tars

under Sta lin as “ful fill ing the eter nal dreams of the Rus sian tsars.” See for ex am ple, Ibraim Ab dul laev, “Torg s is to riei ne umes ten!,” Golos Kryma no. 28, 7 July 2006; and V. E. Voz grin, Is tor i ches kie sudby Kryms kikh tatar (Mos cow: Mysl’, 1992), 324–30.

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Rus sia, Mount Athos, and the East ern Ques tion, 1878–1914

Lora Gerd

Be gin ning in the seven teenth cen tury, Rus sia turned its po lit i cal as pi rations to ward the Black Sea and the Straits of the Bos porus and Dar danelles. The de sire for a free exit to the Med i ter ra nean for its trade, and from the eigh teenth cen tury on ward a safe guard for its south ern fron tier, gen er ated a more as ser tive Rus sian foreign pol icy in its south west ern bor der lands. The only pos sible way to guar an tee these eco nomic and se cur ity re quire ments was the pos ses sion of the Turk ish Straits and Con stan tin o ple. The many times re vised the ory of Rus sian dom i na tion in the East ern Chris tian world con tin ued to pro vide the ideo log i cal back ground for this strat egy, for after the fall of Con stan tin o ple in 1453, Rus sia re mained the only free and strong Or tho dox state in the world. As the selfproclaimed heir of By zan tium and the pro tec tor of the Or thodox world, Rus sia sought to add le git i macy to its foreign pol icy ob jectives through re li gious back ing until the rev o lu tion of 1917. By the late eigh teenth cen tury, im pe rial Rus sian foreign pol icy de parted from this gen eral line, but after the de feat in the Cri mean war (1853–56), Rus sian pol icy mak ers re turned to the ec cle sias ti cal trend when for mu lat ing strat egy in the Near East.

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Russia’s spir i tual en ter prise in the Ot to man Em pire aimed at achieving closer con tacts with the Or tho dox pop u la tion while strength en ing tsar ist in flu ence in the east ern Med i ter ra nean as a whole. Mount Athos, a col lec tion of mon as ter ies sit u ated on a small pe nin sula in the north of the Ae gean, played a lead ing role in this pro cess. Un like the Rus sian foun da tions in Pal es tine, the Rus sian mo nas tic com mu nity on the holy moun tain had a long his tory out side govern ment in itia tives. Rather, the spir i tual as pi ra tions of com mon peo ple (narod) sup ported by the tsars and gov ern ing elite pro vided the ma te rial foun da tion for Russia’s pres ence on Athos. This chap ter ex plores how Rus sian pol icy between the RussianOttoman War of 1877–78 and the First World War har nessed pop u lar spir i tu al ity for geo stra tegic pur poses. Stated dif fer ently, this chap ter con sid ers the pos sible sub or di na tion of the gen eral line of Russian stra te gic aims in the Bal kans and the Near East to purely spir i tual con cerns. It argues that de bates sur round ing mon as ti cism on Mount Athos crys tal lized the ten sions between Rus sia and Greece over po lit i cal inter ests in newly in de pen dent re gions of the for mer Ot to man Em pire. The case of Athos fur ther dem on strates the con tin u ing rel e vance of

Russian Skete of St. Andrew. The diplomat B. S. Serafimov and Archimandrite Hieronym to his right, 1913. (from the Photograph Archive, Simonopetra Monastery)

Russia, Mount Athos, and the Eastern Question, 1878–1914

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re li gion in the RussianOttomanBalkan re la tion ship. Fi nally, the case of Mount Athos sug gests ways in which pop u lar spir i tu al ity could in flu ence East ern Ques tion di plo macy.

The RussianOttoman War of 1877–78 changed the map of the Bal kans. The Treaty of San Ste fano fi nal iz ing the war sanc tioned the crea tion of an in de pen dent Bul gar ian state, cov er ing a large ter ri tory in the Bal kan pe nin sula. Un satis fied with the re sults of the peace, Brit ain and AustriaHungary inter vened to thwart the Rus sian quest to create a large Slavic buf fer state on the road to Con stan tin o ple. The Ber lin Con gress con vened in June 1878 by the Ger man chan cel lor Otto von Bis marck, who acted the “hon est bro ker,” partly re vised the terms of the San Ste fano Treaty. The semiindependent Bul gar ian Prin ci pal ity was lim ited to the area between the Da nube and the Bal kan moun tains. East ern Ru me lia re mained sub or di nate to the sul tan, and a vaguely de fined re gion called Mac e do nia with a large Sla vonic pop u la tion stayed within the bor ders of the Ot to man Em pire as well. This com pro mise de ci sion led to fur ther con fron ta tions in the tur bu lent Bal kan re gion.

The pro ject of “Great Bul garia” pro posed by the Rus sian am bas sa dor to the Sub lime Porte, Count Ni ko lai Ignat’ev, there fore failed. De spite the gen eral dis ap point ment with the re sults of the Con gress of Ber lin, Rus sian di plo macy in sisted on in clud ing an im por tant ar ti cle, num ber 62, which pro vided dip lo matic pat ron age for the nonGreek monks on Athos. This cru cial point guar an teed the auton o mous ex is tence of a Rus sian com mu nity in Ot to man ter ri tory under Rus sian state pro tec tion. In the fol low ing decades pre ced ing the First World War, the cen ter of the East ern Ques tion re mained the straits, Con stan tin o ple, and the ad ja cent ter ri tory. Mount Athos, due to its im por tant geo graph i cal loca tion on the south ern coast of Mac e do nia and its spir i tual sig nifi cance for the East ern Or tho dox world, was a cen ter of at ten tion for all the states inter ested in the fu ture di vi sion of the Ot to man leg acy.1

As the Ot to man Em pire with drew from south east ern Eu rope, Russia quickly moved to con sol i date its in flu ence in the va cated ter ri to ries through dip lo matic means and grass roots ag i ta tion. The Rus sian Foreign Min is try de ployed spe cially pre pared agents from St. Pe ters burg to work among the local pop u la tion. The tra di tional sup port ers of Russian pol icy in the Bal kans and the Near East were the Or tho dox peo ples of the Ot to man Em pire, in clud ing Greeks, Bul gar ians, Serbs, and Arabs. These peo ples formed a “state within a state” in the sultan’s do main, en joy ing a large de gree of semiindependence, thanks to their spe cial po si tion within the mil let system. On their way to the west dur ing the

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years of con quest in the four teenth cen tury, the Ot to man sul tans formed sep ar ate com mu nities from the nonMuslim pop u la tion called mil lets. In side the mil lets, the Chris tians or Jews could fol low their re li gion and live ac cord ing to their own ju rid i cal norms. Until the re forms in the mid dle of the nine teenth cen tury known as the Tan zi mat, re li gion, not na tion al ism, formed the guid ing prin ci ple for the mil let system. The term mil let ac quired new mean ing only with the rise of Bal kan na tion alism and es pe cially in con nec tion with the Bul gar ian ec cle sias ti cal question by the 1870s.2

As the lead ers of the Or tho dox mil let, the re li gious au thor ities in these Chris tian com mu nities played the role of po lit i cal ad min is tra tors. This is one rea son why the church was so im por tant in Rus sian foreign pol icy for mu la tion in the Near East and the Bal kans. The shared Or thodox faith gave Rus sian pol icy mak ers in St. Pe ters burg and in con su lar posts through out the re gion a strong ideo log i cal weapon, which was an es sen tial ad van tage over the West ern great pow ers. This di rec tion of Rus sian Near East ern pol icy was tra di tional since at least the six teenth cen tury, when Rus sia de clared it self the suc ces sor of By zan tium in the Or tho dox world. Phil an thropic do na tions to East ern mon as ter ies and churches, and gen eral sup port of Or tho doxy in the Ot to man Em pire, com bined with po lit i cal as pi ra tions formed the basis of Rus sian pol icy in the re gion. In the nine teenth cen tury, a new mod ifi ca tion of the same the ory of the Third Rome in mod ern con di tions emerged.

One of the main ob sta cles for Rus sian ac tiv i ties in the Bal kans in the sec ond half of the nine teenth cen tury was the Bul gar ian schism, pro claimed by the Pa tri ar chate of Con stan tin o ple in 1872.3 The strug gle of the Bul gar ian peo ple for na tional in de pen dence led to the es tab lishment of a re gion of church auton omy in 1870, called the Bul gar ian Exar chate. The PanSlavicoriented Rus sian govern ment of the 1860s and 1870s strongly sup ported the Bul gar ian move ment for church in de pendence. The fact of the schism, how ever, put Rus sia in a very dif fi cult po si tion. On one hand, Rus sia did not stop sup port ing the Bul gar ians, yet it could not allow it self to ig nore the pa tri ar chal coun cil of 1872. Rus sia had no op por tu nity to sup port the Bul gar ians openly in order to avoid a con flict with the Ec u men i cal Pa tri ar chate. There fore, St. Pe tersburg main tained a pas sive po si tion by tack ing between the two sides. In fact, Rus sia was aware of the dan ger ous com pli ca tions of uni lat eral ac tion and gen er ally re jected op por tu nities to take an ac tive part in the major po lit i cal events in the Bal kans dur ing this pe riod. The Russian Holy Synod con tin ued send ing money and other forms of aid to


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Bul gar ian mon as ter ies and churches, and scores of Bul gar ian youths con tin ued to study in Rus sian theo log i cal acad e mies on im pe rial schol arships. How ever, of fi cial re la tions between the Rus sian and the Bul gar ian churches ceased for many decades, until the final aban don ing of the schism in 1945. In 1878 and af ter ward, the Bul gar ian Ex ar chate be came the ban ner be hind which the Bul gar ian na tion al ist move ment waged the strug gle against the Greeks in Mac e do nia. Dur ing this broil ing con flict, Rus sia tried to play the role of peace maker and with drew its sup port from ei ther side.4

As the con tro versy sur round ing Bul gar ian ec cle sias ti cal in de pendence gained mo men tum, Rus sian re la tions with the in de pen dent Kingdom of Greece re mained rather cool. In the 1880s dur ing the ten ure of Prime Min is ter Cha ri laos Tri kou pis, who kept Greece closely aligned with Great Brit ain in Near East ern af fairs, there could be no ques tion of ac tive ec cle sias ti cal and po lit i cal coop er a tion between Rus sia and Greece. In Con stan tin o ple, the “sec ond cen ter of Hel len ism” ac cord ing to the ma jor ity of Greek ob serv ers, Rus sia tried to sup port the mod er ate bish ops, who were mostly na tives from the Ot to man re gions of the Balkans and Asia Minor. These hier archs, if not friendly, at least tol er ated Russia’s am bi tions in ec cle sias ti cal ques tions. The dip lo matic slo gan of the times was “to el e vate the Greek East ern clergy in its own eyes” and to di vest it of the nation alis tic in flu ence of Ath ens. Rus sian agents were in structed to in spire a “true ec u men i cal spirit,” free from na tion al ist as pi ra tions.5 A united, peace ful Or tho dox world under Rus sian di rection, the final goal of Rus sian church pol icy, could be formed only on a super na tional basis. At this point, the Rus sian im pe rial idea of an ec umen i cal Or tho dox com mu nity contra dicted the Greek ir re den tist Great Idea (Meg ali Idea), which aimed at the lib er a tion and uni fi ca tion all historic Greek lands with Con stan tin o ple as the nat u ral cen ter. The ri valry of these two ideas de ter mined re la tions between Rus sia and the Greek world in the nine teenth and at the be gin ning of the twen ti eth cen tury.

The cen ter of ec cle sias ti cal re la tions between Rus sia and the Or tho dox pop u la tion of the Ot to man Em pire was the Ec u men i cal Pa tri ar chate of Con stan tin o ple. The tur bu lent world of the pa tri ar chal synod and the Mixed Coun cil (Mik ton Sym bou leion) was a con stant ob ject of at ten tion for the Rus sian em bassy in Con stan tin o ple. At the same time, Rus sian agents could use ec cle sias ti cal pol i tics as an av e nue for ex er cis ing in fluence and pres sure. Pa tri arch Joa chim III (first pa tri ar chate, 1878–84) was the most suit able per son through whom Rus sia could pur sue such a pol icy of bal ance and ma neu ver in the re gion. Joa chim kept a

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mod er ate proRussian po si tion and had great au thor ity among the Greek pop u la tion of Tur key. In contrast, his suc ces sors, Joa chim IV (1884–86), Dio ny sios V (1887–90), An thi mos VII (1895–97), and Constan tine V (1897–1901), pur sued an antiRussian line dur ing their ten ures on the pa tri ar chal throne. Dur ing his sec ond term as pa tri ar chate (1901–12), Joa chim III was in itially sup ported by Rus sia but did not meet the Rus sian aims to the de gree that was ex pected; he pre ferred to lis ten to ad vis ers from Ath ens and be came a strong sup porter of the Meg ali Idea.

The first decade of the twen ti eth cen tury was a pe riod of stag na tion in Rus sian Bal kan and Near East pol icy.6 On one hand, a se ries of trea ties with AustroHungary (first of all, the Murav’evGoluchwski agree ment of 1897), de signed to pre serve the status quo in the Bal kans, lim ited the flex ibil ity of Russia’s pol icy. On the other, Rus sia was too busy in its war with Japan and later the rev o lu tion ary events of 1905–7 to pay much at ten tion to the Near East. The “Dip lo matic Tsu shima” of the Bos nian cri sis of 1908–9, which led to fur ther hu mil i a tion of Rus sia, was fol lowed by an at tempt to re view the re ac tive pol icy of the pre vi ous decades. It was only in the sec ond decade of the twen ti eth cen tury that St. Pe ters burg again adopted a more ac tive pol icy in the re gion. In 1911– 12, Rus sia pro vided strong dip lo matic sup port for the Bal kan Al li ance (in clud ing Greece, Ser bia, Bul garia, and Mon te ne gro). Usu ally re garded as the most im por tant as pect of Russia’s Bal kan foreign pol icy in this pe riod, the for ma tion of the Bal kan Al li ance may be St. Petersburg’s only se ri ous suc cess at the be gin ning of the twen ti eth cen tury. As one of the con di tions of sup port for the al li ance, Rus sia de manded the mend ing of the Bul gar ian schism. Nev er the less, the Bal kan Wars (1912– 13) did not bring the re sults that Rus sia ex pected. The new map of the Bal kans failed to satisfy the Bal kan na tions, es pe cially Bul garia, which lost in 1913 most of the ter ri to rial gains won in the pre ced ing year. Nei ther could the ec cle sias ti cal prob lem be solved. Thus, on the eve of the First World War, the po lit i cal and ec cle sias ti cal sit u a tion in the Bal kans re mained tense and dan ger ous.7

In this com pli cated inter na tional set ting, the Rus sian Foreign Min istry, lim ited in its mil i tary and po lit i cal ac tiv i ties, paid more at ten tion to its ideo log i cal in stru ments. Mount Athos played a pri mary role, due to its geo graph i cal sit u a tion in Mac e do nia and be cause of its unique, outstand ing po si tion in the Ae gean and prox im ity to the Straits of Constan tin o ple. Be gin ning in the tenth cen tury, Athos, the east ern part of the Chal ki diki pe nin sula, was one of the most im por tant spir i tual cen ters


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of the East ern Chris tian world. It was a unique mo nas tic re pub lic: every Or tho dox peo ple (besides the dom i nant Greeks, then Geor gians, Bul gar ians, Serbs, Rus/Rus sians, and later Ro ma nians) had its own mon as tery on Athos. As By zan tium was an em pire of Greek cul ture and lan guage and the ec u men i cal pa tri archs were usu ally of Greek or i gin, most of the mon as ter ies be longed to the Greeks. The high spir itual au thor ity on Athos was the pa tri arch of Con stan tin o ple. All the mon as ter ies were under the pro tec tion of the Byz an tine em per ors and the mon archs of the Or tho dox states. Athos thus pre sented a spir i tual model of the East ern Chris tian world, re flect ing all po lit i cal and cultural pro cesses within it. The priv i leged and iso lated po si tion of Athos due to the socalled aba ton (the pro hi bi tion of ac cess for women and alien per sons) and the rich do na tions con trib uted to the selfgovernment of the holy moun tain and made the mon as ter ies very in fluen tial spir itual and cul tural cen ters. The sul tans pre served these priv i leges after the Ot to mans con quered Athos in 1423–24.

Though the po si tion of the church in the Mus lim state was prin ci pally dif fer ent, Athos con tin ued to be the sym bol of the as pi ra tions of all Or tho dox Chris tians. Dur ing the six teenth and seven teenth cen tu ries, the mon as ter ies of the holy moun tain re ceived huge sums from the hos po dars of Mol da via and Wal la chia and from the Rus sian tsars. However, they also be came vic tims of rob bery and the des potic ac tions of Ot to man au thor ities. Stepbystep, the nonGreek mon as ter ies fell into the hands of Greek monks, a pro cess that re flected the sit u a tion in the Or tho dox Church in the whole ter ri tory of the Ot to man Em pire.8

In the eigh teenth cen tury, ac cord ing to the ac count of the traveler Va si lii Bar sky, only a few Rus sian monks could be found on the holy moun tain.9 The Rus sian mon as tery of St. Pan te lei mon and the two sketes—the Holy Prophet Ilias and the Holy Apos tle An drew—rose in the mid dle of the nine teenth cen tury. The pros per ity of Rus sian mon as ticism on Athos in the late nine teenth and early twen ti eth cen tu ries is usu ally con nected with two major fig ures, the con fes sor of the Rus sian mon as tery Hier onym and its abbot, Ma ka rii Sush kin.10 After the Russian Ottoman War of 1877–78, due to the pro tec tion of high dip lo matic and govern men tal of fi cials and in creas ing inter est among the Rus sian peo ple, the Rus sian mo nas tic com mu nities grew rap idly. In fact, they soon be came the rich est and most pop u lated on the rocky pe nin sula.

This spir i tual flour ish ing in spired ad mi ra tion among Rus sian pilgrims and travel ers, who began to flock to the re gion in large num bers. The for mer pa tri arch Joa chim III, who lived on Athos in 1886–1901,

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stressed the contrast between the Rus sian in sti tu tions and the Greek ones. “The spir i tual power on Athos doesn’t mat ter at all,” he wrote to the Rus sian con sul in Thes sal o niki, Ivan S. Ias tre bov. “You can no tice dis obe di ence every where. The Greek mon as ter ies are at odds and are try ing to sur pass each other in will ful ness. On the contrary, order dom i nates in the Rus sian com mu nities; every body fol lows the voice of the abbot, they are work ing with hu mil ity and are selfdenying, and they don’t inter fere in lay af fairs.”11

The pros per ity of the Rus sian mon as ter ies and sketes pro voked dis con tent and envy among the Greeks, whose mon as ter ies at the same time suf fered lack of fi nan cial sup port. The gen eral ad verse condi tions in the Bal kans, the in ten sity of na tion al ist pas sions, and antiSlav prej u dices pro moted hos til ity on the holy moun tain. The govern ment of Ath ens re peat edly under took meas ures against the Rus sian mo nas tics. In 1883, a del e ga tion of two theo lo gians and his to rians, pro fes sors N. Da ma las and P. Pav li dis, ar rived from Ath ens. They pro posed several steps to strengthen the Greek po si tions on Athos. Pri mar ily, they ad vo cated con vinc ing the pa tri arch to re sist the pres sures of Rus sian di plo macy and to act in de pen dently. They also pro posed strength en ing Greek ed u ca tion on the holy moun tain to en cour age the monks to pro tect the rights of the Greeks and send ing a Greek con sul from Mac edo nia to Athos at least once a year to sup port the na tional feel ings of the monks. The Greek del e ga tion fur ther spon sored the plan of or ganiz ing Greek pil grim ages to Athos, to coun ter the Rus sian ones, which in cluded as many as four thou sand pil grims a year. Fi nally, the pro ject pro posed a scheme to grant Ath on ite monks Brit ish cit i zen ship so that they would ben e fit from Brit ish pro tec tion. If this lat ter point would be dif fi cult, con tin ued Da ma las and Pav li dis, “we should en cour age the ar ri val of more monks who are En glish cit i zens, for ex am ple from Cy prus.”12 Though this pro ject was not ful filled, it tes tifies to Greek con cern about Rus sian in flu ence on Athos as well as the Brit ish in flu ence on Greek pol icy at this time.

The Greek con sul in Thes sal o niki, G. Dokos, who vis ited Athos in 1887, wrote a lengthy re port to the Greek foreign min is ter, Ste pha nos Dra gou mis, which an a lyzed the sit u a tion on the holy moun tain from the view point of Greek na tional inter ests. In his re port, Dokos paid special at ten tion to the Rus sian threat and sug gested that leas ing build ings in the Athos cap i tal, Karea, should be pro hib ited. He also con sid ered the open ing of dip lo matic rep re sen ta tives there ex pe di ent. “We must have able peo ple in every mon as tery,” stressed Dokos. “By system atic


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work from one cen ter, we can neu tral ize the ac tiv i ties of the Rus sians, who are under strong pro tec tion. They are work ing with one pur pose: they are or ga nized with mil i tary dis ci pline and sub mit to po lit i cal cen ters abroad.”13 It is inter est ing to note that among the meas ures that could be used against the Rus sians, Dokos did not ex clude help from even the Roman Cath o lic states. In fact, he ob served that the Aus trian con sul in Thes sal o niki showed inter est in the for mer Ital ian mon as tery of the Amal fi tani, known as Mor fa nou. The con sul was cu ri ous to find some doc u ments con cern ing this mo nas tic set tle ment, which had ceased to exist cen tu ries ear lier. Dokos be lieved that es tab lish ing a Cath o lic mon as tery on Athos was hardly pos sible, but the sup port from a rep re sen ta tive of a great power like Italy could be used against the Rus sians.14

As the re ports in di cate, Greek dip lo mats feared that the Rus sian govern ment was inter ested in Athos as a po lit i cal and even a mil i tary base. In deed, St. Pe ters burg spared no ex pense for strength en ing the Rus sian ele ment there. The real po si tion of the Rus sian govern ment regard ing the Greek clergy and Rus sian mon as ti cism can be gleaned from a re port com posed by an em ployee of the Rus sian em bassy in Con stantin o ple, A. E. Vlan gali, in late De cem ber 1883. Vlan gali wrote: “Under the gen eral name ‘Greeks,’ we mean the Ath ens govern ment, the inhab i tants of Tur key of Greek or i gin, the pa tri ar chate and the clergy, and at last the Greek monks of Athos. . . . Our duty is to pro tect as possible the rights and in de pen dence of the East ern Church. But we must draw a strict line of de mar ca tion between the inter ests of this church and the na tional inter ests of the Greeks of Ath ens, be cause the Ec u men ical Pa tri ar chate is not called at all to serve as a strong hold of Hel len ism.”15

Thus it ap pears that the gen eral aim of Rus sian church pol icy in the Near East at this time was to pac ify and rec on cile the Or tho dox peo ples under the power of a su pra na tional Ec u men i cal Pa tri arch. The Greek monks on Athos are re garded here as an ele ment of the gen eral term “Greeks” in the Ot to man lands, and ac cord ing to the sense of the re port they should not serve as a weapon of the po lit i cal am bi tions of the Ath ens govern ment. In fact, the Rus sian dip lo mats dis tin guished well enough between the Greek monks of Ot to man or i gin, who usu ally were more open to super na tional ec u men i cal views, and those who had come from the Greek king dom and were typ i cally in flu enced by ex treme na tion al ism.

The in creas ing num ber of Rus sian monks and pil grims on Athos prompted the Rus sian govern ment to ap point a rep re sen ta tive to

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con trol the sit u a tion. Until 1889, Abbot Ma ka rii ful filled this role, but after his death, the ques tion about ap point ing a leader to super vise the flood of pil grims ap peared again. Govern ment of fi cials in St. Pe ters burg, who were afraid of creat ing on Athos the same con flict and com pli cated sit u a tion that they had with the Rus sian spir i tual mis sion in Je ru sa lem, did not sup port ideas of open ing a Rus sian con su late on Athos or sending an ec cle sias tic rep re sen ta tive there.16

Based on the in con sis tent in struc tions of the Rus sian Foreign Min istry, one can see that the Rus sian govern ment had no clear pol icy to ward Athos; it ex hib ited no defi nite po si tion re gard ing the use ful ness of the Rus sian pres ence there at all. The Rus sian em bassy in Con stan tin o ple as well as the con su late gen eral in Thes sal o niki sent nu mer ous in quir ies to the Rus sian Foreign Min is try con cern ing Athos but never re ceived con crete an swers. Many of the dip lo mats ex pressed a strong ob jec tion against the fur ther prog ress of Rus sian Athos (an idea ear lier pro posed by the met ro pol i tan of Mos cow, Fi la ret Droz dov) be cause of the outflow of Rus sian money abroad.17 They argued that such re sources would be bet ter used in the pe riph er ies of the Rus sian Em pire it self. Re al iz ing the de sir abil ity of a con crete de ci sion, the Rus sian am bas sa dor to the Sub lime Porte, Al ex an der I. Nel i dov, re gret ted that he could not point a way out, be cause no body would do nate such sums of money for the re cently founded mon as tery of New Athos in the Cau ca sus.18 “We have only phys i cal data that dem on strate the deep rev er ence of the Rus sian peo ple for the holy moun tain and can not weigh the moral ad van tages of this ven er a tion or to what de gree Athos is use ful for us from governmen tal point of view. . . . We must deal with an un known area, the in de pen dent and mighty na tional force,” wrote Nel i dov.19 Nel i dov sup posed that the Rus sian govern ment should re fuse to have ex clu sive in flu ence on Athos and should avoid co or di nat ing the pop u lar movement there. Nev er the less, St. Pe ters burg con sis tently tried to limit the stream of money col lected all over Rus sia by Rus sian monks, most of whom were kel li otes (in hab i tants of the small cells that be longed to the big mon as ter ies and could never be re garded as Rus sian prop erty).

The ju rid i cal status of the Rus sian monks on Athos re mained uncer tain as the surge in pil grim ages co in cided with major po lit i cal and ju di cial changes tak ing place in the Ot to man Em pire at this time. The move ment of Tan zi mat in Tur key cov ered a pe riod of sev eral decades after the Cri mean War. Its gen eral goal was the sec u lar iza tion and mod ern iza tion of the govern ment and the ad min is tra tive system of the Ot to man Em pire. As for the church, the re forms aimed at state


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con trol of it.20 Ac cord ing the Athos Reg u la tions (Kan o nis mos) of 1876 (in cluded in the Turk ish law code), all Athos monks ir re spec tive of their na tion al ity were con sid ered Ot to man cit i zens. They were given a doc u ment called in Turk ish a nufus (a sort of res i dence per mit), but in fact their Turk ish cit i zen ship re mained nom i nal. The Rus sian monks pre served their Rus sian pass ports and en joyed the pro tec tion of the dip lo matic au thor ities ac cord ing to Ar ti cle 62 of the Ber lin Treaty of 1878. Rus sian laws stip u lated that a per son could lose his or her nation al ity by serv ing a foreign state with out the per mis sion of the per son’s govern ment and by re fus ing to re turn to Rus sia on the call of the govern ment. How ever, ac cord ing to the edict of the Rus sian Holy Synod of 13 July 1816, Rus sian sub jects who be came monks abroad were not rec og nized as monks in side Rus sia. Fur ther more, Tsar Al ex an der I amended an other law that al lowed Rus sian cit i zens to be come monks abroad on the con di tion that they would never re turn to their moth erland.21 Later per sons who had be come monks abroad were adopted into Rus sian mon as ter ies after spend ing three years as nov ices; in every case, per mis sion from the Holy Synod was nec es sary. The dual status of the Rus sian monks on Athos gave them an op por tu nity to act in Rus sia with their for mer so cial rank; on the other hand, it was conven ient for govern men tal of fi cials to pro tect them only when they found it rea son able to do so. If a cer tain monk was re garded as “un re liable,” the for mula “such per son, call ing him self a hier om onk,” was em ployed; in some cases, Rus sian dip lo mats did not hes i tate to send away the most im por tu nate ap pli cants be cause they were “Turk ish cit i zens.”22

The Turk ish au thor ities under took many at tempts to rec og nize the Rus sian monks as Ot to mans, but these ef forts al ways found counterac tion from Rus sian di plo macy. Dur ing the cen sus of the Athos pop u lation in 1905, for ex am ple, the Turk ish au thor ities tried to con fis cate the pass ports of Rus sian monks. The de mand of the of fi cials, how ever, met res o lute re fu sal from all Rus sian mon as ter ies. Rather than create an inter na tional scan dal, the Turk ish au thor ities did not in sist. Only the monks of the Geor gian cell of St. John the Theo lo gian sur ren dered their pass ports, but after the protest of Rus sian rep re sen ta tive in Thes sal o niki, Ni ko lai V. Kokh mans kii, the vali (governor) of the city prom ised their re turn.23 After a new wave of con fis ca tions of Rus sian monks’ pass ports by the Young Turk govern ment in 1909, Kokh mans kii com posed a note on this sub ject, in which he again stressed that the Rus sians on Athos were re garded as tem po rar ily out side Rus sia and had never lost their

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cit i zen ship. Un will ing to clash with the Ot to man au thor ities, the Russian con su late in Thes sal o niki de cided to issue new pass ports in place of the con fis cated ones, as if their own ers had lost them. The Ot to man au thor ities did not ob ject.24

By the be gin ning of the twen ti eth cen tury, the main ten den cies connected with the Rus sian pres ence on Athos con tin ued. The fears concern ing Rus sian ex pan sion on the holy moun tain and its final tran si tion into Rus sian hands are re flected in the re port of the Bul gar ian agent in Thes sal o niki, Ata nas Sho pov:

I traveled from mon as tery to mon as tery around the whole Athos pe nin sula, and it seemed to me as if I were travel ing around Rus sia. Con tin u ally on the quays, in the mon as ter ies, in the cells, in the cen tre of the kaza (the ad min is trative dis trict of Athos), in for ests and on roads you meet Rus sians and Rus sians, both monks and laity. Their num ber is in creas ing from day to day. . . . In five or six years, the num ber of Rus sians will be two or three times more. No body doubts that in few years only Rus sians will in habit the en tire holy moun tain. First the Rus sians and after them the Greeks and Bul gar ians sup pose that soon the Athos pe nin sula will be come po lit i cally Rus sian as well. Ec o nom i cally it has been in Rus sian hands for a long time. All the rich Greek mon as ter ies re ceive their in comes from Rus sia under the con trol of the govern ment.25

In 1898, the Rus sian con sul in Thes sal o niki, N. A. Il a ri o nov, vis ited the Ser bian Hil an dar mon as tery. Hil an dar, one of the old est mon as ter ies on the holy moun tain, had huge debts and a very small mo nas tic pop u lation. The Serbs there were few, and most of the monks were Bul gar ians from Mac e do nia. The Rus sians had kept an eye on this mon as tery and pro posed to pay its debts in order to set tle one or more Rus sians into the broth er hood; in this way stepbystep the mon as tery could pass to the Rus sians.26 The Ser bian govern ment, for its part, under took meas ures to strengthen the Ser bian ele ment at Hil an dar. In 1900, an agree ment was made ac cord ing to which Bel grade paid the debts of the mon as tery and granted it an an nual sum of one thou sand Ot to man liras.27 The Rus sian con sul de cided to sup port the Serbs in Hil an dar, which was con sis tent with the gen eral pol icy of the Rus sian govern ment in Mac e donia dur ing these years of sup port ing the Serbs against the Bul gar ians.

The Rus sians oc cu pied sev eral cells be long ing to Hil an dar; the biggest one being the cell of St. John Chry sos tom. In 1902, an agree ment was signed between the abbot of the cell and the Ser bian met ro pol i tan of Rashka and Priz ren. Ac cord ing to this act, the met ro pol i tan passed au thor ity over the his tor i cally Ser bian Lavra of De chani to the Rus sians


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for a num ber of years. In ex change, the Rus sians agreed to or ga nize a strict mo nas tic order, to re store the build ings, and to pro tect the mon astery from at tacks by Al ba nian brig ands. While for the Ser bian ec cle siasti cal au thor ities this meas ure was the only way to save the mon as tery, for the Rus sian monks it was an op por tu nity to found a new Rus sian mon as tery in the Bal kans. The Rus sian abbot aimed at or ga niz ing the set tle ment as a de part ment of the cell of St. John Chry sos tom, which would not be lim ited in the num ber of monks and build ing in itia tives.

In the fol low ing years, about twenty Rus sian monks were in stalled in De chani. Since the Rus sian govern ment re garded this pro ject as comple men tary to its gen eral line of pro tect ing the inter ests of Or tho doxy in the Near East, it ac corded the De chani mon as tery an an nual sub sidy of ten thou sand ru bles. Later, how ever, the mat ter pro voked great re sis tance from the Ser bian govern ment and church, which feared the ag gres sive Rus sian in cur sion. The Rus sian govern ment also ex pressed doubts re gard ing the ne ces sity of main tain ing con trol over the mon astery.28 De spite the govern ment sub sidy and the in comes of the cell, De chani suf fered be cause of the com pli cated po lit i cal sit u a tion in Al bania and the ne ces sity to pay large sums to Al ba nian chief tains. The Russian monks re fused to leave De chani on con di tions other than turn ing their cell on Athos into an in de pen dent mon as tery, which would be an in a li en able Rus sian pos ses sion. They hoped that the Ser bian government would press the Hil an dar mon as tery to ful fill their de sire. The sit u a tion re mained the same until 1916, when the Aus trians de ported the monks.

Si mul ta ne ously, Rus sian monks from Athos ex plored an other direc tion for their crea tive ac tiv i ties, namely, Pal es tine and Syria. Many ne glected small mon as ter ies ex isted in this re gion that could be eas ily bought by the rich Rus sian kel li ots. In 1903, the abbot of the Rus sian cell of the Holy Cross on Athos, Pan te lei mon, pur chased the an cient Lavra of St. Cha ri ton, eight ki lom e ters from Je ru sa lem, and set tled seven monks there.29 This act pro voked the pa tri arch of Je ru sa lem, Dam i a nos, to ob ject that it was an un ca non i cal inter fer ence into the af fairs of an other church, but the patriarch’s let ter of protest re mained un an swered. On 12 July 1912 in Da mas cus, the pa tri arch of Anti och, Greg ory, and the rep re sen ta tive of the cell of the Holy Cross on Athos, Gen nady, signed an agree ment that en a bled Rus sians to lease the pa tri ar chal mon as tery St. Ilias Shuaya in Leb a non. The Rus sian abbot of the cell was ap pointed abbot of the mon as tery. Ac cord ing to the agree ment, the Rus sian broth er hood be came for ever own ers of all the mov able and im mov able

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prop er ties of the mon as tery and had to pay the pa tri arch a grad u ated pay ment of two hun dred to four hun dred French na po le ons a year. The Rus sian con sul in Da mas cus con sid ered this ar range ment as fa vor able both for the strength en ing of Or tho doxy in Syria and for the Rus sian con vent.30

Ir re spec tive of the po lit i cal sig nifi cance of such in itia tives, the main rea son for the Rus sian monks’ inter est in Pal es tine was the lack of space and op por tu nities for de vel op ment on the Athos pe nin sula. The ab bots of the rich est Rus sian cells had enough money to re ceive a greater number of monks and to build large mon as ter ies, but Ath on ite reg u la tions strictly for bade this ac tiv ity. The chal lenge led to con stant con flicts be tween Rus sians and Greek church au thor ities. The kel li ots posed one of the main prob lems as so ciated with the Rus sian pres ence on Athos at the be gin ning of the twen ti eth cen tury, for both Greek and Rus sian di plo macy. Of fi cially, no more than three monks could live in each cell, one sen ior and two younger. But in prac tice, within a few years the sen ior monk often gath ered money to take on more nov ices and re build the cell into a more sub stan tial and pros per ous set tle ment. The pop u lation of such cells some times grew to more than one hun dred per sons, who built mag nifi cent churches and houses. This de vel op ment made the de pen dent cells, the in hab i tants of which were no more than ten ants, and de facto mon as ter ies some times richer than the pri mary one.

In 1896, the Athos kel li ots united and founded an or gan iza tion, “The Broth er hood of Rus sian Kel li ots.”31 The or gan iza tion aimed to pro tect the rights of the kel li ots in their strug gle with the Greek chief mon as ter ies. Soon the broth er hood man aged to draw fa vor able at ten tion of the tsar’s fam ily and sup port from the am bas sa dor in Con stan tin o ple, Ivan A. Zin o viev, as well as the in fluen tial di rec tor of the Rus sian Ar chae o log i cal In sti tute in Con stan tin o ple, Fe o dor I. Us pens kii. The broth er hood kept a hos pi tal in Thes sal o niki and a mo nas tic school in the Ot to man cap i tal.

Al though the kel li ots en joyed sym pa thy from some dip lo mats and high of fi cials, the Rus sian Holy Synod was not in clined to sup port them. It was easier for church au thor ities to deal with the big mon as ter ies than with in de pen dent set tle ments. The legal dis putes between the smaller Rus sian set tle ments and the large Greek mon as ter ies could con tinue for decades and pro voke se ri ous dif fi cul ties. The Rus sian Holy Synod there fore pre pared sev eral de crees against the kel li ots and monks’ let ters for eco nomic sup port, which had been spread to all cor ners of Rus sia.32 The large Rus sian mon as ter ies and some pub lic au thor ities sup ported the po si tion of the Rus sian synod. For ex am ple


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the fa mous li tur gist pro fes sor of the Theo log i cal Acad emy in Kiev, Alexei Dmi trievs kii, wrote a pas sion ate ar ti cle against the kelliots’ ac tiv ities.33 Ob vi ously, such crit i cism to ward a large seg ment of the Rus sian monks could not con trib ute to the stabil ity of the Rus sians on the holy moun tain as a whole. Dmitrievskii’s ar ti cle also caused a sen sa tion in Greece after being trans lated by the sec re tary to Me le tios Metak sa kis, the arch bishop of Cy prus and later pa tri arch of Alex an dria and of Constan tin o ple, who used it in his ex treme Rus so phobic book.34 En cour aged by the po si tion of the Rus sian synod, the pa tri arch of Con stan tin o ple is sued a de cree lim it ing the power of the kel li ots and their num ber on Athos.35 De spite these meas ures, the kel li ots con tin ued their ac tiv i ties.

In the dan ger ous and stormy sit u a tion in the Bal kans in the first decades of the twen ti eth cen tury, the rich Rus sian monks, who lived with out any guard, in creas ingly be came vic tims of thefts and rob bery. The Rus sian dip lo mats dur ing their fre quent vis its to the holy moun tain tried to pro tect the kel li ots. The re ports of the em ploy ees of the em bassy and the con su late in Thes sal o niki in di cate that they usu ally sym pa thized with the kel li ots and stressed that with rare ex cep tions they were pious peo ple who cared only about sav ing their souls.36 This pro vides an ex am ple of the contrast between the ac tions of the Rus sian Foreign Min is try and the Holy Synod; here, the Rus sian govern ment proved more sup por tive of monks on Athos than did the Rus sian Or tho dox Church.

A new pe riod in the life of Athos began with the Bal kan Wars. In No vem ber 1912, the Greek mil i tary an nexed the holy moun tain. A Greek army de tach ment of eight hun dred sol diers formed a gar ri son; the Bul gar ians also sent seventy sol diers to pro tect their mon as tery. While the Greek in hab i tants of Athos re garded the lib er a tion as a true res ur rec tion, the Slavs were rather anx ious about their fu ture. The question about the status of Athos was a mat ter of inter na tional dis cus sion at the Lon don Con fer ence of 1912–13. Rus sia cat e gor i cally in sisted on the inter na tion al iza tion of Athos under the pro tec to rate of the six Or thodox states (Rus sia, Greece, Ser bia, Ro ma nia, Mon te ne gro, and Bul garia). The first goal was to neu tral ize Greek su pre macy; the sec ond was the pro tec tion of the rights of the monks, na tive from each Or tho dox state. Had the Greeks suc ceeded in dom i nat ing Athos, all the con tro ver sial ques tions would have been re solved in favor of the Greeks and not the Rus sians. In the Rus sian plan, un sur pris ingly, inter na tional con trol of the Or tho dox states over the holy moun tain pro vided for the dom i nation of Rus sia.

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Rus sian dip lo mats pro posed sev eral pro jects con cern ing ju ris diction. Ac cord ing to the pro po sal of the con sul in Thes sal o niki, Alexei K. Bel i aev, each of the six Or tho dox states had to ap point one rep re sen tative, who would have his seat in Karea, the ad min is tra tive cen ter of Athos. The del e gates would com prise an of fi cial coun cil with the Russian rep re sen ta tive as chair man. This coun cil would be the only rep resen ta tive of Athos in its inter na tional con tacts. The func tions of the del e gates would be the same as of the con suls of the great pow ers in the Ot to man Em pire. Thus Beliaev’s plan made the Athos mo nas tic pop u lation de pen dent po lit i cally on the Rus sian Foreign Min is try. The spir i tual au thor ity of the pa tri arch of Con stan tin o ple and the selfgovernment of Athos in its inter nal af fairs would re main as pre vi ously.37 The sec ond pro po sal, writ ten by the Rus sian con sul in Mon as tir, A. M. Pet ri aev, in gen eral re peated the main points ar tic u lated by Bel i aev.38

The pro po sal writ ten by Boris S. Se rafi mov, the ad viser on ec cle siasti cal af fairs of the Rus sian em bassy in Con stan tin o ple, fur ther en hanced the de gree of tsar ist pro tec tion.39 Se rafi mov stressed that since the non Russian mon as ter ies ex isted due to in comes from their es tates in Rus sia or the col lec tion of money there, with out Rus sian aid they should soon be re duced into des o la tion. He em pha sized the num ber of Rus sian monks in 1909–11, which was 4,250, with out con sid er ing the me tochs (farm steads) and ad vo cated ex pand ing Rus sian in flu ence there. “One can hope that with the change of po lit i cal circum stances the present sit u a tion will change as well. In due course many of the 17 Greek monas ter ies will be come Rus sian, as had hap pened with the mon as tery of St. Pan te lei mon, and then our monks will feel them selves in bet ter condi tions,” he wrote.40 Rus sia it self would deal with all Athos af fairs, giving the monks the op por tu nity for inter nal selfgovernment ac cord ing to the an cient rules. The rep re sen ta tives of the other Or tho dox states would also send their rep re sen ta tives in turn. One can no tice that this pro po sal was writ ten in haste and was not free of po lit i cal ro man ticism.

The legal ad viser of the Rus sian em bassy in Con stan tin o ple, An drei N. Man delsh tam, dis cussed the ju rid i cal side of the ques tion in de tail. He ad vo cated ei ther des ig nat ing Athos as a neu tral ter ri tory under the pro tec to rate of the six Or tho dox states or mak ing it a neu tral ter ri tory under com mon sov e reignty of these states.41 In his opin ion, the crea tion of a neu tral ter ri tory was pref er able for Rus sian inter ests, be cause on such a ter ri tory Rus sian laws could be ap plied. Man delsh tam maintained that in ei ther case a strong govern men tal power was oblig a tory


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in order to stop the na tional dis agree ments on the holy moun tain. The na tional contra dic tions between the Rus sians and the Greeks, the Greeks and the Bul gar ians, the Greeks and the Geor gians were a re flection of the gen eral GreekSlav (and GreekGeorgian) ten sion in the Bal kans in those years. The Sec ond Bal kan War and the de feat of Bulgaria had made the sit u a tion on Athos more acute.

When the Athos monks learned of Rus sian pro po sals for inter na tional iza tion and con do min ium, the seven teen Greek mon as ter ies sent their del e gates to the Ath ens govern ment and to the Lon don con fer ence with a pe ti tion to unite Athos with the Greek king dom. At the same time, the Rus sian monks on 12 May 1913 ad dressed an other pe ti tion to the rep resen ta tives of the pow ers in Lon don de mand ing the neu tral iza tion of Athos under the pro tec to rate of Rus sia and the Bal kan states. The pe tition argued for send ing a rep re sen ta tive from every 250–300 monks to the cen tral coun cil; sep ar a tion of the civil and crim i nal mat ters from the spir i tual; and can cel ling the present rules on pos ses sion of landed es tates and the pri vat iza tion of these es tates by the own ers who had bought them.42

The ques tion of the inter na tional status of Athos was not solved dur ing the de lib er a tions of the great pow ers in Lon don. The Lon don Treaty of 17 May 1913 only post poned the de ci sion re gard ing the holy moun tain. In July–Au gust 1913, am bas sa dors of the great pow ers held a meet ing about the con se quences of the Bal kan Wars in Lon don, and the status of the holy moun tain num bered among the is sues of dis cussion. The Rus sian pro po sal for neu tral iza tion met strong re sis tance from the AustroHungarian rep re sen ta tive. This op po si tion can be under stood if one ex am ines the ac tiv i ties of AustriaHungary to ward the Thes sal o niki re gion dur ing sev eral decades be fore 1914. At this time, the Habs burg Em pire more than the other pow ers was inter ested in south ern Mac e do nia. As a re sult, only the first part of the pro po sal was adopted, con cern ing the pres er va tion of the spir i tual sub or di nation of Athos to the pa tri arch. As for the sec ond part of the pro po sal, the com mon pro tec to rate, it was post poned due to ir rec on cil able disagree ments. The Treaty of Bu char est signed on 26 Au gust 1913 also did not re solve the prob lem.

The Sec ond Bal kan War and the de feat of Bul garia bur ied all hopes for a union of Or tho dox states or of Slavic states under a Rus sian protec to rate. The Bul gar ian ec cle sias ti cal schism could not be mended, and a com mon pro tec to rate on Athos was un likely. The re sis tance of the West ern pow ers was not the only ob sta cle. In June–July 1913, an other

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inter nal prob lem arose on Athos, namely, the Name Wor ship ers (Im i as lavtsy, or Imi a bozh niki) move ment. The fol low ers of the move ment ac cepted the idea that “the name of God is God him self.” The roots of this con cept lay in the tra di tions of the Byz an tine mys ti cism of Symeon the New Theo lo gian and hes y chasts lead by St. Greg ory Pal a mas. The con stant re peat ing of the Jesus prayer was a longheld tra di tion of the Athos monks. Thus it was not a mod ern heresy but just an inter pre tation of the old tra di tion.43 This move ment, being purely spir i tual, split the Rus sian mo nas tic pop u la tion into two par ties. The Rus sian government, weary of fur ther com pli ca tions in the Bal kans, mis took the distur bances for some thing more po lit i cal. The Greek mon as ter ies and the pa tri arch, who de sired the dep or ta tion of a part of the Rus sian mo nas tic com mu nity, sup ported the Rus sian ec cle sias ti cal and civil au thor ities, who re garded the move ment as a re bel lion. As a re sult, in July 1913 more than eight hun dred Rus sian monks were for cibly re moved to Rus sia. This ac tion marked the be gin ning of the weak en ing of the Russian ele ment on Athos.

As the inter na tional status of Athos re mained un cer tain, in Sep tem ber 1913 a rep re sen ta tive of the Rus sian em bassy in Con stan tin o ple, Boris S. Se rafi mov, ar rived on a spe cial mis sion. The aim of his visit was to in form the em bassy about the sit u a tion, to pro tect the monks from vi o lations, and to con trib ute to the pac ifi ca tion of the holy moun tain. In the same month, the met ro pol i tan of Cy prus, Me le tios Metak sa kis, ar rived in Athos to in cite ag i ta tion among the Greek monks and sup port their na tional feel ings. The pres ence of Se rafi mov (who de spite his in cog nito was re garded as a Rus sian con sul) ir ri tated the Greek monks to a remark able de gree. At the end of Sep tem ber 1913, the Kinot (the Athos ad min is tra tion body) de cided to move him from the Skete of St. An drew. This de ci sion was not car ried out be cause of the un cer tain po si tion of the Vat o pedi mon as tery, which was afraid to lose in come from its es tates in Bes sa ra bia. Mean while, the Greek press printed angry ar ti cles against Se rafi mov in its sec tions on re cent news.44

In Oc to ber 1913, the Kinot of Athos to gether with Met ro pol i tan Me le tios wrote a pe ti tion to the Greek king Con stan tine ex press ing the will of the holy moun tain to be in cluded in the ter ri tory of the Greek king dom so that no civil au thor ity could inter fere in its af fairs.45 The rep re sen ta tives of the Bul gar ian and Ser bian mon as ter ies, in tim i dated by the Greeks, also sub scribed to the pe ti tion. Only the rep re sen ta tive of St. Pan te lei mon Mon as tery re fused. The an nounce ment of this doc u ment on 3 Oc to ber, a great na tional hol i day for the Greeks, was ac com pa nied


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by a cer e mony and pros tra tion be fore the icon Ak sion Esti, claims of “Long live Greece!” and a pas sion ate pa tri otic speech by Met ro pol i tan Me le tios.46 A del e ga tion of five rep re sen ta tives vis ited King Con stan tine and Prime Min is ter Elef the rios Ven i ze los. The lat ter as sured the monks, “As the holy moun tain has kept and keeps all the Byz an tine rites, has kept for us our lan guage dur ing the long ages of slav ery, it is of great im por tance for Hel len ism. Be sure, fathers, that the govern ment will do its best to pre serve on Athos its struc ture, both ec cle sias ti cal and po lit i cal.”47

De spite of the pend ing rift between the king and the prime min is ter, both of them were ready to sup port the de sire of the Greek monks on Athos. Dur ing his stay on Athos, Se rafi mov con tin ued to con cen trate on the fu ture inter na tional status of Athos. Met ro pol i tan Me le tios pro posed that Rus sia should ab stain from the pro ject of inter na tion al iza tion, while Greece should guar an tee all the Rus sian monks the rights and priv i leges that they had pre vi ously. In the present sit u a tion, Se rafi mov was in clined to adopt this pro po sal, be cause the es tab lish ment of an as so ci a tion of Or tho dox states would be im pos sible with out vi o lent meas ures and Greek pe ti tions to the pow ers. Mean while, the Bul gar ian schism con tin ued, and Ser bia began act ing in uni son with Greece against Rus sian inter ests. Ro ma nia had only two sketes and sev eral cells on Athos (which were hos tile to the pa tri ar chate), and Mon te ne gro had no inter ests on the holy moun tain. The pro tests of the Athos Greek kinot would re sult in the lim i ta tion of Rus sian pen e tra tion to ward the ar chipel ago and the Med i ter ra nean and would end the Rus sian pro ject. The lat ter would mean a ca tas trophe for the Rus sian mon as ter ies, while the adop tion of Meletios’s pro po sal could “give [them] the op por tu nity to reach [their] in tended re sults.”48

Se rafi mov also pre sented the con di tions under which, in his opinion, the RussianGreek agree ment could be signed. Se rafi mov pro posed that the Athos re li gious com mu nity re main under the spir i tual power of the ec u men i cal pa tri arch, and that all ac tions on Athos would be under taken only after their ap proval by both Rus sian and Greek au thorities. Ac cord ing to his pro po sal, a guard formed by both Greeks and Rus sians would re place the Greek mil i tary de tach ment, and the Greek govern ment should not con fis cate mo nas tic prop er ties off the pe ninsula (mainly in Mac e do nia and Thrace). The lat ter point, stressed Se rafi mov, had spe cial sig nifi cance for Rus sia re gard ing the es tate “Nuzla,” be long ing to the Rus sian Skete of St. An drew, in the Gulf of Ka vala, which could be used as an ex cel lent navalmilitary base.49 The pro po sal

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of Se raf i mov, though very fa vor able for the Rus sian side, was not adopted by the Rus sian Foreign Min is try. Mean while, the po si tion of the Rus sian rep re sen ta tive on Athos be came in creas ingly dif fi cult and even dan ger ous. In De cem ber 1913, he left the holy moun tain.

The ques tion of the status of Athos con tin ued to be dis cussed in 1914. The art ful and flex ible dip lo mat Ven i ze los, who de sired Rus sian sup port, was ready to make con ces sions. In May 1914, the Rus sian am bas sa dor in Con stan tin o ple, Mi khail N. Giers, handed the Greek rep re sen ta tive the plan con cern ing the inter na tional status of Athos and ex pressed his readi ness to start nego ti a tions. The con di tions of the agree ment bor rowed from Serafimov’s plan and their gen eral sense came to the same two main points: the spir i tual sub or di na tion of Athos to the ec umen i cal pa tri arch and Rus sian con trol over the po lit i cal ad min is tra tion of the mo nas tic foun da tions.50 The Greek govern ment put for ward a counter pro po sal in volv ing a GreekRussian con do min ium on Athos. It pro posed dou ble cit i zen ship for Ath on ite Rus sian monks and re strict ing other Or tho dox states from tak ing part in the de ci sion of the Athos ques tion.51 This pro po sal might have been the bet ter way out for Rus sia as a pa tron of Slav inter ests in the Bal kans. Its re al iza tion, how ever, was doubt ful due to the re sis tance of Ser bia and Bul garia. More over, Greece would in sist on chang ing the sit u a tion at the first op por tu nity.

With the be gin ning of the First World War, the ques tion of the status of Athos did not arise again on a dip lo matic level. Until the rev o lu tion of 1917, the Rus sian govern ment did not rec og nize Athos as part of the ter ri tory be long to the Greek king dom. We may defi nitely speak about the final unit ing of Athos with Greece only in 1926, when the Greek govern ment is sued a law that all monks of the holy moun tain should be Greek cit i zens. Thus, the long dis cus sions on the inter na tional status of Athos ceased im me di ately after dip lo matic pres sure from Rus sia ended.

After the de feat of the Name Wor ship ers in 1913 and the be gin ning of the First World War in the fol low ing year, when many of the nov ices were called up for mil i tary ser vice, a rapid de cline of the Rus sian Athos began. From 1913 to 1917, the Rus sian pop u la tion on Athos was re duced al most by half, from 4,100 to 2,460.52 After 1917, when Rus sians lacked op por tu nities to visit Athos and the govern ment no longer sup ported the mon as ter ies, Rus sian mon as ti cism on the holy moun tain ceased until the end of the twen ti eth cen tury.

The pe riod between the end of the RussianOttoman War of 1877– 78 and the be gin ning of the First World War was the “golden age”


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of Rus sian Athos. De spite op po si tion from the Ec u men i cal Pa tri ar chate and the Greek mon as ter ies (as well as of the Rus sian govern ment), the as pi ra tions of the Rus sian peo ple for a pres ence on Athos were so strong that the Rus sian mo nas tic pop u la tion grew from year to year. In the dif fi cult po lit i cal sit u a tion at the turn of the cen tury, the Rus sian govern ment did not take ac tive steps in the Bal kans; its main pol icy was to keep the status quo. The fear of dis rupt ing the bal ance of power and pro vok ing a mil i tary con flict led to an ex tremely pas sive po si tion on the part of the Rus sian Foreign Min is try, which pre ferred to withdraw on every ques tion at issue. Some times even the ra tional pro po sals of the dip lo mats met no under stand ing in the Holy Synod; many mat ters that had to be solved im me di ately be came en tan gled in red tape.

Be cause of the in con sis tency of the pol icy to ward the Rus sian monks on Athos, a strong po lit i cal po ten tial of Rus sia was not used to the full est and did not bring the ben e fit it could have. One could say that Rus sian Athos acted not in co or di na tion with the govern men tal policy but to some de gree in spite of it. The en ter pris ing, businesssavvy Rus sian peas ants, in spired by the lib erty that they could not re ceive in their moth er land created a unique phe nom e non in south east ern Eu rope: a huge Rus sian com mu nity with strong eco nomic and moral po ten tial. One can not doubt that this orig i nal “Rus sian is land” in the east ern Med i ter ra nean served as a great sup port to the Rus sian au thor ity in the re gion. It is dif fi cult to pre dict the fate of the Rus sians on Athos if the rev o lu tion of 1917 had not hap pened. Yet one thing is cer tain: Rus sian mon as ti cism had a great in flu ence on the po lit i cal and spir i tual life of the Bal kans and of East ern Chris ti an ity in gen eral.

After 150 years of pre vail ing sec u lar foreign pol icy, the Rus sian Em pire at the end of the nine teenth cen tury re turned to the mes sianic ideol ogy of the Third Rome in Near East ern af fairs. In this con text, church pol icy be came a fun da men tal com po nent of Rus sian foreign pol icy. The Rus sian in sti tu tions in the East ern Or tho dox world—the Rus sian spir i tual mis sion in Je ru sa lem and the Pal es tine so ci ety, as well as the Rus sian mon as ter ies on Athos—were called to serve Rus sian inter ests in the East ern Ques tion and to strengthen Rus sian in flu ence in the east ern Med i ter ra nean.

After 1990, with the spir i tual re vi val after the col lapse of com mu nism, Rus sian inter est in Mount Athos has ap peared again and is stead ily grow ing. Many pil grims from Rus sia visit the holy moun tain every year, and many nov ices gather in the St. Pan te lei mon Me to chion in Mos cow. A num ber of Rus sians live in Greek mon as ter ies as well. The

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spir i tual au thor ity of Athos among Or tho dox be liev ers in mod ern Rus sia is as high as it was in the nine teenth cen tury. Strik ing ev i dence of it is the long lines of peo ple wait ing to bow and touch the rel ics brought from Athos to dif fer ent Rus sian cit ies or vis it ing the ex hi bi tion of photos of Athos (held in Mos cow in No vem ber 2011). The as pi ra tions of the Rus sian peo ple to the holy moun tain today are spir i tual or prompted by his tor i cal and cul tural inter est and do not seem to be enmeshed in the po lit i cal ri val ries char ac ter is tic of the East ern Ques tion of one hun dred years ago.

Nev er the less, the presentday govern ment pol icy of the Rus sian Fed er a tion sup ports these trends, so there is a wide field for di alogue between Rus sia, Greece, and the Athos monks. Nu mer ous con fer ences on Athos (both sci en tific and pub lic for ums) in re cent years have discussed dif fer ent prob lems. A ques tion of vital im por tance is the status of Athos in the mod ern sec u lar world. The Greek Church to gether with the con ser va tive seg ment of so ci ety, sup ported by Rus sian govern ment struc tures, re sist any at tempts of Eu rope to open Athos to the pub lic and to break its unique an cient reg u la tions. Until now, the monks have man aged to main tain this strong hold of East ern spir i tu al ity in its more or less un touched Byz an tine form, which makes it a calm gulf in the stormy, tur bu lent mod ern world.

Notes

1. For ar gu ments under scor ing this stra te gic zone, see Sean McMee kin, Rus sian Or i gins of the First World War (Cam bridge, MA: Har vard Uni ver sity Press, 2011); Ro nald Bo broff, Roads to Glory: Late Im pe rial Rus sia and the Turk ish Straits (Lon don: I. B. Tau ris, 2006); Bar bara Jel a vich, The Ot to man Em pire, the Great Pow ers, and the Straits Ques tion, 1870–1887 (Bloom ing ton: In di ana Uni versity Press, 1973); idem, Russia’s Bal kan En tan gle ments, 1806–1914 (Cam bridge: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 1991).

2. B. Braude, “Foun da tional Myths of the Mil let System,” in Chris tians and Jews in the Ot to man Em pire, ed. B. Braude and Ber nard Lewis, 2 vols. (New York: Holmes and Meier, 1982), 1:69–88; R. Clogg, “The Greek Mil let in the Ot to man Em pire,” ibid., 1:185–208; K. H. Kar pat, “Mil lets and Na tion al ity: The Roots of the In con gru ity of Na tion and State in the PostOttoman Era,” ibid., 1:141–70; D. Sta mat o pou los, “The Split ting of the Or tho dox Mil let as a Sec u lar iz ing Pro cess: The ClericalLay As sem bly of the Bul gar ian Ex ar chate (I˙ stan bul, 1871),” in Grie chis che Kul tur in Südesteuropa in der Neu zeit: Beiträge zum Sym po sium in Me mor iam Gun nar Her ing (Wien, 16–18 De zem ber 2004), ed. M. A. Stas sin o pou lou and I. Ze le pos, By zan tina et Neo graeca Vin dob o nen sia 26 (Vienna: Ver lag der Österreichischen Akad e mie der Wis sens chaf ten), 243–70.


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3. V. F. Kur ga nov, “Is tor i ches kii ocherk grekobolgarskoi ras pri,” Pra vos lavnyi sob e sed nik 1 (1873): 187–260; V. Te plov, Greko-bolgarskii tser kov nyi vo pros po neiz dan nym is toch ni kam (St. Pe ters burg: Tip. V. S. Bal a sheva, 1889); Kiril, pa tri arch Byl gar ski, Graf N. P. Ig na tiev i bul gars kiiat tsur koven vu pros: Iz sled vane i dok u menti (Sofia: n.p., 1958); Z. Mar kova, Bul gars kata Ek zark hiia, 1870–1879 (Sofia: Izdvo na Bul gars kata ak a de miia na nauk ite, 1989); V. Bo neva, Bul gars koto tsur kov no na-t sio nalno dvizhe nie, 1856–1870 (Ve liko Tur novo: Za bukviteO pism neh, 2010).

4. On the Rus sian po si tion in the GreekBulgarian ques tion, see L. A. Gerd, Konstantinopol’ i Pe ter burg: Tser kov naia pol i tika Ros sii na pra vos lav nom Vos toke (1878–1898) (Mos cow: In drik, 2006), 225–308; idem, “Ros siia i grekobolgarskii tser kov nyi vo pros v 1901–1914 gg.,” Is tor i ches kiie za pi ski 13 (2010): 225–73; E. Kofos, “At tempts at Mend ing the GreekBulgarian Schism (1875–1902),” Balkan Stud ies 18, no. 2 (1984): 347–75; I. Sneg a rov, “Ruski opiti za predotvrat’avane i vdi gane na shiz mata,” Mac e don ski Pre gled 5, no. 1; 5, no. 2 (1929): 1–44, 1–32.

5. These ideas were re peated many times in dif fer ent doc u ments. See, for ex am ple, the note of A. E. Vlan gali from 15/28 De cem ber 1883, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/2, d. 3212, ll. 19–23.

6. A. N. Sheb u nin, Ros siia na Blizh nem Vos toke (Le nin grad: Ku buch, 1926); I. S. Gal kin, Dip lo ma tiia Ev ro peis kikh der zhav v svi azi s osvoboditel’nym dvizhe niem nar o dov Ev ro peis koi Turt sii 1905–1912 (Mos cow: Izdvo Mos kovs kogo uni ver siteta, 1960); G. A. Georgiev et al., Vos toch nyi vo pros vo vnesh nei pol i tike Ros sii: Ko nets XVIII–na chalo XX veka (Mos cow: Nauka 1978); V. M. Khvos tov, Is to riia dip lo ma tii, vol. 2 (Mos cow: Nauka 1963); I. V. BestuzhevLada, Bor’ba Ros sii po vop ro sam vnesh nei pol i tiki: 1906–1910 (Mos cow: Izdvo Ak a de mii nauk SSSR, 1961); K. B. Vi nog ra dov, Bos niis kii kri zis 1908–1909 (Le nin grad: Izdvo Le nin grads kogo uni ver si teta, 1964).

7. R. C. Hall, The Bal kan Wars 1912–1913: Pre lude to the First World War (London: Rout ledge, 2000), 22–24. Con cern ing Russia’s pol icy dur ing the Bal kan Wars and its par tic i pa tion in the Lon don Con fer ences of 1913, see I. A. Pis a rev, “Bal kany mezhdu mirom i voi noi (Lon dons kiie con fe rent sii 1912–1913 gg.),” No vaia i no vei shaia is to riia, no. 4 (1984): 63–75; idem, “Bal kans kii soiuz 1912–1913 gg. i Ros siia,” So vets koe slav i an o ved e nie, no. 3 (1985): 58–69; idem, “Ros siia i mezh du na rod nii kri zis v pe riod per voi bal kans koi voiny (ok’tabr 1912–mai 1913 g.),” Is to riia SSSR, no. 4 (1986): 56–67.

8. The schol ar ship on Mount Athos is ex ten sive. Use ful guides in clude I. Doens, Bib lio graphie de la Sainte Mon tagne de l’Athos (Mount Athos: Agio rei tiki Viv li o thiki/ Bibliothèque Ath on ite, 2001); D. Pa pach ry san thou, Ath o ni kos mon a-chis mos: Arches kai or ga nosi (Ath ens: Morpho tiko Id ryma Eth nikes Tra pezes, 1992).

9. V. GrigorovichBarsky, Per voe po ses che niie svai toi Afons koi gory Va si liia Grigorovicha-Barskogo, im samim op i san noe (St. Pe ters burg: Pra vos la voe Pa les tins koe Obsh chestvo, 1885).

10. On the Rus sians on Athos, see A. A. Dmi trievs kii, Russ kie na Afone: Ocherk zhizni i deiatel’nosti igu mena russ kogo Pan te lei mo nova monastyr’a

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sviashchenno-arhimandrita Ma ka riia (Sush kina) (St. Pe ters burg: Pra vos la voe Pa les tins koe Obsh chestvo, 1895); N. Fen nell, The Rus sians on Athos (Ox ford: Berg, 2001); Ierom. Ioa kim (Sabel’nikov), Ve li kaia stra zha: Zhizn’ i trudy bla zhen noi pam’ati afons kikh start sev ie ro shim o nakha Ie ron ima i shiark hi man drita Ma ka riia; Kn. I. Ie ro shim o nakh Ie ro nim, starets-dukhovnik Russ kogo na Afone Sviato-Panteleimonova mon as tyria (Mos cow: Izdatel’stvo Mos kovs koi Pa tri ark hii, 2001); P. Troits kii, Is to riia russ kikh ob i te lei Afona v XIX–XX ve kakh (Mos cow: In drik, 2008); L. A. Gerd, Russ kii Afon 1878–1914: Ocherki tserkovno-politicheskoi is to rii (Mos cow: In drik, 2010); N. Fen nell, P. Troits kii, and M. Ta la lai, Il’inskii skit na Afone (Moscow: In drik, 2011).

11. Re counted in I. S. Ias tre bov to A. I. Nel i dov, 24 Jan u ary 1891, RGIA, f. 797, op. 61.2 otd. 3 st., d. 146, ll. 8–12.

12. Ch. Kar da ras, “I pol i tiki drasi tou Pa tri arheiou Ioa chim G’ (proti patri archia 1878–1884)” (PhD diss., Uni ver sity of Ioan nina, 1993), 253–58.

13. T. Dokos to S. Dra gou mis, 24 Au gust 1887, Ar cheion Gen na dion /Archeion St. Dra goumi, f. 32.1 (AthosMones Agiou Orous), 1–26. The re port was ed ited fol low ing a copy in the Archive of the Greek Min is try of Foreign Af fairs: I. A. Pa pag ge los, “Ek thesi tou prok se nou G. Dokou peri tou Agiou Orous (1887),” Hro nika tis Hal kid i kis, 40–41 (1985–86): 67–125.

14. Re port from 5 Au gust 1889, ibid.15. AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/2, d. 3212, l. 20.16. On the Rus sian foun da tions in the Holy Land, see N. N. Li so voi, ed.,

Ros siia v Svi a toi zemle: Dok u menty i ma ter i aly, 2 vols. (Mos cow: Mezh du na rod nye ot no she nia, 2000); idem, Russ koe du hov noe i po lit i ches koe pri sutst vie v Svi a toi Zemle i na Blizh nem Vos toke v XIX–na chale XX v. (Mos cow: In drik, 2006); Nik o dim Rotov, Is to riia Russ koi Duk hov noi mis sii v Ie ru sa lime (Ser puk hov: Ser puk hovs kii Vy sots kii Muzhs koi Mon as tyr, 1997).

17. Fi la ret Droz dov, met ro pol i tan of Mos cow and Ko lomna (1782–1867), was the head of the ec cle sias ti cal pol icy of Rus sia from the 1840s to the 1860s. All the dip lo matic re ports on church prob lems were sent to him. See the edi tion of his opin ions on the mat ters of church pol icy in the Near East, Sob ra nie mne nii i ot zy vov Fil a reta mi trop o lita Mos kovs kogo i Kol o mens kogo po delam pra vos lav noi tserkvi na Vos toke (St. Pe ters burg: Sinodal’naia tip o gra fiia, 1886).

18. Nel i dov means the mon as tery of St. Simon Kan a nitis called “New Athos,” founded in Abk ha sia in 1875 by the Rus sian monks of St. Pan te lei mon Mon as tery on Old Athos.

19. A. I. Nel i dov to N. P. Shish kin, 10 April 1890, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/2, d. 1193a, ll. 292–95.

20. K. Kar pat, “The Trans for ma tion of the Ot to man State 1789–1908,” Interna tional Jour nal of Mid dle East ern Stud ies 3 (1972): 243–81; A. D. Nov i chev, Is to riia Turt sii: Novoe vre mia, vol. 4, 1853–1875 (Le nin grad: n.p., 1978); M. Tod o rova, An gliia, Ru siia i Tan zim a tyt (Sofia: BAN, 1980); C. Fin dley, Bu reau cratic Re form in the Ot to man Em pire: The Sub lime Porte, 1789–1922 (Prince ton, NJ: Prince ton Uni ver sity Press, 1980); N. A. Du lina, Tan zi mat i Mus tafa Re shid Pasha (Mos cow:


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Nauka, 1984); F. Ahmad, The Mak ing of Mod ern Tur key (Lon don: Rout ledge, 1993); I. Or taily, “Pe riod Tan zim ata i pos le duiush chee ad min is tra tiv noe us troistvo,” Is to riia Os mans kogo gos u darstva, ob shestva i tsi vil i zat sii, vol. 1 (Mos cow: Vos toch naia li ter a tura RAN, 2006); I. F. Mak a rova, Bol gary i Tan zi mat (Mos cow: Knizh nyi dom Lib ro kom, 2010).

21. Pri bav le niia k Tser kov nym Ved o mos tiam (11 Feb ru ary 1917): 134; ibid. (18 Feb ru ary 1917): 161.

22. For ex am ple, in 1879 Am bas sa dor A. B. LobanovRostovskii de clined to help the Geor gian monks on the grounds that they, hav ing be come monks abroad, had lost their Rus sian cit i zen ship. See AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/2, d. 3672, ll. 11–12.

23. N. V. Kokh mans kii to I. A. Zin o viev, 1 No vem ber 1905, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/2, d. 3679, ll. 2–3.

24. N. V. Kokh mans kii to N. V. Char y kov, 29 Au gust 1909, l. 8; N. V. Kokhmans kii to N. V. Char y kov, 29 Au gust 1909, l. 9; a note by N. V. Kokh mans kii, Con stan tin o ple, 11 Sep tem ber 1909, ll. 6–7; N. V. Char y kov to A. M. Pet ri aev, Oc to ber 15 1909, l. 5, all in AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/2, d. 3679.

25. A. Sho pov to I. S. Ge shov, 22 May 1900, CDA, f. 321k, op. 1, d. 1480, ll. 69–70.

26. Ibid., ll. 66–71.27. A. Sho pov to T. Ivan chov, 19, 26, and 27 April 1900, CDA, f. 321k, op. 1,

d. 1480, ll. 4–5, 20–21, 26.28. D. T. Bat a kovic , De chansko pi tanje (Bel grade: His tor i cal Institute

Prosveta, 1989), 9. The book is based on Ser bian archives. See the re ports of the Rus sian con suls on the De chani af fair, AVPRI, f. 146, op. 495, d. 4993–4998 (1902–16).

29. For the doc u ments on this af fair, see “Lavra pre po dob nogo Khar i tona Is po ved nika (AinFarskoe delo) (1904–1914 gg.),” in Li so voi, Ros siia v Svi a toi Zemle, 2:302–28.

30. Sha hovs koi to the Rus sian Holy Synod, 1912, RGIA, f. 796, op. 195, VI otd. 1 st., d. 1116, l. 4.

31. Kel li ots were the in hab i tants of small mo nas tic huts called kel lion (cell, the third and smaller form of set tle ment be hind the mon as ter ies and the sketes). These foun da tions be longed to some of the large in de pen dent mon as ter ies, and monks could only lease them. The Athos reg u la tions lim ited in hab i tants for the kel lia to six, and they were con sid ered her mits. Nev er the less, the Rus sian monks brought a much larger num ber there and built huge churches and edi fices. The or gan iza tion of the broth er hood made the kel li ots a power com par able to St. Pan te lei mon Mon as tery. Their ac tiv i ties were a mat ter of con stant con tro ver sies with the Greek own ers of the kel lia. See P. Troits kii, Is to riia russ kikh ob i te lei Afona v XIX–XX ve kakh (Mos cow: In drik, 2009), 111–88.

32. “O me rakh dlia bor’by s zlou pot re blen i ami afons kikh kel li o tov po sboru po zhert vov a nik v Ros sii,” Tser kov nye ved o mosti, 30 April 1911, no.18, pribal’eniia, raz del “Khro nika.”

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33. A. A. Dmi trievs kii, Russ kie afons kie monakhi-kellioty i ikh pro si tel nye o mi los tyni pis’ma, ras sy lae mye po Ros sii: Rech, pro iz ne sen naia pri otk ry tii chte nii v Kievs kom religiozno-prosvetitel’nom ob shestve 9 ok tia bria 1 905 g. (Kiev: Kievs kaia Duk hov naia Ak a de miia, 1906).

34. G. Pa pam i hail, Apok a lip seis peri tis Ros i kis po lit i kis en ti Or tho doxi An a toli (Alex an dria: n.p., 1910); Me le tios Metax a kis, mitr. Kri tiou, To Agion Oros kai i Ro siki pol i tiki en An a toli (Ath ens: n.p., 1913).

35. Pa tri archi kon si gil lion peri kel li ot i kou zit i ma tos ek dothen epi tis pa tri arheias tou Pan a gio ta tou Oi kou men i kou Pa tri arheiou k. Ioa chim G’ tou apo Thes sa lon i kis (Con stan tin o ple: n.p., 1909).

36. N. Kokh mans kii to I. A. Zin o viev, 30 April 1906, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/2, d. 3680, ll. 1–6, 7, 8–9; 8 May 1907, RGIA, f. 797, op. 73, II otd. 3 st., d. 293, ll. 18–19; 21 May 1912, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/2, d. 3682, ll. 7–9.

37. AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/2, d. 3686, ll. 1–4.38. Ibid., ll. 5–9.39. Ibid., ll. 20–27.40. Ibid., l. 25.41. AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/2, d. 3689, ll. 1–21.42. Ibid., d. 3686, ll. 29–36.43. The stim u lus for its spread ing was the book Na go rakh Kav kaza by

Hier om onk Ilar ion. The leader of the move ment be came monk An to nii Bu lat ovich, a for mer of fi cer. The Name Wor ship ers fol lowed the Byz an tine prac tice of the hes y chast and in fact had no po lit i cal in spi ra tions. On this topic, see the ex cel lent work by Ep. Ilar ion (Al feev), Svi ash chen naia taina Tserkvi: Vvede niie v is to riiu i pro blem a tiku Im i as lavs kikh spo rov (St. Pe ters burg: Izdatel’stvo Olega Abyshko, 2007); see also K. K. Pa pou li dis, Oi Ros soi On o mat o la trai tou Agiou Orous (Thes sal o niki: IMXA, 1977); L. Gra ham and J. M. Kan tor, Nam ing In fin ity: A True Story of Re li gious Mys ti cism and Math e mat i cal Crea tiv ity (Cam bridge, MA: Har vard Uni ver sity Press, 2009), 7–18.

44. Re ports of B. S. Se rafi mov to M. N. Giers, 24 Sep tem ber 1913; 1 Oc to ber 1913; 7 Oc to ber 1913, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/2, d. 3697.

45. See the Rus sian trans la tion of this text in ad di tion to the re port of Se rafi mov, 21 Oc to ber 1913, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/2, d. 3697, ll. 46–47.

46. Re ports of Se rafi mov, 7 Oc to ber 1913, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/2, d. 369, ll. 23–24, 34–35.

47. An ex tract from the proto col of the ses sion of the Kinot on 28 Oc to ber 1913. Quoted from the re port of B. Se rafi mov, 2 No vem ber 1913, AVPRI, f. 180, op. 517/2, d. 3697, ll. 57–60.

48. Ibid., ll. 30–31.49. Ibid., ll. 31–32.50. H. K. Pa pas ta this, “To ka thes tos tou Agiou Orous kai tis Ekk li sias stin

Mak e do nia meta tin syn thiki tou Bou kou res tiou,” in Nom o kan o nikes me letes (Ath ens: Pro types Thes sa likes Ek do seis, 2009), 61–63.


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51. A se cret tele gram of M. N. Giers, 13 July 1914, AVPRI, f. 151, op. 482, d. 3877, l. 13. See O. E. Pet ru nina, “Afons kii vo pros 1812–1917 gg. Po mat e ri a lam russ kikh dip lo mat i ches kikh is toch ni kov,” Vest nik archi vista, no. 1 (2002): 74.

52. M. G. Ta la lai, “Russ koe mon a shestvo na afone 1913–1917 gg. Otch ety A. A. Pav lovs kogo v Ro siis koe general’noe konsul’stvo v Sa lon i kakh,” in Ros siia i Khris tians kii Vos tok, II–III (Mos cow: In drik, 2004), 595–617.

Russian soldiers taking the oath at the Apostolic Church of Kars, 1915. (reprinted with permission from the State Archive of Audio Visual Documents of Georgia, A29891)

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“Forty Years of Black Days”?The Rus sian Ad min is tra tion of Kars, Ar da han, and Batum, 1878–1918

Can dan Badem

This chap ter ex am ines the basic ten ets of the Rus sian “Military Customary Ad min is tra tion” (Voenno-narodnoe up rav le nie) and the Russian re set tle ment (col o ni za tion) pol icy in Kars, Ar da han, and Batum from the Rus sian an nex a tion in 1878 until the Treaty of BrestLitovsk in 1918.1 While there is a siz able lit er a ture on the Rus sian ad min is tra tion in the Cau ca sus in gen eral, very few stud ies in Rus sian, En glish, Ar me nian, or Turk ish have been de voted to the Rus sian ad min is tra tion of this area.2 Whereas con tem po rary Rus sian his to rians have al most for got ten about these ter ri to ries, works by Turk ish, Kurd ish, Geor gian, and Ar me nian his to rians are gen er ally marked by na tion al ist inter pre ta tions, with few ex cep tions. There fore, one of my goals is to dis pel na tion al ist myths.

An other goal is to ex am ine the outmigration of Mus lims from the re gion fol low ing the Treaty of Con stan tin o ple (1879). In the three years fol low ing the Treaty of Con stan tin o ple between Rus sia and the Ot toman Em pire, a treaty that gen er ally af firmed the Trea ties of San Ste fano (1878) and Ber lin (1878), more than 110,000 Mus lims from Kars and Ar da han and more than 30,000 Mus lims (with a few Ar me ni ans) from

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Batum and Art vin aban doned their na tive lands and mi grated to the Ot to man Em pire. Turk ish na tion al ist historiog ra phy until now has de picted the years under Rus sian rule (1878–1918) as “forty years of black days” (kırk yıllık kara günler) and has con sid ered the Mus lim ex o dus from 1879 to 1882 as forced by the Rus sian govern ment.3

I argue that the Rus sian ad min is tra tion was not as “black” or bad as claimed by na tion al ist his to rians, and that the Rus sian ad min is tra tion did not force the local Mus lim pop u la tion to em i grate, al though it encour aged outmigration by some in di rect in cen tives. The outmigration of Mus lims from these ter ri to ries after the an nex a tion was largely due to the un will ing ness of the Mus lim elites and the masses led by them to live as Rus sian sub jects and to some Ot to man in cen tives to em i grate. These Mus lim elites (not ables, clergy, of fi cials, and mer chants deal ing mainly with the state) feared loss of their priv i leged status under the new Rus sian ad min is tra tion. Some eco nomic rea sons also played a role for at least some of the em i grants. Sec ond, I argue that nearly half of the Mus lim em i grants from the re gion re turned to Rus sia le gally or il le gally, a fact that is hardly men tioned in Turk ish historiog ra phy. Fur ther, I as sert that the Rus sian pol icy in these ter ri to ries was com plex and incon sis tent, and the Rus sian ad min is tra tion in the end was un suc cess ful in col o niz ing the re gion with Rus sian peas ants or even with Chris tians in gen eral to a sig nifi cant de gree. Fi nally, al though this chap ter fo cuses on the re la tion ship between Rus sian pol icy and the Mus lim mi gra tion from the Cau ca sus, it is worth high light ing the role played by the many RussianOttoman wars and East ern Ques tion trea ties in pro vid ing context for the Mus lim mi gra tion and Rus sian de ci sion mak ing.

The RussianOttoman wars of the nine teenth cen tury were fought in two main the a ters of war: the Bal kans and the Cau ca sus. Both em pires al ways con sid ered the Cau ca sian front as sec on dary. By 1877, Rus sia had al ready con quered the east ern Black Sea coast as far as Batum, as well as the once Ot to man dis tricts of Ak halt sikhe and Ak hal ka lak. After the RussianOttoman War of 1877–78 and the Con gress of Ber lin, Rus sia fur ther an nexed the three Ot to man san jaks of Kars, Ar da han (for merly Chil dir), and Batum. From these three san jaks (elviye-i se lase in Ot to man of fi cial par lance), the Rus sian govern ment formed two oblasts: Kars (in clud ing Ar da han) and Batum. In 1883, the Batum oblast was dis solved and be came part of the Ku taisi gu ber niia; how ever, the two dis tricts (ok rugs) of Art vin and Batum were still under the MilitaryCustomary Ad min is tra tion. In 1903, the Batum oblast was re stored.

“Forty Years of Black Days”?

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The MilitaryCustomary Ad min is tra tion was an ad min is tra tive system de vel oped by the Rus sian Em pire in the nine teenth cen tury, par tic u larly dur ing its wars in the north ern Cau ca sus against the Mus lim “moun tain eer” peo ples of the re gion. The system mixed Rus sian mar tial rule and local cus toms. In es sence, it rested upon sim ple rules eas ily under stood by the local pop u la tions in stead of the com plex cor pus of Rus sian laws. This meant in prac tice a dual ju ris dic tional system in the re gion under con sid er a tion. In cer tain cases, local peo ple could have re course to local courts that de livered ver dicts ac cord ing to the sharia and cus to mary laws. In other cases, lo cals were sub jected to the same system of laws in op er a tion through out the en tire Rus sian Em pire. The MilitaryCustomary Ad min is tra tion tried to con cil i ate the cus toms of the local pop u la tion with Rus sian govern men tal in sti tu tions, and it al lowed local peo ple to ex er cise to a cer tain ex tent their cus toms in their inter nal af fairs.4

The system was first put into prac tice in 1852, even be fore Imam Shamil’s sur ren der in 1859. Gen eral Prince Alek sandr I. Ba ri a tins kii (1815–79), the then chief of staff of the Army of the Cau ca sus and later the vice roy of the Cau ca sus (com mander in chief of the Army of the Cau ca sus and governorgeneral of the Cau ca sus) from 1856 to 1862, had ex ten sive ex pe ri ence in the Cau ca sus, and was fa mil iar with local lan guages and Is lamic prac tices. Hop ing to learn from the ad min is trative mis takes com mit ted under Gen eral Er mo lov at the be gin ning of the nine teenth cen tury, Ba ri a tins kii de vel oped the MilitaryCustomary Ad min is tra tion, which at tempted to elim i nate the prob lems of the for mer system of rule by in cor po rat ing na tive cus toms and pro ce dures. In 1852, he set up a meh keme (court) in Grozny, cap i tal of Chech nya, to hear cases among Che chens. Pre sided over by a Rus sian of fi cer, the court con sisted of three mem bers and a Mus lim judge (kadi or qadi ). The court’s mem bers took of fice after being elected by local peo ple. The kadi de cided all Is lamic cases under his ju ris dic tion, where the pres i dent and mem bers had only ad vi sory votes. In other cases based on local cus toms (adat), the pres i dent and mem bers were de ci sive, while the kadi had only an ad vi sory vote.5

Besides jus tice, local pop u la tion also took part in the ad min is tra tion of vil lages under the hy brid system de vel oped under Rus sian rule. Vil lage com mu nities ( ja maat) and tri bal as so ci a tions (tohum) re tained their tra di tional struc ture of govern ance. Yet the final aim of Bariatin skii’s in no va tion was to help peo ple grad u ally grow ac cus tomed to the

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tsar ist re gime and abide by its laws. Like Prince Mi khail S. Vo ront sov (1782–1856), who had pre vi ously served as the vice roy of the Cau ca sus from 1844 to 1854, Ba ri a tins kii also took care to in cor po rate Cau ca sian feu dal land lords into the tsar ist aris toc racy. Based on ex pe ri ence, the tsar ist re gime con sid ered local land lords its great est al lies in the conquered ter ri to ries. In this re spect, the Rus sian Em pire did not sig nifi cantly dif fer from other em pires. Just as the Ot to man Em pire ap pointed Kurd ish beys as ad min is tra tors of cer tain dis tricts in Kur di stan, the Rus sian Em pire en trusted local khans with the ad min is tra tion of some uezds in the Cau ca sus and Turke stan.6 In fact, it is clear from the cor respon dence between Em peror Nich o las I and his gen er als (in clud ing the min is ter of war Alek sandr I. Cher ny shev) that Rus sian co lo ni al ists had se ri ously ex am ined the ex pe ri ences of Brit ish and French im pe ri al ism in India and Al ge ria. Brit ain and France also ex am ined Russia’s ex pe rience in the Cau ca sus. After all, they were all in spired by the Ot to man system as well.7

The pro vi sional reg u la tion (vre men noe po lozh e nie) of 9 Oc to ber 1878 endorsed by Grand Duke Mi khail Nik o lae vich, the vice roy of the Cauca sus and the com mander in chief of the Cau ca sus army, briefly de fined the boun dar ies and ad min is tra tive di vi sions of the Kars oblast as well as the pow ers of the mil i tary governor. One of the two dep u ties of the mil i tary governor of Kars would pre side over the Su preme Pop u lar Court (glav nyi na rod nyi sud), which was the pro vin cial court of ap peals, while the other one would be charged with mil i tary af fairs. Local courts would see all cases ex cept for those in volv ing the local population’s land af fairs and crimes com mit ted against the state. Rules per tain ing to land own er ship would be set forth later. A per ma nent gen dar me rie unit (mi lit siia) con sist ing of four com pa nies would be es tab lished in Kars to pro vide militarypolice ser vices.8 In short, the grand duke en vi sioned an ad min is tra tion that con sol i dated cen tral au thor ity in the hands of Rus sian mil i tary of fi cials but left local af fairs to na tive lead ers. The Rus sian govern ment tried to ex tend its ex pe ri ence from the Military Customary Ad min is tra tion of the Cau ca sus into the two newly ac quired oblasts of Kars and Batum. How ever, the Mus lim pop u la tion of the new re gion dif fered from the Cau ca sus Mus lims in some ways.

A major dis tinc tion between the peo ple of the north ern Cau ca sus and those of the Kars and Batum oblasts was that the lat ter had been gov erned by the Ot to man Em pire for cen tu ries and so did not have such strong local adat (cus to mary law) tra di tions as those of the for mer. Under the Ot to man system, I˙ stan bul ap pointed a kadi to the dis trict


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cen ter (kaza), which meant the ju ris dic tion of a kadi. There were also the vil lage coun cils of eld ers (ih tiyar me clisi) who set tled petty mat ters. How ever, as re ported by LieutenantGeneral Vik tor A. Fran kini, the first Rus sian mil i tary governor of the Kars oblast from 1878 to 1881, local peo ple hated those coun cils, which they thought had abused their au thor ity. Now the Rus sian governor thought it would be un nec es sary to set up such vil lage coun cils. Fur ther more, there were not enough liter ate per sons to serve as sec re tar ies.9 In stead, each dis trict (okrug) in the Batum and Kars oblasts would have its “pop u lar court.”10

A reg u la tion dated Feb ru ary 1879 con cern ing the pow ers and respon sibil ities of the mil i tary govern ors of the Batum and Kars oblasts stip u lated that these govern ors were re spon sible for main tain ing order and safety in their re spec tive prov inces. They grad u ally were to pre pare the pop u la tion for civil cit i zen ship (grazh danst ven nost), but the reg u lation cau tioned against sharply dis rupt ing their rou tine order and lifestyle un less a spe cial need arose.11 Govern ors were ex pected to in te grate the ma te rial and moral inter ests of local in fluen tial peo ple with Rus sia, in duc ing them to send their chil dren to Rus sian schools. Govern ors had to ob tain per mis sion from the com mander of the Army of the Cau ca sus to exile un wanted per sons. Yet in cases of emer gency, mil i tary govern ors were au thor ized to exile nui sance peo ple and crim i nals to Tbi lisi along with an ex plan a tory re port re gard ing the in di vid u als and infrac tions in ques tion. Mil i tary govern ors could also sen tence sub jects to fines as much as three hun dred ru bles and to im pris on ment for up to three months. To ar rest in di vid u als from priv i leged classes, they first had to gain per mis sion from the Cau ca sus ad min is tra tion in Tbi lisi; how ever, they also had the power for im me di ate ar rest in ur gent cases so long as they in formed the chief com mander. De spite ef forts to in volve na tives in the ad min is tra tion, the mil i tary govern ors thus re tained enor mous pow ers over the local pop u la tions in the dis tricts under their con trol.

St Pe ters burg did sup port a pol icy of tol er a tion con cern ing ed u cation and re li gious af fairs. Mil i tary govern ors, for ex am ple, were not to inter fere with the af fairs of Mus lim re li gious schools as long as those schools did not dis play fa nat i cism. In the ory, the Rus sian sec u lar schools ad min is tered by the Min is try of People’s En light en ment were open to Mus lims as well. Few Mus lims, how ever, sent their chil dren to Rus sian schools. The Cau ca sus ad min is tra tion in structed mil i tary govern ors to sup port pri vate en ter prises but not to allow mo nop o lies; to im prove pub lic works and trans por ta tion; to find new lands for Rus sian set tlers with out put ting any limit on the rights of the local pop u la tion; to

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pre serve for ests; to en cour age vol un teers for the mounted gen darme; to be at ten tive to the se lec tion of gen darme of fi cers; and to take nec essary meas ures to in crease pro vin cial rev e nues.12 Over all, Rus sian admin is tra tors pro vided bet ter ser vices for lesser taxes than was the case in the Ot to man Em pire.

Mi gra tion and Col o ni za tion

The eth nic com po si tion of the pop u la tion in the two oblasts has been a bat tle field for com pet ing na tion al isms, which makes any dis inter ested ac count of the col o ni za tion pol i cies dur ing the pe riod under study highly im por tant. Stud y ing the dem o graphic fig ures be fore and after the Rus sian an nex a tion of the area as in di cated in Rus sian and Ot to man sources will help sort through var i ous com pet ing na tion al ist claims to the re gion. Such anal y sis also il lu mi nates under ex plored as pects of the East ern Ques tion, par tic u larly its im pact on na tive pop u la tions. Ac cording to the Ot to man year book of the vi layet of Er zurum for the year 1877, the male pop u la tion of the san jaks of Kars and Çıldır (Ar da han) that went into the Kars oblast num bered 57,503 Mus lims and 5,245 Chris tians, to tal ing 62,748 men.13 From this fig ure, we can es ti mate that the total pop u la tion in clud ing women and al low ing for those who es caped census must have been more than 140,000 peo ple. In the san jak of La zi stan (Batum), the sit u a tion was sim i lar, with an even smaller Chris tian pop u la tion. Thus the ma jor ity of the pop u la tion in these san jaks was Mus lim (Turks, Geor gians, Kurds, and oth ers), while Chris tians (mainly Ar me ni ans) con sti tuted a small mi nor ity. Ste pan Er mo laev, sec re tary of the sta tis tics com mit tee of the Kars oblast, also noted that at the time of its cap ture by Rus sians the en tire pop u la tion of Kars was Mus lim with only a very small Chris tian pop u la tion. Er mo laev wrote that ac cord ing to Ot to man of fi cial local records, the male pop u la tion amounted to 41,500 in 1878 ex clud ing no madic Kurd ish tribes, and the Chris tians num bered 4,000, most of whom were Ar me ni ans.14

Con versely, the So viet Ar me nian his to rian Ar tashes M. Po gho sian has argued that on the eve of the Con gress of Ber lin in 1878, the num ber of Ar me ni ans in the san jaks of Kars and Çıldır reached up to 280,000, re fer ring to the jour nal Ar a rat in 1914.15 How ever, Poghosian’s source does not give any in for ma tion on the pop u la tion of these two san jaks, but pro vides data only on other vi lay ets in An a to lia. Fur ther more, Russian sta tis tics do not sup port this num ber. Al though the Ar me nian pop u la tion in the Kars and Batum oblasts under Rus sian rule in creased


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with Ar me nian im mi grants and ref u gees, the total Ar me nian pop u lation (in clud ing the tem po rary pop u la tion) in these oblasts did not ex ceed 115,000 in the for mer and 15,000 in the lat ter even on the eve of the First World War. Po gho sian would be right if he gave that num ber for the war years be gin ning with 1915, when many Ar me ni ans from An a to lia in deed fled to Kars. How ever, Po gho sian again makes a very sur pris ing, im pli citly nation alis tic claim in his book, ar guing this time with out any ref er ence, that be fore an nex a tion by Rus sia, “the pop u la tion of the Kars san jak con sisted of Ar me ni ans ex clu sively.”16

An other nation alis tic mis rep re sen ta tion re gard ing the eth nic compo si tion of the pop u la tion comes from Ta tiana F. Aris tova, a Rus sian eth nog ra pher and Kur do log. Re fer ring to an ar ti cle by the Geor gian eth nog ra pher Dmi trii Z. Bak radze, Aris tova argues that in the 1870s, Kurds dom i nated the eth nic com po si tion of the Kars oblast.17 How ever, Bak radze, to whom Aris tova re fers, writes that among the set tlers in the Kars prov ince, Kurds out num bered any other eth nic ity, fol lowed by Ka rap a paks and Turk mens.18 Using the term vse lentsy, or “set tlers,” Bak radze does not mean the na tive pop u la tion but rather a group of peo ple set tled in the re gion some time ago, most likely dur ing the Ot toman pe riod. In deed, ear lier, Bak radze de scribes the Kurds, Ka rap a paks, Turk mens, Cau ca sian high land ers, and oth ers, as new com ers to the Kars prov ince. Kurds thus did not con sti tute a ma jor ity or plu ral ity in the whole pop u la tion of the area, and Aris tova there fore mis under stood ei ther what she read or made a de lib er ate fal sifi ca tion.

While Ar me nian and Kurd ish na tion al ism has thus tried to ex agger ate the num ber of Ar me ni ans or Kurds within the pop u la tion of the area, Turk ish na tion al ism for its part in most cases has de nied a substan tial pres ence of Ar me ni ans in the area in the Mid dle Ages. Turk ish na tion al ist historiog ra phy for its part has in ac cu rately claimed that Rus sia tried to col o nize the area with Ar me ni ans after 1878. Sim i larly, for many years dur ing the re pub li can pe riod in Tur key, Turk ish na tional ist historiog ra phy has also claimed that the Kurds in Tur key were just “moun tain Turks.” It would not be super flu ous to note here that Fah ret tin Kırzıo˘glu, an in fluen tial his to rian on the his tory of Kars, was the in ven tor of this ri dic u lous moun tain the ory, ac cord ing to which the name “Kurd” orig i nated from sounds of “kart kurt” that were heard when peo ple walked on the snow in moun tains.

After the Con gress of Ber lin in 1878, when the three san jaks were ul timately ceded to Rus sia, the Mus lim pop u la tion in these san jaks began to im mi grate to the Ot to man Em pire. Ac cord ing to Ar ti cle 21 of the

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Treaty of San Ste fano of 3 March 1878 and later Ar ti cle 7 of the Treaty of Con stan tin o ple of 8 Feb ru ary 1879, the in hab i tants of the Ot to man ter rito ries an nexed by Rus sia were en ti tled to sell their prop erty and im migrate to the Ot to man Em pire within three years after the treaty was rat ified. Sim i larly, Chris tians liv ing in the Ot to man Em pire could migrate to Rus sia.19 After the threeyear pe riod, those who re mained would auto mat i cally be come Rus sian sub jects.

It is some mat ter of de bate whether Mus lim em i gra tion from the Rus sian Em pire in the sec ond half of the nine teenth cen tury was a pol icy ob jec tive of the Rus sian govern ment.20 Ev i dence here sug gests that the Rus sian govern ment in gen eral acted neu trally, nei ther forc ing the Mus lims in the two oblasts under con sid er a tion to im mi grate to Tur key nor con vinc ing them to stay. While Turk ish na tion al ist his to rians have claimed that the Rus sian au thor ities forced the local Mus lims to im migrate to Tur key in order to make room for Rus sian or Or tho dox set tlers, doc u ments in the Ot to man, Rus sian, Geor gian, and Ar me nian archives point to the re li gious mo ti va tion and vol un tary na ture of the Mus lim ex o dus. The Ot to man au thor ities for their part, at least at the be gin ning of the threeyear term, en cour aged Mus lim im mi gra tion into An a to lia by prom is ing land, houses, and tax ex emp tions to the var i ous del e gations from the three san jaks. The Mus lim clergy (ulema or the mul lahs, muf tis, imams, hod jas) of these san jaks ac tively prop a gated for im mi gration to Tur key. They thought that they would lose their in flu ence under the Rus sian rule; there fore, they ag i tated for im mi gra tion to the Ot toman Em pire to gether with their com mu nities. In fact, they were able to col lect money and goods for their “ser vices” from their com mu nities with the help of the Ot to man ad min is tra tion. Now the new Rus sian ad min is tra tion was not inter ested in de fend ing the Mus lim clergy’s priv i leges. There fore, the clergy opted for em i gra tion to gether with as many peo ple as pos sible. In their pe ti tions to Ot to man au thor ities complain ing of hard ships in their new homes after their mi gra tion, the Muslim em i grants from the “three san jaks” wrote that they did not want to live under Rus sian rule. For ex am ple, in a pe ti tion signed by thirtythree mem bers of the ulema of Kars and Ar da han, dated July 1881, the pe tition ers stated that they left their homes due to their fate ful in va sion by Rus sia, but they did not men tion any co er cion by Rus sian au thor ities.21

Al though the ag i ta tion of the Mus lim clergy and the prom ises of the Ot to man au thor ities had an im por tant ef fect, it is not pos sible to ex plain the whole pro cess of mi gra tion by re li gious mo tives or by fa nat i cism, as other, eco nomic rea sons ex isted as well. By un for tu nate co in ci dence,


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bad har vests marked the first two years under Rus sian rule in the two oblasts. Thus many peas ants were un able to pay taxes. The eco nomic sit u a tion of peas ants was es pe cially hard in those areas that had been af fected most in the last war. Fur ther more, the dec lar a tion of Batum as a free port (porto franco) was not in the inter ests of the neigh bor ing pop u la tion, which lost the op por tu nity to sell its prod ucts and to buy goods in Batum with out pay ing taxes. Due to the sev er ance of eco nomic ties with I˙ stan bul, some peo ple had lost their op por tu nities and jobs. For ex am ple, sin gle men in the Mur gul val ley used to go to I˙ stan bul and other big cit ies for work. As Gen eral Kom a rov, mil i tary governor of the Batum oblast, argued, with the es tab lish ment of new bor ders, free pas sage of goods and men ceased and many peo ple lost their means of sub sis tence.22

Prince Grigol D. Or bel i ani, in his let ter of No vem ber 1879 to the viceroy’s dep uty in charge of civil af fairs, Ad ju tant Gen eral Prince Dmi trii I. SviatopolkMirskii, com plained of the Mus lim ex o dus from Rus sia: “The Cri mea be came empty, more than 200 thou sand Cir cas sians left Kuban, Abk ha zia is left with out pop u la tion. Now the in hab i tants of Ajaria and Kars, even the Ar me ni ans, are run ning away from us, as if from the plague! Can all this be ex plained by fa nat i cism?”23 Or bel i ani, who had talked to local peo ple in Batum, be lieved that al though fa nat icism had an im pact, the in com pe tency and cor rup tion of local ad min istra tors was a more im por tant fac tor in the outmigration. He argued that cor rupt local of fi cials were al ien at ing the peo ple from Rus sian ad min is tra tion. He sug gested that young, idea lis tic uni ver sity grad u ates re place all ad min is tra tors at the uezd (dis trict) level in the re gion.

One year later, LieutenantGeneral Dmi trii S. Star o sels kii, head of the main ad min is tra tion of the vice roy, was sent to Batum to ex am ine the rea sons for the com plaints of local peo ple about the ad min is tra tion. He lis tened to local not ables (the bek) and large mer chants. In his re port to the vice roy, Star o sels kii wrote that he talked with ten beks sep ar ately, and these beks said that under Turk ish rule they were in state ser vice and re ceived sal a ries, whereas only two or three beks had been ac cepted into Rus sian ser vice. The rest were now de prived of their means of sub sis tence. Con se quently, many beks tried to at tract large groups to em i grate from Rus sia to Tur key with them, in order to be con sid ered in fluen tial by Turk ish au thor ities. Al though the mil i tary governor of Batum had argued that he hoped to gain the re spect and trust of the local pop u la tion with out pay ing at ten tion to beks and other in fluen tial peo ple, Star o sels kii be lieved that this was a mis take; in stead, the beks

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should be given some ti tles and sal a ries. “We have adopted such a system of ac tion in the newly con quered places of the oblasts of Dagestan and Terek, and ex pe ri ence proved the ra tion al ity of this system,” he added.24 In the end, many beks in the two oblasts were en ti tled to large lands and to sal a ries in com pen sa tion for lost in come they once had dur ing Ot to man rule.

The Land Ques tion

About ninetenths of all fields, mead ows, and pas tures in the three san jaks, now the oblasts of Kars and Batum, be longed to the treas ury. Ac cord ing to the Ot to man Land Code of 1858, such per ma nently leased state lands (arazi em i riye) could not be al ien ated from their ten ants (the peas ants) as long as they paid their taxes. Ot to man law rec og nized full own er ship only for houses with small gar dens in vil lages and houses with land plots in cit ies. The rest was ei ther state or waqf prop erty. How ever, such cat e go ries of landed prop erty were not com pat ible with the Rus sian laws of that time; the Rus sian ad min is tra tion thus faced a land prob lem that re mained un solved through out Rus sian rule. When mi gra tion of fi cially started in Sep tem ber 1878 in the Kars oblast, the sale of real es tate owned by the res i dents of the prov ince also be came a prob lem.25 Gen eral Fran kini set up a com mis sion called “go rods kaia up rava,” to which real es tate reg is ters and trans fer and sale pro ce dures were handed over. Prop erty rights were de ter mined by Ot to man title deeds, in the ab sence of which one had to pro duce ac cept able wit nesses.

Gen eral Fran kini, in a cir cu lar to the dis trict and po lice ad min is trations of the Kars oblast on 25 Sep tem ber 1878, stated that many res i dents ap pealed to mi grate to Tur key and for per mis sion to sell their mov able and im mov able prop er ties be fore leav ing. Other res i dents had asked whether land own ers who wished to stay and to ac cept Rus sian na tional ity would be granted ten ure over their lands as was the case under Ot to man rule. Fran kini in structed the dis trict govern ors that those wouldbe em i grants with title deeds should hand them over, while those with out any title deed should sign writ ten com mit ments at test ing that they would not raise any claims for land own er ship or ten ure in the fu ture. Fran kini fur ther stip u lated: “Those wish ing to stay here and ac cept Rus sian sub ject hood shall not be de prived of their rights of land use pro vided that they doc u ment their rights. Those wish ing to em i grate are not al lowed to sell their lands, but those who want to de part im medi ately may sell all the har vest of this year (grass, fod der, bar ley, wheat,


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etc.) with out hav ing to pay the tithe.” He re quired his agents to pre pare and sub mit lists in clud ing first name, last name, fam ily mem bers (names and ages), and the amount of land at their dis po sal. Fi nally, Fran kini granted “mi gra tion per mits” only after he re ceived these lists, the title deeds, and the afore men tioned com mit ments to be handed over by the em i grants.26 Au then ti cat ing the title deeds was dif fi cult, how ever, and they were even un avail able in many places. The govern ors of Kars wrote to Tbi lisi about the issue of title deeds sev eral times, es tablished com mis sions, pro posed pro jects, but failed to re ceive a clear re sponse from Tbi lisi.27

On 9 Feb ru ary 1879, Gen eral Fran kini wrote to Lieu ten ant Gen eral Al ex an der V. Kom a rov, head of the ad min is tra tion for Cau ca sus mountain tribes (gors koe up rav le nie) and a dep uty of Grand Duke Mi khail Nik o lae vich, that Ar ti cle 21 of the Treaty of San Ste fano was caus ing the Rus sian ad min is tra tion “much trou ble,” be cause of the right of em i gra tion within three years.28 Fran kini argued that Rus sia had nei ther the right nor the means to re sist em i gra tion. Nor did Rus sia have any inter est in doing so due to the stip u la tions of the treaty and the dif fi culty of con trol ling a prac ti cally open bor der. Fur ther more, the Rus sian admin is tra tion could not ex pect a pop u la tion held by force to “ful fill its civic du ties.” There fore, Fran kini rec om mended that Rus sia not re tain such a pop u la tion. Still, the governor thought that em i grants should be paid ap pro pri ate sums close to the rent in re turn for their lands.

Governor Fran kini wrote that the ad min is tra tion now needed to de cide what to do about the emigrants’ lands to en sure the “proper reset tle ment” of the oblast. He noted that a sig nifi cant part of the Turk ish pop u la tion in the dis tricts of Ka˘gızman, Takht, and Oltu was pre pared to em i grate if they felt any co er cion from the au thor ities and wor ried that “Turks” (mean ing Mus lims) in other dis tricts would join them. He also ex pressed con cern over the prob lem of land spec u la tion. If the ad min is tra tion al lowed em i grants to sell their reg is tered lands to any buyer, he argued, all free lands could soon be handed over to “spec u lators” in the face of the emigrants’ de sire to sell their im mov able prop erty as soon as pos sible. Sub se quently, ac cord ing to Fran kini, the ad min is tration would be de nied the op por tu nity to or ga nize the province’s set tlement. Fran kini sug gested two meas ures to pre vent this from hap pen ing. The first one was to an nounce that rural lands could be pur chased only by per mis sion of the ad min is tra tion. Such a meas ure would largely fa cil i tate the set tle ment of the oblast but had lim i ta tions. He be lieved that (1) the govern ment might be ac cused of ar bi trari ness; (2) it would

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be harder to have homo ge ne ous vil lage com mu nities; and (3) the delay in title deed pur chases would pro long the un cer tainty sur round ing pros pec tive em i grants be cause of the treaty.

As an al ter na tive to al low ing wouldbe em i grants to sell the land on the free mar ket, Fran kini pro posed that the Rus sian govern ment buy the lands of all pros pec tive em i grants by re im burs ing the fees paid for the title deeds. The govern ment would then col o nize the oblast as it liked, and this would cer tainly prove to be very use ful in the fu ture, es pe cially in case of a new war with Tur key. Fran kini es ti mated that five hun dred thou sand ru bles would be enough to buy the title deeds of the Mus lims leav ing the Kars oblast, given that the title deeds showed small amounts of rent for tax eva sion pur poses. The govern ment could also give a loan to the new set tlers for the land. Governor Fran kini went on to say that if the loan pro ject was rat ified, im me di ate im ple men ta tion would fol low and de tailed reg u la tions would be drafted right away.29

While the Rus sian governor wrote that title deeds could be pur chased cheaply, Fah ret tin Erdogan, the Young Turk It ti had ist agent who vis ited Batum and Kars many times from 1899 to 1914, inter est ingly claimed that Rus sians over paid for the title deeds. Erdo˘gan wrote the fol low ing in his me moirs: “In and around Kars, Rus sians were fol low ing a cun ning pol icy and ex ert ing max i mum ef forts to drive the Turks liv ing in Kars, Batum, and Ar da han away from their home lands by buy ing their real es tate and lands at high prices.”30 Erdo˘gan also main tained that op posing the Rus sian pol icy of en cour ag ing Turks to em i grate, Is mail Agha, his uncle from the Asbo˘ga vil lage in Sarıkamı¸s, and some oth ers prop agan dized against em i gra tion. Their mes sage pen e trated the most re mote vil lages and ac cord ing to Erdogan, thus “ob vi ated em i gra tion.” Erdo˘gan also wrote that a treaty granted Mus lims the right to em i grate within five years, which was, in fact, three years. An other claim by Erdo˘gan is that his uncle and oth ers also made antiemigration prop a ganda by say ing that Kars, Batum, and Ar da han had been pledged to Rus sians for twenty years as in dem nity, and these lands would again be given back to Turks at the ex piry of the term. It is un cer tain whether Erdo˘gan and his uncle be lieved these words they ut tered, or they just told them for prop a ganda pur poses. What ever the case, their claims were false; no treaty pro vi sion ex isted stip u lat ing that Kars would be re turned to Tur key after twenty years or upon the pay ment of the in dem nity. On one level, fac tual in ac cu ra cies in Erdo˘gan’s me moirs, and those like it, re flect con tem po ra ne ous con struc tion of var i ous na tion al ist nar ra tives sur round ing this re gion. On an other, Erdo˘gan’s me moirs sug gest that


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con tem po rar ies did in deed per ceive an or ches trated at tempt by the Rus sian govern ment to force Mus lim mi gra tion.

Col o ni za tion Pol icy and the Ar me nian Ques tion

In an other re port to his super i ors, Gen eral Fran kini ex pressed his vi sion that the fu ture pop u la tion of the Kars prov ince should be “en tirely re liable and loyal” and should also be a main stay against the “un trust worthy Mus lim pop u la tion in the Cau ca sus,” de tach ing them from the surround ing Turk ish prov inces and cen ters of prop a ganda. The Mus lim ele ment should, he as serted, “make up only an in sig nifi cant part of the pop u la tion, in the form of ex cep tions. The over whelm ing ele ment should be Rus sian, while it is pos sible to form the rest from Ar me ni ans and Greeks. I be lieve these last two ele ments should be counter bal anced. Around 4,000 Greek fam i lies are will ing to im mi grate to our lands from the prov inces of Er zurum and Trab zon. They are a do cile, obe di ent, and hard work ing group of peo ple en gaged in farm ing and crafts with no po lit i cal as pi ra tions what soever. They would act as a counter weight against oth ers. Our con su lates in Er zurum and Trab zon should aid these Greeks.”31

Here, in ad di tion to cast ing as per sions on the Mus lim pop u la tion, Fran kini also ex pressed dis com fort with Ar me ni ans. He im plied that Ar me ni ans had po lit i cal as pi ra tions, and he pro posed using Greeks as counter weight against them. The governor be lieved that the oblast could in fact sus tain twice as much as the pop u la tion under Ot to man rule, which he es ti mated as eigh teen thou sand house holds, ar guing that Ot to man cen suses under stated the pop u la tion. For the col o ni za tion of the re gion, pref er ence should be given first to Rus sians and then to Greeks, while the Ar me nian pop u la tion should not be al lowed to reach a sig nifi cant per cent of the pop u la tion. For this rea son, Fran kini or dered the Ar me nian im mi grants from Tur key to be dis trib uted among Ar menian vil lages, but they should not be al lowed to create new vil lages.

Ac cord ing to Ni ko lai Shav rov (1826–99), a Rus sian na tion al ist re tired gen eral who pub lished var i ous books on Rus sian col o ni za tion in the Cau ca sus and nu mer ous ar ti cles in the news paper Kav kaz in Tbi lisi, Mi khail Nik o lae vich de manded that Rus sian peas ants be set tled (col onized) in the Kars oblast. How ever, Gen eral Mi khail T. LorisMelikov, then min is ter of the inter ior and of Ar me nian de scent, op posed the grand duke’s de mand.32 Con queror of Kars in 1877, min is ter of the inter ior from No vem ber 1880 to April 1881, LorisMelikov was the au thor of

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the sec ond Rus sian con sti tu tional pro ject and was known as a sup porter of grad ual lib eral con sti tu tional re forms. When Em peror Al ex an der II died of an in jury from an as sas si na tion at tempt on 13 March 1881, the more con ser va tive seg ment of the rul ing classes turned the new em peror against LorisMelikov, and LorisMelikov had to re sign. Many his torians con sider his res ig na tion from the post of min is ter of the inter ior as a turn ing point in nineteenthcentury Rus sian po lit i cal his tory.33 Thus the new em peror, Al ex an der III, changed the po lit i cal course to ward con ser va tism, cen tral ism, and Rus sian na tion al ism. He also saw Ar menian na tion al ism as a threat to Rus sia. In 1882, he would order Count Dmi trii A. Tol stoi, the ultra con ser va tive min is ter of the inter ior, to take se ri ous meas ures against Ar me nian na tion al ism.

The opin ions of Gen eral Fran kini con cern ing re gional set tle ment evolved dur ing this change of re gime and were ap par ently ac cepted by the Cau ca sus ad min is tra tion. Prince SviatopolkMirskii wrote to Mi khail Nik o lae vich in St. Pe ters burg that he had pro vided Gen eral Fran kini with de tailed in struc tions. In his re port dated 16 Feb ru ary 1879, SviatopolkMirskii out lined his plans for the re gion: Mus lims in the Kars prov ince should not be pre vented from mi grat ing to Tur key; and nec es sary pre cau tions should be sug gested to avoid foreign ac quisi tion of the lands left be hind by em i grants and to en sure com plete govern ment con trol over them. Ac cord ing to SviatopolkMirskii, cer tain sums should be paid to em i grants in re turn for the lands they left be hind. In turn, as many Rus sians as pos sible should be set tled in the evac u ated lands.

In the prince’s opin ion, this was such an im por tant mat ter that the state should not hes i tate to pay sev eral mil lion ru bles. The Rus sian gen eral argued that it had been a mis take to set tle the lands around Ak halt sikhe and Gyumri with Ar me ni ans and Greeks from Tur key in stead of Rus sian peo ple in 1829, em pha siz ing that it would now be in ex cus able to re peat that mis take in the set tle ment of the Kars prov ince. He added that a few Rus sian vil lages in south ern Cau ca sus had proved them selves very use ful in many re spects dur ing the re cent war.34 In fact, Mol o kans and Duk ho bors along the Ot to man bor der of fered im portant ser vices such as trans port and pro vi sions to the Rus sian army in re turn for com pen sa tion.35 Al though Ar me ni ans had also helped the Rus sian army in many ways dur ing its war against Tur key, Sviatopolk Mirskii still con sid ered the set tle ment of Ar me ni ans a mis take, ap parently be cause he thought that the Ar me ni ans in tended to create an in de pen dent or auton o mous Ar me nia.


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Given that the Rus sian govern ment had re nounced an in dem nity of 1.1 bil lion ru bles in re turn for the Kars and Batum prov inces, the amount of 500,000 ru bles sug gested by Fran kini could not be con sid ered ex ces sive. Po gho sian has writ ten based on cer tain archi val doc u ments that Prince SviatopolkMirskii had no ti fied the governor of Kars through se cret cor re spon dence on 21 Feb ru ary 1879 of the government’s de ci sion to lend fi nan cial sup port to Rus sian peas ants to set tle in the Kars province.36 Again, ac cord ing to Po gho sian, SviatopolkMirskii had or dered that Rus sians were to be set tled not only in va cant but also in in hab ited vil lages. While Rus sian set tlers in the Cau ca sus had been banned from em i grat ing in the past, they were now al lowed to mi grate into the Kars prov ince.

Based on SviatopolkMirskii’s re port and the grand duke’s ap proval, Al ex an der II or dered an al lo ca tion of 500,000 ru bles (the equiv a lent of 375,000 US dol lars at that time) on 3 March 1879 for this pur pose. Subse quently, SviatopolkMirskii or dered Gen eral Fran kini to move for ward with ac tive Rus sian set tle ment in the Cau ca sus. He also pro hib ited Russian of fi cials from tak ing co er cive meas ures to en sure Mus lim mi gra tion. He wrote:

Col o ni za tion of the Kars oblast with Rus sian ele ments as largely as pos sible is, as dem on strated by the al lo ca tion of such a se ri ous sum of money for this pur pose, a sig nifi cant state af fair. But how ever im por tant the aim is, the means to achieve this aim must con form to the glory and the just laws of our government. It would be un worthy of us to re sort to ar ti fi cial means to force the Mus lims in the Kars prov ince to em i grate. The at ti tude we need to adopt is sim ple and clear. We should ful fill the terms of the treaty in both let ter and spirit and re main on legal and fair ground. The Mus lim pop u la tion has been granted a term of three years (start ing from the rat ifi ca tion of the final treaty signed on 8 Feb ru ary of the cur rent year) to de cide between Rus sian and Turk ish sub ject hood. The term was granted pre cisely to en sure the proper con duct of mi gra tion with out any com mo tion and de struc tion. It is also a moral im per a tive for us. The only thing we can and should do is to clearly ex plain to the Mus lim pop u la tion what their ob li ga tions as Rus sian sub jects are and will be, not to im pede those who wish to em i grate and on the contrary to make em i gra tion easier for them. The most im por tant pre cau tion to be taken for this last issue is for the govern ment to pay money [voz na grazh de nie, “re ward”] to em i grants in re turn for their rights over the lands they will leave be hind.37

SviatopolkMirskii added that there were two prin ci ple ways to set tle Rus sian im mi grants in the Kars prov ince, both of which had their ad vantages and dis ad van tages. The first in volved wait ing for the full body of

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Mus lims to em i grate and to reg is ter the amount and char ac ter is tics of the lands they left be hind. At that point, a de ci sion could be made about a de lib er ate re dis tri bu tion of land among a large group of Rus sian set tlers. Al ter na tively, SviatopolkMirskii pro posed a more grad ual process of set tling in di vid ual Rus sians as Mus lims evac u ated their lands. In the end, the govern ment adopted the sec ond op tion.

Gen eral Fran kini re ported to the vice roy of the Cau ca sus twice a month about em i grants from the oblast to Tur key. Ac cord ing to his re ports, 32,494 in di vid u als had em i grated by midAugust in 1879.38 From 7 Sep tem ber 1878 until 13 June 1880, 4,383 house holds in clud ing 42,853 in di vid u als ap plied for em i gra tion to Tur key.39 By 13 June 1880, the num ber of em i grants had reached 5,816 house holds con sist ing of 65,447 in di vid u als.40 The num ber of em i gra tion per mits (bi lets) is sued by the governor rose to 89,477 by the end of De cem ber 1881 and fi nally reached 111,202 (56,588 men and 54,614 women) by the end of Feb ru ary 1882, that is, when the threeyear term stip u lated by the Treaty of Constan tin o ple ex pired.41 In the Batum oblast, how ever, there was no such of fi cial count of em i grants. Ac cord ing to French and Brit ish con su lar re ports, between 1879 and 1881, some 6,000 Geor gian Mus lim households (roughly 30,000–40,000 in di vid u als) mi grated to ports along the Black Sea coast in the Ot to man prov ince of Trab zon. By Feb ru ary 1882, ac cord ing to Ali Pasha of Çürüksu, a local not able ap pointed by the Ot to man govern ment as an of fi cial for set tling the mi grants from the Batum re gion, the total num ber of Geor gian Mus lims who had im migrated to Ot to man An a to lia by sea was around 80,000; the num ber of mi grants who had come over land was around 40,000.42

In his an nual re port for 1879, Gen eral Fran kini also de scribes the var i ous eth nic and re li gious ele ments of the local pop u la tion of the Kars oblast in a sec tion called “the set tle ment prob lem,” which in cludes a tell ing anal y sis of the em i gra tion of the Mus lim pop u la tion. He noted that the local peo ple knew about the re la tions between Rus sia and the Ot to man Em pire and the lifeordeath strug gle between the two em pires through first hand ex pe ri ence, not from books or hear say in for ma tion. These un for tu nate peo ple had shoul dered all the bur den of this strug gle. Ac cord ing to Fran kini, the suf fer ing of the local peo ple dur ing the numer ous RussianOttoman wars was ex treme. In fact, the cur rent gen er ation alone had wit nessed all three wars of the cen tury. Lis ten ing to the ar til lery fire of Gen eral Paske vich at their mothers’ bosom (the 1828–29 war), spend ing all their en ergy in a war with Rus sians in their youth (the


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Cri mean War of 1853–56), and fi nally, feel ing the pain of sur ren der ing to the Rus sian army for the third time at an old age, when they de served to rest, this was a tragic gen er a tion. Thus, he said, “the present gen er ation opened their eyes to the strug gle of their home land with Rus sia and [have] lived with it ever after.” “Ob vi ously,” he con tin ued, “in this case, a Turk would in ev i ta bly and nat u rally see his his tor i cal and na tional enemy in Rus sians. This is the or i gin of the local Turks’ deep seated dis trust for us that no ac tion could ever re pair in any way.”43 Gen eral Fran kini be lieved that the Turks’ dis trust was so “deep in their flesh and blood” and “had be come such an in sep a ra ble part of their na ture” that al though they had “sound judg ment and nat u ral wis dom,” they could not ob jec tively eval u ate the good will of Rus sian au thor ities to ward them and saw a fu ture under Rus sian rule with “a blind and fool ish fear.” There fore, they chose to use their treatygranted right to em i grate as soon as it be came clear that the re gion would ul ti mately re main in Rus sian hands.

Governor Frankini’s words in his an nual re port to de scribe the em igra tion of the peo ple of Kars and Ka˘gızman are highly inter est ing, sur pris ing, and straight for ward. An em pha sis on re li gious “fa nat i cism” not with stand ing, Fran kini writes with a sym pa thy that is un char ac ter istic for any ad min is tra tor of a con quered prov ince:

The first ones to leave Kars were the Turks, who had been im bued with a religiousnational spirit and who were the en e mies not only of Rus sia but also of all Chris ten dom: for all their lives, they had been fanaticspatriots who had read ArabicTurkish lit er a ture and Is lamic theol ogy, and these formed a highly in fluen tial cler i cal class in Kars. They em i grated be cause of their fa nat i cism and pa tri ot ism; they deeply mourned the sep ar a tion of their re gion from their home land and its an nex a tion by the hated Mus co vites. Of course, they used all their rhe tor i cal power and theo log i cal logic to rally the en tire Turk ish pop u la tion of the prov ince to their cause. They were fol lowed by a whole group who had been de pen dent on the Turk ish govern ment for their means of ex is tence: these were for mer Turk ish of fi cials and partly mer chants. Then came the mass movement of those mod el ing the urban not ables. It is hard to en vis age a scene more heart break ing than this long train of ox carts cov ered by can vas, car ry ing si lent and crest fal len women and chil dren: be fore they left the lands they had tilled and im proved by sweat ing blood since their young age, and set out for the gloomy un cer tainty await ing them and maybe even for mis ery and early death, the em i grants with women and chil dren vis ited grave yards to bid fare well to the graves of their fathers, chil dren, and com pan ions of their labor life. In Ka gyz man, where the peo ple were en gaged in hor ti cul ture, the em i grants not

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only pain fully said goodbye to the cold graves of their be loved chil dren but also hugged and kissed every tree in their gar dens; trees that had been grown by cen tu ries of labor and fed them with their fruits.44

Fah ret tin Kırzıo˘glu cor rob o rated Frankini’s ac count, writ ing that the Mus lim pop u la tion had been en cour aged to em i grate by some ulema. The two quat rains below from an anon y mous “epic of mi gra tion,” as re corded by Kırzıo˘glu, were re cited in the court yards of the large and small mosques in towns and vil lages. They con sti tute a good ex am ple of the rhet o ric and theo log i cal logic de scribed by Fran kini:

Pay heed to the ulema’s wordsWhat do you wait for? Em i grate!This is a duty for be liev ersWhat do you wait for? Em i grate!

On the ram page are these in fi delsBur y ing you alive in gravesNo lit er ate man now re mainsWhat do you wait for? Em i grate!45

Fran kini thought that the govern ment had to take a neu tral stance to ward em i gra tion to avoid undue sus pi cions. He re ported that work ing to fa cil i tate em i gra tion would be mo rally im proper, par tic u larly given the “in ev i ta ble mis ery that mi gra tion to a coun try like Tur key would bring.” On the other hand, try ing to pre vent em i gra tion even through in di rect means would also vi o late the treaty and the de sires of the peo ple. There fore, he con cluded that his govern ment “fully acted in ac cor dance with people’s pe ti tions and the terms of the treaty.” However, we must not for get that de spite Frankini’s words, much de pended on the local officials’ at ti tudes.

The Ques tion of Mil i tary Con scrip tion

The ques tion of mil i tary ser vice in the tsar ist army was an im por tant fac tor in the Mus lim emigrants’ de ci sion to re lo cate. In his an nual re port for 1879, Gen eral Fran kini wrote that Mus lim “ag i ta tors” going from vil lage to vil lage told the peo ple, “Rus sians seek to re cruit us as sol diers and force us to fight against our Mus lim broth ers. Then, they will ask our women to dress im mod estly just like Rus sian women,” an ar gu ment that was used in the Batum oblast as well and which prob ably many peo ple be lieved.


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As Rus sian of fi cials dis cussed whether to en cour age Mus lims to mi grate and made plans to pur chase their lands, they also de bated involv ing the Mus lim pop u la tion in the two oblasts in mil i tary ser vice. In the Ot to man Em pire, mil i tary re cruit ment of nonMuslims had been con sid ered after the Cri mean War, but some how the idea was never put into prac tice. Now Rus sia was faced with a sim i lar ques tion: would it re cruit the nonChristian pop u la tion into its army? The tsar ist government started work ing on intro duc ing gen eral mil i tary ob li ga tion in the Cau ca sus prior to the 1877–78 war, after which it began to re cruit Christian men at the age of twenty in var i ous re gions in the Cau ca sus. The Cau ca sus ad min is tra tion also tried re cruit ing the Mus lim pop u la tion, but fi nally it gave up on the idea and lev ied taxes in stead.

Gen eral Fran kini sub mit ted a re port dated Feb ru ary 1879 to Gen eral Kom a rov, act ing com mander of the Army of the Cau ca sus. Ac cord ing to the re port, Mi khail Nik o lae vich had ver bally in formed Gen eral Fran kini that re cruit ment of gen darmes (mi lit siia) should be con sid ered a pre lim i nary step to mil i tary re cruit ment soon to be im ple mented as a means to test the tem per of the Mus lim pop u la tion. Thus, the governor or dered vil lage com mu nities to give one mounted gen darme for every ten house holds. Al though the cav al ry men were called gen darme of ficers, their re cruit ment was op posed every where. Every where mi lit siia re cruit ment was re garded as draft ing (re krutch ina); Mus lims com pared mi lit siia to Cos sacks and Rus sian troops (sol dats). Vil lage com mu nities and dis trict govern ors pe ti tioned the governor to can cel the ob li ga tion to pro vide mounted men. In re sponse, the governor tried to con vince the peo ple that the mounted men to be re cruited would serve as a gen dar me rie, not as Cos sacks. He argued that re cruit ment of mounted men was aimed at sav ing the peo ple from the abuse of un trust worthy vol un teers, and if the vil lage com mu nities re jected it, he would have to form the mi lit sia from vol un tary mer cen ar ies, which would be in conven ient for both the govern ment and the peo ple. Such ar gu ments proved per sua sive, and Fran kini suc cess fully re cruited mi lit siia men in many places.46

Still, the governor ob served rest less ness among the peo ple against mi lit siia re cruit ment and the es tab lish ment of new courts. Lo cals met in mosques to dis cuss the pol i cies of the Rus sian govern ment, and Frankini noted that there was now a greater de mand for tem po rary passes for travel to Er zurum for peo ple inter ested in con sult ing the Turk ish au thor ities there. Fi nally, he wrote that nu mer ous del e ga tions re quested the can cel la tion of re cruit ment. They ob jected to the pro ce dure of

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sup ply ing men for cav alry, for they had been granted a term of three years by the treaty to de cide on sub ject hood; argued that cen tral vil lages did not exist under Turk ish rule; and stated that they had been pleased with the old courts. These del e ga tions stated that they were ready to ful fill each and every ob li ga tion (carts, road build ing, tithes, etc.), but asked for ex emp tion from pro vid ing gen darmes. The governor responded that he ac knowl edged the right granted to them by the treaty, but he him self never pre vented any body from mi grat ing to Tur key, and they were sup posed to act along with the government’s in structions for their own ben e fit dur ing their stay in the prov ince, even if for a short term. Sub se quently, del e ga tions of Turks, Turk mens, and Kurds from the Takht dis trict fi nally de clared in an open man ner that they were ready for im me di ate em i gra tion under those circum stances. Takht was fol lowed by Oltu dis trict.

There upon, as the governor clar ified in his re port, he under stood that ex pla na tions and meet ings would get no where, and “re pres sive” meas ures had to be taken, such as send ing the lead ers of the ag i ta tion to exile. To do so, he first sum moned iden tified ag i ta tors to Kars. He de tained and threat ened them for a few days and then re leased them after they prom ised that they would not con fuse peo ple any more. Yet, he says, “I con cluded that it would not be wise to im pose co er cive meas ures on a pop u la tion that was ready to leave, and then the govern ment’s duty should be to thwart all hopes of the peo ple for stay ing here with out obey ing our order.”47

The governor re ported that the ag i ta tion had started only a few months ear lier when the sur ren der of Batum broke all the hopes of peo ple for the final re turn of the Kars prov ince to “Tur key.” The tur moil was caused by the Muslims’ com mon re luc tance to live among Christians and under a Chris tian govern ment; how ever, their re luc tance was not sharp ened after they learned about the government’s new de mands. Pri mary cen ters of the move ment were Ka˘gızman and Oltu. Con cerned about what was going to be come of their farms and see ing no rem edy but the Turk ish government’s sup port sup pos edly based on cer tain priv i leges granted by inter ven ing Eu ro pean states in Ber lin, pow er ful land own ers in these two areas went to visit Is mail Pasha in Er zurum, whose re sponse to their de mands was soon known all around the prov ince.

Ac cord ing to Fran kini, Is mail Pasha prom ised Mus lim vis i tors from Kars that he would protest against the prac tice of re cruit ing gen darmes and other under tak ings by the Rus sian govern ment, a prom ise that he


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kept. Is mail Pasha also an nounced that Mus lim res i dents of the Kars prov ince would be pro vided with lands, an i mals, build ings, and other goods if they wished to mi grate to Tur key. In fact, some lands in Erzurum, Er zin can, Bay burt, and along the Black Sea coast had al ready been re served for im mi grants for this pur pose. The governor of Kars wrote:

I sup pose we should be happy about the Muslims’ de ci sion to em i grate in a state of panic caused by their con cerns for an un cer tain fu ture and as they and Is mail Pasha acted in such an im pul sive man ner, for we would fall into a predic a ment if they had gone on re ject ing our re forms and at the same time had not em i grated on the basis of the threeyear term they have been granted. We would be at a loss, not know ing what to do with a mass of peo ple who sim ply re sist our rules with the power of in ac tion and in er tia, fi nally hav ing to force them to em i grate. There fore, it is my be lief that after the cat e gor i cal dec lar a tions about an im me di ate em i gra tion sub mit ted to my self and the dis trict govern ors, the government’s duty is to sup port the people’s in cli na tions and to wait until the spring, as it would be in ap pro pri ate to ask them to set off in win ter, and in the mean time to deal with nec es sary for mal ities to se cure an or derly mi gration pro cess.48

As we learn from the governor’s re port, the re forms did not meet any re sis tance in the Shu ra gel dis trict due to the com po si tion of the pop u lation. In the Kagızman dis trict, the mi lit sia and the courts were es tab lished with some minor re stric tions; how ever, pe ti tions were sub mit ted ask ing for em i gra tion from cer tain Kurd ish win ter shel ters (kı¸slaks) with some de gree of pres sure from the govern ment. In Zar u shad, coun cil mem bers were ap pointed by an order as the peo ple re fused to elect them. Not all cen tral vil lages pre pared the lists of the mounted mi li tia. Every thing was fine in the sub dis tricts of Çıldır and Hor a san. The in struc tions were also im ple mented through meet ings and ex pla na tions in the Ar da han dis trict and Posk hov sub dis trict. Yet part of the pop u la tion in the Göle sub dis trict sub mit ted pe ti tions for mi gra tion. Mi li tia men were se lected from a smaller crop of vol un teers where cen tral vil lages re fused to give any men for the mounted mi li tia. In the Takht dis trict, only Cir cas sians (Ka bar dins, Os se tians, and Che chens) were con vinced of the ne ces sity to obey govern ment in struc tions be cause ap par ently they wished to stay in the oblast. Local Turk mens were di vided into two groups: one will ing to stay, the other ready to leave im me di ately along with Turks and Kurds. Under these circum stances, the governor asked for a list of the fam i lies who wished to leave to ver ify that every fam ily had de cided for it self.

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The cen sus taken in 1886 to iden tify those to do mil i tary ser vice once more caused some un rest within the Mus lim pop u la tion. Some Mus lims who did not want to enter the mil i tary de manded per mis sion to mi grate to or take ref uge in the Ot to man Em pire. Hear ing the news, the Ot to man govern ment gave in struc tions to the Foreign Min is try to urge Rus sia to allow those seek ing to em i grate from the Rus sian lands, even though the threeyear term granted by the Treaty of Con stan tin o ple in Feb ru ary 1879 had ex pired.49

Fi nally, the Rus sian govern ment aban doned the idea of re cruit ing Mus lims as sol diers and gen darme of fi cers at least for a while.50 In 1889, the Rus sian ad min is tra tion lev ied a mil i tary tax on Mus lim, Jew ish, and Yezidi pop u la tions such as the one paid by nonMuslims in the Ot to man Em pire for ex emp tion from mil i tary ser vice. The mil i tary tax for the en tire Kars oblast was pre set at 10,300 ru bles, an amount shared among the nonChristian males in the cit ies and vil lages in pro por tion to the land taxes.51 The Chris tian pop u la tion was obliged to serve in the army, yet like Mus lims al beit per haps for dif fer ent rea sons, Duk ho bors and many Mol o kans re fused to enter mil i tary ser vice. In 1891–92, only 59 men were re cruited into the mil i tary from the Chris tian male pop u la tion, of whom 32 were Ar me ni ans, 18 were Greeks, 8 were Rus sians, and 1 was an Es ton ian.52 In 1901, of 314 young draft ees, 177 were Ar me ni ans, 92 were Greeks, 43 were Or tho dox Rus sians, and 2 were Es ton ians.53 In other words, the ef forts of the Rus sian mil i tary to re cruit from the non Orthodox pop u la tion were less than aus pi cious.

f

After a pe riod of Geor gian and Ar me nian na tion al ist rule and the shortlived Turk ish “Re pub lic of SouthWest Cau ca sus” in 1919, Bolshevik and Kem al ist forces even tu ally de ter mined the TurkishSoviet bor der in 1921, leav ing Batum in So viet Geor gia and the rest of the two oblasts, as well as the I˘gdır (Sur malu) dis trict (uezd ) of the Er i van gu berniia in Tur key. Thus today’s Turk ish prov inces of Art vin (south ern part of the for mer Batum oblast), Ar da han, Kars, and I˘gdır con sti tute the only ter ri tory gained by the Ot to man Em pire at the end of the First World War, while it lost ter ri tory every where else. These prov inces are also unique in the sense that their local Ar me nian pop u la tions did not ex pe ri ence the dep or ta tions and mas sa cres of 1915 but later (at the end of the war in 1918) were in volved in the mu tual mas sa cres and the war between Turk ish forces and Dash nak Ar me nia. Dur ing the whole pe riod


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of Rus sian rule, Kars oc cu pied a spe cial place in the Ar me nian na tion al ist move ment as a train ing cen ter for rev o lu tion ar ies.54

The long his tory of RussianOttoman wars, com bined with the Cold War po la rity between the USSR and Tur key (as a mem ber of NATO), served to unite tra di tional antiRussian ideol ogy with antiCommunism in Tur key. So viet Geor gian and Ar me nian claims to Kars and Ar da han in 1945, al though aban doned shortly after being made, nev er the less fur ther strength ened the antiRussian and antiCommunist cli mate in Tur key. This led to a cer tain bias in Turk ish historiog ra phy con cern ing RussianTurkish re la tions, and many his to rians have viewed the his tory of Kars and Ar da han under Rus sian rule from this per spec tive. They char ac ter ized the fortyyear pe riod of Rus sian rule (1878–1918) through a neg a tive light only, re fer ring to it as the “forty years of black days,” not un like the char ac ter iza tion of Ot to man rule in the Bal kans. Dur ing the Cold War years, Turk ish his to rians had lit tle con tact with Rus sian sources, and even learn ing Rus sian was a sus pi cious ac tiv ity from the Turk ish state’s point of view. Now the sit u a tion is chang ing. Many Turkish his to rians are learn ing Rus sian and are more likely to look at the RussianTurkish re la tions in a more ob jec tively de tached way. Now we can try to eval u ate the suc cesses and fail ures of the Rus sian ad min is tration in Kars, Ar da han, and Batum.

First, it should be noted that not all tsar ist min is ters were en thu sias tic about an nex ing the three san jaks, ex cept for the port of Batum. Dur ing the prep ar a tions for the Con gress of Ber lin in 1878, some prom i nent mem bers of the Rus sian govern ment, in clud ing the min is ter of war, Dmi trii A. Mi liu tin, sug gested to Tsar Al ex an der II that Rus sia be satisfied with hav ing the port of Batum only. They argued the ad van tages of leav ing Kars and Ar da han to the Ot to man Em pire, be cause the local peo ple there were “at a very low level of cul ture,” mak ing them dif fi cult to rule, and the ter ri tory was too moun tain ous. Be cause the re gion lacked roads and eas ily ob tain able re sources, tsar ist of fi cials con sid ered it not worth main tain ing at all. Mi liu tin and sev eral other states men, such as the am bas sa dor Ni ko lai Ignat’ev in I˙ stan bul, also feared Eu ropean ac cu sa tions of Rus sian ex pan sion ism. Thus Mi liu tin be lieved that the area would be only a “bur den” to Rus sia.55 In deed his words proved to be pro phetic.

Nation alis tic (proTurkish, proArmenian, etc.) and sim plis tic approaches por tray Rus sian pol i cies as uni form, co her ent, rel a tively constant over time, and gov erned by a sin gle dy namic, whereas they were in re al ity am biv a lent, contra dic tory, chang ing over time, and de pen dent

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on many fac tors.56 Also, an im por tant fac tor was the bu reau cracy. What ever pol icy the Rus sian govern ment pur sued, it had to be im plemented in part by local lowlevel govern ment of fi cials, who were in many cases ei ther in sig nifi cant in num bers, or in ef fi cient, cor rupt, or po lit i cally un re li able from the of fi cial Rus sian per spec tive. Thus any pol icy, good or bad for Mus lims or for nonMuslims, could be thwarted by these qual ities of the local bu reau cracy or by the lack of any prop erly func tion ing bu reau cracy. A lack of qual ified per son nel with knowl edge of the local lan guages con stantly ham pered the Rus sian ad min is tra tion in the Cau ca sus.57

This was more acutely felt in Trans cau ca sia and even more so in the three san jaks dis cussed here. For ex am ple, Gen eral Fran kini, as the mil i tary governor of Kars, had many op por tu nities to con front problems as so ciated with the lack of welltrained per son nel. Touch ing on the prob lem of local staff in his an nual re port for 1879, he com plained that Rus sia, a coun try with vast ter ri to ries in Asia, lacked ad e quate staff to gov ern “Asian peo ples.” He also noted that whether they oc cu pied civil or mil i tary posts, pub lic of fi cials of Rus sian or i gin did not know the his tory, geog ra phy, re li gion, cus toms, and lan guage of the local peo ple. In par tic u lar, he com plained about the qual ita tive and quan ti ta tive insuf fi ciency of lowlevel of fi cials, whom he com pared to cap il lary ves sels in re la tion to the government’s re la tions with the peo ple. There fore, he said, “most of the of fi cials are lo cals and act on ei ther what their tribe thinks or what they them selves think, par a lyz ing the government’s in flu ence.”58 In fact, Gen eral Fran kini was per haps the only qual ified mil i tary governor in the oblasts of Batum and Kars for the en tire forty year pe riod of Rus sian rule. On the other hand, Rus sian of fi cials had rea son to con sider ap point ment to the two oblasts as a kind of pun ishment or exile due to the hard ships of every day life. As late as Jan u ary 1913, an of fi cial wrote in the of fi cial news paper of the Kars oblast that even an uezd cen ter in inner Rus sia pro vided more fa cil ities and a more com fort able life than in Kars.59 Sig nifi cant short ages in cluded the per ennial prob lem of hous ing. Lowlevel govern ment of fi cials had dif fi culty find ing proper homes suited to the se vere win ter cli mate in the area. To make the sit u a tion worse, fuel prices were also very high.

The Rus sian ad min is tra tion was with out doubt more mod ern and more ef fi cient in com par i son to the Ot to man ad min is tra tion. It built more roads and rail ways. It also opened more schools, al though these schools did not at tract Mus lims. More over, the Rus sian govern ment spent more than the rev e nues from the war in dem nity and local taxes.


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Here as in the Cau ca sus in gen eral, the Rus sian govern ment tried to in te grate local elites into the Rus sian aris toc racy. The Rus sian ad min istra tion was more or less suc cess ful in in te grat ing Mus lim not ables, al though some of them went to the Ot to man side dur ing the First World War.

It is re mark able that even Turk ish na tion al ist pol i ti cians who lived in the re gion dur ing Rus sian rule and who were af ter ward ac tive in the Turk ish re pub lic wrote in their me moirs that the Rus sian govern ment col lected fewer taxes from the pop u la tion, re spected their re li gion and cus toms, and did other things to make its rule ac cept able. How ever, these pol i ti cians also wrote in their me moirs that this was just a “pol icy of nar cot iza tion” (uyu¸stu rucu siya set) in tended to blunt the Turks’ national con scious ness.60 They also crit i cized the Rus sian govern ment for not tak ing Mus lims into the mil i tary, as this al leg edly left them with out mil i tary knowl edge. What they did not want to re mem ber is that the Mus lims them selves did not want to enter mil i tary ser vice in the Russian army. Turk ish na tion al ist his to rians have also argued that the Rus sian govern ment sup ported the Ar me ni ans in the re gion as a counterweight against the Mus lims. How ever, this was not the case at least until the out break of the Great War in 1914.

The Rus sian ad min is tra tion did not force Mus lims to em i grate; nei ther did it try to pre vent them from em i grat ing. Dur ing the three years from 1879 to 1882, more than 140,000 peo ple (about fourfifths of Mus lims) in the two oblasts im mi grated to Tur key. How ever, about half of these peo ple re turned to their home places due to hard ships in An a to lia, be cause the Ot to man govern ment, ec o nom i cally bank rupt, could not ful fill its prom ises to the im mi grants. Thus in 1914, on the eve of the war, slightly more than half the pop u la tion in the Kars oblast and al most 90 per cent of the pop u la tion in the Batum oblast was still Mus lim.

Un like in Cri mea and the north ern Cau ca sus, the Rus sian ad min is tration ut terly failed in col o niz ing the two oblasts with Rus sian peas ants. By 1914, only about 5 per cent of the per ma nent pop u la tion (ex clud ing troops and govern ment of fi cials) in the Kars oblast and less than 1 per cent in the Batum oblast con sisted of eth nic Rus sians, mainly the “sec tar ians,” that is, Mol o kans and Duk ho bors. Most of the Duk ho bors had left Kars at the end of the 1890s due to their un will ing ness to do mil i tary ser vice. While the pro por tion of the Ar me nian pop u la tion rose to 30 per cent in the Kars oblast, it re sulted not from in ten tional Rus sian pol icy, but rather from circum stances. Many Rus sian ad min is tra tors

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like Prince SviatopolkMirskii saw the set tle ment of Ar me ni ans from the Ot to man Em pire in 1829 as a mis take that should not be re peated.

The ref u gee Ar me ni ans who fled the Ot to man Em pire and il le gally crossed the Rus sian bor der into the Cau ca sus dur ing the Ar me nian mas sa cres of the 1890s caused an other per en nial prob lem for the Russian ad min is tra tion, es pe cially in the two oblasts as well as in the gu berniia of Yere van. These Ar me ni ans (about thirty thou sand peo ple, more than half of whom lived in the Kars and Batum oblasts) had come without any means of sub sis tence and had fal len into mis ery. Some of them even tu ally sup ported the Ar me nian rev o lu tion ary move ment, which smug gled arms into the Ot to man Em pire for the Ar me nian bands. De spite the Rus sian government’s nu mer ous rep re sen ta tions to the Sub lime Porte, Sul tan Abdülhamid ad a mantly re fused to per mit the Ar me nian ref u gees back into the Ot to man Em pire. Thus the Rus sian govern ment was obliged to offer those ref u gees Rus sian cit i zen ship in 1902. While most of the Ar me nian ref u gees be came Rus sian sub jects, some of them did not, and some of them re turned to Tur key after the 1908 con sti tu tional rev o lu tion in Tur key. There were also Ot to man Kurd ish bands vi o lat ing the Rus sian bor der to pil lage and plunder.

The out break of the First World War and the en su ing vi o lence led to fur ther de te ri ora tion of inter eth nic and inter con fes sional re la tions in the oblasts of Batum and Kars. The vac uum of power left after the dis solu tion of the Rus sian army in the wake of the Rus sian Rev o lu tions of 1917 led to fur ther mas sa cres of both Mus lims and nonMuslims in the two oblasts. By 1921, the two re gions ex cept for the city of Batum be came the ter ri tory of the new Turk ish re pub lic. The dis so lu tion of eco nomic ties with the Cau ca sus and the rest of the Rus sian Em pire led to se clusion and back ward ness in this area. One of the most vol a tile sites for pop u la tion move ments in the his tory of the East ern Ques tion, the area be came the pe riph ery of the Turk ish re pub lic in stead of the Rus sian Em pire. The fact that the re gion was still in dis pute between the USSR and Tur key in 1945 shows the longlasting leg acy of the vi o lence and mi gra tions as so ciated with the RussianOttoman wars and the East ern Ques tion.

Notes

Re search for this study has been sup ported by Tunceli Uni ver sity under Pro ject no. MFTUB01102.


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1. It is dif fi cult to trans late the Rus sian term Voenno-narodnoe up rav le nie into En glish or any other lan guage. Al ter na tive trans la tions are as fol lows: militarycivil, militarycommunal, militarynative, or militarypopular ad min istra tion. In this chap ter all trans la tions from Rus sian and Turk ish sources are mine.

2. SovietArmenian his to rian Ar tashes M. Poghosian’s Karss kaia oblast’ v sos tave Ros sii (Yere van: Hay a stan, 1983) is the only mono graph on the Kars oblast’ in Rus sian. For a re cent work from an Ar me nian per spec tive, see Rich ard G. Ho van ni sian, ed., Ar me nian Kars and Ani (Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda, 2011). In Ar me nian, see Ar a rat Ha gop yan, Karsi Marz 1878–1917 (Yere van: Char ta ra ket, 2000). In Turk ish, see my own Çarlık Rus yası Yönetiminde Kars Vi lay eti (I˙ stan bul: Bir za man lar, 2010). Alek sandr B. Shi rok o rad, Uter i an nye zemli ros sii: Ot Petra I do grazh dans koi voiny (Mos cow: Veche, 2006), in cludes a chap ter on this re gion from a Rus sian na tion al ist per spec tive.

3. The his to rian Fah ret tin Kırzıo˘glu (1917–2005), a na tive of Kars, was the main pro tag o nist of this ap proach. His books Kars Ta rihi (I˙ stan bul: Isıl Mat baası, 1953) and Ed e biyatımızda Kars (I˙ stan bul: Isıl Mat baası, 1958) as well as his nu merous ar ti cles have been quoted by many other his to rians who have sim ply repeated his claims.

4. Semen Esadze, Is tor i ches kaia za piska ob up rav le nii Kav ka zom, 2 vols. (Tbi lisi: Gut ten berg, 1907), 2:257–58. See also Tim o thy K. Blau velt, “MilitaryCivil Ad min is tra tion and Islam in the North Cau ca sus, 1858–83,” Kri tika: Ex plo ra tions in Rus sian and Eur asian His tory 11, no. 2 (Spring 2010): 221–55.

5. Esadze, Is tor i ches kaia za piska, 1:165–98. See also Alla S. Kon dra sheva, “Sis tema voennonarodnogo up rav le niia kak forma po lit i ches kogo kom promissa ros siis koi ad min is trat sii i severokavkazskikh gort sev (2ia pol o vina XIX veka),” Vest nik Sev KavGTU Se riia “Pravo” 1, no. 6 (2004).

6. In the Ot to man Em pire, this prov ince, with its cen ter in Diy ar be kir, was of fi cially called “Kur di stan” between 1847 and 1867. The Turk ish words bey and bek have the same mean ing; the for mer is the of fi cial ver sion, and the lat ter is a local var i ant.

7. For a com par a tive study of Russia’s “militarycommunal ad min is tration” in the north ern Cau ca sus and the French system in Al ge ria in the nineteenth cen tury, see Vlad i mir O. Bo brov ni kov, “Voennonarodnoe up rav le nie na Se ver nom Kav kaze (Dage stan): Mu sul mans kaia per i fe riia v ros siis kom im pers kom pros transtve, XIX–XX vv,” in Pros transtvo vlasti: Is tor i ches kii opyt Ros sii i vy zovy sov re men nosti, ed. B. V. An a nich and S. I. Bar zi lov (Mos cow: Mos kovs kii obs chest venny nauchny fond, 2001), 372–90; and idem, Mu sul mane Se ver nogo Kav kaza: Oby chai, pravo, nas i lie (Mos cow: Vos toch naia Li ter a tura, RAN, 2002), 171–75.

8. Proekt vre men nogo pol o zhe niia ob up rav le nii Kars ski oblasti, 27 Sep tem ber (9 Oc to ber) 1878, HAA, f. 274, op. 1, d. 1.

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9. Governor Fran kini to the Vice roy of the Cau ca sus, 27 Feb ru ary 1879, HAA, f. 1262, op. 2, d. 1, ll. 9–11.

10. STsSA, f. 1087, op. 3, d. 215, l. 5.11. The con cept of grazh danst ven nost, pop u lar ized by the his to rian Ka ram zin

and the poet Push kin, de noted Eu ro pean cul ture and civ il iza tion. See Jörg Bab e row ski, “Tsiv i liz a tors kaia mis siia i nat sio na lizm v Zakavkaz’e: 1828–1914 gg.,” in No vaia im pers kaia is to riia post so vets kogo pros transtva, ed. I. Ge ras i mov (Kazan: Tsentr Iss led o va niy Nat sio na lizma i Im pe rii, 2004), 314.

12. “Proekt in strukt sii o pra vakh i obi a zan nos tiakh voen nykh gu ber nat o rov Karss koi i Ba tums koi oblas tei po na rod nomu up rav le niiu, po go rods koi chasti i po us troistvu kraia,” HAA, f. 274, op. 1, d. 3.

13. Sâlname-i Vilâyet-i Er zurum sene 1293 (Er zurum: Er zurum Vi layet Mat baası, 1876–77), 144.

14. Pam yat naia knizhka i adres kal en dar Karss koi oblasti za 1904 god (Kars: Oblast naia tip o gra fiia, 1904), opis a telny otdel, 4.

15. Po gho sian, Karss kaia oblast, 71.16. Ibid., 72.17. Ta tiana Fed o rovna Aris tova, Material’naia kul tura kur dov. XIX–per voi

pol o viny XX v. (Mos cow: Nauka, 1990), 56.18. Dmi trii Bak radze, “Pri zan i a tii nami oblasti, iz vse lent sev, v chis li tel

nom ot no she nii, os o benno pre ob la dali kurdy, zatem ka rap a pakhi i, na ko nets, turk meny,” and “Istoricheskoetnograficheskii ocherk Karss koi oblasti,” Iz ves tiia Kav kazs kago Ot dela Im per a tors kago Russ kago Geo grafi ches kago Obsh chestva 7 (Tbi lisi, 1883): 6.

19. For the OttomanFrench texts of the Treaty of Con stan tin o ple, see BOA, I˙ . MMS. 60/28551. For the Rus sian text, see E. A. Ad a mov, ed., Sbor nik do gov o rov Ros sii s dru gimi gos u darst vami 1856–1917 gg. (Mos cow: Po lit i ches kaia Li ter a tura, 1952), 159–75. James Meyer has in ac cu rately writ ten that Ar ti cle 7 of this treaty stip u lated a span of “six months” for em i gra tion. See Meyer, “Im mi gra tion, Re turn, and the Pol i tics of Cit i zen ship: Rus sian Mus lims in the Ot to man Em pire, 1860–1914,” Inter na tional Jour nal of Mid dle East Stud ies 39 (Feb ru ary 2007): 25.

20. Meyer, “Im mi gra tion, Re turn, and the Pol i tics of Cit i zen ship,” 16.21. “Hasb’elkader Rusya tarafından vatanı mu kad des le rim i zin is ti lasıyla

be ra ber . . . ,” BOA, I˙ . DH. 834/67140 lef 1, quoted in Badem, Çarlık Rus yası Yönetiminde Kars Vi lay eti, 112.

22. Sham she V. Meg re lidze, Aj aris Tsar su li dan (Mu haj i roba 1878–1882 tsleb shi) (Tbi lisi: Met snie reba, 1964), 83–84. See also idem, Zakavkaz’e v russko-turetskoi voine 1877–1878 gg. (Tbi lisi: Met snie reba, 1972), 260.

23. Prince Grigol D. Or bel i ani to Ad ju tant Gen eral Prince Dmi trii I. SviatopolkMirskii, 9 No vem ber 1879, quoted in Meg re lidze, Aj aris Tsar su li dan, 79. The orig i nal let ter is in Rus sian.

24. Ibid., 82.


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25. Go do voi otchet voen nogo gu ber na tora Karss koi oblasti o sos toia nii vve ren noi emu oblasti za 1879 god (Kars: June 1880), 60. This source is sub se quently cited as Otchet 1879.

26. Gen eral Fran kini to dis trict and po lice ad min is tra tions of the Kars oblast, 25 Sep tem ber 1878, Ko piia s tsir kiu lar nago pred pi sa niia Voen. Gub. Karss koi oblasti ok ruzh nym i po lit seis kim up rav le niiam ot 13 sent. 1878 g. N. 5703, HAA, f. 1262, op. 1, d. 7(II), ll. 5–6.

27. Ko mis siia dlia okon cha niia soslovnopozemelnago vo prosa v chas tiakh Kav kazs kago kraia voennonarodnago up rav le niia 11 marta 1903 g. N. 807, v sovet Glav non a chalst vuiush chago grazh dans koi chas tiu na Kav kaze, 23 March 1903, STsSA, f. 231, op. 1, d. 309.

28. The name of this ad min is tra tion was changed to Cau ca sus Military Customary Ad min is tra tion (Kav kazs koe voennonarodnoe up rav le nie) to ward the end of 1879.

29. Gen eral Fran kini to Gen eral Kom a rov, Za piska o per es e le nii mu sul mans kago nas e le niia, 28 Jan u ary 1879, N. 394, HAA, f. 1262, op. 1, d. 7(II), ll. 16–25.

30. Fah ret tin Erdo˘gan, Türk Elle rinde Hatıralarım (I˙ stan bul: Yeni Mat baa, 1954), 18.

31. Gen eral Fran kini to Gen eral Kom a rov, Kars, 6 (18) Feb ru ary 1879, no. 1053, HAA, f. 1262, op. 1, d. 7(II), ll. 65–75.

32. Svet lana Lur’e, “Ros siis kaia i bri tans kaia im pe rii na sred nem vos toke v XIX–Na chale XX veka: Ideo lo giia i prak tika” (kan di dat the sis in his tory, Mos cow In sti tute of Orien tal Stud ies of the Rus sian Acad emy of Sci ences, 1996). Lur’e be lieves that a sig nifi cant num ber of Ar me ni ans were set tled in the Kars province, and Ar me ni ans as sumed the func tion of col o ni za tion, but she has not pro vided any ev i dence to sup port her ar gu ment.

33. See, for ex am ple, B. S. Iten berg and V. A. Tvar dovs kaia, eds., Graf M. T. Loris-Melikov i ego sov re men niki (Mos cow: Tsentr pol i graf, 2004).

34. “Dok lad Gen eral Ad yu tanta Kn. SviatopolkMirskago ot 4 fev ralya 1879 g., no. 39,” HAA, f. 1262, op. 1, d. 7(II), ll. 76–79. See also Bakradze’s re port, 5 March 1879, STsSA, f. 229, op. 1, d. 12, l. 14.

35. Nich o las Brey fo gle, Here tics and Col o niz ers (Ithaca, NY: Cor nell Uni versity Press, 2005), 140; and Meg re lidze, Zakavkaz’e v Russko-Turetskoi voine, 101.

36. Po gho sian, Karss kaia oblast, 124.37. Bakradze’s re port, 5 March 1879, STsSA, f. 229, op. 1, d. 12, l. 14.38. Gen eral Fran kini to the Vice roy, 17 Au gust 1879, HAA, f. 1262, op. 1,

d. 7(II), l. 117.39. Gen eral Fran kini to the Vice roy, 23 June 1880, HAA, f. 1262, op. 1, d. 7,

l. 27.40. Otchet 1879, Pri lozh e nie N. 15: 176–77. The re port was signed on 27 June

1880.41. Bak radze, Re port of the Land Com mis sion of Kars, 17 March 1882,

STsSA, f. 229, op. 1, d. 12, l. 16, also see f. 545, op. 1, d. 3008, ll. 16–43.

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42. Oktay Özel, “Mi gra tion and Power Pol i tics: The Set tle ment of Geor gian Im mi grants in Tur key (1878–1908),” Mid dle East ern Stud ies 4 ( July 2010): 478.

43. Otchet 1879, 50.44. Ibid., 51.45. For the full orig i nal text of the epic in Turk ish, see Kırzıo˘glu, Ed e

biyatımızda Kars (I˙ stan bul: I¸sıl Mat baası, 1958), 53–54.46. The Governor of Kars to the Com mander of the Cau ca sian Army, Kars,

28 Jan u ary (9 Feb ru ary) 1879, no. 388, HAA, f. 1262, op. 1, d. 7(II), ll. 29–40.47. Ibid.48. Ibid.49. The Grand Vi zier to the Foreign Min is ter, 28 Tem muz 1302 [9 Au gust

1886], BOA, A. MKT. MHM. 491/23 lef 4.50. Hav ing vis ited Kars in 1893, H. F. B. Lynch wrote that he had heard

from the local Mus lim pop u la tion that mil i tary ser vice would be made compul sory in ten years by a de cree is sued in 1890, but he had not in ves ti gated the va lid ity of the news. Lynch also noted that Mus lim peo ple wished to em i grate due to the de cree. See Lynch, Ar me nia. Travels and Stud ies, 2 vols. (Lon don: Long mans, Green, 1901), 1:75.

51. Kav kazs kii Kal en dar na 1894 god (Tbi lisi: Tip o gra fii Gru zinsk. Iz da telsk. Tovarı shchestva i M. Mar tir o siantsa, 1893), V otdel, 139.

52. Ibid., 140.53. Obzor Karss koi oblasti za 1901 god (Kars: Tip o gra fiia Kant sel ya rii Voen

nago Gu ber na tora Karss koi Oblasti, 1901), 20.54. See Ru bina Per oo mian, “Kars in the Ar me nian Lib er a tion Move ment,”

in Ho van ni sian, Ar me nian Kars and Ani, 245–69.55. Sham she V. Meg re lidze, Vo prosy Za kav kazya v is to rii russko-turetskoi

voiny 1877–1878 gg. (Tbi lisi: Met snie reba, 1969), 87.56. Peter Hol quist, “The Pol i tics and Prac tice of the Rus sian Oc cu pa tion of

Ar me nia, 1915–Feb ru ary 1917,” in A Ques tion of Gen o cide: Ar me ni ans and Turks at the End of the Ot to man Em pire, ed. R. G. Suny, F. M. Goçek, and N. M. Nai mark (New York: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 2011), 151–52.

57. Blau velt, “MilitaryCivil Ad min is tra tion and Islam,” 228.58. Otchet 1879, 104.59. A. Bez ru kov, “Kvar tirny vo pros v Karse,” Kars 2, no. 8 (20 Jan u ary

1913): 3, quoted in Badem, Çarlık Rus yası Yönetiminde Kars Vi lay eti, 241–42.60. Yasin Ha¸simo˘glu, Oltu Sura Hükümeti’nin Er meni Mücadelesi (Er zurum:

Salkımsö˘güt Yayınları, 2005), 39; and Erdo˘gan, Türk Elle rinde Hatıralarım, 27–29.

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The Idea of an East ern Fed er a tionAn Al ter na tive to the De struc tion of the Ot to man Em pire

John A. Mazis

It is clear today, with the ben e fit of hind sight, that the idea of an East ern fed er a tion, the vol un teer union based on equal ity of the var i ous peo ples of the Bal kans and An a to lia, was doomed from the start. The late nineteenth and early twen ti eth cen tu ries, when this idea emerged, were char ac ter ized by ris ing na tion al ism and at tempts, or rather hopes, of break ing down great em pires and creat ing na tion states. While this sen ti ment was wide spread in cen tral and East ern Eu rope, it was more pro nounced in the Bal kans, where wars (GreekTurkish in 1897 and the two Bal kan Wars in 1912–13), up ris ings (the Ilin den re volt), and guer rilla war fare (Mac e do nia, 1903–8) kept the pe nin sula in a con stant state of war.1 If the idea of coop er a tion among the peo ples of the Bal kans in gen eral sounds im pos sible, the peace ful co ex is tence as equal part ners of Turks and Greeks under the same pol ity sounds even more far fetched. The two peo ples found them selves in the oc cu pier/sub ject role for over four cen tu ries, and since the suc cess ful Greek re volt and the

Ion Dragoumis, circa 1914. (from the personal collection of John Mazis)

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crea tion of the mod ern Greek state their re la tions have been an tag o nis tic at best, hos tile at worst, but sel dom, if ever, “nor mal.” That sen ti ment was par tic u larly present among the Greeks, who, after all, had been the (mostly) un will ing sub jects of the Ot to man Em pire and the ones who found them selves after their in de pen dence liv ing in a small and vul nerable state, want ing to ex pand at the ex pense of the Ot to man Em pire but at the same time feel ing threat ened by it.2

The fact that the peo ple of the Bal kans and the Turks sel dom agreed on any thing should not be viewed as an in sur mount able ob sta cle to their coop er a tion. Such coop er a tion did occur from time to time due to out side pres sures or threats.3 Noth ing il lus trates bet ter the need for re gional coop er a tion, but also the depth of en mity among those in volved, than the way the var i ous states treated each other’s peo ple in times of war or how they treated each other using war as an ex cuse.4 The gen ocides at the hands of the Ot to man state and those of the early Re pub lic of Tur key, of Ar me ni ans, Greeks, and As syr ians high light both the need for a multi eth nic East ern fed er a tion based on equal ity of its mem bers, but also one of the main rea sons that the East ern Idea re mained just an idea and never came to frui tion.5

The im per fect trea ties that brought the First World War to its close had as their re sult, among many oth ers, the re draw ing of the maps of Eu rope and the Mid dle East as well as the de struc tion of the Ger man, AustrianHungarian, Rus sian, and Ot to man Em pires.6 While end ing four em pires created many hard ships and fu ture prob lems for the peo ple in volved, ar gu ably the dis ap pear ance of the Ot to man Em pire left a more last ing leg acy. With the col lapse of Ot to man rule, the po lit i cal makeup of the Mid dle East and the east ern Med i ter ra nean basin changed for ever, and the dip lo matic im pli ca tions from that change are ev i dent to this day. To be sure, the de struc tion of the Ot to man Em pire was consid ered long over due; the socalled East ern Ques tion was for mu lated as early as 1844, if not be fore, when the Rus sian tsar Nich o las I la beled the Ot to man Em pire “the sick man of Eu rope.”7 By the turn of the twen ti eth cen tury, the most press ing con cerns were not if but rather when the em pire would dis solve, and which coun try would ben e fit the most from that de mise. The var i ous Eu ro pean pow ers, which fore saw if not ac tively sought the dis so lu tion of the Ot to man Em pire, at tempted to an swer the East ern Ques tion to their ad van tage. Var i ous nonMuslim (for mer) sub jects of the sul tan, now cit i zens of small Bal kan states, were also look ing for ward to the end of the Ot to man state; some were even work ing to has ten the end of the em pire. The Greek ir re den tist ideol ogy

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of the Megavlh Ideva (Meg ali Idea, Great Idea) rep re sents just one ex ample, al beit the best known, of the as pi ra tions of the Bal kan peo ples at the ex pense of the Ot to man State.8

As one would ex pect, Ot to man states men and in tel lec tu als sought ways to avoid the de struc tion of their em pire. Start ing with the changes of Sul tan Mah mud II (1808–39), con tin u ing with the socalled Tan zi mat (Re form) era of the mid to late nine teenth cen tury, and cul mi nat ing with the Young Turk re volt of 1908, a num ber of Ot to man states men at tempted (with un even re sults) to mod ern ize the govern ment.9 Many Young Turks sought even to in sti tute a dem o cratic, multi eth nic state. As a re sult, the East ern Ques tion has been pre sented as a di lemma whose so lu tion was in the hands of ei ther the Ot to man Turk ish elite or the Eu ro pean pow ers that could pre serve or de stroy the Ot to man Empire at will.10 As Chris tine M. Phil liou has noted: “The frame work of the East ern Ques tion . . . does not allow for com plex ity and im pli cations of changes within Ot to man pol i tics, but tends in stead to re in force a polar op po si tion between re form and con ser va tism within Ot to man pol i tics and to place most of the dy na mism and po ten tial to enact change in the hands of the great pow ers.”11 Phil liou points to the tra di tional way of ap proach ing the East ern Ques tion. Ac cord ing to that model, the only ac tive players, and thus the only sources of a pos sible so lu tion, were ei ther the Turk ish elite or the Eu ro pean pow ers. Under that rubric, the Ot to man sub jects who were not part of the rul ing elite (both Mus lims and Chris tians) as well as the peo ple of the newly in de pendent Bal kan states were pas sive ob serv ers of ac tions and pol i cies that were to de ter mine their fate. As this dis cus sion will show, the tra ditional view needs re as sess ing.12 A num ber of in di vid u als who were part of nei ther the Ot to man gov ern ing elite nor the West ern po lit i cal and dip lo matic es tab lish ments were seek ing an al ter na tive which would po ten tially re sult in ben e fits to the peo ple of the area. Thus, while re form ing the em pire was the so lu tion em braced by the Mus lim Ot to man elite and Eu ro pean inter ests, some of the Sultan’s Chris tian sub jects cham pioned other al ter na tives that could have helped modern ize and strengthen the coun try. This third way has been for got ten in the tra di tional binarycentered pres en ta tion of the East ern Ques tion. While this third al ter na tive failed to ma te ri al ize, it should nev er the less be stud ied as part of ex am in ing the sub al tern re ac tion to greatpower pol i cies.

Among those who ad vo cated a rad i cal, and rather imag i na tive, reform of the Ot to man Em pire, Ion Dra gou mis is the most un ex pected.


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Dra gou mis (1878–1920) is a major fig ure in the in tel lec tual, cul tural, and po lit i cal his tory of mod ern Greece. As a dip lo mat, pol i ti cian, po lit ical theo rist, and writer, he had a sixteenyear meteoric ca reer in the Greek Foreign Ser vice cul mi nat ing with his ap point ment as Greek am bas sa dor to Rus sia.13 Elected to Par lia ment in 1915, Dra gou mis became a foe of Greek prime min is ter Elef the rios Ven i ze los and his pro Entente pol i cies.14 A found ing mem ber of the “Coun cil of the Six teen Mem bers of the United Op po si tion,” Dra gou mis and his party were pre par ing to chal lenge Ven i ze los in the No vem ber 1920 elec tions. However, a few months be fore the elec tions, on 13 Au gust 1920, an at tempt on Venizelos’s life set in mo tion a se ries of counter meas ures (ar rest of op po si tion lead ers, at tacks on in di vid u als and of fices) by his fol low ers cul mi nat ing in the as sas si na tion of Dra gou mis by Ve niz el ist par a mil i tary troops.15

Dur ing the late nine teenth and early twen ti eth cen tury, a num ber of Ot to man sub jects (many but not all of them Greeks) ex pressed inter est in the idea of trans form ing the state. Dur ing the Con gress of Ber lin (1878) the Ot to man rep re sen ta tive, Kar a the o dori Pasha, and the sultan’s pri vate banker, George Zar i fis (both eth nic Greeks) were work ing on a pro ject aimed at the crea tion of a GreekTurkish state.16 The tim ing and the iden tity of the peo ple in volved are cru cial in under stand ing the im pe tus be hind al ter na tive plans of re form ing the em pire. Be gin ning in the 1870s, Greek ir re den tist as pi ra tions were on a col li sion course with sim i lar move ments among other Bal kan na tion al ists, par tic u larly the Bul gar ians. Both the Greeks and the Bul gar ians viewed the Ot to man prov ince of Mac e do nia as an area pop u lated by a large num ber of their conationals and thus ripe for an nex a tion at a fu ture date. Since there were com pet ing claims about the eth nic com po si tion of the prov ince, na tion al ists from both coun tries wanted to make sure that their co nationals would be the dom i nant ele ment in Mac e do nia by the time the Ot to man Em pire dis solved. To achieve their com pet ing ends, Greeks and Bul gar ians or ga nized ed u ca tional and re li gious in sti tu tions in Mac e do nia, but they also came to rely on armed bands to pro tect their inter ests and harm those of their an tag o nist.

Dur ing this time of at tempts to fend off both the Ot to man Em pire and com pet ing Bal kan claims by Bul garia, some Greek pa tri ots reached the con clu sion that the out right re al iza tion of the Meg ali Idea was impos sible and an al ter na tive might be in order. Both Kar a the o dori and Zar i fis were ac cus tomed to work ing in the Ot to man state as highlevel bu reau crats and fi nan ciers. De spite their Greek her i tage, both men

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en joyed great in flu ence and pref e ren tial treat ment. To priv i leged Greeks such as these men, a GreekTurkish state was an at trac tive prop o si tion; as eth nic Greeks they wanted to achieve some of Greece’s ir re den tist goals, while as priv i leged mem bers of the Ot to man elite they did not want the de mise of the Ot to man Em pire. Their in ten tions notwith stand ing, Kar a the o dori and Zar i fis did not at tempt to present con crete plans for the suc cess of their ideas.

An other idea for a “Near East ern Fed er a tion” came from the Greek so cial ist P. Ar gy ri ades, a mem ber of the Inter na tional League for Peace and Lib erty and pres i dent of its sub group League for Bal kan Con fed er ation. Speak ing in Paris in 1894, Ar gy ri ades pro posed a fed er a tion consist ing of the fol low ing Bal kan coun tries and ter ri to ries: Greece with the is land of Crete, Bul garia, Ro ma nia, Ser bia, BosniaHerzegovina (at the time ad min is tered by AustriaHungary), Mon te ne gro, and the Ot toman prov inces of Mac e do nia, Al ba nia, and Thrace. Ar gy ri ades wanted to add to the new state some of the nonEuropean parts of the Ot to man Em pire such as the Asia Minor lit to ral, Ar me nia, and Con stan tin o ple as a free city and the confederation’s cap i tal.17

Ac cord ing to this plan, the con stit u ent states would have inter nal auton omy but co or di nate mat ters of mu tual inter est, de fense, and foreign pol icy. While the ear lier plan pro posed by Kar a the o dori and Zar i fis was ad vo cated by mem bers of the Ot to man es tab lish ment, Ar gy ri ades, a so cial ist work ing out side main stream pol i tics, was in spired not so much by con sid er a tions of na tion al ism and selfpreservation as by dreams of broth er hood among peo ples and re struc tur ing of the econ omy and so ci ety.

Some where between these two vague ideas stood the Fed er a tive Union of the Peo ples of the East, a su pra na tional or gan iza tion created in 1909 and headed by an eth nic Greek Ot to man cit i zen and doc tor, Con stan tine Roc cas. The Fed er a tive Union of the Peo ples of the East was sup ported by the in fluen tial na tion al ist Greek news paper of Con stan tin o ple Laovı (The Peo ple). Part of its pro gram (sim i lar to the KaratheodoriZarifis pro po sal) ad vo cated “the di vi sion of Tur key into in de pen dent fed eral states . . . an al li ance of the fed eral cit i zens . . . in order to de fend the Em pire from the fre quent foreign at tacks and to pre vent it from par ti tion.”18 Roccas’s pro gram also en vi sioned that the new state, whose of fi cial lan guage would be French, would be com prised of the fol low ing peo ples: Al ba nians, Ar me ni ans, Bul gar ians, Greeks, Jews, Kurds, Kut sow al lachs, Leb a nese, Mon ten e grins, Serbs, Syr ians, Turks, and Wal lachs. Also, the King doms of Greece, Ser bia, Bul garia,


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Ro ma nia, Mon te ne gro, and Hun gary were in vited to join the fed er ation, which was to be based on “jus tice, equal ity, and his tory.”19 At the same time, the pro gram of the Fed er a tive Union sup ported some of Argyriades’s so cial ist ideas, for it also re nounced des pot ism and class di vi sions.

While the Greeks took a lead ing role in de vis ing pos sible al ter natives to the Ot to man state, they were not the only eth nic group think ing along these lines. Roccas’s or gan iza tion was not ex clu sively Greek in com po si tion and in cluded mem bers from a va riety of Bal kan na tional ities. In Oc to ber 1912, days be fore the Bal kan Wars started, the Interna tional So cial ist Bu reau pub lished the Man i festo of the So cial ists of Tur key and the Bal kans, 1912. This doc u ment con demned the com ing war as a cap i tal ist tool seek ing to de stroy the Ot to man Em pire for the ben e fit of the great pow ers and not the Ot to man peo ple, nor the peo ple of the Bal kans in gen eral. The Man i festo called for the peo ple of the Bal kans and the Near East to unite “in the most dem o cratic form of govern ment, with out ra cial or re li gious dis crim i na tion.” The au thors pro claimed that only rad i cal re form would re vive and safe guard the Ot to man state and “ren der pos sible the dem o cratic fed er a tion of the Bal kans.”20

The peo ple in volved in for mu lat ing these ideas and plans had clearly iden tifi able mo tives for want ing the crea tion of a GreekTurkish state. Greeks liv ing in the Ot to man Em pire, es pe cially those with priv i leges, would ben e fit from a GreekTurkish state in which they would be on equal foot ing with their Turk ish neigh bors. So cial ists, like Ar gy ri ades, with their tra di tion of down play ing na tion al ism, were also will ing to cham pion a Bal kan/An a to lian fed er ated state. The pos sibil ity, however, of a Greek liv ing in the Greek King dom and steeped in the Meg ali Idea want ing the same sounds im prob able. Yet Ion Dra gou mis, a nation al ist icon in Greece to this day, cham pioned a GreekTurkish fed er ation. Dra gou mis will be for ever re mem bered, above every thing else, as a pa triot who be came the soul and the brain of the suc cess ful Greek at tempt to coun ter Bul gar ian in flu ence in Ot to man Mac e do nia. His three years (1902–5) as sec re tary to the Mon as tir (Mac e do nia) con su late rep re sent his most dy namic work on be half of Hel len ism and the ful fillment of the Meg ali Idea.21

Dra gou mis ar rived in Mon as tir at a time when Bul gar ian ir re den tist ac tions in Ot to man Mac e do nia seemed to be bear ing fruit. Sev eral Bulgar ian ed u ca tional and re li gious in sti tu tions were thriv ing, and Bul garian armed bands were act ing with im pu nity. At the same time, a cau tious

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Greek state was di rect ing its con su lar of fi cers in the area to re frain from openly pro mot ing Greek na tion al ist goals. What ever in struc tions Dra gou mis was given by his super i ors be came, in his view, sec on dary to the real work that needed to be done. He used the free dom of movement and the pres tige of his dip lo matic po si tion to create a Greek nation al ist net work in the mid dle of Ot to man Mac e do nia. In a let ter to his father, dated 18 De cem ber 1903, Dra gou mis ar tic u lated his mas ter plan for ac tion in Mac e do nia.22 He wanted to create a net work of Greek patri ots who, in co or di na tion with and fi nanced by the Greek govern ment, would pro vide the Mac e do nian coun try side with Greek teach ers and priests. He also wanted to en cour age rich Greeks to buy land from Bulgar ians and to in vest in com mer cial and in dus trial en ter prises with an eye to mak ing the Greek ele ment in the area stable and at trac tive to those who might be wa ver ing in their al le giance.

Dur ing the three years that Dra gou mis spent in Mac e do nia, he de voted all his en er gies to achiev ing these goals. In gen eral, the scope of Dragoumis’s work in Mac e do nia has not been prop erly under stood. Most often, if not ex clu sively, his role is de scribed as being that of a lo gis ti cal or ga nizer for the guer rilla bands, a co or di na tor of ac tion with local not ables, a pur veyor of na tion al ist prop a ganda, and a con duit by which the Greek govern ment could pass money and sup plies to var i ous places in Mac e do nia. These func tions were in deed a major part of Dragoumis’s work, and the ded i ca tion and en ergy he brought to these tasks can not be over es ti mated. But there was an other ele ment of his work largely ab sent from most ac counts. In the last days of 1902, Dra gou mis and some local Greeks of Mon as tir created an or gan iza tion called Mac e do nian De fense (Makedonikhv). This was a con spir a to rial or gan ization (in deed, one would call it a ter ror ist or gan iza tion today) ded i cated to creat ing a closeknit net work of Greeks who would be will ing to de fend Greek inter ests in their area. Such de fense was often in the form of prop a ganda and ed u ca tion but in tim i da tion and mur der of those who sup ported the Bul gar ian cause were also com mon.23

Dragoumis’s role in awak en ing the local Greeks was so cen tral that he was nick named “the alarm clock.”24 As a re sult of his wellknown ac tiv i ties in Ot to man Mac e do nia, Dragoumis’s pa tri ot ism, ir re den tist cre den tials, and his ad her ence to the Meg ali Idea were be yond re proach. Nev er the less, it was Dra gou mis who looked at the po lit i cal and dip lomatic land scape of his time, changed course, and be came the champion of what came to be known as the Anatolikhv Ideva or Anatolikhv Omospondiva (East ern Idea or East ern Fed er a tion).25


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The East ern Idea was an at tempt to strengthen the Ot to man state by chang ing its na ture from that of an em pire with a par tic u lar eth nic/re li gious group as the dom i nant one (Turks/Mus lims) to a fed er a tion in which a num ber of eth nic/re li gious groups (Greeks, Turks, and Ar meni ans, Chris tians and Mus lims) would co ex ist on an equal basis. Thus, while part of the elite in the Greek con text, Dra gou mis clearly be longs to the greater sub al tern of the Bal kan/Ot to man world whose ideas about the fate of their coun tries and fu ture has been ne glected in favor of the more tra di tional ap proach to so lu tions to the East ern Ques tion.

Dra gou mis ar tic u lated his ideas about the East ern Fed er a tion in books, news paper and jour nal ar ti cles, let ters, and in his pri vate jour nals from 1908 until 1920. Al though he was never par tic u larly pre cise about the de tails of the pro posed state, he left enough ma te rial for us to re create a fairly clear image. Dragoumis’s sub sti tu tion of the Meg ali Idea with the East ern Idea was a pro cess fueled by po lit i cal con di tions of the Bal kans and the Near East, the dip lo matic land scape of Eu rope, and the author’s per sonal be liefs about such con cepts as state, na tion, and cul ture. Iron i cally, Dragoumis’s great est con tri bu tion to the Meg ali Idea, his ser vice in Ot to man Mac e do nia, might have con vinced him to seek an al ter na tive way to achieve his ends. The Ot to man prov ince of Mac e do nia, which is di vided today between Bul garia, Greece, and the For mer Yu go slav Re pub lic of Mac e do nia, was pop u lated by a mix of peo ple in clud ing, among oth ers, Turks, Greeks, Bul gar ians, Serbs, Al banians, Jews, Vlachs, and Po maks, with none of these peo ples con sti tut ing a clear ma jor ity in the prov ince as a whole.26 Claim ing ter ri tory ac cording to a clearly de fined eth nic ma jor ity pop u la tion was an issue of the ut most con ten tion, as each side de vel oped car to graphic ar gu ments to best sup port its claims. The pos sibil ity then of ab sorb ing into a Greater Greece only the areas eas ily iden tified as pop u lated by a clear Greek ma jor ity was rather re mote. The al ter na tive, to in cor po rate these areas into Greece proper with out the con sent of their nonGreek in hab i tants, was clearly a rec ipe for creat ing a new set of prob lems. Ad di tion ally, while the col lapse of the Ot to man state was in the ory good for Greek na tional as pi ra tions, the re al ity was rather dif fer ent.

Dra gou mis had no con fi dence in the Greek state and its abil ity to gain from the de cay ing Ot to mans. One major prob lem was Bul garia, whose vi brant na tion al ism rep re sented a real threat to the fu ture of Hel len ism. As Greece and Bul garia fought for su pre macy in Mac e do nia, it be came clear that they were in volved in a zerosum game.27 Since both sides claimed the same ter ri tory and peo ple as their own, any gain by

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one was a net loss for the other. Bul gar ian suc cesses were cel e brated as major na tion al ist ac com plish ments in Sofia and as cat as trophic events in Ath ens (and vice versa). If the threat posed to Hel len ism by Bul garia was not enough, the dis so lu tion of the Ot to man Em pire would also at tract the at ten tion of the great pow ers, which could not miss an oppor tu nity to aug ment their em pires at the ex pense of the fledg ling Balkan states. Add ing to Dragoumis’s anx iety, Bulgaria’s pa tron, im pe rial Rus sia, had its own longstanding claims on the Ot to man Em pire.28 These claims (not ably Con stan tin o ple) in cluded areas that Dra gou mis con sid ered in dis pens able parts of the Hel lenic world.29

Com par ing the dan ger posed to Greece’s ir re den tist as pi ra tions by Bul garia and the great pow ers, Dra gou mis be lieved that the dif fer ences between Greece and the Ot to man Em pire, how ever se ri ous, could be bridged. Since the Greek state was clearly not in a po si tion to im pose its views on oth ers, an al ter na tive ap proach was needed. Dra gou mis reached the con clu sion that the inter ests of Hel len ism were best served not by the de struc tion of the Ot to man Em pire but rather by its sur vi val. In short, Dra gou mis went against the ideol ogy that dom i nated mod ern Greece al most from the mo ment of its in cep tion and pro posed coop er ation and co ex is tence of the Greeks with the Turks in a fed er ated Greek Ottoman state. Given the fact that Bul gar ian na tion al ism and great power pol i tics posed equal threats to Hel len ism and the Ot to man Em pire, Dra gou mis could fore see a sit u a tion in which an ex hausted Tur key might be easy to ma nip u late and even eager to ac com mo date Greek na tion al ist de mands. Thus, Dra gou mis pro posed coop er a tion, not con fron ta tion, with the Ot to man Em pire.30

While Dragoumis’s East ern Idea was in great part based on pragmatic con sid er a tions, such as the dip lo matic dy nam ics of the time, he was also mo ti vated by his be liefs about the role of Greece visàvis both East and West. His thoughts on the sub ject are an in te gral part of his East ern Idea and shed light on his way of think ing about the sub ject.31 Greece, like Rus sia and the Ger man Em pire, noted Dra gou mis, is lo cated some where on the bor der between East and West. On the one hand, the West had been ben e fi cial to Greece in as much as it helped the Greeks to bet ter under stand them selves and their an cient past. On the other, the West viewed mod ern Greek cul ture as in fe rior, or at best a bad copy, of its mod ern West ern counter part.32 While Greece was in a po si tion of weak ness visàvis the West, Dra gou mis be lieved that Greek cul ture could deal with the East from a po si tion of strength. The rea son that the Greeks could pre vail in the East, ac cord ing to Dra gou mis, was to be


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found in the so cial de vel op ment of the peo ple liv ing in the Ot to man Em pire.33 In an inter est ing twist, Dra gou mis ap plied the same neg a tive views that the West had about Greece to the peo ple and cul tures lo cated to the east of Greece. In an at ti tude that would be la beled today as Orien tal ist, Dra gou mis viewed the Mus lim peo ple of the Ot to man Empire as cul tu rally in fe rior to the West (in that scheme Greece is lo cated closer to the West both geo graph i cally and cul tu rally). Ac cord ing to Dra gou mis, most, if not all, of the sub ject peo ple of the em pire, such as the Arabs and the Al ba nians, had not yet de vel oped a dis tinct na tional iden tity.34 The Turk ish ele ment of the em pire, which was po lit i cally dom i nant, could not im pose its cul ture on its Chris tian mi nor ities, which were cul tu rally more ad vanced.35

Dra gou mis be lieved that the Greeks should con cen trate their po lit ical, eco nomic, and cul tural ac tiv i ties in the East, cul tu rally in cor po rate other eth nic groups, such as the Al ba nians, and strengthen the Greek ele ment in the Turk ish Em pire.36 In time a GreekTurkish under stand ing would el e vate the Greeks to the po si tion of co rul ers.37 At first glance, Dragoumis’s no tions of a multi eth nic state do not ap pear new. In deed, a closer look at the ideals of the early Greek rev o lu tion ary Rigas Ve les tinles as well as the leader of the 1821 rev o lu tion, Alex an dros Ypsi lan tis, re veal that both had in mind the crea tion of a multi eth nic state.38 By the early twen ti eth cen tury, many Greeks per ceived ful fill ment of the Meg ali Idea as being the recreation of ei ther the Byz an tine Em pire or more out land ishly the em pire of Al ex an der the Great. In op po si tion to these plans and the Meg ali Idea, some Greek pol i ti cians be lieved that the coun try should limit it self to the bor ders of the time. Dra gou mis disagreed with both views; he be lieved that dip lo mat i cally and nu mer ically the Greeks were too weak to create a new Greek em pire. Since both Alexander’s and the Byz an tine em pires were not purely Greek but rather multi eth nic, recreating them under a Greek pol ity would in cite na tion al ist as pi ra tions by the sub ject peo ple and create many new prob lems, rather than solv ing the old ones.39

Dra gou mis re jected the idea of Greece as a nationstate as well. Some of his con tem po rar ies, claimed Dra gou mis, were mis taken to equate the na tion with the state. In his view, the whole no tion of the nationstate was a West ern one that was trans planted in Greece with out any al ter ations to ac count for local re al ities; he was sus pi cious of such onesize fitsall so lu tions. Hel len ism was much broader and not syn on y mous with the Greek state. Those Greeks who were un happy with the ter rito rial and po lit i cal status quo had, ac cord ing to Dra gou mis, three op tions

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at their dis po sal. Two of them were im prac ti cal. He re jected, first, the at tempt to recreate old par a digms of an cient Greece and By zan tium, and sec ond, he be lieved that the mod ern par a digms of so cial ism and an archism had yet to be tested. Dra gou mis was con vinced, there fore, that the third ap proach, his idea of an East ern Fed er a tion, while also un tested, rep re sented the best pos sible out come.40

Al though ideol ogy and dip lo matic con sid er a tions were at the heart of Dragoumis’s at tempts to an swer na tional ques tions, two po lit i cal de vel op ments of the time were also im por tant in the for mu la tion of his East ern Idea the ory. Dur ing the late nine teenth and early twen ti eth cen tury, when Dra gou mis was for mu lat ing his the o ries, an other model for Greek ir re den tism had emerged. The is land of Crete moved from being part of the Ot to man Em pire (up to 1896) to be com ing a semi independent en tity (1897–1912) to fi nally unit ing with Greece. In the Cre tan story, Dra gou mis saw a pos sible model.41 In stead of the Greek state grad u ally con quer ing parts of its his tor i cal lands, an easier so lution might be the si mul ta ne ous ex is tence of a num ber of small Greek states that even tu ally, when the time was ripe, could unite.42 An other po lit i cal de vel op ment that in flu enced Dragoumis’s think ing was the re volt of the Young Turks. Westerneducated and reformminded, the Young Turks, mainly mil i tary of fi cers, wanted to change the course of the em pire by re vers ing its steady de cline.43 A main com po nent of their pro gram was equal ity of the var i ous eth nic groups within the em pire. The Young Turk re gime, which os ten sibly rep re sented the dawn of Westernstyle po lit i cal re forms, en cour aged those eth nic mi nor ities within the em pire who wanted a dem o cratic, multi eth nic state based on mod ern Eu ro pean mod els.44 In itially Dra gou mis ac cepted the sin cer ity of the pub lic state ments of the Young Turks and ex pected them to accom mo date the mi nor ities of the Ot to man Em pire and come to an under stand ing with Turkey’s neigh bors.45 Fol low ing the Young Turk re volt, an anon y mous Greek dip lo mat was quoted as say ing: “The Great Idea in its po lit i cal sense, it’s im prac ti cable for the present and will in defi nitely re main so. Why then should we Greeks . . . quar rel with the Turks? Why should we ob ject to liv ing under a Turk ish sove reign in Tur key as we live under a Dan ish sove reign in Greece? All that we ask from the Young Turks is not to inter fere with our na tional language and cus toms.”46 A. J. Pa nay ot o pou los de duces (I be lieve ac curately) that the un named Greek dip lo mat was Ion Dra gou mis.47

Clearly, after 1908 Dra gou mis had come to be lieve that the Young Turk govern ment work ing with the Greek ele ment in the em pire would


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create a GreekTurkish part ner ship.48 While Dra gou mis hoped that the Young Turk govern ment would bring about mean ing ful changes in the realm of po lit i cal rights and de moc rat iza tion, he was also care ful to ex plore other op tions. Thus, while call ing for GreekTurkish coop er ation on the basis of equal ity and pres er va tion of the Ot to man state, Dra gou mis also ad vised Ot to man Greeks to take ad van tage of the new par lia men tary system intro duced by the Young Turks. Dra gou mis argued for the crea tion of pow er ful Greek local and re gional com munities and other so cial, cul tural, and po lit i cal or gan iza tions within the em pire, which would help en sure prog ress and safe guard Greek interests from in tru sions “ei ther legal or il le gal by the Turk ish state.”49 If the new state pro posed by the Young Turks flour ished, then the Greeks would be po si tioned fa vor ably to be come po lit i cal equals. In the event that the Young Turk ex peri ment failed and the em pire col lapsed, then the Greeks would be po si tioned to win the lion’s share of the ter ri to rial spoils.50

While the idea of an East ern Fed er a tion was but one of the is sues oc cu py ing Dragoumis’s time and thoughts, it was im por tant enough to his vi sion for the fu ture for him to at tempt some in itial plan ning for the state’s pos sible bor ders and po lit i cal system. Al though he ab stained from de vis ing de tailed plans of ac tion and or gan iza tion, he did pro vide some gen eral idea of his vi sion, based inter est ingly enough on the AustroHungarian Em pire.51 On a trip to AustriaHungary in Oc to ber 1910, Dra gou mis was im pressed by the three dif fer ent lan guages often en coun tered in pub lic spaces such as on street signs and in rail road sta tions. He noted that Aus tria al lowed the sub ject peo ples the free dom to man age their re li gious, cul tural, and ed u ca tional af fairs.52 He also com mented on the fact that the var i ous peo ples en joyed equal po lit i cal rights with the Aus trians in the em pire as a whole, while at the same time they en joyed local auton omy and even, in the case of the Hun garians, con trolled their own par lia ment. If the East ern Fed er a tion was to em u late AustriaHungary, the Greeks would play the role of the Hungar ians. That is, the Greeks would be the jun ior part ner in the state but with wide ad min is tra tive, po lit i cal, and cul tural free doms. The Hun garians and the Aus trians were gov ern ing their re spec tive halves of the AustroHungarian Em pire but in ques tions of fed eral foreign pol icy and de fense the Hun gar ians, even thought they were the jun ior part ner, had veto pow ers. At the same time, the Hun gar ians were given a free hand in ad min is ter ing their an ces tral ter ri to ries and ex er cised con trol over the nonHungarian peo ple who re sided there. Ad di tion ally, the

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Hun gar ians took a free hand in con trol ling parts of the em pire pop ulated by nonMagyars (such as the Slo vak lands), al low ing them in es sence to have an em pire within the em pire.53

Dra gou mis en vi sioned a pol ity in which the Turks and the Greeks would be co rul ers, but at the same time the Greeks would be al lowed broad pow ers, es pe cially when it came to re la tion ships with other Chris tian mi nor ities. En vi sion ing the Greeks of the GreekTurkish Empire as the Hun gar ians of AustriaHungary might also ex plain cer tain of Dragoumis’s equiv oca tions re gard ing his com mit ment to a so called East ern Fed er a tion. Just as the Hun gar ians (al though part ners in the AustroHungarian Em pire) were often per ceived as less than wholeheartedly in vested in the pres er va tion of the Habs burg do min ion, so Dragoumis’s com mit ment to the pres er va tion of the GreekTurkish state would be pro vi sional. Dragoumis’s aim with the pro po sal of an East ern Fed er a tion was not nec es sar ily to pre serve the ter ri to rial in teg rity of the Ot to man Em pire prior to the First World War but rather to gain more po lit i cal power for the Greek and Chris tian mi nor ity.

In the pe riod 1914–19, Dra gou mis was too busy with other is sues to give much thought to his East ern Fed er a tion idea. As Greek am bassa dor to St. Pe ters burg, he was in volved in the highlevel de lib er ations re gard ing Greece’s po si tion in World War I. Dra gou mis was of the opin ion that Greece should stay neu tral and pro posed a co ali tion govern ment as the best way to gov ern the coun try under those dif fi cult circum stances, but the pro po sal was re jected by the main po lit i cal par ties.54 In 1915 Dra gou mis was elected to par lia ment as a foe of the Greek prime min is ter Ven i ze los and his pol icy of en ter ing the war on the side of the Triple En tente. Soon Dra gou mis (through news paper ar ti cles and par lia men tary speeches) be came a thorn in the side not only of the govern ment but also of the En tente, whose troops con trolled parts of north ern Greece.55 In June 1917, Dra gou mis and a num ber of other op po si tion lead ers were ex iled to Cor sica for the du ra tion of the war. For about two years, Dragoumis’s let ters were cen sored, and his ac cess to the news was lim ited; as a re sult he was in no po si tion to comment on con tem po rary events. In April 1919, Dra gou mis was al lowed to leave Cor sica for Greece. Un for tu nately for him, in stead of being al lowed to re turn to Ath ens and re sume his life, he was sent to the is land of Sko pe los for a term of inter nal exile that lasted until No vem ber of that year.

Today Sko pe los is a major tour ist des ti na tion with thou sands of foreign vis i tors and reg u lar con nec tions with the main land. In 1919 the


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is land was a back wa ter with out electric ity or run ning water; a per fect place to iso late some one from the pub lic eye. The long spell of in ac tiv ity and his re turn to inter nal exile af fected Dragoumis’s health. Re port edly he ex pe ri enced some prob lems with his “nerves” and was treated by the local doc tor.56 Between ex iles, iso la tion, and health prob lems, Dragou mis had very lit tle time to con tem plate the East ern Fed er a tion. The only pub lic com mu ni ca tion deal ing with the fu ture of the Bal kans and An a to lia that Dra gou mis had dur ing that time came in 1919 while he was in Sko pe los. In a let ter to friends, Dra gou mis noted with satis fac tion the fact that the pro posed set tle ment with the Ot to man Em pire (which be came known as the Treaty of Sèvres in 1920) would leave mostly Greeks and Turks in Asia Minor. This de vel op ment made the pos sibility of an East ern Fed er a tion easier to ac com plish, for it took from the Ot to man Em pire those ele ments that Dra gou mis con sid ered back ward (mostly Mus lim Arabs and Kurds) while forc ing the two main na tion alities in the area, the Turks and the Greeks, to come to grips with the new re al ities of the post–World War I era.57

Dra gou mis en vi sioned the crea tion of a new GreekTurkish state to exist along side but in de pen dent from Greece proper with auton o mous local govern ment for the var i ous eth nic groups, full po lit i cal free doms, and two of fi cial lan guages. This state’s cap i tal would be Bursa or Ikonium or an other in land city. He argued that Con stan tin o ple, Thrace, and the Dar da nelles should con sti tute an other in de pen dent state commit ted to neu tral ity and free nav i ga tion through the straights due to its stra te gic im por tance. Thus the East ern Fed er a tion was to be com posed of three states, one Greek and two GreekTurkish, but eth nic mi nor ities would be al lowed to exist within each of the three states and their rights, pre sum ably, safe guarded. Even tu ally auton o mous areas would be al lowed within the var i ous states. Dra gou mis did not pro vide de tails about the exact gov ern ing struc ture of the East ern Fed er a tion. He did not ex plain such im por tant is sues as what kind of con sti tu tion would gov ern the state or what kind of govern ment would run the dayto day af fairs of the coun try. How ever, ex am in ing some of his writ ings does per mit cer tain hypoth e ses. Since Dra gou mis mod eled his East ern Fed er a tion on AustriaHungary, it is safe to as sume that the East ern Fed er a tion would re sem ble that state. Be cause AustriaHungary was gov erned by a par lia men tary, or quasiparliamentary system, one can also as sume that Dra gou mis had a sim i lar ar range ment in mind. He had no prob lem with the mon arch of the East ern Fed er a tion being a con sti tu tional one more or less like the king of Greece or the Aus trian

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em peror.58 Al low ing the Ot to man sul tan to ful fill such a lim ited role as cer e mo nial head of state was ac cept able to Dra gou mis.

If this fed er a tion had come to pass, what would have hap pened to the Dan ish royal fam ily, which oc cu pied the Greek throne? Was the king of Greece to be sub or di nate to the sul tan? (The king of Ba varia and his re la tion ship with the Ger man em peror come to mind). Or was there an other ar range ment in the mak ing? Dra gou mis left no an swers to those ques tions. Time and again in his writ ings about the Greek state, Dra gou mis com plains of the tyr anny of the cen tral govern ment and de scribes an ideal con di tion with pow ers ac corded the pre fec tures and the mu nic i pal ities. While at times he wanted a mil i tary of fi cer in charge of the pre fec tures, he al lowed for an elected mu nic i pal govern ment as well as an elected pre fec ture coun cil. Since he was sus pi cious of the pow ers of cen tral govern ments, Dra gou mis would most likely have wanted the role of the cen tral govern ment of the East ern Fed er a tion to be lim ited as well.59 The new state would be based on two pil lars: auton o mous com mu nities and coop er a tive as so ci a tions.60 In gen eral, the state that Dra gou mis en vi sioned would be a loose con fed er a tion with sig nifi cant pow ers de volv ing from the cen tral govern ment to the con stit u ent units.61 Thus, the power of the fed eral govern ment would be lim ited while state, mu nic i pal, and local elected bod ies would run their af fairs. Al though the East ern Fed er a tion would be a dem o cratic state, the vot ers would have an in di rect role in elect ing their rep re senta tives.62 This no tion de rived from Dragoumis’s be lief that par lia ments had a role to play in gov ern ing the state, but that role was mostly consul ta tive rather than leg is la tive or super vi sory visàvis the ex ec u tive branch. Dra gou mis did not op pose par lia ments per se, but he mistrusted par lia men tar ians as being pa ro chial in out look and be holden to their local electo rate to the det ri ment of the greater com mon good.63 Since the main groups that would con sti tute the East ern Fed er a tion were to be Mus lims and Chris tians, and both re li gions had tra di tion ally played im por tant roles in po lit i cal de ci sion mak ing, some men tion of churchstate re la tions (es pe cially since the sul tan was tra di tion ally both a tem po ral and a re li gious leader) seems in order. Here again Dra gou mis de murs from di rect com ment, but his vo lu mi nous aux il iary writ ings allow for some in formed con clu sions.

Dra gou mis was a sec u lar ist who, al though he rec og nized a pub lic role for or ga nized re li gion, en vi sioned the po lit i cal au thor ity of the state in firm con trol over church af fairs.64 In short, Dra gou mis en vi sioned an East ern Fed er a tion as a sec u lar state with a Mus lim mon arch as its


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fig ure head. The peo ple of the fed er a tion would be free to wor ship in any faith, but their re li gious in sti tu tions and lead ers would be firmly under the con trol of the po lit i cal lead er ship.

Dra gou mis hoped that his East ern Idea of a GreekTurkish state would have ful filled a num ber of goals as far as the Greeks were concerned. More spe cifi cally, the plan would have ad vanced the ir re dentist needs of the Greek state, al beit with out out right an nex a tion of land, while pro tect ing the inter ests of the 1,500,000–2,000,000 Greeks liv ing in the Ot to man Em pire. As it ap peared on paper, the new state would have been strong enough to coun ter the at tempts by the Slavs (Russians, and Bul gar ians) to annex ter ri to ries that Dra gou mis con sid ered Greek. While the inter ests of Hel len ism re mained par a mount in Dra goumis’s plans, his pro posed state (strong, pros per ous, mod ern, and dem o cratic) would have also bestowed ben e fits on all its cit i zens.65 The peo ple of the East ern Fed er a tion, re gard less of their eth nic back ground or re li gion, would be free to pur sue their inter ests and be come the ben efi ci ar ies of a so cial, po lit i cal, and eco nomic re nais sance.

Al though Dra gou mis and likeminded think ers thought of the East ern Fed er a tion as a so lu tion to the eth nic prob lems of the Bal kans and the Near East, their plan would have had wider im pli ca tions. The East ern Fed er a tion was a de par ture from the con ven tional po lit i cal wis dom of its time. In deed, part of its al lure and inter est today stems from its orig i nal ity. In early twentiethcentury Eu rope, two par a digms of vi able states reigned su preme. One was that of the nationstate as rep re sented by coun tries such as France or Italy, where the over whelming ma jor ity of the peo ple were iden tified as hav ing a shared lan guage, cul ture, and re li gion. The other al ter na tive con sisted of a multi eth nic em pire such as Rus sia or AustriaHungary. In both em pires, the pop u lation was di verse with dif fer ent lin guis tic and cul tural char ac ter is tics. In the case of Rus sia, the dom i nant group at tempted with lit tle suc cess to re tain power by push ing the mi nor ities to in te grate lin guis ti cally, cul tu rally, and even re li giously.66 In the case of AustriaHungary, the dom i nant group gave up part of its power and created a part ner ship with one of its mi nor ity groups (Aus trians with Hun gar ians). The East ern Fed er a tion was an at tempt to forge a new course: the crea tion of a fed eral state on a vol un tary basis. In the East ern Fed er a tion, there would be no dom i nant group but rather a vol un tary as so ci a tion of peo ple who would agree to a union in order to safe guard their inter ests from infringe ment by more pow er ful states. The East ern Fed er a tion rep re sented a new par a digm, for its time, of a mod ern state.67 Such a hy brid, it was

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hoped, com bined the best ele ments of the dy namic nationstate with that of a pow er ful em pire, an in ge ni ous so lu tion to a com plex prob lem. The East ern Fed er a tion also rep re sented the po ten tial for the crea tion of a new great power, which would change the bal ance of power in Eu rope and serve as a model for the Near East, and be yond. Lo cated in a strate gic part of the world, the East ern Fed er a tion was des tined to play a dy namic inter na tional role.

For the past two cen tu ries, as the Ot to man Em pire was weak ened year after year, the stra te gic con flu ence of east ern Med i ter ra nean, the Black Sea, and the Mid dle East was at the mercy of other more pow erful states, which al lowed its ex is tence only be cause they could not agree among them selves on the spoils. While the Ot to man Em pire was al lowed to exist, it was ruth lessly ex ploited ec o nom i cally—by the great pow ers as well as by its own elites—to the det ri ment of its peo ple re gard less of their re li gion or eth nic or i gin. One of the most vis ible signs of foreign ex ploi ta tion of the Ot to man Em pire were the socalled ca pit u la tions, a system that gave West ern mer chants pref e ren tial treat ment and thus a com pet i tive edge to the det ri ment of Ot to man sub jects and the empire’s econ omy. The ca pit u la tions were also used to keep a large num ber of peo ple, foreign ers but also lo cals work ing for foreign firms, im mune from the ju ris dic tion of Ot to man law and its au thor ities.68

In deed, both the cor rupt do mes tic elites and the great pow ers ex ploited na tional and re li gious dif fer ences in order to pro mote their inter ests. The dream for an East ern Fed er a tion en tailed a super state in which Chris tians and Mus lims (per en nial com pet i tors for su pre macy in the area) could co ex ist and coop er ate, rid the coun try of the old, corrupt elites, and end foreign eco nomic and mil i tary dom i na tion. The East ern Fed er a tion would have also been a new way of ad dress ing the prob lem of co ex is tence among dif fer ent peo ples in the same state. For the past one hun dred years, the de clin ing Ot to man Em pire had been in more or less con stant war with its Chris tian sub jects. The re sult of those wars, re gard less of who won, was vi o lence, de struc tion, and dis lo ca tion of the pop u la tion. In the end, the Ot to man Em pire and its Mus lim cit izens were weak ened, while the Chris tian peo ples, even after achiev ing in de pen dence, found their new, small states vul ner able to out side pressure. The East ern Fed er a tion held the prom ise of the peace ful co ex is tence of Mus lims and Chris tians, as well as a way to coun ter threats from out side.

Fi nally, Dra gou mis hoped that this new GreekTurkish state would have all the po ten tial of the Ot to man Em pire with all the vigor of the


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Greek ele ment, which would allow it to re sist out side pres sures, mainly from the West.69 Con sid er ing the his tory of the Near East since the Great War, the im por tance of a strong East ern Fed er a tion be comes ev i dent. One won ders how suc cess ful out side pow ers would have been in control ling ei ther phys i cally or ec o nom i cally parts of this sen si tive area of the world with its stra te gic lo ca tion and oil re serves. The ex is tence of a strong East ern Fed er a tion would have changed the dip lo matic dy nam ics of the area, and Eu rope in gen eral, with un fore seen im pact on such devel op ments as the Sec ond World War and even the Cold War.

Un for tu nately for Dra gou mis, his dreams for a union of the Greek and the Turk ish peo ple in an East ern Fed er a tion failed to ma te ri al ize, and its po ten tial and prom ise re mained un ful filled. One rea son, maybe the main one, was the area’s long his tory. There had been too much an imos ity between the Turks and their sub ject peo ples. For most Greeks, Ar me ni ans, and other mi nor ities, the Turks rep re sented not a fu ture part ner but an enemy and op pres sor. Fol low ing a num ber of wars be tween Tur key and its for mer sub ject peo ples, cul mi nat ing in the Bal kan Wars of 1912–13, most Turks were also un will ing to coop er ate. Their for mer sub jects had been able not only to create in de pen dent states but also to hu mil i ate a for merly glo ri ous em pire. As Turk ish ref u gees fled the Bal kans and re set tled in Tur key proper, their tales of suf fer ing at the hands of their Chris tian en e mies hard ened the po lit i cal stance of those who con tem plated, how ever re motely, coop er a tion. To be sure, even be fore the Bal kan Wars the co ex is tence of Greeks and Turks in Asia Minor was far from idyl lic.70 After the Young Turk re volt, while the Greeks and the Turks of the Asia Minor lit to ral, pre sum ably more so phis ti cated and open to new ideas due to their com mer cial ties to the West, em braced the prom ised changes of de moc rat iza tion and sec u larism, their breth ren in the hin ter land were un sure about, if not out right hos tile to, those ideas.71

The Young Turks also share a great part of the re spon sibil ity for the fail ure of any kind of MuslimChristian rap proche ment. Their in itial mes sage—full of highminded ideals of de moc racy and re spect for mi nor ity rights—res o nated with the empire’s sub ject peo ple, who rushed to sup port the new re gime. Soon after tak ing con trol of the state, however, the Young Turks not only re verted to the Ot to man state’s pol i cies of dis crim i na tion against mi nor ities but also be came the cat a lyst for the strength en ing, if not the emer gence, of Turk ish na tion al ism. As Ion Dra gou mis noted in his jour nal in July 1914, the Young Turks at tempted to create a mod ern multi eth nic state based on equal ity under the law,

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but they failed and in stead “created Turk ish na tion al ism, re in forced the na tion al ism of Greeks, Bul gar ians, Ar me ni ans, and awak ened the na tion al ism of the Kurds, Al ba nians, Cir cas sians, and Arabs.”72 The tragic his tory of the Ar me nian gen o cide il lus trates why the idea of an East ern Fed er a tion was pre ma ture or even im pos sible.73 It clearly dem on strates how deep and im pos sible to heal was the an i mos ity be tween the peo ples of the Near East. While most of the kill ing oc curred dur ing, and as a re sult of, the First World War, part of its plan ning and even some po groms had oc curred be fore the war it self. The main mo tivat ing fac tor was not state se cur ity, as one might claim for the 1915 gen o cide, but rather an at tempt by the Turk ish state to en sure that the sub ject peo ple would be un able to trans late their eco nomic strength into po lit i cal power, what the his to rian Sia Anag nos to pou lou la bels “na tion al iz ing econ omy and space.”74 While the case of the Ar me nian gen o cide is the most no to ri ous, the Greeks were also tar geted for elim ina tion through po lit i cal, eco nomic, and mil i tary meas ures.75 To achieve these ends, the Young Turks used or ga nized ter ror, forced re lo ca tion, and even wide spread kill ings of Asia Minor Greeks by mil i tary and par a mil i tary units under the super vi sion of the Turk ish govern ment even be fore World War I started.76 The ex pul sions of mi nor ities and the Ar me nian gen o cide were but the clos ing chap ter in the his tory of an em pire and the open ing one in the his tory of a strictly homo ge ne ous nationstate. A mod ern and dem o cratic multi eth nic state, of the type the East ern Fed er a tion could have be come, would have able to pre vent such trag e dies.

An other rea son that might ac count for the fail ure of a GreekTurkish state is the fact that such ideas re mained lim ited to dis cus sions among cer tain mem bers of the elite. For rea sons that are un clear, there were no ef forts to com mu ni cate such plans to a wider au di ence. As a re sult, the var i ous ideas for su pra na tional coop er a tion failed to achieve pop u lar sup port. Any talk of wider East ern coop er a tion of peo ples re mained just talk and failed to gain any real trac tion in pop u lar po lit i cal dis course. A major short com ing of Ion Dragoumis’s plans for an East ern Fed er a tion was his fail ure to grasp the chang ing dip lo matic land scape of the world. Did he really be lieve, de spite his ex pe ri ence in foreign af fairs, that the great pow ers would allow the gen e sis of such a pow er ful fed er a tion, which was going to com pete with them and hin der their geo po lit i cal and eco nomic plans? Fur ther, the spirit of the times was mov ing in a di rec tion that dif fered from Dragoumis’s way of think ing. The end of the First World War be came the ap o gee of the nationstate. United States pres i dent Woo drow Wil son be came a hero in Eu rope be cause of


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his ideas of de moc rat iza tion and selfdetermination. As a re sult, the trea ties that ended the war at tempted (al beit at times halfheartedly or/and un suc cess fully) to re draw the map of Eu rope based on the prin ci ple of na tional selfdetermination.77 In such a cli mate, the idea of creat ing multi eth nic em pires was anach ron is tic; at the time the trend was to split great em pires into many small nationstates, rather than al low ing the crea tion of new pow ers. While the great pow ers al lowed, in deed encour aged, the crea tion of Czech o slo va kia and Yu go sla via, these states were not strong enough to be come ei ther em pires or a se ri ous chal lenge to the pow ers of the day. Ad di tion ally, Czechoslovakia’s peace ful split and, more trag i cally, Yugoslavia’s vi o lent end ing are not hope ful signs for what might have hap pened to the East ern Fed er a tion.

The EU is a con tem po rary en tity that might be a bet ter ex am ple of what the East ern Fed er a tion could have been. The fact that it took the major trauma of the Sec ond World War to push the Eu ro peans closer in di cates that the 1920s were too early for such de vel op ments. Also, the Eu ro pean states that came to gether in the 1950s to create the nu cleus of today’s EU were at a more ad vanced stage ec o nom i cally, so cially, and po lit i cally than the areas that would have been part ners in the East ern Fed er a tion. France, West Ger many, Italy, Bel gium, the Neth er lands, and Lux em burg were in dus tri al ized states with a long tra di tion of dem o cratic govern ance (Ger many less so) that served as a guide for the struc ture and pro ce dures of EU. In contrast, the Bal kans and An a to lia were still agrarianbased so ci eties with very lit tle, if any, ex pe ri ence with dem o cratic govern ments and mod ern so ci eties. In any case, be fore we rush to pro claim the EU a suc cess, we should keep in mind that the re cent eco nomic down turn has put strains on the part ner ship, and one can only spec u late if the EU will sur vive in the fu ture in its cur rent form. Ad di tion ally, the eco nomic cri sis has re vealed that the EU is not as co he sive as pre vi ously thought (or hoped), and far from being a part ner ship of equals, it is an en tity dom i nated by uni fied Ger many. At the same time, it is also in the con text of the EU that TurkishGreek coex is tence under the same federationlike en tity is, how ever re motely, pos sible. If at some point in the fu ture Tur key joins the EU, then it will join other mem ber states such as Greece, Bul garia, Roma nia, and Cy prus, as well as coun tries of the for mer Yu go sla via, which are or will be mem bers by that time. If this sce nario ma te ri alizes, then a mod ified ver sion of the East ern Fed er a tion might yet come to exist.

The fact that we are left to spec u late about a fu ture (and re mote) pos sibil ity of re al iz ing a ver sion of the East ern Idea in di cates that the “orig i nal” idea of an East ern Fed er a tion, how ever prom is ing, was

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ei ther un re alis tic or at best be longed to the nineteenthcentury way of think ing while the nationstate was the new par a digm of the early twen ti eth. In deed, a major vic tim of that pol icy of nationstate creation was Dragoumis’s ideal model of mod ern em pire based on the prin ci ples of de moc racy and re spect for eth nic mi nor ity rights; the Trea ties of Tri anon and SaintGermain brought about the dis so lu tion of the AustroHungarian Em pire and re placed it with a num ber of nationstates.

Notes

An ear lier ver sion of this work was pre sented at the con fer ence “Med i ter ra nean and its Seas,” Sep tem ber 2008, Min ne ap o lis, Min ne sota.

1. While the bib liog ra phy of the his tory of the Bal kans is ex ten sive, a sam ple of works, from Bar bara Jel a vich, His tory of the Bal kans, 2 vols. (New York: Cambridge Uni ver sity Press, 1983), to Tha nos Ver e mis, Val ka nia apo ton 19o os ton 20o aiona [The Bal kans from the 19th to the 21st cen tury] (Ath ens: Pat a kis, 2004), in di cates the ex pe ri ence of al most con stant war fare among the Bal kan peo ples at the time under ex am ina tion.

2. While works by his to rians of Greek his tory are more prone to em pha size GreekTurkish prob lems, those of Ot to man schol ars give them less at ten tion, usu ally be cause the for mer write stud ies more spe cific to Greece, while the lat ter ex am ine the Ot to man Em pire in its to tal ity. See Rich ard Clogg, A Con cise His tory of Greece, 2nd ed. (Cam bridge: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 2002); Thomas Gal lant, Mod ern Greece (New York: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 2001); Karen Bar key, Em pire of Dif fer ence: The Ot to mans in Com par a tive Per spec tive (New York: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 2008); and ¸Sükrü M. Han io˘glu, A Brief His tory of the Late Ot to man Em pire (Prince ton, NJ: Prince ton Uni ver sity Press, 2008).

3. The best known case of such coop er a tion is the agree ment between Greece and Tur key in the late 1920s. See Evan this Hat zi vas sil iou, O Elef the rios Ven i ze los, e El lin o tour kike Pro se gise kai to Prov lema tis As fal ias sta Val ka nia 1928–1931 [Elef the rios Ven i ze los, the GreekTurkish rap proche ment and the prob lem of se cur ity in the Bal kans 1928–1931] (Thes sal o niki: IMXA, 1999).

4. See Re port of the Inter na tional Com mis sion to In quire into the Causes and Con duct of the Bal kan Wars (Wash ing ton, DC: Carne gie Endow ment for Inter national Peace, 1914).

5. For re cent works on the var i ous gen o cides by the Ot to man Em pire and the Re pub lic of Tur key, see Taner Akçam, From Em pire to Re pub lic: Turk ish Na tion-al ism and the Ar me nian Gen o cide (Lon don: Zed Books, 2004); idem, The Young Turks’ Crime against Hu man ity (Prince ton, NJ: Prince ton Uni ver sity Press, 2012); and George N. Shi rin ian, ed., The Asia Minor Ca tas trophe and the Ot to man Greek


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Gen o cide: Es says in Asia Minor, Pon tos, and East ern Thrace, 1912–1923 (Bloom ington, IL: Asia Minor and Pon tos Hel lenic Re search Cen ter, 2012).

6. The trea ties in ques tion are those of Ver sailles (28 June 1919) with Germany, SaintGermain (10 Sep tem ber 1919) with Aus tria, Tri anon (4 June 1920) with Hun gary, and Sèvres (10 Au gust 1920) with the Ot to man Em pire. The case of Im pe rial Rus sia is dif fer ent be cause that state “morphed” into the USSR due to do mes tic de vel op ments. Nev er the less, the Treaty of BrestLitovsk (3 March 1918) between Rus sia and Ger many, how ever short lived, can be taken as the “of fi cial” end of the Rus sian Em pire. For more on the trea ties in ques tion, see Mar ga ret Mac mil lan, Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World (New York: Ran dom House, 2002); David From kin, A Peace to End All Peace (New York: Avon Books, 1989); and Ni ko laos PetsalesDiomedes, Greece at the Paris Peace Con fer ence (1919) (Thes sal o niki: IMXA, 1978).

7. While the term “sick man of Eu rope” is the most com mon one, ac cord ing to W. Bruce Lin coln, Nich o las I, Em peror and Auto crat of All the Rus sias (Bloom ington: In di ana Uni ver sity Press, 1978), 222–23, Tsar Nich o las I said, “Tur key is a dying man.”

8. The term it self is a bit mis lead ing. While Great Idea is the di rect En glish trans la tion of the Greek term Megavlh Ideva, Megavlh can mean “great,” but it can also mean “im por tant” or “pro found,” which is more de scrip tive of the spirit of this ideol ogy. Pro po nents of the ideol ogy (the ma jor ity of the Greek lead er ship as well as the peo ple) ad vo cated ei ther the out right de struc tion of the Ot to man Em pire and the recreation of a Byz an tine/Greek one, or the ac quisi tion of as much land from the Ot to man state as pos sible. From the 1840s to the 1920s, the Meg ali Idea was at the cen ter of Greek pol i tics and foreign af fairs. For a de tailed treat ment, see Ad a ma tia Pollis’s “The Meg ali Idea: A Study of Greek Na tion al ism” (PhD diss., Johns Hop kins Uni ver sity, 1958); see also Mi chael Lle wel lyn Smith, Io nian Vi sion: Greece in Asia Minor, 1919–1922 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1973), 2–3; Jerry Au gus ti nos, “The Dy nam ics of Mod ern Greek Na tion al ism: The ‘Great Idea’ and the Mac e do nian Prob lem,” East Eu ro-pean Quar terly 6, no. 4 (1972): 444–53.

9. On the at tempted re forms and the dif fi cul ties en coun tered, see Ro deric Dav i son, Re form in the Ot to man Em pire, 1856–1876 (Prince ton, NJ: Prince ton Uni ver sity Press, 1963); Han io˘glu, Brief His tory of the Late Ot to man Em pire, 72–149; and Stan ford Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, His tory of the Ot to man Em pire and Mod ern Tur key, 2 vols. (New York: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 1977), 2:155–71.

10. The socalled Greek Pro ject, as so ciated mainly with Cathe rine the Great and Al ex an der I, is a prime ex am ple of the at tempts by out sid ers to im pose their will on the peo ple of the Bal kans and the Ot to man Em pire. What ever one might at trib ute to such plans, it is clear that they were con jured to ben e fit Rus sia first, if not ex clu sively. See Janet Har tley, Al ex an der I (New York: Long man, 1994), 100–101.

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11. Chris tine M. Phil liou, Biog ra phy of an Em pire: Gov ern ing Ot to mans in an Age of Rev o lu tion (Berke ley: Uni ver sity of Cal i for nia Press, 2011), 224n7.

12. Some his to rians do por tray the peo ples of the Bal kans as hav ing some agency, but this is usu ally under stood as some form of re volt aimed at weak ening or out right de stroy ing the Ot to man Em pire, rather than re form ing and re viv ing it. See A. J. Grant and Har old Tem per ley, Eu rope in the Nine teenth and Twen ti eth Cen tu ries (1789–1932) (Lon don: Long mans, Green, 1932), 257.

13. Ion Dra gou mis Archives, pt. A, file 29, Gen na dius Li brary, American School of Clas si cal Stud ies, Ath ens (hence forth cited as Dra gou mis Archives). All trans la tions from Greek to En glish are mine. See also Ger a si mos Au gous tinos, Con scious ness and His tory: Crit ics of Greek So ci ety, 1897–1914 (Boul der, CO: East Eu ro pean Mono graphs, 1977).

14. Given Venizelos’s im por tance in mod ern Greek his tory, one would ex pect sev eral avail able works about him, but that is not the case. Besides Doros Alastos’s hag io graph i cal Ven i ze los: Pa triot, States man, Rev o lu tion ary (Gulf Breeze, FL: Ac a demic Inter na tional Press, 1978), there is also Tha nos Ver e mis and E. Ni kol o pou los, O Elef the rios Ven i ze los kai e Epoche Tou [Elef the rios Ven i ze los and his era] (Ath ens: Greek Let ters, 2005); and Pas chalis Ki trom i lides, ed., Elef the rios Ven i ze los: The Trials of States man ship (Edin burgh: Edin burgh Uni versity Press, 2006). Mac mil lan, Paris 1919, pro vides a vivid por trayal, es pe cially the chap ter ti tled “The Great est Greek States man since Per i cles,” 347–65.

15. Pav los Dran da kis, ed., Meg ali El li niki En gik lo pe dia [Great Greek en cy clope dia], 24 vols. (Ath ens: Phoe nix Ek do seis, n.d), 9:530. One would think that a cul ture that em pha sizes its long his tory (like that of mod ern Greece) would have a tra di tion of his tor i cal biog ra phy. This is not the case, how ever; thus biograph i cal in for ma tion on Dra gou mis ex ists mainly as en cy clo pe dia en tries.

16. See Evan ge los Kofos, Greece and the East ern Cri sis, 1875–1878 (Thes sal oniki: IMXA, 1976), 20.

17. A. J. Pa nay ot o pou los, “The Great Idea and the Vi sion of East ern Fed er ation: Apro pos of the Views of I. Dra gou mis and A. Sou li o tis—Nic o lai dis,” Bal kan Stud ies 21 (1980): 332–33; and L. S. Stav ri a nos, Bal kan Fed er a tion (Ham den, CT: Ar chon Books, 1964), 150–51. Al though a num ber of his to rians have dealt with the East ern Ques tion, most of them fol low the tra di tional route of view ing the prob lem from the per spec tive of the great pow ers and the Ot to man gov ern ing elite. In contrast, only the works of Pa nay ot o pou los and Stav ri a nos have addressed the plans for a third way via a Bal kan fed er a tion.

18. Pa nay ot o pou los, “Great Idea,” 348.19. Ibid., 348–49. One could see a fed er a tion based on jus tice and equal ity,

but “his tory” is prob le matic. Clearly, the peo ple who would par tic i pate in the fed er a tion had some com mon his tory, but his tor i cally they viewed them selves as dis tinct groups. Since there is no ex pla na tion of what the fram ers had in mind by “his tory,” any spec u la tion now would be of lit tle use.

20. Pa nay ot o pou los, “Great Idea,” 356–57.


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21. Dra gou mis Archives, pt. A, file 30. There is no ev i dence that Dra gou mis knew of the plans pre sented here. While he must have known Kar a the o dori and Zar i fis by rep u ta tion, he most likely had never heard of Ar gy ri ades, his or gan iza tion, or his ideas.

22. Ion Dra gou mis, Ta Tetra dia tou Ilin den [Note books from the Ilin den up ris ing], ed. George Pet si vas (Ath ens: Pet si vas, 2000), 401–3.

23. See K. A. Va kal o pou los, Ion Dra gou mis–Pav los Gy paris: Kor y fees Morfes tou Mak e don i kou Agona (1902–1908) [Ion Dra gou mis–Paul Gy paris: Lead ing in di vid u als of the strug gle for Mac e do nia (1902–1908)] (Thes sal o niki: Barbou nakes, 1987), 37–44.

24. See anon y mous, Epi ta fia Styli ston Iona Dra goumi [Epi taph mon u ment for Ion Dra gou mis] (Ath ens: Ek do seis Ef thynes, 1978), 67.

25. Is toria tou El lin i kou Eth nous [His tory of the Greek na tion], 16 vols. (Athens: Ek do tiki Athe non, 1978), 15:485. Dragoumis’s East ern Idea was de vel oped as early as 1908 with the help of his good friend Ath a na sios SouliotisNicolaidis. See Philip Dra gou mis, Imer o lo gio: Val ka ni koi Po le moi 1912–1913 [Pri vate jour nal: Bal kan Wars 1912–1913], ed. Ioan nis K. MazarakisAinian (Ath ens: Do doni, 1988), 331; and Imer o lo gio: Di chas mos 1916–1919 [Pri vate jour nal: The Na tional Split 1916–1919], ed. Mark Dra gou mis and Chris tina Varda (Ath ens: Do doni, 1995), 65.

26. For a fairly bal anced treat ment of the Mac e do nian ques tion (al though sym pa thetic to the Greeks), see Doug las Dakin, The Greek Strug gle in Mac e do nia, 1897–1913 (Thes sal o niki: IMXA, 1966).

27. Ion Dra gou mis, To Mono pati [The foot path] (Ath ens: Do doni, 1925), 49.28. There is a tra di tion of Rus sia being thought of as Bulgaria’s pa tron,

while Bul garia has been viewed as Russia’s tool. In re al ity, RussianBulgarian re la tions were never as har mo ni ous as pre sented. See Bar bara Jel a vich, Russia’s Bal kan En tan gle ments, 1806–1914 (New York: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 1991), 178–96.

29. Ion Dra gou mis, “Pro ky rixe stous skla vom e nous kai tous ask lav o tous El lines” ([Man i festo to the free and un re deemed Greeks], Dra gou mis Archives, pt. A, file 37, 2.

30. See D. P. Tag o pou los, ed., Deka Ar thra tou Ionos Dra goumi ston Nouma [Ten ar ti cles by Ion Dra gou mis in Nou mas] (Ath ens: Ek do sis Typou, 1920).

31. Ion Dra gou mis, “Oxi pros tin Dysin, pros tin Anat o lin einai o dro mos” [The road leads to the east, not to the west], At lan tis, 3 Sep tem ber 1927, 2–5. See Dra gou mis Archives, pt. A, file 37.

32. For a mod ern schol arly treat ment of the issue, see Maria Tod o rova, Im a gin ing the Bal kans (New York: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 1997).

33. The idea that the Greek ele ment could, under the right con di tions, pre vail in a new Turk ish dem o cratic em pire was not Dragoumis’s (or his fellow Greeks’) alone. In a let ter to Dra gou mis dated 4 Feb ru ary 1920, a Brit ish ac quain t ance of his, William Ram say, notes that the an tic i pated Greek con trol

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of Asia Minor would re sult in the Greek ele ment rul ing its west ern part and also hav ing a great de gree of in flu ence in the cen ter of the pe nin sula. For the let ter, see the Gen na dius Li brary, Al lil o gra fia Ionos Dra goumi, let ter 0648.

34. See Ion Dra gou mis, “Ypom nima ston Ek u men i kon Pa tri archin Ioa kem III, 1907” [Note to the ec u men i cal pa tri arch Joa chim III, 1907], Dra gou mis Archives, pt. B, file 16–18, 2.

35. See Dra gou mis Archives, pt. B, file 16–18; and Ion Dra gou mis, “I Thesi tes Tourk ias” [Con di tions in Tur key], Nou mas 460 (11 De cem ber 1911).

36. Ion Dra gou mis, “O El li nis mos mou kai oi El lenes” [My sense of Hel le n ism and the Greeks], in Apanta Ionos Dra goumi [The col lected works of Ion Dra gou mis] (Ath ens: Nea The sis, 1991), 81, 108.

37. Ion Dra gou mis, “Osoi Zon ta noi” [Those who are alive], in Apanta Ionos Dra goumi [The col lected works of Ion Dra gou mis]) (Ath ens: Nea The sis, 1991), 119, 127, 140. Dra gou mis was not alone in his be lief in the super ior ity of Greek cul ture in the Ot to man Em pire. Even some other, nonGreek mem bers of the first Young Turk par lia ment (1908–9) rec og nized that Greek na tional iden tity was more ad vanced than that of other eth nic groups in the em pire. See Emre Sencer, “Bal kan Na tion al isms in the Ot to man Par lia ment, 1909,” East Eu ro pean Quar terly 38, no. 1 (2004): 56–59.

38. Pa nay ot o pou los, “Great Idea,” 359.39. Ibid., 336, 342.40. See Ion Dra gou mis, Fylla Im e rol o giou, 6, 1918–1920 [Pages from the pri

vate jour nal, v. 6, 1918–1920], ed. Theo do ros So ter o pou los (Ath ens: Hermes, 1987), 116.

41. Ion Dra gou mis, Pol i ti koi Pro gram a ti koi Sto chas moi [Po lit i cal thoughts] (Ath ens: Byron, 1972), 16. See also his “Osoi Zon ta noi,” 148.

42. In a let ter to Char ises Vam va kas, 26 July 1913, Dra gou mis pro poses an in de pen dent State of Thrace with Ad ri an o ple as its cap i tal. In this way cer tain ob jec tions by the great pow ers could be over come, and the pos sible fu ture threat to the area by Bul garia could be averted. See Gen na dius Li brary, Al lil ogra fia Ionos Dra goumi, let ter 0276.

43. See Bar key Em pire of Dif fer ence, 292–94; John Pat rick Kin ross, The Ot to man Cen tu ries (New York: Mor row Quill, 1977), 575–76; and Shaw and Shaw, His tory of the Ot to man Em pire and Mod ern Tur key, 2:255–71.

44. Sencer, “Bal kan Na tion al isms,” 53.45. Dra gou mis was not the only Greek to ac cept the sin cer ity of the Young

Turk pro gram. A num ber of Greek news papers in Con stan tin o ple, rep re senting the views of a large seg ment of the over two hun dred thou sand Greeks in the city, wel comed the pos sibil ity of a new be gin ning. See Pa nay ot o pou los “Great Idea,” 348–49; and G. F. Ab bott, Tur key in Tran si tion (Lon don: Ed ward Ar nold, 1909), 84–85.

46. Ab bott, Tur key in Tran si tion, 85–86.


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47. A. J. Pa nay ot o pou los, “Early Re la tions between the Greeks and the Young Turks,” Bal kan Stud ies 21 (1980): 91. Even tu ally Dra gou mis and oth ers re al ized that the Young Turk man i festo on cit i zen equal ity re gard less of re ligious and eth nic back ground was just a slo gan, and not govern ment pol icy. See Pa nay ot o pou los, “Great Idea,” 352; and Ab bott, Tur key in Tran si tion, 106–7.

48. Smith, Io nian Vi sion, 30.49. Tag o pou los, Deka Ar thra, 85.50. Th. Pap a kos tan ti nou, Ion Dra gou mis kai Pol i tike Pez o gra fia [Ion Dra gou mis

and po lit i cal prose] (Ath ens: Za har o pou los, 1957), kgæ.51. In his jour nal ( Jan u ary 1911) Dra gou mis wrote: “I would ac cept my

na tion to exist in the way Hun gary ex ists in Aus tria.” Dra gou mis noted how priv i leged the Hun gar ian part of the AustroHungarian Em pire was and wanted a sim i lar GrecoTurkish pol ity. See Ion Dra gou mis, Fylla Im e rol o giou, IV, 1908–1912 [Pages from the pri vate jour nal, vol. 4, 1908–1912], ed. Tha nos Ver e mis and John Ko li o pou los (Ath ens: Hermes, 1985), 158.

52. See Ion Dra gou mis, Fylla Im e rol o giou, IV, 1908–1912, 140.53. For a so phis ti cated but read able ex pla na tion of the crea tion and work

ings of the dual mon ar chy of AustriaHungary, see A. J. P. Tay lor, The Habs burg Mon ar chy, 1809–1918 (Chi cago: Uni ver sity of Chi cago Press, 1976), 130–40. In de scrib ing the com pro mise that al lowed the crea tion of the new pol ity, Tay lor shows how the Hun gar ians were able to gain al most com plete in de pen dence from Vienna in do mes tic mat ters while keep ing the right to veto, or at least shape, im pe rial pol i cies. The au thor notes how in the years 1900 to 1914 (the time that Dra gou mis vis ited the em pire), a num ber of na tional mi nor ities within the em pire had achieved a large meas ure of cul tural auton omy. At the same time, the agree ments that ac corded a de gree of auton omy to dif fer ent na tion al ities in the em pire did not solve all the eth nic prob lems. Dragoumis’s views were based on a short visit with out any indepth study of the AustroHungarian Em pire, its po lit i cal system, and its eth nic chal lenges. One won ders if the var i ous national mi nor ities in the AustroHungarian Em pire thought of them selves as priv i leged as Dra gou mis be lieved them to be. In deed, Tay lor, Habs burg Mon ar-chy, 196–213 and 224–27, notes that for all the deals and com pro mises, by 1914 the AustroHungarian Em pire faced major eth nic prob lems that could not be solved by peace ful po lit i cal means.

54. George Le on tar itis, Greece and the First World War: From Neu tral ity to Inter ven tion, 1917–1918 (Boul der, CO: East Eu ro pean Mono graphs, 1990), 140, 108; and Pe tros Hor o lo gas “E pol i tike Drase tou Dra goumi” [Dragoumis’s po lit ical ac tions], in Nea Estia “Teu chos Afie ro meno ston Iona Dra goumi” [Spe cial issue ded i cated to Ion Dra gou mis] 29, no. 342 (1941): 256.

55. Dra gou mis Archives, pt. A, file 12–14 (now re named “Inter na tional Re lations I 1915–1916” and “II Foreign Inter ven tion”).

56. See Philip Dra gou mis, Imer o lo gio, 432.

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57. Dra gou mis Archives, pt. B, file 16–18, let ter dated 1 July 1919, 3–5.58. See Ion Dra gou mis, “Osoi Zon ta noi,” 164.59. Ibid., 154–55, 167–68; and Ion Dra gou mis, Sa moth raki to Nisi [The is land

of Sa moth race] (Ath ens: Do doni, 1926), 42; idem, Pol i ti koi Pro gram a ti koi Sto-chas moi, 22, 24; and idem, “O El li nis mos mou kai oi El lenes,” 122.

60. See Ion Dra gou mis, Fylla Im e rol o giou, 6, 1918–1920, 14 Au gust 1919, 116.61. While Dra gou mis named his state “Omospondiva” (fed er a tion), it is clear

that he had a much looser union in mind; thus the term “Sunomospondiva” or “con fed er a tion,” would be more ap pro pri ate.

62. Ion Dra gou mis, Koi no tis, Eth nos kai Kra tos [Com mu nity, na tion and state], ed. Philip Dra gou mis. (Thes sal o niki: He te ria Mak e don i kon Spou don, 1967), 78; and idem, “O El li nis mos mou kai oi El lenes,” 31.

63. Dra gou mis, “O El li nis mos mou kai oi El lenes,” 135–36.64. Ibid., 85–86.65. Dra gou mis did not hy poth e size about the inter ests of the Greeks of the

Ot to man Em pire. Pre sum ably a con fed er a tion would have of fered re li gious and eth nic mi nor ities some pro tec tion from in fringe ment of their rights by the ma jor ity.

66. For de tails on im pe rial Russia’s pol icy of Rus sifi ca tion, see Theo dore R. Weeks, Na tion and State in Late Im pe rial Rus sia (De Kalb: North ern Il li nois Univer sity Press, 1996).

67. The post–World War I crea tions of Czech o slo va kia and the King dom of Serbs, Croats, and Slo venes are ex am ples of states created on the basis of vol untary coop er a tion of the con stit u ent eth nic groups. The dif fer ence between those two states and the pro posed East ern Fed er a tion is that whereas the eth nic groups in the for mer cases were quite close cul tu rally, in the lat ter case the state would be truly multi cul tu ral.

68. Shaw and Shaw, His tory of the Ot to man Em pire and Mod ern Tur key, 2:97–98; and Mark Ma zower, Sa lon ica City of Ghosts: Chris tians, Mus lims and Jews, 1430–1950 (New York: Vin tage Books, 2004), 165–66.

69. Con stan tine Svol o pou los, E El li nike Ex ot e rike Pol i tike apo tis Arches tou 20ou Eona os to Deu tero Pa gos mio Ploemo [Greek foreign pol icy from the be ginning of the 20th cen tury to the Sec ond World War] (Thes sal o niki: Sak koula, 1983), 47.

70. Sia Anag nos to pou lou, Mikra Asia, 19os ai.–1919: Hoi Hellenor tho doxes Koi no tetes [Asia Minor, 19th c.–1919: The Greek Or tho dox com mu nities] (Ath ens: Greek Let ters, 1998), 12–13.

71. Ibid., 459–60.72. Ion Dra gou mis, Fylla Im e rol o giou, V, 1913–1917 [Pages from the pri vate

jour nal, v. 5, 1913–1917], ed. Theo do ros So ter o pou los (Ath ens: Hermes, 1986), 76.

73. The topic of the Ar me nian Gen o cide is not open to inter pre ta tion. The over whelm ing ma jor ity of schol ars ac cept that what oc curred in 1915 was a


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statesponsored gen o cide of the Ot to man Empire’s Ar me nian mi nor ity. See Inter na tional As so ci a tion of Gen o cide Schol ars, 20 July 2012, www.atour .com/~aahgn/news/20080311a.html (ac cessed 14 Oc to ber 2013). De ny ing that what oc curred was gen o cide, as in the case of Shaw and Shaw, His tory of the Ot to man Em pire and Mod ern Tur key, 2:315–16, or blam ing the ex i gen cies of war, as in the re cent case of Sean McMee kin, The Rus sian Or i gins of the First World War (Cam bridge, MA: Har vard Uni ver sity Press, 2011), 242, are con sid ered acts of schol arly mis con duct. http://www.voel ker mord.at/docs/Schol ars_ De ny ing_IAGS.pdf (ac cessed 14 Oc to ber 2013).

74. Anag nos to pou lou, Mikra Asia, 529; Akçam, From Em pire to Re pub lic, 144–49; and Don ald Blox ham, The Great Game of Gen o cide (New York: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 2005).

75. Akçam, From Em pire to Re pub lic, 144.76. See re ports of the Greek con su late in Smyrna to the Greek Min is try of

Foreign Af fairs in Anag nos to pou lou, Mikra Asia, 597–604; and Taner Akçam, A Shame ful Act: The Ar me nian Gen o cide and the Ques tion of Turk ish Re spon sibil ity, trans. Paul Bes se mer (New York: Met ro pol i tan Books, 2006), 97, 106–8.

77. For the trials and trib u la tions of state for ma tion in the post–World War I Bal kans, see Charles and Bar bara Jel a vich, The Es tab lish ment of the Bal kan Na-tional States, 1804–1920 (Seat tle: Uni ver sity of Wash ing ton Press, 1977), 298; and Lef ten Stav ri a nos, The Bal kans since 1453 (New York: New York Uni ver sity Press, 2000).

Sergei Sazonov. (from Eugene de Schelking, Recollections of a Russian Diplomat: The Suicide of Monarchies [New York: Macmillan, 1918])

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Squab bling over the SpoilsLate Im pe rial Russia’s Ri valry with France in the Near East

Ro nald P. Bo broff

The FrancoRussian Al li ance, from its be gin nings in 1891 through its de mise with the Rus sian Rev o lu tion in 1917, is best re mem bered for the way France and Rus sia coop er ated pri mar ily to re sist what was perceived as a grow ing threat from Ger many. In deed, this al li ance formed one side of a di ar chy of al li ances that en gen dered the ten sions fa cil i tat ing the be gin ning of the First World War in 1914. How ever, while the two part ners stood to gether against Ger many, their coop er a tion re gard ing the Ot to man Em pire was strained, as Paris and St. Pe ters burg had quite dif fer ent inter ests in the Ot to man Em pire and its ul ti mate fate. That these dif fer ences over the East ern Ques tion nearly wrecked the Dual Al li ance, even in the midst of war, shows how vital Near East ern is sues were to France, to Rus sia, and to Eu rope as a whole.

Be fore the First World War, France sought to han dle the Sub lime Porte care fully in order to pre serve the Ot to man Em pire for as long as pos sible to pro tect its own fi nan cial inter ests and in flu ence in the Near East. In deed, France had often main tained a work ing re la tion ship with the Ot to mans as far back as the six teenth cen tury. Rus sia, in contrast,

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usu ally a rival of the Ot to mans, had lit tle mon e tary in vest ment, so could af ford to pur sue a blunter ap proach. Russia’s se cur ity con cerns, how ever, were great as the Ot to man navy began to mod ern ize. Rus sia felt ob li gated to re spond with the con struc tion of its own cap i tal ships on the Black Sea, lead ing to a naval race of sorts between the two countries. With the out break of war in 1914, the dis par ate fi nan cial en gagement largely gave way to dis agree ments about the Ot to man Empire’s ul ti mate par ti tion, which ex posed the mis align ment of France and Rus sia’s geo stra tegic goals. This dis cord over the Ot to man Em pire dur ing the last decade of Rom a nov rule il lu mi nates the pre car i ous na ture of the FrancoRussian Al li ance. Dis agree ment over ad min is tra tion and par ti tion of Ot to man lands strained the al li ance to the limit dur ing the First World War.

Schol ars have stud ied the FrancoRussian re la tion ship both as a sub ject in its own right and via stud ies of the events of the time. Most mono graphs that ex am ine the al li ance con cen trate on its or i gins.1 Shorter works have looked more broadly at the al li ance, yet au thors have pre dom i nantly fo cused on the fi nan cial re la tion ship between the two states.2 Fur ther more, each of the cri ses on the road to war in 1914 has re ceived at ten tion by his to rians, but no one has an a lyzed the French and Rus sian po si tions over the whole se ries of cri ses—par tic u larly those cri ses that re lated to the Ot to man Em pire—in order to draw out les sons about the al li ance dy namic. In deed, the FrancoRussian disagree ment over the Ot to man Em pire and its in her i tance shows us how the East ern Ques tion could mag nify as well as transcend the is sues that usu ally de fined re la tion ships within Eu rope.

Though rather over shad owed by the mil i tary his tory of the war, val u able stud ies of the di plo macy of the First World War exist in a va riety of lan guages based on archives from nearly all the bel lig er ent par ties. These stud ies have run the gamut from the di plo macy of the war as a whole to the res o lu tion of spe cific con cerns.3 Works on the al lied de ci sion in March 1915 to award the Turk ish Straits—the Bos porus and the Dar da nelles—to the Rus sians upon the de feat of the Cen tral Pow ers have tended to con cen trate on Great Britain’s will ing ness to ac cept Russia’s gain. Brit ain had long op posed Rus sian ex pan sion into the re gion, so schol ars have sought to under stand such an aboutface in at ti tude.4 His to rians, how ever, have lit tle scru ti nized France’s stub born re sis tance to award ing this most val u able prize to its ally. Sim i larly, much has been writ ten about the leg en dary SykesPicot talks, cred ited with be gin ning the im pe ri al ist di vi sion of the Near East and lay ing the

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ground work for the mod ern Mid dle East. Less at ten tion, how ever, has been de voted to Russia’s role in these talks or its ob jec tives.5 A re cent trend in the schol ar ship of Rus sia and the East ern Ques tion has been to ex am ine RussianOttoman re la tions di rectly. Mi chael Re ynolds and Sean McMee kin have both used the archives of Rus sia and Tur key to offer new inter pre ta tions of the strug gle between the two aging em pires.6 Nei ther, how ever, draws France suf fi ciently into the pic ture, with McMee kin even mis ta kenly sug gest ing that the East ern Ques tion was not “ter ribly ur gent” for France, leav ing a sig nifi cant part of the dy namic un ap pre ciated.7 This essay seeks to un cover the pat tern of Franco Russian dis agree ment over the Ot to man Em pire on the eve of and dur ing World War I.

The East ern Ques tion pro vides the crit i cal (if ne glected) con text for this re la tion ship. This dis pute over the pace and man age ment of per ceived Ot to man de cline dom i nated no small amount of inter na tional re la tions in the long nine teenth cen tury. In deed, given the im por tance of the East ern Ques tion to re la tions among Eu ro pean states in this pe riod and the in flu ence of Eu ro pean ri val ries on the Near East, any study of the RussianOttoman bor der lands ought to con sider the dip lo matic arena. Inter na tional his tory of fers val u able in sights into the na ture of re la tions among states and into the con nec tions between inter na tional re la tions and non po lit i cal de vel op ments in cul tures and so ci eties as well. As Zara Steiner re minds us, inter na tional his tory con sti tutes far more than what one foreign min is ter said to an other.8 Given the in herently trans na tional na ture of a bor der land, a field that relies on multina tional stud ies achieved through work in the archives of many states of fers im por tant in sights into the prob lem, lost in the vales and dunes of any sin gle land.9 This chap ter aims to do just that with archi val sources from Rus sia, France, Great Brit ain, and the United States. The internationalhistory ap proach to the bor der lands shows how intractable ques tions about their fate could be, even in the face of the lifeor death strug gle play ing out in west ern and east ern Eu rope.

The East ern Ques tion played an es pe cially sig nifi cant role in the foreign pol icy of Rus sia, which en gaged in at least six wars with the Ot to man Em pire dur ing this time and slowly but in ex or ably pushed the mu tual bor der fur ther south on both sides of the Black Sea. The East ern Ques tion also fea tured in the re la tions of France and Rus sia, given the former’s long con nec tion with the Sub lime Porte. For ex am ple, among the rea sons for the Cri mean War (1853–56) was a FrancoRussian dis pute over ste ward ship of the holy places within Ot to man Pal es tine.10

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The war did not un seat newly in stalled French in flu ence over the holy places, much to the frus tra tion of St. Pe ters burg, long ac cus tomed to the role of pro tec tor of Or tho dox Chris tians in Ot to man do mains. French inter est in the Near East was thus con firmed and en hanced, while FrancoRussian re la tions were left strained by the hu mil i at ing loss that the Rus sians suf fered on their own ter ri tory.

The FrancoRussian Al li ance, formed in the early 1890s, thus rep resented a new land mark in the dip lo matic land scape. For the first time in decades, Rus sia and France found com mon ground in their mu tual con cerns about the rise of Ger many fol low ing the forced re tire ment of Ger man chan cel lor Otto von Bis marck. Bis marck had worked to keep France iso lated while pre serv ing peace between Rus sia and Austria Hungary by bind ing St. Pe ters burg first into tri par tite agree ments with Ber lin and Vienna and then into the bi lat eral Re in su rance Treaty.11 In 1890, how ever, Kai ser Wil helm II de cided to let lapse the Re in su rance Treaty between Rus sia and Ger many. Wil helm was sure that auto cratic Rus sia and re pub li can France could never put aside their ideo log i cal dif fer ences to breach Paris’s iso la tion. With fi nan cial links al ready grow ing after Bis marck closed the Ber lin bond mar kets to Rus sian needs, the end of the agree ment between Ber lin and St. Pe ters burg encour aged Rus sia to turn to Paris as a stra te gic part ner, lest Rus sia find it self iso lated as well by the in creas ingly pow er ful Ger man Em pire. A po lit i cal agree ment in 1891 was fol lowed by a mil i tary al li ance, rat ified by 1894, which pledged the two pow ers to mu tual aid in case of an at tack by Ger many or by an other rival with Germany’s sup port. Given the French ri valry with Great Brit ain in Af rica and the Rus sian chal lenge to Brit ain in Asia, the al li ance took on an antiBritish tinge as well for ap prox i mately a decade. Ten sion with Great Brit ain, how ever, sub sided as first Paris and then St. Pe ters burg de cided to solve their co lo nial con flicts with Lon don via en tentes in 1904 and 1907.12 Grow ing con cern over Ger man in ten tions acted to con cen trate the at ten tion of the En tente pow ers on af fairs in Eu rope.

The first decade of FrancoRussian coop er a tion was not free from dif fi cul ties, of course. For ex am ple, Paris’s low level of sup port for St. Pe ters burg dur ing the RussianJapanese War of 1904–5 deeply dis appointed the Rus sians. Nev er the less, France ul ti mately of fered Rus sia loans that al lowed it to sur vive both the se vere losses it suf fered dur ing the war in Asia and the rev o lu tion be gin ning in Jan u ary 1905, which un set tled both city and coun try side.


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In the wake of tsar ist losses dur ing the RussianJapanese War, the Rev o lu tion of 1905 and the en su ing govern men tal re form, the new Rus sian pre mier, Pyotr A. Stol y pin, rose to power as Russia’s first Westernstyle prime min is ter. He pro vided some co or di na tion among the Rus sian min is ters who typ i cally com peted for in flu ence on the tsar, and dom i nated the foreign pol icy of Rus sia over the years 1907 to 1911.13 Stol y pin sought to avoid any dip lo matic ad ven ture that might threaten war, given how weak Rus sia had be come and how slowly recon struc tion and re ar ma ment were pro gress ing. Tal ented and well connected but ego tis ti cal to a fault, foreign min is ter Alek sandr P. Iz vols kii fol lowed this line at first. In 1908, how ever, Russia’s Bal kan rival, the AustroHungarian Em pire, began build ing a rail way through Ot toman do min ions in the Bal kans to con nect Aus trian pos ses sions with the Ae gean port of Sal o nika and ap peared ready to push their in fluence fur ther into the heart of the Bal kan Pe nin sula by fi nally an nex ing the Ot to man prov inces of Bos nia and Her zeg o vina, ad min is tered by Vienna since 1878. As these moves vi o lated decadesold under stand ings, Iz vols kii thought that an op por tu nity had arisen to ad vance Rus sian inter ests at the straits though an agree ment with Vienna.14 Iz vols kii and the Aus trian foreign min is ter, Alois Lexa von Aeh ren thal, met quietly in Sep tem ber 1908 at the latter’s es tate, and as far as Iz vols kii later claimed to under stand, the two had agreed that Rus sia would ac cept Aus trian an nex a tion of BosniaHerzegovina in re turn for Aus trian sup port for an al ter a tion of the re gime at the straits in Russia’s favor. How ever, be fore Iz vols kii could gain the ac cep tance of the other great pow ers for such a change at the straits, Aus tria de clared the an nex a tion in Oc to ber 1908, leav ing Iz vols kii ex posed. When Rus sia tried to re sist Vienna’s move, Ber lin threat ened St. Pe ters burg with an ul ti ma tum, forc ing Rus sia to back down and fur ther lose pres tige and in flu ence in the re gion.

The Bos nian cri sis spelled the end of Izvolskii’s min is try. Once the cri sis had passed, Stol y pin ar ranged for Izvolskii’s re moval from his mini ste rial post. Izvolskii’s dis mis sal could not hap pen im me di ately in order to save face, so his de par ture awaited the open ing of an ap pro priate am bas sa do rial post. Si mul ta ne ously, Stol y pin in stalled as as sist ant foreign min is ter some one he could trust more fully, and who would rise to foreign min is ter once Iz vols kii was gone. That per son was Ser gei D. Saz o nov, Stolypin’s brotherinlaw, with far fewer con nec tions and with out an in de pen dent base in St. Pe ters burg, thus sub ject to Stolypin’s

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in flu ence. Both as as sist ant and, start ing in No vem ber 1910, as full min is ter, Saz o nov toed the line that the prime min is ter set out: an avoidance of foreign ten sion in order to pre serve the peace that Rus sia needed to con tinue its re build ing. In deed, an ex am ina tion of Sazonov’s ten ure through the out break of the world war, even after Stolypin’s as sas si nation in Sep tem ber 1911, re veals that he as sid u ously sought to pre vent dis cus sion of the Turk ish Straits when ever a cri sis around the Ot to man Em pire emerged. Rus sia was at the time too weak to en sure that an al tera tion in the straits re gime would occur along lines that Rus sia de sired, so Saz o nov sought to pre vent any change until Rus sia was strong again.15

Yet while not at this point seek ing a change at the straits, Rus sia did at tempt to in flu ence the Ot to man Em pire on a couple of oc ca sions be tween 1912 and 1914, as dip lo matic ten sions in creased across Eu rope. In try ing to de fend its inter ests, Rus sia sought the coop er a tion of France, be cause Rus sian pres sure alone rarely suc ceeded in per suad ing the Porte to change pol icy. France, with its sig nifi cant in vest ment in the Ot to man econ omy, pos sessed lev ers of in flu ence that Rus sia did not have, and St. Pe ters burg hoped its ally would as sist in pres sur ing the Porte to change its ways. Paris, how ever, was rarely will ing to do so.

The Bal kan Wars of 1912–13 ex posed the first rift within the Franco Russian Al li ance over Ot to man af fairs. Dur ing the First Bal kan War, Mon te ne gro, Ser bia, Bul garia, and Greece at tacked Ot to man forces, seek ing to push the Ot to man Em pire out of the Bal kan Pe nin sula.16 In this con flict, the Bul gar ian army met un an tic i pated suc cess against Ot to man forces. Their vic tory was be com ing so com plete by late Oc tober 1912 and again in March 1913 that the Rus sian govern ment grew very con cerned that the Bul gar ians might seize Con stan tin o ple. This pos sibil ity the Rus sians could not allow, as inter ested as they were in pre vent ing any state but the Ot to man Em pire or their own from control ling the Turk ish Straits and in al low ing no other leader but the tsar the honor of bring ing Con stan tin o ple back under Chris tian rule. St. Pe ters burg thus sought any en tice ment it could find to hold back the Bul gar ians. One tack the Rus sians took in the spring of 1913 to per suade Sofia to keep its forces out of the Ot to man cap i tal was to gain the great powers’ ac cep tance of an Ot to man in dem nity for Bul garia. In mid March 1913, Bul gar ian en voys had re quested sup port from St. Pe tersburg for a re vi sion of the BulgarianOttoman bor der along with an in dem nity, a typ i cal levy forced on a los ing power.17 Foreign Min is ter Saz o nov hoped that once the pow ers prom ised such com pen sa tion to Sofia, Bul garia would ac cept an ar mis tice and re lin quish the in ten tion


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of at tack ing Con stan tin o ple. Al though the re vised bor der line through Thrace had re ceived easy ap proval, France in par tic u lar re acted hos tilely to the in dem nity.

Al ready afraid that these new changes to the ar range ments of the Am bas sa do rial Con fer ence of the great pow ers in Lon don would lead Vienna to put for ward de mands serv ing its own inter ests, Paris felt that such an ad di tion to the Ot to man Empire’s fi nan cial bur den di rectly af fected France’s own inter ests in the Ot to man Em pire.18 France car ried 45 per cent of the Ot to man debt and had huge cap i tal in vest ments there, so the French par tic u larly feared the Ot to man Em pire going bank rupt under an added bur den.19 The French fur ther more pos ited that other pow ers, es pe cially Ger many, would surely re sist if an in dem nity were im posed on the Ot to mans. French dip lo mats argued that the Ger mans would make use of this pres sure to present it self as a bet ter friend of the Sub lime Porte.20 As much as Saz o nov in sisted on meet ing the Bul gar ians on this issue, the French would only agree to allow the com mis sion in Paris in charge of the Ot to man debt to ex am ine the issue after the war.

In late March 1913, Rus sia pon dered the mer its of a uni lat eral dispatch of a flo tilla to the Bos porus, ready to de ploy to Con stan tin o ple if Ot to man power in the cap i tal should col lapse. While the Brit ish government im pli citly opened the door to what ever ac tion the Rus sians thought nec es sary, the French were pan icked by the thought of such a Rus sian coup.21 The French were sus pi cious of what Rus sia might do once it was in ac tual pos ses sion of the Ot to man cap i tal and how that might af fect the French po si tion there. The French am bas sa dor to Lon don, Paul Cam bon, strongly op posed al low ing Rus sia to act in a way that would leave it in con trol of Con stan tin o ple. In March he spoke of an inter na tional force to oc cupy Con stan tin o ple to avoid a uni lat eral Russian oc cu pa tion, and then he de rided H. H. As quith, the Brit ish prime min is ter, and An drew Bonar Law, the op po si tion leader, who op posed the ambassador’s sug ges tions, as “being led astray by their clas si cal mem o ries” when they re sisted pro tect ing the Ot to mans in a way that was rem i nis cent of Disraeli’s pol i cies.22 At the be gin ning of April, Cam bon told the Brit ish foreign sec re tary, Sir Ed ward Grey, that “Rus sia could not be left to go to Con stan tin o ple alone.”23 In deed, the French may not have hid den their con cerns about Rus sian de signs on Con stan tin o ple from St. Pe ters burg. As early as No vem ber 1912, Saz o nov com plained to Iz vols kii, then the Rus sian am bas sa dor to Paris, of his sus pi cions that the French were try ing to en cour age the Bul gar ians to take the city.24

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In the Sec ond Bal kan War, the Rus sians again turned to the French for help, but now in op po si tion to the Ot to mans, who had joined Bulgaria’s erst while al lies in a re di vi sion of the spoils of the war. It ap peared dur ing the sum mer of 1913 that the Ot to mans might be able to re con quer lands pre dom i nantly pop u lated by Chris tians, a turn of events that above all the Rus sians were un will ing to coun te nance. While it is un clear who sug gested it, Saz o nov fas tened onto the idea of a great power fi nan cial boy cott of the Ot to man Em pire that would force it to coop er ate with the pow ers. France was the only power to op pose this strat egy.

Paris and St. Pe ters burg be came the poles of a de bate over such a boy cott.25 The French in sisted that Ot to man debt was a Eu ro pean concern, and Paris could not act with out coop er a tion from the other pow ers with in vest ments and inter ests in the em pire. Cam bon ob served in late July 1913 that “the Eu ro pean fi nan cial world would not per mit the govern ments to drive Tur key to bank ruptcy.”26 The French pointed to fears that if they acted uni lat er ally, other na tions, es pe cially Ger many, might fill the gap left by the French. Paris first tried to sug gest that contracts were pri vate, so the French govern ment could not inter fere.27 The French then claimed that even if they were to seek ap proval of the coun cil in charge of the Régie des Ta bacs, the Ger mans and the Aus trians on the coun cil would never go along with such a step.28

Saz o nov coun tered these strokes as they ar rived. His own ad vis ors had ex am ined the pos sibil ity of oth ers profi t ing at France’s ex pense and de nied that ei ther minor pow ers or the United States would take ad van tage of the French with drawal. The Ger mans them selves in di cated that Ber lin was pre pared to join a boy cott.29 As to the lack of coop er a tion by the Ger manic pow ers on the coun cil, both the Aus trian and the Ger man am bas sa dors in St. Pe ters burg told Saz o nov that France dom inated the com mit tee, and Vienna and Ber lin would be will ing to act on the coun cil in a man ner com pat ible with Sazonov’s sug ges tions.30 This FrancoRussian spar over the boy cott re veals that France, via its many ex cuses and claims, was the real ob sta cle to Rus sian at tempts to in flu ence the Ot to mans. More over, the dis pute shows that the Cen tral Pow ers had some suc cess at using this issue to drive a wedge between the two al lies.31 Ul ti mately, the French dragged their heels long enough to under mine Rus sian at tempts at em ploy ing such a means against Con stan tin o ple.

An other ex am ple of FrancoRussian dis agree ment re lates to the grow ing naval race between Rus sia and the Ot to man Em pire on the


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Black Sea.32 After the Young Turk coup in Con stan tin o ple in 1908, the Ot to man govern ment ap plied it self more se ri ously to the task of improv ing its armed forces. For the navy, this meant the ac qui si tion of mod ern war ships, in clud ing the new dreadnoughtclass bat tle ships, intro duced by the Brit ish in 1906 as a quan tum ad vance in fire power, armor, and speed. Every thing else afloat was ob so lete in com par i son, or so it seemed at the time. The Ot to mans did not try to build such boats them selves but in stead sought them abroad, ei ther by or der ing their own built from scratch or by pur chas ing those al ready under con struction for other states. Such boats could then be sailed by the Ot to mans into the Black Sea. Both the Rus sian navy and the Rus sian Foreign Min is try feared such a de vel op ment, be cause the Rus sians could only build com pen sat ing dread noughts in their Black Sea ship yards.33 The rel e vant inter na tional agree ments still pro hib ited other states from sail ing war ships through the Turk ish Straits, thus pre vent ing St. Pe tersburg from adopt ing the same pur chas ing strat egy as Con stan tin o ple. While the Rus sians tried to com pen sate by im prov ing their Black Sea ship yards and plow ing money into new con struc tion, such a method prom ised no re sults be fore the Ot to mans could put their own boats in the Black Sea. There fore, the Rus sians also tried to deny the Ot to mans the boats that they sought. On the one hand, they sought coop er a tion from the Brit ish in slow ing the com ple tion of the ships under con struction in Brit ain. Lon don of fi cially de murred but was able to slow the com ple tion of two dread noughts nearly fin ished so that at the start of the war they were still in the ship yards and se ques tered by the Royal Navy.34 Less suc cess fully, Saz o nov com plained about con tin u ing French loans to the Ot to mans. He claimed that this money was fa cil i tat ing the new Ot to man ac qui si tions. The French de nied that these trans ac tions were hav ing an ef fect, short sight edly not ing that the Ot to man Em pire had to use their first tranche to pay off their debt from the Bal kan Wars, while the sec ond tranche would de pend on the main te nance of the peace.35 The French were also con vinced that if they held their funds back, the Ger mans would step in to fill the Ottomans’ needs, thereby gain ing even more in flu ence over the Porte.36 Saz o nov had never succeeded in ob tain ing French fi nan cial sup port for his ex ter nal pol i cies to ward the Ot to man Em pire, and this case was no ex cep tion.

Once the First World War had begun and the Ot to man Em pire had en tered the con flict at the end of Oc to ber 1914, the focus of Rus sian pol icy moved from pres sure to par ti tion. With war under way, the Sto ly pi nesque cau tion could be put de fin i tively aside. It had long been

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the re li gious dream of the Rus sians to put the cross back on top of the Hagia So phia in Con stan tin o ple, but the sec u lar goal of con trol over the Turk ish Straits that would en sure the eco nomic and mil i tary se cur ity of Rus sia had grown in im por tance through the long nine teenth cen tury. For those in Rus sia who cared about war aims, no prize was more attrac tive. For Foreign Min is ter Saz o nov, sei zure of this ter ri tory was to hap pen “now or never.”37 By March 1915, with the AngloFrench op er ation at the Dar da nelles (and ul ti mately Gal lip oli) under way, Saz o nov put forth Rus sian claims. The Rus sians sought both Con stan tin o ple and nearly the whole of the straits for them selves. Pet ro grad (as St. Pe tersburg was now known) ex pected the Brit ish to re sist, still be liev ing that Lon don was com mit ted to keep ing the Rus sians out of the east ern Med i ter ra nean Sea in the tra di tion of the great foreign sec re tar ies Palmers ton and Sa lis bury. The talk in the foreign min is try was that they would need French help to per suade Great Brit ain to change its pol icy.38 More than a decade ear lier, how ever, the Brit ish had al ready de cided that they no longer needed the straits closed to main tain the se cur ity of the Suez Canal and other Brit ish inter ests in the re gion. They there fore quickly in formed Pet ro grad of their as sent to the Rus sian claim, re quiring only that Rus sia coop er ate with the as yet un de ter mined Brit ish claims in the rest of the Ot to man Em pire and as sum ing that the war was seen through to vic tory.39

In stead, the real trou ble came from the French. Paris was very concerned about the im pact of an ex ten sion of Rus sian power on its economic inter ests in the Ot to man cap i tal and hin ter land. Paris also feared that Rus sian con trol of the straits would allow the pro jec tion of Rus sian naval power into the east ern Med i ter ra nean, a re gion in which the French too had spe cial inter ests. Privy to the de tails of Rus sian naval plan ning be fore the war, the French knew that the Rus sians pos sessed plans for a bluewater navy. Such a fleet, able to shel ter in Rus sian Black Sea ports or Con stan tin o ple, could fun da men tally alter the bal ance of power in the re gion. So con cerned was Paris about this pos sible shift that Ray mond Poin caré, the French pres i dent, wrote an un usual, di rect let ter to the French am bas sa dor in which he said,

The pos ses sion of Con stan tin o ple and its vi cin ity would not only give Rus sia a sort of priv i lege in the in her i tance of the Ot to man Em pire. It would intro duce her, via the Med i ter ra nean, into the con cert of West ern na tions, and this would give her, via the open sea, the chance to be come a great naval power. Every thing would thus be changed in the Eu ro pean equi lib rium. Such an en large ment and such added strength would only be ac cept able to us if we would our selves


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re ceive the same ben e fits of war. Every thing is thus in ev i ta bly linked. We can agree to the Rus sian de sires only in pro por tion to the satis fac tions that we ourselves re ceive.40

In short, Poin caré argued that Rus sian con trol of the Turk ish Straits would com pletely upset the Eu ro pean bal ance of power, which the French ex pected to dom i nate after the de feat of Ger many. The French thus used var i ous strat a gems to avoid the dis patch of an ac cep tance of the Rus sian de mands. This tem por iz ing frus trated Pet ro grad, and Saz o nov pressed Paris to come in line with the Brit ish.41 Dur ing one ar gu ment with Mau rice Pa léo logue, the French am bas sa dor to the tsar, over the neu tral iza tion of the straits, an ex as per ated Saz o nov threat ened Pa léo logue that if the Rus sian de mands were not ac cepted, he would im me di ately ten der his res ig na tion to Nich o las II. The im plied threat was that the next min is ter might not have the com mit ment to the uni fied war ef fort that Saz o nov pos sessed and thus could be more re cep tive to a separatepeace pro po sal by the Cen tral Pow ers.42 Al most two weeks later, Saz o nov told the Brit ish am bas sa dor, Sir George Bu cha nan, that the line of Paléologue’s nego ti a tion “had made a very bad im pres sion and a com par i son was being drawn between the man ner in which the French and Brit ish Govts. [sic] treated var i ous ques tions con nected with Con stan tin o ple and the Straits, much to the dis ad van tage of the former.”43 By the end of the first week of April, fear ing that fur ther delay might cause Saz o nov to make good his threat, the French ap proved the Rus sian meas ure.44 With Paris’s ac quies cence, Rus sia at last stood on the verge of re al iz ing its ep o chal as pi ra tion: Rus sian pos ses sion of Constan tin o ple and the straits with Eu ro pean sup port. The dream would be come re al ity once the En tente pow ers had won the war. How ever, vic tory was not yet in their grasp, as the fight ing and the dip lo matic wran gling con tin ued.

These prom ises given by the Brit ish and the French were pred i cated on Rus sia ac cept ing Al lied de sires else where in the Ot to man Em pire. Lon don, es pe cially, began to sort out ex actly what it de sired in the lands south of An a to lia. Here Brit ish and French inter ests more di rectly clashed. In the south west, the Brit ish sought to pro vide the great est pos sible buf fer for the de fense of the Suez Canal, while the French sought to claim con trol over a “Syria” that Paris de fined as reach ing all the way through Pal es tine to the edge of the Sinai Pe nin sula. In the east, there was dis agree ment over who would get north ern Mesopo ta mian areas, such as Mosul.45 The res o lu tion of the lat ter con cerns was in the

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end left to Sir Mark Sykes and François GeorgesPicot, En glish and French dip lo mats with ex pe ri ence in the Mid dle East. Be fore these his toric ex changes took place, how ever, the FrancoRussian ar gu ment over Pal es tine pre sented an other ran cor ous de bate over the post Ottoman fu ture.

From the first dis cus sions with the Rus sians in the fall of 1914 through the tense nego ti a tions over the Rus sian de mands in March 1915, Paris sought to steal a march on Lon don, by try ing to con vince Pet ro grad to side with France on its ob jec tives. In midNovember 1914, in the con text of pre lim i nary dis cus sions about war aims soon after the Ot to man Em pire had en tered the war, Pa léo logue used the oc ca sion to de scribe to the tsar French inter ests in gen eral by re fer ring to France’s long inter est in Syria and Pal es tine. The am bas sa dor asked Nich o las II if he would op pose France tak ing the meas ures it be lieved nec es sary to pro tect its “pa tri mony” in the re gion. He re ceived a la conic “cer tainly not” in reply.46 Théo phile Del cassé, the French foreign min is ter, echoed his am bas sa dor in Jan u ary 1915, when he too re ferred to French inter ests in those two re gions, though he con ceded that no one Eu ro pean power could con trol Pal es tine alone.47

Pa léo logue re turned to the theme dur ing the March 1915 nego ti ations over the straits with the Rus sian Foreign Min is try and the tsar. On his way to see Nich o las, Pa léo logue told the as sist ant foreign min is ter that he be lieved Syria in cluded Pal es tine, but the of fi cial re fused to ac cept the claim.48 The am bas sa dor said the same to the tsar, in sist ing that Syria’s bor der stretched to the Egyp tian fron tier, thus in clud ing Pal es tine, in which rel e vant nineteenthcentury stat utes would pro tect the holy places. He also put for ward spe cific lines of ter ri tory to in clude Cil i cia in the north. Af ter ward, Pa léo logue met with Saz o nov to seek Russia’s ac cep tance of French pos ses sion of Cil i cia and a Syria that in cluded Pal es tine. While the tsar re mained non com mit tal, Saz o nov re fused to allow any thought of an other Chris tian power hav ing full con trol over the holy sites, even mak ing a veiled threat by re fer ring to past con flicts, tell ing the am bas sa dor: “You know how Rus sian opin ion is sen si tive to re li gious ques tions. Re mem ber that the Cri mean War had its or i gin in the ar gu ment over the holy places.”49 Saz o nov was so disturbed that he wrote his own am bas sa dor in Paris to learn whether the French govern ment really felt the way Pa léo logue im plied.50 Iz vols kii re plied that Del cassé thought that France might seek some spe cific parts of Pal es tine but that as Saz o nov sug gested, se ri ous dis cus sion was still re quired re gard ing the holy places.51


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In deed, con cerned as the Brit ish and the French were about the possibil ity of a Rus sian sep ar ate peace with Ger many, Sazonov’s ref er ence to the Cri mean War must have been es pe cially alarm ing. If the French were try ing to present a fait ac com pli to the Brit ish, they ut terly failed given this Rus sian re sis tance and the fact that the Rus sians in formed the Brit ish of Paléologue’s prop o si tion. The Rus sians them selves suggested inter na tion al iza tion of the holy places to the Brit ish, the so lu tion even tu ally adopted by the SykesPicot Agree ment.52 Even in these early nego ti a tions about the post war dis po si tion of Ot to man ter ri to ries, the dif fer ences between Rus sia and France were clear. That Saz o nov should es ca late to threats so quickly in di cates how se ri ously the Rus sian government took these ques tions, now that the whole of the Ot to man corpse ap peared ready for dis mem ber ment. France fur ther more ap pears to have tried to sep ar ate Rus sia from Great Brit ain dur ing the March negoti a tions over the straits, per haps in an ef fort to strengthen its play for Pal es tine. Early in March 1915, Del cassé led Iz vols kii to be lieve that the key to re solv ing the straits ques tion lay in Lon don and that while Del cassé would do all he could to meet Russia’s wishes, the Brit ish Cab i net stood op posed.53 In fur ther con ver sa tion, Del cassé, try ing to con vince Iz vols kii that the straits would need to re main un for tified, noted that Russia’s es tab lish ment on the Asiatic coast of the straits “de pend[ed] on the res o lu tion of yet an other ques tion, the ques tion of the par ti tion of the Asian pos ses sions of Tur key.”54 Del cassé per haps hoped that were Pet ro grad to be lieve that the French were being more coop er a tive than the Brit ish, the tsar might ac cept the French de sires in Pal es tine. The Rus sians, under lit tle il lu sion about the real ob sta cle—the French—re mained un sym pa thetic to Paris’s views. The Rus sian po si tion was help ful to the Brit ish, who them selves were think ing about the post war Mid dle East. The Brit ish ap pear to have ex pected Anglo French ri valry to re emerge after the war and so thought about lim it ing French ter ri to rial gains in the Mid dle East and at the same time pro tecting their stra te gic po si tion in the east ern Med i ter ra nean.55 Early Brit ish dis cus sions in fact con sid ered seiz ing the whole coast from Egypt to Alex an dretta, just south of mod ern Tur key, but the pol i ti cians understood that this was po lit i cally im pos sible. Keep ing Pal es tine out of French hands, how ever, came to as sume in creas ing stra te gic sig nifi cance, and the Rus sian at ti tude made that easier.

Inter est ingly, in late March 1916, as the nego ti a tions in Pet ro grad over changes to the SykesPicot Agree ment in itialed in Lon don were con clud ing, Pa léo logue again sought Sazonov’s ac cep tance of a French

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Pal es tine, with the pro viso that the holy sites would have an inter national re gime. Under those circum stances, Saz o nov was will ing to sup port the change if France could get Brit ish ap proval. This how ever was a non starter, as Saz o nov likely ex pected, and inter na tion al iza tion re mained the plan. The archives have still not clar ified if this was an in de pen dent at tempt on Paléologue’s part or some thing sug gested by Paris, but ei ther way it could only have fur ther raised sus pi cions about the French.56

As for the ar range ment of ter ri tory in the east ern Ot to man Em pire, the Rus sians had a po si tion to stake out here too, but these talks progressed with some, if less, con flict. In ap prox i mately six weeks in late 1915, Brit ish and French dip lo mats, led by Sir Mark Sykes, who had been Lord Kitchener’s man on the com mit tee that had done pre lim inary work on Brit ish inter ests in the re gion, and the Englishspeaking François GeorgesPicot, briefly consulgeneral in Bei rut, ham mered out the agree ment that was to carry their names.57 Ac cord ing to the agreement in itialed on 3 Jan u ary 1916, France and Great Brit ain both gained areas that they would di rectly con trol (for France this was a cres cent from north ern Gal i lee through Leb a non and the Syr ian coast, through Cil i cia to the Per sian bor der; for Brit ain this was cen tral and south ern Mesopo ta mia and the north ern coast of Ara bia with the port of Haifa to serve as a rail head and naval sta tion).58 The two coun tries then were to have zones of in flu ence over north ern parts of the fore cast Arab state, the leg en dary zones A and B. Cen tral Pal es tine, con tain ing the holy sites, was to be under inter na tional ad min is tra tion.

Once they had ac com plished this draft par ti tion, the two men brought the doc u ment to Rus sia for ap proval. The changes that the Rus sians made give us a bet ter sense of Petrograd’s con cerns at the time. The pri mary change that Saz o nov ef fected was to ex change ter ritory with France. While France sought a band of ter ri tory that would run all the way to the Per sian bor der, leav ing all of Ar me nia to the Rus sians, Pet ro grad in sisted on tak ing that French ter ri tory along the Per sian bor der and in north ern Kur di stan in ex change for west ern Ar me nia. On see ing the draft for the first time, Saz o nov man i fested ex treme sur prise, say ing that he had “never fore seen the es tab lish ment of France on the fron tiers of Per sia.”59 In April and May 1916, France and Great Brit ain ac cepted the Rus sian changes, and the agree ment as a whole was rat ified in Oc to ber 1916. Clearly, Rus sian se cur ity was par amount in Petrograd’s de ci sions. On top of the in sis tence on full pos session of the straits with the abil ity to for tify them, Rus sia kept France


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far ther from the bor ders of the Rus sian Em pire as well as mostly from Per sia, in the north ern part of which Rus sia was in creas ingly in fluen tial.

Sub or di nated to tak ing con trol of the straits re gion and pre vent ing France from ap proach ing Russiandominated bor der lands was the fate of the Ar me ni ans.60 While Sazonov’s in itial re ac tion to see ing the draft doc u ment in cluded con cern about the treat ment of the Ar me ni ans, and the tsar said some thing sim i lar a couple of days later, this may have been just a ploy to buy time for the Rus sians to de lib er ate over the pro po sal.61 In March 1915, Nich o las II had told Pa léo logue that he won dered if it would not be pos sible to guar an tee auton omy for the Ar me ni ans under the nom i nal sov e reignty of the Ot to mans, and al most ex actly a year later, the tsar told the am bas sa dor that he had never dreamed of conquer ing Ar me nia, save for stra te gic areas such as Er zerum and Treb izond.62 In a meet ing on the sub ject with the rel e vant min is ters, Saz o nov ex plained that such a di vi sion was war ranted based on the to pog ra phy and re li gious dif fer ences among the Ar me ni ans in the re gion.63 Re ynolds argues, fur ther more, that Sykes also sup ported such a re dis tri bu tion of the Ar me nian lands by sug gest ing that this ar range ment would put the cen ter of grav ity of Ar me nian na tion al ism in the French areas and that the ter ri tory Rus sia would take had in fact been largely stripped of its Ar me nian pop u la tion by Ot to man ac tions and dis ease.64 In the end, the Rus sians pre ferred split ting Ar me nia between them selves and the French in order to take as much of the French zone along the Per sian bor der as pos sible, keep ing a major Eu ro pean power far ther from Rus sia it self.

This essay re veals the high level of ten sion that ex isted within the FrancoRussian Al li ance, both in peace time and in war. The East ern Ques tion was cen tral to those ten sions, ob scured until now by foci on the other al lies and top ics of greater con cern to them. Nev er the less, di ver gent inter ests in the Ot to man Em pire pre sented here were not enough to de stroy the al li ance, even as the Ger mans of fered coop er a tion in Sazonov’s de sired fi nan cial boy cott of the Ot to man Em pire in 1913 and dur ing the world war dan gled a prom ise of Con stan tin o ple be fore Rus sia to lure it away. The tsar and his foreign min is ter re mained faithful to their ally and do not ap pear ever to have given se ri ous thought to a sep ar ate peace. While frus tra tion was com mon for St. Pe ters burg be fore the war, one won ders whether the Rus sians were not just tre men dously suc cess ful in suc ces sive games of chicken with the French and the Brit ish dur ing the war, and had the Brit ish foreign sec re tary or French foreign min is ter been more stub born whether Saz o nov might have

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made con ces sions. Re gard ing the straits, at least, that is doubt ful, given Sazonov’s be lief that this was Russia’s one real chance to seize them. In the other areas, it is less clear that Rus sian dip lo mats did not sim ply out last al lied nego tia tors. Rus sia made the most of its strong nego tiat ing po si tion to pro tect its inter ests dur ing the war, which, bigger fail ings aside, re flects well on Russia’s war time di plo macy. Russia’s suc cess dur ing the war, in contrast with its reg u lar frus tra tion in its deal ings with France be fore the war, speaks to its bet ter bar gain ing po si tion once the French were de pen dent on the Rus sian war ef fort for their na tional sur vi val. Though ten sion grew over the last years be fore the out break of war in 1914, the stakes were not yet high enough for Paris to sac ri fice cen tral inter ests. After 1914, with Ger many in oc cu pa tion of an im portant swathe of French ter ri tory, the sit u a tion had changed.

Over all, these cases also make clear what the French and Rus sian govern ments felt to be core stra te gic inter ests. For France, its fi nan cial and eco nomic po si tion in the Ot to man Em pire was cru cial. Govern ment, en ter prises, and in di vid u als were well in vested in the east ern em pire, and Paris sought to en sure the se cur ity of this im por tant in come and in flu ence. Im pli citly be fore the war, then ex pli citly from 1914 on ward, France also was inter ested in the fate of the phys i cal Ot to man ter ri to ries, not just for their fi nan cial value but also for their util ity in ex tend ing French in flu ence as it ex pected to re as sume the role of pre dom i nant Eu ro pean power. The Rus sians, too, were inter ested in im pe rial ex pansion, with at ten tion al ways cen tered on the Turk ish Straits. Gain ing this exit to the open seas seemed to prom ise eco nomic se cur ity as well as mil i tary ad van tage. Fur ther more, Rus sia de sired nei ther to have France too close to the Cau ca sian bor der lands nor to allow it sub stan tive ac cess to Per sia, where Rus sia was try ing to de velop its in flu ence, and this in flu ence trumped its pur ported con cern for its fel low Chris tians, the Ar me ni ans. This sug gests that had the al li ance suc ceeded in its pri mary ob jec tive of re sist ing and de feat ing the Ger mans, it would not have lasted long into the post war pe riod, as the di ver gent inter ests of the two em pires drew Paris and Pet ro grad into a ri valry that only war time ne ces sity kept at bay. Thus re gard less of the Bolshe vik rev o lu tion, the strug gle over the fate of Ot to man do mains was des tined to con tinue well into the twen ti eth cen tury.

Notes

Re search for this paper was funded in part by a grant from the Inter na tional Re search and Ex changes Board (IREX), with funds pro vided by the Na tional


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Endow ment for the Hu man ities and the US De part ment of State. Fund ing for re search was also pro vided by the fol low ing di vi sions of Duke Uni ver sity: the Grad u ate School, the His tory De part ment, the Cen ter for Slavic, Eur asian, and East Eu ro pean Stud ies, and the Cen ter for Inter na tional Stud ies; and of Wake For est Uni ver sity: the Grif fin Fund of the His tory De part ment and the Archie Fund for Arts and Hu man ities. The au thor also thanks the ed i tors of the vol ume, Mara Ko zel sky and Lu cien J. Frary, as well as par tic i pants in a ses sion on this vol ume at the 2012 meet ing of the ASEEES, for their help ful sug ges tions.

Dates in this paper fol low the Gre go rian cal en dar, not the Ju lian cal en dar still in use in Rus sia at the time.

1. See most not ably, George F. Ken nan, The Fate ful Al li ance (New York: Pantheon, 1984); I. S. Ry bach e nok, Soiuz s Frant siei vo vnesh nei pol i tike Ros sii v kontse XIX v. (Mos cow: In sti tut is to rii SSSR AN SSSR, 1993); Anne Hogenhuis Seliverstoff, Une Al li ance Franco-Russe (Brus sels: Bruy lant, 1997); William L. Langer, The Franco-Russian Al li ance, 1890–1894 (Cam bridge, MA: Har vard Uni ver sity Press, 1929); and Boris Nolde, L’alliance franco-russe: Les or i gines du systeme di plom a tique d’avant-guerre (Paris: Droz, 1936). But see also Georges Michon, L’alliance franco-russe, 1891–1917 (Paris: Del peuch, 1927) for a longer view.

2. See, for ex am ple, Die trich Geyer, Rus sian Im pe ri al ism (New Haven, CT: Yale Uni ver sity Press, 1987); John P. Son tag, “Tsar ist Debts and Tsar ist Foreign Pol icy,” Slavic Re view 27 (1968): 529–41; and D. W. Spring, “Rus sia and the FrancoRussian Al li ance, 1905–14,” Sla vonic and East Eu ro pean Re view 66 (1988): 562–92.

3. On the war in gen eral, see, for ex am ple, David Ste ven son, The First World War and Inter na tional Pol i tics (Ox ford: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 1988); V. A. Emets, Ocherki vnesh nei pol i tiki Ros sii v pe riod per voi mi ro voi voiny: Vzai moot no-she niia Ros sii s soiuz ni kami po vop ro sam ve de niia voiny (Mos cow: Nauka, 1977); Z. A. B. Zeman, A Dip lo matic His tory of the First World War (Lon don: Wei den feld and Nic ol son, 1971); W. W. Gott lieb, Stud ies in Se cret Di plo macy dur ing the First World War (Lon don: George Allen and Unwin, 1957).

4. Geof frey Miller, Straits: Brit ish Pol icy to wards the Ot to man Em pire and the Or i gins of the Dar da nelles Cam paign (Hull: Uni ver sity of Hull Press, 1997); Zara S. Steiner and Keith Neil son, Brit ain and the Or i gins of the First World War, 2nd ed. (New York: Pal grave Mac mil lan, 2003).

5. See, for ex am ple, F. W. Brecher, “French Pol icy to ward the Le vant 1914–18,” Mid dle East ern Stud ies 29, no. 4 (Oc to ber 1993): 641–63; Ste ven son, First World War and Inter na tional Pol i tics,130; Emets, Ocherki, 148; A. V. Ignat’ev, ed., Is to riia vnesh nei pol i tiki Ros sii: Ko nets XIX–na chalo XX veka (Mos cow: Mezh duna rod nye ot no she niia, 1997), 523–24; and Ed ward Peter Fitz ge rald, “France’s Mid dle East ern Am bi tions, the SykesPicot Nego ti a tions, and the Oil Fields of Mosul, 1915–1918,” Jour nal of Mod ern His tory 66, no. 4 (1994): 697–725. Ex ceptions are Dmi tri L. Sheve lev, “K is to rii zak liu che niia sog la she niia o raz dele az i ats kikh ter ri to rii os mans koi im pe rii 1916 g.,” Vos tok 5 (2001): 39–43; Mi chael

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A. Re ynolds, Shat ter ing Em pires: The Clash and Col lapse of the Ot to man and Rus-sian Em pires, 1908–1918 (Cam bridge: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 2011), 140–41; and es pe cially Sean McMee kin, The Rus sian Or i gins of the First World War (Cambridge, MA: Har vard Uni ver sity Press, 2011), 194–213.

6. Re ynolds, Shat ter ing Em pires; and McMee kin, Rus sian Or i gins.7. McMee kin, Rus sian Or i gins, 11.8. Zara Steiner, “On Writ ing Inter na tional His tory: Chaps, Maps and Much

More,” Inter na tional Af fairs 73, no. 3 ( July 1997): 531–46, esp. 533.9. Ibid., 545.10. David M. Gold frank, The Or i gins of the Cri mean War (Lon don: Long man,

1994).11. Jon a than Stein berg, Bis marck: A Life (Ox ford: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press,

2011), 328–29.12. In 1904, the Brit ish and the French reached a set of agree ments that

re solved some of the most intract able co lo nial dis putes that had plagued the two em pires dur ing the nine teenth cen tury. Britain’s in flu ence over Egypt and France’s over Mo rocco were rec og nized. Siam was under stood to be a buf fer between the two em pires in South east Asia. Ca na dian dif fer ences were re solved as well. The Rus sians were less inter ested in an under stand ing until their de feat at the hands of Japan in 1905. After this, with the en cour age ment of the French, the Brit ish and the Rus sians agreed to di vide Per sia into two zones of in flu ence sep ar ated by a neu tral zone, and spe cial Brit ish inter ests in Af ghan i stan and Tibet were rec og nized. On the con clu sion of the en tentes, see Chris to pher An drew, Théo phile Del cassé and the Mak ing of the En tente Cor di ale: A Re ap prai sal of French Foreign Pol icy, 1898–1905 (Lon don: Mac mil lan, 1968); Steiner and Neil son, Brit ain and the Or i gins, 30–32, 84–92; I. V. Bestu zhev, Bor’ba v Ros sii po vop ro sam vnesh nei pol i tiki 1906–1910 (Mos cow: Izdvo AN SSSR, 1961), 127–50; Sam uel R. William son Jr., The Pol i tics of Grand Strat egy: Brit ain and France Pre pare for War, 1904–1914 (Lon don: Ash field, 1990), 1–29; M. B. Hayne, The French Foreign Of fice and the Or i gins of the First World War, 1898–1914 (Ox ford: Cla ren don Press, 1993), chaps. 2–8; and George Mon ger, The End of Iso la tion: Brit ish Foreign Pol icy, 1900–1907 (Lon don: Thomas Nel son, 1963).

13. David Ma cLaren McDo nald, United Govern ment and Foreign Pol icy in Rus sia, 1900–1914 (Cam bridge, MA: Har vard Uni ver sity Press, 1992), 103–26. See also Abra ham As cher, P. A. Stol y pin: The Search for Stabil ity in Late Im pe rial Rus sia (Stan ford, CA: Stan ford Uni ver sity Press, 2001); and Fiona To mas zew ski, A Great Rus sia: Rus sia and the Triple En tente, 1905–1914 (West port, CT: Praeger, 2002).

14. D. C. B. Lie ven, Rus sia and the Or i gins of the First World War (Lon don: Mac mil lan, 1983), 37. On the Bos nian cri sis, see Lie ven, Rus sia, 33–37; David Ste ven son, Ar ma ments and the Com ing of War, Eu rope 1904–1914 (Ox ford: Cla rendon Press, 1996), 112–22; Sam uel R. William son Jr., Austria-Hungary and the Or i gins of the First World War (New York: St. Martin’s, 1991), 69–72; Luigi


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Al ber tini, The Or i gins of the War of 1914, trans. Is a bella M. Mas sey, 3 vols. (Lon don: Ox ford, 1952–57), 2:190–300.

15. See Ro nald P. Bo broff, Roads to Glory: Late Im pe rial Rus sia and the Turk ish Straits (Lon don: I. B. Tau ris, 2006), 19.

16. On Rus sian pol icy to ward the straits dur ing the Bal kan Wars more gen er ally, see Bo broff, “The Bal kan Wars: Choos ing between the Bal kan States and the Straits,” chap. 3 in Roads to Glory. See also Ernst C. Helm reich, The Di plo-macy of the Bal kan Wars, 1912–1913 (Cam bridge, MA: Har vard Uni ver sity Press, 1938); Ed ward C. Tha den, Rus sia and the Bal kan Al li ance of 1912 (Uni ver sity Park: Penn syl va nia State Uni ver sity Press, 1965); Ste ven son, Ar ma ments; Rich ard C. Hall, The Bal kan Wars, 1912–1913 (Lon don: Rout ledge, 2000); and McMee kin, Rus sian Or i gins, 21–27.

17. Saz o nov to Benck en dorff, 22 March 1913, tel. 680, in Der di plom a tis che Schrift wech sel Is wols kis, 1911–1914, aus dem Ge hei mak ten der rus sis chen Staa t ar chiv, ed. Frie drich Stieve (Ber lin: Deuts che Ver lags ge sells chaft für Pol i tik und Ges chichte, 1926) (here after cited as DSI ), 3, no. 783.

18. Iz vols kii to Saz o nov, 31 March 1913, tel. 139, Un Livre Noir: Di plom a tie d’avant guerre d’après les doc u ments des archives russes, no vem bre 1910–juil let, 1914, ed. René Marc hand, 3 vols. (Paris: Lib ra rie du Tra vail, 1922–34) (here after cited as LN ), 2:59.

19. Note de Di rec teur des Af faires pol i tiques (Pa léo logue), 7 April 1913, France, Ministrère des Af faires Etrangères, Doc u ments di plom a tiques français (1871–1914) 2e et 3e série (Paris: Impr. Nation ale, 1929–54) (here after cited as DDF ), 3.6, no. 222.

20. Ibid.21. On the Brit ish side, see Grey to Ber tie, 3 April 1913, ltr. 235, Brit ish Doc u-

ments on the Or i gins of the War 1898–1914, ed. G. P. Gooch and Har old Tem per ley, 11 vols. (Lon don: H. M. Sta tion ary Of fice, 1926–38) [here after cited as BD], 9.2, no. 800; Benck en dorff to Saz o nov, 3 April 1913, tel. 298, RGIA, f. 1276, op. 9, d. 600, l. 6; and Benck en dorff to Saz o nov, 3 April 1913, tel. 301, RGIA, f. 1276, op. 9, d. 600, l. 7.

22. Cam bon to Pichon, 6 April 1913, dep. 197, DDF, 3.6, no. 216.23. Grey to Ber tie, 1 April 1913, ltr. 232, BD, 9.2, no. 783.24. Saz o nov to Iz vols kii, 8 No vem ber 1913, tel. 2502, AVPRI, f. 151, op. 482,

d. 130, l. 110.25. Bo broff, Roads to Glory, 68–70.26. P. Cam bon to Pichon, 21 July 1913, tels. 204, 205, DDF, 3.7, no. 433. See

also P. Cam bon to Pichon, 18 July 1913, tels. 199, 200, DDF, 3.7, no. 412.27. P. Cam bon to Pichon, 24 July 1913, dep. 436, DDF, 3.7, no. 465.28. Iz vols kii to Saz o nov, 12 Au gust 1913, tel. 396, Ma ter i aly po is to rii

franko-russkikh ot no she nii za 1910–1914 gg. (Mos cow: Izd. Na rod nogo ko mis sa ri ata po in os tran nym delam, 1922), 398–99; and LN, 2:120. See also Pichon to Del cassé, 12 Au gust 1913, tel. 860 and 860 bis, DDF, 3.8, no. 13; and the de part men tal

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source for Pichon’s note in Note du Dé parte ment, 11 Au gust 1913, DDF, 3.8, no. 1.

29. Saz o nov to Iz vols kii, 20 Au gust 1913, tel. 2338, LN, 2:136–37 and in correctly num bered as tel. 2238 in Ma ter i aly po is to rii, 410–11. Bro nevs kii to Saz o nov, 11 Au gust 1913, tel. 201, AVPRI, f. 151, op. 482, d. 3715, l. 107. More than a will ing ness to put pres sure on the Ot to mans, with whom the Ger mans were try ing to gain favor, this en thu siasm to coop er ate with St. Pe ters burg is more likely an other case of Ber lin at tempt ing to use the dif fer ences within the Franco Russian Al li ance by sid ing with Rus sia against France, in the hopes of draw ing Rus sia out.

30. Saz o nov to Iz vols kii, 21 Au gust 1913, ltr. 777, in Ma ter i aly po is to rii, 411; and LN, 2:137–38. In contrast, Ger many showed less will ing ness to fol low such a course when speak ing with other pow ers. See Gos chen to Grey, 20 Au gust 1913, disp. 301, BD, 9.2, no. 1248; and Helm reich, Di plo macy of the Bal kan Wars, 401, who does not con sult the Rus sian doc u ment, so misses the dou ble game that the Cen tral Pow ers ap pear to play here, and which Saz o nov de tects, as he notes in this let ter to Iz vols kii.

31. Ber tie to Grey, 26 July 1913, tel. 101, BD, 9.2, no. 1180 and min utes; Saz o nov to Iz vols kii, 1 Au gust 1913, tel. 2194, in Ma ter i aly po is to rii, 396, and LN, 2:116.

32. See K. F. Shat sillo, Russ kii im pe ri a lizm i raz vi tie flota nak a nune per voi mi ro voi voiny (1906–1914) (Mos cow: Nauka, 1968); McMee kin, Rus sian Or i gins, 33–40.

33. McMee kin misses both Navy Min is ter I. K. Grigorovich’s late con version to con cern over the Turk ish buildup and the French fi nan cial role in the Ot to man pur chases of cap i tal ships. McMee kin, Rus sian Or i gins, 34–37; and Bo broff, Roads, 76–95.

34. Benck en dorff to Saz o nov, 12 June 1914, tel. 149, in En tente Di plo macy and the World: Ma trix of the His tory of Eu rope, 1909–1914, ed. G. A. Schreiner (Lon don: Knick er bocker, 1921), no. 853; Miller, Straits, 200–201.

35. Dou mergue to Pa léo logue, 23 April 1914, tels. 193, 194, DDF, 3.10, no. 147.

36. Boppe to Dou mergue, 25 Jan u ary 1914, tels. 56, 57, DDF, 3.9, no. 152.37. G. N. Mik hai lovs kii, Za pi ski: Iz is to rii ros siis kogo vnesh nep o lit i ches kogo

ve domstva, 1914–1920 gg., 2 vols. (Mos cow: Mezh du na rod nye ot no she niia, 1993), 1:87. McMee kin, Rus sian Or i gins, 98–111, glosses over the fact that the Rus sians did not make de mands on the Ot to man Em pire, and Saz o nov tried to keep the Ot to man Em pire out of the war until the Ot to mans ac tu ally en tered the war in Oc to ber 1914. See also, Bo broff, Roads, 96–115. On Ot to man entry, see Re ynolds, Shat ter ing Em pires, 108–14. While McMee kin sug gests that a de sire for cap tur ing the straits de fines vir tu ally every de ci sion any Rus sian leader made in 1914, in clud ing in the July cri sis and the months be fore Ot to man entry, Re ynolds, Shat ter ing Em pires, 115, with more sub tlety, cor rectly notes that the


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Rus sians “who pre ferred to keep the Ot to mans out of the war did so be cause they be lieved that it was more im por tant to con cen trate on de feat ing Ger many, not be cause they lacked am bi tions in the Ot to man lands.”

38. Mik hai lovs kii, Za pi ski, 1:85–88, and Pa léo logue to Del cassé, 4 March 1915, tel. 367, Archives de Ministère des Af faires Etrangères (here after cited as MAE) Paap 211 Del cassé, v. 25, p. 94.

39. Steiner and Neil son, Brit ain and the Or i gins, 87; Mar ian Kent, “Con stantin o ple and Asiatic Tur key, 1905–1914,” in Brit ish Foreign Pol icy under Sir Ed ward Grey, ed. F. H. Hin sley (Cam bridge: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 1977), 156; Miller, Straits, 11; and Mon ger, End of Iso la tion, 116–17. McMee kin, Rus sian Or i gins, 120–31, misses this ear lier con ver sion of the Brit ish and spends much more time dis cuss ing London’s part in this than in ex am in ing the strong French re sis tance.

40. Poin caré to Pa léo logue, 9 March 1915, ltr., DDF, 1915 t. 1 (Brus sels: P. I. E. Peter Lang, 2002), no. 320.

41. Saz o nov to Iz vols kii, 23 March 1915, tel. 1315, in Kon stan tin o pol i pro livy: Po sek ret nym dok u men tam b. Mini sterstva in os tran nykh del, ed. E. A. Ad a mova, 2 vols. (Mos cow: Iz da nie Li tiz data NKID, 1925–26), vol. 1, no. 88; and Saz o nov to Iz vols kii, 3 April 1915, tel. 1518, in Kon stan tin o pol i pro livy, vol. 1, no. 95.

42. Diary of Foreign Min is try, 5 March 1915, in Mezh du na rod nye ot no she niia v epokhu im pe ri a lizma: Dok u menty iz ark hi vov tsars kogo i Vre men nogo pravitel’stv, 1878–1917 gg. (Mos cow: Gos. SotsEcon. Izd, 1931), 7.1, no. 312; Pa léo logue to Del cassé, 5 March 1915, tel. 374, Hoover In sti tu tion Archives (here after cited as HI), Bas ily MSS.; Bu cha nan to Grey, 5 March 1915, tel. 257, TNA FO 371/2481/26072.

43. Bu cha nan to Grey, 3/17/15, tel. 314, TNA FO 371/2449/30806.44. Ber tie to Grey, 10 March 1915, tel. 87, TNA FO 371/2449/25014/28338;

Ber tie to Grey, 11 March 1915, tel., TNA FO 371/2449/25014/28458; and “Verbal’naia nota frant suzs kogo posol’stva v Pet ro grade mini stru in os tran nykh del,” 10 April 1915, Konstantinopol’ i pro livy, vol. 1, no. 99. See also William A. Renzi, “Great Brit ain, Rus sia, and the Straits, 1914–1915,” Jour nal of Mod ern His tory 42, no. 1 (1970): 1–20.

45. See Fitz ge rald, “France’s Mid dle East ern Am bi tions.”46. Pa léo logue to Del cassé, 11/22/14, tels. 957–58 and 959–62, DDF, 1914

(Paris: Im prim e rie Nation ale, 1999), nos. 561, 562.47. Iz vols kii to Saz o nov, 10 Jan u ary 1915, tel. 740, in Raz del az i ats koi Turt sii,

ed. E. A. Ad a mov (Mos cow: Izd. Li tiz data NKID, 1924) (here after cited as RAT ), no. 3. McMee kin, Rus sian Or i gins, 203–4, sug gests that the issue of Pal es tine arises in 1916 only as a “Brit ish red her ring” and that Saz o nov paid lip ser vice to the con cern in order to lev er age Russia’s own de mands. He misses the longer story and Russia’s real con cern laid out here.

48. Ner a tov to Saz o nov, 15 March 1915, tel. 1156, RAT, no. 28.

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49. Pa léo logue to Del cassé, 17 March 1915, tels. 426–428, DDF, 1915, t.1, no. 358. See also Bu cha nan to Grey, 17 March 1915, tel. 314, TNA FO 371/2449/30806.

50. Saz o nov to Iz vols kii, 16 March 1915, tel. 119, AVPRI, f. 138, op. 467, d. 469/488, l. 87.

51. Iz vols kii to Saz o nov, 17 March 1915, tel. 140, RAT, no. 31.52. Bu cha nan to Grey, 18 March 1915, tel. 320, TNA FO 371/2449/31923.53. Iz vols kii to Saz o nov, 4 March 1915, tel. 113, in Mezh du na rod nye ot no-

she niia, 7.1, no. 305.54. Iz vols kii to Saz o nov, 4 March 1915, tel. 115, in Mezh du na rod nye ot no-

she niia, 7.1, no. 307.55. Benck en dorff on 7 March 1915 wrote Saz o nov that Foreign Sec re tary

Grey feared a dis cus sion about the par ti tion of Asiatic Tur key given French and Ital ian inter ests, while Del cassé was push ing the topic for ward. Benck en dorff felt sure that there was dis agree ment between the Brit ish and the French on the fu ture of Ot to man Asia and the Med i ter ra nean Sea. Benck en dorff to Saz o nov, 7 March 1915, tel. 159, in Mezh du na rod nye ot no she niia, 7.1, p. 402n1.

56. See Pa léo logue to Bri and, 26 March 1916, tel. 254, MAE, paap 133 Pa léo logue, v. 3, p. 30; Pa léo logue to Saz o nov, 26 March 1916, let ter, RAT, no. 91; Saz o nov to Pa léo logue, 28 March 1916, ltr. 247, RAT, no. 92.

57. On GeorgesPicot, see Brecher, “French Pol icy to ward the Le vant”; on Sykes, see Efraim Karsh and Inari Karsh, Em pires of the Sand: The Strug gle for Mas tery in the Mid dle East, 1789–1923 (Cam bridge, MA: Har vard Uni ver sity Press, 1999), 202; and Elie Ke dou rie, “Sir Mark Sykes and Pal es tine 1915–16,” Mid dle East ern Stud ies 6, no. 3 (1970): 340–41.

58. Karsh and Karsh, Em pires of the Sand, 225.59. Pa léo logue to Bri and, 11 March 1916, tel. 203, MAE, paap 43, Cam bon,

Jules, v. 79, p. 26.60. On the Rus sian re la tion ship to Ar me nia dur ing the war, see es pe cially

Peter Hol quist, “The Pol i tics and Prac tice of the Rus sian Oc cu pa tion of Ar menia, 1915–Feb ru ary 1917,” in A Ques tion of Gen o cide: Ar me ni ans and Turks at the End of the Ot to man Em pire, ed. Ro nald Grigor Suny, Fatma Müge Goçek, and Nor man M. Nai mark (Ox ford: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 2011), 151–74; but also Re ynolds, Shat ter ing Em pires, 140–66; and McMee kin, Rus sian Or i gins, 141–74.

61. Pa léo logue to Bri and, 11 March 1916, tel. 204, MAE, paap 133, Pa léo logue, v. 1, pp. 19–20; Pa léo logue to Bri and, 13 March 1916, tel. 210, HI, Bas ily, box 9.

62. Pa léo logue to Bri and, 13 March 1916, HI, Bas ily, box 9.63. Os o boe so vesh cha nie, 17 March 1916, Proto col, RAT, no. 96. At tend ing

were the chair man of the Coun cil of Min is ters, Stürmer; navy min is ter Gri gor ovich; Saz o nov, for the army min is ter, Bel i aev; and for the vice roy of the Cau casus, Nikol’skii. See also Saz o nov to Iz vols kii and Benck en dorff, 17 March 1916, tel. 1098, AVPRI, f. 133, op. 470, d. 77, l. 53.

64. Re ynolds, Shat ter ing Em pires, 141.

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The East ern Ques tion in Turk ish Re pub li can Text booksSet tling Old Scores with the Eu ro pean and the Ot to man “Other”

Nazan Çiçek

On a cold Jan u ary day in 1923 in Eski¸sehir, a small An a to lian town near An kara, Mus tafa Kemal (Atatürk) gave a lengthy speech to the of fi cials and not ables who had gath ered at the governor’s of fice to hear him. During the ad dress, which touched upon many press ing mat ters, Mus tafa Kemal dis cussed the Lau sanne Con fer ence (1922–23), which was still in prog ress. He com plained that de spite sev eral long and tir ing ses sions, there was still no good news to cel e brate. He ve he mently pro tested that “en e mies” held the An kara govern ment re spon sible for a se ries of matters con cern ing many cen tu ries of his tory that had noth ing to do with the peo ple of today’s Tur key. “If our en e mies were fair, hu mane, and con scien tious, the prob lem would be solved in two days” he argued, “but we know that they are not.”1 A few days later, this time in the movie house of I˙ zmit, a small town east of I˙ stan bul, he re peated that the Lau sanne Con fer ence did not look prom is ing. “Nev er the less,” he added, “this is only nat u ral, be cause this con fer ence has not been try ing

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to sort out and set tle ac counts that merely emerged yes ter day. It has been deal ing with prob lems that first ap peared hun dreds of years ago and be came ex tremely acute re cently. It is never an easy task to re solve such ab struse, pro found, in tri cate, and cor rupt mat ters.”2 By “en e mies” and “in tri cate and cor rupt mat ters,” Mus tafa Kemal meant Eu ro peans and the East ern Ques tion, al though he did not em ploy the term as such.

As the phrase the “East ern Ques tion” it self sug gests, the West ern world de fined the East, rep re sented by the Ot to man Em pire, as a problem, and “pro blem a tized” it dis cur sively.3 For the West ern world, the East ern Ques tion was, in sim plest terms, the an swer sought to the ques tion of “what to do with the Turk?”4 Could he be re formed, civ il ized, or even if pos sible Chris tian ized? Or would it be bet ter to leave him alone to meet his fate in his “bar baric,” “back ward,” and “Is lamic” state? Should the Ot to man Em pire be sup ported in order to slow its pos sible dis so lu tion and delay its final col lapse? These ques tions appeared as byproducts of more com pli cated ques tions of farreaching ef fect that had been keep ing Eu ro pean po lit i cal de ci sion mak ers busy for some time: Who (or what) would fill the vac uum in the re gion after

The Turkish Historical Society visits the Museum of Old Eastern Historical Artifacts, 15 September 1934. Those pictured, including Afet ˙ Inan, who was also Mustafa Kemal’s adopted daughter, and Yusuf Akçura, were the architects of the Turkish History Thesis. (reprinted with permission from the Turkish Historical Society, file HEED 57N 23Ön Yüz)

The Eastern Question in Turkish Republican Textbooks

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the seem ingly im mi nent col lapse of the Ot to man Em pire? Who would be come the heg e monic power gov ern ing the east ern Med i ter ra nean? How would the pa ram e ters of the Con cert of Eu rope and the bal ance of power es tab lished after the Con gress of Vienna in 1815 change, and at whose ex pense?

In a frame work con structed by these ques tions, main tain ing the in de pen dence and ter ri to rial in teg rity of the Ot to man Em pire, tot ter ing but in tact, be came in creas ingly more im por tant for Great Brit ain, which could ill af ford to lose com mer cial con trol of the east ern Med i ter ra nean and the In dian do min ions to Rus sia. More over, the Ot to man Em pire, with its pro vi sion ist eco nomic pol icy in her ited from By zan tium, was becom ing a cen ter of at trac tion for Brit ain, “the world’s work shop, the world’s ship builder, [and] the world’s banker” in the nine teenth century.5 Brit ain saw in the Ot to man Em pire a largely un touched mar ket for customsfree massproduced fac tory goods and fi nance cap i tal. Nev er the less, Brit ish jeal ousy with re spect to the east ern Med i ter ra nean and the Ot to man Em pire also ap plied to Rus sia, which had its own plans for the re gion.

Sim ply put, the inter ests of the Brit ish and Rus sian Em pires in the Ot to man Em pire and Near East were openly an tag o nis tic, at least until the last quar ter of the nine teenth cen tury. In this con text, at the be ginning of the cen tury Brit ain set out to for tify the Ot to man Em pire against Rus sian at tacks. For the Brit ish Foreign Of fice, the em pire of the tsars, mo ti vated by the ideal of “build ing a uni ver sal Rus sian King dom,” posed a dra co nian threat to Brit ish inter ests in the Near East.6 Thus, “Pal mers ton ism,” which would later be come the tra di tional pol icy of Brit ain visàvis the East ern Ques tion, aimed to pro tect and main tain the ter ri to rial in teg rity and po lit i cal in de pen dence of the Ot to man Em pire. Both Con ser va tives and Lib er als vig or ously sup ported Palmers ton ian pol icy until the last quar ter of the nine teenth cen tury. Brit ain proved its com mit ment by sid ing with the Ot to mans against Rus sia in the Cri mean War (1853–56). While it man aged to avoid en gag ing its army in other po ten tially end less wars between Rus sia and the Ot to man Em pire, Brit ain em ployed all other means pos sible, in clud ing co er cion, in tim i da tion, threats, and psycho log i cal vi o lence at the nego tiat ing table.

The Brit ish media at the time hailed Pal mers ton ian pol icy as the “pro ject of sav ing the Turk.” The pol icy en com passed is sues rang ing from open ing the Ot to man econ omy to free trade and Eu ro pean money mar kets, to the con scrip tion of nonMuslims into the Ot to man army,

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from threat en ing the re bel lious governor of Egypt, Meh med Ali Pa¸sa, into sub mis sion, to op pos ing the SlavicOrthodox union of the Da nu bian prin ci pal ities. Con crete ac tion in cluded fight ing in the Cri mean War and “con vinc ing” Greece to with hold her sup port dur ing the Cre tan up ris ing of the 1860s. As one his to rian of the “East ern Ques tion” has argued, “In the quad rille of the bal ance of power, En gland had the spe cial role, she led the dance.”7

In the mean time, Pal mers ton ian pol icy sought to intro duce some de gree of lib er al iza tion and re form into the Ot to man po lit i cal and admin is tra tive system in order to gen er ate co he sion within a frag mented Ot to man so ci ety, as well as to turn the Ot to man state into a “mod ern state” with infra struc tu ral power.8 In im ple ment ing its aims, Great Brit ain de vel oped a form of coop er a tion that at times seemed more like co er cion and pres sure than friendly col lab o ra tion with the Ot to man rul ing elites. As Foreign Sec re tary Lord Pal mers ton put it: “A com munity is not like a man or a tree or a build ing whose parts are not ren ovated but re main the same, and are worn out and decay by age and use. All that is req ui site to keep an Em pire vig or ous for an in defi nite pe riod of time is that its in sti tu tions and laws should adapt them selves to the changes which take place in the hab its of the peo ple and in the rel a tive po si tion of the com mu nity as com pared with other coun tries.”9

The al lies of the Ot to man Em pire there fore under took a mis sion of re form ing “the Turk,” who was oth er wise in ca pable of his own pres erva tion, and set out to teach him how to be “mod ern” and “civ il ized.” Their em bas sies vig i lantly over saw the im ple men ta tion of a se ries of re form edicts that the sul tan prom ul gated to en sure that they did not re main dead let ters. Brit ish con suls and agents ac tively inter fered in the af fairs of the Porte when ever they be lieved that “fa nat i cal” Mus lim con ser va tism had reared its ugly head and hin dered the mod ern iza tion pro ject. The socalled re forms that the Ot to man rul ing elites had been ex pected to im ple ment clearly re flected the “cul tural mis sion of the West ern world which was heav ily tainted by a ro man ti cized cru sader per spec tive, pro fess ing as its ob ject the lib er a tion of [the] Chris tian pop u la tion under the yoke.”10 Pal mers ton ian pol icy, in this sense, was selfcontradictory, for it aimed to pre serve the ter ri to rial in teg rity and po lit i cal in de pen dence of the Ot to man Em pire as a freetrade re gion, while it also de sired to free Chris tians from Mus lim rule.11

As the cen tury pro gressed, Pal mers ton ism grad u ally lost its al lure. In the last quar ter of the nine teenth cen tury, it be came ev i dent in the eyes of the Brit ish that the “sick man” was long past re ha bil i ta tion. Con cur rent with Ot to man fi nan cial bank ruptcy, the Chris tian re volt in


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Bos nia and Her zeg o vina in 1875, fol lowed by the Bul gar ian up ris ing in 1876, played a con sid er able role in re build ing the image of the Turk in Eu rope as “the great antihuman spec i men of hu man ity.”12 Ac cord ingly, the Dis raeli cab i net re frained from openly back ing the Ot to man Em pire dur ing the RussianOttoman War of 1877–78, which would end in abso lute de feat for the lat ter. Yet the terms of the Treaty of San Ste fano, con cluded between Rus sia and the Ot to man Em pire on 3 March 1878, prompted Brit ain once more to inter vene in favor of its old ally since the treaty had brought about an un ac cept able in crease in Russia’s in fluence in the east ern Med i ter ra nean, which in a way in val i dated al most a centurylong Brit ish at tempt to re tain the bal ance of power in Eu rope. The mod ifi ca tions in the Treaty of San Ste fano, which took the form of the Treaty of Ber lin (1878), cou pled with the Cy prus Con ven tion and the Eu phra tes Val ley Rail way pro ject, sig nified a con spic u ous shift in Britain’s tra di tional Near East ern pol icy. Brit ain no longer at tempted to sup port Turk ish rule in the Bal kans and con cen trated in stead on the straits as well as the Asian do min ions of the sul tan as a bul wark against Rus sian en croach ments. The com plete dis so lu tion of Ot to man rule in the Bal kans (1912–13) and the worst night mare of every Ot to man polit i cal leader, namely, a RussianBritish al li ance in the First World War, sealed the end of the Ot to man Em pire and the East ern Ques tion by creat ing fer tile ground for the longdelayed dis mem ber ment plans.

The pre ced ing de scrip tion of the socalled East ern Ques tion dem onstrates, briefly, how the West with its ar ro gant so lip sism of co lo nial knowl edge under stood and por trayed the po si tion of the Ot to man Empire in a Europeandominated world system dur ing the nine teenth and early twen ti eth cen tu ries. The East ern Ques tion as a prod uct of al teri tist dis course that es tab lished the East as anti thet i cal to the West was a po lit i cally con structed phe nom e non that in creas ingly de ter mined the Ot to man Empire’s po si tion visàvis the Eu ro pean pow ers. It also worked as a site of dis cur sive strug gle that pro duced a Eu ro cen tric, heg e monic dis course that was di chot o mist, re duc tion ist, im pe ri a lis tically driven, and by and large Orien tal ist in Sai dian terms. In this sense, the East ern Ques tion was the Ot to man Empire’s West ern Ques tion, yet even Ot to man pol icy mak ers them selves adopted and inter nal ized the con cept, as dem on strated by the many doc u ments pro duced by Ot to man states men of the time, a sit u a tion that at tests to the term’s heg e monic qual ity.13

This chap ter ex plores nar ra tions of the East ern Ques tion as they ap peared in a se ries of Turk ish pri mary, sec on dary, and high school his tory text books printed between 1940 and 2007. Re pub li can so cial

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sci ence and his tory text books since 1923 have cov ered the topic of the East ern Ques tion (al though not nec es sar ily under this head ing) as part of Turk ish historiog ra phy. Un like the Ot to man rul ing elite, whose per cep tion of their own em pire was widely af fected by its tainted reflec tion in the mir ror of the East ern Ques tion, the re pub li can found ing elite was de ter mined to create a new image of Turks and Turk ish history, purged of the un pleas ant as so ci a tions with the East ern Ques tion. This did not nec es sar ily mean that the events that had con sti tuted the phe nom e non called the East ern Ques tion were for got ten or ig nored. How ever, the term was con spic u ously ab sent in early republicanera text books, im ply ing that the East ern Ques tion, with its pow er ful discur sive con no ta tions, was no longer ac cepted as a de fin ing ve hi cle for Turk ish selfperception. On some oc ca sions when writ ers used the term, they em ployed it as an un mis tak ably foreign con cept coined and cir culated by the West ern world as part of its im pe ri a lis ti cally driven al ter i tist at ti tude to ward the Ot to man Em pire and/or Turks. The sig nifi cance of the term as a po tent ve hi cle mark ing the “other ing,” di chot o mist, and Orien tal ist fea tures of the West ern con struc tion of the Turks in creas ingly made it self felt in the Kem al ist frame work as the “of fi cial im a gin ing of iden tity.”14 The found ing nar ra tives it pro duced were grad u ally sub ject to al ter a tions in ac cor dance with the new dy nam ics, chal lenges, and changes in Turkey’s identityformation pol i tics and its re la tion ship with the idea of the West.

Draw ing on the as sump tion that his tory text books are po lit i cal texts through which na tional and his tor i cal con scious ness, as well as the per cep tions of the “other” and the “self,” are both con structed and reflected, this chap ter ex am ines Turk ish text books in order to under stand the mean ing and place of the East ern Ques tion in the cog ni tive map of sev eral gen er a tions of re pub li can elites. These elites, with their cul tural and “sym bolic cap i tal,” have under taken the task of re writ ing the history of the Turks as a nationbuilding and nationstate con sol i da tion strat egy.15

Since the East ern Ques tion was the Turks’ West ern Ques tion, its nar ra tive in re pub li can text books can be read as the long story of the Turks’ inter ac tion with Eu rope, which had been and still is marked by many inner con flicts, contrasts, and ten sions, whereby an an tag o nis tic dis course to ward the West co ex ists along side oblique (and some times overt) praise and ad mi ra tion. It can also be read as the story of the Turk ish Republic’s prob le matic re la tion ship with its Ot to man past and leg acy, which is in trin si cally linked to the way that the East ern Ques tion


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played out in the nine teenth cen tury. Con sid er ing the ways in which Ot to man mem ory is as so ciated with Turk ish iden tity in power re la tions and in power holders’ par tic u lar world view and an a lyz ing the shifts in the por trayal of this ex tremely trau matic part of the Ot to man past pro vide an under stand ing of the chang ing trends in mod ern iden tity for ma tion. This chap ter con trib utes to such an under stand ing through an indepth ex am ina tion of twentynine Turk ish his tory text books.

After a brief dis cus sion of the vital role at trib uted to text books as “au thor i ta tive texts that not only rep re sent pol i tics in their con tents, but also set up the terms of cit i zen ship in the na tion,” this chap ter delves into the treat ment of the East ern Ques tion in the his tory text books taught in Turk ish schools between 1940 and 1980.16 After de tect ing an al most com plete avoid ance of the term in those text books and as certain ing the pos sible rea sons be hind this void, the chap ter ex am ines his tory text books pub lished between 1980 and 2007. The re intro duc tion of the term “East ern Ques tion” into the text books after the mil i tary inter ven tion of 1980 is ex tremely sig nifi cant, in that it pro vides val u able in sights into the chang ing pa ram e ters of Turkey’s sense of na tional se cur ity, selfperception, and iden tifi ca tion with Eu rope. The emer gence of the East ern Ques tion as an om ni pres ent term to ward the twentyfirst cen tury marks yet an other shift in Turkey’s re la tion ships with both its Ot to man past and Eu rope. The re ap pear ance of the term in text books dem on strates a new his tor i cal con tin uum between Is lamic civ il iza tions, the Ot to man Em pire, and today’s Tur key based on sup pos edly “deepseated” and “con stant hos til ity” dis played by the West ern world to wards its Mus lim “other.”

Com pet ing for Mem ory and Iden tity: Turk ish His tory Text books

For the mem bers of the politicalbureaucratic elite that founded the Turk ish Re pub lic on the her i tage of the Ot to man Em pire, the pro ject of creat ing a nationstate also en tailed “im a gin ing” and “in vent ing” a new his tory fit for na tional needs. As Er nest Gell ner sug gests, “na tions as a nat u ral, Godgiven way of clas sify ing men, as an in her ent po lit i cal des tiny, are a myth; na tion al ism, which some times takes preexisting cul tures and turns them into na tions, some times in vents them, and often oblit er ates preexisting cul tures: that is re al ity.”17 In the pro cess of creat ing na tions as “im a gined com mu nities,” the nationstates, alongside many other socialengineering meas ures, also in vent a new his tory

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for the na tion.18 E. J. Hobs bawm argues that “nat u rally states would use the in creas ingly pow er ful ma chin ery for com mu ni cat ing with their in hab i tants, above all the pri mary schools, to spread the image and her itage of the ‘nation’ and to in cul cate at tach ment to it and to at tach all to coun try and flag often ‘in vent ing traditions’ or even na tions for this pur pose.”19 Thus of fi cial re writ ing of his tory and its dis semi na tion through com pul sory statecontrolled pri mary ed u ca tion be comes an in eluc ta ble en ter prise of nationstates in im a gin ing and con struct ing the na tion and na tional be long ing. The Turk ish re pub li can case in this sense epit o mizes the im a gin ing and in vent ing of a na tion with a brand new his tory that would take the form of the Turk ish His tory The sis in the 1930s. This me tic u lously com posed nar ra tive bore all the signs of of fi cial his tory re writ ing. It sought to prove “sci en tifi cally” that the Turks as a na tion had ex isted since time im me mo rial. Un like the stereo typed im ages gen er ated by the Orien tal ist lit er a ture, the new nar ra tive portrayed the Turks as the in ven tors and rep re sen ta tives of the high est civ il iza tion on the planet.

With the foun da tion of the Re pub lic in 1923, his tory teach ing in schools was hailed as an es sen tial com po nent in the con struc tion of the new Turk ish iden tity, state, and na tion.20 As Akçurao˘glu Yusuf summar ized in the First His tory Con gress (1932), the pri or ity of the new Turk ish historiog ra phy was to “nar rate the past ac cord ing to na tional inter ests, rather than merely copy ing the his to ries writ ten from the per spec tives of other na tions.”21 Re pub li can elites argued that “know ing the pro found Turk ish his tory” was “a sa cred gem feed ing the Turk’s skills and might, and his un beat able strength in the face of any cur rents that would harm na tional ex is tence.”22 More over, the new Turk ish na tional his tory aimed to erad i cate the “in fe ri or ity com plex” en gen dered by the trau matic ex pe ri ence of the East ern Ques tion, as well as chal lenge the centurieslong Eu ro pean antiTurkish dis course in Glads ton ian terms. “The Re pub li can con ver sion nar ra tive,” which pro fessed an on tolog i cal frac ture between the Ot to man Em pire and the Turk ish Re pub lic, at tempted to re con struct the mem ory of so ci ety along “na tional” lines.23 The new nar ra tive found its ex pres sion in crys tal lized form in his tory text books, which the Min is try of Ed u ca tion has strictly con trolled from the be gin ning of the Re pub lic.24

As so cial mem ory stud ies sug gest, mem ory is an es sen tial fac tor in iden tity for ma tion. There fore, nationstates ap pear keen on “achiev ing the dom i nance of na tional mem ory over other mem o ries and thus exclud ing and elim i nat ing other con test ants for con trol over other types of iden tity for pri mary al le giance.”25 As Mark Beis singer notes, “na tion al ism


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is not sim ply about im a gined com mu nities; it is much more fun da mentally a strug gle over de fin ing com mu nities, and par tic u larly a strug gle for con trol over the imag i na tion about com mu nity.”26 While the nation building elites strug gle to re place other forms of iden tity with the national one and to re shape the cul tural and col lec tive mem ory, historiogra phy be comes a pow er ful tool in over pow er ing and si lenc ing rival voices and nar ra tives that rep re sent dif fer ent mem o ries than the “nation ally con structed” one.

By iden tify ing and an a lyz ing the por trayal of the East ern Ques tion in re pub li can his tory text books, this chap ter at tempts to under stand how Turk ish pol icy mak ers used the theme of the East ern Ques tion as an in te gral ele ment of the re pub li can found ing nar ra tive, as they fought their way into con struct ing a na tional iden tity and a new so cial mem ory for the Turk ish peo ple. Com par ing the cover age of the East ern Ques tion in a num ber of text books pub lished in a rel a tively long pe riod also helps us com pre hend the on go ing nego ti a tion pro cess between na tional memory and iden tity in the Turk ish con text.

The East ern Ques tion as a Fad ing Mem ory in Early RepublicanEra Text books

Of the seven teen his tory text books pub lished between 1940 and 1980 ex am ined here, only a few openly use the phrase “East ern Ques tion,” al though they all ex ten sively nar rate and dis cuss the event ful years of the Ot to man Empire’s long nine teenth cen tury.27 While the term “Eastern Ques tion” is com pletely ab sent from many text books, some textbooks men tion the term only in pass ing. For ex am ple, in the 1941 study by Sadri Ertem and Kazım Nami Duru, the sec tion on the “Pe riod of Ex ter nal Inter ven tion” de scribes the “East ern Ques tion” as the “dis cord between Mah mud II and Meh met Ali Pasa [that] be came a great con cern for the Eu ro pean states. Around that time, the term East ern Ques tion was coined and gained pop u lar ity. It was used to refer to all is sues regard ing the Near East. In fact, the East ern Ques tion was com pletely about the Ot to man Empire’s po si tion visàvis the Eu ro pean states. The Ot to man Em pire had been in de cline since the eigh teenth cen tury. [Eu ropeans] had planned to par cel it out one day just like Po land. This was an issue of grave im por tance. This is the es sence of what is called the East ern Ques tion.”28

An other text book, pub lished by Mus tafa Cezar in 1951, states that “in this cen tury [the nine teenth] En gland’s de moc racy im proved un prec e dent edly. Her in dus try and trade made great prog ress. She

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enor mously en larged her com mer cial fleet and her naval force. Her co lo nial ter ri tory also be came very large. En gland paid ut most at ten tion to the issue called the East ern Ques tion, which con sisted in the dismem ber ment of the Ot to man Em pire, and she strug gled to pre vent Rus sia from tear ing off large pieces from the Ot to man ter ri tory. Around this time, En gland be came a world wide in fluen tial power.”29

Bedriye Atsız and Hilmi Oran, in 1953, de scribe the set ting as fol lows: “Thus Rus sia [thanks to the Treaty of Un kiar Ske lessi, 1833], found a way to med dle with the Ot to man Empire’s inter nal mat ters and increased her in flu ence over the Em pire. She also se cured her po si tion in the Black Sea and ac quired the most in fluen tial role on the stage of the East ern Ques tion.”30

As one scholar opines, in the early years of the Re pub lic “it would have been anath ema to sug gest that the Ot to man Em pire might have a pos i tive leg acy to pass on to the new na tion. The door to the past was to be not merely firmly closed but slammed shut and locked tight to prevent any seep ing of in flu ence or temp ta tion to nos tal gia.”31 The found ing elites of the Turk ish Re pub lic were de ter mined to dis own the mem ory of the Ot to man Em pire in their quest to create a new na tion. They looked upon the Ot to man past with dis dain and des per ately sought for mu lations that would dis tance the “glo ri ous” his tory of the Turk ish na tion from the “shame ful acts” of the Ot to man dy nasty. This dy nasty, ac cording to Mus tafa Kemal, “had ac quired the power to rule over the Turk ish na tion for more than six cen tu ries by vi o lence” and were a bunch of “mad men,” “dis so lute spend thrifts,” and “pure evil doers.”32

In the early 1920s, his to rians ve he mently argued over the place of the Ot to man Em pire in the his tory writ ing of the Re pub lic. Some writ ers even went so far as to sug gest elim i nat ing the Ot to man Em pire from Turk ish his tory alto gether. Mu hit tin Bir gen, for ex am ple, called for a total re jec tion of the Ot to man past and ven tured that “the so lu tion to the prob lem of Ot to man and Turk ish his tory [could not] be pro cured by stick ing the word Turk onto the tail of the word Ot to man.”33 The ma jor ity of schol ars, how ever, were in favor of in te grat ing Ot to man his tory into Turk ish his tory in a pe cu liarly se lec tive and prag matic way. Ac cord ingly, the wellknown at tempts to de sign a nar ra tive of “discontinuity,” which took the form of no to ri ous Turk ish His tory The sis, en sued.34

The Turk ish His tory The sis is the quin tes sence of crea tive mem ory mak ing. The the sis found the an ces tors of the Turks on the steppes of Cen tral Asia, whose civ il iza tion man i fested it self in the Ork hon


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In scrip tions. It in vented the leg end of the great ex o dus of the Turk ish clans west ward and re lated them to the ear li est in hab i tants of An a to lia, who built the an cient civ il iza tions of Asia Minor, such as the Hit tites and the Su mer ians. This last as pect of the for mula al lowed the Turk ish Re pub lic to as sert that An a to lia be longed to the Turks long be fore the an ces tors of the con tem po rary Greeks and Ar me ni ans be came its inhab i tants, thereby re fut ing the ter ri to rial claims of those na tions over this “pre his tor i cally” Turk ish land. Like an other gran di ose the ory, called the Sun Lan guage The ory, read at the Third Turk ish Lan guage Con fer ence in Au gust 1936, which claimed that Turk ish was the first lan guage of prim i tive man from which all other lan guages were de rived, the Turk ish His tory The sis as serted that the an ces tors of the con tem porary Turks were the first and real own ers of the ter ri tory on which the Re pub lic was built. Thus the Turks, as con vey ers of the world’s first lan guage, were not a bar bar ous and in fe rior “race.” In fact, the Turks were the very pro gen i tors of civ il iza tion.

The first out come of the Turk ish His tory The sis was the book ti tled Türk Ta ri hi nin Ana Hat ları (The main forms of Turk ish his tory), which de voted only fifty pages to the Ot to man Em pire out of its total six hun dred pages. The Turk ish qual ities of the Ot to man Em pire as a state were highly ques tion able, and its re la tion ship with the Turk ish Re pub lic was a puz zle con sist ing of many am big u ous, selfcontradictory, and blurry ref er ences.35 For ex am ple,

the po lit i cal elite tried both to dis tance them selves from their im pe rial leg acy (which in cluded glo rifi ca tion of this his tory) and hold onto par tic u lar pe ri ods of this same his tory. In other words, the at ti tude was not a com plete dis mis sal of the Ot to man past. Rather, there was an at tempt at pick ing and choos ing spe cific ele ments and pe ri ods of this past: more over, what ever was deemed good in this his tory was talked about as the deeds of the Turk ish ele ments, whereas every thing bad was at trib uted to the sul tans and to ex ter nal ac tors. Thus, for ex am ple, the ear lier pe ri ods of the em pire were dis cussed with ad mi ration. It was the later pe ri ods that were de fined as cor rupt and full of re li gious con ser va tism and sus cep ti bil ity to ex ter nal in flu ences—fac tors that they argued even tu ally led to the de mise of the em pire.36

As for Eu rope, Kem al ists had mixed feel ings. In “Nutuk” (the long speech de livered by Mus tafa Kemal from 15 to 20 Oc to ber 1927 at the Sec ond Con gress of Cum hu riyet Halk Par tisi [Re pub li can People’s Party]) two com pet ing per spec tives on Eu rope emerge. “The first perspec tive re sents Eu rope, the sec ond ad mires it. . . . [Mus tafa Kemal]

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Atatürk dis trusts Eu ro pean na tions. The great pow ers of Eu rope argue for human rights, peace and civ il ized meth ods, but they see no harm in oc cu py ing a coun try that does not be long to them, and in di vid ing, col o niz ing and an ni hi lat ing it.”37 Yet it was no mys tery that the Tur key of his dreams was con structed along West ern lines, a coun try where peo ple would be re ha bit u ated in the Bour dieuan sense through a West ern men tal ity and life style.

The pref ace of Türk Ta ri hi nin Ana Hat ları states, “The main mo ti va tion for the crea tion of such book, apart from writ ing a longoverdue proper na tional his tory for the Turk ish na tion, was to cor rect the pre vail ing false be liefs and ideas about Turks that pre dom i nate in ac a de mia across the world.”38 The book in deed ap peared in a con stant “di alog i cal con versa tion” in the Bakh tin ian sense with the West ern world.39 Em ploy ing West ern sci ence to chal lenge and coun ter the West ern world’s biased ideas and at ti tudes to ward Turks speaks vol umes about the Kemalists’ ap proach to the West. The new regime’s in sis tence on de riv ing its ideolog i cal dis cur sive in stru ments from socalled sci en tific truth, as well as its be lief in the au thor i ta tive status of West ern schol ars as the ul ti mate rep re sen ta tives of the tem ple of sci ence, was clearly dis cern ible in the foun da tional texts of Turk ish na tion build ing. The archi tects of the Turkish His tory The sis and the Sun Lan guage The ory char ac ter is ti cally sought the ap proval of West ern so cial sci en tists—in fact mostly Orien tal ists—and con sid ered it a yard stick for the cred ibil ity of their ideol ogy. As Etienne Co peaux points out, al though West ern Orien tal ist schol ars, who had al most ex clu sively created the ac a demic lit er a ture on the his tory of Turks, partly caused this at ti tude, the un chal lenged po si tion of the West as the monop o lis tic pro ducer of sci en tific knowl edge must have been the real rea son be hind it.40

Ac cord ing to Cemil Aydın, “the mod ern his tor i cal mem ory of interna tional re la tions in the past two hun dred years, in scribed into the foun da tional texts of Turk ish na tion al ism, in cludes the betrayal of the OttomanTurkish de sire to be come an equal mem ber of the Eu ro pean state system by the Eu ro pean pow ers. . . . But the Re pub li can elite adopted a rad i cal West ern ist mod ern iza tion pro ject at home, an in di cation that the uni ver sal West was al ready di vorced in their minds from the im pe ri al ist West. Grad u ally, a proWestern Oc ci den tal ism was constructed in Turk ish in tel lec tual life mainly for the jus tifi ca tion of the rad ical cul tural rev o lu tion that the Re pub li can re gime began to im ple ment.”41

This “proWestern Oc ci den tal ism” did not nec es sar ily pre clude the text book au thors of the early re pub li can era from dis semi nat ing some


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neg a tive stereo typ i cal im ages of Eu rope in the con text of nineteenth century inter na tional re la tions. In other words, under tak ing a pro ject of whole sale West ern iza tion at home did not read ily gen er ate a whitewash ing cam paign, so to speak, that ig nored West ern im pe ri al ism and its dev as tat ing ef fects on the Ot to man Em pire.42 The dif fi cul ties that the Re pub lic was ex pe ri enc ing with “es tab lish ing the Eu ro pean par a digm as a part of Turkey’s over all mag num opus or Uto pia,” namely the mod ern iza tion visàvis “the Sèvres apol ogy, a no tion that holds the outer world, es pe cially the West, as re spon sible for Turkey’s prob lems rang ing from eco nomic in stabil ity to do mes tic un rest” were dis cern ible in this at ti tude.43

Early republicanera text books keep talk ing about the “ar ro gant,” “con ceited,” “in so lent,” “equiv ocal,” “un trust worthy,” and “op por tu nist” char ac ter is tics of the West ern pow ers, yet al ways as out dated things. Besides, the Ot to man sul tans and of fi cials with their “feck less,” “shortsighted,” “spine less,” and “selfi sh” pol i cies were partly re sponsible for the dis as ter that be fell the Ot to man Em pire. Alto gether, the Ot to man state be longed to the do main of West ern im pe ri al ism. The young Turk ish Re pub lic, “free from the shack les of the im pe ri al ism after Lau sanne,” a no tion proudly re peated in all text books, be longed to the do main of West ern uni ver sal ism. The im me di ate mem ory of Eu rope as the “tooth less mon ster” of the days of the Turk ish War of In de pen dence (1919–23) was bal anced with the image of a West ern world that Tur key, a staunch be liever in the mer its of West ern civ il iza tion, wished to em ulate and join. Al though the West con tin ued to op er ate as an ex ter nal “other” in the con struc tion of Turk ish ness, “ef forts to frame Turk ish iden tity as dis tinct among a glo bal com mu nity of na tions co ex isted with at tempts to as so ciate Tur key in dis put ably with the West.”44 As Çaglar Keyder aptly sug gests, “in contrast to the anticolonial sen ti ment which fuelled the ma jor ity of thirdworld na tional move ments, Turk ish na tion al ism did not ex hibit an antiWestern na ti vism. [Turk ish re formers and their epi gones] saw their so ci ety as back ward, but not es sentially dif fer ent. They were all Neh rus, and there was no Gan dhi among them.”45 Thus, the seven teen his tory text books pub lished between 1940 and 1980 (ex cept for the three ex am ples men tioned ear lier) re frain from men tion ing the term “East ern Ques tion.”

All this, how ever, was to change by the 1980s, when the pol icy makers of the Re pub lic opted to res ur rect the West ern ghosts of late Ot toman times in order to re mind Turk ish chil dren that if not safe guarded vig or ously, their country’s in de pen dence was in dan ger. The “tooth less

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mon ster,” al beit in dif fer ent at tire, was back. As the dis course of Western “betrayal” rep re sented by the “Sèvres apol ogy” was re called and re es tab lished, the term “East ern Ques tion” re claimed its place in the text books.

Dur ing the 1990s, al though it kept a rel a tively low pro file, the Eastern Ques tion nev er the less pre served its place as a sep ar ate topic in textbooks. In the twentyfirst cen tury, with Turkey’s na tional pride bruised in the pro cess of seek ing EU can di dacy, and a new po lit i cal party with Is la mist back ground (Ada let ve Kalkınma Par tisi [AKP] [ Jus tice and De vel op ment Party]) in power since 2002, the term “East ern Ques tion” has been re vis ited by the text books and inter preted in a way to re de fine Turkey’s stance visàvis Eu rope and the Ot to man past. Once more, the term has proved its sym bolic power.

The Re dis cov ery of the Term “East ern Ques tion” from the 1980s On ward

Un like the early republicanera text books that treated the East ern Ques tion as a pain ful yet seem ingly in eluc ta ble se quence in Ot to man his tory, the text books of the 1980s re flected the mil i ta rist, con ser va tive, and se cu ri tist zeit geist of Turk ish pol i tics after the coup d’état of Sep tember 1980. The new nar ra tive cau tioned Turk ish youth that the East ern Ques tion was not as dead as it had seemed.46

In the 1980s, “Tur key was at tempt ing to re af firm na tional in teg rity and uti lize tra di tional Ke mal ism as a uni fy ing force. Dur ing the pe riod of ex treme po lit i cal po la riza tion and in creas ing re li gious fun da men talism, Atatürk na tion al ism was em ployed to en hance sol i dar ity.”47 Yet, as Co peaux as serts, after 1980 a nar ra tive po lyph ony is present in the text books, where two dif fer ent ap proaches to Turk ish his tory co ex ist: Ke mal ism and the TurkishIslamic Syn the sis.48 The TurkishIslamic Syn the sis, which em pha sized Islam and Turk ish cul ture as inter de pendent and mu tu ally con struc tive en tities, in ev i ta bly ushered in a de sire to re store the gran deur of the Ot to man Em pire and in te grate it into Turk ish his tory in a more pro nounced way.49 Given that “the past, for Kem al ists, [was] an other coun try,” the TurkishIslamic Syn the sis was a dé tente between Tur key and the Ot to man Em pire.50 Since the 1950s, the in cli na tion of re pub li can pol icy mak ers to re es tab lish Turkey’s rup tured re la tions with the Ot to man past en a bled the au thors of text books to grad u ally en large the space de voted to the Ot to mans at the ex pense of world his tory (spe cifi cally an cient) and to tone down the harsh crit i cism


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di rected at the em pire. In the mean time, “the Turk ish His tory The sis was not to tally aban doned but re stricted as back ground knowl edge.”51 Thus with the TurkishIslamic Syn the sis as the new par a digm of of fi cial Turk ish na tional iden tity, plac ing not Atatürk him self but his at tachment to the West in a sec on dary po si tion to the TurkishIslamic identity, his tory text books in the 1980s ea gerly re dis cov ered the term “Eastern Ques tion.”52

The de fen sive men tal ity of the 1980s text books, while in vok ing the trau matic mem o ries of the Treaty of Sèvres era, iron i cally ben e fited from the con di tions laid by the proOttoman TurkishIslamic Syn the sis, which fa cil i tated the iden tifi ca tion pro cess with the Ot to mans. The term “East ern Ques tion” came to rep re sent the al leg edly system atic hos til ity faced by Turks since the foun da tion of the em pire. More over, the contem po rary inter na tional threats per ceived by the Turk ish state were sup pos edly spec ters of the same East ern Ques tion. Al though Eu rope was never openly named, there was lit tle doubt as to the iden tity of “some other quar ters and great pow ers” that aided and abet ted the anti Turkish plots and pol i tics in the re gion. Ac cord ing to a pop u lar high school his tory text book first pub lished in 1981 (later edi tions fol lowed):

It is a great pity that since the es tab lish ment of the Ot to man state, the num ber of en e mies that have eyes for our be loved father land has never dwin dled. When the Ot to man state started to de cline, an ex tremely ob nox ious scheme was launched and car ried out until the end of the In de pen dence War. This in volved all the ef forts that sought the par ti tion of our land and an ni hi la tion of our na tional ex is tence [em pha sis in orig i nal]. The East ern Ques tion, which lasted hun dreds of years, was as sumed to end with the final col lapse of the Ot to man State at the end of the First World War. . . . Yet since then, those who wish to dis mem ber Tur key have not di min ished. Yes, per haps some of our for mer foes seem to have turned into our friends. Nev er the less, the num ber of pow ers that are unhappy with a united and pros per ous Tur key has in creased. One of our neigh bors wishes to seize the whole Ae gean Sea and suf fo cate Tur key. Two of our neighbors hanker after our east ern and south east ern re gions hop ing to cap ture and turn them into their own pro tec to rates. An other neigh bor has never changed its as pi ra tions re gard ing the straits, and it will never cease to want them. The ex istence of Tur key as the sym bol of peace and unity in the Mid dle East prompts the jeal ousy of its neigh bors. They wrongly as sume that Tur key as a power grow ing ever stronger will pose a threat to them selves. There are also some other quar ters that ma nip u late the bal ance of power in the Mid dle East to their own ad van tage, and some great pow ers fos ter and back this shady busi ness as they see fit for their own inter ests. These un scru pu lous de sires and pol i cies that aim to send Tur key back to the days of the Treaty of Sèvres find sup port ers in

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many cir cles and keep Tur key under a con stant threat both from within and with out.53

As this pas sage clearly shows, the term “East ern Ques tion,” which was not very pop u lar with the text book au thors of the ear lier decades, re ap pears in the nar ra tive. The phrase gained the status of a topic that de served ex clu sive at ten tion. Its re mark able re turn marks an in dis putable shift both in the per cep tion of Eu rope and in Turk ish pol icy makers’ at tempts to form na tional mem ory.

From the 1980s on ward, the image of Eu rope has under gone an unmis tak able change in Turk ish text books. The an tag o nis tic qual ity of past and present re la tion ships between Tur key and Eu rope de rives increas ingly from and is con sti tuted through its oth er ness. As a scholar draw ing on his work on Turk ish his tory text books pub lished in the 1990s and the twentyfirst cen tury sug gests, “Eu rope is re lo cated from a dis tant ‘other’ to an ‘other’ that is hos tile and ag gres sive to wards the Ot to man State—and by im pli ca tion, the Turk ish na tion.”54 This “new” no tion of Eu rope pro moted by the power hold ers of the time leaves its un de ni able im print not only on the ac counts of the East ern Ques tion but also on the prom i nence and ex plan a tory force of the phrase in textbooks. As the text book au thors choose to “re mem ber” the role of the East ern Ques tion in the tragic and trau matic col lapse of the Ot to man Em pire and re in cor po rate it into na tional mem ory, Eu rope slowly and ir re ver sibly turns into the epit ome of “hy poc risy,” “Ma chi a vel lian ism,” “greed,” and “in jus tice.” Un like the text books of ear lier decades, however, this image is not con fined to dis tant times but is vi brant today. The Ot to man Em pire as Europe’s prey in the con text of the East ern Question at tracts more sym pa thy and ac quires a new status. Pre vi ously at tributed qual ities such as “in com pe tence,” “pu sil la nim ity,” and “devilry” are re placed by more neu tral or mod er ate traits. A newly emerg ing discourse of vic tim iza tion, when read to gether with other ac counts on the Ot to mans in the nine teenth cen tury, tends to pic ture the em pire as a help less suf ferer at the hands of the West ern im pe ri al ists.

Re dis cov ery of the term “East ern Ques tion,” in other words, goes hand in hand with a new rap proche ment with the Ot to man leg acy. This pro cess, how ever, is by no means one way. Chang ing per cep tions of Eu rope and the Ot to man past are inter twined and mu tu ally con stit u tive. As the Kem al ist found ing nar ra tive and rhet o ric grad u ally lose ground, and their orig i nal as sump tions and dic tates are re inter preted ac cord ing to the needs of the time, con tex tu al iza tion of re pub li can his tory with


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re gard to the Ot to man past changes, which in turn re con structs the image of Eu rope. On the other hand, chang ing per cep tions of Eu rope con trib ute to the dwin dling cred ibil ity of the na tional mem ory fash ioned by the Kem al ist found ing nar ra tive in the first decades of the Re pub lic.

In the text books of the 1990s, the East ern Ques tion re in forces its place and re mains a sep ar ate topic de scribed in seem ingly valuefree terms that nev er the less ac cen tu ate Europe’s share in the des tiny of the Ot to man Em pire. The prob lem of set ting a chron o log i cal frame work for the East ern Ques tion is also a topic ad dressed in a pop u lar text book:

There has been no con sen sus on the exact time that the East ern Ques tion first emerged. Some trace it as far back as the Cru sades. In this book, the East ern Ques tion will be de fined as an issue en gen dered by the power pol i tics among the Eu ro pean states in the nine teenth cen tury. Most of the Eu ro pean states believed that the Ot to man state was not ca pable of main tain ing its ex is tence on its own. Its un timely col lapse could give rise to largescale con flicts among the Eu ro pean pow ers. There fore, some Eu ro pean states opted to pro tect the Ot toman state. In the sim plest sense, the term “East ern Ques tion” was used to refer to the pol i cies of main tain ing the in teg rity and in de pen dence of the Ot to man state in the first half of the nine teenth cen tury. In the sec ond half of the cen tury, it meant the par ti tion of the Ot to man ter ri tory in Eu rope. In the twen ti eth cen tury, it re ferred to the dis mem ber ment of all Ot to man ter ri to ries. Each and every cri sis in the inter nal or foreign af fairs of the Ot to man state were placed under the ru bric of the East ern Ques tion by Eu ro peans.55

An other ex am ple that starkly de fines the East ern Ques tion as a longterm Eu ro pean im pe rial pro ject aimed at Ot to man dis mem berment states that the phrase:

was first used at the Vienna Con gress of 1815. Eu ro pean States con vened this con fer ence in order to sort out the prob lems caused by the French em peror Bon a parte. At the con gress, the Rus sian tsar Al ex an der asked the other par tic ipants to be come in volved in the Greek cause and used the term East ern Ques tion [em pha sis in orig i nal]. How ever, the Aus trian prime min is ter Met ter nich, who had made great ef forts to con vene the con fer ence and who was against na tion alist move ments, ve he mently op posed the tsar’s view. En gland, anx ious about a pos sible Rus sian ad vance in the East, also ob jected. Thus, the con gress did not deal with the Greek issue. The term “East ern Ques tion,” how ever, be came a po lit i cal term and was fre quently used af ter ward. In the first half of the nineteenth cen tury, it was used to ex plain the pol i cies aim ing at the main te nance of the ter ri to rial in teg rity of the Ot to man state. In the sec ond half of the cen tury, it meant the di vi sion of Turks’ ter ri tory in Eu rope [em pha sis in orig i nal]. In the twen ti eth cen tury, it meant the dis mem ber ment of all ter ri tory that the Ot to man

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State still pos sessed. Eu ro peans at tempted to ex plain the Ot to man state’s every cri sis by using the term “East ern Ques tion.” Pol i ti cians per ceived it as a term re lated to the pre vail ing sit u a tion and the fu ture of the Ot to man Em pire. Eu ropean his to rians used it in order to nar rate and ex pound the past re la tion ships between Turks and Eu rope. Thus, the East ern Ques tion turned into a con cept and term of the dis ci pline of his tory. Re gard ing the be gin ning of the East ern Ques tion, the opin ion of the his to rians was largely ac cepted. They in fact of fered dif fer ent views on this mat ter. Eu ro pean his to rians as serted that the East ern Ques tion was rooted in the emer gence of Islam. Some argued that the be gin ning of the East ern Ques tion co in cided with the con quest of I˙ stan bul. In re al ity, the East ern Ques tion first ap peared in the sec ond half of the eigh teenth cen tury, was named so at the Vienna Con gress of 1815, con tin ued through out the nineteenth and the first two decades of the twen ti eth cen tury, and fi nally cul mi nated in the dis in te gra tion of the Ot to man state. The East ern Ques tion from be ginning to end was a ques tion of Eu ro pean im pe ri al ism. The East ern Ques tion in the sense that was under stood by Eu ro peans was in fact a West ern Ques tion for Turks.56

Writ ing on the Turk ish de bate over the na ture and leg acy of the Ot toman past, one scholar sug gests that it is, “at one level, an en act ment of the ten sion between Eu ro pean and postcolonial nar ra tives.” How ever, be cause the Ot to mans were never ac tu ally col o nized, “the Turk ish de bate can be read not so much as an at tempt to as sert postcolonial par tic u lar ity in the face of Eu ro pean uni ver sal ism, but rather a bid to res ur rect Ot to man uni ver sal ism in the face of Kem al ist par tic u lar ism.”57 As many schol ars argue today, the of fi cial im a gin ing of the Turk ish na tional his tory by the re pub li can found ing elites, namely, the glo rifica tion of a mythic past with out any sig nifi cant ref er ence to Islam (and by im pli ca tion the Ot to man Em pire) and overtly West ern in na ture, did not ap peal to the ma jor ity of the pop u la tion.58 “Re li gious lead ers and in tel lec tu als who felt that Islam should have some place in the new order were in con flict with the na tion al ist ethos of the early Re pub li can era. To those who felt that Islam should play a part in the new na tional iden tity, the an swer was un equiv ocally neg a tive. Islam had over shadowed the true great ness of the Turks, ul ti mately caus ing the de cline and fall of the Ot to man Em pire, and thus was not to play a part in the new na tional iden tity.”59

Since then, in tel lec tu als and pol i ti cians with Is la mist back grounds have been per sis tently ask ing for a cor rec tive inter ven tion into the national mem ory as con structed by the early re pub li can Kem al ist nar rative. This inter ven tion in ev i ta bly in volves a re ha bil i ta tion of Turkey’s


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re la tion ship with its Ot to man past and the crea tion of an al ter na tive nar ra tive that places stronger em pha sis on the re li gious, im pe ri al ist, and Orien tal ist as pi ra tions of the West ern world visàvis the Ot to man Em pire. With the Jus tice and De vel op ment Party in power since 2002, the reIslamization of the Turk ish pub lic sphere since 1990s along with the emer gence of neoOttomanism60 move ment is well in prog ress.61 The de sire for a more nu anced his tory that ac cen tu ates and under lines the “system atic wrong do ings of Chris tian Eu rope” to ward “Mus lim Ot tomans and Turks” has been dis cern ible in the nar ra tions of the East ern Ques tion in the text books. For ex am ple:

The East ern Ques tion: It was first used as a po lit i cal term by the West ern dip lomats at the Vienna Con gress of 1815. Its be gin ning goes back to very old times. This term re fers to all kinds of re la tion ships that took place between the Christian West ern world and the TurkishIslamic world start ing from 1071 [the Bat tle of Man zi kert] and end ing in 1923. The first part of the East ern Ques tion cov ers the pe riod in which Turks began to ad vance to ward the West, and Eu rope at tempted yet failed to stop them through Cru sades. Al though they proved abor tive, the Cru sades nev er the less brought about a men tal ity mainly built on re li gious think ing. That men tal ity was called the Crusader’s men tal ity in the Is lamic world [em pha sis in orig i nal]. The goal of the East ern Ques tion at that time was to drive Turks from Bal kans and An a to lia, which Eu ro peans con sidered Chris tian ter ri tory. Eu ro peans came near their goals when the Ot to mans were de feated at Vienna in 1683 and signed the Treaty of Kar lo witz in 1699. The sec ond phase of the East ern Ques tion cov ers the pe riod between 1699 and 1923. The goal of Eu ro peans dur ing this time was os ten sibly to pro tect the Chris tian mi nor ities liv ing under Ot to man rule, but ac tu ally to tear off Ot to man ter ri to ries and de stroy the Ot to man state. In the sec ond half of the nine teenth cen tury, they com bined co lo ni al ism with their Crusader’s men tal ity, but skill fully concealed their real in ten tions and acted under the false pre tense of pro tect ing the rights of Chris tian sub jects of the Ot to man state. In fol low ing decades, Eu ropeans at trib uted sev eral dif fer ent mean ings to the term East ern Ques tion. They were aware that Rus sia with her in creas ing power was pur su ing the pol icy of ac quir ing ac cess to warm seas that posed a threat to their own inter ests. Therefore, dur ing the first half of the nine teenth cen tury Eu ro pean states pro moted the pol icy of main tain ing the ter ri to rial in teg rity of the Ot to man state that was in har mony with their inter ests in the re gion. They pre ferred a weak Ot to man state to a pow er ful state that could jeop ard ize their inter ests. In the sec ond half of the cen tury, the East ern Ques tion came to refer to Europe’s plans to evict the Ot to man state from Eu rope as well as to re cap ture I˙ stan bul with a view to res urrect ing the Byz an tine Em pire. Through out the cen tu ries in which the East ern Ques tion un folded, Eu ro peans al ways adopted a hos tile and twofaced at ti tude to ward Turks.62

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f

By ex am in ing twentynine Turk ish his tory text books pub lished between 1940 and 2007, this chap ter sheds light on the role and the place of the East ern Ques tion as both a his tor i cal term and a phe nom e non within the “sym bol system that makes up of fi cial [Turk ish] na tional iden tity.”63 The chap ter began by ex plor ing the re pub li can found ing elite’s nation building strat egy to ac tively con trol the do main of na tional iden tity and carry out a pro ject of iden tity for ma tion by con struct ing a new his tory for the Turk ish na tion. Al though the state was the sole actor in de vis ing the of fi cial na tional iden tity, it nev er the less was open to my riad in fluences from so cial and inter na tional forces. In time, these forces ev i dently shaped the tra jec tory of the of fi cial line and the pro cess of na tional mem ory con struc tion, and hence brought about dis cern ible shifts in the of fi cial historiog ra phy. This fluid na ture of Turk ish iden tity for ma tion found its ex pres sion in his tory text books. The chang ing nar ra tions of the East ern Ques tion in the text books as an un de ni ably pow er ful term that not only linked the his tory of the Ot to man Em pire to the Turk ish Re public but also por trayed the West ern world in a par tic u lar way re flected the on go ing strug gle among the sev eral ac tors as to what should be included in of fi cial Turk ish iden tity. In this sense, the East ern Ques tion came to serve as a lit mus test for de tect ing and per ceiv ing the way the Turk ish state po si tioned it self visàvis the Ot to man Em pire and the West ern world.

In its early decades, the young Turk ish Re pub lic could be com pared to a re bel lious child who gained in de pen dence from strict par ents through a pain ful and system atic strug gle that ter mi nated in fam ily dis as ter, so to speak. Like an in di vid ual with a child hood trauma who re jects pa ren tal in flu ence after the re la tion ship with them is ir re ver sibly dam aged, the Turk ish Re pub lic dis tanced it self from its Ot to man pre deces sors and at tempted to set tle the score with them by “in vent ing” a brandnew Turk ish “fam ily” his tory that vac il lated between al most com pletely ig nor ing the Ot to mans and ea gerly re veal ing their “betrayals.” Al though the past mat tered enor mously, the chil dren of the Re public were ex pected to focus on the present and the fu ture and “re mem ber” the over all mag nifi cence of their na tion since an cient times, rather than be come en tan gled with the re cent past mostly as so ciated with East ern Ques tion dis as ters. The ten sion caused by the dif fi culty of rec on cil ing two dif fer ent im ages of the West ern world, one being the “tooth less mon ster” that had threat ened the very ex is tence of the Turks, and the


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other as the high est form of civ il iza tion, which the Turk ish na tion state wished to em u late, did not help ei ther. The term “East ern Ques tion” had to go, and so it did, as the his tory text books from the pe riod be tween 1940 and 1980 tes tify. Al though the 1970s saw a re in state ment of the Ot to man leg acy into the of fi cial Turk ish na tional iden tity in the form of the TurkishIslamic Syn the sis, the term “East ern Ques tion” nev erthe less had to wait until after the coup of 1980 to make its re mark able come back. Prov ing once again its sym bolic value and sin gu lar ity in the cog ni tive map of Turk ish pol icy mak ers in the con text of iden tity forma tion, the term “East ern Ques tion” in his tory text books be came the locus of re inter pre ta tion of the self and the “other.” As the in creas ingly stronger em pha sis placed on the cul tu rally and re li giously charged as pects of the East ern Ques tion in his tory text books in the 1990s and the twentyfirst cen tury dem on strates, the term con tin ues to mir ror the chang ing dy nam ics in the Turk ish state’s in tri cate re la tion ships with the West ern world.

As Turkey’s thirtyyearlong ef forts and as pi ra tions to be come a mem ber of the EU seem to wane un prec e dent edly in the sec ond decade of the new mil len nium, and as Eu rope grad u ally loses its status as the sole point of ref er ence for Turk ish pol icy mak ers, the im pact on the nar ra tion of the East ern Ques tion in the his tory text books in com ing years is yet to be seen. Turk ish his tory text books, after all, have never ceased to trans mit what the state wishes the Turk ish na tion to know about its his tory, al though the defi ni tion, the con tent, and the com ponents of that his tory have been in con stant de con struc tion and re construc tion since the foun da tion of the Re pub lic.

Notes

1. Mus tafa Kemal, “Eski¸sehir Mu ta sarrıflık Daire sinde Konu¸sma, 15.01.1339 [1923],” in Mus tafa Kemal, Eski¸s ehir-I˙ zmit Konu¸smaları (I˙ stan bul: Kay nak Yayınları, 1993), 57.

2. Mus tafa Kemal, “I˙ zmit Sin ema Binasında Konu¸sma, 19. 01.1339 [1923],” in Kemal, Eski¸s ehir-I˙ zmit Konu¸smaları, 183.

3. I use the term “pro ble mat iza tion” in the Fou caul dian sense, that is, “the set of dis cur sive or non dis cur sive prac tices that makes some thing enter into the play of the true and false, and con sti tutes it as an ob ject for thought (whether under the form of moral re flec tion, sci en tific knowl edge or po lit i cal anal y sis, etc.).” See Michel Fou cault, “The Con cern for Truth,” in Fou cault Live (Inter views 1966–1984), ed. Sil vêre Lo tringer (New York: Semi otext(e), 1989), 456–57. Of course, Ed ward Said’s Orien tal ism the ses that draw from Foucault’s con cept of

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“pro ble mat iza tion” should be kept in mind. See Ed ward W. Said, Orien tal ism (New York: Vin tage, 1978).

4. An anon y mous work ti tled What Is to Be Done with Tur key? Or Tur key, Its Present and Fu ture (Henry Col burn: Lon don, 1950) gives in sights into the way the East ern Ques tion was con cep tu al ized and per ceived in the West ern world.

5. Asa Briggs, Vic to rian Peo ple: Re as sess ment of Per sons and Themes, 1851–1867 (Lon don: Pen guin Books, 1955), 10.

6. Hans Kohn, The Mind of Mod ern Rus sia: His tor i cal and Po lit i cal Thought of Russia’s Great Age (New Bruns wick, NJ: Rut gers Uni ver sity Press, 1955), 17.

7. I˙ nari Rautsi, The East ern Ques tion Re vis ited: Case Stud ies in Ot to man Bal ance of Power (Hel sinki: Hel sinki Uni ver sity Print ing House, 1993), 12.

8. The con cepts of “infra struc tu ral power” and “mod ern state” should be under stood as used in Mi chael Mann’s “The Auton o mous Power of the State, Its Or i gins, Mech a nisms and Re sults,” Archives Eu ro péennes de So ci ol o gie 25 (1984): 185–213. Mann de fines the mod ern state as “the state with infra struc tu ral power” and terms the infra struc tu ral power as “the ca pac ity of the state ac tu ally to pen e trate civil so ci ety, and to im ple ment lo gis ti cally po lit i cal de ci sions through out the realm.”

9. Pal mers ton to Beau vale (Pri vate Com mu ni ca tion), 25 Au gust 1839, quoted in F. S. Rod key, “Lord Pal mers ton and the Re ju ve na tion of Tur key 1830–41, Part II,” Jour nal of Mod ern His tory 2, no. 2 (1930): 202.

10. Çaglar Keyder, State and Class in Tur key: A Study in Cap i tal ist De vel op ment (Lon don: Verso, 1987), 21–22, 34.

11. M. H. Yavuz, “The Trans for ma tion of ‘Empire’ through Wars and Reforms: In te gra tion vs. Op pres sion,” in War and Di plo macy: The Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 and the Treaty of Ber lin, ed. M. Hakan Yavuz and Peter Slu glett (Salt Lake City: Uni ver sity of Utah Press, 2011), 21.

12. W. E. Glad stone, Bul gar ian Hor rors and the Ques tion of the East (Lon don: John Mur ray Glad stone, 1876), 13.

13. David M. Gold frank also of fers a dis cus sion of the East ern Ques tion as a West ern Ques tion in The Or i gins of the Cri mean War (New York: Long man, 1994).

14. Bedia Tan yel Taysı, “For the Peo ple in Spite of the Peo ple? Of fi cial Turkish Iden tity from 1960” (PhD diss., Wash ing ton State Uni ver sity, 2004), 53–54.

15. I use the term “sym bolic cap i tal” in a Bour dieuan sense that “re fers to the de gree of ac cu mu lated pres tige, ce leb rity, con se cra tion of hon our and is founded in a di alec tic of knowl edge and rec og ni tion.” See Pierre Bour dieu, The Field of Cul tural Pro duc tion: Es says on Art and Lit er a ture (New York: Co lum bia Uni ver sity Press, 1993), 7.

16. Sam Ka plan, “‘Re li gious Nationalism’: A Text book Case from Tur key,” Com par a tive Stud ies of South Asia, Af rica and the Mid dle East 25, no. 3 (2005): 669.

17. Er nest Gell ner, Na tions and Na tion al ism (Ox ford: Black well, 1983), 48–49.


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18. Bene dict An der son, Im a gined Com mu nities (Lon don: Verso, 1983), 5–6.19. E. J. Hobs bawm, Na tions and Na tion al ism since 1780 (Cam bridge: Cam

bridge Uni ver sity Press, 1990), 91.20. Apart from his tory teach ing, school life was struc tured in a way to

in cul cate at tach ment to the na tion and create bond ing among the cit i zens of the Re pub lic. Ele men tary school pu pils wear ing black uni forms started each school day by re peat ing an oath in which they prom ised to be in dus tri ous and truth ful as an ideal Turk ish child should be, and swear ing that they would love those younger than them selves, re spect their eld ers, and hap pily sac ri fice their lives for their na tion and father land if nec es sary. Sec on dary and high school pu pils also wore uni forms. Mon u ments and busts of Mus tafa Kemal Atatürk were erected in school yards. On every Mon day and Fri day in front of Atatürk busts, flag cer e mo nies were held, and the na tional an them was sung col lec tively. Atatürk’s “Ad dress to the Turk ish Youth,” one of the cult texts of Ke mal ism that ex horts youth to be ready for duty in times of dan ger in hyper bolic lan guage, was re pro duced in al most all course ma te rial and was reg u larly re peated by stu dents. Sev eral na tional fes ti vals were in vented, and pu pils wore spe cial cos tumes for the oc ca sion and per formed in pa geants to cel e brate them. See Nazan Çiçek, “The Role of Mass Ed u ca tion in NationBuilding in the Ot to man Em pire and the Turk ish Re pub lic, 1870–1930,” in Mass Ed u ca tion and the Lim its of State Build ing, c. 1870–1930, ed. Laur ence Brock liss and Ni cola Shel don (New York: Pal grave Mac mil lan, 2012), 234–41. For a se lec tion of biog ra phies and auto biog ra phies that re flect the in doc tri na tion cam paign of the early re pub li can re gime in schools, see Bekir Onur, Türkiye’de Çocuklu˘gun Ta rihi (An kara: I˙ mge Yayınları, 2005), 376–83. As a work of oral his tory that dwells on the per cep tions of chil dren circa the foun da tion of the Re pub lic, sev eral ac counts of school life can be found in Mine Gö˘gü¸s Tan et al., Cum hu riy ette Çocuktular (I˙ stan bul: Bo˘gaziçi Üniversitesi Yayınları, 2007).

21. Ebru Boyar, Ot to mans, Turks and the Bal kans: Em pire Lost, Re la tions Al tered (Lon don: I. B. Tau ris, 2007), 19.

22. Yesim Bayar, “The Dy namic Na ture of Ed u ca tional Pol i cies and Turk ish Na tion Build ing: Where Does Re li gion Fit In?,” Com par a tive Stud ies of South Asia, Af rica and the Mid dle East 29, no. 3 (2009): 367.

23. Murat Ergin, “Chro matic Turk ish ness: Race, Mod er nity and West ern Schol ars in the Con struc tion of Turk ish Na tional Iden tity” (PhD diss., Uni ver sity of Min ne sota, 2005), 9, 173.

24. In Tur key, cur ric u lum and text book con tent have been al ways con trolled at the na tional level. As ex plained in an Or gan isa tion for Eco nomic Cooperation and De vel op ment (OECD) re port, “the cur ric u lum, sub ject mat ter, syl labi, textbooks and teacher’s guides are sub ject to na tional reg u la tions pre scribed in min ute de tail from An kara. The rule in ed u ca tional man age ment in Tur key is that ‘An kara knows best’” (OECD Re views of Na tional Pol i cies for Ed u ca tion: Tur key 1989, OECD Pub lish ing, 19 April 1989, 20). All text books have to be

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ex am ined and ap proved by the Com mit tee of In struc tion and Ped a gogy at the Min is try of Na tional Ed u ca tion. Al though today many pub lish ers pro duce text books, the con tem po rary text book se lec tion and ap proval pro ce dure does not dif fer from that of 1930s. See F. J. Chil dress, “The Re pub li can Les sons: Ed u cation and Mak ing of Mod ern Tur key” (PhD diss., Uni ver sity of Utah, 2001), 130.

25. Jon a than Boy arin, ed., Re map ping Mem ory: The Pol i tics of Time Space (Min ne ap o lis: Uni ver sity of Min ne ap o lis Press, 1994), 126, quoted in Jef frey K. Olick and Joyce Rob bins Joyce, “So cial Mem ory Stud ies: From ‘Col lec tive Memory’ to the His tor i cal So ci ol ogy of Mne monic Prac tices,” An nual Re view of So ci ol ogy 24 (1998): 105–40, 117.

26. Mark Beis singer, “Na tion al isms That Bark and Na tion al isms That Bite: Er nest Gell ner and the Sub stan ti a tion of Na tions,” in The State of the Na tion: Er nest Gell ner and the The ory of Na tion al ism, ed. John A Hall (Cam bridge: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 1998), 175.

27. This study is built on an indepth ex am ina tion of twentynine Turk ish his tory text books pub lished between 1940 and 2007. Seven teen of those textbooks were taught in all Turk ish pri vate and pub lic schools between the 1940 and 1980, while twelve of them were used between 1980 and 2007. These textbooks were cho sen for this study be cause they are the his tory text books that could be ob tained by the writer in the Turk ish Na tional Li brary in An kara. Since the Turk ish Re pub lic was founded in 1923, un doubt edly other his tory text books were pub lished and used be fore 1940. The his tory text books ti tled Türk Ta ri hi nin Ana Hat ları (The main forms of Turk ish his tory), taught in high schools between 1931 and 1939, were the re vised and abridged ver sions of the texts that made up the Turk ish His tory The sis. Those text books were some what con tro ver sial, and in 1935, Mus tafa Kemal Atatürk com mis sioned some his torians to de vise a new pro gram for his tory writ ing. From 1939 on ward, new his tory text books that were not the abridged ver sion of Türk Tar i hini Ana Hat ları but were writ ten for the ex clu sive use in the schools were pub lished and used. This study chooses the year 1940 as the start ing point be cause the re pub li can re gime reached its point of con sol i da tion around that time. The re pub li can of ficial ideol ogy con structed (and con structed by) the Turk ish His tory The sis embed ded in na tional ed u ca tion crys tal lized to ward the end of the 1930s. The time frame of this study ends in 2007, be cause in the fol low ing years the same textbooks pub lished in the mid dle of the first decade of the new mil len nium went into new edi tions. Be cause this study anal y ses a se ries of text books pro duced for the con sump tion of pri mary, sec on dary, and high school stu dents, the tar geted au di ence of the text books ex am ined here in clude the whole body of stu dents at tend ing those schools. As men tioned, text book con tent has al ways been controlled at the na tional level in Tur key. No text book un in spected and un au thorized by the Min is try of Na tional Ed u ca tion finds its way into the class room. This has as sured uni for mity and al most com plete ho mog en iza tion in the cur ric ulum of all schools across the coun try. In some cases, the text books do not even


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bear the names of the au thors, dem on strat ing that the Min is try of Na tional Ed u ca tion has paid at ten tion to con tent, rather than au thor ship, in choos ing text books. As the ex am ina tion of seven teen text books pub lished between 1940 and 1980 dem on strates, al though dif fer ent au thors wrote them, the con tent of the text books re mained iden ti cal. This also ap plies to the twelve text books used between 1980 and 2007. The Min is try of Ed u ca tion picked the text books whose con tent com plied with the par tic u lar under stand ing of OttomanTurkish his tory that was cham pioned by the power hold ers of the time. The four teen text books that I ex am ined (yet do not refer to in this study be cause they avoid the term “the East ern Ques tion”) are the fol low ing: (1) Enver Beh nan ¸S apolyo, Kemal Atatürk ve Milli Mücadele Ta rihi (no grade) (An kara: Ber kalp Kit a bevi, 1944); (2) Tarih V (fifth grade) (I˙ stan bul: Maarif Mat baası, 1945); (3) Arif Müfid Man sel, Cavid Bay sun, and Enver Ziya Karal, Yeni ve Yakın Ça˘glar Ta rihi Lise Üçüncü Sınıf (eleventh grade) (An kara: MEB Yayınları, 1947); (4) Faruk Kur tu lu¸s and Osman Kur tu lu¸s, Tarih V (fifth grade) (I˙ stan bul: Neb io˘glu Kitap, 1950); (5) Enver Koray, Tarih III Lis eler I˙ çin Yeni ve Yakın Ça˘glar (eleventh grade) (I˙ stan bul: I˙ nkılap Kit a bevi, 1951); (6) Ali Ekrem I˙ nal and Nu ret tin Or mancı, Tarih Orta III (eighth grade) (I˙ stan bul: Atlas Yayınevi, 1953); (7) Zu huri Danı¸sman, Tarih V (fifth grade) (I˙ stan bul: Samim Sadık Özaygen Ne¸sriyat, 1955); (8) Hilmi Oran, I˙ lko kul lar için Tarih V (fifth grade) (I˙ stan bul: I˙ nkılap Kit a bevi, 1955); (9) Emin Oktay, Tarih Orta III (eighth grade) (I˙ stan bul: Atlas Yayınevi, 1956); (10) Halit Aksan and Büruz Sar mat, Tarih I˙ lko kul V (fifth grade) (I˙ stan bul: I˙ nkılap Kit a bevi, 1956); (11) Enver Ziya Karal, Yeni ve Yakın Çaglar Ta rihi (eleventh grade) (I˙ stanbul: Maarif Basımevi, 1957); (12) Enver Beh nan S apolyo, Yeni Lise Kit a pları Yeni ve Yakın Ça˘glar ve Türkiye Ta rihi Lise III (eleventh grade) (I˙ stan bul: I˙ nkılap Kit abevi, 1960); (13) Ali Ekrem I˙ nal and Rakım Çalapala, Tarih V (fifth grade) (I˙ stanbul: Atlas Yayınevi, 1962); (14) Yılmaz Öztuna, Tarih Lise III (eleventh grade) (I˙ stan bul: Milli E˘gitim Ba kanlı˘gı, 1976).

28. Sadri Ertem and Kazım Nami Duru, Or tao kul I˙ çin Tarih III (eighth grade) (An kara: Maarif Mat baası, 1941), 119.

29. Cezar Mus tafa, Or tao kul lar I˙ çin Tarih III (eighth grade) (I˙ stan bul: Okul Kit a pları Türk, 1951), 133.

30. Bedriye Atsız and Hilmi Oran, Yeni Lise Kit a pları, Tarih III (eleventh grade) (I˙ stan bul: Yeni ve Yakın Ça˘glar, I˙ nkılap Kit a bevi, 1953), 162.

31. Amy Singer, “The Ot to man Leg acy for Con tem po rary Turk ish Cul ture, In sti tu tions, and Val ues,” Com par a tive Stud ies of South Asia, Af rica and the Mid dle East 31, no. 3 (2011): 553–56.

32. Aysel Morin, “Craft ing a Na tion: The Mythic Con struc tion of the New Turk ish Na tional Iden tity in Atatürk’s Nutuk” (PhD diss., Uni ver sity of Ne braska, 2004), 170.

33. Boyar, Ot to mans, Turks and the Bal kans, 18.34. Bü¸sra Er sanlı, “The Ot to man Em pire in the Historiog ra phy of the

Kem al ist Era: A The ory of Fatal De cline,” in The Ot to mans and the Bal kans: A

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Dis cus sion of Historiog ra phy, ed. Fik ret Adanır and Su raiya Fa roqhi (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 121.

35. Bü¸sra Er sanlı Behar, I˙ kti dar ve Tarih Türkiye’de Resmi Tarih Tez i nin Olu¸sumu (1929–1937), 2nd ed. (I˙ stan bul: Afa, 1996); Etienne Co peaux, Tarih Ders Kit a plarında (1931–1993) Türk Tarih Te zin den Türk-Islam Sente zine [De L’Adriatique à La Mer de Chine], trans. Ali Berk tay (I˙ stan bul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998).

36. Bayar, “Dy namic Na ture of Ed u ca tional Pol i cies,” 368.37. Morin, “Craft ing the Na tion,” 246–47.38. Türk Ta rihi Hey eti Az a ları, Türk Ta ri hi nin Ana Hat ları (I˙ stan bul: Dev let

Mat baası, 1930), 1.39. Mi khail Bakh tin, The Di alogic Imag i na tion: Four Es says (Aus tin: Uni ver sity

of Texas Press, 1980), 281.40. Co peaux, Tarih Ders Kit a plarında, 51–53.41. Cemil Aydın, “Between Oc ci den tal ism and the Glo bal Left: Is la mist

Cri tiques of the West in Tur key,” Com par a tive Stud ies of South Asia, Af rica and the Mid dle East 26, no. 3 (2006): 451.

42. For an anal y sis of “the epis te mo log ical dif fer ence between the West and the pro cess of West ern iza tion” in the Turk ish col lec tive con scious, and the national ap oria of West ern iza tion against and/or in spite of the West, see Emre Kay han, “Between Apol ogy and Uto pia: A Study on the Sources of Turk ish Con duct” (PhD diss., Fletcher School of Law and Di plo macy, 2009), 103.

43. Ibid., 169–71.44. Ergin, “Chro matic Turk ish ness,” 11.45. Ça˘glar Keyder, “A His tory and Geog ra phy of Turk ish Na tion al ism,” in

Cit i zen ship and the Nation-State in Greece and Tur key, ed. Faruk Bir tek and Thalia Dra go nas (Lon don and New York: Rout ledge, 2005), 12.

46. Twelve text books pub lished between 1980 and 2007 have been ex am ined for this study. In ad di tion to the four text books quoted later in the chpater, the eight un quoted text books are the fol low ing: (1) Rakım Çalapala, Sos yal Bil giler V (fifth grade) (I˙ stan bul: I˙ nkılap Kit a bevi, 1988); (2) I˙ lko kul lar I˙ çin Sos yal Bil giler V (fifth grade) (I˙ stan bul: Milli E˘gitim Basımevi, 1993); (3) Erdo˘gan Sahin Tahir, Os manlı Ta rihi Lise I (ninth grade) (An kara: Koza E˘gitim Yayıncılık, 1993); (4) Kara Kemal, Milli Tarih Orta II (seventh grade) (I˙ stan bul: Se rhat Yayınları, 1994); (5) Tarih Lise II (tenth grade) (I˙ stan bul: Mil san Basım A.¸S, 2003); (6) Erdo˘gan ¸Sahin Tahir and Ali Kaya, Os manlı Ta rihi II (tenth grade) (An kara: Koza E˘gitim ve Yayıncılık, 1993); (7) Ahmet Güne¸s and Süleyman Özbek, Tarih Lise II (tenth grade) (I˙ stan bul: Tu ti bay Yayınları: 2006); (8) Ahmet Ba¸saran, Ali Sert, Lütfi I˙ lgün, and Lis eler I˙ çin Os manlı Ta rihi (ninthtentheleventh grade) (An kara: Dev let Kit a pları MEB, 2007); Ahmet Güne¸s and Süleyman Özbek, Tarih Lise II (tenth grade) (I˙ stan bul: Tu ti bay Yayınları, 2006).

47. Avonna Deanne Swartz, “Text books and Na tional Ideol ogy: A Con tent Anal y sis of the Sec on dary Turk ish His tory Text books Used in the Re pub lic of Tur key since 1929” (PhD diss., Uni ver sity of Texas, 1997), 78.


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48. Co peaux, Tarih Ders Kit a plarında, 62.49. TurkishIslamic Syn the sis as a po lit i cal ideal and dis course began to

ger mi nate in the 1970s. The ideo logues of the rightwing or gan iza tion Aydınlar Oca˘gı (The Hearth of the En light ened) were mainly re spon sible for its for mu lation. As Zürcher cor rectly points out, “ac cord ing to this the ory, Turk ish cul ture was built on two pil lars: a 2500 yearold Turk ish ele ment and a 1000 yearold Is lamic ele ment.” See Erik J. Zürcher, Tur key: A Mod ern His tory (Lon don: I. B.Tau ris, 1998), 303. As Taysı sug gests, between 1970 and 1980, “the gen eral nature of the ideol ogy of those in power had more of a Tur kist and Is la mist tinge to it, thus the state tol er ated, and in some cases fos tered Is lamic and Tur kist expres sions of iden tity.” See Taysı, “For the Peo ple in Spite of the Peo ple?,” 97. It was only after 1980s, how ever, that the TurkishIslamic Syn the sis came to encom pass and rep re sent the main pa ram e ters of of fi cial Turk ish na tional identity. Kem al ist sec u lar ism was re as sessed in order to reach a res o lu tion between the Is lamic Ot to man past and the sec u lar Turk ish present. For fur ther read ing on the TurkishIslamic Syn the sis, see Gökhan Çetinsaya, “Re think ing Na tion alism and Islam: Some Pre lim i nary Notes on the Roots of ‘TurkishIslamic Synthesis’ in Mod ern Turk ish Po lit i cal Thought,” Mus lim World 89 (1999): 350–86; Boz kurt Güvenç, Gen cay ¸Saylan, I˙ lhan Tekeli, and ¸Ser a fet tin Turan, Türk-I˙ slam Sen tezi [TurkishIslamic Syn the sis] (I˙ stan bul: Sar mal, 1991); I˙ lhan Tekeli, “TürkI˙ slam Sen tezi Üzerine” [On TurkishIslamic Syn the sis], Bilim ve Sanat 77 (1987): 5–8; Paul J. Mag na rella, “State Pol i tics: De sec u lar iza tion, State Cor po ra tism, and Elite Be hav ior in Tur key,” in Human Ma te ri al ism: A Model of So ci ocul tu ral Systems and a Strat egy for Anal y sis (Gaines ville: Uni ver sity Press of Flor ida, 1993), 87–113.

50. Nora Fisher Onar, “Echoes of a Uni ver sal ism Lost: Rival Rep re sen tations of the Ot to mans in Today’s Tur key,” Mid dle East ern Stud ies 45, no. 2 (2009): 233.

51. H. Kaya, M. Öztürk, D. Kah yao˘glu, and A. Çetiner, “The Struc ture of the Turk ish Ed u ca tion System,” in Clio in the Bal kans: The Pol i tics of His tory Ed u-ca tion, ed. C. Kou louri (Thes sal o niki: CDRSE, 2002), 507.

52. Taysı, “For the Peo ple in Spite of the Peo ple?,” 125.53. Mükerrem K. Su and Ahmet Mumcu, Lis eler I˙ çin T.C I˙ nkılap Ta rihi ve

Atatürkçülük, 9th ed. (I˙ stan bul: MEB Basımevi, 1989), 306–7.54. Nihat Gürel Kah veci, “Teach ing ‘Europe’ in Tur key: An Anal y sis of

Sec on dary His tory Text books 1956–2005” (PhD diss., Uni ver sity of Il li nois at UrbanaChampaign, 2007), 53.

55. Tarih, Lise II (tenth grade) (I˙ stan bul: MEB TTK Basımevi, 1993), 55.56. Veli ¸Sirin, Tarih II, Lis eler I˙ çin (tenth grade) (I˙ stan bul: Gen da¸s, 1995),

92–93.57. Onar, “Echoes of a Uni ver sal ism Lost,” 229.58. Ça˘glar Keyder, “‘Whither the Pro ject of Mod er nity?’ Tur key in the

1990s,” in Re think ing Mod er nity and Na tional Iden tity in Tur key, ed. Sibel Bozdo˘gan and Re¸sat Ka saba (Seat tle: Uni ver sity of Wash ing ton Press, 1997), 42–43.

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59. Taysı, “For the Peo ple in Spite of the Peo ple?,” 11.60. Many mem bers of the cur rently in cum bent Ada let ve Kalkınma Par tisi

(Jus tice and De vel op ment Party) are neoOttomanists pit ting Ot to man plu ral ism against uni ver sal ist re pub li can ism. The neoOttoman nar ra tive em pha sizes mod er ate Is lamic con ser va tism over the strict sec u lar ist prin ci ples of Ke mal ism. It also sug gests as much, if not more, po lit i cal, eco nomic, and cul tural en gagement with Is lamic coun tries as with Eu rope. See Erikli Cihan, “Through the Turk ish Look ing Glass: Turkey’s Di ver gent Nar ra tives, Na tional Iden tity and Foreign Pol icy” (master’s the sis, George town Uni ver sity, 2010), 30.

61. Draw ing on the anal y sis of Türkmen, we can as sert that his tory textbooks in the twentyfirst cen tury are not the only ones in the cur ric u lum that re flect a new em pha sis on Islam, which by defi ni tion points to a more em brac ing at ti tude to ward the Is lamic Ot to man past. As Türkmen as serts, “the way Atatürk is pre sented in text books changes from 1995 to 2007–8. The 2007–8 textbooks show a new con cern for Atatürk’s rel i gios ity and his knowl edge about Islam. Anec dotes prov ing his deep Qo ranic knowl edge are in serted into chap ters and sup ported with photo graphs of him in prayer in the unit ‘Re li gion and Sec u lar ism. . . .’ Such a con cern is not seen in the 1995 text books.” See Buket Türkmen, “A Trans formed Kem al ist Islam or a New Is lamic Civic Mo ral ity? A Study of ‘Re li gious Cul ture and Morality’ Text books in the Turk ish High School Cur ric ula,” Com par a tive Stud ies of South Asia, Af rica and the Mid dle East 29, no. 3 (2009): 381–97, here 394.

62. Vic dan Cazgır, Ser vet Yavuz, and Niy azi Cey hun, Tarih Lise II (tenth grade), 2nd ed. (An kara: Dev let Kit a pları, 2007), 58–59.

63. Taysı, “For the Peo ple in Spite of the Peo ple?,” 47.

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Epi logueLeg a cies of the East ern Ques tion

Lu cien J . Frary and Mara Ko zel sky

Mac e do nia Square, the cen tral meet ing place in Skopje, Re pub lic of Mac e do nia, is part of an am bi tious “anti quiza tion” pro ject fi nanced by the govern ment that re flects the bus tling cap i tal as a his tor i cal crossroads. Syn the siz ing more than two mil len nia of his tory, the square’s cen ter piece fea tures an enor mous white mar ble foun tain with a twenty twometerhigh bronze Al ex an der the Great on a rear ing Bu ceph alus. Gotse Del chev and Dame Gruev, rev o lu tion ary lead ers and found ers of nineteenthcentury in de pen dence move ments in Bul garia and Mac e donia, flank stat ues of the Byz an tine em peror Jus tin ian I (whose birthplace is twelve miles out side Skopje), and Tsar Sam uel, the leader of the me di eval Bul gar ian Em pire. Newly im a gined twentiethcentury he roes, such as the lex i cog ra pher Dim i trija Chu pov ski and the Yu go slav pol i tician Met o dija AndonovChento, com plete this pantheon of nation alis tic kitsch, in cor po rat ing the na tive cham pions of sev eral Bal kan states. Anach ron is tic pub lic mon u ments like these il lu mi nate the con fus ing na ture of bor ders and iden tities in the Bal kans. The “Skopje 2014” pro ject, which in cludes plans for about twenty build ings and forty mon u ments, under scores the fraught pol i tics of his tor i cal mem ory and

Statue of Alexander the Great on horseback in Macedonia Square, Skopje, Macedonia. (photo by Raso MK / Wikimedia Commons)

Epilogue

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the at tempt of Mac e do nians to grap ple with a state created, in part, by the East ern Ques tion.

When the Ot to man Em pire col lapsed in the wake of the First World War, the East ern Ques tion by all ap pear ances ex pired. Many con tem porary ob serv ers re garded the Trea ties of Sèvres (1920) and Lau sanne (1923) as the de noue ment to the strug gle for the Ot to man in her i tance. Brit ish pol i ti cian and his to rian J. A. R. Mar ri ott con cluded the fourth edi tion of his land mark study, pub lished in 1940, with the trans fer ence of the Turk ish cap i tal from I˙ stan bul to An kara and the crea tion of the mod ern Turk ish Re pub lic. Ac cord ing to Mar ri ott, “the birth of a new Na tion in the brac ing at mos phere of An a to lia” closed one as pect of the East ern Ques tion. He vaguely con ceded, how ever, that other fac tors still awaited so lu tions.1 More de ci sively, M. S. An der son ended his 1966 sur vey with a dis cus sion of the peace trea ties of the post war years: “With the Lau sanne set tle ment the East ern Ques tion was no more.”2 An der son argued that the dis ap pear ance of em pires lim ited the ri val ries of the great pow ers and fos tered the wellbeing of nationstates. Still, An der son also hinted at the trou bles em bed ded in un satis fied ter ri to rial claims. In such a man ner, the two stan dard works of the East ern Question al luded to is sues un re solved by the post war set tle ment.3

Be gin ning in the nine teenth cen tury, the East ern Ques tion evolved from Eu ro pean pre sump tions to man age a per ceived Ot to man de cline into an elab orate inter na tional con test in volv ing mil lions of peo ple and doz ens of states. The pat tern of com pe ti tion and ri valry, how ever, did not sud denly halt with the par ti tion of the Ot to man Em pire ac cord ing to the Treaty of Sèvres. In stead, the con trived so lu tion of the East ern Ques tion, the crea tion of the man date states of the Mid dle East, unleashed a new gen er a tion of prob lems that have dom i nated the twen ti eth cen tury. Thus, American his to rian L. Carl Brown has sug gested that the East ern Ques tion “still ex ists,” al beit “in muted form.”4 More gen er ally, it could be said that the East ern Ques tion has shaped many of “the struc tu ral is sues and con flicts of mod ern East ern Eu ro pean and Mid dle East ern pol i tics.”5

This book under stands the East ern Ques tion as be long ing to a partic u lar his tor i cal era with spe cific his tor i cal ac tors. The con cept emerged in the vo cab u lary of Eu ro pean pol i tics in the 1820s as pub li cists and pol i ti cians retrospec tively ap plied the East ern Ques tion to past events, in some cases dat ing its or i gins as far back as the Per sian in va sion of Greece. For a cen tury, con tem po rar ies ap plied the con cept to de scribe

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the ten sions un leashed by the RussianOttoman con fron ta tion of the late eigh teenth cen tury through the end of the First World War. As chapters in this book dem on strate, Eu ro pean con cerns about the East ern Ques tion had real and often dev as tat ing con se quences for peo ples of the Ot to man Em pire and in hab i tants of its west ern and north ern bor derlands. His tor i cal phe nom ena of such sig nifi cance do not sim ply exit the stage of his tory with out leav ing a last ing leg acy. In these final pages, we pro pose that con tem po rary na tional iden tities, ter ri to rial boun dar ies, con flicts, and cul tures from the Bal kans to the Cau ca sus have deep roots in East ern Ques tion pol i cies, wars, and mi gra tions.

As his to rians, we do not in tend this brief foray into af fairs of the present as an ex haus tive re search essay. Such is the do main of po lit i cal sci en tists and jour nal ists. Rather, we are tak ing the op por tu nity to re flect in a gen eral way on the leg acy of the East ern Ques tion. Here we aim to high light the lit er a ture that has al ready begun to con tem plate the East ern Question’s her i tage in the twen ti eth and twentyfirst cen tu ries and to en cour age schol ars to fur ther ex plore how this past inter na tional dilemma has shaped the present. Al though the East ern Ques tion may no longer sur vive as for mu lated by nineteenthcentury dip lo mats, il lu minat ing its leg acy pro vides a key to under stand ing the po lit i cal cul ture that still ex ists in the Bal kans, the Black Sea re gion, the Cau ca sus, and the Mid dle East. As il lus trated by the Mac e do nian mon u ments, the East ern Ques tion still frames how in dig e nous ac tors create col lec tive iden tities and re la tion ships to the world around them. On a more danger ous level, many cur rent con flicts in the bor der land re gions between the for mer Rus sian and Ot to man Em pires con tinue to ex hibit the po lit ical pat tern of East ern Ques tion dis putes. Rec og niz ing the un in tended con se quences of foreign inter ven tion, whether for peace en force ment, hu man i tar ian rea sons, or eco nomic selfinterest, has much to teach us about the un fore seen chal lenges of inter na tional re la tions and inter state ri valry in a per sis tently vol a tile and frag mented re gion of the world. The ouster of Cri mean Pres i dent Yanu ko vych and Russia’s foray into Cri mea in Feb ru ary 2014 at tests to the rel e vance of the East ern Ques tion when con tem plat ing the his tory of the present.

f

Un sur pris ingly, cen tu ries of the East ern Ques tion have left their toll. Al though the ac tiv ity of na tive pop u la tions me di ated ex ter nal in tru sion, greatpower pol i tics swept up local ac tors who reg u larly bore the bur den

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of en su ing wars. Trea ties de signed by West ern pow ers, even when in te grat ing de sires of se lect in dig e nous in tel lec tu als and na tion al ists, typ i cally failed to cor re spond to na tive re al ities. By the early twen ti eth cen tury, the rel a tive eth nic and re li gious har mony fos tered by cen tu ries of Ot to man rule had dis in te grated. A mix ture of foreign and do mes tic forces had im posed a new frame work based on na tional sov e reignty and eth nic ho mo ge ne ity. As a re sult, neigh bors turned on neigh bors in con tin u ous lo cal ized vi o lence sparked by new geo graphic di vi sions and eco nomic dis lo ca tions. Chris tian state pow ers in the Bal kan Pe nin sula and north ern Black Sea basin pushed Mus lims south ward and fur ther east. The Ot to mans, mean while, re moved Ar me ni ans from their midst.6

The Eu ro pean pow ers re sponded to the lo cal ized vi o lence (which they, in part, pro voked) with car to graphic ex peri ments and hu man itar ian inter ven tions. De ci sions made in smokefilled Eu ro pean con ference halls in the nine teenth cen tury gen er ated much of the twentyfirst century’s po lit i cal map of south east ern Eu rope. Sim i larly, the imag i nary geog ra phy of pol i tics and iden tity that has set tled over the space between the Bal kans through the Mid dle East is mostly the re sult of foreign think ing.7 The new Eu rope and Mid dle East created by the peace trea ties end ing the First World War failed to re solve the prob lems of eth nic vi olence that they os ten sibly sought to ad dress. In stead, fric tion im medi ately en sued between Mus lims and Chris tians, Serbs and Croats, Bul gar ians and Greeks, Jews and Pal es tin ians, Ku waitis and Ira qis, and so on. In the Cau ca sus, sim i larly, hos til ity among Ar me ni ans and Azerbai ja nis, Geor gians and Rus sians det o nated with the end of tsar ist rule, as myths of “an cient ha treds” were born.

The vi o lence of the First World War per sisted after 1918 for many of the new states created by the Eu ro pean pow ers, as up ris ings and bor der wars con tin ued in the space of the for mer Ot to man Em pire. In some cases, such as in the inter war King dom of Yu go sla via, un re solved ten sions erupted dur ing the Sec ond World War and be yond.8 Ex periments of selfrule in the Cau ca sus ended through the ap pli ca tion of brute force.9 Sub se quently, the So viet Union con tin ued the pro cess of ex pel ling Mus lims from the north ern Black Sea shore. Eu ro pean pen etra tion con tin ued to guide the de vel op ments of the new man date states as the strug gle for the Ot to man suc ces sion con tin ued into the Cold War.10

Nat u rally, not all the region’s con tem po rary con flicts are due to the pol i cies gen er ated by the East ern Ques tion. Yet nearly all of them have some or i gin in the pre dom i nant prob lem of nineteenthcentury

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inter na tional re la tions. An il lus tra tive ex am ple is the in fa mous ex change between Church ill and Sta lin in 1944 known as “the per cent ages agreement,” which pre sumed the right of the great pow ers to di vide East ern Eu rope into spheres of in flu ence. Both war time lead ers, well versed in mod ern Eu ro pean his tory, relied on the clear prec e dent gen er ated by cen tu ries of East ern Ques tion inter ven tions in East ern Eu rope to carve up the re gion into zones of do min ion. In a sim i lar in stance, when discuss ing the ques tion of the Turk ish Straits dur ing the war time con ference at Pots dam in July 1945, So viet foreign min is ter Vya ches lav Mol otov relied on the East ern Ques tion trea ties of 1805 (the RussianOttoman De fen sive Al li ance) and 1833 (Un kiar Ske lessi) to press for So viet bases on Turk ish ter ri tory.11

Dur ing the Cold War, the im po si tion of a strong, uni fy ing na tion al ist prin ci ple in the So viet Union, Yu go sla via, and the Re pub lic of Tur key, ap peared to sup press the sec tar ian and eth nic vi o lence gen er ated in the cru cible of the East ern Ques tion. The Yu go sla vian wars of the 1990s, the NagornoKarabakh con flict, and the re sur gence of Kurd ish na tion alism soon shat tered this im pres sion. The re vi val of eth nic and sec tar ian clashes re vealed that au thor i tar ian na tional pol i cies had not solved the old con flicts em bed ded in East ern Ques tion af fairs but had merely put them into a deep freeze. Sim i larly, presentday con flicts over sym bols, he roes, and home lands in the Bal kans, the Black Sea re gion, and the Cau ca sus di rectly stem from greatpower ri val ries in the ter ri tory of the for mer Ot to man Em pire. An on go ing issue in volves com mon place as sump tions about the mean ing of “East” and “West” con structed by East ern Ques tion po lit i cal dis course and how these cat e go ries can cloud our ap pre ci a tion of re al ity.12

Per haps more than any of the bor der land re gions of the for mer Ot toman Em pire, Tur key bat tles the leg acy of the East ern Ques tion today. Whether com ing to terms with longstanding fears of dis mem ber ment or de bates over Turkey’s entry into the EU, echoes of the East ern Question en dure. Mem ory of the East ern Ques tion per meates Turk ish concep tions of its own state hood and its foreign pol icy. In some cases, as Nazan Çiçek points out in this vol ume, this mem ory has created a lin gering re sent ment of West ern inter fer ence. In other cases, as Ohran Kemal Cen giz, a col um nist for the Turk ish news paper Zaman, has argued, the leg acy man i fests it self in a “se cur ity state neuro sis.” In the after math of cen tu ries of Eu ro pean de bates about par ti tion ing the Ot to man Em pire, Turkey’s found ers and sub se quent rul ing par ties have had “a deep fear of los ing the home land as a whole.”13

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Mean while, the lex i con of nineteenthcentury inter na tional re la tions (and the schol arly and jour na lis tic lit er a ture that lent it le git i macy) pro moted the deepseated no tion of Tur key as a nonEuropean power. “Other ing” dis course that under girded the East ern Ques tion still ex ists in Eu ro pean pol i tics and the con tin u ing de bate over Turkey’s can di dacy for the EU. Is Tur key part of Eu rope, or not? Such ques tions and their an swers have as sumed a con sis tently es sen tial ist tone, with much of the op po si tion re volv ing around the na ture of Turk ish cul ture and whether Mus lims can be con sid ered Eu ro pean. The Cy prus dis pute, mean while, has mag nified the prob lem pro foundly. Dis course around Turkey’s entry into the EU, in other words, has much in com mon with the West ern por trayal of the Ot to man Em pire dur ing the nine teenth cen tury and the leg acy of Eu ro pean inter ven tion in Ot to man af fairs.14

As Turk ish inter est in join ing the EU wanes, Mus tafa Kemal Atatürk’s vi sion of a highly mod ern ized, sec u lar, and homog e nous eth nic nation state has given way to a na tion al ist model based on a more dis tant past. In place of Ke mal ism, Turk ish pol i ti cians and na tion al ists have turned to the Ot to man Em pire for in spi ra tion. The re sult has been called “neoOttomanism,” and more pop u larly, “Ot to ma nia.”15 Many books, theat rical works, and tele vi sion shows set in the Ot to man era have reached Turk ish au di ences in re cent decades. Turk ish fash ion in cor po rates Otto man style, and res tau rants fea ture Ot to man dishes. Many Turk ish women have re turned to the veil. NeoOttoman pol icy mak ers cel e brate the Is lamic and multi eth nic his tory of Turkey’s past and en vi sion an im por tant eco nomic and cul tural role in the for mer Ot to man space. The Turk ish govern ment has in creased trade with neigh bor ing coun tries.16 The re cently es tab lished Black Sea Eco nomic Coop er a tion (BSEC) and the South east ern Eu ro pean Coop er a tion Pro cess (SEECP) pro vide a frame work for this new or ien ta tion.17 Turk ish mis sion ar ies, many of whom fol low the teach ings of Mus lim cleric Fe tul lah Gülen, spread their prac tice of Islam to the peo ples of Cri mea, the Cau ca sus, and Central Asia. Gülen sup port ers dis tin guish An a to lian Islam from Ara bian Islam. They char ac ter ize the for mer as in flu enced by Sufi mys ti cism and the teach ings of Said Nursi, a Mus lim theo lo gian who em pha sized pair ing the tra di tion of Ot to man clas si cal learn ing with mod ern ad vances in sci ence. Rooted in ed u ca tion in itia tives, the movement’s ex pan sion ist im pulse fol lows the con tours of the for mer Ot to man Em pire and the Mus lim re gions of the for mer So viet Union.18

His tor i cal mem ory in vig o rates Turk ish inter est in areas of the for mer Ot to man realm, al though prag matic ties with the pop u la tions of Cri mea

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and the Cau ca sus in form Turk ish po lit i cal and eco nomic be hav ior. De scen dants of the ref u gees who fled Rus sia and the Bal kans dur ing the nu mer ous RussianOttoman wars and East ern Ques tion con flicts, for ex am ple, con sti tute ac tive mi nor ity groups in Tur key. Some, such as the large di as pora com mu nities of Cir cas sians and Cri mean Ta tars, who im mi grated to Tur key in multi ple large waves through out the nine teenth cen tury, ad vo cate for Turk ish sup port in the af fairs of their home lands.19

Be yond Tur key, the leg acy of the East ern Ques tion can be seen in the bor der land re gions between the for mer Rus sian and Ot to man Em pires. In Bul garia, for ex am ple, Bul gar ian Mus lims, or Po maks, thrive de spite centurieslong spo radic eth no cul tu ral an tag o nism with their non Muslim neigh bors. Al though the most re cent statedirected on slaught against Bulgarianspeaking Mus lims and Bul gar ian Turks under Todor Zhiv kov re sulted in the tragic ex o dus of thou sands of in di vid u als, over half a mil lion Bul gar ian Mus lims and Bul gar ian Turks still re side within Bul garia. Con cen trated in the East ern Rho dopes and north east ern Lu dog o rie re gion, many Bul gar ian Mus lims have mo bi lized be hind the ban ner of the Move ment for Rights and Free doms (Dvizhe nie za prava i svo bodi), a cen trist po lit i cal party that has be come in creas ingly vis ible in re cent years. Their pres ence adds com plex ity and tex ture to an intri guing re gion and con sti tutes one of the many sen si tive lo cales shaped by the East ern Ques tion.

For those of us bene fit ting from hind sight, it seems ob vi ous that the twentiethcentury ex peri ments in so cial ism in the Bal kans re solved few of the under ly ing causes of con flict. One of the more im por tant de bates today con sists of the dis puted ter ri tory of Ko sova, the most re cent state created through greatpower inter ven tion. In fact, for those look ing for a link between past and present, Ko sova tes tifies to the fail ure of interna tional me di a tion to over power the region’s in hab i tants. Kos o vars today still as so ciate with the clan, fam ily, and re gional ties that the forces of a NATO or EUguided “in de pen dent” state could not har ness.20 The stub born pa ro chi al ism alive in Ko sova is sim i lar to that en coun tered by nineteenthcentury dip lo mats when they tried to mold the re gion along “West ern” pat terns. Ko sova also stands as a tes ti mony to the lon gev ity of East ern Ques tion align ments in the postOttoman world. Ninety eight UN states rec og nize its in de pen dence, while Rus sia and Ser bia con tinue to dis pute its ex is tence.

The status of Mac e do nia as an in de pen dent state and the ques tion of Mac e do nian iden tity, al luded to at the be gin ning of this epi logue,

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sim i larly il lu mi nate the con tested na ture of pol i tics and iden tity in the his tor i cal area of the East ern Ques tion. Al though the Re pub lic of Mac edo nia has been a mem ber of the UN since 1993, Greece con tin ues to chal lenge the usage of the name “Mac e do nia,” be cause of the his tor ical and ter ri to rial am bi gu ity of the term and the mil lions of Greeks who iden tify them selves as Mac e do nian. Thus, the pro vi sional ref er ence of the For mer Yu go slav Re pub lic of Mac e do nia (FYROM) re mains the of fi cial mon i ker. Mac e do nian pol i ti cians strug gle to create a “Mac e donian iden tity” in a state com posed of many dif fer ent eth nic and re ligious groups, in clud ing Turks, Serbs, Bos nians, Ar o ma nians, Roma, and a quar ter of the pop u la tion that selfidentifies as Al ba nian.

Like Tur key and the Bal kan Pe nin sula, the Cau ca sus also bears the im print of the East ern Ques tion. Ar gu ably, of all the areas under dis cussion, the leg acy here is cur rently the most vol a tile and the least understood. Prob lems in the Cau ca sus range widely to in clude eth nic and sec tar ian dis putes, re gion al iza tion, and stalled tran si tions to de moc racy. Wars fought over Abk ha zia, Chech nya, and Kar a bakh in the 1990s and the first decade of the new mil len nium failed to re solve la tent ten sions, lead ing many ex perts to de scribe the re gion as one of “fro zen conflicts.”21 Dis placed peo ples from these re gions fan out into sur rounding states and strug gle for sur vi val. More over, in what ap pears to be a mod ern re en act ment of the East ern Ques tion, Rus sia, the EU, and Tur key vie for in flu ence in the re gion. In the past, great pow ers were inter ested in the Cau ca sus for its ports, geo stra tegic lo ca tion at the inter sec tion of the Rus sian and Ot to man Em pires and Eur asian trade routes, and, in the case of Brit ain, ac cess to Per sia.22 Today com pe ti tion takes a sim i lar pat tern of foreign inter fer ence but re volves around oil re serves in the Cas pian Sea and marks the entry of the United States as a key player. The prob lem here is not the pur chas ing of oil but the char ac ter iza tion of the re gion as in trin sic to na tional se cur ity inter ests, a plat form that in creas ingly jus tifies inter fer ence.23

In an ef fort to main tain its tra di tional sphere of in flu ence in the south ern Cau ca sus as well as its monop oly over en ergy sup plies to Eu rope, Rus sia ma neu vers to block or con trol Cas pian oil trade with the West.24 Al though hes i tant to an tag o nize Rus sia by grant ing member ship to the states of the south ern Cau ca sus, NATO began reach ing out to the re gion after the So viet Union col lapsed. Cur rently no Cauca sian states be long to NATO, but they all par tic i pate in the NATO pro gram Part ner ship for Peace. Tur key, mean while, with fewer resources than Rus sia or the West, nev er the less ac tively en gages the

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Cau ca sus through BSEC, SEECP, and Black Sea for, a navalbased “peace keep ing” force.

At the mo ment, the south ern Cau ca sus is split fairly evenly between spheres of in flu ence, with Ar me nia seek ing sup port from Rus sia, Azerbai jan from Tur key, and Geor gia from the EU and NATO in sti tu tions.25 Twentyfirstcentury greatpower pol i tics in this re gion of the world, among other things, has as sisted the re ar ma ment of states of the Cau casus. Pet ro dol lars from Rus sia, the United States, and Tur key have sped up this pro cess.26 The RussianGeorgian War of 2008 il lus trates the dan ger ous con se quences of ex ter nal com pe ti tion in this re gion. Russia’s inter ven tion on be half of South Os se tia and Abk ha zia has guar an teed nei ther in de pen dence nor stabil ity. It did, how ever, cost mil lions of dol lars, re sulted in thou sands of ref u gees, and caused tre men dous dam age to the Geor gian econ omy. Es ti mates of human cas u al ties range from a few to a few thou sand. An a lysts such as Vicken Che ter ian as cribe these con flicts ei ther to the rise of na tion al ism or to the “his toric uphea val caused by the So viet col lapse.”27 We sug gest, how ever, that many of the con flicts in the Cau ca sus also stem from a pat tern of geopol i tics that date to the East ern Ques tion; inter nal eth nic ten sions and ex ter nal com pe ti tion for the Cau ca sus among the great pow ers have roots in the con flicts of the nine teenth cen tury.

Presentday Ukraine, like the Bal kans and the Cau ca sus, bears the mark of the East ern Ques tion. Po lit i cal sci en tists often note Ukraine’s iden tity con flict between eth nic Ukrai nians and those who are ei ther eth ni cally Rus sian or cul tu rally iden tify with Rus sia.28 How ever, the UkrainianRussian di vide is only part of the story, more re flec tive of its re cent past in the So viet Union. Be fore Rus sia ab sorbed Ukraine in the late seven teenth cen tury, much of the re gion fell under Ot to man sway. After Rus sia pushed down to the Black Sea in the eigh teenth cen tury, what is now south ern Ukraine ex isted as a fron tier zone between the Rus sian and the Ot to man Em pires.

The many bor der changes, mi gra tions, and pop u la tion ex changes as so ciated with East ern Ques tion con flicts in the eigh teenth, nine teenth, and twen ti eth cen tu ries have left Ukraine with a di verse pop u la tion of Cri mean Ta tars, Hun gar ians, Mol do vans, Bul gar ians, Ar me ni ans, Poles, and oth ers. Cri mean Ta tars, whose fate has been closely tied to the Eastern Ques tion, rank among the larg est and most in fluen tial eth nic groups. They are locked in a bat tle with Rus sians for in flu ence in the pe nin sula, while mem ory of the Cri mean War con tin ues to haunt Rus sian and Tatar re la tions. Ta tars today view the Cri mean War as an ex pres sion

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of Rus sian co lo ni al ism, big otry, and a fore run ner to Sta lin ist dep or tations. Ultra nation alis tic Cos sacks have re prised their Cri mean War–era par a mil i tary roles with antiIslamic ac tiv i ties, an ugly phe nom e non also transpiring in the Caucasus.29 Following Russia’s reannexation of the peninsula in 2014, painful memories of the recent and distant past have left many Tatars uncertain of their future. Some have once again begun to leave their homelands.

The future of mainland Ukraine also hangs in a terrible uncertainty. Torn between NATO and the EU to the west and Russia to the east, Ukrainian citizens struggle to assert their sovereignty amid heavily fortified great powers. Diplomatic patterns reminiscent of the Eastern Question operating in Ukraine today include: external provocation of nationalist sentiment; clandestine intervention; regional nationalists appealing to big states for assistance; big states presuming to manage the affairs of small nations; and Western suspicion of Russian motivation. To be sure, many of Ukraine’s present problems flow from seventy years of Soviet policy and the challenges of the postSoviet transition.30 Still, it is hard not to see the imprint of nineteenthcentury diplomatic behaviors.

Any dis cus sion of the last ing in flu ence of the East ern Ques tion must make ref er ence to the Mid dle East. Whereas dip lo mats in flu enced by Wil so nian ideals of na tional sov e reignty may have seen the crea tion of the man date states from the par ti tioned Ot to man Em pire as a rup ture with the past, schol ars who have stud ied the re gion in the decades since have also em pha sized con ti nu ities.31 In this view, the Brit ish and French man date states di rectly stemmed from dip lo matic pro jects to par ti tion the Ot to man Em pire dur ing the nine teenth cen tury. West ern diplomats’ pre sump tion to gen er ate a new po lit i cal geog ra phy in the Treaties of Sèvres and Lau sanne fol lowed tra di tional pat terns of Eu ro pean interven tion ism in Ot to man af fairs. As in the Treaty of Ber lin fol low ing the RussianOttoman War of 1877–78, new boun dar ies often did not re flect the de sires of all in dig e nous pop u la tions. Thus, the prob lem of Kurd ish state hood, the IsraeliPalestinian con flict, and sec tar ian strife in the for mer man date states can be di rectly and in di rectly at trib uted to the East ern Ques tion.32 Re cently, Hu seyin Yil maz has even sug gested that the term “Mid dle East” is vir tu ally syn on y mous with the East ern Question, with out the “ques tion at tached.”33

In the twentyfirst cen tury, the toll of the East ern Ques tion is everywhere ev i dent in states from the Bal kans to the Cau ca sus. It can be seen in awk wardly crafted bor ders and an al tered de mog ra phy, as well as

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the na tion al ist move ments that draw in spi ra tion from a fraught past. Fur ther, the present pre sump tion of the great pow ers to reg u late af fairs in this re gion fol lows worn pat terns and threat ens to create new problems. At worst, the East ern Ques tion re veals it self in in con clu sive wars over ter ri tory and peo ples. Under stand ing the East ern Ques tion in its past and present com plex ity grows ever more im por tant, as the reemerg ing states at its cen ter es tab lish them selves.

Notes

1. J. A. R. Mar ri ott, The East ern Ques tion, 4th ed. (Ox ford: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 1940), 577.

2. M. S. An der son, The East ern Ques tion, 1774–1923: A Study in Inter na tional Re la tions (Lon don: Mac mil lan, 1966), 388.

3. The en tries on the “East ern Ques tion” in the three edi tions of the Bol shaia So vets kaia Ent sik lo pe diia (1929, 1951, 1971) like wise end de mon stra tively with the First World War and the Oc to ber Rev o lu tion, when “the term de parted from usage” (2nd ed.) and “ex ited the arena of world pol i tics” (3rd ed.).

4. L. Carl Brown, Inter na tional Pol i tics and the Mid dle East: Old Rules, Dan ger-ous Game (Prince ton, NJ: Prince ton Uni ver sity Press, 1984), 7; idem, Di plo macy in the Mid dle East: The Inter na tional Re la tions of Re gional and Out side Pow ers (London: I. B. Tau ris, 2004), xv.

5. Mu jeeb R. Khan, “The Ot to man East ern Ques tion and the Prob le matic Or i gins of Eth nic Cleans ing, Gen o cide, and Hu man i tar ian Inter ven tion ism in Eu rope and the Mid dle East,” in War and Di plo macy: The Russo-Turkish War of 1877–1878 and the Treaty of Ber lin, ed. Peter L. Slu glett and M. Hakan Yavuz (Salt Lake City: Utah Uni ver sity Press, 2011), 99.

6. For a col lec tion of path break ing es says on this topic, see Ro nald Grigor Suny, Fatma Müge Gö¸cek, and Nor man M. Nai mark, A Ques tion of Gen o cide: Ar me ni ans and Turks at the End of the Ot to man Em pire (Ox ford: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 2013).

7. For re as sess ments of the crea tion of bor ders in the Bal kans and the Ara bian Pe nin sula, see Isa Blumi, Foun da tions of Mod er nity: Human Agency and the Im pe rial State (New York: Rout ledge, 2012); idem, Re in stat ing the Ot to mans: Al ter na tive Bal kan Com mu nities, 1800–1912 (New York: Pal grave Mac mil lan, 2011); Eu gene Rogan, Fron tiers of the State in the Late Ot to man Em pire: Trans-jor dan, 1850–1921 (Cam bridge: Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 1999); Frede rick An scombe, The Ot to man Gulf: The Crea tion of Ku wait, Saudi Ara bia, and Qatar (New York: Co lum bia Uni ver sity Press, 1997).

8. Jo seph Roths child, East-Central Eu rope between the Two World Wars (Seat tle: Uni ver sity of Wash ing ton Press, 1977), re mains un sur passed. See also Hugh SetonWatson, East ern Eu rope between the Wars, 1918–1941 (Cam bridge:

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Cam bridge Uni ver sity Press, 1944); and Balázs Trencsényi The Pol i tics of “Na-tional Char ac ter”: A Study in Inter war East Eu ro pean Thought (New York: Routledge, 2012).

9. Rich ard Pipes, The For ma tion of the So viet Union: Com mu nism and Na tion al-ism, 1917–1923, 2nd ed. (Cam bridge, MA: Har vard Uni ver sity Press, 1964); Ro nald Suny, The Re venge of the Past: Na tion al ism, Rev o lu tion, and the Col lapse of the So viet Union (Stan ford, CA: Stan ford Uni ver sity Press, 1993); Firuz Ka zem zadeh, The Strug gle for Trans cau ca sia (1917–1921) (New York: Co lum bia Uni versity Press, 1951); R. G. Ho van ni sian, The Re pub lic of Ar me nia, 4 vols. (Berke ley: Uni ver sity of Cal i for nia Press, 1971–96); Ro nald Suny, The Mak ing of the Geor gian Na tion, 2nd ed. (Bloom ing ton: In di ana Uni ver sity Press, 1994); idem, Look ing to ward Ar a rat: Ar me nia in Mod ern His tory (Bloom ing ton: In di ana Uni ver sity Press, 1993).

10. Brown, Inter na tional Pol i tics and the Mid dle East, 93–196; A. L. Mac fie, The East ern Ques tion, 1774–1923 (Lon don: Long man, 1996), 78–80.

11. J. C. Hure witz, “Rus sia and the Turk ish Straits: A Re eval u a tion of the Or i gins of the Prob lem,” World Pol i tics 14, no. 4 ( July 1962): 605–32; idem, The Mid dle East and North Af rica in World Pol i tics: A Doc u men tary Record, 2 vols. (New Haven, CT: Yale Uni ver sity Press, 1975), 1:162–67, 252–53.

12. See the es says in An drew Ham mond, The Bal kans and the West: Con-struct ing the Eu ro pean Other, 1945–2003 (Al der shot, Hamp shire: Ash gate, 2004).

13. Ohran Kemal Cen giz, “Can We To tally Get Rid of ‘Se cur ity State’ Neurosis?,” 6 Au gust 2010, http://www.to days za man.com/ columnist218272 canwetotallygetridofsecuritystateneurosis.html; for an ex tended anal y sis of the Sèvres syn drome, see Fatma Müge Göçek, The Trans for ma tion of Tur key: Re-de fin ing State and So ci ety from the Ot to man Em pire to the Mod ern Era (Lon don: I. B. Tau ris, 2011), 98–184.

14. Beyza Ç. Tekin, Rep re sen ta tions and Other ing in Dis course: The Con struc tion of Tur key in an EU Con text (Am ster dam: John Ben ja mins, 2010).

15. Omer Tas pi nar, “Turkey’s Mid dle East Pol i cies: Between Neo Ottomanism and Ke mal ism,” Carne gie Papers 10 (2008), http://car ne gieen dow ment.org/files/cmec10_tas pi nar_final.pdf; Al ex an der Mu rin son, Turkey’s En tente with Is rael and Azer bai jan: State Iden tity and Se cur ity in the Mid dle East and Cau ca sus (New York: Rout ledge, 2009), 82, 119, 121.

16. Göçek, Trans for ma tion of Tur key, 2–9.17. Char lotte Ma thilde Louise Hille, State Build ing and Con flict Res o lu tion in

the Cau ca sus (Am ster dam: Brill, 2010), 3. See also Olek sandr Pav liuk and Ivanna KlympushTsintsadze, eds., The Black Sea Re gion: Coop er a tion and Se cur ity Build ing (Ar monk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 2003).

18. M. Hakan Yavuz and John L. Es po sito, eds., Turk ish Islam and the Sec u lar State: The Gülen Move ment (Sy ra cuse: Sy ra cuse Uni ver sity Press, 2003); Bekim Agai, “ Fe tul lah Gülen and His Movement’s Is lamic Ethic of Ed u ca tion,” Cri tique: Crit i cal Mid dle East ern Stud ies, 11, no. 1 (2002): 27–47; Pınar Akçalıa and Cen net

344


EnginDemirb, “Turkey’s Ed u ca tional Pol i cies in Cen tral Asia and Cau ca sia: Per cep tions of Pol icy Mak ers and Ex perts,” Inter na tional Jour nal of Ed u ca tional De vel op ment 32, no. 1 ( Jan u ary 2012): 11–21.

19. Hille, State Build ing and Con flict Res o lu tion, 4.20. Blumi, Re in stat ing the Ot to mans, 189.21. See, for ex am ple, Svante E. Cor nell, Small Na tions and Great Pow ers: A

Study of Eth nop o lit i cal Con flict in the Cau ca sus (Lon don: Cur zon Press, 2001), 2; and Ste phen Blank, “Rus sia and the Black Sea’s Fro zen Con flicts in Stra te gic Per spec tive,” Med i ter ra nean Quar terly 19, no. 3 (Sum mer 2008): 23–54.

22. Charles King, “Im a gin ing Cir cas sia: David Ur qu hart and the Mak ing of North Cau ca sus Na tion al ism,” Rus sian Re view 66, no. 2 (2007): 238–55. The East ern Ques tion and the Great Game fre quently over lapped, and the Cau ca sus was often the inter sec tion.

23. For a re cent sum mary of out side inter ests in af fairs of the Cau ca sus, see Ste fan Georgescu, Ma ril ena Mun teanu, Ta briz Ga rayev, and Stanca Co stel, “Po si tions of the States In volved in En ergy Pro jects in the South Cau ca sus,” An a lele Uni ver si ta tii Mar i time Con stanta 13, no. 18 (2012): 89–296. The au thors also point to China and Iran as ac tors of ris ing im por tance in the Cau ca sus.

24. Che ter ian, War and Peace in the Cau ca sus, 356–67.25. Hille, State Build ing and Con flict Res o lu tion, 316–18. For Black Sea for, see

the of fi cial web site of the Re pub lic of Turkey’s Min is try of Foreign Af fairs, “Black Sea for,” http://www.mfa.gov.tr/black sea for.en.mfa.

26. Vicken Che ter ian, War and Peace in the Cau ca sus: Eth nic Con flict and the New Geo pol i tics (New York: Co lum bia Uni ver sity Press, 2008), 365–71.

27. Ibid., 5.28. Ste phen Shul man notes that these cat e go ries do not nec es sar ily fol low

strict eth nic, cul tural, lin guis tic, or even geo graphic align ment and dis tinguishes between those Ukrai nian cit i zens who iden tify with an “eth nic Ukrai nian iden tity” ver sus those of an “East Slavic iden tity.” Those of the “eth nic Ukrai nian iden tity,” ac cord ing to po lit i cal an a lysts, tend to show greater inter est in open mar kets and de moc racy, spe cifi cally par tic i pa tion in the EU, while those who iden tify with an “East Slavic iden tity” tend to favor heavy state in volve ment in the econ omy, au thor i tar ian po lit i cal struc tures, and eco nomic union with Rus sia. See Ste phen Shul man, “Na tional Iden tity and Pub lic Sup port for Po lit i cal and Eco nomic Re form in Ukraine,” Slavic Re view 64, no. 1 (Spring 2005): 59–87; and My kola Ri ab chuk, “Ukraine’s ‘Mud dling Through’: Na tional Iden tity and Post com mu nist Tran si tion,” Com mu nist and Post-Communist Stud ies 45 (2012): 439–46.

29. Ibraim Ab dul laev, “Ot go lo ski kolonial’noi Voinyi,” Golos Kryma, 17 Oc to ber 2003, 7. See also idem, “Postup’ Kres nost sev v Krymu,” Golos Kryma, 24 No vem ber 2000, 4; and Gul’nara Ab dul laeva, “Kryms kie Ta tary v Kryms koi Voine 1853–1856,” Advet, 15 Feb ru ary 2005, 3; “Mus lim Imam in Cri mea Ac cuses Cos sacks of Using Chil dren in Prov o ca tion,” Re li gious In for ma tion Ser vice of

Epilogue

345

Ukraine, 13 Feb ru ary 2013, http://risu.org.ua/en/index/all_news/com mu nity /pro tests/51274/; and Ellen Barry, “The Cos sacks Are Back: May the Hills Trem ble,” New York Times, March 16, 2013, http://tin yurl.com/mf2ljer.

30. For a good intro duc tion to postSoviet Ukrai nian pol i tics, see Taras Kuzio, Con tem po rary Ukraine: Dy nam ics of Post-Soviet Trans for ma tion (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1998); Paul D’Anieri, Under stand ing Ukrai nian Pol i tics: Power, Pol i-tics, and In sti tu tional De sign (New York: M. E. Sharpe, 2007).

31. For a dis cus sion of diplomats’ per cep tion of the nov elty of their task, see Toby Dodge, In vent ing Iraq: The Fail ure of Na tion Build ing and a His tory De nied (New York: Co lum bia Uni ver sity Press, 2003).

32. D. K. Field house, West ern Im pe ri al ism in the Mid dle East, 1914–58 (Ox ford: Ox ford Uni ver sity Press, 2006); Tim o thy J. Paris, Brit ain, the Ha she mites and Arab Rule, 1920–1925: The She ri fian So lu tion (Lon don: Rout ledge, 2003). See also Ed ward Knox, The Mak ing of a New East ern Ques tion: Brit ish Pal es tine Pol icy and the Or i gins of Is rael, 1917–1925 (Wash ing ton, DC: Cath o lic Uni ver sity Press, 1981); and W. Roger Louis, “The United King dom and the Be gin ning of the Man dates System, 1919–1922,” Inter na tional Or gan iza tion 23, no. 1 (1969): 73–96.

33. Hu seyin Yil maz, “The East ern Ques tion and the Ot to man Em pire: The Gen e sis of the Near East and the Mid dle East in the Nine teenth Cen tury,” in Is There a Mid dle East? The Ev o lu tion of a Geo po lit i cal Con cept, ed. Mi chael E. Bo nine, Abbas Am a nat, and Mi chael Eze kiel Gapser (Stan ford, CA: Stan ford Uni ver sity Press, 2012), 32.

347

Con trib u tors

Can dan Badem (PhD, Sa bancı Uni ver sity, I˙ stan bul, 2007) is an as sist ant pro fes sor in the De part ment of His tory, Tunceli Uni ver sity, Tunceli, Tur key. He is the au thor of The Ot to man Cri mean War (Brill, 2010) and Çarlık Rus yası Yönetiminde Kars Vi lay eti (Bir za man lar, 2010). Cur rently, he is con tin u ing re search on the Rus sian ad min is tra tion of the Kars and Batum prov inces and on World War I in this area.

Ro nald P. Bo broff (PhD, Duke Uni ver sity, 2000) is an as so ciate pro fes sor in the Di vi sion of His tory, Pol i tics, and Inter na tional Stud ies at Og le thorpe Uni ver sity. His con cen tra tions are in Eu ro pean inter na tional and Rus sian his to ries. He also holds an MSc from the Lon don School of Eco nom ics through the De part ment of Inter na tional His tory. He is the au thor of Roads to Glory: Late Im pe rial Rus sia and the Turk ish Straits (I. B. Tau ris, 2006). He has also taught at Wake For est Uni ver sity, where he is cur rently interim chair of the His tory De part ment, and Duke Uni ver sity.

Nazan Çiçek (PhD, School of Orien tal and African Stud ies, Uni ver sity of Lon don, 2006) is the au thor of The Young Ot to mans: Turk ish Crit ics of the East ern Ques tion in the Late Nine teenth Cen tury (I. B. Tau ris, 2010). She cur rently teaches at An kara Uni ver sity in the Fa culty of Po lit i cal Sci ences. She has pub lished ar ti cles on the po lit i cal and in tel lec tual his tory of the Ot to man Em pire and the Turk ish Re pub lic in sev eral jour nals in clud ing Mid dle East ern Stud ies and Études Bal ka niques.

Jack Fai rey (PhD, Uni ver sity of To ronto, 2004) is an as sist ant pro fes sor of his tory at the Na tional Uni ver sity of Sin ga pore. His re search deals pri mar ily with the Or tho dox Chris tian peo ples of the Near East and the his tory of the nineteenth-century Med i ter ra nean. He was the Ted and Elaine Ath a nas siades Post-Doctoral Re search Fel low at the Pro gram in Hel lenic Stud ies at Prince ton in 2005–6 and pre vi ously taught Med i ter ra nean and Ot to man his tory at Queens

348

Contributors

Uni ver sity and York Uni ver sity in On ta rio, Can ada. He is cur rently com plet ing a mono graph on the inter na tional cri sis over re li gious priv i leges and pro tec-to rates in the Ot to man Em pire that gave rise to the Cri mean War.

Lu cien J. Frary (PhD, Uni ver sity of Min ne sota, 2003) is an as so ciate pro fes sor of his tory at Rider Uni ver sity. His main areas of inter est are Med i ter ra nean, Slavic, and East ern Or tho dox stud ies. He is the au thor of ar ti cles and re views in schol arly jour nals such as Rus sian His tory, Med i ter ra nean His tor i cal Re view, Kri tika, and Mod ern Greek Stud ies Year book. He is cur rently com plet ing a mono-graph about Rus sia and the mak ing of mod ern Greece.

Mara Ko zel sky is an as so ciate pro fes sor of his tory at the Uni ver sity of South Al a bama. Her areas of inter est in clude re li gious and po lit i cal his tory, his tory of Rus sia and Ukraine, and the Cri mean War. Her study Chris tian iz ing Cri mea: Shap ing Sa cred Space in the Rus sian Em pire and Be yond was pub lished in 2010 (North ern Il li nois Uni ver sity Press), and she is com plet ing a book about war and re cov ery in Cri mea.

Lora Gerd is the au thor of forty-five ar ti cles and three books on Byz an tine and post-Byzantine canon law, the his tory of Byz an tine stud ies, church his tory, and re la tions between Rus sia and the Greek world in the nine teenth and early twen ti eth cen tu ries. She is a pro fes sor at St. Pe ters burg State Uni ver sity and chief re searcher at the Rus sian Acad emy of Sci ences (In sti tute of His tory). Her cur rent re search ex am ines church his tory from the nine teenth cen tury through 1917.

John A. Mazis is a pro fes sor of Eu ro pean his tory at Ham line Uni ver sity in St. Paul, Min ne sota. He is the au thor of The Greeks of Odessa: Di as pora Lead er ship in Late Im pe rial Rus sia (East Eu ro pean Mono graphs, 2004) as well as sev eral ar ti cles on Rus sian and mod ern Greek his tory. His cur rent re search inter ests focus on Greek in tel lec tual and po lit i cal his tory at the turn of the twen ti eth cen tury.

Theo phi lus C. Prou sis is Dis tin guished Pro fes sor of His tory (2006) at the Uni ver sity of North Flor ida in Jack son ville. He spe cializes in Eu ro pean, Rus sian, and Near East ern his tory and has pub lished ex ten sively on a va riety of top ics, in clud ing im pe rial Russia’s con tacts with East ern Or tho dox com mu nities in the Ot to man Em pire, Brit ish en coun ters with the Ot to man Le vant, and Eu ro pean de signs in the East ern Ques tion. His pub li ca tions rely on Rus sian and Brit ish archives, and he is cur rently work ing on a multi vo lume com pi la tion of Brit ish em bassy doc u ments from Con stan tin o ple in the early 1820s.

Vic tor Taki (PhD, Cen tral Eu ro pean Uni ver sity, Bu da pest) is cur rently af fil i ated with the Cen ter of Ukrai nian and Bel o rus sian Stud ies at the Fa culty of

Contributors

349

His tory of Mos cow State Uni ver sity. His doc to ral dis ser ta tion, “Rus sia on the Da nube: Im pe rial Ex pan sion and Po lit i cal Re form in Mol da via and Wal la chia, 1812–1834,” ex am ined dis cur sive and in sti tu tional as pects of re la tions between the Rus sian Em pire and the elites of the two Ro ma nian prin ci pal ities at the dawn of the mod ern epoch. He has held po si tions at Carle ton Uni ver sity (Ot tawa), the Uni ver sity of Al berta (Ed mon ton), and Dal hou sie Uni ver sity (Hal i fax). From 2011 to 2013 he was a post doc to ral fel low and lec turer at the Uni ver sity of Al berta work ing on a book pro ject de voted to the Rus sian en coun ters with the Ot to man Em pire in the eigh teenth and nine teenth cen tu ries. His most re cent pub li ca tions are “Orien tal ism at the Mar gins: The Ot to man Em pire under Rus sian Eyes” (Kri tika, 2011) and a co au thored mono graph, Bes sa ra biia v sos tave ros siis koi im pe rii, 1812–1917 (Novoe Li ter a tur noe Oboz re nie, 2012).

351

Index

Ab du laeva, Gul’nara, 182 Abdülhamid II, Sul tan, 32–33n73, 246 Abdülmecid I, Sul tan, 120, 134, 142, 148,

155Abk ha zia, 229, 339–40Ad ler berg, Ni ko lai, 167, 170–74Ad ri an o ple, Treaty of (1829), 43–44, 48Aeh ren thal, Alois Lexa von, 285Ahmed Kasım Efendi, 139–40Ai va zov sky, Ivan: View of Con stan tin o ple by

Eve ning Light, 132 Akçura, Yusuf, 304Ak ker man, Con ven tion of (1826), 43–44Akty so bran nye Kav kazs koiu ark he o graf i

ches koiu kom mis siei, 12Al a bin, Petr Vlad i mir o vich, 54–55Al be roni, Car di nal, 3, 7Alek sei Mik hai lo vich, Tsar, 38–39Al ex an der I, Tsar, 50, 76–77, 107, 174, 203Al ex an der II, Tsar, 176, 178, 234–35, 243Al ex an der III, Tsar, 234Al ex an der the Great, 261, 331, 332Alex an dra Fed o rovna, Em press, 137Ali Pa¸sa, 16, 236Amal fi tani, 201Anag nos to pou lou, Sia, 270An der son, M. S.: The East ern Ques tion:

1774–1923: A Study in Inter na tional Re la tions, 4–5, 7, 14–15, 333

Andonov-Chento, Met o dija, 331

Anna Ioan novna, Em press, 40An thi mos IV, Pa tri arch, 147An thi mos VI, Pa tri arch, 150An thi mos VII, Pa tri arch, 198Ar da han, 221–22, 226, 228, 232, 241–43Ar giri, Jean, 116Ar gy ri ades, Pav los, 256–57Aris tova, Ta tiana F., 227Ar me nian Ap os tolic (Gre go rian) Church,

142–43, 153Ar me ni ans, 335; gen o cide (1915), 12–13,

270; mas sa cres of (1895 and 1909), 13; na tion al ist move ment among, 242–43; rev o lu tion ary move ment among, 246; Rus sian ac qui si tion of lands of, 143; Sykes-Picot Agree ment on, 295. See also under Kars-Batum

Arse nije III, Pa tri arch, 38As quith, Her bert Henry, 287At a li o tissa, Ar tietu, 113Athos. See Mount AthosAthos Reg u la tions (Kan o nis mos), 203Atsız, Bedriye, 312 Austria-Hungary: at ti tude to ward Thes-

sal o niki re gion, 209; col lapse of, 253, 272; as a model for an East ern Fed er a-tion, 263–67

Aydın, Cemil, 314Ayion Po tir ion (Holy Grail) of Vla tades,

135, 136–41, 153–54

Page ref er ences in ital ics in di cate il lus tra tions.

352

Index

Ba cons chi, Te o dor, 59Badem, Can dan, 20, 183; The Ot to man Cri

mean War, 16Bak radze, Dmi trii Z., 227Bal kan Al li ance, 198Bal kan na tion al ism, 195–96Bal kan Wars (1912–13), 4, 198, 207, 209,

269, 286–88Ba ri a tins kii, Alek sandr I., Prince, 223–24B˘asescu, Traian, 60Bass, Gary, 18Batum. See Kars-BatumBaz ili, Kon stan tin, 112Beis singer, Mark, 310–11Bel i aev, Alexei K., 208Bel kov kii, Sta nis lav Alek san dro vich, 60Be na zet, Théo dore, 8–9Ber lin Con gress (1878), 195, 222, 227, 255Ber lin Treaty (1878), 203, 221, 307, 341Bes sa ra bia, 42, 58–59, 182Bi bescu, Ghe or ghe, 44Bir gen, Mu hit tin, 312Bis marck, Otto von, 195, 284Bitis, Al ex an der, 17Black Sea Eco nomic Coop er a tion (BSEC),

337, 339–40Black Sea for, 339–40Blanc, Louis, 46Blumi, Isa, 16Blunt, Charles, 136, 138–40, 147–50, 156Bo broff, Ro nald, 17, 20–21Bog dan o vich, Kha tib Alek sandr Us ma nov,

179bor der lands, trans na tional na ture of, 283Bos nian cri sis (1908–9), 198, 285boy ars, 40–44, 54–56Bratianu, Ion C., 58 Brest-Litovsk, Treaty of (1918), 221Broth er hood of Rus sian Kel li ots, 206 Brower, Dan iel, 153Brown, L. Carl, 333Bryce, James, Vis count, 12–13BSEC (Black Sea Eco nomic Coop er a tion),

337, 339–40Bu cha nan, Sir George, 291Bu char est, Treaty of (1812), 76Bu char est, Treaty of (1913), 209

Bul garia: Bal kan claims by, 255, 257–60; in the Bal kan Wars, 209, 286; crea tion of, 195; Mus lims in, 338; na tion al ism of, 259–60; Ot to man in dem nity for, 286–87; Turks in, 338; up ris ing in, 306–7

Bul gar ian con spir a cies (1840s), 45Bul gar ian Ex ar chate, 196–97Bul gar ian Hor rors and the Ques tion of the

East (Glad stone), 11Bul gar ian mas sa cres (1875), 13Bul gar ian na tion al ist move ment, 197Bul gar ian schism (1872), 196–97, 209, 211Burn ing of the Govern ment Build ings at

Kertch, 166By zan tium, 40, 136, 142, 193, 196, 199, 262,

305

Cam bon, Paul, 287–88Can ning, Strat ford de Red cliffe, 136, 140,

144–45, 156Can tac u zino, Mihai, 41Can tac u zino, Serban, Prince, 38Cante mir, Con stan tine, Prince, 38Cante mir, Dim i trie, 39–40Cas pian oil trade, 339Cas tle reagh, Rob ert Stew art, 78. See also

Strang ford filesCathe rine II, of Rus sia, 8, 40–41, 174Cathe rine the Great, 50Cau ca sus, gen er ally, 224–25, 339–41Ceau¸sescu, Nic o lae, 59Cen giz, Ohran Kemal, 336Ceza, Mus tafa, 311–12Cha bert, Fran cis, 90, 92 Charge of the Light Bri gade, 168. See also

Cri mean War Charles XII of Swe den, King, 39Chech nya, 223, 339Che ter ian, Vicken, 340Chich e rin, B. N., 10Chios Mas sa cre (1822), 9, 79, 86–88, 107–9Chor gun, 174Choub lier, Max: La ques tion d’Orient avant

la Traité de Ber lin, 11–12Chris tian cap tives dur ing the Greek Rev o-

lu tion, 101–21; apos ta tized, 115;

Index

353

en slave ment con di tions/pro cess, 110; Eu ro pean re sponse to, 109–10; fam- ilies’ searches for, 103; hu man i tar ian inter ven tion for, 103, 106; num ber of, 108, 112; Ot to man en slave ment of cap tives and Rus sian ran som ing of, 102, 110–21; Ot to man re sponses to the revolution’s out break, 104–10; over view of, 20, 101–3

Chu pov ski, Dim i trija, 331Church ill, Wins ton, 36, 336Çiçek, Nazan, 15, 19, 336; Young Ot to mans,

16Çıldır. See Kars-BatumCir cas sian mi gra tion, 183Cla ren don, George Vil li ers, 133–34, 156Cold War, 243, 336Com merce, Treaty of (1783), 76Con gress of Foçsani (1772), 41Con stan tine, King, 210–11Con stan tine V, Pa tri arch, 198Con stan tin o ple, 132; fears of Rus sian oc cu-

pa tion of, 287, 295; Ot to man con quest of (1453), 9, 193; Rus sian ec cle sias ti cal pol i tics in, 197–98; stra te gic im por-tance to Rus sia, 193

Con stan tin o ple, Treaty of (1879), 221–22, 227–28, 236

Co peaux, Etienne, 314, 316Cor, Mathurin-Joseph, 149Cos sacks, 169–70, 180, 341Coun cil of the Six teen Mem bers of the

United Op po si tion, 255Crete, 262Crews, Rob ert, 153Cri mean War (1853–56), 4, 165–83; Al lied

in va sion of Cri mea, 168, 170; Bat tle of Ba lak lava, 168; Brit ish sup port of the Ot to mans in, 305; causes of, 283; “the chaos,” 168–70; Cossacks’ role in, 169–70, 180; dev as ta tion in Cri mea, 173; East ern Ques tion stud ies sparked by, 9–10; mar tial law im posed, 171; over view of, 165–68; present-day Tatars’ view of, 340–41; ra cial ist set tle-ment fol low ing, 174–75; religion’s role in, 17, 131–35; Rus sian oc cu pa tion of

Mol da via and Wal la chia as trig ger-ing, 47; Rus sian re spon sibil ity for, 134–35; Russian-Tatar ten sions dur-ing, 169–70; siege of Se vas to pol, 168– 69, 179–80; start of, 168; star va tion/pov erty caused by, 173; Tatar con di-tions/ losses dur ing, 171–76, 180– 82; and Tatar na tion al ism, 168, 170; Ta tars blamed for Rus sian losses, 171, 174, 180. See also Tatar ex o dus fol low-ing the Cri mean War

Cus tine, Mar quis de, 9Cy prus Con ven tion, 307Cy prus dis pute, 21, 337Czar to ry ski, Adam, 45, 51–52Czech o slo va kia, 271

Daly, John, 17Da ma las, N., 200Dam i a nos, Pa tri arch, 205Dan i levs kii, Ni ko lai Ia kov leich, 36, 60;

Ros siia i Ev ropa, 10, 55–56Dantz, Jacques, 114, 116Da nu bian prin ci pal ities, 35–61; and cur-

rent Russian-Romanian re la tions, 57– 61; and the Greek myth in Rus sian cul ture, 50–51, 57; Mol da vian/Wal la-chian map, 34; Mol da via/Wal la chia na tion al ism, 18–19, 37, 48, 53–54, 59; Moldova’s re un ifi ca tion with Ro ma-nia, 59–60; Ot to man ca pit u la tions to Mol da vian/Wal la chian, 37, 41–44, 46–48, 58 (see also Ku chuk Kai nardji, Treaty of); over view of, 18–19, 35–37; Rus sian per cep tions of Ro ma nians, 48–57; Rus sia pro tec tion of, 37–48, 49–50; Russian-Moldavian trea ties, 39–43; Strang ford on, 88–89; West ern in flu ence in, 53–54; and the young Ro ma nians, 45–47

Dar da nelly, Bos for i Cher noe more v XVIII veke (Uli a nits kii), 10

Dash kov papers, 74–75De chani mon as tery, 204–5De lac roix, Eugène: La Grèce sur les ruines de

Mis so lon ghi, 109; Mas sa cre at Chios (Les Scènes des Mas sa cres de Scio), 79, 109

354

Index

Dela Turt sii i Egipta v 1832 i 1833 go dakh (N. N. Murav’ev), 10

Del cassé, Théo phile, 292–93Del chev, Gotse, 331Dem i doff, An a tole, 54De stu nis, Spy ri don, 107dev shirme (type of en slave ment), 111Dio ny sios IV, Pa tri arch, 38Dio ny sios V, Pa tri arch, 198Dis raeli cab i net, 307Dmi trievs kii, Alexei, 206–7Dnev nik pis a te lia (Dos toev sky), 11Do bro gea, 58Dokos, G., 200–201Do si fei, Met ro pol i tan, 37–38, 41Dos toev sky, Fyo dor: Dnev nik pis a te lia, 11Dou ma nis, Nich o las, 16Dra gou mis, Ion, 19, 252, 254–55, 257–70,

272Dra gou mis, Ste pha nos, 200Dragu nescu, P., 40 dreadnought-class bat tle ships, 289Dri ault, Ed ouard: La ques tion d’Orient, 12Dru zhi nina, E. I., 166Dugin, Al ex an der Ge lie vich, 60Dupin, Charles, 8–9Duru, Kazım Nami, 311Dzha niis kii, Ab dulla Murza, 176

East ern Cri sis (1821–22). See Strang ford files

East ern Cri sis (1875–78), 4, 11East ern Fed er a tion con cept, 251–72; Ar gy-

ri ades pro po sal, 256–57; Dra gou mis pro po sal, 19, 254–55, 257–70, 272; emer gence of, 251; and the end of the Ot to man Em pire, 253–54; and the EU, 271; fail ure of, 251, 270–72; and the Fed er a tive Union of the Peo ples of the East (Roc cas pro po sal), 256– 57; Karatheodori-Zarifis pro po sal, 255–56; and the Man i festo of the So cialists of Tur key and the Bal kans, 1912, 257; vs. the Meg ali Idea (the Great Idea), 19, 253–55, 257–59, 261; as a new par a-digm, 267–68; ob sta cles to coop er a-tion, 251, 253; over view of, 19, 251,

253; and re draw ing of maps after the First World War, 253, 271, 335

East ern Ques tion, 3–21; defi ni tions of, 4–6; emer gence/ev o lu tion in Eu ro pean/Rus sian thought, 7–13, 253, 319–21, 333–34; as Eu ro pean re sponse to Ot to man de cline, 3–4, 6, 304; hu man i-tar ian inter ven tion in, 18, 103, 106, 335; im por tance to re la tions among Eu ro pean states, 283; inter na tional re-la tions shaped by, 6–7, 17; Islam’s role in, 16–17; leg acy of, 21, 333–42; major epi sodes of, 4; Mar ri ott on, 4–5, 13–15, 333; new def i ni tions of, 13–18; new di rec tions for schol ar ship on, 18–21; over view of, 3–7; religion’s role in, 19 (see also Mount Athos; Ot to man Chris-tian re li gious af fairs); Rus sian in-volve ment in, 16–17, 19; schol ar ship/jour na lis tic lit er a ture on, 4–5, 7–13; tra di tional ap proach to, 254. See also Turk ish re pub li can text books on the East ern Ques tion

The East ern Ques tion: 1774–1923: A Study in Inter na tional Re la tions (An der son), 4–5, 7, 14–15, 333

The East ern Ques tion: An His tor i cal Study of Eu ro pean Di plo macy (Mar ri ott), 4–5, 13–15, 333

Ech mi ad zin ca the dral, 143–44Edhem, Ib ra him, 115Em rence, Cem, 16En tente, 58–59, 255, 264, 284Erdo˘gan, Fah ret tin, 232–33Er mo laev, Ste pan, 226Ertem, Sadri, 311Etai reia up ris ing (1821), 50–51, 77EU (Eu ro pean Union), 271Eu phra tes Val ley Rail way pro ject, 307Eur asian Union, 341Eu ropa, Rusia ¸si România (D. A. Sturdza),

35–36, 47, 57, 61n1Ev mor fo pou los, Zanni, 113Ev pa toria, Al lied oc cu pa tion of, 170, 176

Fa deev, Ros tis lav An dree vich, 36, 56Fai rey, Jack, 17, 19

Index

355

Fed er a tive Union of the Peo ples of the East, 256–57

Fe o dor Alex ee vich, Tsar, 37–38Figes, Or lando, 17First World War (1914–18), 4; and Brit ish

view of the East ern Ques tion, 12–13; re draw ing of maps fol low ing, 253, 271, 335; stud ies of the di plo macy of, 282; ten sions lead ing to, 281; vi o lence fol low ing, 335. See also Franco-Russian Al li ance

Fisher, Alan W., 167, 183Fon ton, Felix Pet ro vich, 48–49, 51, 58For mer Yu go slav Re pub lic of Mac e do nia

(FYROM), 339. See also Mac e do nia Franco-Russian Al li ance, 281–96; anti-

British as pect of, 284; dur ing the Bal-kan Wars, 286–88; de mise of, 281; and dis cord over Pal es tine, 292–94; and dis cord over the Ot to man Em pire, 281–83, 286, 289, 292–93, 295; es tab-lish ment of, 284; and fears of Rus sian oc cu pa tion of Con stan tin o ple, 287, 295; and French op po si tion to Ot to-man in dem nity for Bul garia, 287; over view of, 20–21, 281, 295–96; and pro posed boy cott of the Ot to man Em pire, 288, 295; and the Russian- Japanese War, 284; and Rus sian naval power, 289–91; schol ar ship on, 282; and the Sykes-Picot Agree ment, 294– 95; and the Turk ish Straits, 285–86, 289–96

Fran kini, Vik tor A., 225, 230–41, 244Frary, Lu cien, 20 French Rev o lu tion, 50Fuad Pa¸sa, Meh met, 150

Gedeon, 38Gell ner, Er nest, 309Gen nady, 205gen o cides, 183 Georges-Picot, François, 291–92, 294Gerd, Lora, 16, 19Ger ma nos, Arch bishop, 104–5Ger many, 253, 284Ghica, Alex an dru, 44

Ghica, Ion, 46–47Gia nib Efendi, 85, 120Giers, Mi khail N., 212Gin ku lov, Iakov Da nil o vich: Na cher ta nie

pra vil mol dov lak hiis koi gram ma tiki, 53Glad stone, William Ewart, 11Gold frank, David, 17Gooch, Bri son, 134Gor cha kov, Al ex an der Mik hai lo vich, 58Gor cha kov, Mi khail Dmi trie vich, Prince,

167, 171–72Gor don, Thomas, 108Gor goli, Ivan Sav vich, 137, 141Gor ski, Philip, 131Great Brit ain: dur ing the East ern Cri sis, 78

(see also Strang ford files); French vs. Brit ish inter ests in the Ot to man Em-pire, 291–92; inter est in the Turk ish Straits, 290, 293; inter ests in/pro tec-tion of the Ot to man Em pire, 305–7

Great Idea. See Meg ali IdeaLa Grèce sur les ruines de Mis so lon ghi (De la-

c roix), 109 Greece: in the Bal kan Wars, 286; in de pen-

dence for, 120; on Mac e do nia, 339; as a nation-state, 261; in re la tion to the East and the West, 260–61; role in the First World War, 264

Greek-Ottoman re la tions and the Meg ali Idea, 19, 40, 197–98, 253–55, 257–59, 261

Greek Rev o lu tion (1821–30), 4; East ern Cri-sis trig gered by, 75–76 (see also Strang-ford files); hu man i tar ian inter ven tion in, 103, 106; sec tar ian/eth nic vi o lence dur ing, 9, 102–7 (see also Chris tian cap tives dur ing the Greek Rev o lu-tion); as a source for the East ern Ques tion, 8–9; start of, 104; Sub lime Porte’s re sponse to, 102; Ypsilantis’s role in, 104. See also Chios Mas sa cre

Greek-Turkish state. See East ern Fed er a-tion con cept

Greg ory, Pa tri arch, 205Greg ory Pal a mas, Saint, 210Grig o rios V, Pa tri arch, 76, 105–6Grig o rios VI Four tou ni a dis, Pa tri arch,

146–47, 151, 155

356

Index

Gruev, Dame, 331Gülen, Fe tul lah, 337

Habs burg Em pire. See Austria-HungaryHalet Efendi, 80–81Hatt-ı Serif of Gülhane, 148–49hes y chasts, 210Hier onym, Archi man drite, 194, 199Hil an dar mon as tery, 204–5Hobs bawm, Eric, 310Holy Al li ance, 50, 89Holy Apos tle An drew, 199Holy Grail. See Ayion Po tir ion of Vla tadesHoly Prophet Ilias, 199Holy Synod (Rus sia), 110, 196–97, 203,

206–7, 213Hroch, Mi ros lav, 45 Hubsch, Kon stan tin, Baron, 114–16

Ias tre bov, Ivan S., 200iden tity and mem ory, 310 Ignat’ev, Ni ko lai, 195, 243Il a ri o nov, N. A., 204I˙ nan, Afet, 304In sti tut d’Égypte, 8Inter na tional So cial ist Bu reau, 257Ioan ni kios II, Arch bishop, 147Io nian Is lands, 78, 146 Isaiah, Archi man drite, 38Islam: place in Turk ish re pub li can text-

books, 320–21; role in the East ern Ques tion, 16–17; slav ery sanc tioned by, 111, 118; spread of, 337

Is mail Agha, 232Is mail Pa¸sa, 240–41 Israeli-Palestinian con flict, 341Iu zef o vich, T., 10Ivan V, Tsar, 38Iz vols kii, Alek sandr P., 285, 287, 292–93

Ja lussi, Stam a tis and Nik o risi, 113Jel a vich, Charles and Bar bara, 16Jesus prayer, 210Joa chim III, Pa tri arch, 197–200Joa chim IV, Pa tri arch, 198John Chry sos tom, Saint, 142

Jus tice and De vel op ment Party (Tur key), 321

Jus tin ian I, Em peror, 331

Kab u zan, V. M., 166Ka lam ata, 104Ka lav ryta, 104Kal myks, 101Kane, Ei leen, 153Kap o dis trias, Ioan nis, 118, 120Kara Ali, 108Kar a bakh, 339Ka ram a no˘glu, Yakub Pa¸sa, 139Kar a the o dori Pasha, 255–56Kar pat, Kemal, 15–16, 167, 177–78 Kars-Batum, 221–46; and the Ar me nian

na tion al ist move ment, 242–43; Batum de clared a free port, 229; Batum oblast dis solved/re stored, 222; bu reau cratic ad min is tra tion of, 244; vs. the Cau ca-sus, 224–25; court system for, 224–25; eth nic com po si tion of the pop u la tion in, 226–27; governors’ re spon sibil-ities/au thor ity in, 225–26; kadi in, 224–25; land in, 230–34, 236; local elites’ in te gra tion into Rus sian aris-toc racy, 245; mil i tary con scrip tion in, 238–42, 245; and the Military- Customary Ad min is tra tion, 221, 223–24; mil i tary tax in, 242; Mus lim mi gra tion from, 183, 221–22, 226–31, 235–38, 245; Mus lim re li gious schools in, 225; over view of, 20, 221–26, 243–46; pop u la tion of, 226; pro vi-sional reg u la tion for, 224; Rus sian an nex a tion of, 221–22, 243; and the Russian-Ottoman wars, 222, 236–37, 246; Rus sian Revolution’s im pact on, 246; Rus sian sec u lar schools in, 225; Rus sian set tle ment and the Ar me-ni ans, 222, 232–37, 245–46; Rus sian sol diers tak ing oath at the Ap os tolic Church, 220; and the Treaty of Brest- Litovsk, 221

Ka zakhs, 101Kerr, Niven, 147

Index

357

Keyder, Ça˘glar, 315Kho mi a kov, Alek sei Ste pan o vich, 51, 52Kise lev, Pavel Dmi trie vich, 51Kırzıo˘glu, Fah ret tin, 227, 238Kogalni ceanu, Mihai, 45, 58Kokh mans kii, Ni ko lai V., 203–4Kom a rov, Gen eral Al ex an der V., 229, 231,

239Ko sova, 338Kov a levs kii, Egor Pet ro vich, 53Ko zel sky, Mara, 17, 20Ku chuk Kai nardji, Treaty of (1774), 8, 18,

41–42, 76, 106, 152Kurd, or i gin of term, 227Kurd ish na tion al ism/state hood, 336, 341Kur di stan, 224

labor, ra cial ized no tions of, 174 Laiota Bas a rab, 41Lamp sei, Ivan, 180–81Lau sanne, Treaty of (1923), 18, 333, 341Lau sanne Con fer ence (1922–23), 303–4Lavra of De chani, 204–5Lavra of St. Cha ri ton, 205Law, An drew Bonar, 287La zi stan. See Kars-Batum League of Na tions, 13Leb a non, 205–6 Ledru-Rollin, Alexandre-August, 46Lenin, V. I., 13 Leont’ev, Kon stan tin Nik o lae vich, 55–56Li prandi, Ivan Pet ro vich, 54Li so voi, Ni ko lai, 16Lo goth e tis, Ly kour gos, 108Lon don Con fer ence (1912–13), 207, 209Lon don Treaty (1913), 209 Loris-Melikov, Mi khail Tarle vich, 233–34Lou kou, Ni ko las and Fran gouli, 115Lupu, Vas i lie, 38Lutsk, Treaty of (1711), 39

Mac e do nia, 4, 195, 255, 257–59, 331, 333, 338–39

Mac e do nian De fense, 258Mac e do nia Square (Skopje, Mac e do nia),

331, 332

Mah mud II, Sul tan, 148, 154Ma ka rii Sush kin, Abbot, 199, 202Mal i novs kii, Va si lii Fe o dor o vich, 51Man delsh tam, An drei N., 208–9Man i festo of the So cial ists of Tur key and the

Bal kans, 1912, 257Mar ri ott, J. A. R.: The East ern Ques tion: An

His tor i cal Study of Eu ro pean Di plo macy, 4–5, 13–15, 333

Mar tens, F. F., 11Marx, Karl, 9, 13Mas sa cre at Chios (Les Scènes des Mas sa cres

de Scio; De lac roix), 79, 109Mazis, John A., 19Maz zini, Giu seppe, 46McMee kin, Sean, 17, 283Meg ali Idea (the Great Idea), 19, 40, 197–98,

253–55, 257–59, 261Meh med Ali Pa¸sa, 4, 8–9, 16, 306 Mel’nikova, L. V., 17mem ory and iden tity, 310Men shi kov, Alek sandr Ser gey e vich, Prince,

155–56, 168–71Metak sa kis, Me le tios, 207, 210–11Meyer, William, 119Mid dle East, East ern Question’s im pact

on, 341mi gra tions, 166–67, 183. See also Kars-Batum,

Mus lim mi gra tion from; Tatar ex o dus fol low ing the Cri mean War

Mi khail Fe o dor o vich, Tsar, 39Mik hai lii, Mavra, 174Mil i tary In ten dancy, 179Mi liu tin, Dmi trii Alek see vich, 243Min chaki, Mat vei (Min ciaky), 113–17Min is try of Ed u ca tion (Tur key), 310Min is try of People’s En light en ment, 225Min is try of State Do mains (St. Pe ters burg),

174–75, 181Mir cea the Old, 41Mis so lon ghi, 104, 116Mol da via. See under Da nu bian prin ci pal itiesMol da vian Church, 37–38Mol o tov, Vya ches lav, 336 Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact (1939), 59Mon te ne gro, 211, 256–57, 286

358

Index

Mor fa nou, 201Mount Athos, 193–214; cit i zen ship of

monks on, 203–4, 212; dip lo matic pat ron age for non-Greek monks on, 195; Greek an nex a tion of, 207; Greek del e ga tion to, 200–201; Greek mon-as ter ies on, 194, 199–200; Hil an dar mon as tery, 204–5; inter na tional status of, 208–12; kel li ots of, 205–7; Kinot of, 210–11; Name Wor ship ers move ment on, 209–10, 212; Ot to man con quest of (1423–24), 199; over view of, 19, 194– 95; Russian-Greek au thor ity pro-posed for, 211–12; and Russian-Greek ten sions, 194, 207–8; Rus sian monas- teries’ and sketes’ pros per ity, 199–200, 206; Rus sian pil grims/monks on, 200–204, 208, 212–14; spir i tual sig nifi -cance for Or tho dox Chris tians, 195, 198–99, 205, 213–14; stra te gic lo ca tion of, 194–95, 198–99, 211; union with Greece (1926), 212

Mou rousi, Con stan tine, 78Move ment for Rights and Free doms

(Dvizhe nie za prava i svo bodi), 338 Münnich, Burk hard Chris toph von, 40 Murav’ev, An drei Nik o lae vich, 136 Murav’ev, N. N.: Dela Turt sii i Egipta v 1832

i 1833 go dakh, 10; Russ kie na Bos fore v 1833 godu, 10

Murav’ev-Goluchwski agree ment (1897), 198

Mu seum of Old East ern His tor i cal Ar ti-facts, 304

Mus tafa Kemal (Atatürk), 303–4, 312, 337; “Nutuk,” 313–14

Mus tok sidi, An ge los, 119, 137–41, 154

Na bucco, 60Na cher ta nie pra vil mol dov lak hiis koi gram ma

tiki (Gin ku lov), 53Naf plion, 117–18 Nagorno-Karabakh con flict, 336Nai mark, Nor man, 183Name Wor ship ers move ment, 209–10, 212Na pol e onic era, 50Na pol e onic Wars, 8, 173

NATO, 339–40Na voni, M., 86Nel i dov, Al ex an der I., 202 neo-Ottomanism, 337Nes sel rode, Karl Vasil’evich, 43, 106–7,

117, 132–35, 154–56Nich o las I, Tsar, 42–43, 46, 132–34, 143,

151, 155–56, 174, 176, 253Nich o las II, Tsar, 292, 295Nik o lae vich, Mi khail, Grand Duke, 224,

233–34, 239No gais, 101Nursi, Said, 337Nuzla es tate, 211

Ob re novic, Milosˇ , 45 Odessa, ref u gees in, 112, 167oil re serves in the Cas pian Sea, 339Oran, Hilmi, 312Or bel i ani, Grigol D., Prince, 229Or ganic Stat utes (1827–28), 44, 46Orien tal ism (Said), 15Ork hon In scrip tions, 312–13Ot to man Chris tian re li gious af fairs, 131–

57; Ayion Po tir ion (Holy Grail) of Vla tades, 135–41, 153–54; Brit ish inter est in sec u lar iz ing Ot to man so ci-ety, 153; and Cath o lic claims at holy places, 155–56; Or tho dox clergymen’s ap point ment/re moval, 135, 145–51; over view of, 19, 131–36; po lit i ci za-tion/inter na tion al iza tion of, 135–36, 151–54, 156–57; prayer books and li-tur gi cal com memora tions, 135, 141– 45, 155–56; role in the Cri mean War, 131–35; Rus sian mis trust of the Brit ish and French re gard ing, 154–55

The Ot to man Cri mean War (Badem), 16Ot to man Em pire: boy cott of, 288, 295; ca-

pit u la tions by, 268 (see also under Da-nu bian prin ci pal ities); col lapse of, 2, 13, 253, 307, 333; in the First World War, 289; foreign ex ploi ta tion of, 268; im mi gra tion to, 167; mil let system in, 195–96; mod ern iza tion/sec u lar iza-tion of, 202–3, 306 (see also Tan zi mat); per ceived de cline of, 3–4, 7 (see also

Index

359

East ern Ques tion); ref u gees from, 17–18; Rus sian con suls in, 102–3, 112, 196; as the “sick man of Eu rope,” 80, 253; slav ery under, 20, 101, 110–12, 120 (see also Chris tian cap tives dur ing the Greek Rev o lu tion); with drawal from south east ern Eu rope, 195. See also Sub lime Porte

Ot to ma nia, 337Ot to man Land Code (1858), 230

Pah len, F. P., 117Pai sios, 38–39Pa léo logue, Mau rice, 291–95Pal es tine: French and Rus sian inter ests in,

292–94; Israeli-Palestinian con flict, 341; po lit i ci za tion/inter na tion al iza-tion of, 152, 294; Rus sian mon as ter ies in, 205–6

Palmer, William, 144–45Pal mers ton, Henry John Tem ple, 134, 144,

306Pal mers ton ism, 305–6Pa nay ot o pou los, A. J., 262Pa nesh, A. D., 17Panin, Vik tor N., 118 Pan-Slavism: Bulgarians’ place in, 52–53;

and cur rent Russian-Romanian re la-tions, 57–58; growth of, 51–52; and Ro ma nian dis tinc tive ness/in de pen-dence, 56–57; Ro ma nian elites’ at ti-tude to ward, 55–56; and the Slavic or i gin of Ro ma nians, 52–53

Pan te lei mon, Abbot, 205Pa par rig o pou los, Ioan nis, 119Pa rem bli, Mi chael and Coco, 113Paris, Treaty of (1856), 165, 168, 176–78,

181–83Part ner ship for Peace, 339Paske vich, Gen eral Ivan Fe dor o vich, 236–37Pa tras, 104–5Pav li dis, P., 200Pel o pon nese, 104per cent ages agree ment (1944), 336Pes tel, Vlad i mir Ivan o vich, 169, 170–71Peter the Great, 38–40, 49–50Pet ri aev, A. M., 208

Pet ro vitch, George, 51Pha nar i ote Greeks, 40, 43, 51, 53–54Phil hel len ism, 50–51, 107, 109Phi liki Etai reia (So ci ety of Friends), 77–78.

See also Etai reia up ris ingPhil liou, Chris tine M., 254Pin son, Mark, 167Pit zi pios, Ia ko vos, 144Po gho sian, Ar tashes M., 226–27, 235Pog o din, Mi khail Mik hai lo vich, 52, 55Poin caré, Ray mond, 290–91Pon sonby, John, 144, 147Pots dam Con fer ence (1945), 336Prou sis, Theo phi lus, 16, 20Pruth Cam paign (1711), 39–40, 49–50Pur year, Ver non, 14Putin, Vlad i mir, 60, 341

La ques tion d’Orient (Dri ault), 12La ques tion d’Orient au XVIIIe siècle (Sorel),

12La ques tion d’Orient avant la Traité de Ber lin

(Choub lier), 11–12La ques tione d’Oriente in nanzi l’Europa

(Ubi cini), 9Quran on slav ery, 118

Rakov, V. S., 170Rauf Pa¸sa, Meh med Emin, Grand Vi zier,

150Re in su rance Treaty, 284rel ics: Ayion Po tir ion (Holy Grail) of Vla-

tades, 135–41, 153–54; at Ech mi ad zin, 143; as gifts, 137–38

re li gious turn, 131Re pub lic of South-West Cau ca sus, 242Re¸sid, Meh med, 119Re¸sid Pa¸sa, Mus tafa, 148–49Re ynolds, Mi chael, 17, 283, 295 Ribop’er, Al ex an der I. (Ri beau pierre),

117–18 Rizos-Neroulos, Ia ko vos, 118Roc cas, Con stan tine, 256–57Ro dogno, Da vide, 18Ro ma nia, 35–36; Bessarabia’s uni fi ca tion

with, 59; dis putes with Ukraine, 61; in the EU and NATO, 59–61; Moldova’s

360

Index

Ro ma nia (continued )re un ifi ca tion with, 59–60; par tic i pa-tion in World War I, 58–59; par tic i pa-tion in World War II, 59; pop u lism in, 59; re la tions with Tur key, 59– 60. See also Da nu bian prin ci pal ities; Pan-Slavism

Ro ma nian lan guage, 53Ros siia i Ev ropa (Dan i levs kii), 10, 55–56Ru me lia, 195Rus sia: Bul gar ians sup ported by, 196–97;

on the Cas pian oil trade, 339; col lapse of, 253; East ern Ques tion re search after the Cri mean War, 10; on Ko sova, 338; Military-Customary Ad min is tra-tion (see under Kars-Batum); naval power of, 21, 289–91; Ot to man Chris-tians pro tected by, 19; pop u lism in, 59; ra cial ist set tle ment pol i cies of, 175; re la tions with Aus tria, 285; re la-tions with France (see Franco-Russian Al li ance); re la tions with Ger many, 284; re la tions with the West, 59–60; Serbs sup ported by, 204; spir i tual en-ter prise in the Ot to man Em pire, 193–97; as suc ces sor of By zan tium, 193, 196

Rus sian Foreign Min is try: Athos pol icy of, 202, 207; Bal kan/Near East ern pol icy of, 10, 195–98, 213 (see also Mount Athos)

Russian-Georgian War (2008), 340 Russian-Japanese War (1904–5), 284–85Rus sian Old Be liev ers, 174 Russian-Ottoman De fen sive Al li ance (1805),

336 Russian-Ottoman War (1677–81), 39 Russian-Ottoman War (1735–39), 40 Russian-Ottoman War (1768–74), 40, 50 Russian-Ottoman War (1828–29), 53 Russian-Ottoman War (1877–78), 8, 11,

183, 222, 307; causes of, 16. See also Kars-Batum

Russian-Persian War (1826–28), 4Rus sian Rev o lu tion (1905), 285Rus sian Rev o lu tion (1917), 246

Russian-Romanian re la tions. See Da nu bian prin ci pal ities

Russ kaia pol i tika v vos toch nom vo prose (Zhig a rev), 11

Russ kie na Bos fore v 1833 godu (N. N. Murav’ev), 10

Saab, Ann Pot tinger, 153Said, Ed ward: Orien tal ism, 15Sam i ote Greeks, 79, 87–88, 108. See also

Chios Mas sa creSam uel, Tsar, 331San drini, An toine F., 105San Ste fano, Treaty of (1878), 195, 221,

227–28, 231, 307Saz o nov, Ser gei D., 280, 285–96SEECP (South east ern Eu ro pean Coop er a-

tion Pro cess), 337, 339–40Selim III, 42Se rafi mov, Boris S., 194, 208, 210–12Ser bia, 56, 142, 204–5, 211–12, 286, 338Ser bian up ris ing (1804–13), 51Ser gee vich, Kon stan tin and Ivan, 52 Seton-Watson, Rob ert William, 14 Sèvres, Treaty of (1920), 265, 315–17, 333,

341Sha mil, Rus sian de feat of (Cau ca sus, 1859),

4, 9–10, 183, 223Shav rov, Ni ko lai, 233She remet, Vi ta lii, 17Sho pov, Ata nas, 204Shu va lov, P. A., 58Sil via, Aspa sia, 113Skete of St. An drew, 194, 210–11Sko pe los, 264–65 Skopje 2014 pro ject, 331, 333Slu glett, Peter: War and Di plo macy, 16 Smyrna Mas sa cre (1821), 107, 109 Smyrna slave mar ket, 108So bie ski, Jan, 38 Solov’ev, Ser gei Mik hai lo vich: “Vos toch nyi

vo pros,” 11Sorel, Al bert: La ques tion d’Orient au XVIIIe

siècle, 12South east ern Eu ro pean Coop er a tion Pro-

cess (SEECP), 337, 339–40

Index

361

South Os se tia, 340 Soutso, Mi chael, 77So viet Union, 243, 335–36, 339, 341Spir i dov, A. M., 52Sta lin, Jo seph, 175, 183, 336, 340–41Star o sels kii, Dmi trii S., 229Stav rou, Theo fa nis, 16¸Stefan, Ghe or ghe, 38–39 Steiner, Zara, 283St. Ilias Shuaya mon as tery, 205–6St. John Chry sos tom mo nas tic cell, 204–5St. John the Theo lo gian mon as tery, 203Stol y pin, Pyotr A., 285–86St. Pan te lei mon Me to chion, 213St. Pan te lei mon mon as tery, 199, 210St. Pe ters burg Proto col, 114Strang ford, Percy Clin ton Sid ney Smythe,

73, 74, 78–80Strang ford files, 73–94; on abuses of foreign-

flagged ves sels, 85–86; on brib ing Halet Efendi, 81–82; on Chios, 86–88; on com merce, 91–92; on con fer ence with Ot to mon min is ters, 82–84; on the Da nu bian prin ci pal ities, 88–89; on di rect Russian-Ottoman nego ti a tions, 84–85; East ern Cri sis con text of, 73– 78; on Greek-Ottoman naval clashes, 92–93; on Greek-Ottoman sec tar ian vi o lence, 78–80; over view of, 20, 74– 75, 81; on the Porte’s right to search Brit ish ships, 89–91; on Rus sian de-mands re gard ing Black Sea nav i ga-tion, 93–94; spec i fic ity/ur gency of, 80

—documents by date: 10 Jan. 1822 (no. 3), 81–82; 25 Feb. 1822 (no. 27), 82–84; 25 Feb. 1822 (no. 29), 84–85; 10 Apr. 1822 (no. 47), 85–86; 25 Apr. 1822 (no. 55), 86–88; 10 May 1822 (no. 70), 88–89; 10 Jun. 1822 (no. 85), 89–91; 25 Jun. 1822 (no. 97), 91–92; 26 Jun. 1822 (no. 101), 92–93; 3 Sept. 1822 (no. 145), 93–94

Strog a nov, An drei Nik o lae vich, 167, 171, 173–76, 178, 181

Strog a nov, Gri go rii Alek san dro vich, 76– 80, 89, 106

Sturdza, Dim i trie Alex an dru, 45, 58; Eu ropa, Rusia si România, 35–36, 47, 57, 61n1

Sturdza, Mi chael, 44Sub lime Porte, 8–9, 16, 43; al le ga tions of of-

fenses against the Or tho dox Church, 133–35 (see also Ot to man Chris tian re li gious af fairs); on the Ar me nian Church’s re la tions with Rus sia, 143– 44; au thor ity shared with local lead ers, 16; Brit ish am bas sa dors to, 73 (see also Strang ford files); cen tral iz ing re forms by, 76; re sponse to the Greek Rev o lu-tion, 102; Rus sian am bas sa dors to, 106, 117; trea ties with Rus sia, 76–77 (see also Ku chuk Kai nardji, Treaty of); tsar ist in flu ence at, 9

Suez Canal, 290–91Sufi mys ti cism, 337Su lei man Pa¸sa, 46Sun Lan guage The ory, 313, 314 Sviatopolk-Mirskii, Dmi trii I., Prince, 229,

234–36, 245–46Sykes, Sir Mark, 291–92, 294 Sykes-Picot Agree ment (1916), 3, 282–83,

293–96 Symeon the New Theo lo gian, 210Syria, 205, 292

Taki, Vic tor, 18–19Tan zi mat (Re struc tur ing/Re forms), 120,

196, 202–3, 254 Tash-Basty (now Bol’shoe Sad o voe), 172Tatar ex o dus fol low ing the Cri mean War,

165–83; alarm over/in ves ti ga tion of, 179–81; Crimea’s re set tle ment fol low-ing, 182; first wave of mi gra tion, 170, 176; forced re lo ca tion as a cause of, 167–68, 171–72, 175–76, 180, 183; and holy war rhet o ric, 168; Ot to man en-cour age ment of, 177–78; over view of, 20, 167; pop u la tion loss’s im pact on Cri mea, 167, 178–79, 182; pre vent ing fur ther mi gra tion, 181–82; re li gious rea sons for, 177–78, 181; Rus sian en-cour age ment of, 167, 176, 178, 181; scope of the mi gra tion, 165–66, 178,

362

Index

Tatar ex o dus (continued )182; sec ond wave of mi gra tion, 177; Treaty of Paris’s role in, 168, 176–77, 181; vs. other mi gra tions/gen o cides, 183

Ta tars: dep or ta tions under Sta lin, 183; present-day view of the Cri mean War, 340–41; slave trade of, 101, 111–12. See also under Cri mean War

Tau ride Sta tis ti cal Com mit tee, 182Tbi lisi, 225Tem per ley, Har old, 14 ten-years’ cri sis (1831–41), 4text books, Turk ish. See Turk ish re pub li can

text books on the East ern Ques tionThouve nel, Éd ouard, 152Titov, Vlad i mir Pav lo vich, 151Tol stoi, Dmi trii An dree vich, 234Tot le ben, Ed u ard, 180–81Toyn bee, Ar nold J., 12–13Trans cau ca sia, 244Trans nis tria, 59–60Tri kou pis, Cha ri laos, 197Tri po litza Mas sa cre (1821), 104Tur key: anti-Communism in, 243; dur ing

the Cold War, 336; coup d’état in (1980), 316, 323; cul tural mis sions of, 341; EU ad mis sion sought by, 21, 271, 316, 336–37; foreign trade by, 337; found ing of, 120, 310, 333; in dus trial plans of, 341; in NATO, 243; ref u gee mi nor ities in, 338; re la tions with Rus-sia, 36, 76–77; re la tions with the USSR, 243, 336

Turk ish His tor i cal So ci ety, 304Turk ish His tory The sis, 304, 310, 312–14,

317 Turkish-Islamic Syn the sis, 316–17, 323Turk ish re pub li can text books on the East-

ern Ques tion, 307–23; East ern Ques-tion as a fad ing mem ory in, 311–16; “East ern Ques tion” term re dis cov-ered (1980s), 309, 315–23; Europe’s image in, 313–15, 317–19, 322–23; his-tory books, 309–11, 323; Islam’s place in, 320–21; and na tion build ing, 309–11,

314, 322; over view of, 19, 307–9, 322–23; Sun Lan guage The ory, 313, 314; Turk ish His tory The sis, 304, 310, 312–14, 317; and Turk ish iden tity, 308–10, 322; and the Turkish-Islamic Syn the sis, 316–17, 323; Türk Ta ri hi nin Ana Hat ları, 313–14; and West ern iza-tion, 314–15

Turk ish Straits, 145, 193, 282, 285–86, 289–96, 336

Turk men chai, Treaty of (1828), 143Türk Ta ri hi nin Ana Hat ları (The main forms

of Turk ish his tory), 313–14

Ubi cini, A.: La ques tione d’Oriente in nanzi l’Europa, 9

Ukraine, 61, 340–41Uli a nits kii, V. A.: Dar da nelly, Bos for i

Cher noe more v XVIII veke, 10 United States, oil inter ests of, 339Un kiar Ske lessi, Treaty of (1833), 336Ur qu hart, David, 9Us pens kii, Fe o dor I., 206USSR. See So viet Union

Val sa maky, Kon stan tin, 114, 116 Vasil’chikov, Vik tor Ilar i an o vich, Prince,

179–81Vat o pedi mon as tery, 210Ve les tin les, Rigas, 261Ven e lin, Iurii Ivan o vich, 52–53Ve ni a min, Archi man drite, 138–40Ve ni a min Ka ry po glou, Bishop, 137–38Ven i ze los, Elef the rios, 211–12, 255, 264View of Con stan tin o ple by Eve ning Light

(Ai va zov sky), 132Vlan gali, A. E., 201Vlas so pou los, Ioan nis, 104–5, 116Vo ront sov, Mi khail Se men o vich, Prince,

112–16, 171, 224“Vos toch nyi vo pros” (Solov’ev), 11

Wal l a ch ia . See under Da nu b ian prin ci pal ities

Wal la chian Rev o lu tion (1848), 45–46, 48Walsh, Rob ert, 105–6, 109

Index

363

War and Di plo macy (Yavuz and Slu glett), 16war cap tives, 101–2. See also Chris tian cap-

tives dur ing the Greek Rev o lu tionWerth, Paul, 143, 153Wil helm II, Kai ser, 284 Williams, Bryan Glyn, 167Wil son, Woo drow, 270–71World War I. See First World War

Yanu ko vych, Vik tor, 334Yavuz, M. Hakan: War and Di plo macy, 16Yer ma nos IV, Pa tri arch, 147, 150Yil maz, Hu seyin, 341Young Ot to mans (Çiçek), 16

Young Turks, 4, 254, 262–63, 269–70, 289Ypsi lan tis, Al ex an der, 50, 52, 77, 104, 261.

See also Etai reia up ris ingYu go sla via, 271, 335–36Yush chenko, Vik tor, 341Yusuf Pa¸sa, 105

Za kadi, Gav ril, 139Zak ha rov, Zak haria, 114, 116–17Zar i fis, George, 255–56Zhig a rev, Ser gei: Russ kaia pol i tika v vos toch

nom vo prose, 11Zhiv kov, Todor, 338Zin o viev, Ivan A., 206