Russian Orthodox History Review Essay

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Constant Themes of the Russian Orthodox Church throughout Russian History

If questioning the importance the Russian Orthodox Church has in today's modern

Russian state, one need look no further than the recent rehabilitation of Tsar Nicholas II,

who met an untimely demise at the hands of Bolshevik agents in 1917. Considered less

than saintly by his contemporaries, the canonization of Nicholas served not only to

bolster the image of the church but also provided a clean break from the Soviet past for

the State and ruling elites that governed it. Reshaping Nicholas' image in public and

religious life also allowed the Russian Orthodox Church to resume, in a much more

active way, its role as one of the defining features of Russian culture. Indeed, the

relationship between church and state in Russia draws upon a historic and complex past

through which both institutions fostered and supported each other. While the State

provided protection and endowment in the form of military force and subject donations

(be that land, money or labor), the Church provided the ruling authorities with a religious

belief that could be used to form a religious link to the peoples of the Russian lands and

bind them under the idea of an Orthodox religious community.

The power of a unified community allowed the Orthodox Church to provide two

key functions for the Russian state throughout history. First, the Church established a

cultural tradition that helped to define an ‘imagined’ community1 based on traditions and

culture unique to that of first Kiev and later Moscow. This promotion of culture allowed

both cities, in their regional area, to hegimonically dominate the ideological landscape,

1See Benedict Anderson. Imagined Communities, Revised Edition. Verso. New York. 2006.


with further expansion and assimilation efforts based on the establishment of Orthodoxy

as the conduit of both religious and secular power. Orthodoxy established credibility for

the Rus’ in the early medieval period with the then superpower in the region,

Constantinople. When that political and religious capital of Orthodoxy fell to the

Ottomans in the 15th century, Moscow would come to see its growing principality as a

natural successor, best elaborated in the 'Third Rome' belief elaborated below. Beyond

legitimizing the Muscovite state, Orthodoxy also introduced Western influences through

the growing role of Clergy originating from the Ukrainian territories during the 15 th-16th

centuries. The Synodal period of Imperial Russia witnessed not a reduction, but an

enhancement of the Church in Russian cultural affairs, with Orthodoxy contributing a

foundational basis for Russification efforts and the various intellectual 'Slavophile' vs

'Westernizer' debates of the 19th century.. Even in the Soviet period, the Church survived

the early anti-religious campaigns of the 20's and 30's to become an accepted entity

within the Soviet bureaucratic structure, via endorsement by Stalin, in 1943. From then

on, it has endured the end of communism and continues to be a prominent symbol of

Russia today.

Second, as the Church provided a link between heaven and earth for the common

person, it provided the State this same benefit as the primary institution to provide a link

between governing authorities and the local populace. Adherence to Orthodoxy gave the

ruling elites a 'divine' justification to rule over the population so long as they fulfilled

their equally 'divine' mission of protecting the faith and the flock. In exchange for

providing material support, the Church used its clergy network to disseminate laws and


edicts, note the mood of the population in their reception of said laws or edicts, and

establish, through physical construction of churches and the tangible presence of

clergymen, a marked presence of Muscovite power. While many generations of peasants

could legitimately claim to have rarely seen a representative of the state (indeed, the

centralized bureaucracy of Russia's many states always faced a chronic shortage of

qualified civil personnel), those same peasants nonetheless encountered the force of the

state in the presence of Orthodox clergy though their daily contact with its institutions.

Yet the State also provided more than monetary compensation for services

rendered. Russian Tsars, along with their ruling boyars, went through elaborate

ceremonious rituals during religious holidays, often making very public displays of

subordination to the Church as spiritual master on Earth in return for blessings upon the

Russian land and its people. The Epiphany Ceremony, described in more detail below, is

only one religious ceremony that, through public spectacle, affirms the sovereigns role as

protector of the faith and its believers. This outward manifestation of the Church/State

relationship changed during the Imperial period with the introduction of the Synod and

the modification of public ceremonies of faith by the ruling family. While the State

sought to redefine its relationship with the Church during this period to become more like

the model set by Western monarchies, that is, it wanted to place Orthodoxy in a

bureaucratically subordinate position vis-à-vis the Tsar, it failed to take into account that

the justification of its rule demanded a ‘symphonic’ ideal2, whereby both parties

2This ideal originates from Byzantine practice, in which the roles of the Patriarch, the religious ruler, and the Emperor, the secular ruler, interact in a balance that, in theory, does not place one above the other. In actual practice, the Byzantine Emperor held considerable temporal power that was not so easily checked by the religious position of the Patriarch.


supported each other in a, generally, equal manner. During the Soviet period, the ravages

of World War II induced Stalin to see the public relations benefit of an open

rapprochement with the Orthodox Church, a move questioned by a few hardcore

ideologues but accepted by many regular citizens. Even today, the Russian government

seeks to find a suitable public space from which to display its favored position for the

Orthodox faith, passing measures that place protestant groups at a disadvantage in an

attempt to protect the hegemonical position of an institution traditionally at the center of

historic Russian conceptions of identity.

Using these two themes, that the Russian Orthodox Church provided the basis for

the development of a cohesive identity and that it also provided an essential link between

ruler and ruled, this essay will trace the history of the Church through three parts. The

early and late medieval period, covering the early conversion of the Rus’ to Orthodoxy up

to the late 17th century comprises the first part. The Imperial period, ushered in by Peter

the Great and marked in Russian Church history with the introduction of the Synod,

comprises the second part. Soviet anti-religious campaigns and uneasy tolerance of the

Russian church leading up to the current post-soviet era rounds out the third part. As part

of the foundation of identity and culture, the Orthodox Church underwent several

changes, ultimately evolving to match the times in an attempt to remain a vital element in

the social fabric of Russia.

The Orthodox Church in the Early Period

Even though this essay, in title, is confined to the Russian Orthodox Church, one

cannot begin to discuss the impact of the faith upon the later Muscovites without


touching upon the initial contributions from the earlier period of Kievan Rus’. While the

sources conflict over the exact date, the year 988 is generally accepted for when the

peoples of Rus’ converted to Eastern Orthodox belief. Their ruler, Prince Vladimir,

sought conversion not only for the unity in community and culture it would bring, but

also for the opening of trade and diplomacy with Constantinople, then a major power in

the region.3 Yet the conversion process proved far from smooth; the Primary Chronicle, a

documentation of the annual history compiled a few hundred years after the event, noted

that the introduction of the Orthodox faith engendered dissent and emotional outbursts for

those who followed the old Slavic gods. Vladimir ordered the Slavic idols to be tossed in

the river, and have a new Orthodox church built where the old pagan worshiping site

stood. In a curious note, one that foreshadowed the problem of dvoeverie (more on this

later), the idol figure of Perun, one of the prominent Slavic gods, did not wash away, but

instead found itself lodged on a sandbar in the middle of the river, the same spot where

years later, according to the Chronicle, people still gathered to worship the pagan god.

The chronicle also noted that Vladimir mandated that children of the noble families

would be taken and educated in the new Orthodox ways, perhaps in an attempt to solidify

the future of what appeared to be an unpopular measure.4 While there was some

vacillation over the next few decades, Orthodoxy would ultimately remain the faith of

Rus’, spreading its message slowly across the northern area through a sparse network of

3Janet Martin. Medieval Russia: 980-1584. Cambridge University Press. Cambridge, UK. 2003: 8-20.

4Serge A. Zenkovsky. Medieval Russia’s Epics, Chronicles, and Tales. E.P. Dutton and Company. New York. 1974: 65-71.


monasteries. In this way, Moscow, still little more than a small wooden hamlet, inherited

the faith of the Eastern Roman Empire.

Until the arrival of the Mongols in the 13th century, Kievan Rus’ developed and

established a tradition of Orthodoxy that incorporated regional elements and eventually

developed into a church able to stand separate from the cultural borrowings of the Eastern

Roman empire. Unfortunately, the sacking of Kiev and hardships imposed upon other

prominent Rus’ towns by their Mongol invaders brought an end to Kiev's dominance of

northern Orthodox affairs.5 Encroaching Catholic influence in Poland and Lithuania

convinced the Orthodox authorities in Constantinople to move the headquarters for the

Kiev Metropolitanate to Moscow, whose princes were considered secure in the folds of

Orthodox belief.6

The movement of Metropolitanate brought a prominence to Moscow not held

before, and gave the Muscovite rulers an opportunity to use a new, powerful set of

ideological concepts and ideas in order to further their own political ambitions. After the

fall of Constantinople to the Ottoman Empire in 1483, a new idea circulated around

church thinkers in Moscow as to the ultimate mission and reason for Moscow’s existence.

Labeled the ‘ Third Rome’ theory, it stipulated that both Rome and Constantinople were

centers of Christianity laid low by their abandonment of core values and practices sacred

to the faith.7 ‘Corruption’ by foreign elements precipitated their fall, leaving only

5Martin, 145-157.

6Frank Sysyn. “The Formation of Modern Ukrainian Religious Culture: The Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries” in The Religious World of Russian Culture Andrew Blane, ed. and William K. Medlin “Cultural Crisis in Orthodox Rus’ in the Late 16th and Early 17th Centuries as a Problem of Socio-Cultural Change” in The Religious World of Russian Culture, Andrew Blane, ed. The Hague: Mouton, 1975. 173-188.

7John Fennell. A History of the Russian Church to 1448. Longman. London, UK. 1971.


Moscow to maintain the true faith and bear the cross against the infidel. This powerful

concept gave Muscovite rulers and believers the opportunity to claim religious lineage

stemming from the original centers of Orthodox Christian power, as well as provide a

new sacred mission with regard to their purpose; they would become defenders of the

faith against heretical forces. This meant that the Grand Princes, and later Tsars, of

Moscow ruled by 'divine sanction', a political justification that would later prove

problematic when peasants used claims of 'naïve monarchism' to refute the tsars edicts.

With the erosion of Mongol power in the 14th and 15th centuries, a succession of

Grand Princes made steady gains in both territory and power and culminating in the rule

of Ivan IV during the 16th century. During this period of growing expansion, the

Orthodox Church dramatically increased its monastic presence, expanding its influence

among the growing number of peoples under Muscovite rule. The 17th century saw

Patriarch Nikon institute 'modernization' reforms for church practices, relying on texts

and ideas emanating from the Ukrainian territories, whose geographical position and

seminarian training methods included a mix of ideas present in both Western Catholicism

and Eastern Orthodox beliefs.8 Thus, instead of being bulwark of conservatism, the

Russian Orthodox Church acted as a reforming presence in Russian society. Seen in this

light, the efforts of Peter the Great in the 18th century to ‘westernize’ Russia were not a

dramatic break with past traditions, but instead a continuation of established trends, set in

part by the acts of the Orthodox Church in the 17th century.

8Sysyn, 5.


One significant effect of Orthodox belief upon the culture of Moscow involved

the Grand Princes altering their title to the more familiar Tsar, a change made possible by

the growing association of the ruling elites and the Orthodox faith. Ivan IV made several

pilgrimages to far-flung monasteries of the kingdom during his reign, both as a symbol of

piety and that of a ruler visiting his subjects.9 Centralization and consolidation were still

big priorities for Grand Princes of the 16th century, with rituals such as pilgrimages and

celebrations of holy days playing a key role in establishing a unique Russian identity as

well as providing a means by which recently absorbed territories could be connected in a

personal relationship to their new rulers. Examination of the rituals undertaken on Palm

Sunday and the Blessing of the Waters on Epiphany Day demonstrate the complex,

layered nature of Orthodox belief and its connection to the state apparatus of Russia.

These rituals adapted themselves to the needs of the Russian political and religious

culture, and presented an outward sign that reaffirmed the role of the Tsar and the mission

of the Russian nation as a bastion of Orthodoxy.

The Palm Sunday ritual occurred annually, held one week before Easter. It began

with the emergence of a large tree secured upon two sleds and adorned with an

assortment of fruits, followed by a few carriers of lanterns and painted images. Then the

clergy follow suit, in one account a hundred or more, with one half of the Tsar’s boyars

behind. At the end, the Tsar emerged, leading, on foot, a horse disguised as an ass by use

of grey cloth, on top of which sat the Metropolitan holding a copy of the gospels in his

left hand and a gold crucifix for which to bless the people in his right. The Tsar guided

9Nancy S. Kollmann. “Pilgrimage, Procession and Symbolic Space in Sixtheenth-Century Russian Politics” in Medieval Russian Culture, vol. II University of California Press. Berkeley, Caifornia. 1994: 163-181.


the horse by its reins while holding a branch of a palm tree, leading the Metropolitan to

various churches in the Kremlin. For services rendered, the Metropolitan gave the Tsar

200 rubles, after which followed a large feast.

Since this procession occurred more or less in the public eye, every part played

contained clues that would not be lost on, then, contemporary observers. The Tsar led the

horse, placing himself in low and subservient position, while the Metropolitan rode high,

surrounded by the sacred symbols of faith. While some might observe that this ritual

symbolizes the dominance of the church above the government, in fact this ritual

purposely uses this inverted relationship to suggest the opposite- the Tsar purposely

placed himself in the subservient position, announcing his piety before Christ,

represented by the Metropolitan.10 By doing so, the Tsar not only affirms his compact

with the faith, but also allows the Russian land and people to partake in the blessings of

the Church via the public procession. Similar messages and symbolism permeate another

public ceremony, the Blessing of the Waters on the Epiphany.

The Blessing of the Waters occurred on the 6th of January, and involved a

procession consisting of the Patriarch leading a bareheaded Tsar and fellow boyars to the

Moskva River.11 Through a hole in the river, the Patriarch took some water, blessed it,

and cast it upon the Tsar and his boyars. After this display, the public came down to the

river to receive blessings, healings, with even horses allowed to drink the blessed water.

At one point, the ritual used ceremonial thrones on the river ice, with the Patriarch seated

10Michael S. Flier “Breaking the Code: The Image of the Tsar in the Muscovite Palm Sunday Ritual” 227-232.

11Paul Bushkovitch. “The Epiphany Ceremony of the Russian Court in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries” Russian Review 49:1. 1-17.


higher than the Tsar. Again, the ritual described above indicated, on face, the submission

of the Tsar to the Church, yet in reality reflected not his glorification but humility. The

blessings not reserved for his sole use instead are given freely for the benefit of the

Russian people and land.

Much like the Palm Sunday ritual, the role played by Tsar and Metropolitan in the

Epiphany ceremony incorporated elements of the older Byzantine tradition fused with

changes brought on by the political necessities of the 16 th-17th centuries. In this early

period, the Church offered the leaders of Moscow an ideological concept and discourse

that allowed both the creation of a unique identity separate from that of the older Rus’ of

Kiev and established a justification for rule based upon the precepts of Orthodoxy,

creating a link to the common populace through religious ceremony and doctrine.

However, with the rise of Peter at the end of the 17th century the royal court modified

both rituals to suit a stronger, centralized autonomy, and the Russian Orthodox Church

acquiesced to a formal bureaucratic reformation. Whereas before the church occupied an

ambiguous role in relation to the central governmental authorities, Peter sought to bring

the relationship of the Russian government with the faith more in line with models of the

protestant West, placing the Church in a formal organization known as the Synod. This

readjustment of the role and status of the Church in State affairs leads us into the second

portion of this review, the Imperial Period.

The Orthodox Church in the Imperial Period

Spanning from roughly the beginning of the 18th century to the collapse of the

monarchy in 1917, the Imperial period of Russian Orthodox Church history encompassed


several shifts in both the focus of the State/Religion relationship and the use of the church

as a means to link the ruling structure to citizens. These shifts appeared to alter the status

and prominence of the Russian Church, yet in actuality enabled the continuation of the

role previously held by Orthodoxy in cultural affairs. Peter’s introduction of the Synod

did not represent a radically new method of church organization, as it drew upon previous

models used in the past to contemplate changes to official doctrine. Along with

reorganization, the Imperial Church faced several new issues pertaining to identity and

common linkage. Modernization efforts, introduced by Ukrainian clergy in the 17 th

century, led to the adoption of reforms in Orthodox religious practice.12 This, in turn, led

to the schism of the Russian Church by those who believed the new reforms violated the

sanctity and traditions of the faith, producing a new religious sect known as old belief.

Old Belief broke the ideological monolithic hold of Russian Orthodoxy, allowing several

other religious groups to find justification in separation from the church.13 The dual use

of Christian and popular beliefs, known to the Russian church as dvoeverie, also brought

issues of identity to the fore of the Church’s gaze during this period. What constituted

correct belief and how the Church could instill this correct behavior among peasants and

heretics alike were issues of paramount importance to Orthodox authorities. Conflicts of

the 19th century over issues of nationalization and the definition of the Russian identity

exposed weaknesses of the Russian society and state, with intellectuals and government

officials alike calling upon the Church to act as the agent of revitalization. In short,

12Medlin and Sysyn.

13Laura Engelstein. Castration and the Heavenly Kingdom. Cornell University Press. Cornell, NY. 1999. 11-13.


despite the appearance of a curtailed Church, several issues pertaining to the central role

Orthodoxy played in Russian society maintained, if not enhanced, the presence of the

traditional institution during the Imperial period.

One of the first tasks taken on by the new Synod encompassed the growing battle

about inconsistencies between religious doctrine and popular belief. While locality does

impact the shape and nature of religious practices, the growing awareness by the Church

of the problem became evident under the increased capacity to view the religious

landscape through the lens of parish reports and state police organs. Centralization

efforts pursued by the government made larger documentary evaluations possible, and the

State’s concern with the allegiance of potentially rebellious subjects made variations in

religious belief a dramatic and central concern. Old Believers were a target for both

Church and State authorities; on one level they represented a direct challenge to authority

in temporal and religious matters with their rejection of both as a legitimate governing

force, and on the other they were symptomatic of a larger disconnect between

Religious/State institutions and the common populace.

Thus, the Church embarked upon a massive campaign to ‘Rechristianize’ the

countryside in an attempt to correct the deviations in belief that existed in both heretical

and orthodox populations. Decrees in the 1740’s and 1750’s by the Synod ordered clergy

to teach the basic elements of the faith to their parishioners during their tenure, a measure

repeated in 1785 perhaps indicating that success was not so easily achieved.14 By the

early 19th century, the Church began to specifically target schismatic parishes for religious

14Gregory Freeze.“The Rechristianization of Russia: The Church and Popular Religion, 1750-1850” Studia Slavica Finlandensia, v. 7 (1990): 105.


educational focus, believing the influence of Old Belief to be harmful to the general

society.15 Yet these decrees found little success due to many factors. Consolidation of

parishes in an effort to reduce expenses meant that some parishioners had to travel large

distances to church, and attendance, consequently, suffered. Clergy, trained in

increasingly westernized seminaries, received “…a scholastic Latin training in the

seminary that gave far too little attention to the crucial problem of preaching.” 16 Their

sermons and moral tales held little significance to village peasants, and the link between

believer and church weakened even further. Increasingly, the church became aware of

this growing estrangement, most notably in their campaign to target dvoeveria held

among peasant populations.

Dvoeverie as a term differs from a similar, yet distinct, concept known as

syncretism. Whereas syncretism implied a mixing of popular belief and Christianity,

dvoeverie differed in that it stressed a dualistic ideal in which popular belief was

combined with Christianity, although each element possessed distinctness from the other.

17 For example, peasants often selected a variety of paths when seeking aid for an ailment

or sick relative; they went to the church to pray for health and intercessions from God,

and they traveled to a local healer known as a znakhar/znakharka to seek potent and

proper herbs and potions.18 Belief in one method did not preclude the usage of another,

15Ibid. 107-108.

16Ibid. 114-115.

17Eve Levin. Dvoeveria and Popular Religion . In Seeking God: The Recovery of Religious Identity in Orthodox Russia, Ukraine, and Georgia Stephen K. Batalden, ed. Northern Illinois University Press. DeKalb, Illinois. 1993: 32.

18Samuel C. Raimer. “Traditional Healers and Peasant Culture in Russia, 1861-1917” in Peasant Economy, Culture, and Politics of European Russia, 1800-1921. Esther Kingston-Mann, Timothy Mixer, and Jeffrey Buds. Princeton University Press. Princeton, New Jersey. 1990. 213-216.


and those who sought both religious and folkloric remedies sought merely to maximize

their potential benefit from two sources of ‘mystical’ power.19 However, practice of

popular religion alongside Russian Orthodoxy concerned both the State and Church.

Much like Old Belief, dvoeverie represented a fundamental challenge to authority by

localizing religious practice and interpreting the discursive framework of ‘true believer’

to fit that locality’s needs. Though largely unsuccessful in elimination efforts, the

campaign to fight dvoeverie once again proved the necessity of the State to rely upon the

Church as a linkage institution to the common people.

While the dvoeverie campaign struck at the heart of the elites linkage to the

common citizen, it also played a significant role in the ongoing question of Russian

identity. Eastern expansion across Siberia and the Central Asian steppe during the 17 th

and 18th centuries brought numerous foreign peoples within the bounds of the Russian

Empire, thus provoking an intellectual debate as to the true characteristics of a Russian

citizen. Members of the intelligentsia and clergy alike wrote about the general malaise of

the Russian soul, and the need to find those nationalistic characteristics unique to their

homeland. This quest took on ever more importance once the Russian territories

expanded into ‘foreign’ areas and were forced to deal with assimilation of diverse

cultures. Annexation of the Crimea in the 18th century spurred the search for the church

where St. Vladimir, (the same that converted Kievian Rus’ to Orthodoxy) received

baptism. The Church devoted funds towards not only excavation but also restoration of

19Ibid.


old Greek/Byzantine structures.20 Establishing a tangible connection to St. Vladimir

provided the Church with cultural capital and gave the State a link to an older Greek

heritage that justified their imperial expansion in the Crimea. In the end, Russian

Orthodoxy provided the Imperial government the means necessary to expand and

promulgate Russian identity among a diversified audience while also linking them back

to central authority.

In summary, the Imperial period changed the structure and mission of the Russian

Orthodox Church. Whereas before the church provided a means to dispense information

and authority across the vast, uncoordinated Russian lands, by the 18th century the central

governmental bureaucracy began to supplant this function albeit in a meager and

underwhelming manner. Yet the church still provided input on identity, through its

evaluation of dvoeverie and Old Belief, and still helped to link the state to its subjects,

seen through its quest for St. Vladimir’s baptismal church in the newly acquired Crimea.

The most challenging period to face the Russian Orthodox Church emerged with the rise

of the Bolsheviks to power in 1917. Previous models established relied upon a mutual

need between Church and State- Soviet ideology changed all this, with its view of an

atheistic society. The next challenge facing the Orthodox church centered around proving

its usefulness to an ideology that declared religion to be culturally and socially bankrupt,

the fundamental cause for ‘backwardness’ among the Soviet population.

The Orthodox Church in the Soviet/Post-Soviet Period

20Mara Kolzelsky. “Ruins into Relics: The Monument to St. Vladimir on the Excavations of Chersonesos, 1827-57” Russian Review 63:4 (2004): 655-672.


Arrival of Soviet power boded ill for the fate of the Orthodox Church. An

ideology predicated on the freeing the Russian citizen from the bondage of Tsarist society

and religion possessed, on face, no room within its discursive construct for compromise.

Despite the zealousness of some of its members, the Bolshevik party found it difficult to

simply eliminate the vestiges of religious belief among its citizens. Simple closure of

churches and condemnation of clergy did not suffice to stem the tide of religion. Indeed,

this initial Soviet period marked the lowest point the Russian Orthodox church faced

during its existence; where once it found a tolerant, sometimes cooperative, partner in the

previous incarnations of the Russian state, the Church now found itself under attack on

many fronts initiated by the modernized and idealistic Soviet government. However,

simple closure of churches did not equate to elimination of belief in citizens despite the

wishes of the ruling authorities. Failure to make significant headway by the mid 1920’s

forced the party to reevaluate its approach towards solving the problem of religious

belief. The Soviet League of the Godless became one of several answers to this problem

21; a volunteer organization, the League’s task involved spreading atheism through the use

of propaganda and anti-religious lectures targeting populations who still clung to their

faith.

Successful completion of the grandiose mission proved to be an uphill battle, and

several factors ultimately undermined the effectiveness of the League. To begin, the

volunteer nature of the organization stayed true to the models of citizen participation in

everyday affairs espoused by Bolshevism, yet its ‘open’ nature ensured that qualified and

21Daniel Perris. Storming the Heavens: The Soviet League of the Militant Godless. Cornell University Press. Cornell, NY. 1998.


truly devoted personnel were at a premium. The content of the League’s propaganda and

anti-religious lectures did not target religious belief specifically, instead focusing on

outward manifestations that could be quantified, such as open churches and number of

clergy. Success, evaluated in terms of numbers, failed to measure actual acceptance of

atheistic beliefs. The League also competed for a scant amount of public resources

among larger pool of other state-backed organizations, meaning that funding for

initiatives often fell short. Attempts to replace religious holidays and common

ceremonies with Soviet counterparts (Octobering replaced naming ceremonies, a Red

Wedding instead of an Orthodox one, etc…) failed to take hold and supplant the culture

Orthodoxy instilled over the past millennia. In the end, the League did not achieve much

success and ultimately any gains they made were effectively rendered null by the

reconciliation between the Soviet state and the Orthodox Church during World War II.

Extensive land gains made by the German army in the early years of the war

exposed the weak ideological hold the Soviet government claimed to possess, as several

of its citizens in occupied territory began opening Orthodox churches and once again,

openly practiced their faith. Stalin, concerned about the potential of faithful defectors,

made an ideological compromise and brought the Orthodox Church back into a legal, yet

tightly controlled, existence. In small numbers, faithful petitioned to have their local

church re-opened, and many believers saw this embrace of the church to be a true

rapprochement. This was not the case, as clergy submitted sermons in advance to

authorities, reported any seditious activity of parishioners, and generally bent over


backward to accommodate Soviet regulations. In many ways, this arrangement mirrored

similar models of Church/State cooperation established in the Imperial period.

In bringing back the Church, Stalin openly discarded the idea of Soviet patriotism

in favor of Russian patriotism and in doing so alienated core believers who spent their

early years of service to the party participating in anti-religious campaigns.22 The

Russian church found itself more than happy with the new arrangement, as it provided a

defined space within Soviet identity for the institution to exist. Even Soviet youth of the

post-war era were ambivalent or apathetic towards religion- some actively pursued belief,

choosing not just Orthodoxy but also one of several other Christian sects that filtered into

Russia over the past few hundred years.23 When the party began to fear that the new

generation of Cold Warriors did not possess the level of ideological commitment required

to hold and win the battle against the forces of capitalism. Initial efforts in targeting

youth tolerance towards religion during the late 40’s did not attack the belief itself,

merely the contradiction between belief and Soviet identity. Renewal of anti-religious

campaigns by Khrushchev in the 50’s and early 60’s, much like the efforts of the 20’s and

30’s, again failed to eliminate the presence of belief among the Soviet populace. 24 While

top party leaders and ideologues believed Soviet identity to be incompatible with

religious belief, they could not effectively communicate this idea to the masses through

propaganda or educational lectures.

22Juliane Furst.“Not a Question of Faith- Youth and Religion in the Post-War Years”. Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Ostevropas. 52:2000. 570.

23Ibid. 560.

24Andrew B. Stone.“Overcoming Peasant Backwardness: The Khrushchev Antireligous Campaign and the Rural Soviet Union”. Russian Review, vol. 67 (April 2008). 296-320.


While Bolshevik stances of 1917 would not allow a place for the Russian

Orthodox Church in the new society, the larger necessity of national survival heralded the

re-emergence of the classic Russian institution during the throes of World War II. While

Stalin may have successfully created strict parameters and policing of the church in an

attempt to control its influence, he could not control the cultural links Russian Orthodoxy

possessed among the people. By using the church’s traditional role as the elites link to

the people, Stalin tapped the larger idea of Russian patriotism for Soviet use, yet he could

not foresee that, once revived, Russian Orthodoxy’s link to the people would outlive his

mighty empire.

With the collapse of the U.S.S.R. in 1989-91, the Church once again emerged a

survivor, working with a new state desperately looking for justification to rule and

unburdened by ideological constraint. The post-Soviet period, while still in its infancy,

so far has brought the church mixed opportunities in the face of new, sometimes radical,

nationalistic calls for independence in Eastern Europe and Central Asia, among other

places. In many ways, the Russian state of the post-Soviet period must deal with several

issues once tackled by its Imperial ancestors; how to unite a country of distance and

diversity, how to define the essential nature of Russian nationality, and, most importantly,

how to draw upon a vast historical legacy in building a new and hopeful future.

Conclusion

Covering the entire span of Russian Orthodox history, attempted in this brief

survey, is especially difficult. For one thing, Orthodoxy is tightly interwoven within all

events of significance for the Russian state and its people. It formed one of the cores of


Russian identity, borrowing and adapting elements of culture inherited from Greek and

Byzantine sources. It created a rich and complex discourse that influenced intellectual

developments in both the secular and sectarian thought, from the idea of Moscow as the

‘Third Rome” to the usage of archeology and architecture in the establishment and

reconstruction of St. Vladimir’s baptismal church. While the State constantly sought to

re-position or re-evaluate its relationship with the Church, it consistently turned to

Russian Orthodoxy to validate its claim to rule through the discursive constructs created

by the church that fused faith with the larger ideal of Russian identity. This is one of the

prominent themes of the Russian Orthodox Church.

The other prominent theme of the Russian Orthodox Church involves its use as a

linking institution for elites to interact with the common people. During the early

consolidation period of Muscovy in the 14th and 15th centuries, few organizations

possessed the same level of manpower and literacy, not to mention direct access to the

people, as did the Orthodox Church. The elaborate rituals of Palm Sunday and the

Blessing of the Water on Epiphany Day brought the Tsar and his boyars into direct

contact with the people, reaffirming the elite's commitment to promotion of the faith and

securing blessings for the Russian land and people. During the Imperial period, the State

considered the Orthodox belief to be one of the pillars of a secure, loyal populace.

Clergy, forced to report any seditious confessions received from parishioners, acted as

eyes for the gaze of the State and their various records kept in terms of births, deaths,

marriages, etc., helped elites evaluate the populace under their control. Even during the

Soviet period, the once persecuted Church found use during World War II, serving to


rouse patriotism towards the Red cause. Even in today’s modern, post-soviet Russia, safe

bets should be placed on the State utilizing the Russian Orthodox Church in a manner

much like those used by previous generations of Muscovite/Tsarist/Soviet rulers.

Jeremy Antley [email protected]

Documents

Russian Orthodox History Review Essay