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Russian Culture at the Crossroads: Paradoxes of Post Communist Consciousness. by Dmitri N. Shalin Review by: Vladimir Shlapaentokh Slavic Review, Vol. 57, No. 4 (Winter, 1998), pp. 951-953 Published by: Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2501110 . Accessed: 12/06/2014 12:36 Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at . http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp . JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected]. . Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Slavic Review. http://www.jstor.org This content downloaded from 91.229.229.129 on Thu, 12 Jun 2014 12:36:34 PM All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions

Russian Culture at the Crossroads: Paradoxes of Post Communist Consciousness.by Dmitri N. Shalin

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Russian Culture at the Crossroads: Paradoxes of Post Communist Consciousness. by Dmitri N.ShalinReview by: Vladimir ShlapaentokhSlavic Review, Vol. 57, No. 4 (Winter, 1998), pp. 951-953Published by:Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2501110 .

Accessed: 12/06/2014 12:36

Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the Terms & Conditions of Use, available at .http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp

.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact [email protected].

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Association for Slavic, East European, and Eurasian Studies is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserveand extend access to Slavic Review.

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Book Reviews 951

interesting is her examination of his published efforts in the twenties to recast his social origins (as being from the poor peasantiy rather than the son of a scribe/carpenter), conceal his first marriage (to the daughter of a Moscow notable), and portray himself as an autodidact. More significant is documentation of the composer's shifting political allegiances in 1917 (from anarchist to Socialist Revolutionary, to Left SR, to Bolshevik) and his activities as a member of the Moscow Soviet and in the early administration of Profsoiuz rabotnikov iskusstv and Proletkul't.

Although Roslavets resigned from the party and many administrative positions in 1921, he remained an influential figure in musical life and the state bureaucracy throughout the period of the New Economic Policy. He was the political editor for Glavrepertkom/Glavlit, head of the political division of the State Publishing House, and editor of the Marxist-oriented journal, Muzykal'naia kul'tura. A polemical proponent of the modernist musical association, the Assotsiatsiia sovremennoi muzyki, he engaged in vicious debates with the puritanical radicals of Rossiiskaia assotsiatsiia proletarskikh muzykantov (RAPM).

Lobanova has two objectives: to (re-)establish Roslavets as a major figure in musi- cal modernism and to indict the sinister forces that truncated his creative life. Certainly no one would dispute that Roslavets was a victim, first of the militancy of the Cultural Revolution and then of the conservatism of Stalinist cultural policy. After losing his em- ployment in 1930, he spent two years in Tashkent where he composed the first ballet using Uzbek themes. In this piece and the few that followed, Roslavets abandoned his synthetic chord technique, turning to a more conventional harmonic language. He died of natural causes in 1944, impoverished and ostracized from the mainstream of Soviet music.

But Roslavets was more than simply a victim. As a censor (political editor) he exer- cised considerable power in the twenties and obviously enjoyed some measure of support from higher authorities. RAPM's attacks on him were met, or even prompted, by his ef- forts (in print and at the bureaucratic level) to counter their agenda and promote his own. Like other members of the creative intelligentsia, Roslavets supported Soviet rule in part because he hoped to link artistic and political radicalism and saw in the Bolsheviks a potential ally in the cultural transformation he hoped to effect. By viewing Roslavets as a courageous martyr for musical radicalism and artistic freedom, Lobanova slights his efforts to realize his own vision for the culture of the future. Equating Roslavets's de- cision to leave the party with a rejection of political activity in general, she ignores his overt Trotskyist leanings (and the implications thereof) in 1923-24 and finds nothing remarkable in the fact that he returned to his former position as chief political editor at Glavrepertkom from December 1936 to May 1938-the very height of the Terror.

A knowledgeable, compassionate appraisal of an intriguing and complex individual, this book will be of interest to musicologists and specialists in Russian modernism and Soviet culture.

AMY NELSON Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University

Russian Culture at the Crossroads: Paradoxes of Post Communist Consciousness. Ed. Dmitri N. Shalin. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1996. ix, 341 pp. Notes. Index. Illustrations. Photographs. $24.00, paper.

Despite the foibles of some of its contributors, this book will attract the attention of any- one who studies Russia, its history and culture, and especially the most recent evolution from Soviet society into postcommunist Russia. The editor, Dmitii Shalin, a well-known sociologist, managed to assemble the cream of Russian and American experts in this volume. The book contains eleven chapters devoted to various aspects of culture. Most chapters are very informative, almost textbook-like (for instance, Maurice Friedberg's "Literary Culture").

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952 Slavic Review

At the same time, this book poses several methodological questions related to the study of Soviet and post-Soviet societies. The strong anticommunist ideology that un- doubtably permeates a few of the chapters had some adverse effects on the analysis of "objective reality," a term I use to counter the extremists of social construction theories.

This anticommunist slant proved detrimental to Boris M. Paramonov's interesting chapter, "Historical Culture." Paramonov describes Soviet communists as foolish "vision- aries" (32), ignoring the fact that politicians since Vladimir Lenin, although certainly cruel and merciless toward their people, were also extremely pragmatic and capable of creating a powerful military-industrial power that rivaled the strongest nations in the world. To the delight of Russian nationalists of all sorts, past and present, Soviet leaders established a country that stayed on par with western as well as eastern nations for many years. Furthermore, the nostalgia for some elements of the Soviet system, especially its superpower status, are deeply rooted in the hearts of no less than one-half of the popula- tion of postcommunist Russia. This fact is strongly at odds with Paramonov's analysis-for instance, his suggestion that "shameless procommunist sentiments" can only be found in such "Slavophile publications as Nash sovremennik and Den"' (26).

The totalitarian Soviet system was "objectively" horrendous enough, so to accentuate one's abhorrence by inventing new features, seemingly for the sake of derision alone, is completely unnecessary. Alexander M. Etkind, in his chapter, "Psychological Culture," is simply inaccurate when he claims the Soviet political order was based on a "mafialike pattern of personal bonds" (110). In fact, contrary to Boris Yeltsin's regime, the Soviet hierarchy on the whole was deeply impersonal, and Soviet leaders always repressed the tendencies of apparatchiks to create their own networks of people loyal, not to the system, but to individual relationships.

Igor S. Kon, the author of "Moral Culture," groundlessly discounts the existence and importance of the private lives of Soviet citizens: "There was no place left for privacy (the Soviet citizen had no right to lead a private life hidden from or unaccountable to the party)" (189). On the contrary, during the post-Stalin era, one's private life was an indispensable refuge, a sanctuary from totalitarianism where people invested a great deal of energy and emotion. Dubious is also Kon's assertion that official Soviet propaganda did not play a considerable role in the people's mentality. Referring to a propagandized litany of Soviet ideals, Kon writes, "Needless to say, hardly any Soviet person took this ideological fiction seriously" (193). In my opinion, the only thing "needless to say" is the antipode of Kon's statement: official propaganda, in fact, inculcated major fundamental precepts in the minds of the Soviet citizenry.

Absorbed by their noble hatred of communism, some of the authors have distorted certain elements of Soviet and post-Soviet society, often exaggerating the problems and confusing their origins. Kon considers envy "the most powerful enemy of social and eco- nomic progress" (197). Rampant envy, Kon believes, is a major obstacle for Russia on its road to becoming a modern society. For the sake of refutation, it is enough to point out that envy is epidemic in many of the world's most advanced societies-for example, within highly successful American corporations, or the thriving academic milieu. If Vladimir S. Magun, in his "Labor Culture," had better knowledge of contemporary American reality he would not have suggested that only Soviet ideology condemns "dodging employment" and putting one's private interests over the public interest. Eveiy country, regardless of its regime, wants the population to maintain a high regard for public concerns. John F. Kennedy, in his famous inaugural address, made this point exactly: "Ask not what your country can do for you. Ask what you can do for your country."

Fortunately, some of the authors (Yuri A. Levada in his brilliant "Civic Culture"; Jerry G. Pankhurst in "Religious Culture"; Frederick Starr in the conclusion; and to some de- gree, Daniil B. Dondurei in "Artistic Culture") present their topics without an anticom- munist bias and indeed are able to find interesting paradoxical developments in postcom- munist Russia. The authors do not deem it necessary to claim that everything is better now than it was in the Soviet past; nor do they contend that in the next decades we will see a well-developed democratic society in Russia. Levada speaks about "the disenchant- ment with democracy" (305), the spread of apathy in society, and the deep pessimism of the Russian intelligentsia. Dondurei, in his turn, draws a gloomy picture of the decline

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Book Reviews 953

of Russia's cultural life-for instance, the drastic drop in reading, and the deep crisis in the movie industry. Melancholically, Dondurei notes, "old artistic culture ... was not without its graces" (270).

Another methodological problem for some of the authors (Paramonov, first and foremost) is the exaggeration of the role of cultural traditions as well as the influence of intellectuals on the historical process. This is not to say that cultural traditions and values inherited from the past do not play an important role in Russian life. But it would be wrong to disregard how many people in a polarized society, like postcommunist Russia, adjust to their new environment by abandoning some of their most deep-seated values. Sociological studies (including those conducted byYuri Levada) have clearly documented that many Russians lost their respect for the paternalistic role of the state, patriotism, pub- lic activity, and the Russian army in postcommunist society. It is also difficult to agree with Shalin's argument that perestroika was "invoked by politically conscious Russian intellec- tuals" (84). In my view, perestroika was initiated first of all by pure "material" factors such as the willingness of the Soviet elite to maintain military parity with the United States. Furthermore, liberal intellectuals en masse did not join perestroika until 1987.

Another example of the belief in the continuity of cultural patterns can be found in Svetlana Boym's chapter "Everyday Culture." With reference to the causes of the Soviet kommunalka (shared apartment space), Boym discusses Russian support for the "revolu- tionary experiment in collective living" and Russians' "longing for unfettered collectivity" and a "guarantee of stability" (168-69, 171). Here Boym grossly exaggerates the utopian drive of the era. Even David Lean's movie rendition of Boris Pasternak's Doctor Zhivago offers a more objective description of communal living. Boym seems to leave out the con- crete explanations for the emergence of the "housing commune"-namely, the dramatic housing crisis in Bolshevik Russia.

Despite all its controversial issues (or, perhaps, because of them), Dmitri Shalin is to be thanked for providing us with this interesting and stimulating volume.

VLADIMIR SHLAPENTOKH Michigan State University

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