RUSSIA - ETH ZKonstantin Radchenko Circulation Andrei Yevdokimov tel.: 7 (095) 937-7611 [email protected] INFORMATIONAL PARTNERS • Newspapers: Izvestia, Moscow News, …

ContentsPassions Over Sovereignty Fyodor Lukyanov 5

Russia’s Global StrategiesNew Contours of the World Order Sergei Karaganov 8

The recent changes in the world situation have brought about several his-toric challenges to Russia, causing it to amend its policy. The rapid redis-tribution of forces on the world arena in favor of “New Asia” requires thatRussia revise its economic and political priorities.

Invigorating Russia’s Foreign Policy Sergei Kortunov 23The Russian Federation should unequivocally and unconditionally defineitself as a successor to the millennium-old Russia. It will have to assumeresponsibility for all of its past sins, including – unpleasant as this maybe – the sins of the Soviet era. But the game is worth the candle: Russiawill once again become the doer of world history, recognizable andunderstandable to all.

Torn Between Two Choices Fyodor Shelov-Kovediayev 35Russia’s move toward the West would be a lucrative decision, as well asnicely matching the psychological orientations of those individuals whocherish the idea of Russia’s great mission. By going West again, we will res-cue the entire European project and ourselves.

An Outlook for Joint Countering of Security Threats 45Vladimir Dvorkin

For more than three decades, missile attack warning systems have beenmajor spheres of strategic rivalry in relations between the SovietUnion/Russia and the United States. In a new environment, with enoughcommon sense and political will, they could become a no less important fac-tor in the consolidation of efforts to meet global security challenges.

RUSSIAin

G L O B A LA F FA I R SVol. 3•No. 4•OCTOBER – DECEMBER•2005

On the Threshold of G-8 PresidencyGlobal Energy Agenda Vladimir Milov 60

Global energy security will top the agenda of the Group of Eight’s nextsummit, to be held in Russia’s St. Petersburg in 2006. If Russia consid-ers itself a full-fledged member of the ‘elite club,’ it must approach thisdiscussion from the perspective of objective interests of the internationalcommunity, rather than try to use the favorable situation on the marketin its own interests.

The Importance of Being Normal Vlad Ivanenko 69The contrast between Russia and the G7 institutions is so stark as to beuninformative. On the other hand, a comparison with the Big Five group ofmiddle-income large countries – Brazil, China, India, Indonesia and SouthAfrica – is more instructive. A “horse race” between Russia and the B5group allows a prediction as to who among large non-OECD members islikely to increase its political weight and who will lag behind.

Sources of Sovereignty Russia as a European Nation and Its Eurasian Mission 84 Valery Tishkov

There is a new purpose in the continuation of Russia’s Eurasian civilizingmission within the next several decades. This purpose is to preserve thememory and identity of former Soviet citizens, concerned with its affiliationwith the Soviet people, as well as to perform the function as a host countryfor all those who continue to feel an attachment to Russia and would evenprefer to work and live in Russia.

Sovereignty vs Democracy? Vladimir Ryzhkov 101By a merciless twist of fate, those who seize power under the slogan ofsaving Russia are unable to maintain their power and, at the same time,place Russia on the brink of disaster. The unconditional implementationof popular sovereignty through free and honest elections protects theindependence and integrity of Russia, together with its inner strength andfreedom.

My Perception of Russia Sven Hirdman 113In Russia the State is the strongest concept, the Holy Russian State,whose main task is to defend the Russian nation and Russianness. Societyin Russia is a much weaker notion as a consequence of the strong State.Russia has no long tradition of strong, well-developed non-governmentorganizations.

Restoring Russia’s Future Mikhail Leontyev 117No kind of sovereignty or law can rely on legislative acts, contracts, coali-tions, guarantees or promises if it does not rely on power as well. In the end,the might of a country is the only basis for its sovereignty. The degree ofmight determines the ability of any state to make and implement sovereigndecisions.

Contents

RUSSIA IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS VOL. 3 • No. 4 • OCTOBER – DECEMBER • 2005

Contents

Statehood: The Regional Dimension 132Leonid Grigoriev, Yulia Urozhaeva

Russia clearly needs to rely on a couple dozen big and prosperous citiescapable of developing rapidly in some key areas. These cities are locatedespecially near seas and oceans, and at communication hubs in importantborder areas. It is equally important that they have a business and politicalelite with a sense of local patriotism; individuals who are not prepared tojump ship and move to Moscow at any moment, while sending their off-spring abroad with the bulk of their capital.

North Caucasian Map of Threats Ivan Sukhov 150 The sweeping economic depression in the Caucasian territories has caused arapid process of latent separation: the population is developing a steadyestrangement from the state power and the rest of the country while simu-lating superficial loyalty to it.

The Distant Near AbroadRussia’s Solitude After the CIS Mikhail Delyagin 160

The instability in some of the CIS countries has been brought about by the fail-ure of the post-Soviet integration process, which in turn was due to the insuf-ficient actions of the present Russian bureaucracy. A new generation of politi-cians must come to power that would be responsible to their country and capa-ble of modernizing Russia and, finally, carrying out post-Soviet integration.

Democracy by Remote Control Vladimir Frolov 171Elections in the CIS countries are turning from an instrument of the people’swill into a convenient pretext for outside multilateral interference. This newenvironment is aimed at creating international legal conditions for changinga regime by challenging election results, claiming as illegitimate the existingconstitutional procedures and provoking an acute political crisis.

Between Assimilation, Irredenta, and Globalization 177Robert A. Saunders

Russians have had acute difficulties in coming to terms with their status asminorities in the unwelcoming — sometimes openly hostile — successorstates of the Soviet Union. Severed mentally, politically, and geographical-ly from their homeland, these “new” immigrants have had to rethink whatit means to be part of a diaspora community and to mentally place them-selves within that conceptual space.

PersonageFernando Henrique Cardoso:“We Need More Democracy to Tame Markets” 190

You can compare globalization with the beginning of industrialization inEurope in the early 19th century when the workers were prepared to breakthe machinery because they were against it. To be against globalization is asimilar situation, to some extent. If Karl Marx were still alive he would say:“You people are crazy. This is the means to progress.”

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RUSSIA IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS VOL. 3 • No. 4 • OCTOBER – DECEMBER • 2005 5

Of the many subjects of political debate

in Russia in 2005, the main emphasis

has been on national sovereignty. The

protection of sovereignty against terror-

ists, destructive social elements, strate-

gic rivals and external competitors has

been the primary focus of statements

made by the country’s top officials and

political experts.

In light of sentiments within the

Russian leadership, this past year can

be clearly divided into two parts. The

first half was marked by near panic

calls for society to rally in the face of

threats to Russia’s sovereign existence.

The nervousness derived from a series

of negative developments, the first

being the terrorist attack on Beslan;

next was Moscow’s embarrassing defeat

in Ukraine where the Kremlin’s

protégé lost in the presidential elec-

tions. Other scenarios, such as instabil-

ity in Central Asia, attempts to revise

the Soviet Union’s role in the war

against Nazi Germany on the eve of

the 60th anniversary of the victory in

World War II, the harsh reaction of

the West to the centralization of power

in Russia, and the guilty verdicts in the

YUKOS case, only exacerbated the

feeling of an “enemy encirclement.”

Later, however, the psychological

state of the Russian ruling class began

to change. And although there are no

grounds to rest on our laurels today –

the way there were no extraordinary

reasons to fear for the country’s

sovereignty and territorial integrity six

months ago – Russia’s position has

really strengthened. A series of global

developments have added to the self-

confidence of the Russian establish-

ment: the inability of the United

States to solve many of the global

problems it has undertaken to

address, the ongoing crisis in the

European Union, disillusionment with

the outcome of the ‘colored’ revolu-

tions, the rapid rise of oil prices, and

the equally rapid rise of Asia. The

recent ‘contract of the century’ – the

construction of a north-European gas

pipeline that will bring Russia and the

EU still closer together – confirms

that Russia possesses a real resource,

the importance of which is hard to

overestimate in the new century.

This issue offers a wide variety of

views on the sources of Russia’s

sovereignty and threats to it, as well

as Russia’s ability to pursue an inde-

pendent and effective policy.

Mikhail Leontyev describes Russia as

one of the few countries in the world

Passions Over Sovereignty

Fyodor Lukyanov, Editor-in-Chief


that is capable of conducting a really

independent policy. He believes that

the country’s sovereignty must rest on

might, which the Kremlin must now

restore. According to Sven Hirdman, to

better understand Russia one must

compare the perception of the notions

of the State, Society and Motherland

in Russia and West European coun-

tries. Vladimir Ryzhkov argues that gen-

uine sovereignty is impossible unless it

relies on law and democratic proce-

dures. Valery Tishkov focuses on the

formation of the Russian people as the

basis of a new national identity.

Russia’s identity must rest on its entire

1,000-year-long colorful history, rather

than on individual periods chosen out

of short-term political considerations,

Sergei Kortunov writes. Ivan Sukhov

analyzes the situation in the Caucasus,

a region that poses the greatest threat

to the integrity of the Russian

Federation. Leonid Grigoriev and Yulia

Urozhaeva argue that the sovereignty of

this huge country can be strengthened

only through the successful develop-

ment of its constituent regions.

Sergei Karaganov warns about the

danger of ‘Eurasianism,’ that is,

Russia’s attempt to isolate itself from

the fast-developing global centers

under the guise of an ‘original path,’

while Fyodor Shelov-Kovediayev

advocates the earliest possible acces-

sion of Russia to NATO. Vladimir

Milov analyzes Russia’s role in the

G-8, which will gather in St.

Petersburg in 2006. He believes that

Russia will guarantee for itself the

role as a key energy actor on the

global stage only if it proposes a

joint program for ensuring universal

energy security to the developed

countries. Vlad Ivanenko discusses

how distant the next chairman of the

G-8, Russia, is from the standards of

this group of countries and what

consequences this factor may have.

Vladimir Dvorkin proposes ways to

use the legacy of Russia’s strategic

military confrontation with the

United States for the benefit of a

Russian-U.S. partnership.

Vladimir Frolov writes about dangers

posed by elections in the post-Soviet

space, which often become instruments

for replacing power from abroad and

thus violating the national sovereignty

of the post-Soviet states. Mikhail

Delyagin draws a line under the

Commonwealth of Independent States

– in his view, the incumbent Russian

authorities have wasted the chance for

this country to become the center of

post-Soviet integration. Robert

Saunders discusses the phenomenon of

ethnic Russians in a foreign state –

Latvia – following the breakup of the

Soviet Union.

Finally, Vladislav Inozemtsev, the host

of our journal’s new section Personage,

speaks with one of the most brilliant

intellectuals in Latin America.

Fernando Henrique Cardoso, former

president of Brazil, which is often

compared with Russia, speaks about

democracy, reforms and globalization.

6

Russia’s Global Strategies

New Contours of the World Order Sergei Karaganov8

Invigorating Russia’s Foreign Policy Sergei Kortunov23

Torn Between Two Choices Fyodor Shelov-Kovediayev35

An Outlook for Joint Countering of Security ThreatsVladimir Dvorkin

45

� Calls to embrace Asia should not be interpret-ed as the triumph of barbarian ‘Eurasianism’ underthe guise of an ‘original path,’ an anti-Westernpolicy or renunciation of the European choice. Itshould be viewed as a movement along the path ofaccelerated modernization, without which there willbe neither prosperity, nor democracy. �

A Russian Cossack leading a captive Chinese “Boxer.”Illustration from the Moskovsky Listok magazine, 1900

In the past year, there have been several definite tendencies ininternational relations that indicate the beginning of a new polit-ical stage in the world’s development. The period that replaced theCold War era is over, while few people can say with any degree ofcertainty what will happen next in the world. Nevertheless, factorsthat will determine its future development are already obvious.The format of this article does not permit an all-embracing anal-ysis of international developments; so many important factorshave been left out, including the proliferation of nuclear weapons,the progressive weakening of international governance systems,and the growth in the number of failing or failed states.

A S I A B R E A K S I N T O T H E M I D D L E O F W O R L D P O L I T I C S

The center of international politics is steadily shifting to Asia,demonstrated by the People’s Republic of China, a sprawlingnation that continues to increase its potential at an incredible pace.Since 1978, the year when its economic reforms began, China’sGDP has increased four times, while the annual growth rate of theChinese economy stands at 8.5 to 10 percent. There are some ana-lysts, however, who speculate that Beijing deliberately conceals the


New Contours of the World Order

Sergei Karaganov

Sergei Karaganov, Doctor of Science (History), is Chairman of the Presidium

of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy; Deputy Director of the Institute

of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences; Chairman of the Editorial Board of

Russia in Global Affairs.

true figures of China’s economic growth, perhaps in order to con-ceal the true figures of its defense spending.

A majority of analysts have come to the conclusion that theeconomic growth rates of China will remain high and that withinthe next 20 years the country will become the world’s second lead-ing power in terms of its economic performance figures. It alreadyranks second in the world as regards the purchasing power of itsgross domestic product, while the amount of U.S. securitiesowned by China provides influence on the United States and theglobal financial system. Meanwhile, many analysts argue thatChina’s rapid reforms will inevitably bring about a crisis there;however, such prophecies have been popular for two decades now.

According to some forecasts, by 2040-2050 China will accountfor 14-16 percent of global GDP. These prospects magnify its pre-sent economic, political and military might, while increasingChina’s weight on the international scene. Thus, it is no surprisethat other nations are struggling for influence on Beijing, as wellas for access to the Chinese market. At the same time, efforts tocontain China, or gradually integrate it into the world economy,are becoming dominant features of global politics.

Another Asian country making rapid progress into the topranks of global powers is India. Over the last 10 years, the Indianeconomy has been growing by 8 percent annually. Moreover, thisgrowth is arguably more stable and sound than that in China, asit is ensured by domestic, rather than foreign, investment. India isbecoming a motor of global technological progress, and in 20 to30 years it is expected to be the world’s third leading power afterthe U.S. and China. India is one of the world’s largest suppliersof software and other high technologies, and has more people whorank in the middle class than does the European Union.

Of course, India and China remain relatively underdeveloped,with many people living in poverty. Yet their people no longer starveas they did just five to ten years ago, and this factor adds to their sta-bility, and especially in India which is a very stable democracy.

India’s armed forces – relatively modest in strength consider-ing the country’s size (one million servicemen – less than Russia’s



troop strength) – are capable of rapidly increasing their combatreadiness. India is building a mighty navy that in the future willinclude four aircraft carrier groups, and may become an indepen-dent military and political guarantor of stability in South Asia andin the Gulf region. Furthermore, New Delhi is increasing its inter-national activities, offering large military forces for UN peace-keeping operations.

To all appearances, India’s main goal is to become a nation ofmajor influence in the whole of Asia, including in the unstableregion of the Broader Middle East, most notably Iran and the GulfStates. By pursuing a policy of gradual rapprochement with China,New Delhi simultaneously seeks to become a counterbalance toBeijing without turning into an instrument of its “containment.”

Countries in South and Southeast Asia include a group of suc-cessfully developing “Asian Tigers.” South Korea, for example,has achieved high growth rates, while Japan is overcoming a pro-tracted economic crisis. In light of the aforementioned develop-ments, there is no doubt that the competition for influence in Asia(just like the struggle for Europe was in past centuries) is becom-ing a major factor of international politics.

Tactics being employed against China include both its “con-tainment” and integration into global structures, with emphasismade on the preservation of China’s dependence on external ener-gy supplies. India is no longer “contained;” on the contrary –active attempts are being made to “turn it Westward.” Meanwhile,India is in no hurry to become anyone’s ally, preferring instead topursue a relatively independent multivector policy.

In Asia, there is an obvious move toward the formation of aregional economic center – a soft integration bloc capable ofbecoming a mighty center of economic strength within a decade,possibly built on the basis of the Association of Southeast AsianNations (ASEAN). It is not ruled out that such an alliance willultimately develop into a formal integration association, similar tothe North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), or theEuropean Economic Community of the past. The yuan, the yenand the rupee may all strengthen at the dollar’s expense. The

Sergei Karaganov


development of the new association will be met with serious resis-tance (above all, by the U.S.), but this process can hardly bestopped.

Simultaneously, the new phenomenon of nationalism is alsogrowing in the fast-developing Asian countries, and is manifest inrelations between these countries (witnessed in conflicts betweenJapan and China, for example, and between Japan and SouthKorea, stemming from differences in the interpretation of histo-ry), and in their attitude toward the West. The Asian nations,growing more and more confident about their strength, seek toremove the centuries-old ideological and cultural domination ofthe West. They declare their readiness to pursue independent eco-nomic and political lines – with their neighbors’ support or (forthe time being) through their own initiative.

T H E M I D D L E E A S T : N U C L E A R W E A P O N SA N D T H E C O N F I D E N C E I S S U E

The probability for the increased proliferation of nuclear weaponsin the world continues to grow. North Korea may already havethese weapons, while Iran is about to develop them. A majority ofanalysts are skeptical about the chances for a global solution to theproblems in Teheran; according to estimates by U.S. officials, adiplomatic or military solution is possible within the next 12 to 16months. After that, the process will become irreversible and theprice of settlement will sharply increase. The next U.S. presidentialelections will be an important factor in solving the Iranian problem.

The leaders of Iran and North Korea believe there are highmilitary and political threats to their countries, while the majori-ty of their neighbors also feel concern for their security. Thedevelopment of nuclear weapons by Pyongyang and/or Teheranmay provoke a chain reaction and cause Japan, South Korea,Egypt, Saudi Arabia and other states to unfreeze their nuclear pro-grams. No state has ever tried to combat the causes of the nucle-ar “disease;” emphasis remains on fighting its symptoms. Buildingthe necessary confidence for such a program requires the creationof regional security systems, together with the creation of local


RUSSIA IN GLOBAL AFFAIRS VOL. 3 • No. 4 • OCTOBER – DECEMBER • 2005 1 1

“Helsinki processes.” This agenda requires the participation andguarantees of the Great Powers.

To date, all attempts to deliver democracy to the Broader MiddleEast have failed, although Washington has succeeded in bringingsome of the local regimes (Syria, Egypt, Libya) around to its point ofview by means of pressure. Meanwhile, the breakup of Iraq remainsa probability; the most optimistic estimates show that the situationthere will not stabilize for at least another 8 to 12 years. Anotherhotspot is the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, which may flare up again atany moment. The latest moves by Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharonindicate that, by sensing the approach of a new crisis, he is seekingto shift responsibility onto the Palestinians. It is not clear yet whetherthe U.S. and other external parties to the Middle East process,including Russia, are ready for the “imposition of peace.”

In any case, the present concept of transforming the BroaderMiddle East, based not on modernization but democratization(this refers, above all, to the holding of elections according to theWestern model), has failed, or at least postponed for an uncertainamount of time. A solution to the problems facing the MoslemMiddle East can be accelerated through modernization. This pro-cess should begin with economic and educational reform, theimprovement of the position of women, and the softening of par-ticular religious postulates.

But modernization cannot be started before regional security isstrengthened through systematic measures. The regional elites willuse the pretext of external threats – be it “Western,” “Israeli,”“Saudi” or “Iranian” – for rejecting modernization.

T H E U N I T E D S T A T E S –P O W E R F U L Y E T W E A K

The United States is witnessing an unprecedented drop in its pop-ularity, once the very foundation of its international influence, asdevelopments in recent years have undermined Washington’s pres-tige and authority.

At the beginning of the 21st century, the United Statespinned its hopes on two factors in regional politics: first, “con-

Sergei Karaganov


trollable destabilization” of international relations which includ-ed the possibility of using its military superiority in this situation;second, the democratization of the Broader Middle East, with aview to reducing the terrorist threat while strengthening its ownpositions in the region.

U.S. attempts to achieve these goals, however, in particular byinvading Iraq, failed. The Iraqi operation tied Washington’s handsand limited its capabilities to influence other crises (Iran, NorthKorea, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict). For the first time in recentdecades, the American elite divided over Washington’s foreignpolicy. The United States had enough military power to win anywar, but lacked the resources to achieve political goals and “winpeace” – that alone would have been advantageous enough. Then,the tragic events in New Orleans demonstrated the ineffectivenessof the American government’s response to natural cataclysms onits own territory. This served to highlight the limitations of thecapabilities of the sole superpower.

Although the U.S. and Europe are still parts of one political,economic and cultural civilization, the divergence between themnow is too great to be overcome. Washington does not conceal itsintention to prevent a European integration that would turn theOld World into a global military and political actor. The UnitedStates is obviously giving up its orientation toward Europe as a keyactor, giving long-term preference instead to Asia. In all probabil-ity, Asia will be a real factor in U.S. policy for the next few years.

In the intensifying competition for influence in India, the U.S.is displaying unprecedented interest. Washington proposes to NewDelhi not only “special relations” and seats in the Group of Eightand the UN Security Council, but also cutting-edge armaments.America is ready to participate in the construction of nuclearpower plants in India, while General Electric and Westinghouse –companies that enjoy political support from the White House –have already made construction proposals. These offers of assis-tance are made despite India’s nuclear status, a relatively recentdevelopment that has delivered a severe blow to the nonprolifera-tion regime.



U.S. foreign-policy difficulties are aggravated by structural prob-lems of the American economy. U.S. foreign and consumer debtcontinues to grow, while overestimates in the real estate markethave produced another bubble. Simultaneously, U.S. officialsoften utter super-liberal statements while pumping back doormoney and investment into the economy by means of the statedebt mechanism (actually, by neo-Keynesian methods), thusensuring very high and stable growth. The newly created bubblemay harmlessly deflate, or, on the other hand, it could burst andbring about social upheavals.

The U.S. is the world’s largest provider of the highest qualityeducation, as well as major technologies. At the same time, how-ever, American experts express concern over the level of technicaleducation in the country. The shortage of highly skilled specialistsin the U.S. is partly compensated for by an active policy ofattracting educated immigrants into the country, and partly byoutsourcing in technologically rising countries.

It seems likely, given these conditions, that America will even-tually face serious economic problems. In the foreseeable future,however, it will remain the fastest-developing society and themain economic, military, diplomatic and ideological superpower.Moreover, it is very unlikely that the United States will give up itsactive global role: even circles that traditionally espouse isolation-ist ideology support Washington’s energetic interventionist policy.Attempts to take avail of the relative unpopularity and partialweakening of the United States would be extremely dangerous andwould cost any state dearly.

T H E E U R O P E A N U N I O N : A F A R E W E L L T O A M B I T I O N S ?

The failure of France and the Netherlands to pass the EuropeanConstitution by referendum came as the gravest crisis for theEuropean Union in its history, and revealed many of its structuralweaknesses that had been accruing for years. These include sloweconomic growth, a consistently high unemployment rate (about10 percent or even higher in the majority of the countries of “Old

Sergei Karaganov


Europe”), and the inability to carry out liberal reforms due to theirrejection by the majority of their population. However, despite theawareness of the crisis situation, which includes stubborn lowgrowth rates, there is little chance for a drastic change in EU eco-nomic and social policies. Europe simply cherishes its well-beingtoo much to launch painful reforms. The causes that sparked twoworld wars have been eradicated, it is believed, and there is nomore need to combat the Communist influence. Meanwhile, theEuropeans have achieved almost all the goals set out in the origi-nal integration project. Today, it seems that power belongs to theyounger generation, a group that has a tendency to take thepresently favorable situation for granted. While the “newEuropeans” may initiate reforms in “Old Europe,” the potentialof their influence is limited.

After the failure of the Constitutional referendums, the processof building a political union, or a quasi-state (the last shot of theolder generation of Europeans), will most likely stop for a fewyears. A further enlargement of the European Union does notarouse much enthusiasm among the ruling elites, while it is notsupported by the larger part of the population. The decision toadmit Bulgaria and Romania into the EU in 2007 was made behindthe scenes, almost in secret from the European public, at the levelof foreign ministers rather than heads of state, as is the standardprotocol. The question of Turkey’s EU membership has been prac-tically removed from the agenda for the next few years, whileUkraine’s candidacy, let alone Russia’s, is not seriously considered.

The European Union may spend another four or five yearsdebating its future, while wasting precious time required for thereforms. Furthermore, it is unlikely in the immediate future thatthe EU states will draw up a common foreign policy, or, moreimportantly, a common defense policy. As a result, Europe’s lagbehind other world centers may increase and become irreversible.By 2030-2050, United Europe will fall behind the U.S. and Chinain the volume of its GDP.

In a world where military force is again acquiring weight, theEU is building a one-million-strong “post-military armed forces”



which are unable to fight, not to mention effectively participate,in the majority of peacekeeping operations.

In light of the above factors, there is a growing belief that theOld World, although still culturally attractive, is increasingly outof sync with global policy and that it has, in any case, lost its eco-nomic dynamism.

Thus, the European Union has actually begun to freeze its rap-prochement with Russia, despite the continuing atmosphere offriendly rhetoric, and pursue a policy of “peaceful coexistence”and even stiff competition in the economic sphere. Against thebackground of outstanding problems, such as agricultural subsidies,energy prices and transit rights to the Kaliningrad Region, the EU

is trying to undermine the competi-tive ability of Russia’s civil aviationand aircraft industry, while threaten-ing Moscow that it may withdrawfrom the agreement on Russia’saccession to the World TradeOrganization – even though Russia

has met the request of Brussels and signed the Kyoto Protocol. AtRussia’s expense, the European Union seeks to create an impres-sion that it has a common – and effective – foreign policy.

Hence the ongoing attempts to play the role of an arbiter inaddressing the problems of “frozen crises,” or rather “unrecog-nized states,” and constant demands that Russia withdraw itstroops from these states. The EU’s appointment of a “special rep-resentative for Central Asia” falls into the same category of suchmoves. Meanwhile, the European Parliament almost always sideswith the Baltic States which hold strong anti-Russian positions,while it has also supported Japan’s demand that Russia “return theNorthern Territories.” The approval of the “Road Maps” docu-ment has failed to attain even the short-term goal of mitigating thecrisis in Russian-EU relations.

The strained relations between Russia and Europe are pro-voked by difficulties inside the EU and the growing divergence ofthe ways of their internal development. Moscow is now pursuing

Sergei Karaganov


Moscow is now pursuing a policy that was characteristicof the West European statesmany decades ago

a policy that was characteristic of the West European states manydecades ago. But these differences are surmountable, especially asa renunciation by Russia of the European path, which best corre-sponds to the Russian mentality and traditions, is very unlikelyand would mean the nation’s self-destruction.

Russia-EU relations have not yet reached the “end of history.”In the future, the European Union may change its values and stopbuilding a political association, returning instead to the model ofan “extended common market and social union, plus a commoncurrency.” Besides, seeing the weakening of its positions, Brusselsmay finally assume a policy of strategic rapprochement withRussia. Therefore close interaction with the EU remains animperative of Russia’s policy.

O I L : T H E R E T U R N O F G E O P O L I T I C SFactors that caused the present relative oil shortage include increasedoil consumption in Asia, and the uncertainty of producers aboutinternational political stability, which limits their readiness for invest-ment. There is also the shortage of oil refining facilities.

The demand for oil is not expected to decrease even if Westerneconomies slow down their growth or decline. India and Chinaincrease their demand by approximately 25-30 percent per year. Thedemand for oil products is rapidly growing in other Asian countries,as well. The demand for oil and oil prices will not fall also becausethe share of oil costs in the world GDP is much lower than the samefigure during previous oil price hikes. Besides, consumer countriesoften earn on more expensive oil products through the tax systemmuch more than energy-producing countries themselves.

Also, there is little hope that oil resources of Russia and theCaspian region will seriously reduce the general dependence onMiddle Eastern oil. The Middle East (Iraq and Iran) boasts themost promising oil reserves. The convenience of transportationmakes oil the main energy source for the foreseeable future,although it may make way for natural gas or, less likely, renew-able energy sources. Electricity production is expected to increaseat nuclear power plants. The U.S. and Great Britain plan to build



more such plants, while Germany and Sweden have increasedallocations for nuclear power engineering and work to extend thelifetime of plants that not long ago were planned to be shut down.Also, there is competition among Western countries for the sup-ply of nuclear reactors to China.

Oil geopolitics has entered a new era – that of struggle for con-trol over oil fields and oil transportation routes. The new develop-ments are best manifest in the U.S. policy. Washington seeks to denyChina free access to energy resources and to diversify routes of oilsupply from the Caspian region. The U.S. policy toward Russia isfriendly enough, yet it is not based on deep mutual understanding;rather, it resembles the U.S. policy toward Saudi Arabia. Less man-ifest developments include the struggle for the future of Iraq, theaforementioned sharp buildup of India’s Navy, and the rapproche-ment between Beijing and New Delhi which are not interested to seeany third force use their competition in its own interests.

R U S S I A : T I M E F O R S E R I O U S D E C I S I O N SThe recent changes in the world situation have brought about sev-eral historic challenges to Russia, causing it to amend its policy.The rapid redistribution of forces on the world arena in favor of“New Asia” (not to be confused with traditional Asia, whose val-ues are the center of gravitation for Russian “Eurasianists”)requires that Russia revise its economic and political priorities.

I do not mean the phantom axes between Moscow and NewDelhi and between Moscow and Beijing, but specific moves toreinvigorate economic and political cooperation with the worldleaders. These moves must include a long-awaited breakthroughby the Russian energy sector into the South and the East, anaccelerated construction of oil and gas pipelines, and a markedincrease in investment in geological prospecting. It is Russia, notEurope, that must seek to diversify routes for the supply of ener-gy resources in order to raise their prices and prevent limitationson the country’s exports and an increase of price diktat.

At the same time, the political and cultural line toward rap-prochement with Europe must remain a priority of Russia’s for-

Sergei Karaganov


eign policy. The pause imposed by Brussels must be used to rein-vigorate the search for a “new beginning” in Russian-Europeanrelations. At the same time, constructive relations with the U.S.must continue to be viewed as a major resource. For example,Russia needs to launch a project to explore Siberia and theRussian Far East, in cooperation with the United States,European and Asian countries.

Moscow’s policy with regard to the Commonwealth ofIndependent States also needs revising. The majority of integrationprojects, including the Common Economic Space, will not befully initiated due to the position of Ukraine, as well as, to a less-er degree, that of Belarus. The only viable projects left areRussian-Kazakh and Russian-Belarusian interaction, that is, ifMoscow decides to breathe new life into its Belarusian policy.

The majority of the CIS countries will inevitably see achangeover in post-Soviet political elites. The only country wherethe incumbent leadership theoretically can remain in the saddle isKazakhstan. In this situation the conservatism in Russia’s policyis not justified. Wherever possible (in Belarus and, possibly,Armenia), Russia should promote a relatively painless change ofthe ruling regimes, providing them with corresponding guarantees.In other newly independent states (first of all, in Central Asia),Russia should try to share responsibility for ensuring stability therewith third outside forces (China, the United States, and theEuropean Union) or keep itself aloof from that at all.

The chances are approximately 30 to 40 percent that Ukraine,which the West seeks to keep within its zone of influence, will joinNATO in the next few years. There is no disagreement on thisissue between the U.S. and the EU, which most likely havealready agreed in principle to such a scenario. Ukraine will be fol-lowed by Moldova, Georgia and, possibly, Belarus (if Moscowfails to bring about changes in Minsk and if developments thereunfold according to the Ukrainian scenario).

NATO enlargement will force Moscow to make one of themost difficult choices in its history. Should it demand NATOmembership for itself at that point? That would be unrealistic;



moreover, it would prevent the necessary consolidation of theAsian vector in Russia’s policy. The question is: Should Moscowintroduce a regime of “real borders” with countries tied by close,human bonds? Or should it confront the West, despite the factthat it lacks enough resources for that? The latter variant wouldinevitably make Russia still more dependent on China.

For all its problems, Russia still has a high political, econom-ic and foreign-trade potential:

– a relatively fast-developing economy (although this processis now decaying);

– rich mineral and energy resources (which can be used muchmore effectively);

– nuclear weapons;– large general-purpose forces (almost equal to the forces of

India, China, and United Europe);– membership in the UN Security Council, the Group of Eight

and, simultaneously, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization;– advantageous geopolitical position (neither the U.S., nor

China or Europe want Russia to be under the influence of only oneof the centers, which gives Moscow wide room for maneuver);

– the immediate neighborhood with states that are sources ofterrorism (the unstable Broader Middle East and unstable CentralAsia) increases Russia’s geopolitical weight.

Nevertheless, the unpredictability of the global situation andthreats to Russia’s security and geopolitical position increase itsvulnerability to external challenges, which in some cases mergewith domestic ones. The country’s international position isbecoming increasingly complicated and unpredictable, threateningto seriously worsen in several years.

Such developments can and must be prevented by stepping updomestic reforms and increasing the effectiveness of the politicalmodel, the decision-making system and general governability.Without these measures, as well as without stepping up state pol-icy, including investment, in the basic sectors (education,medicine, the transport network, communication, geologicalprospecting, aircraft building, the exploration of outer space, and

Sergei Karaganov


others), Russia will not be able to change its image of a degrad-ing state, which undermines all foreign-policy prospects.

Under the present conditions, the effectiveness of the polit-ical system cannot be increased without a combination ofauthoritarian and democratic principles. However, the excessivegrowth of authoritarianism is now depriving the “power verti-cal” of its basis – active support and participation of society.

The new conditions require increased attention to foreign andforeign-economic policies, as well as the coordination of efforts.But the main thing is that the Russian leadership and intellectu-als understand the unprecedented nature and acuteness of ourexternal challenges.

The aforesaid requires creating (or recreating) a non-govern-mental analytical and forecasting mechanism that would fulfillspecific tasks set by Russia’s leadership. This mechanism must reston the potential of the Russian Academy of Sciences, on capabil-ities of the corporate sector, and on foreign intellectual resources.This task may require the establishment of several new-generationresearch centers (technology for creating such small centers hasbeen developed and tested.)

Finally, it is time to implement the long-overdue idea of set-ting up a group of centers (institutions) that would analyze the sit-uation in CIS countries and, simultaneously, serve as channels forinfluencing them. Borrowing from foreign experience, Russiashould rebuild its research and analytical base at a new level forworking out a modern pragmatic concept for developing Siberiaand the Russian Far East.

Moscow must allocate funds (relatively small) for the trainingand retraining of personnel and adapt it to the new geopoliticaland geo-economic situation. First of all, this refers to high-levelpersonnel for work with the European Union. (According to dif-ferent estimates, there are 20 to 25 highly skilled experts in thisfield in the country, and only half of them work in the state appa-ratus. This is even less than in the Baltic States.) What is alsorequired is retraining specialists in Asian issues, most of whom stillidentify with “old” Asia, which now is actually non-existent.



* * *Thus, in order to prevent the weakening of its positions in achanging world, Russia must carry out the following steps:

– change the philosophy of its approach to the CIS, focusingits attention only on those countries that play a key role and whereRussia’s active policy has good prospects;

– reorient and diversify energy exports to Asia or the worldmarket as a whole;

– step up dialog with rapidly developing Asia;– avoid sliding toward an anti-Western policy.Calls to embrace Asia do not imply a multipolar policy direct-

ed de facto against the U.S. Such a move should not be inter-preted as the conservation of backwardness, the triumph of bar-barian “Eurasianism” under the guise of an “original path,” ananti-Western policy or renunciation of the European choice. Itshould be viewed as a movement along the path of acceleratedmodernization, without which there will be neither prosperity, nordemocracy. This is a call for a real multivector strategy aimed atusing the new tendencies in the global development in the inter-ests of the country.

Sergei Karaganov



If the state of Russia’s foreign policy could be summed up in oneword, “crisis” would be the most fitting description. The crisis iswide-ranging, systemic, and structural. Furthermore, it is accom-panied by highly coordinated pressure on Russia from the princi-pal international players. Meanwhile, talk about the “pragmatism”of President Putin’s course is only designed to cover up the obvi-ous fact that the country’s foreign policy is sporadic and based ona response-to-emergency formula. It is not built as a coherent sys-tem of pre-emptive measures. Not surprisingly, Moscow has beensuffering one setback after another in international affairs.

At the same time, nobody doubts the high professionalism ofRussia’s diplomatic corps. What then are the causes of the pre-vailing situation?

C A U S E S O F T H E C R I S I SFirst, the crisis is conceptual: Russia lacks a viable, realistic foreignpolicy concept. The Foreign Policy Concept of the RussianFederation that the president approved in June 2000 containedmany correct propositions and conclusions, but generally speaking,it was obviously out-of-date. More importantly, neither the conceptnor the president’s subsequent pronouncements (including hisannual state-of-the-nation addresses to the Federal Assembly)answered the question about Russia’s national identity.

Invigorating Russia’s Foreign Policy

Sergei Kortunov

Sergei Kortunov, professor, is Chairman of the Foreign Policy Planning

Committee, Vice-President of the Russian Foreign Policy Association.


Unfortunately, not only the outside world but even Russian societyitself still has trouble understanding what we are – an entirely newstate that was put on the map only in 1991. Is the new Russia thesuccessor to the Soviet Union who voluntarily “reduced” its terri-tory and swapped a planned economy for a wild-market economy,or the legal inheritor of millennium-old Russian traditions?

Thomas Graham, a well-known U.S. political scientist, aptlyobserved that the key to success lies in Russia’s new identity in thecontemporary world, something that the majority of the Russianpeople and the country’s political elite are not ready for yet. Thislack of identity is the main reason why Russia has not yet made astrategic choice as to which nations it views as allies and whichnations it views as adversaries.

Second, the crisis is institutional: there is no effective mechanismfor preparing, making or implementing foreign-policy decisions.Unfortunately, during Vladimir Putin’s presidency, the situation hasnot improved; in fact, it has worsened. The principle of collegialityand transparency of foreign policy decision-making is being appliedmuch less consistently than it was under Boris Yeltsin. This raisesmany questions about the rationale behind specific moves, while theresponsibility for foreign policy activity rests with just one person –the Russian president. Oftentimes, especially in dealing with theCIS countries (Belarus, Ukraine, and Georgia), the RussianForeign Ministry, the Russian Security Council, and even theForeign Policy Department of the Presidential Administration havebeen sidelined, while the head of state becomes a veritable hostageto his inner circle – a circle that is not always very proficient.Generally speaking, the trend toward a loosening of administrativediscipline in the sphere of foreign policy, which emerged under BorisYeltsin, has deepened greatly. Not even express directives from theRussian president are carried out any longer.

As is popularly known, during the Soviet era there was a coor-dination mechanism for the elaboration of foreign policy positions– namely, the Interdepartmental Commission of the CPSUCentral Committee (the so-called “group of five”), which draftedresolutions on basic national security matters with the participa-

Sergei Kortunov


tion of the Foreign Ministry, the Defense Ministry, the KGB, andthe Council of Ministers’ Military-Industrial Commission. It waslargely through this mechanism that the Soviet Union achievedgreat successes in nuclear arms control, nonproliferation, and thelimitation of conventional forces in Europe. This mechanismhelped neutralize the active opponents of disarmament andencouraged the country’s political and military leaders to searchfor compromises with their partners.

In post-Soviet Russia, however, nothing has come anywhereclose to such effectiveness. Attempts during the past several yearsto install an appropriate mechanism – be it inside or outside theRF Security Council – have been invariably thwarted by variousstate and government agencies. Interagency commissions, howev-er, only lead to the dissipation of effort, duplication and, eventu-ally, to greater irresponsibility and lower effectiveness of state pol-icy. These commissions, which lie within the jurisdiction of theRussian Security Council, are meant to harmonize security posi-tions. However, they are unable to take over the functions ofdrafting and preparing appropriate decisions, or synchronizing theactivities of government ministries and departments. Furthermore,as it turns out, the Foreign Ministry plays merely a symbolic roleas a foreign policy coordinator.

The truly titanic efforts by the RF president’s foreign policyadviser are incapable of reversing this situation. Thus, there is ineffect no foreign policy coordination on the state level.

Judging by the extent to which Russia’s foreign policy objec-tives are matched by the available means and resources, it fails torely on a system of strategic planning that considers short-, medi-um- and long-term foreign policy options. Nor is there a thoroughanalysis of the current international situation, which cannot bebased on any of the patterns or stereotypes inherited from theSoviet era.

Perhaps only a handful of non-governmental organizations –such as the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy, the “Russiain a United Europe” public committee, and the Expert Board ofthe Federation Council Foreign Affairs Committee – can be seen



as an embryo of such a system. The Kremlin, however, is not par-ticularly inclined to listen to the expert recommendations fromthese organizations.

The lack of a strategic planning system (the Strategic PlanningGroup that was recently created at the RF Security Council doesnot count), which would rest on a sound analytical basis, has infact caused Russia’s foreign policy crisis. After all, none of thestrategic objectives formulated by the country’s political leadershipduring the past 15 years have been achieved.

An important, although not necessarily the main cause ofRussia’s foreign policy crisis, is its visibly declining internationalimage (although during the first several years of Putin’s rule, it tend-ed to improve). Unfortunately, in recent years Russia has ceased tobe an attractive partner for its neighbors. In the past couple of years,Moscow has been confronting a barrage of criticism (for the mostpart fair and well-grounded) from the outside world. Experienceshows that the semi-feudal relations that still exist in a number ofRussia’s internal-policy spheres are utterly incompatible with thepost-industrial architecture of the developed world into which –judging by the Russian president’s annual state-of-the-nationaddresses to the Federal Assembly – it wants to integrate.

Finally, there is a lack of well-trained, qualified personnel, aswell as a general degradation, of the diplomatic service. This islargely due to the fact that a diplomatic career in Russia (in con-trast to all other countries, including former Soviet republics) is nolonger seen as prestigious, primarily because of poor compensation.There are few young and talented cadres worthy of replacing thehandful of Foreign Service veterans who received excellentschooling at the Soviet Foreign Ministry and are still at their posts.This means only one thing: Russia is doomed to being beaten byboth its partners and opponents within the international arena.

R E T H I N K I N G T H E S T R A T E G YSporadic, or purely subjective foreign policy decisions, ill-consid-ered and based on considerations of expediency, are unacceptablein the modern world. This is what Russia – not only its political

Sergei Kortunov


leadership, but the entire political class – should think abouttoday.

First, in order to overcome the conceptual crisis in its foreignpolicy, Russia should first correct the issue of its national identi-ty. Russia must make a clean break with the preposterous attemptsof the 1990s to come across as “pure and innocent” and strive fora kind of “new” Russia that builds its statehood from zero. Thecountry should unequivocally and unconditionally define itself asa successor to the historical – i.e., millennium-old – Russia. It willof course have to assume responsibility for all of its past sins,including – unpleasant as this may be – the sins of the Soviet era.But the game is worth the candle; at this point, Russia will onceagain become a subject of world history, recognizable and under-standable to all. Until it does this, our foreign partners, includingthe United States, will hardly be able to formulate a correct poli-cy line toward Russia, maintaining their wait-and-see position.

In other words, we should define our identity and tell thewhole world exactly what we are. This is critical, for instance, forRussian-U.S. relations. If we have been in existence for a mere 15years, then we cannot claim a more significant role than as a U.S.client state. If we view ourselves as a mini-USSR, we are doomedto mini-confrontation with the United States, not to mentiondefeat in a mini-Cold War, and ultimately, mini-disintegration. If,however, we define ourselves as millennium-old Russia, then part-nership and even strategic alliance with America, not to mentionEurope, will be a natural option for us.

It is also time for Russia to declare its national project, whichhas yet to be finalized. As far as it can be interpreted from dis-parate statements by the Russian leadership, in general outline,this project boils down to two key ideas:

– modernization in the midst of a transition to postindustrialsociety with all of its trappings, including the appropriate qualityof life and political freedoms for all citizens; and

– Russia’s cautious but sufficiently rapid integration into theworld economy as an equal partner of the developed countries,while preserving its national sovereignty.



These two objectives are inseparable from each other: one cannotbe attained without the other. The first is directly linked withRussia’s economic transition to an innovative development model(as opposed to mobilization-based development, which is nolonger possible now); together with a move to a ‘knowledge econ-omy’ that is today the key to development in the postindustrialworld. The second task involves ensuring the competitiveness ofsovereign Russia, its economy, specific sectors of industry, com-panies, businesspeople, and even ordinary citizens in the contextof globalization – in short, the task that was formulated byVladimir Putin in his 2003 state-of-the-nation address to theFederal Assembly.

A reasonable and carefully formulated transition to an innova-tive development model can, under certain circumstances, ensureRussia the status as one of the world’s intellectual leaders (one ofthe world’s principal science laboratories).

Postindustrial society as the basis of a national project also putsthe country’s foreign policy priorities into perspective.

In the foreign policy sphere, Russia should orient itself, aboveall, toward those states that have already embraced an innovativedevelopment model and built a postindustrial society, as well ascountries sharing the same cultural and other values, with Russia.These are primarily countries of Western Europe and the UnitedStates that are the cradle and foundation of our commonChristian civilization. It is important to uphold Russia’s Europeanidentity. Russia is an inseparable part of Greater Europe, thus theEuropean vector is paramount.

At the same time, Russia should not bank on modern Europereceiving it into its fold with outstretched arms. The Old Worldhas not as yet fully understood its own identity, let alone formu-lated its attitude toward Russia (not least because Russia has notdefined its own identity). We have yet to prove to the Europeansthat Greater Europe – not the European Union as it is today, buta truly inclusive community of European nations, capable ofdeveloping dynamically and competing for influence with theUnited States and the rapidly advancing Asian region – is impos-

Sergei Kortunov


sible without Russia on the economic, political, cultural or mili-tary fronts.

Therefore, there can only be one principal development vector forRussia, and that is in Greater Europe, without the dividing lineswhere, for example, Ukraine would not be confronted with thedilemma of orienting itself toward either the East or the West. Thecontention that Russia is “too big for Europe” is ridiculous, to saythe least. Even Zbigniew Brzezinski, who is not known for hissympathy for Russia, has no doubt about its European future.Russia’s security and democratic freedoms hinge on Europe; ofcourse, this is not going to happen next year, but in the nextdecade, as he predicted in an interview with the Kommersant dailyin December 2004.

Geopolitically, Russia is a Eurasian and therefore a globalpower. This makes it inevitable that it has close interaction withkey international players, above all China and India (these coun-tries are rapidly emerging as an important part of the world’sinnovative economy), Iran, the Arab countries and Turkey.Finally, it necessitates a strategic alliance with the United Stateson global security problems.

Yet such foreign policy strategies as “multivector setup,”“multipolarity,” and “unique path” (as distinct from theEuropean path), need rethinking. Upon closer examination, theidea of a “multipolar world order” that is upheld by manyRussian politicians and diplomats, is actually extremely danger-ous for Russia. In its present condition, it falls far short of thestatus as one of the “poles” in this construction. Given Russia’sirreversible demographic decline, its territory will be literally tornto pieces by the more dynamic “poles.” As far as the “uniquepath” is concerned, this road has already been followed on morethan one occasion by Russia, each time resulting in a nationalcatastrophe. Russia could tempt fate once again, of course, butit would probably be its last attempt.

If the European development vector is given priority, it will bemuch easier to build relations with the newly independent states aswell. While integrating into Europe, Russia should not hinder its



neighbors’ movement in the same direction. At the same time,Moscow does not have to pay for this movement by remaining thedonor of a former empire. Russia will not force its neighbors intounions or alliances. But it will also abandon the practice of con-cessions for the sake of preserving a semblance of influence on theneighboring states and subsidizing their development at the expenseof its own taxpayer. Strictly speaking, Russia should immediatelypull out of the CIS and stop the “peoples’ friendship” game whereinonly the newly independent states stand to win.

With this approach, the post-Soviet space will cease to be anarena of rivalry between Russia and the West. The European statesof the CIS (Ukraine, Moldova, and Belarus) will become a fieldfor partnership mainly between Russia and the EU; the CentralAsian states and Kazakhstan, between Russia and the UnitedStates (in the not so distant future, also China); the SouthCaucasus countries, between Russia, the EU and the UnitedStates (eventually with Iran). This approach, among other things,unties Russia’s hands in interacting with the pro-Russian opposi-tion in those countries.

Second, it is necessary to pass special legislation that outlinesthe procedures for formulating and implementing foreign-policydecisions, effectively synchronizing the activities of various gov-ernment agencies under the general supervision of the president inthe interest of pursuing a uniform foreign policy line. This proce-dure should follow the principle of collegiality, encompassing allforeign policy agencies and relying on analysis and expertise bygovernmental and non-governmental think tanks that Russia mustestablish and generously finance.

Under the guidelines of the Russian Constitution, it is thepresident who makes fundamental foreign policy decisions. Thereis, however, a pressing need for preliminary coordination betweenthe relevant state officials – specifically, the head of government,the secretary of the Security Council, and top officials at theForeign Ministry, the Defense Ministry, the Federal SecurityService (FSB) and Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). At the cur-rent stage of state-building in Russia, this procedure should also

Sergei Kortunov


be open to representatives of the legislative branch: speakers of theFederation Council and the State Duma. This is necessary inorder to ensure a unified position by the top representatives of thetwo branches of government on major foreign policy issues, i.e.,elementary administrative discipline. The aforementioned officialsshould form a new foreign policy and international affairs bodyunder the Russian president. This should be a new organizationsince all of the existing bodies, including the Russian SecurityCouncil, have proven unfit to perform this function. This neworganization would be analogous to the U.S. National SecurityCouncil. In this context, it would be necessary to introduce aposition similar to that of the U.S. national security adviser, occu-pied by an authoritative diplomat (with a small but well equippedand efficient staff). A newly introduced bill, On Coordination ofthe Activity of State Power Agencies in the Foreign Policy Sphere,drafted by the Expert Board of the Federation Council ForeignAffairs Committee, is relevant to this issue and is pending.

Third, commensurability, that is, a balanced mix of objectivesand available resources, is a major foreign policy principle. A care-fully planned and prudent resource policy is not only vital toensure an effective foreign policy; it is crucial for Russia’s viabil-ity as a state, its national economy, specific industrial sectors,domestic business, innovative systems, etc., in the global world.This, in turn, is one of the prerequisites of national security.

Fourth, Russia’s image definitely needs improvement. At thesame time, it should be remembered that any PR efforts, anyfinancial inputs, will prove useless unless the internal situationimproves as well. To have a respectable image abroad, Russiamust be attractive, not just appear attractive. Thus, the maineffort to salvage the country’s image should be deployed athome, not abroad.

Fifth, it is imperative to provide more prestige to a career inthe diplomatic service. To this end, a Russian diplomat – regard-less of whether he is posted abroad or in Moscow – should be ableto enjoy a decent life style. Moreover, he wants assurances that thestate will take care of him when he retires. In short, a diplomat



must not feel like a second-rate citizen, with his status on thesocial ladder beneath the dignity of his position.

T H E U S E F U L C R I S I SDespite the significance of the problem, the ongoing foreign pol-icy crisis in Russia should not be overdramatized. Generallyspeaking, such a systemic crisis can actually play a positive role ifsteps are taken to drastically modernize and improve the system.Furthermore, the current stage in Russia’s history is definitely not

the worst-case scenario. The absence offar-reaching external threats enablesRussia to concentrate on its internalproblems perhaps for the first time. Onthe other hand, perhaps never before inits history have Russia’s resources beenso limited (paradoxically, the windfalloil revenues do not address this prob-lem: these funds are all but ineffectualin the absence of mechanisms, princi-ples and priorities for their effectiveuse).

A balanced mix of ends and meansprioritizes Russia’s European develop-ment vector, especially considering itsirreversible demographic decline. Giventhe overriding priority of sustainable,

democratic development, as well as its limited resources, Russiacannot afford to get involved in foreign wars or reckless adven-tures. Its foreign policy should not be aggressive, not even overlyambitious.

The postwar development of Japan and Germany shows that a(de facto) great-power status can be maintained even with a con-siderable moderation of foreign-policy ambitions. In this respect,national history is also quite instructive.

Following the end of the Times of Trouble and the signing ofthe Deulin Peace Accords with Poland in 1618, Russia was not

Sergei Kortunov

Russian Chancellor Alexander Gorchakov (1798–1883)


only weak, it bled white. Until the late 17th century – that is, forabout 70 years – Russia avoided any protracted armed conflictsagainst formidable opponents. During the same period, however,and without going to war, it incorporated the left-bank Ukraineand Kiev, as well as Siberia, all the way up the Pacific and alongthe southern Chinese border. These events happened thanks to aclever foreign-policy course and initiative. During this period, bystaying out of serious conflicts and not pursuing an aggressive pol-icy, Russia expanded its territory more than any other time in itshistory. Following a military-political “vegetation” that lasted 80years, devastated Russia eventually built up such a military-eco-nomic capability that it subsequently emerged victorious againstSweden, at that time one of the most formidable European pow-ers, in a 21-year-war.

After the death of Peter the Great (1725) and up until theSeven-Year War (1756-1763), Russia once again resembled analmost ruined state. However, once again it minimized its foreignpolicy ambitions, especially in the most risky region – Europe. Itseemed that it did not have an independent foreign policy line,acting merely as the ally of others. Yet even that period of peaceand humiliation was parlayed into a series of subsequent foreignpolicy victories and triumphs by Catherine the Great, when almostall of western Russia was reunited; Turkey was routed, andaccording to historian Vassily Klyuchevsky, “Russian state territo-ry expanded and restored to its historical borders both in the southand in the west.” Of the 50 governorates that Russia had, 11 wereacquired under Catherine the Great. Whereas at the start of herreign, Russia’s population was not more than 20 million, by theend of her reign, it was at least 34 million (i.e., growing by three-quarters). Meanwhile, state revenues had more than quadrupled.Russia firmly integrated into world (at that time this meantEuropean) politics as one of the most influential powers. CountAlexander Bezborodko thus was able to tell young Russian diplo-mats: “I don’t know how it is going to be on your watch, but onour watch, not a single cannon in Europe dared fire a shell with-out our permission.”



In the wake of its defeat in the Crimean War in 1856 (just as atthe end of the Times of Trouble and the death of Peter theGreat), Russia once again moderated its foreign policy claimsand geopolitical ambitions. For 21 years, in the expression ofChancellor Alexander Gorchakov, it “kept its cool and focusedon getting things done,” dealing mainly with domestic mattersand building up its power base. At that time, the Russian Empirehad no allies. Yet when Russia had to sign the humiliating ParisTreaty (1856), Count Nikolai Orlov, a Russian diplomat,exclaimed: “Yes, ladies and gentlemen, we’ve suffered a defeat,and we are withdrawing from the Balkans. But don’t you worry:we’ll come back.” A mere 13 years passed, and Russia returnedto the Balkans and the Black Sea. No country, not even the“only superpower” – Great Britain, which pursued an anti-Russia policy – could do anything about it.

Thus, periods of relative passivity in the realm of foreign poli-cy are not always bad. This is something to be pondered by cer-tain Russian “statists” who – some honestly, some disingenuous-ly – are playing the “great-powerism” card without bothering totake stock of the country’s available resources. Their recommen-dations could spell a national disaster, which the world witnessedtwice in the twentieth century.

The other choice is to focus on internal matters, whichincludes the generation and effective use of resources, togetherwith dynamic economic development in the next several years (or,the international situation permitting, even decades). All of this isa key to Russia’s forthcoming triumphs, not least of all in the for-eign policy sphere. An important factor in these future triumphs(hopefully a not-so-distant future) is a prudent, careful overhaulof the country’s foreign policy mechanism.

Sergei Kortunov


In order to understand the controversies unveiled by the process ofglobalization, as well as to see Russia’s actual place within these pro-cesses, we must first recognize two fundamental truths. First, compe-tition between the two differing global projects has been unfoldingwithin Eurasia since before the invention of writing. Second, it isimportant to discern the specific nature of the current moment apartfrom the hitherto unknown influences that have come into play today.

A look at inscriptions left behind by the first small lords whoruled in Mesopotamia 5,000 years ago suggests they proudly calledthemselves the rulers of all four sides of the world. They were thefirst ones to make claims to global domination; sometime later,the tendency repeated itself in China.

These historical truths reveal several important facts. First, theOriental vector of globalization is antecedent to the Western vectorand, second, it is soaked in ideology since its aspiration for stand-ing at the helm of the world has no resources to draw upon.

The European model, on the contrary, has never, even inmuch later epochs – in ancient Greece, despite the fact that theyviewed the rest of the world as barbarians, and in Rome in thefirst few centuries of its history – focused on ideology. Alexanderthe Great set out for the Orient only after two massive Persianinterventions in the Balkans and a multitude of cases of repres-

Torn Between Two Choices

Fyodor Shelov-Kovediayev

Fyodor Shelov-Kovediayev, former First Deputy Foreign Minister of the

Russian Federation (1991-1992), is a political scientist, professor at the

Higher School of Economics.


sion against the Greeks. Even then, his purpose for going to warwas mainly to recover lost spoils. The official slogan of that cam-paign was to win back the desecrated shrines or, simply speaking,precious utensils and decorations that the Medes had taken outof continental Greece.

The Macedonian Military Council insisted that Alexander,their ruler, take hold – with a full measure of responsibility – ofthe huge amount of defenseless power lying prostrate before himonly after he had defeated the Persian king Darius, whose armieshad finally run away and dispersed, for a third time.

One possible conclusion from the above is that the Westerngeopolitical project has a secondary role compared with theOriental project; it actually responds to the Oriental challenge andits basic difference lies in its pragmatism. It develops an imperialmindset only after it acquires the resources for implementing it.

A similar thing happened to the Quirites. Early in their histo-ry, they twice dealt crushing blows to Carthage on their own ter-ritory (first at a request from Greece and second while defendingRome from Hannibal). They achieved a third such victory inAfrica, which made them conclude – only after victory – thatthey had responsibility for the entire Mediterranean region,although Conservatives in the Senate tried to block the people’swillingness to take care of anything more than their own land. Asfor the Latin world’s ideology, which was the first global power toembrace the whole civilized world, that appears much later thanthe events herein describe.

Byzantine, if viewed from the angle of this opposition, contin-ued the political traditions of the Western model, while the Franks– who admired Byzantine on the one hand, and wished to destroyit on the other because it was the heir apparent to the RomanEmpire – realized that perfectly well. Let us recall, however, thatthe Byzantine system had parties, municipalities, a parliament,and philosophy at a time when the West lacked anything similar,even in its basic outlines.

Democratic institutions and self-government were primarilyrevived in the West in the cities that provisionally returned to the



rule of Constantinople from the Goths – Venice, Florence andGenoa. They influenced the rise of parliaments in England andIceland at a much later epoch. Interestingly, the fall ofByzantium, which signaled the end to the first stage of theWestern global political project, coincided with a prelude to itstransition to the second stage, manifest by the colonial system ofEuropean kingdoms through their great geographic discoveries.

As colonialism fell, neo-colonialism, economic transnational-ization and finally, contemporary economic globalization as anoffspring of its predecessor, rose up before our eyes. This meansthat the Western global project has proven to be successful anduninterrupted over a period of over two thousand years.

In the meantime, quite the opposite has transpired with itsOriental antipode, which arose much earlier than the Westernproject and ignited the latter’s activity, but it has never come tomaturity. The Arab Caliphate drew close to the might of Romeonly in terms of territory, and that is why today’s Arab extremistsregularly evoke its power. It existed as a single organism for just afew decades and did not leave behind any successors that couldcompare with it in the scale and reach.

China of the Han era eventually collapsed as well, whileexternal aggressors held it together. In later epochs, new aggres-sors – the Mongols and the Manchus – pulled it together onceagain. The same function was performed by an imported ideol-ogy in the 20th century.

The Ottoman Empire never enjoyed global power either – ithad looser controls than the Caliphate, while large Europeancolonial empires fringed its borders. Moreover, the whole notionof ‘the civilized world’ had changed by that time.

Thus, the Oriental project proved to be impracticable andinfected with a virus of internal collapse.

It appears then that pragmatism is a stabilizing force, whileideologized projects, even derivations witnessed in Rome,Byzantium or the colonial networks, are not. What I am speakingabout here is political models and their ability – or inability – toretain their main essence in the process of transformation and

Torn Between Two Choices


adapt to new circumstances. I am not speaking about individualexamples of those models, since we know perfectly well thatWestern empires fell apart as well.

However, if we look at the cultural aspect of history in its tra-ditional sense, the picture is entirely different.

The Orient spreads its cultural influences right into the heartof the Occident. The tendency is traced everywhere, from theRoman cults of Cybele and Isis to Christianity and later toHinduism, Buddhism and Taoism. In contrast, after the coloniz-ers relinquished political control over different parts of Asia,Christianity – eagerly assimilated by the Europeans – failed totake root throughout Asia, unlike its native Islam. The Philippinesseems to be an exception in this case rather than the rule.

The legend about the Rape of Europa offers the best metaphor forthe real situation with regard to many basic cultural skills and knowl-edge. In light of this, the Americans should not have been so aston-ished by the turn of events, since globalization is a two-way street –they somehow overlooked the fact that this has always been so.

This opposite movement provides an explanation for the tensestandoff evidenced in the situation. While one project is seeking toadd its cultural preferences to political dominance, the other pro-ject is thrusting forward political ideas as an appendage to cultur-al dominance. However, Nature hates excessive uniformity, sinceuniformity is the soul of emptiness.

Now we must ask what part Russia plays in all of this. One ofthe theories popular inside and outside the country is that Russiahas always been an Oriental satrapy. This is wrong, and there aremany ways to prove it.

Varangians founded Russia, which built all of its contactsbefore the Mongol conquest and afterwards with the Europeans.Russia’s dynastic bonds with Europe were abundant. The GoldenHorde’s control over Russia’s principalities was purely formalalready 80 years after the conquest, and the bows of respectMoscow Prince Ivan the Moneybag made at the khan’s court werevery pragmatic. Traditions of democracy in northwest Russia andgenerally among tradesmen are fairly well known.



Ivan the Terrible fell formally into the Oriental format with a pro-ject proclaiming Moscow to be the ‘Third Rome,’ but instead ofwaging war against Constantinople or the Western Christians,which he should have been expected to launch, he fought for con-trol over Astrakhan and Kazan, the Tatar fortresses that blockedlucrative trade routes. As for Latin Christians, he voluntarily metwith some of them on one occasion while searching for ice-freeports to trade with the Hanseatic cities, Holland and England.This act, however, was sheer pragmatism.

Another popular example is Peter the Great. We know quitewell he did not introduce dramatic novelties into the policy of theearly Romanovs, except for eccentricity and new resources,although he did enhance his measures with a strong new impulse.It was thanks to Peter that Russia gained membership within theEuropean family of nations.

Russia began its first Oriental project in 1917. This was to be aglobal and permanent revolution, the logical extension of which wasa global republic of Soviets. There was a great lack of resources, asthe Russian Social-Democratic and workers’ movement lacked theunity to implement their grandiose plans. The money was in shortsupply, too: the Bolsheviks had to become traitors in order to getthe necessary funds for a revolution even in one country. The aiddid not produce the desired effect, however limited (geographical-ly) the actual use of the money was in reality.

The paradox is that Russia continued to implement Western-style initiatives in the East. Industrialization, its policies in CentralAsia and in the Caucasus, in Afghanistan and in Chechnya –these were instances of Westernization, in terms of reproducedmatrixes, not methods.

Since the Oriental project contains an inherent mechanism forself-destruction, the Warsaw Pact fell apart. The Soviet Union,w

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