Russia Development Index 2011-2012 (Valdai Index), English version

7/30/2019 Russia Development Index 2011-2012 (Valdai Index), English version

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RUSSIA DEVELOPMENTINDEX 2011/2012

Expert opinion poll of the Valdai

Discussion Club

Moscow, November 2012

valdaiclub.com


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Russia Development Index 2011/2012

3ExpErt opinion poll of thEValdai discussion club

The results of the survey of the Valdai Clubinternational experts have pointed to differ-

ent trends in the development of Russianinstitutions and society. Positive changesin certain spheres, such as the develop-ment of innovative industries and the finan-cial services market, the strengthening of thedefense potential and foreign policy activity,are set off by negative estimates inother areas, which means that the minorrecessive trend indicated in last years sur-vey remains dominant.

Experts believe that changes lie in store

for Russia. And these changes are like-ly to be caused by recalibration of thesystem and a search for a new balanceas a result of Vladimir Putins returnto the Kremlin.

The Russian Political System moduledemonstrates a slackened pace of

decline (to 0.3 in 2012 from 0.4 in 2011and 0.5 in 2010).

The main downward factor is the assess-ment of the efficiency of Russian institutionsand public's trust in them. According to the2012 survey, the deteriorating efficiency ofthe prime minister was mentioned by 72.6%of respondents, of the government by 57.5%,of the State Duma by 46.6% and of thepresident by 45.2% of respondents. A totalof 80.8% said public trust in the president

has decreased, 79.5% said the same aboutthe prime minister, 69.8% about the gov-ernment, 67.1% about the State Duma, and58.9% about courts.

According to experts, the party with the par-liamentary majority (the ruling party) waseven less efficient: 78.1% assessed its effi-ciency as low and 84.9% believe that publictrust in the party has decreased (nearly 40%of them pointed to substantial deteriora-tion).

At the same time, the influence of parlia-mentary and especially non-parliamentaryopposition has grown, which is a positivesign for the awakening of society and thepolitical life of the country as a whole. Thegrowing influence of the extra-parliamen-tary opposition was mentioned by 71.2% ofrespondents, and 68.5% pointed to growingpublic confidence in them. Public opin-ion and civil society have new means andplatforms for channeling their messages,a number of experts said in explaining the


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4 Moscow, noveMber 2012

trend. Another factor is the developmentof the new middle class. Until the non-reg-istered opposition formulates its medium-and long-term plans and systemic actions,it will be the new urban residents whowill promote the systems growth, the com-mentators said. Their growing influence willattract the attention of the authorities andserve as the reason for dialogue.

Meanwhile, 63% of respondents said that

the standards of civil rights and freedoms,including freedom of the press, have declinedsince September, 2011, and 57.6% said theextent to which citizens interests are reflect-ed during elections has decreased. Over60% of respondents said that the extent towhich the rights and freedoms to elect andbe elected are observed and the freedom ofcampaigning in Russia have declined.

Speaking about the role of NGOs in organizingthe protest movement and the reaction to theJuly 2012 law regulating the work of NGOs,

experts were divided almost equally on therole of NGOs in Russias political system.

The survey showed that the roles of the Fed-eration Council, the Constitutional Courtand the Public Chamber in the Russianpolitical system have remained almost con-stant at last years level. The regional execu-tive branch appears to be more balancedthan the federal authorities, which expertsexplain by a low level of involvement on thepart of regional governments in political

life, or insufficient information for the pub-lic and the media on their operation.

After Vladimir Putin and Dmitry Medvedevswapped places, the position of the presi-dent has become more influential, whichexperts note as a major tend. Over 60%of them pointed to that trend, and overhalf said that the position of the presidenthas grown considerably stronger. Expertsbelieve that this shift of the decision-makingcenter to the Kremlin will also increase thepresidents potential to enhance the effi-ciency of the system.

Most economic performance indica-tors have fully shown mixed trends

not in absolute terms, but relative to expec-tations that the economy would respond tothe leadership's rhetoric about moderniza-tion and innovation, one of the experts said.Despite positive macroeconomic parameterscompared to European figures, the ValdaiIndex has not remained in the black. Aftergrowing to 0 in 2011 from 0.1 in 2010, theindicator has slumped back to 0.1 in 2012.

The relative balance of macroeconom-ic parameters has been confirmed by the

experts, 34,2 % of whom said they haveimproved, while 41,1% pointed to a minordecline.

A similar balance of opinions, though witha slightly more pronounced stagnationsentiment, was provided for trends in thecommodity and manufacturing industries.As for innovative industries and financialservices, 35.7% and 41.1% of experts respec-tively said they have improved over the pastyear. This result was obviously due to theconsistent policy of modernization and the

development of an international financialcenter in Moscow.

However, these achievements are not suf-ficient to provide a positive assessmentof Russias economic diversification. Over50% of experts do not see any change in thisarea, and 41.1% said that the modernizationefforts could be more effective.

Almost 50% of respondents positivelyassessed Russias efforts to integrate in


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the global economy, and 38.3% positive-ly assessed the openness of the Russianeconomy. The key factor influencing theiropinion was of course Russias accession tothe WTO.

The experts praised the establishment ofthe post of business ombudsman and theappointment of Boris Titov to this post,but they also said that Russias investmentattractiveness and business climate have

deteriorated. They explain this primarily byinvestors increasing uncertainty due to pre-and post-election protests.

The Valdai experts believe that Russiashould improve its competitiveness andstimulate foreign investment. The Russianeconomy is insufficiently diversified, whichcould become a major problem in condi-tions of low oil prices, global economicstagnation and the ensuing decrease inenergy exports.

The respondents assessment of theRussian human dimension reaffirmedthe negative trend: 0.3, as in 2011.

Most experts said that the situation in theenvironment, public health, and povertyand prosperity levels has not changed. Butthey are divided almost equally on the feel-ing of safety/security and general and pro-fessional/vocational education standards:some believe that the situation has deterio-rated while others say it has not changed.

In the Ideology and Politics sector of theHuman Dimension module, 41.1% of expertssaid the level of patriotism has not changedas compared to last year. But the majority ofrespondents pointed to deterioration in thesense of freedom, the level of mutual trustand the level of tolerance (74%, 65.7% and67.1%, respectively). Approximately 50% ofexperts said that the cultural level of popu-lation has not changed.

On the other hand, the feeling of decline inthe past year was probably stronger than theactual decline, another Valdai expert said.Social media are building and extendingtrust amongst people who have no directpersonal connection. These virtual com-munities, which form on the basis of affin-ity, interest and outlook, have considerablemobilization potential.

However, the level of trust between strang-ers in Russia is still considerably lower thanin Europe or North America. As a country

that is becoming increasingly more opento external, global public opinion, Russiaseems to be living a paradox of a growinglevel of freedom in terms of public opinionand independent sources of informationand a growing sense of restriction andlack of independence in media and publiclife altogether. National pride and patrio-tism are feeding nationalist feelings and apoor level of tolerance, alongside a grow-ing sense of a mutual distrust, one of theexperts said.


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Compared to 2009/2010 and2010/2011, the trend in science andinnovative development was slightlynegative (0.1).

Opinions regarding the competitiveness ofRussian higher education, post-graduateand doctorate courses were divided betweendeterioration and no change. The cre-ative potential of academics/scientists andengineers has not changed either.

According to 31.5% of respondents, theinfrastructure incentives for innovationhave improved, but the business commu-nitys willingness to be involved in ventureinvestment and tax incentives for innova-

tion remained flat at last years level, indi-cating a lack of progress in these spheres.However, up to 20% of respondents had noopinion on this issue.

A total of 52% of experts believe that the braindrain has seriously accelerated over the pastyear, although 39.7% point out that the levelof state financing for science has increased.

The number of competitive innovationprojects has grown, said 34.3% of experts,

whereas nearly half of respondents believethat the extent to which R&D results areapplied in the economy has not grown.

One of the experts said that there have notbeen any major changes despite the sharp

criticism of corruption in the system ofhigher education. According to another Val-dai Club expert: The attention and impor-tance officially given to several categoriesof innovative development does not finda direct correspondence in political prac-tice, in programs and everyday life of thepopulation. Although a number of innova-tive higher education, post-graduate anddoctorate courses have been created, theRussian post-graduate educational systemis not yet perceived as competitive on theinternational level. A still big creative poten-tial is threatened by a persisting brain drain,especially in terms of young specialists.

Russias index in the system of nation-

al, regional and global security is thehighest compared to other develop-ment aspects (0.1). After a pause lastyear, it has resumed growth due to relativelystatic threat conditions and governmentmeasures to strengthen national defenses.

Over half of respondents said that the exter-nal border security index remained quitestable. Although some experts pointed tostalled military reform, the majority believethat the level to which the Russian Armed

Forces are equipped with modern weaponsand the level of advanced military R&Dprojects have grown (over 50% and 40% ofexperts, respectively). They also pointed toimprovements in the professional qualitiesof officers, commanders and soldiers and


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their ability to quickly respond to a threatfrom abroad, to conduct operations in Rus-sia and outside it, and to combat the terrorthreat.

External border security is better becausethe West has fallen into the economic cri-sis, one Valdai expert said. Another expertbelieves that in spite of rhetoric, after theAugust 2008 war in the Caucasus Russiahas proved quite pragmatic in terms ofinternational security, including in the Lib-yan conflict and to a great extent in Syria aswell. While defending its interests, though,Moscow finds itself on the other side interms of international community percep-tion, giving the idea of defending old and

tyrannical systems.

The index of the Russian diplomat-ic activity on the international sceneplunged to 0.2 in 20112012 (from 0.2in 2011 and 0.8 in 2010).

The experts are widely divided over Russiasstance on Syria. Some of them describedit as harmful and said that Russia's for-eign policy appears to be more focused onpreventing U.S. leadership than on sup-

porting Kofi Annan's plan for a transition.Others have a positive view of Russias roleas mediator: Russia has been highly activeon the diplomatic scene connected withSyria and has made strenuous attemptsto help to find a political solution throughstrong support for the Kofi Annan missionand Moscow's own contacts with the Syriangovernment as well as representatives ofopposition groups. Its role has been poorlyunderstood in the Western and much of theArab media and deliberately distorted byspokespeople for Western and some Arab

governments. As a result, perceptions ofRussia's global diplomacy have, unfortu-nately, become more negative.

Accordingly, over 75.4% of respondents saidthat the perception of Russia abroad hasworsened, while 46.6% have a negative viewof Russias diplomatic initiatives.

Most Valdai experts have a neutral opin-ion of Russias participation in interna-tional organizations, which they say has

not changed since last year. At the sametime, Russias participation in the G20 andthe Organization for Economic Cooperationand Development (OECD) has improved,according to 32.8% and 20.6% of experts,respectively.

A total of 63% of experts have a positiveview of Russias chairmanship of APEC andAPEC Leaders Week in Vladivostok.

They have a more positive opinion of Rus-sias participation in the SCO (39.6%), theCIS (36.9%) and the CSTO (31.5%), than inthe UN, the OSCE and the Council of Europe.Despite the general consensus about a lackof major change in Russias participation inthese organizations compared to last year,negative assessments prevail in the caseof the UN (34.2%) and the OSCE and theCouncil of Europe (32.9%).

Experts point to a negative trend inRussias openness to the world (0.1),

although 46.6% of them mentioned improve-ment in the degree to which Russian citizensare free to travel internationally and 39.7%in the degree to which foreign citizens arefree to travel within Russia. Russians travelmore and more extensively, while foreigntourists are still a minor presence in mostregions of the Russian Federation exceptMoscow and St. Petersburg. Russia is stillperceived as a closed country. Easing visasystems would certainly help to a greatextent, a number of experts said.


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The Russian populations attitude towardforeign citizens remained largely stable,whereas foreign perception of Russian citi-zens has deteriorated, said 37% of experts.A total of 76.7% of experts believe that for-eign perception of Russia as an open coun-try has deteriorated. The level of accessi-bility of information on Russia to foreigncitizens has not changed. Russia has longceased to be a daily news item. Onlya handful of correspondents and report-

ers are serious or knowledgeable. So theimpressions of most people are created bystories: Berezovsky v Abramovich, Mag-nitsky, and Pussy Riot, one of the expertssaid.

The majority of experts said the level ofopenness and accessibility of representa-tives of federal and regional governmentbodies to foreign citizens remained almostflat at last years level, and that there wasonly a minor negative trend. There havebeen increasing image problems for Rus-

sia because of arrests and persecution ofopposition and dissident figures. Particu-larly since President Putin took office inMay, the increasing repression of Russiancivic groups has significantly worsenedRussia's international reputation, expertssaid.

The trend for Russias soft power indexremained slightly negative (0.2).

Almost half of respondents (46.6%) noteda decrease in the attractiveness of Rus-sias cultural and civilizational models. Theextent to which Russias political valuesare reflected in its foreign policy and theassessment of the national idea (values thatpredominate nationwide) reflected a slightnegative trend.

The experts are divided in their assessmentof the global role of the Russian languageand the global popularity of Russian culture,saying that they have not changed, or showa minor deterioration in the case of the Rus-sian language (28.7% v 23.2%) and an equalbalance of positive and negative in the caseof Russian culture (24.7% respectively).

Russian culture is highly respected world-wide. But teaching and knowledge of theRussian language are declining, at least in

the West, one of the experts said.

Some respondents doubt whether manyforeign countries look to Russia for a civiliza-tional model. According to 56.1% of respon-dents, Russias attractiveness as a place ofpermanent residence has declined.


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The analysis of the surveys over the past three years leads to the con-

clusion that international experts still view Russia as a strong and active global

power. Their opinions of its domestic policy and some aspects of Russian society

are mostly negative, but they do not dramatize the situation and only point to

a minor negative trend. It is important to note that they have a positive view of

the political priorities on which Russia has been consistently working, such as

support for innovative development. Therefore, it can be concluded that in the

current circumstances the choice of development trends depends on Russians,

and primarily on the Russian president who has greatly strengthened his stance

over the past year and who will have to address the issue of confrontation with

a class of new urban residents and to redouble efforts to diversify the Russian

economy and stimulate investment in human capital (education, culture and bet-

ter living conditions).


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1.1. The President

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1.2. The executive branch1.2.1. The Prime Minister

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1.2.3. The regional executive branch (Plenipotentiary Representatives,Governors, Mayors)

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1.5.2. Parliamentary opposition


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1.5.3. Extra-parliamentary opposition

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1.6. The role of civil society1.6.1. Civil society development level

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1.6.2. The electoral process


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1.6.4. The role of the Russian Public Chamber


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2.1. Macroeconomic parameters (GDP trends, external debts,the trade balance and inflation)

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5.Russia in the systemof national, regionaland global security


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6.Russian diplomatic activityon the international scene

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6.1. General assessment of the Russian foreign policy

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6.2. Russia's participation in international organizations

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About the project:

The Russia Development Index (Valdai Index) reflects the combined opinion ofthe world's leading experts on Russia as regards Russias political, economic,

social, cultural and international performance. The annual poll aims to studychanges in Russias development trends over a year. It is important that respon-dents assess not the current situation, but changes.

The first Valdai Index survey was conducted at the seventh annual conference of the ValdaiInternational Discussion Club in 2010. A group of 25 leading experts on Russia from theUnited States, Great Britain, Germany, France, Italy, China, Poland, Canada and Japanwere asked to answer nine questions and to provide their marks on a 7-point scale rangingfrom 5 (significant deterioration) to +5 (significant improvement).

In 2011, the Valdai Index structure was changed significantly. The questionnaire mod-ules were expanded, each containing a number of categories that specify and define more

accurately the changes that happened in Russia over the year. The participants were askedto choose one mark on a seven-point scale for each category in eight modules that bestdescribes the current trend. The marks range from 3 (significant deterioration) to +3 (sig-nificant improvement). The new format was approved as the basis for the project.

The focus group for the Russia Development Index 2011/2012 included 230 participantsof the Valdai Club conferences, and more than 30% of respondents from 17 countries par-ticipated in the survey: Great Britain, Hungary, Germany, Israel, Iraq, Iran, Italy, Canada,China, Russia, Singapore, the United States, Turkey, Ukraine, Finland, France and Japan.Among them, 71% were foreign experts.

There might be a slight error in the diagrams that show the results of the poll due to rounding.


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Documents

Russia Development Index 2011-2012 (Valdai Index), English version