Russ Shafer Landau - A Defence of Categorical Reasons

Meeting of the Aristotelian Society held at Senate House, University of London, on 9 March 2009 at 4:15pm.

X—A DEFENCE OF CATEGORICAL REASONS

RUSS SHAFER-LANDAU

In this paper I offer two arguments designed to defend the existence of cat-egorical reasons, which I define as those justifying considerations that ob-tain independently of their relation to an agent’s commitments. The firstargument is based on certain paradigm cases meant to reveal difficultiesfor practical instrumentalism—the view, as I define it here, that categori-cal reasons do not exist, because all reasons must serve the commitmentsof the agents to whom they apply. The second argument relies on consid-erations of responsibility and blame to establish the existence of categori-cal reasons.

I

Categorical reasons, as I will define them here, are reasons that ob-tain independently of their relation to an agent’s commitments. Suchreasons do not depend for their existence on their being instrumen-tal to the achievement of any of an agent’s desires, goals or cares. Ibelieve that there are categorical reasons for action, and will offertwo arguments on their behalf.

If there are categorical reasons for action, then practical instru-mentalism is false. Practical instrumentalism (henceforth, just in-strumentalism) is the view that the only reasons there can be are so-called hypothetical reasons, i.e. reasons to do things that are insome way ancillary to the achievement of one’s commitments (cares,desires, wants, goals, etc.).

Apart from the intrinsic interest of the matter, showing that thereare categorical practical reasons, and that instrumentalism is false,is important for at least two reasons. First, it would enable us to re-sist relativistic arguments that assume that moral requirements en-tail excellent reasons for action, but make reasons contingent on ourcommitments, thereby making the content of moral requirementscontingent on our commitments. Second, it would provide us with

©2009 The Aristotelian SocietyProceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. cix, Part 2

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RUSS SHAFER-LANDAU190

an adequate reply to arguments that assume a commitment-inde-pendent source of moral requirements, and then proceed, with thehelp of instrumentalism, to the conclusion that there may be nogood reason to abide by morality’s demands.

II

Both of my arguments for categorical reasons, and against instru-mentalism, begin by directing our attention to a familiar sort of ex-ample: that of the dedicated, successful immoralist. Imagine aperson who is very sharp, very cunning, but also deeply malicious.His happiness is directly proportioned to the misery he wreaks. Histop priority in life is to cause pain and suffering, even if, as heknows, such conduct will likely bring an early death, or a long in-carceration. We intuitively regard such a person as (at the least)morally obligated to desist from the cruel treatment he longs to im-pose. Don’t we also believe that there are excellent reasons for himto so refrain—namely, all of those considerations that constitute thewrongness of his actions? The reasons to refrain from cruelty are (ata minimum) the very considerations that make his actions wrong inthe first place.

Consider an experienced torturer working on behalf of an au-thoritarian government. Such a person not only endorses the legiti-macy of the regime, but takes active pleasure in breaking hisvictims. His greatest joy is stripping the last vestiges of dignity fromthose who initially resist his demands. At a given session, as he isabout to apply the electrodes, he pauses to consider the merits of hisaction. He sees that doing so will get him what he most wants, andwill frustrate none of his desires. He proceeds accordingly.

Consider a different case, one in which a person can very easilyrescue another. A child has strayed from her parents on a busy citystreet, and is about to toddle into the path of an oncoming car. Thebystander sees what is happening. He need only reach an arm downto the child to save her from an awful death. Rather than doing so,he watches in delight as the child is run over and killed.

If there were nothing to be said against these actions andomissions—no considerations that opposed, extinguished, or over-turned the case these agents might make for their cruel conduct—then it is hard to see how their actions could be wrong. But they ob-


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A DEFENCE OF CATEGORICAL REASONS 191

viously are wrong. And the sorts of considerations just mentioned—those directly relevant to matters of justification (and, in this partic-ular context, those that indict the agent’s cruelty)—are preciselywhat reasons are. Reasons are, by definition, considerations that fa-vour or oppose, that make something appropriate, legitimate, orjustified (or the reverse). So, if we think that there is a plausible sto-ry to tell about why the dedicated evildoer is wrong for indulginghis inclinations, then we are committed to there being reasons forhim to refrain. And this despite the fact that, by hypothesis, he hasno commitments that would be furthered by his doing so.

But surely, some will say, the moral monster has some commit-ments that will be furthered were he to refrain from cruelty. Andthat shows that he will, after all, have some reason to refrain. Butwe’ve no grounds for thinking this a categorical reason. Whateverreasons he has to desist will stem straightforwardly from his aver-sion to jail, or his desire to avoid the potential harms inflicted by hisvengeful victims, etc.

There are two things we can say here. First, and fairly obviously,even if all real people in the real world do have at least some endsthat would be served by avoiding cruelty, we can imagine a possibleworld in which our misanthrope does not. The instrumentalist’s re-jection of categorical reasons is meant to express a necessarytruth—reasons must further what an agent cares about—and so isvulnerable if there are possible contexts in which this truth fails toobtain. In the scenarios I am imagining, the ruthless immoralist hasno commitments that would be served were he to refrain from hiscruelty. But there are, nevertheless, excellent reasons for him to sorefrain—namely, and at the very least, all of the considerations thatmake his proposed actions immoral.

More importantly, we don’t want to make the case against crueltydependent on an instrumental link with this man’s goals. Suppose,for instance, that our torturer wanted to avoid the censure that hewould earn were his actions publicized. The best way to minimizehis risk is to stop doing what he does. Though this, let us grant,does provide him a reason to stop, it isn’t the only, or nearly thestrongest, reason to do so. The cruelties he perpetrates are opposedby a host of considerations that make no mention of his aims. Theseconsiderations are reasons—reasons to refrain from deliberately in-flicting misery. And these reasons will, first and foremost, mentionthe suffering of his victims, and the absence of their consent to his


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treatment. If the immoralist’s aversion to being found out entersinto it at all, it is only in a subordinate role, as a consideration thatmay supply an additional reason to refrain from his actions, onethat is likelier than the others to motivate him to do the right thing.

Here is the argument in a nutshell:

(1) If there are reasons for these dedicated immoralists to re-frain from their evil deeds, then practical instrumentalismis false.

(2) There are such reasons.(3) Therefore practical instrumentalism is false.

The first premiss is meant to be acceptable both to fans and to crit-ics of categorical reasons. The dedicated immoralists that I am im-agining are precisely those who lack any commitments that wouldbe furthered were they to hew to the moral path. So there should beno controversy on this score. Premiss (2) is another matter. I havetried to reveal its attractions with the examples of the dedicated evil-doers. So long as we think—as all of us do—that there are genuineconsiderations to oppose their cruelty, and also think that such con-siderations obtain independently of their commitments, then prem-iss (2) is secure. That would be enough to establish the existence ofcategorical reasons.

Instrumentalists will likely charge that the argument begs thequestion, because (as they will see it) the examples and considera-tions that support premiss (2) are insufficiently independent of theconclusion being argued for. An ideal argument is one whose prem-isses can find support from those who are as yet uncommitted onthe matter at hand. If the only reason to endorse a premiss is thatone already accepts the conclusion it is meant to support, then theargument that incorporates that premiss is question-begging. Theinstrumentalist will likely insist that the only ones willing to ratifypremiss (2) are those who are already committed to rejecting instru-mentalism.

I don’t think that instrumentalists are right about that. But beforesaying why, we might undertake a brief excursus on the matter ofbegging questions. Begging a question is sometimes unavoidable. Inethics, the likeliest scenarios are ones in which one is advancing fun-damental normative or evaluative commitments. It is hard to avoidbegging a question if one encounters someone who denies that painis ever bad, or denies that there is anything immoral about humiliat-


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ing vulnerable innocents. Perhaps the only way to avoid a petitio inthese circumstances is to show that one’s interlocutor is contradict-ing himself. This is the fond hope of Kantians and others—to showthat those with patently immoral sensibilities are in some way un-dercutting their own commitments and displaying some internal in-coherence.

Perhaps the Kantians are right. It would be lovely were it so. Butlet us pursue other possibilities, ones that do not vindicate the exist-ence of categorical reasons by attributing a contradiction to thosewho refuse to acknowledge them. On this alternative line, thosewho oppose our basic normative and evaluative commitments cancoherently reject the claims we hold so dear. Any defence of ourdeepest commitments will have to come from the sorts of bolsteringconsiderations that are involved in revealing a belief to be situatedwithin a network of mutually supporting beliefs. But such a defencewill not be able to avoid the charge of begging the question. Theother beliefs we enlist on behalf of our original claim may be nomore persuasive to opponents than the position originally in need ofsupport.

Unless we can reveal a contradiction in our opponent’s position,we may have to beg a question somewhere. The most likely point is,as I have said, with regard to our fundamental normative and evalu-ative commitments. And we are certainly in the neighbourhood,when considering an endorsement (or rejection) of categorical rea-sons.

This is not yet to concede that this first argument is question-begging. But what if it were? There is independent reason for think-ing that question-begging claims and arguments are ones that agentsmay sometimes be justified in believing. I am justified in believingmyself to be conscious, even if others regard me as an unthinkingautomaton whose protestations are merely programmed behav-iours. If I am imprisoned on false charges, I am justified in believingmyself innocent, even if all publicly available evidence convinceseveryone else of the justice of the sentence. If, having cried wolf onetoo many times, my next cry is unheeded and disbelieved, I amnonetheless justified in believing that there is such an animal beforeme if I see it approaching and ready to attack.

In each of these cases, we can easily imagine that any evidencethat I offer to substantiate my claim will be taken as confirming thehypotheses of the doubters who surround me. The credibility of my


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testimony will invariably be rejected, as it is expressive of a conclu-sion that the sceptics will not accept. In this context, anything I sayon my behalf is bound to be question-begging. But I am neverthelessjustified in regarding my supporting beliefs, and the claims they seekto vindicate, as eminently plausible.

I don’t say that our belief in the existence of considerations thatoppose the actions of the immoralist is as epistemically secure as thecontested beliefs in the examples just given. That is not the point ofintroducing them. Rather, the examples are designed to show thatsome question-begging claims are credible and justifiedly held. Soeven if the various beliefs that condemn the actions of the immoral-ist beg the question against the instrumentalist, such beliefs might beepistemically justified.

To pursue this path, we would need to distinguish between thosequestion-begging beliefs that are, and those that are not, justifiedlyheld. I don’t intend to embark on such a discussion, because I do notbelieve that the considerations that support premiss (2) are, in fact,question-begging.

I don’t believe that only those already convinced of instrumental-ism’s failure will find these considerations compelling. What is trueis that dedicated instrumentalists will find something to resist. I sub-mit that those who have yet to develop a considered view about theexistence of categorical reasons will find the considerations thatsupport the second premiss natural and highly plausible. They won’tneed convincing that there is something to be said against the tor-turer’s actions, and something to be said in favour of easily prevent-ing a child from being needlessly killed. They will then discover thatsuch considerations, when conjoined with an uncontroversial defini-tion of reasons, and the absence of any relevant commitments onthe immoralist’s part, entail the existence of categorical reasons. Theonly ones who will deny the appeal of such considerations are thosewhose theoretical commitments already require them to do so. Thatis not enough to show that the argument is unsound.

III

A second argument on behalf of categorical reasons also relies onour views about the dedicated immoralist, but shifts the focus tomatters of responsibility and blameworthiness. Consider those who


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freely commit themselves to blowing up civilians in crowded areas.Such people are (with perhaps rare exceptions) highly capable of as-sessing options, gathering information to discover how best to pur-sue their chosen goals, and taking the needed steps to ensure thattheir goals are met. They are not insane. They are genuine agents,responsible for their deeds. They are as blameable as agents can be.

We would rescind our condemnation if such people were literallycompelled to do what they did. We would mitigate the blame werewe to discover that they had been coerced or manipulated into do-ing what they had done. But on the assumption that the killers haveautonomously elected to proceed in their undertaking, then theyare, at the very least, rightly subject to blame.

One is blameworthy for an action only if there is some reason torefrain from committing it. Because the killers are blameworthy fortheir deeds, there is a reason that opposes their actions. Since thisreason does not depend on the ends that the killers happen to have,the reason is a categorical one. That they have violated or ignored itis the basis of their blameworthiness.

We have here the makings of a second argument for categoricalreasons:

(1) If someone is blameworthy for doing something, then thereis a reason for that person not to do it.

(2) Autonomous fanatics are blameworthy for their killings.(3) Therefore there is a reason for these fanatics not to perpe-

trate such killings.(4) Such a reason, by hypothesis, is neither the content of one

of the fanatic’s commitments, nor instrumental in securingor protecting one of his commitments.

(5) Therefore such a reason applies to the fanatic independent-ly of his commitments.

(6) Therefore there is at least one categorical reason.

There are only three premisses to the argument. I think that eachone is highly plausible.

Premiss (4). Premiss (4) is a stipulation that comports with the rele-vant possibilities, and should be granted by all parties to the debate.It is easy to conjure situations in which perfect instrumentally ra-tional deliberation, begun from a fanatic’s existing commitments,would generate no consideration that opposed his deadly undertak-


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ings. It seems to me that any weak points contained in the argumentwould have to be found in association with premiss (1) or premiss(2). So let’s turn our attention to these.

Premiss (1). Premiss (1) seems to me a conceptual truth. If there areno reasons for an agent to refrain from a given action, then commit-ting it cannot merit blame. Being deserving of blame entails that onehas (at a minimum) ignored a relevant consideration that opposesthe action that one has performed. If one has complied with all rele-vant and applicable reasons, then there is no room for criticism.And if there is nothing criticizable about an agent’s actions, then theperson is not properly blameable for his or her behaviour. So a per-son is blameworthy for an action only if there is some reason thatstands against it. That is what the first premiss says.

There are two important routes to criticizing this first premiss,but I don’t think that either of them is successful in the end. Thefirst argues by counterexample. The second claims that blamewor-thiness requires only that there be a reason that opposes the culpa-ble action, but not that there be a reason for the agent to refrain.Let’s take these criticisms in order.

(a) Here is a purported counterexample to premiss (1): a person in-tentionally sets out to do something that strikes us as just terrible.He has no justification and no excuse. So he is blameworthy. Butthrough his inadvertence, or some fortunate accident, what he endsup doing isn’t at all bad, and may even be quite good. Imagine a dis-gruntled employee who believes that the coffee he is about to handhis supervisor is laced with poison. He is delighted—he put the poi-son in there, and hopes for a lethal effect. But unbeknownst to him,the ‘poison’ is just saccharine, and the coffee is served up exactly tohis employer’s tastes.

Surely such a person is blameworthy for what he’s done. Butthere is no reason to avoid handing someone a cup of coffee pre-pared just the way he likes it. So we have warranted blame for anaction without there being a reason to refrain from it. Thus premiss(1) is false.

We can concoct many such similar examples, but I think that theywill all fail of their purpose, and for the same reason. The key to un-derstanding why is to focus on the precise basis for the assignmentof blame. In this case, it is the possession of malevolent intentions.


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There is a reason not to act with such intentions. If there weren’t, itis difficult to see why we would criticize a person for having them.

As we know, actions can be described in many different ways.There is no reason to refrain from handing a perfectly tasty cup ofcoffee to someone who will enjoy it. But that is not what we areblaming the employee for. We are blaming him for trying to poisonhis boss. And there is a reason not to do that. Further, it’s preciselybecause the employee ignores this reason, or takes this disfavouringreason as a favouring reason, that we believe him to be culpable forthe way he’s acted in this case.

For all such examples—ones in which a person is clearly culpa-ble, though his action under at least one description is innocuous oreven attractive—we must attend carefully to the specific aspect ofhis behaviour that is earning criticism. My contention is that oncewe do this, we will identify a reason that is being ignored or inten-tionally disrespected, and that this indifference to the force of appli-cable reasons is going to explain the blameworthiness of the agentin question. If that is right, then we don’t yet have grounds for re-jecting premiss (1).

(b) Here is another criticism of the first premiss. This criticism be-gins with a subtle distinction between a reason that opposes an ac-tion, and a reason for an agent which opposes that action. Criticswho advance this second objection concede that blameworthinessrequires a reason that opposes the blameable action. But they denythat this reason must be one that applies to each blameable agent. Ineffect, they reject my argument’s first premiss,

(1) If someone is blameworthy for doing something, then thereis a reason for that person not to do it,

while endorsing a close cousin:

(1�) If one is blameworthy for doing something, then there is areason not to do it.

Critics will argue, however, that (1�), when conjoined with premiss(2), does not yield (3). And they are right about that. So if we mustreplace (1) with (1�), my argument collapses.

Here is the core thought that underlies this criticism. Warrantedblame occurs within a practice that is defined by a legitimate set ofrules that are effective in achieving a valuable purpose. Blame is de-


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served whenever these justified rules call for it, and they may do soeven when there is no reason for a given individual to abide by theserules.

Consider a familiar illustration. Suppose that hard determinism istrue, but rather than abandoning our practices of blame, we chooseto retain them. We implement them through a set of rules that as-sign blame when it is socially efficacious to do so. There may be noreason for an agent who is unconcerned with the rules (and the con-sequences of violating them) to refrain from disobedience. But thiswill not immunize her from blame, on the assumption that the ruleswhich specify its assignment are justified.

Once we grant that assumption, it is true that there is a reason toadhere to the relevant rules. This reason is provided by the justifica-tion of the social practices that the blaming rules are designed to en-force and protect. But the reason is a general one; it need not applyto each person whose actions fall within the scope of these rules. So(1�) is true, but (1) is not. And that’s bad news for me, since it is (1)that is needed to make my argument go through.

I agree that (1) is what is really needed. But I also think that thechallenge to it is unsuccessful. Any system of warranted blame mustallow for the existence of legitimate excuses. And it seems to methat an agent has an excellent excuse if there was no reason for herto refrain from doing what she did. If a justified system of rules andcriticism fails to provide an agent with a reason for obedience, thenit is illegitimate to criticize her for failing to meet its standards.

Blame points to a personal failing. But there is nothing necessarilyamiss with the character of an agent who strays from norms that failto provide her with reasons. Indeed, it would be grossly unfair tocriticize a person for flouting rules that supply her with no reasonsfor compliance. (1�) allows for this kind of unfairness. (1) does not.(1�) severs the tie between blameworthiness and personal shortcom-ing. (1) does not. These points give us reason to prefer (1) to (1�).

Premiss (2). Premiss (2) tells us that autonomous fanatics are blame-worthy for their killings. It can be supported thus: if any agents areblameworthy for their actions, surely those who are bent on evil areamong them. This is so whether the immoralists are doing evil forits own sake, or doing what is in fact evil, all the while characteriz-ing their actions to themselves as ones that are aimed at a good. Aninformed, uncoerced, rational fanatic is the perfect exemplar of the


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blameable agent. His consistency is no proof against criticism. Hisintelligence and cunning, his ability to select appropriate means tohis chosen ends, render him more, rather than less, liable to blame.The standard exculpation conditions do not apply here. The dedi-cated evildoers are not compelled to act as they do, but have chosentheir path and have ruthlessly pursued it in the absence of duress,coercion, necessity or factual ignorance.

As far as I can tell, there are only three ways to try to falsify thesecond premiss, and so deny that autonomous fanatics are blame-worthy for their murderous deeds. The first emphasizes the impor-tance of a reason’s accessibility as a precondition of blame. On thisline, fanatics are immune from blame, because their existing com-mitments will prevent them from seeing the reasons that opposetheir misdeeds. If they cannot see these reasons, then (it is said) theyare not blameable for ignoring them. The second way to rejectpremiss (2) is to deny the existence of autonomous fanatics. The lastis to deny that anyone is blameworthy for anything.

(a) The first way in which we might deny that blame accrues to au-tonomous fanatics is to insist that being blameworthy for somethingrequires that an agent has a reason that she has failed to adequatelyrespect. Having a reason implies the reason’s accessibility—one hasa reason to f only if one either appreciates that reason, or can, insome suitable way, be brought to appreciate it. And since the rele-vant evildoers are those whose commitments bear no instrumentalrelation to the relevant reasons to refrain, such people do not haveany reason to avoid undertaking their atrocities. This means thatthey are not to blame for the harm they do.

The following counter-argument sets out the relevant line ofthought:

(1ca) If an agent is blameworthy for doing something, then thatagent must have an accessible reason not to do it.

(2ca) Dedicated immoralists with no commitments that wouldbe served were they to refrain from evildoing do not haveany accessible reason to so refrain.

(3ca) Therefore such immoralists are not blameworthy for theirevil deeds.

Although I cannot give a full assessment of this argument, I thinkthat there are problems for both premisses, and that the accommo-


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dations needed to make its conclusion palatable lead directly to arecognition of categorical reasons.

Though initially plausible, premiss (2ca) may yet be false. De-pending on how we are to understand a reason’s accessibility, it maybe that a reason is accessible to an agent even if acting upon it doesnot serve one of her pre-existing commitments. For one might arriveat true practical conclusions through a variety of routes that extendwell beyond flawless instrumental reasoning. If that is so, thenpremiss (2ca) could be false for many or even all dedicated immoral-ists.

There is also reason to worry about (1ca). The premiss gains sup-port from this thought: if we are rightly subject to blame for some-thing that we did (or failed to do), then we must have had anopportunity to avoid the blameworthy behaviour. And there is suchan opportunity only if the bases of the blame—the considerationswhose flouting explains our culpability—are accessible to us. If wecannot recognize the error of our ways, then we are blameless forour deeds, since we will have had no effective opportunity to avoidculpability. So dedicated immoralists (like the rest of us) are trulyblameless if the reasons that oppose their actions are inaccessible tothem.

I am unsure whether these reasons really are inaccessible (see thebrief discussion of (2ca) above), but let’s proceed as if they were.Still, an inability to appreciate the existence or force of such reasonsdoes not immunize us from blame, if we are blameable for havingendorsed our ends in the first place.

To see this, imagine a person who has promised another to meethim at a certain place and time, but then, through her culpable neg-ligence, finds that it is impossible to fulfil the promise. This currentinability does not cancel her liability to blame. So, too, if the fanat-ic’s prior culpable choices are rendering him unable to see the meritsof refraining from his actions, then his present inability to appreci-ate these considerations does not immunize him from blame.

The question thus devolves to one about whether the fanatic’s in-itial choices to ally himself with evil ends are choices that he isblameable for. And why wouldn’t they be? I am not imagining a per-son who has been brainwashed or neurologically manipulated, butsomeone who makes choices that are as uncoerced and as informedas those of anyone with more ordinary moral preferences. As far asI can see, the only reason to suspend blame here is owing to an as-


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sumption that no one’s choices are blameable. Such a view may betrue. But so long as we are willing to blame anyone for the choicesthat he makes, then we should be prepared to blame the fanatic forhis. And that means that his subsequent immoral choices and ac-tions, even if they are endorsed by his instrumentally rational delib-erations, are ones for which he is blameworthy. That is just whatpremiss (2) states.

Defenders of the counter-argument know that freeing the worstamong us from blame is not a pleasant prospect. They may try to re-move the sting of its conclusion by insisting that they are still able toseriously criticize the various malefactors we have been discussing.We can’t say of them that they have culpably done what they oughtnot to have done, for (on this line) this would imply that they had areason to do otherwise. But we can say of them that they are evilpeople, that they are abhorrent, and that their actions are despica-ble, atrocious, etc. We can register certain negative evaluations, andstrong ones at that.1 All we are blocked from doing is ascribing cul-pable wrongness to such agents, since proper blame entails an acces-sible reason that an agent is failing to adequately respect.

I think that there is a deep problem with this line of thought. Theproblem is this: all of these negative evaluations themselves presup-pose the existence of reasons that have been ignored. We are meantto be barred from depicting consistent immoralists as blameworthy.Yet we are allowed to say that they are evil, awful, horrific, etc. Butwhat is the basis for such criticisms? Isn’t is the very fact that theseagents have not paid sufficient attention to relevant, highly impor-tant (indeed peremptory) reasons to refrain from their misdeeds? Tomerit such epithets means that these agents have failed to adequate-ly respect the reasons that oppose their actions.

There must be something that explains why an agent’s actionsqualify as atrocious, depraved, evil, etc. The explanation will re-quire citation of considerations that oppose such actions. And suchconsiderations are reasons. By hypothesis, these reasons are notones that the moral monsters have. But they are not thereby im-mune from all evaluative criticism. And this forces us to ask: whyshould the assignment of blame require that an agent have an acces-sible reason that she is ignoring, although other very strong (quasi-)

1 See Harman (1975) and Williams (1995) for this criticism of premiss (1), as well as for thisspecific line of defence regarding negative evaluations of the consistent evildoer.


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moral criticism does not? I don’t think there is a good answer to thisquestion.

Instrumentalists see how jarring it is to be unable to denounce themoral monster. So, while denying that he is blameworthy, they nev-ertheless insist that he is evil, awful, demonic, etc. Such criticismsimplicate the existence of reasons that have been ignored. These rea-sons exist even if the moral monsters do not have them. These rea-sons exist even if they bear no instrumental link to the commitmentsof such agents. These are categorical reasons.

Admittedly, I have not offered anything like a full evaluation ofthe counter-argument (1ca)–(3ca). But for present purposes we cando without such an assessment. For even if we were to ignore myreservations about its premisses and concede the soundness of thecounter-argument, this would be at best a Pyrrhic victory for instru-mentalists.

To see this, assume for the moment that the conclusion of thecounter-argument is true, and that dedicated immoralists are not toblame for their actions. We must then ask whether they are properlysubject to other, strong forms of evaluative criticism. Summing upmy line of replies from the previous paragraphs, we can see thatthere is trouble either way.

Suppose they are beyond all criticism. Those who blow up busesof schoolchildren or detonate bombs at civilian funerals are not evil,malign, or depraved; their actions are not horrific, atrocious, odious,or despicable. There is surely something deeply wrong with an in-strumentalist position that licenses such immunity. Yet if dedicatedimmoralists are properly subject to these negative evaluations, thissusceptibility to criticism implies the existence of categorical reasons.On the safe assumption that dedicated immoralists really do meritsome of the criticisms just mentioned, then categorical reasonsexist—even if such evildoers are not blameworthy for their deeds.

(b) A second criticism of premiss (2) claims that autonomous fanat-ics are not blameworthy for their actions, because there can be nosuch thing as an autonomous fanatic. This criticism, sometimesheard in Kantian corners, strikes me as highly implausible. If theclaim is more than an instance of a wholesale denial of personal au-tonomy, then there must be some special reason that agents are una-ble to autonomously elect evil, though they are able to freely attachthemselves to the good. But what could this special reason be? The


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evil, recall, need not be conceptualized as such—the autonomousfanatic may tell himself that what he is doing is good, and be a ded-icated evildoer nonetheless. And he may surely pursue what he real-ly cares about while free of coercion, and in possession of relevantlyfull information. Certainly, absent clear and compelling argument,we are warranted in abiding by the general maxim that anything ap-parently conceivable is possible. It appears that we can conceive ofthe autonomous fanatic. Thus, absent a very strong argument to thecontrary, we are right to suppose that such fanatics can exist.

(c) A last basis for rejecting premiss (2) comes from the assertionthat no one is blameworthy for anything. This might be true. If so,my second argument is unsound. I can’t say anything here to falsifythis potential criticism. All I can do is to express the conviction,shared by almost everyone, that at least some people are rightlyblameable for their poor choices and actions. The examples used tosubstantiate this conviction seem to me more compelling than anyof the premisses employed in arguments to defeat them.

Because my second argument rests in part on this undefendedconviction, it is best to conceive of its conclusion conditionally: ifanyone is blameworthy for any of her choices, then there are cate-gorical reasons. We get to this conclusion by means of a conceptualtruth (premiss 1), an uncontroversial statement of possibilities(premiss 4), and a highly plausible premiss (2) that expresses a deep-ly commonsensical assessment of evildoing.

IV

The notion of a categorical reason has a storied past, and this line-age may contribute to some misunderstandings that it is best toforestall. There are certain elements that are commonly associatedwith the idea of a categorical reason, but whose defence is no partof my current brief. I am thinking specifically of the notions thatcategorical reasons always override any possibly competing reasons,that they apply of necessity to all rational agents, and that they existeither by virtue of being the outcome of successful rational delibera-tion or by virtue of being entailed by presuppositions common to allexercises of rational agency.

The categorical reasons whose existence I am defending are not


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defined by reference to any of these features, but rather are to be un-derstood simply as those reasons that exist independently of any in-strumental link to an agent’s existing commitments. A fuller accountof the source of such reasons may lead naturally to one or more ofthese traditional ideas, but they are not essential elements in the sto-ry that I wish to tell here.

I have offered the beginnings of a case for categorical reasons.The complete account would have to reconstruct and criticize thearguments for instrumentalism that have been offered by numerousphilosophers. That is certainly a task for another day. But I think itreasonable to venture a thought about where we stand prior to suchan extensive examination of instrumentalist arguments. And that, Ithink, is squarely on the side of categorical reasons.

The explanation for this is one that Philippa Foot has recently of-fered, in the recantation of her earlier instrumentalist views (Foot2001, ch. 2).2 She has become puzzled by the predominance of instru-mentalist views, and thinks that a more natural starting point for in-vestigating practical reasons is one that assigns intrinsic importanceto considerations of self-interest, morality, and what we care about.

Indeed, when we reflect on deeply held assumptions about the ul-timate sources of our reasons, it strikes her, as it does me, that we doand ought to start with a recognition that each of these three sourc-es is fundamental, and that none is to receive preferential status overthe other two. This does not foreclose the possibility that excellentarguments may be introduced to reduce the sources from three totwo, or perhaps even to one. But absent such arguments, we areright to reject the demand that we begin our thinking with the claimthat just one of these sources is to be privileged above the others. In-strumentalism makes this very claim, and is therefore suspect.

Though it may eventually overcome our suspicions, the burden ison instrumentalism’s defenders to justify such a move. It should not,in any event, be regarded as the default view about the nature andsource of our practical reasons. If we are ever to accept instrumen-talism, we must not only find fault with the arguments that I (andothers) have offered on behalf of categorical reasons. We must alsobe impressed enough to move away from the default position of plu-ralism about the ultimate sources of practical reasons.

2 She there expresses reservations about the views defended in Foot (1972).


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V

The most powerful kind of philosophical criticism is one that re-veals a contradiction in its target. I have not presented such a criti-cism of practical instrumentalism, because I do not believe thatinstrumentalism entails a contradiction. Nor must instrumentalistsexemplify any kind of practical inconsistency in behaviour or com-mitment. Most defenders of categorical reasons, following Kant,have tried to sustain such charges. Their vindication would be wel-come news for friends of categorical reasons. But I am not optimis-tic about this most direct route to instrumentalism’s refutation.

If a view is not internally contradictory, then any successful criti-cism of it must proceed by adducing non-conclusive but highly plau-sible reasons, cogently put together to make a strong, albeitdefeasible, case. That is what I have tried to do here. Of course, whatcounts as a plausible reason is relative to antecedent beliefs and com-mitments. If one is already devoted to instrumentalism, then one willfind the considerations I have offered less plausible than anyone else.But that does not distinguish the instrumentalist from (say) the scep-tic about other minds. Such people can have internally consistentviews, and will regard with great suspicion the supporting evidenceintroduced by their critics. Still, for those not antecedently weddedto this scepticism, the falsifying evidence can be compelling.

I think that the very same thing is true of practical instrumental-ism. We cannot prove that there are categorical reasons. But whenwe vividly contemplate a world without them, one in which there isliterally no consideration that stands against the actions of a tortur-er, and none in favour of easily rescuing a child from imminentdeath, most of us will find that instrumentalism has as much appealas the various sorts of scepticism that we take seriously only in thestudy.3

3 This paper has gone through a number of different incarnations over the past couple ofyears. I am grateful to Harry Adamson, Simon Blackburn, Jerry Cohen, Steve Darwall,David Enoch, David Killoren, Hallvard Lillehammer, Mike Martin, Ellie Mason, AnthonyPrice, Peter Railton, Geoff Sayre-McCord, Tom Senor, Barry Ward and David Wiggins forforcing me to think much harder about some of the claims and arguments that appeared inearlier drafts. Many thanks to audiences at the University of Michigan, Edinburgh Univer-sity, Northern Illinois University, the University of Arkansas-Fayetteville, Union College,the Institute for Advanced Study at Hebrew University, the Colloquium in Legal and SocialPhilosophy at University College London, the Aristotelian Society, and the Moral SciencesClub at Cambridge University for their acute comments on earlier versions of this essay.


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Department of PhilosophyUniversity of Wisconsin, Madison

600 N. Park StreetMadison, wi 53726

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REFERENCES

Foot, Philippa 1972: ‘Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives’.Philosophical Review, 81, pp. 305–16.

——2001: Natural Goodness. Oxford: Oxford University Press.Harman, Gilbert 1975: ‘Moral Relativism Defended’. Philosophical Re-

view, 83, pp. 3–22.Williams, Bernard 1995: ‘Internal Reasons and the Obscurity of Blame’. In

his Making Sense of Humanity. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.


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Russ Shafer Landau - A Defence of Categorical Reasons