Running Head: JUNIOR OFFICER COMMUNICATION …web02.gonzaga.edu/comltheses/proquestftp/Fuentes_gonzaga_0736M...Running Head: JUNIOR OFFICER COMMUNICATION 1 SUBORDINATE – SUPERVISOR

Running Head: JUNIOR OFFICER COMMUNICATION 1

SUBORDINATE – SUPERVISOR COMMUNICATION:

JUNIOR NAVAL OFFICER FEELINGS AND OBSTACLES WHEN COMMUNICATING UP

THE CHAIN OF COMMAND

A Thesis

Presented to the Faculty in Communication and Leadership Studies

School of Professional Studies

Gonzaga University

Under the Supervision of Nobuya Inagaki

Under the Mentorship of Dr. Kipp Preble

In Partial Fulfillment

Of the Requirements for the Degree

Master of Arts in Communication and Leadership Studies

By

Neva R. Fuentes

December 2012


SIGNATURE PAGE


Abstract

Research on subordinate-supervisor communication has revealed that employees in civilian

organizations often stay silent about workplace problems. Comfort levels between subordinates

and supervisors, was a major factor to this silence. Currently, there exists very little literature on

upward communication from subordinate to supervisor amongst U.S. Naval Officers. The

purpose of this thesis was to explore Junior Officer (JO) feelings and perceived obstacles about

communicating up the chain of command with senior officers. Interview questions from a

previous study (Milliken, Morrison, & Hewlin, 2003) on subordinate-supervisor communication

were adapted for an electronic survey and used to explore JO feelings and perceived obstacles

when communicating workplace problems with senior officers. Results answered the research

question, revealing that while JOs are generally comfortable when communicating with their

senior officers, the hierarchy does negatively affect their communication upward. Other major

reasons to remain silent were attributed to feelings of futility and fear of being perceived

negatively by others.

Keywords: communicative action, deck-plate leadership, effectiveness, interagency, junior

officer, participation, subordinate-supervisor communication


Table of Contents

Abstract 3

Chapter I: Introduction

Problem Statement 5

Definition of Terms 6

Organization of Chapters 7

Chapter II: Literature Review

Background 7

Philosophical Assumptions 8

Alternative Communication Approaches 15

Rationale 16

Research Question 17

Chapter III: Scope and Methodology

Scope 18

Design 18

Reliability and Validity 20

Ethical Considerations 21

Chapter IV: The Study

Introduction 22

Data Analysis 23

Content Classification 24

Results of the Study 26

Discussion 31

Chapter V: Summary and Conclusions

Limitations 32

Future Research 33

Conclusions 34

References 36

Appendices

Survey Cover Letter 40

Survey Instrument 41

Mentor Agreement Form 46


Chapter I: Introduction

Research on vertical communication practices in organizations is on the rise.

Examination of the relationship between subordinates and their supervisors has linked their

communication effectiveness to countless subjects including leadership strength, organizational

learning ability, morale, and even business success. However, available research focuses on a

top-down approach of this hierarchical working relationship often describing how upper

management influences communication downward toward subordinate employees. Furthermore,

the literature available has not explored the communication relationship and effectiveness,

upward from subordinate to supervisor within the U.S. Navy. This thesis is the first to examine

the comfort levels and perceived communication obstacles of Junior Officers when taking

problems further up their chain of command.

Problem Statement

The Officer Professional Core Competencies (PCCs), endorsed by Naval Education and

Training Command, define the terminal learning objectives for all officer accession programs

(Miller & Steindl, 2011). The PCCs include effective oral and written communication skills, but

there are only two line items in over 200 which mention communication and neither of them

discusses how to communicate effectively up the chain of command or address issues that may

impede effective communication with senior officers. In fact, each statement is so broad that

neither is likely to help junior officers (JO) communicate effectively with anyone, much less up

the chain of command. Furthermore, the Navy culture prioritizes war fighting first with “soft

skills” such as communication, leadership, and other non-tactical education taking a back seat in

officer development unless sailors take it upon themselves, to grow intellectually. Coupled with

the traditional hierarchical structure of the military, this culture can negatively impact JOs and


their communication practices. In his Strategic Direction to the Joint Force Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff, General Martin E. Dempsey calls for innovation in the way we operate (2012).

However, if communication is ineffective among naval leaders, it seems unlikely we will be able

to follow his directive. The objective of this study is to explore Junior Officer (JO) feelings,

perceived obstacles in communicating up the chain of command with their senior officers, and

ultimately advance research on Navy communication practices.

Definition of terms

The following terms are applicable to this thesis:

Communicative action- concept coined in 1979 by German philosopher and sociologist

Jürgen Habermas that describes cooperative action by individuals based upon mutual

consideration and debate in society.

Deck-plate leadership- Navy term used to describe leadership that is out and about with

the troops/sailors/subordinates instead of in an office detached from day-to-day business.

Effectiveness- Concerns the value of communicative acts as the means to accomplish

ends; how meaning is transferred and how control through communication is accomplished.

Interagency- Of or pertaining to United States government agencies and departments

including the Department of Defense.

Junior Officer (JO)- This term describes officers in the ranks of Chief Warrant Officers

(CWO), Ensign (01), Lieutenant Junior Grade (02), Lieutenant (O3), and Lieutenant Commander

(O4). JOs generally have less than eight years of military experience, with the exception of

CWOs who average.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Concept

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Germany

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sociologist

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/J%C3%BCrgen_Habermas


Participation- deals with who in a society or group has a right to contribute to the

formation of meaning and the decisions of the group, which individuals have access to the

various systems and structures of communication and can articulate their own needs and desires

within them (Deetz, 1992, p. 94)

Organization of Remaining Chapters

This thesis is separated into five chapters. Chapter I introduced the problem statement

and definitions of key terms. Chapter II reviews other literature on subordinate-supervisor

communication, military hierarchical and cultural obstacles, philosophical assumptions, and

alternative communication approaches. Chapter III discusses the details of the study‟s scope and

methodology while chapter IV reports the research results with data analysis and a discussion.

Study limitations, future research potential, and the conclusion are included in chapter V. The

list of references and appendices A and B are the closing documents to this thesis.

Chapter II: Literature Review

Background

There is an abundance of books, studies, and programs that promise to improve a leader‟s

communication skill set, especially when speaking with subordinates. Yet, if we wanted to apply

these communication practices from a subordinate position to a supervisor, there are few

resources to pull from. This poses a problem for the 42,868 Junior Officers (JO) who constitute

80% of the Navy‟s officers (Naval Personnel Command, 2012) and who lead from the middle of

a traditional hierarchical organizational structure and have sparse communication education or

training embedded in their officer development continuum. Moreover, the Navy‟s culture,


founded on technical and tactical competence, emphasizes that experience at sea is “always the

best and most effective way to develop as an officer as a professional and as a leader” (Andersen,

2012, Technical competence section, para. 4). This on-the-job learning emphasis outweighs

academic professional education that might include lessons to improve communication. This

leads to lessons from individual mentors that have been developed in the same informal, non-

evidenced based ways. Subsequently, when immersed in a joint learning environment, Naval

Officers struggle to compete with their peers from the other armed services and interagencies

particularly in scholarly writing and oral communication at the mid-grade levels (McPherson,

2012).

Unless communication competence is prioritized and supported by infrastructural

education, Junior Officers have to fend for themselves. Self-study, mentorship, and trial-and-

error will help Junior Officers build on their undergraduate communication skills. However, it is

likely that any communication lessons learned prior to naval service were taught in a democratic

organization and may not easily translate to the structured military hierarchy where rank

demands respect, and communication is constrained to vertical routes that can hinder effective

communication.

Ethical & Philosophical Assumptions

Effective organizational communication practices maximize opportunities for all people

to be heard, not just management. When open communication is culturally engrained and their

seniors can easily hear subordinates then dialogue, investigation, and debate will eventually lead

to truth (Collins, 2001). Because of this interactive relationship, members within an organization

who feel involved as valued participants will contribute to the success of the organization.

Social theorist and German philosopher Jürgen Habermas theorizes that over time, people with a


shared culture will agree on the goals to be accomplished and eventually they will gain

understanding on how to achieve those goals (Griffin, 1994). His ethical view on discourse

requires three requirements to be met in order to reach the “ideal speech situation where

participants are free to listen to reason and speak their minds without fear of constraint or

control” (Griffin, 1994, p. 420). The three requirements; for access, for argument, and for

justification may be naïve, especially in a military structure, however, application of this ethical

framework gives insight to the quality of ethical communication that is fostered in an

organization. Additionally, Professor Habermas‟ investigation of control by strategic action,

controlled by management or the organization, versus understanding through communicative

action, an emancipative approach to organizational communication can be used to compare the

actions in the hierarchical Navy structure and offer a theory to improve Junior Officer

communication (1984).

This thesis assumes that participation of all members, no matter the rank or position, in

an organization is essential for effective communication. Open involvement fosters ethical

decision-making, when not coercive, and leads to personal satisfaction and improves the whole

organization. This investigation seeks to understand how Junior Officers are involved and valued

in the communication process of the U.S. Navy. Ultimately, this study works to improve

communication between junior and senior officers, specifically up the chain of command in the

hierarchical structure, which can only improve member motivation and contribute to

organizational success.

Framing the Literature

Communication theorist Stanley Deetz‟s Democracy in an age of corporate colonization

(1992) describes the corporate workplace as hotbed for the “erosion of a democratic


consciousness” (p. 54). He posed that corporations and their internal self-regulated cultures,

hidden from the public eye, could foster an environment that influenced employees construction

of their identity and meaning through communication practices. Message transmittal, cultural

influence (of the organization, not the individual), and power projection constitute some of the

major ways communication is used to influence members in an organization. This controlled

atmosphere subsequently distorts the employees‟ ability to contribute to democratic political and

decision-making practices. Significantly, participation, which deals with who in an organization

has a right to contribute to meaning formation and impact decision making, and effectiveness,

which is how meaning is transmitted and controlled through communication acts to accomplish a

goal, are two fundamental goals of communication (Deetz, 1992). However, the military is not a

corporate business nor a democracy, yet Deetz‟s theories on manipulated communication

practices are still very relevant to the U.S. Navy where the hierarchical structure itself controls

message transmittal and the power, or lack thereof, of rank further influences communication

practices. Junior Officers, in the middle of this regimented filter without any formalized

communication education or training are vulnerable. This literature review examines previous

research that identifies communication obstacles Junior Officers face, including strategic and

consensual domination and controlling decision-making practices (Deetz, 1995). Alternative

communication methods will also be reviewed.

Communication Obstacles

The 2012 update of the Navy‟s Standard Organization and Regulations Manual (SORM)

states that every sailor in their assigned organization must know where they fit in the hierarchy

and what their duties are to operate efficiently (OPNAV INSRUCTION 3120.32D). However, it

is also clear that the Commander has ultimate responsibility of the unit and its personnel, and all


communication is routed to the Commander. Generally, there are three layers between a JO and

the Commander including the Executive Officer (XO), Department Head (DH), and Division

Officer (DIVO). This structure, coupled with geographical separation, is assumed to affect

communication transmission. However, this researcher could find no research that described

how JO communication is affected and if there are problems with upward transmission of their

messages or their participation in decision-making. Available Navy data focuses on cultural

obstacles affecting JO development with no mention of participation inclusion or communication

effectiveness.

A civilian study on supervisor-subordinate communication by Bisel, Messersmith, and

Kelley (2012) examined the problem of the hierarchical mum effect, “subordinates reluctance to

disagree with supervisors results in silence” (p. 128), and its suppression of organizational

learning. The researchers broke their study into two areas applicable to JO communication

issues: the relational context of command structure and the importance of subordinate dissent in

organizational learning.

Command structures, like the SORM, are “communicative and a product of

communication” and provide a relational context for members of an organization (Bisel

Messersmith, & Kelley, 2012, p. 49). In the organization, the structure is a compelling context

for the meaning-making interchange between subordinates and their supervisors and the

researchers posit that both parties draw on these resources to make sense of the conversational

exchange. An interaction between a supervisor and a subordinate is used to describe this

phenomenon. The supervisor “suggests” that the subordinate take information yet indicates that

taking the information is not required. However, the subordinate‟s response reflects compliance

rather than consideration as would be expected in a situation where the “right to speak is


dependent on rank, and the use of mitigation is unnecessary as the tone is fixed by the

communicative context” (Halbe, 2011, p. 219). Theorist Deetz‟ critical theory argues that this

type of distorted decision making is systematically engrained and often reinforced unconsciously

(1992).

Strategy is one of Deetz‟ four two-dimensional classifications of decision practices in

organizations (Deetz, 1995). The dominant expression of strategy is blatant power based control

that can use rewards, manipulation, propaganda, or coercion to reach the dominant groups‟ goals.

A 2010 commentary by social media and communication studies student Melissa Wall examined

military members‟ use of social media in combat theaters, and the different coercive strategies

employed in a battle for authority, examples of strategy in the military. Her article profiled two

soldiers‟ coverage of their experiences during the second war in Iraq. The first subject, a young

National Guard specialist by the name of Buzzell described that his goal was to tell a different

story than the cut and paste version delivered via mainstream media. His “unofficial” remarks

about a messy firefight hinted that lacking supplies were an issue that contributed to casualties.

He was immediately confined to the base and ordered to stop blogging when his supervisors

discovered the blog. Conversely, Sgt Borda characterized his blog as „blue collar” and avoided

controversial topics that would cast a negative light on the war effort. Borda knowingly played

by the implied rules to avoid censorship or punishment. In 2005 and 2007 the Army

implemented rules to force bloggers to register their sites or prevent blogging on government

equipment altogether, which was interpreted by many as a perceived threat of the military‟s

authority.

Sgt. Mom, one of the original milbloggers who started blogging during the invasion of

Iraq in 2003, acknowledged the contour of the underlying struggle, writing that she was


surprised „that milblogs by active duty troops managed to escape the clammy clutches of

the Public Affairs office for as long as they have‟, making clear the real conflict at work

here: milbloggers challenging the militaries‟ public affairs control of the war story.

Obviously, the Pentagon‟s propaganda machine and the officers running it, particularly at

the upper echelons where policies are set, were under threat. (p. 868)

Milblogs complicated the government‟s unilateral top-down information flow that generally

monopolizes “the creation of content” and keeps tight control over what people read, write, and

say about official business (Groysberg & Slind, 2012, p. 81). The military tried to regain

strategic control, but this was a losing battle as social media websites were growing. By 2009, all

of the armed services, including the Navy had incorporated official blogs and numerous other

computer mediated communication modalities as part of their public relations tools (Wall, 2010).

Consent, another critical theory classification, is someone‟s willing allegiance, yet often

unknown, to accomplish the interests of others (the organization/corporation) in a “faulty attempt

to fulfill his or her own” (Deetz, 2005, p. 97). The Navy‟s technical focus and prioritization of

experience at sea over academic education is a solid example of this consent. Very few sailors

are afforded the opportunity to complete advanced degrees full-time while on active duty

because of this focus. However, changing policies are requiring a Master‟s degree and

professional military education for milestone promotions, which requires sailors to commit

personal time to their education in order to stay competitive. The two four-star Admirals that

have their PhDs earned them on their own “despite of the Navy‟s officer development system,

not because of it” (Andersen, 2010, Conclusion, pp. 2). While it can be argued that the benefit of

advanced education is synergistic, the Navy‟s changing expectations of promotion standards


without structural support describes managerial control and influence on the workplace culture

contributing to consensual compliance, another obstacle for JOs.

Hierarchical relationships can hinder communication competence, specifically the

upward movement of information sharing (Bisel, Messersmith, & Kelley, 2012). This hesitance

in relaying messages upward can lead to system wide organizational ignorance. Comprehension

apprehension can be a cause for this self-censored factor, but qualitative data to validate this in

the military or a professional environment is lacking. Communication researcher Travis Russ

notes that this gap in literature does have a starting point with previous studies on high school

and undergraduate students (2012). However, the link between the degree of anxiety or fear one

encounters when communicating with others in a school setting has thus far only led to a

correlation to learning preferences in collegiate curriculum, not communication practices. The

study does recommend diversifying pedagogical initiatives to infuse communication training

throughout the curriculum in order to give students ample opportunity to demonstrate

communication competence necessary for workplace success. The “mum effect” study identifies

two reasons that subordinates opt to keep quiet instead of speaking up at work. The fear of being

negatively labeled and the fear of damaging a supervisor-subordinate relationship are the reasons

why subordinates may not speak up (Bisel, Messersmith, & Kelly, 2012). These findings

suggest that subordinates tend to use silence or ambiguousness when a disagreement with their

supervisor could damage the perceived relationship or their self image (p. 136).

Alternative Communication Approaches

Sally Helgesens‟ Web of Inclusion (1995) discusses a different management style rooted

in women‟s influence when leading people from among, alongside, or within the employee

organization instead of from above as in traditional top-down organizational structure. Built like


webs, Helgesens‟ model of inclusion “gives people at every level the opportunity to exercise

autonomy and self-expression” (Helgesen, 1995, p. 276) and reinforces the importance of

employee participation as described by Deetz. The Web of Inclusion also suggests that

communication through open access to leaders is a significant cause of the success in the

growing number of organizations applying this method of management versus traditional

hierarchical systems. And while the military has no plans to change their organizational

structure (Richardson, 2008), military officers interviewed by Helgesen were fascinated by the

success of this alternative style of communication. And while, like other literature the focus

remained primarily on the leadership or management‟s communication approach versus the

subordinate role, the web-like approach has undeniable potential to open the eyes and minds of

everyone within the organization simply by creating an environment that values input from all

employees.

Hackman and Johnson (1995) noted that soliciting feedback from others is just as

important as creating a “trusting, cooperative work atmosphere” (p.429) in order to foster one of

their three core functions of their communication based leadership skills. Linking humans to

other humans and the environment through symbolic communication is a core tenet to their

perspective on leadership. Their view reinforces the importance of dialogic participation for both

the leader and the subordinate because it fosters a safe place for meaning to be constructed

together. This is contrary to the hierarchical or one-way communication style where the mum

factor is prevalent and contributes to why “supervisors think that they are communicating

effectively” (Billikopf, 2010, p. 34) which is really avoidance of confrontation.

The theory of Communicative Action brings us full circle back to Professor Habermas.

His critical approach centers on reasoning through emancipative communication versus other


types of strategic or instrumental reasoning (Habermas, 1984). Communication in society is

driven by a need for coordinated action, “which must be met if it is possible to coordinate actions

affectively for the purpose of satisfying needs” (Habermas, 1984, p. 274). In the context of the

Navy, the Junior Officer, as well as all service members‟ identity is shaped by their relationships

with others. A JOs desire for fulfillment is affected by their interpersonal communication with

senior officers and “the dialogic pursuit of mutual understanding” (Zakhem, 2007, p. 397). If

communication inclusion were to take hold, engaged JOs would be empowered to take purposive

action toward improvement of their development and more importantly to the success of the U.S.

Navy as a military force (Reynolds & Yuthas, 2008).

Rationale

While the command-and-control management methods are becoming less popular in the

corporate sector (Groysberg & Slind, 2012), the hierarchical structure of the Navy will unlikely

change so the cultural propensities for strategic influence and top-heavy power distribution are

large obstacles for Junior Officers to confront alone. Bridging the communication gap between

senior and Junior Officers in order to pursue a “practice of deliberative democracy” (Goodnight,

2008, p. 422) requires an examination of what the current situation of the communication

practices between JOs and senior officers are. Unfortunately, while there is no shortage of

historical, sociological, and or psychological research of uniformed service members, “language

in the military is still a lacuna in linguistic research” (Halbe, 2011, p. 315). One study on the

relationship between politeness and the military hierarchy concluded that rank could overrule

politeness (from a supervisor to a subordinate), but criticism was intolerable from a junior

service member toward a supervisor (Halbe, 2011). Consequently, the power of rank in the

hierarchy “emphasizes the transmission of monologic communication” (author unknown, 2012,


p. 29) and either stifles participation or forces compliance strategically that in turn contributes to

preservation of the mum effect.

Research Question

Research on supervisor-subordinate communication, especially in hierarchical

organizations, identifies more obstacles and barriers than positive benefits. Since most of the

research is civilian based, I can only assume that Junior Officers feel or experience much of the

same frustration with one-way communication (lack of participation, mum effect, etc.) when

dealing with their supervisors as their civilian counterparts. However, with so much emphasis on

communication at all levels of today‟s modern Navy being more effective, hard data is needed to

rouse senior leadership and improve communication within the organization since it is less likely

that the military will change its hierarchical structure for the foreseeable future. So what is it that

JOs can do to have their voices heard? Do JOs even realize that their voices are stifled by their

rank and position? Do JOs realize that by keeping silent and not voicing concerns with their

supervisors that they could be contributing to a stagnant learning environment? This study

intends to identify what the perspective of the Junior Officers at Officer Training Command in

Newport, Rhode Island are in regards to communication obstacles when dealing with senior

officers/supervisors. Junior Officers will be sampled to identify answers to the question: What

are the perceived communication obstacles of Junior Officers in the U.S. Navy when speaking

with senior officers? Results from this study may lead to further investigations and lead to

improvements in communication from the Junior Officer up to the upper echelons of command.


Chapter III: Scope and Methodology

Scope

This exploratory survey study seeks to identify perceived obstacles, from the Junior

Officers‟ perspective, that affect open communication when interacting with senior officers. An

electronic poll incorporating open essay questions with some multiple-choice questions to detect

areas that inhibit effective communication, specifically Junior Officer silence, will be distributed

over a two-week period at Officer Training Command in Newport, Rhode Island. Respondents

targeted have varied ranks, years, of experience, and represent both genders.

Design

Research method. A descriptive research approach, using a quantitative

assessment, will be used to evaluate communication obstacles as perceived by Junior naval

officers (Rubin, Rubin, Haridakis, & Piele, 2010). A descriptive method is appropriate because I

am seeking to identify communication obstacles in the Junior to senior officer interaction. While

there are some civilian studies on subordinate - supervisor interactions, previous research on

similar communication issues in the U.S. Navy or officer corps is non-existent. The lack of data

is surprising due to the fact that the hierarchical structure of the U.S. Navy is over two hundred

years old and communication obstacles are abundant in corporate organizations with the same

structure. Identification of communication obstacles may validate the prevalence of Junior

Officer‟s use of silence or equivocation when reluctant to disagree with senior officers (Bisel,

Messersmith, and Kelley, 2012) or substantiate strategic control of communication by stifling

Junior Officer participation via closed decision-making practices (Deetz, 1995). Both of these

issues, silence and strategic communication control, can contribute to ineffective communication

and result in poor organizational learning and adaption (Bisel, Messersmith, and Kelley, 2012).


Sampling. Officer Training Command Newport (OTCN) Junior Officers will be the

target population for this study because they are accessible to the researcher geographically,

which reduces cost and time requirements for study completion (Neuman, 2006). Also, the non-

random sample group is represented by various officer designators (specific profession), all five

of the officer types (unrestricted line, restricted line, staff, limited duty, and chief warrant

officers), and a wide range of years of experience (3-26 years) interacting with senior military

members. This demographic diversity is significant because commands do not normally have

total representation due to the specificity of their mission, which could be a limiting factor

(Neuman, 2006). Also, the varied sample pool broadens the study coverage despite the small

sample size; approximately 30 JOs at OTCN compared to 42,868 in the Navy. Respondents will

be contacted via email.

Data collection and analysis. Junior Officer opinions of communication obstacles will

be collected with an electronic survey that can be completed anonymously from a computer or a

smart phone. Once the surveys are completed, the data will be collected and descriptive statistics

that identify trends or significant agreement/disagreement in responses will be included in the

findings section of the final study report.

Research instruments. The survey includes a mixture of multiple-choice and open

text/essay style questions. Most questions are modified from interview questions from an

exploratory study done by Milliken, Morrison, and Hewlin (2003) on employee silence. These

questions were used to complement existing research on upward communication. However, the

original questions were administered in person by multiple researchers in the original civilian

study. Time, money (an incentive was used to increase participation) and labor constraints make

a similar qualitative interview study unfeasible.


Survey wording, syntax, organization, and formatting were examined to build the survey

(Vacha, 2007). Questions from the previous study (Milliken, Morrison, and Hewlin, 2003) were

modified with organizational language to militarize the survey and expand on the Junior Officer

perspective. All but two of the questions are descriptive in nature. The two explanatory

questions seek to clarify the saturation of JO perspectives on communication obstacles. Lastly,

the electronic survey will ask three optional demographic questions that may further identify

trends.

Reliability and Validity

Good representative reliability is anticipated with this study. The survey questionnaire

will be distributed to all five Junior Officer ranks, across multiple professional officer

designations, and all three classifications of officers (unrestricted line, restricted line, and staff).

The majority of the survey is composed of multiple choice questions which have a greater

chance of being completed and are more likely to provide firm data than the few included open-

ended questions (Vacha, 2007). The additional open-ended questions may decrease the study‟s

reliability if the respondent‟s answers are significantly different from other write-in answers,

making the interpretation difficult to correlate a definitive conclusion (Vacha, 2007).

There are some weaknesses that should be acknowledged here. The study will be weak in

stability reliability because there is not a sufficient amount of time to elapse for a second or third

sampling where conditions or the environment may affect the responses, especially if the JO is

exposed to different communication styles of senior officers (Neuman, 2006). Another area of

concern is the potential for guarded answers because respondents may feel that their responses

could be used against them or they want to protect their image. To mitigate these concerns,

participants will be informed that their responses will remain completely anonymous and


confidential.

Content validity is uncertain, as these questions have not previously been tested via

survey distribution before. But since previous research results using similar questions has been

recreated and peer reviewed, face validity is probably fair to good (Neuman, 2006).

Ethical Considerations

Ethical implications of this study have been considered and since the primary tool of this

study is an anonymous survey, there is no need at this time for an additional consent that would

require a signature or other identifiable interactions with the researcher. Assurance of

confidentiality and protection of anonymity will be explained to respondents prior to survey

distribution and again at the beginning of the survey.

This study intentionally samples active duty military members of the United States

government. The researcher will properly securing all data collected to maintain confidentiality,

promote security of research information, and prevent unethical use of data. The researcher will

protect participants‟ identities, by excluding personal identifiers such as name and email

throughout the study.

Potential risks of this study may include an accidental release of confidential information

of the participants. Results of the study may be perceived to expose vulnerabilities of the U.S.

Navy in educational policy, practice, or discredit the communication practices of senior

leadership. Benefits from this study include providing supplementary research in the field of

subordinate-supervisor communication specific to the military and the hierarchical

organizational structure. This data may direct further communication research in the military that

may ultimately enhance service members‟ communication effectiveness, participation, and

satisfaction.


No adverse effects have been identified at this time.

Chapter IV: The Study

Introduction

This research study investigated data from an online survey (see Appendix A) emailed to

37 Junior Officers (JO) assigned to Officer Training Command Newport (OTCN). The targeted

population was full-time officers between Chief Warrant Officer and Lieutenant Commander

grades of various designations. Responses from OTCN totaled 19 for a 51% return rate, yet only

14 respondents answered all questions for a 38% survey completion rate. The survey was

described as an investigation on communication from JOs up to and with senior officers. No

incentives for survey completion were provided. The survey was available for two weeks with

one reminder asking for participation.

An unexpected link to the survey was distributed via Facebook by one of the initial

targeted JOs. The author also added the link to a message addressed to all JOs in the author‟s

Facebook contact list and received 29 additional responses bringing the total number of JOs who

took the survey to 48 respondents. While the actual number of JOs the survey reached is

unknown, 33 JOs actually finished the survey. Since OTCN was the target population but yielded

a low return rate, the author included the Facebook results but kept the results separated. Both

sources and results will be discussed.

Data Analysis

The fifteen survey questions were divided into six sections, beginning with general

questions intended to explore comfort levels of JOs when talking with their supervisor or senior


officers. The following two questions (Q2 and Q3) probed frequency of problems when talking

with supervisors. Following these three general questions, open-ended qualitative questions

asked for respondents to recall an issue or situation where the JO felt that he or she could not

speak openly about an issue and to explain the reasons for this communication problem. Like

previous qualitative research that have explored silence in the workplace from subordinates to

supervisors, this study intended to identify the complexity of communication issues and social

dynamics found in personal experiences. However, where previous studies utilized interview or

focus group qualitative research methods (Milliken et al, 2003), time and access constraints

required creative survey questioning to identify issues that cause JOs to not speak up and list the

reasons why JOs felt they could not be open with their supervisors. Some questions (Q4b, Q4c,

Q5, Q6, Q9) asked the same question but in different ways to uncover all possibly reasons for JO

discomfort when speaking with senior officers. In addition to the JOs personal feelings, Q7 and

Q8 asked if JOs thought that their peers felt the same way and if their feelings of unease or

discomfort when speaking up were the same as those peers. The goal with these questions was to

learn about the command climate and the communication undercurrents JOs faced. Q10 & Q11,

in true military fashion, asked for the JOs input on how to improve subordinate to supervisor

communication obstacles and what they could do to improve it. The last four questions were

demographic in nature. Overall, completion of open-ended questions was lower than the

multiple-choice questions.

Content Classification

During classification, sample groups were separated and and all questions were analyzed

by an individual respondent date/time stamp. Figure 1- Figure 3 summarize questions 1 – 3 and


had a 100% completion rate likely due to being multiple-choice and placed at the beginning of

the survey (Vacha, 2007).

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

Very Comfortable

Comfortable Neither Uncomfortable Very Uncomfortable

Figure 1. Q1:How do you genenrally feel when talking with your

supervisor or to senior officers about problemor issues that concern

you at work?

OTCN

Facebook ®

0%

5%

10%

15%

20%

25%

30%

35%

40%

Always (>90% of the time)

Often (51%-89% of the

time)

Sometimes (50% of the

time)

Occasionally (11%-49% of

the time)

Never (<10 of the time)

Figure 2. Q2: How often do you feel that you CANNOT openly talk

about a problem or issue with your supervisor or to other senior

officers in your chain of command?

OTCN

Facebook ®


Questions 4 – 9 deal with issues that make JOs uncomfortable when communicating up

the chain of command and the underlying reasons for this stressed communication. Responses

from Q4-Q9 are summarized in Tables 1 and Table 2. Issues that make JOs feel uncomfortable

were classified into five groups: (1) concerns about a shipmate‟s or supervisor‟s competence or

performance; (2) problems with organizational processes or performance and/or suggestions for

improvement; (3) disagreement with organizational policies or decisions; (4) personal career

issues or concerns; and (5) ethical or fairness issues. These categories were adapted and

modified from a previous study by Milliken, Morrison, and Hewlin (2003) on “issues that

employees don‟t communicate upward and why” (p. 1453). They developed their coding

checklist based on an “inductive process of developing and refining a coding scheme,” that is a

standard practice for qualitative data analysis (Milliken, Morrison, & Hewlin, 2003, p. 1458).

This process began with the three researchers individually reviewing audio recordings and

transcripts of their respondent interviews and listing issues and reasons for silence. Then the

three discussed their separate lists, consolidated, and streamlined the categories. Data coding

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

>100 times At least once per week (25-

99 times)

A couple of times per

month (8-24 times)

Rarely (1-7 times)

Never

Figure 3. Frequency data on how many times in the last six months,

respondents felt that they could NOT talk openly with supervisors or

senior officers.

OTCN

Facebook ®


followed this step, which took numerous iterations to satisfy the researchers that they had

captured all of the possible reasons and problems employees had with talking to supervisors.

Issues from that study which garnered no responses from the JO survey were pay related

concerns, harassment or abuse, and conflicts with coworkers. For Table 2, the category of “fear

of retaliation or punishment” was initially not retained from the Milliken, Morrison, and Hewlin

(2003) study as a reason JOs gave for not speaking up. However, a tertiary review of the data

noted one Facebook respondent said “fear of retribution if my views don‟t match their own

[supervisor‟s], especially with their „pet‟ projects.”

Responses were not always straightforward, even to „yes/no‟ queries. Consequently, there

were cases where I needed to decide how to appropriately classify the responses. For example,

two responses to Q4a had two different issues noted in the same answer. “Scheduling conflict

and equal opportunity issues” were both noted in one response, yet each issue described two

different categories. Thus, they were coded separately. This finding resulted in some

percentages in Tables 1 & 2 being higher than the number of responses (or closer to 100%)

because respondents described more than one issue or reason for not speaking up. Not applicable

(N/A, NSTR-Nothing significant to report, blank) answers, “none” answers, or categories from

the previous study that yielded no responses (pay related concerns, harassment or abuse, and

conflicts with coworkers) are not reflected in this study.

Results of the Study

The survey suggests that Junior Officers are generally comfortable when speaking to

senior officers about work related issues (27 of 47 JOs from both sources) despite sometimes

(50% of the time) or occasionally (11%-49% of the time) feeling that they cannot openly talk

(see Figure 2) with their higher chain of command. Only 4% (2 of 47 JOs) reported feeling


“very uncomfortable” when speaking with supervisors. Comparatively, OTCN JOs reported less

occurrences in the last six months of feeling like they could not bring up issues with the chain of

command than their Facebook counterparts (Figure 3).

OTCN JOs indicated that concerns about a colleague’s or supervisor’s competence was

their primary concern of the five uncomfortable issues that they felt they could not speak openly

with senior officers about. The Facebook group‟s major concern, noted by 43%, was problems

with organizational processes or performance and/or suggestions for improvement. Table 1

summarizes the issues respondents felt uncomfortable raising.

Table 1. Issues that respondents said they felt that they could not speak openly about with their

supervisor or senior officers.

Issue Category Percentage who mentioned

this is an issue they could not

raise

OTCN Facebook

Concern’s about a colleague’s or supervisor’s competence

or performance

19% 13%

Problems with organizational processes or performance

and/or suggestions for improvement

10% 43%

Disagreement with company policies or decisions 10% 25%

Personal career issues or concerns 10% 13%

Ethical or fairness issues (e.g. professional misconduct,

discrimination)

10% 13%

Table 2 categorizes reasons and lists percentages of respondents who wrote in why they

felt uncomfortable bringing up issues with supervisors. I went through multiple iterations of

scanning each question and respondent, seeking reasons for silence or discomfort due to issues

mentioned earlier. The top three reasons were the same for each sample group, although


prioritized differently. Feelings of futility, organizational characteristics and fear of being viewed

negatively were the most commonly noted reasons why JOs do not speak up. The following

quotation from one of the Facebook respondents illuminates these feelings:

Our chain of command had already brought up the issue higher, but (they) did not support

us like we had hoped. Since the issue had already been addressed, I knew that my DH

(Department Head) would not want to talk about it, even though the issue was not fixed.

Table 2. Reasons that respondents gave for not speaking up about concerns or issues

Reason Percentage who offered this reason

OTCN Facebook

Fear of being labeled or viewed negatively

-As a complainer

-As a backstabber

11% 21%

Fear of damaging a relationship

-Loss of trust and respect

-Loss of acceptance and support

- 7%

Feeling of futility

-Speaking up will not make a difference

-Recipient will not be responsive

21% 28%

Fear of retaliation or punishment

-Not getting promoted

-Losing job or position

- 7%

Concerns about negative impact on others

-Not wanting to embarrass or upset someone

-Not wanting someone else to get into trouble

- 3%

Individual characteristics

-Lack of experience

-Lack of tenure

5% 7%

Organizational characteristics

-Hierarchical structure

-Unsupportive culture

42% 24%

Poor relationship with supervisor

-Supervisor is unsupportive

-Relationship is distant

5% 7%

Frequently used words and phrases that further support the JOs feelings of futility and

organizational dysfunction included the word “time” and the phrase “waste of time.” These

references were noted eight times (15% of responses) in the free text of Q5 & Q6. JOs from both


sources implied that “time” was a major factor in JO communication with senior officers. The

following comments demonstrate the impact of “time”:

“It (Q5 feeling uncomfortable) has to do with the „open door‟ policy.

Everyone says their door is open. It‟s not always true, sometimes that is

intentional, most of the time supervisors/senior officers don‟t make time for

people with problems to approach them.” OTCN JO

“Nothing happens and our concerns are not taken seriously. It has been a

waste of time to discuss problems with them.” Facebook JO

“Generally it is difficult to find a time to meet with a supervisor, especially

when doing shift work.” Facebook JO

Ten potential negative outcomes were presented in Q9 after the free text questions. JOs

were asked to rate how often these possible outcomes affected their decision to remain silent

when speaking to senior officers. Collectively, the top three choices were I believe that speaking

up will not make a difference; I might be viewed negatively; and I feel that the hierarchical

structure restricts communication.

Command Climate

Of the thirty-two respondents who indicated that they have experienced or are

uncomfortable taking certain issues up the chain of command, 61% of the OTCN group and 52%

of the Facebook group noted that their fellow Junior Officers share feelings of unease. Six of

thirteen OTCN JOs and seven of fifteen Facebook JOs also indicate that their peers share the

same reasons for feeling uneasy when communicating with supervisors. Quotes from Q7 and Q8

asking about fellow JO feelings of unease/comfort are listed below:

“Yes, we‟ve shared our frustration together.” OTCN JO


“This is absolutely a shared sentiment in the SWO (Surface Warfare Officer)

community.” OTCN JO

“Many do and for the same reasons. Those that do bring concerns to their supervisors

are considered discontent or “tattletales.” Facebook JO.

“Yes, we talk about it all the time.” Facebook JO

Only two respondents of the thirty-two who commented on their peer group noted that their

fellow JOs did not share their same sentiments of unease or comfort when speaking with their

upper chain of command.

Completed answers diminished by Q10 & Q11. When asked how JOs could overcome

communication obstacles with supervisors, responses were brief. Eight OTCN JOs commented

in three general constructive areas that would help them to overcome communication issues:

leadership education, interpersonal communication (assertiveness, tact, and overcoming fear of

speaking), training, and mentorship. Facebook JOs also requested mentorship possible through

JO forums, integration, and education from civilians and corporate educators, and leadership

education. One Facebook respondent transcribed all thirteen traits of Schuster‟s capacities of

transformational leadership (1994), noting that JOs should utilize these to overcome

communication issues. Between Q10 and Q11, midlevel managers were noted to be

“roadblocks” that often “overreacted” and if “eliminated” would enhance interaction with senior

officers and improve the climate that way.

The four demographic questions yielded similar results between sample groups except in

the area of gender. The average length of miltary serivce was six years for OTCN JOs and 7.5

years per Facebook respondent. Lieutenants(LT) were the overwhelming majority of

respondents for both groups with 79% of OTCN respondents and 63% of Facebook respondents


representing LT rank. No Ensigns took the survey from either source. Men were the dominant

respondents over all with 64% sharing their information. However, while only one woman took

the survey from OTCN, eleven women from Facebook dominated the eight men from that

sample group. Lastly, the predominant ethnic race claimed was white/caucasian by 57% of

OTCN staff and 79% Facebook JOs. For OTCN, the second largest reporting group were 21%

Hispanic/Latino, followed by 14% Black/African American, 7% American Indian or Alaskan

Native, and no Asian respondents. Facebook had 16% Asian and 5% Hispanic/Latino with no

Black/African American or American Indian or Alaskan Natives represented.

When crosstabulated with the comfort levels described in Q1, Lieutenants (LTs) were the

only ones who admitted being uncomfortable when speaking with senior officers. Those

„uncomfortable‟ respondants were 75% caucasian male versus 25% caucasian female. No

minorities reported to be uncomfortable or very uncomfortable when speaking with senior

officers.

Discussion

The survey results confirm that despite a general feeling of comfort from JOs when

speaking to their supervisors or senior officers, there are a number of obstacles that affect

upward communication through the chain of command. When issues do arise, JOs noted that

those that dealt with organizational processes or performance problems, shipmate or supervisor

competence, and disagreement with Navy policy and decisions were the most difficult to

communicate up the chain of command.

As suspected, the hierarchical organizational structure does negatively affect

communication practices. This organizational character flaw was connected in 67% of

respondents directly to feelings of futility. The importance of keeping a positive reputation


within the command was an unexpected finding in the JOs decision-making process for taking

issues up the chain of command. Again, this communication obstacle was overwhelmingly

linked by 75% to organizational characteristics (hierarchical and unsupportive culture) as a

reason why JOs do not speak up about concerns to supervisors. This data aligns with civilian

research that reports negative influences on subordinate-supervisor communication practices in

hierarchical businesses.

Chapter V: Summary and Conclusions

Limitations

The small sample group of the target population is one limitation of this study. Less than

1% of Navy Junior Officers (JOs) were polled for their perceptions on upward communication,

and it is possible that a wider distribution of the survey would yield different results. Also, while

there was representation from all junior officer ranks, no question asked about professional

designation. Respondent comments described representation from unrestricted line, limited duty,

and staff corps designators, but it is unclear if restricted line or chief warrant officers

commented. Also, thirty-three respondents completed the survey, yet there are over one hundred

officer sub-specialty designations, which may lead to different conclusions in specific

communities.

Asking JOs to recall previous experiences is another limitation of the study because the

retrospective view may be inaccurate or incomplete (Neuman, 2006). Biases may have also

played a role in survey completion and truthfulness. An OTCN JO respondent reported that the

“zero defects” mentality of the Navy, a social suitability bias might have influenced respondents

to portray themselves as outspoken or not afraid to speak up. This bias may be compounded by


the JOs desire to retain a positive reputation, as reflected in the study results, despite the

anonymity of the survey tool.

Future research

This study focused on exploring the Junior Officers‟ feelings and social or emotional

obstacles affecting their communication with supervisors in the chain of command. While these

results provide a glimpse into the communication issues of Junior Officers, more qualitative and

quantitative research is needed. Future research should examine a larger and more diverse

sample to validate the results. Replicating this study in a professional community such as the

surface warfare community, in another command, or under a specific senior leadership

team/style may also provide valuable feedback. Expanding this study to include enlisted sailors

could further validate the results, indicating saturation of communication obstacles across the

organization.

Respondent requests for anonymous feedback options and complaints about middle

management deafness align with propositions suggested by Bisel, Messersmith, and Kelley

(2012) that inhibit organizational adaption and learning. Implementation and subsequent testing

of these JO recommendations could positively enhance upward communication and would be

another area for future research.

Lastly, this study examined individual communication practices, but responses alluded to

organizational influence and control. The theoretical corollary back to Deetz‟ Critical Theory

standpoint on participation cannot be overlooked (1992). JO feelings of futility and fear of

damaging relationships or their reputation within the organization reflect JO acceptance of their

position in the pecking order of military management. This accepted nonnegotiable identity

“precludes the examination of that social formation” (Deetz, 1992, p. 194) and reduces the


chances for their voices to be heard. In an age when innovation is required to stay ahead of

dynamic security threats, the Navy cannot afford to silence the voices of the next generation.

Future communication studies should include communicative action by increasing participation

from all servicemen and women, not just top tier voices (Habermas, 1984).

Conclusions

Admiral Greenert‟s strategic guidance to “be ready” in order to sustain U.S. leadership in

the 21st century requires that we, JOs, “harness the teamwork, talent and imagination of our

diverse force to be ready to fight” (Greenert, 2012, p. 4). While most JOs described a general

feeling of comfort when taking problems up the chain of command, it was also clear that JOs

choose to stay silent about workplace issues. This decision to not speak up can potentially cause

significant consequences for JOs, the chain of command, and the Navy at large as “authoritarian

style of management does not encourage employees to produce innovations” (Medvedeva, 2012,

p. 263). Assuming that negative news is most likely to be filtered or silenced all together,

positive information is more likely to make its way to senior officers (Milliken, Morrison, &

Hewlin, 2003). If our voices are not heard, this reality can generate a distorted picture of

potential issues, portray a misleading positive command climate, and hinder our ability to

execute the CNO‟s sailing directions.

The goal of this study was to complement subordinate to supervisor communication

research by exploring what obstacles prevent junior naval officers from taking issues up their

chain of command. This was accomplished as a number of obstacles that stifle upward

communication were identified. Removing these obstacles and implementing solutions to

overcome communication challenges are discernible goals but will require a more thorough

understanding of upward communication practices and obstacles in the Navy. This paper


attempted to begin this process improvement by focusing on the communication obstacles of

Junior Officers.


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Appendix A

SURVEY COVER LETTER

Greetings Fellow Junior Officers,

As many of you know I am completing my thesis for Gonzaga University’s Communication and Leadership Masters of Arts this fall. This survey will provide data for my research on communication practices of Junior Officers, specifically the communication between JOs and senior officers, from the bottom up. I’ve selected this topic for a few reasons including that communication effectiveness in our organization is imperative for successful leadership, good morale, and a positive command climate. However, there are no studies on JO communication practices, proficiencies, or problems. This is surprising since there is a good deal of subordinate-supervisor research in civilian organizations and hierarchical organizations, like ours, generally have greater communication issues than flat organizations. This voluntary survey will contribute to research in subordinate-supervisor communication practices.

Thank you for your time, effort, and always for your service.

Very Respectfully,

Neva Fuentes

Graduate student and fellow JO

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

PURPOSE: The purpose of this online survey is to obtain information about junior officer communication practices with senior officers. The researcher will use the information provided in this survey for educational purposes only.

PARTICIPATION: Completion of this online feedback questionnaire is entirely voluntary. Failure to respond to any of the questions will NOT result in any penalties except possible lack of representation of your views in the final results and outcomes. ANONYMITY: You may choose to remain anonymous by only answering the questions, and not providing written comments. Information you provide will be considered only when consolidated and statistically summarized with the responses of others for sharing with leadership, and will not be attributable to any single individual.


Appendix B






Appendix C

Documents

Running Head: JUNIOR OFFICER COMMUNICATION …web02.gonzaga.edu/comltheses/proquestftp/Fuentes_gonzaga_0736M...Running Head: JUNIOR OFFICER COMMUNICATION 1 SUBORDINATE – SUPERVISOR