Rules of Court - Rule 2 Case Digests

8/10/2019 Rules of Court - Rule 2 Case Digests

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TURNER vs LORENZO SHIPPING

FACTS:The petitioners held 1,010,000 shares of stock of the respondent, a domestic corporation

engaged primarily in cargo shipping activities. In June 1999, the respondent decided to amend its

articles of incorporation to remove the stockholders pre-emptive rights to newly issued shares of

stock. Feeling that the corporate move would be prejudicial to their interest as stockholders, the

petitioners voted against the amendment and demanded payment of their shares at the rate

of P2.276/share based on the book value of the shares, or a total of P2,298,760.00.

Petitioners and respondents havent come into terms as to the fair value of the shares. They sought

for an appraisal committee pursuant to Sec. 82 of the Corporation Code to determine the fair value of

the share.

On October 27, 2000, the appraisal committee reported its valuation of P2.54/share, for an aggregate

value of P2,565,400.00 for the petitioners. Petitioners demanded payment thereof plus 2% penalty

from the time demand was made plus the reimbursement for the advanced appraisers prof. fee.

The respondent refused the petitioners demand, explaining that pursuant to the Corporation Code,

the dissenting stockholders exercising their appraisal rights could be paid only when the corporation

had unrestricted retained earnings to cover the fair value of the shares, but that it had no retained

earnings at the time of the petitioners demand, as borne out by its Financial Statements for Fiscal

Year 1999 showing a deficit of P72,973,114.00 as of December 31, 1999.

Upon respondents refusal to pay, petitioners sued them for collection and damages.

Later on, petitioners filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment when it learned respondents has

accumulated unrestricted retained earnings for the first quarter of 2002.

Respondent opposed the motion for partial summary judgment, stating that the determinatio

unrestricted retained earnings should be made at the end of the fiscal year, and that the pet

did not have a cause of action against the respondent.

RTC granted the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.

Respondents Motion for Recon

PetitionersMotion for Immediate Execution and Motion to Strike out MR

RTC granted petitioners Motion for Immediate Execution and denied petitioners MR.

ISSUE:WON there was a cause of action when the Turners filed their complaint for the colle

their shareholdings

RULING:Turners appraisal right is subject to the legal condition that no payment shall be m

any dissenting stockholder unless the corporation has unrestricted retained earnings in its b

cover such payment.

Before an action can properly be commenced all the essential elements of the cause of action min existence, that is, the cause of action must be complete. All valid conditions precedent institution of the particular action, whether prescribed by statute, fixed by agreement of the paimplied by law must be performed or complied with before commencing the action, unless the of the adverse party has been such as to prevent or waive performance or excuse non-performthe condition.

A cause of actionis the act or omission by which a party violates a right of anotheressential elements of a cause of action are: (a) the existence of a legal right in favorplaintiff; (b) a correlative legal duty of the defendant to respect such right; and (c) an act or oby such defendant in violation of the right of the plaintiff with a resulting injury or damageplaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for the recovery of relief frodefendant.[28]Although the first two elements may exist, a cause of action arises only upoccurrence of the last element, giving the p laintiff the right to maintain an action in court for rof damages or other appropriate relief

It bears restating that a right of action is the right to presently enforce a cause of action, cause of action consists of the operative facts which give rise to such right of action. The action does not arise until the performance of all conditions precedent to the action and may baway by the running of the statute of limitations, through estoppel, or by other circumstancesdo not affect the cause of action. Performance or fulfillment of all conditions precedent upon right of action depends must be sufficiently alleged, considering that the burden of proof to sha party has a right of action is upon the person initiating the suit.
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The Turners right of action arose only when petitioner had already retained earnings in the amountof P11,975,490.00 on March 21, 2002; such right of action was inexistent on January 22, 2001 whenthey filed the Complaint.

HEIRS OF MAGDALENO YPON "GAUDIOSO E. YPON," AND THE REGISTER OFDEEDS OF TOLEDO CITY

FACTS: petitioners, filed a complaint for Cancellation of Title and Reconveyance with Damages(subject complaint) against respondent "Gaudioso E. Ypon" (Gaudioso). They alleged that MagdalenoYpon (Magdaleno) died intestate and childless on June 28, 1968, leaving behind Lot Nos. 2-AA, 2-C,

2-F, and 2-J which were then covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) Nos. T-44 and T-77-A.6Claiming to be the sole heir of Magdaleno, Gaudioso executed an Affidavit of Self-Adjudication andcaused the cancellation of the aforementioned certificates of title, leading to their subsequent transferin his name under TCT Nos. T-2637 and T-2638,7to the prejudice of pet itioners who are Magdalenoscollateral relatives and successors-in-interest

RTC dismissed the complaint finding that it failed to state a cause of action against Gaudioso.

ISSUE: whether or not the RTCs dismissal of the case on the ground that the subjectcomplaint failed to state a cause of action was proper

RULING:

Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right ofanother.16It is well-settled that the existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations inthe complaint.17In this relation, a complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admittingwhat appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayedfor.18Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained,the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants

Petitioners allegations, if admitted to be true, would consequently warrant the reliefs sought for inthe said complaint, the rule that the determination of a decedents lawful heirs should be made in thecorresponding special proceeding20precludes the RTC, in an ordinary action for cancellation of titleand reconveyance, from granting the same.

Jurisprudence dictates that the determination of who are the legal heirs of the deceased must bemade in the p roper special proceedings in court, and not in an ordinary suit for recovery of ownershipand possession of property.1wphi1This must take precedence over the action for recovery ofpossession and ownership. The Court has consistently ruled that the trial court cannot make adeclaration of heirship in the civil action for the reason that such a declaration can only be made in aspecial proceeding.

By way of exception, the need to institute a separate special proceeding for the determination ofheirship may be dispensed with for the sake of practicality, as when the parties in the civil case hadvoluntarily submitted the issue to the trial court and already presented their evidence regarding the

issue of heirship, and the RTC had consequently rendered judgment thereon,23or when a specialproceeding had been instituted but had been finally closed and terminated, and hence, cannot be re-opened.24

In this case, none of the foregoing exceptions, or those of similar nature, appear to exist. Hence,there lies the need to institute the proper special proceeding in order to determine the heirship of theparties involved, ultimately resulting to the dismissal of Civil Case No. T-2246.

SWAGMAN HOTELS vs COURT OF APPEALS

FACTS: Sometime in 1996 and 1997, petitioner Swagman Hotels and Travel, Inc., througLeonor L. Infante and Rodney David Hegerty, its president and vice-president, respectively, ofrom private respondent Neal B. Christian loans evidenced by three promissory notes dated 71996, 14 March 1997, and 14 July 1997. Each of the promissory notes is in the amUS$50,000 payable after three years from its date with an interest of 15% per annum payablthree months.[1]In a letter dated 16 December 1998, Christian informed the petitioner corpthat he was terminating the loans and demanded from the latter payment in the total amoUS$150,000 plus unpaid interests in the total amount of US$13,500.

Private respondent Christian filed with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City, Branch 59, a cofor a sum of money and damages against the petitioner corporation, Hegerty, and Atty. Infante

The petitioner corporation, together with its president and vice-president, filed an Answer radefenses lack of cause of action and novation of the principal obligations . According toChristian had no cause of action because the three promissory notes were not yet dudemandable. In December 1997, since the petitioner corporation was experiencing huge losto the Asian financial crisis, Christian agreed (a) to waive the interest of 15% per annum, aaccept payments of the principal loans in installment basis, the amount and period of whichdepend on the state of business of the petitioner corporation. Thus, the petitioner paid Ccapital repayment in the amount of US$750 per month from January 1998 until the ticomplaint was filed in February 1999.

RTC and CA ruled that there was no novation.

ISSUE: May a complaint that lacks a cause of action at the time it was filed be cured by the aca cause of action during the pendency of the case?

RULING:With these findings of facts, it has become glaringly obvious that when the complaisum of money and damages was filed with the trial court on 2 February 1999, no cause of actas yet existed because the petitioner had not committed any act in violation of the terms of thpromissory notes as modified by the renegotiation in December 1997. Without a cause of actprivate respondent had no right to maintain an action in court, and the trial court shoultherefore dismissed his complaint.

Despite its finding that the petitioner corporation did not violate the modified terms of thepromissory notes and that the payment of the principal loans were not yet due when the cowas filed, the trial court did not dismiss the complaint, citing Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 RCivil Procedure (Amendment to conform to or authorize presentation of evidence)

According to the trial court, and sustained by the Court of Appeals, this Section acomplaint that does not state a cause of action to be cured by evidence presented without obduring the trial. Thus, it ruled that even if the private respondent had no cause of action w

filed the complaint for a sum of money and damages because none of the three promissory nodue yet, he could nevertheless recover on the first two promissory notes dated 7 August 1996March 1997, which became due during the pendency of the case in view of the introducevidence of their maturity during the trial.

Such interpretation of Section 5, Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is erroneou

Amendments of pleadings are allowed under Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Proceorder that the actual merits of a case may be determined in the most expeditious and inexp
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manner without regard to technicalities, and that all other matters included in the case may bedetermined in a single proceeding, thereby avoiding multiplicity of suits.[12]Section 5 thereof applies tosituations wherein evidence not within the issues raised in the pleadings is presented by the partiesduring the trial, and to conform to such evidence the pleadings are subsequently amended on motionof a party. Thus, a complaint which fails to state a cause of action may be cured by evidencepresented during the trial.

However, the curing effect under Section 5 is applicable only if a cause of action in fact exists at thetime the complaint is filed, but the complaint is defective for failure to allege the essential facts . Forexample, if a complaint failed to allege the fulfillment of a condition precedent upon which the causeof action depends, evidence showing that such condition had already been fulfilled when thecomplaint was filed may be presented during the trial, and the complaint may accordingly beamended thereafter.[13]Thus, in Roces v. Jalandoni,[14]this Court upheld the trial court in taking

cognizance of an otherwise defective complaint which was later cured by the testimony of the plaintiffduring the trial. In that case, there was in fact a cause of action and the only problem was theinsufficiency of the allegations in the complaint. This ruling was reiterated in Pascua v. Court of

Appeals.

A complaint whose cause of action has not yet accrued cannot be cured or remedied by an amendedor supplemental pleading alleging the existence or accrual of a cause of action while the case ispending.[16]Such an action is prematurely brought and is, therefore, a groundless suit, which shouldbe dismissed by the court upon proper motion seasonably filed by the defendant. The underlyingreason for this rule is that a person should not be summoned before the public tribunals to answer forcomplaints which are immature.

Hence, contrary to the holding of the trial court and the Court of Appeals, the defect of lack ofcause of action at the commencement of this suit cannot be cured by the accrual of a cause of actionduring the pendency of this case arising from the alleged maturity of two of the promissory notes on7 August 1999 and 14 March 2000.

LUIS JOSEPH vs HON. CRISPIN V. BAUTISTA

FACTS: Respondent Patrocinio Perez is the owner of a cargo truck with Plate No. 25-2 YT Phil. '73 forconveying cargoes and passengers for a consideration from Dagupan City to Manila. On January 12,1973, said cargo truck driven by defendant Domingo Villa was on its way to Valenzuela, Bulacan fromPangasinan. Petitioner, with a cargo of livestock, boarded the cargo truck at Dagupan City afterpaying the sum of P 9.00 as one way fare to Valenzuela, Bulacan. While said cargo truck wasnegotiating the National Highway proceeding towards Manila, defendant Domingo Villa tried toovertake a tricycle likewise proceeding in the same direction. At about the same time, a pick-up truckwith Plate No. 45-95 B, supposedly owned by respondents Antonio Sioson and Jacinto Pagarigan, thendriven by respondent Lazaro Villanueva, tried to overtake the cargo truck which was then in theprocess of overtaking the tricycle, thereby forcing the cargo truck to veer towards the shoulder of theroad and to ram a mango tree. As a result, petitioner sustained a bone fracture in one of his legs. 1

Petitioner filed a complaint for damages against respondent Patrocinio Perez, as owner of the cargotruck, based on a breach of contract of carriage and against respondents Antonio Sioson and LazaroVillanueva, as owner and driver, respectively, of the pick-up truck, based on quasi-delict.

RULING:A cause of action is understood to be the delict or wrongful act or omission committed bythe defendant in violation of the primary rights of the plaintiff. 3It is true that a single act or omissioncan be violative of various rights at the same time, as when the act constitutes juridically a violation

of several separate and distinct legal obligations. However where there is only one delict or wrothere is but a single cause of action regardless of the number of rights that may have been viobelonging to one person.

The trial court was, therefore, correct in holding that there was only one cause of action involvalthough the bases of recovery invoked by petitioner against the defendants therein were notnecessarily Identical since the respondents were not identically circumstanced. However, a reby the petitioner under one remedy necessarily bars recovery under the other. This, inessence, is the rationale for the proscription in our law against double recovery for the same acomission which, obviously, stems from the fundamental rule against unjust enrichment.

PHILIPPINE BANK OF COMMUNICATIONS vs Lim

FACTS: Respondents obtained a loan from it and executed a continuing surety agreement dateNovember 16, 1995 in favor of [petitioner] for all loans, credits, etc., that were extended or maextended in the future to respondents.

Petitioner granted a renewal of said loan upon respondents request, the most recent being onJanuary 21, 1998 as evidenced by Promissory Note Renewal BD-Variable No. 8298021001 in thamount of P3,000,000.00. It was expressly stipulated therein that the venue for any legal actmay arise out of said promissory note shall be Makati City, to the exclusion of all other courts

Respondents allegedly] failed to pay said obligation upon maturity. Petitioner foreclosed the reestate mortgage executed by respondents valued at P1,081,600.00 leaving a deficiency balancof P4,014,297.23 as of August 31, 1999.

Thus, Petitioners filed a complaint for the collection of the deficiency.

Respondents moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of improper venue, invoking thestipulation contained in the last paragraph of the promissory note with respect to therestrictive/exclusive venue.

ISSUE: whether the action against the sureties is covered by the restriction on venuestipulated in the PN

RULING: Petitioner correctly argues that there are two causes of action contained in itsComplaint. Only one suit may be commenced for a single cause of action. I f two or more suits instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, only one case should remain and the othersbe dismissed.

As against Tri-Oro International Trading & Manufacturing Corporation, petitioners caaction is the alleged failure to pay the debt in violation of the PN; as against Elena Lim and Calderon, in violation of the SA.

The cause of action, however, does not affect the venue of the action. Since the cases pertainiboth causes of action are restricted to Makati City as the proper venue, petitioner cannot rely oSection 5 of Rule 2 of the Rules of Court.
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A restrictive stipulation on the venue of actions contained in a promissory note applies to thesurety agreement supporting it, because the nature of the two contracts and the factualcircumstances surrounding their execution are intertwined or interconnected. The surety agreementis merely an accessory to the principal loan agreement embodied in the promissory note. Hence, theenforcement of the former depends upon the latter.

Petition is DENIED.

CHUA and FILIDEN REALTY AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION vs

METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANY

FACTS:

petitioners obtained from respondent Metrobank a loan of P4,000,000.00, which was secured by areal estate mortgage (REM) on parcels of land covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCTs) No.(108020)1148, No. 93919, and No. 125185, registered in petitioner Chuas name.

Petitioners debt amounted to a total of P103,450,391.

For failure to settle its obligations respondents move for the extra judicial foreclosure of the REM tosatisfy petitioners debt.

Petitioner Chua, in his personal capacity and acting on behalf of petitioner Filiden, filed a Complaintfor Injunction with Prayer for Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order (TRO), Preliminary Injunction

and Damages,[12]against respondents Atty. Celestra, docketed as Civil Case No. CV-01-0207. Upon the motion of petitioners, RTC-Branch 257 issued a TRO enjoining respondentsMetrobank and Atty. Celestra from conducting the auction sale of the mortgaged properties on 31May 2001.

After the expiration of the TRO and no injunction has been issued by RTC Br. 257, respondents resetthe auction sale on Nov. 8, 2001. On the sa id date, the court issued an order to reset the auction dateanew. However, respondent Atty. Celestra proceeded with the auction sale and accordingly issued aCertificate of Sale to respondent Metrobank as the highest bidder.

Petitioners filed a Motion to Admit Amended Complaint in Civil Case No., CV-01-0207. Petitionersalleged that the Certificate of Sale was a falsified document since there was no actual sale that tookplace on 8 November 2001. And, even if an auction sale was conducted, the Certificate of Sale wouldstill be void because the auction sale was done in disobedience to a lawful order of RTC-Branch 257.

RTC denied petitioners motion for being moot and academic with the foreclosure sale. MR denied

CA the case for further proceedings.

SC denied respondents appeal

Pending proceedings of the above cited case, another case was filed by petitioners which is a VCompliant for Damages against respondent Metrobank, Atty Celestra and three other Metrobanlawyers before RTC Br. 195 docketed as Civil Case No. CV-05-0402.

Petitioners sought in their Complaint the award of actual, moral, and exemplary damages agarespondents for making it appear that an auction sale of the subject properties took place, as of which, the prospective buyers of the said properties lost their interest and petitioner Chprevented from realizing a profit of P70,000,000.00 from the intended sale.

Petitioners filed with RTC-Branch 195 a Motion to Consolidate seeking the consolidation of CiNo. CV-05-0402, the action for damages pending before said court, with Civil Case No. CV-01the injunction case that was being heard before RTC-Branch 258. One of the grounds therein

Since the subject matter of both cases are the same properties and the partiesof both caalmost the same, and both cases have the same central issue of whether there was an auctiothen necessarily, both cases should be consolidated

RTC Br. 195 granted the consolidation

Respondents filed before RTC Br. 258 two motions: (1) Motion for Reconsideration of thdated 23 January 2006 of RTC-Branch 195, which granted the Motion to Consolidate of petitand (2) Manifestation and Motion raising the ground of forum shopping, among the affidefenses of respondents.

RTC dismissed Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 on the ground of forum shoppingCA affirmed RTC. Petitioners MR denied.Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: whether or not successively filing Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 and Civil Case No.

0402 amounts to forum shopping.

RULING:YES, there was forum shopping.

FORUM SHOPPING, defined

Forum shopping exists when a party repeatedly avails himself of several judicial reme

different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same trans

and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the same issues

pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court.

Forum shopping can be committed in three ways: (1) filing multiple cases based

same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not having been re

yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based
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same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved

(where the ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same

cause of action, but with different prayers(splitting of causes of action, where the ground for

dismissal is also either litis pendentiaor res judicata).

Forum shopping occurs although the actions seem to be different, when it can be seen that there is a

splitting of a cause of action.

EFFECTS for violation thereof

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements (Rule on ForumShopping)shall not be curable by mere amendment of the complaint or other initiatorypleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case without prejudice, unlessotherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission of a falsecertification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constituteindirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative andcriminal actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitutes willful anddeliberate forum shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal withprejudice and shall constitute direct contempt, as well as a cause for administrativesanctions.

In the present case, there is no dispute that petitioners failed to state in the Certificate of

Non-Forum Shopping, attached to their Verified Complaint in Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 before RTC-

Branch 195, the existence of Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 pending before RTC-Branch 258. Petitioners

committed forum shopping by filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, although with

different prayers.

If the forum shopping is not considered willful and deliberate, the subsequent case shall be

dismissed without prejudice,on the ground of either litis pendentiaor res judicata. However, if the

forum shopping is willful and deliberate, both (or all, if there are more than two) actions shall be

dismissed with prejudice..[43] In this case, petitioners did not deliberately file Civil Case No. CV-05-

0402 for the purpose of seeking a favorable decision in another forum. Otherwise, they would not

have moved for the consolidation of both cases. Thus, only Civil Case No. CV-05-0402 is dismissed

and the hearing of Civil Case No. CV-01-0207 before RTC-Branch 258 will be continued.

Chu v. Spouses Cunanan, G.R. No. 156185

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of o

judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others.

FACTS: Spouses Manuel and Catalina Chu (Chus) executed a deed of sale with assump

mortgage[3]involving their five parcels of land situated in Saguin, San Fernando City, Pampa

favor of Trinidad N. Cunanan (Cunanan) for the consideration ofP5,161,090.00.

It was agreed that the Chus would retain the ownership of the lots as vendors and would o

transferred to the Cunanans only upon complete payment of the consideration and complian

the terms of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage.

Cunanan was able to transfer the title of the five lots to her name without the knowledge of th

and to borrow money with the lots as security without paying the balance of the purchase pric

Chus.

Chus commenced Civil Case No. G-1936 to recover the unpaid balance from Spouses Cunanan

it was amended and sought for the annulment of the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage

the TCTs issued pursuant to the deed, and to recover damages.

The Chus, the Cunanans, and Cool Town Rea lty entered into a compromise agreement,[9]wher

Cunanans transferred to the Chus their 50% share in all the parcels of land situated in Sag

Fernando, Pampanga registered in the name of Cool Town Realty for and in consideration of

settlement of their case. The RTC approved the compromise agreement in a partial decision.

the petitioners herein brought another suit, Civil Case No. 12251, against the Carloses and B

Estate seeking the cancellation of the TCTs of the two lots in the name of Benelda Estate, a

issuance of new TCTs in their favor, plus damages.
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The Cunanans moved to dismiss the amended complaint based on two grounds, namely: (a)

bar by prior judgment, and (b) the claim or demand had been paid, waived, and abandoned. Benelda

Estate likewise moved to dismiss the amended complaint, citing as grounds: (a) forum shopping; (b)

bar by prior judgment, and (c) failure to state a cause of action. On their part, the Carloses raised

affirmative defenses in their answer, namely: (a) the failure to state a cause of action; (b) res

judicataor bar by prior judgment; and (c) bar by statute of limitations.

RTC denied Motion to Dismiss; that the action was not barred by res judicata bec. there was no

identity of parties and subj. matter between Civil Case No.12251 and Civil Case No. G-1936; and that

the Cunanans did not establish that the petitioners had waived and abandoned their claim or that

their claim had been paid by virtue of the compromise agreement, pointing out that the compromise

agreement involved only the three parcels of land registered in the name of Cool Town Realty.

Cunanans MR was denied.

CA nullified the RTCs decision; ruled that the compromise agreement had ended the legal

controversy between the parties with respect to the cause of action arising from the deed of sale with

assumption of mortgage covering all the five parcels of land; that Civil Case No. G-1936 and Civil

Case No.12251 involved the violation by the Cunanans of the same legal right under the deed of sale

with assumption of mortgage; and that the filing of Civil Case No.12251 contravened the rule against

splitting of a cause of action, and rendered Civil Case No.12251 subject of a motion to dismiss based

on bar by res judicata.

ISSUE: was there an identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action

between Civil Case No.G-1936 and Civil Case No. 12251?

RULING:YES.

There is identity of parties when the parties in both actions are the same, or there is privity between

them, or they are successors-in-interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action

litigating for the same thing and under the same title and in the same capacity. It is settled t

absolute identity of parties was not a condition sine qua nonfor res judicata to apply, be

shared identity of interest sufficed.[36]Mere substantial identity of parties, or even commu

interests between parties in the prior and subsequent cases, even if the latter were not implea

the first case, was sufficient.

In this case, The requirement of the identity of parties was fully met, because the Chus, on t

hand, and the Cunanans, on the other hand, were the parties in both cases along with their res

privies. The fact that the Carloses and Benelda Estate, defendants in Civil Case No. 12251, w

parties in the compromise agreementwas inconsequential, for they were also the privies

Cunanans as transferees and successors-in-interest.

As to identity of the subject matter, both actions dealt with the properties involved in the deed

with assumption of mortgage. Identity of the causes of action was also met, because Case

1936 and Civil Case No. 12251 were rooted in one and the samecause of action the fa

Cunanan to pay in full the purchase price of the five lots subject of the deed of sale with assu

of mortgage.

Apparently, the petitioners were guilty of splitting their single cause of action to enforce or

the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage.

Splitting a single cause of action is the act of dividing a single or indivisible cause of act

several parts or claims and instituting two or more actions upon them.[26]A single cause of a

entire claim or demand cannot be split up or divided in order to be made the subject of two o

different actions.

The petitioners were not at liberty to split their demand to enforce or rescind the deed

with assumption of mortgage and to prosecute piecemeal or present only a portion of the g

upon which a special relief was sought under the deed of sale with assumption of mortgage,a
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to leave the rest to be presented in another suit; otherwise, there would be no end to

litigation.[28]Their splitting violated the policy against multiplicity of suits, whose primary objective

was to avoid unduly burdening the dockets of the courts.Their contravention of the policy merited the

dismissal of Civil Case No. 12251 on the ground of bar by res judicata.

Pantranco v. Standard Insurance, G.R. No. 140746

FACTS: Crispin Gicale was driving the passenger jeepney owned by his mother Martina Gicale,

respondent herein. The jeepney was hit on the left rear side by a passenger bus owned by petitioner

Pantranco.

The total cost of damage was Php 21,415.00. Respondent Standanrd Insurance paid Php 8,000.00

and the remaining was shouldered by respondent Martina Gicale.

Respondents Standard Insurance and Martina demanded reimbursement from petitioner but the latter

refused to pay. Hence, a complaint for sum of money was instituted by respondents.

In their answer, petitioners specifically denied the allegations in the complaint and averred that it isthe Metropolitan Trial Court, not the RTC, which has jurisdiction over the case.

RTC fvored petitioners; ordering Pantranco to pay respondents

CA affirmed the RTC. Petitioners MR was denied

Hence, this petition

ISSUE: WHETHER OR NOT THE TRIAL COURT HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT OF

THE ACTION CONSIDERING THAT RESPONDENTS RESPECTIVE CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINSTPETITIONERS DID NOT ARISE OUT OF THE SAME TRANSACTION NOR ARE THEREQUESTIONS OF LAW AND FACTS COMMON TO BOTH PETITIONERS AND RESPONDENTS.

RULING:YES, the trial court has jurisdiction because petitioners causeof action arose out of thesame transaction.

Section 6, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court,5provides:

"Sec. 6. Permissive joinder of parties. All persons in whom or against whom any righrelief in respect to or arising out of the same transaction or series of transactions is alto exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative, may, except as otherwise proin these Rules, join as plaintiffs or be joined as defendants in one complaint, where anquestion of law or fact common to all such plaintiffs or to all such defendants may aristhe action; but the court may make such orders as may be just to prevent any plaintifdefendant from being embarrassed or put to expense in connection with any proceediwhich he may have no interest."

Permissive joinder of partiesrequires that: (a) the right to relief arises out of the same

transaction or series of transactions; (b) there is a question of law or fact common to all the plor defendants; and (c) such joinder is not otherwise proscribed by the provisions of the Rules o

jurisdiction and venue.

Such joinder of parties avoids multiplicity of suit and ensures the convenient, speedy and orderadministration of justice.

In this case, there is a single transaction common to all, that is, Pantrancos bus hitting the reaof the jeepney. There is also a common question of fact, that is, whether petitioners are negligThere being a single transaction common to both respondents, consequently, they have the sacause of action against petitioners.

Section 5(d), Rule 2 of the same Rules provides:

"Sec. 5.Joinder of causes of action. A party may in one pleading assert, in the alter

or otherwise, as many causes of action as he may have against an opposing party, suthe following conditions:

x x x

(d) Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money the aggreamount claimed shall be the test of jurisdiction."

The above provision presupposes that the different causes of action which are joined accrue in of the same plaintiff/s and against the same defendant/s and that no misjoinder of parties is in

totality rule - where there are several claims or causes of action between the same or differeparties, embodied in the same complaint, the amount of the demand shall be the totality of thein all the causes of action, irrespective of whether the causes of action arose out of the same odifferent transactions

Umale v. Canoga Park, G.R. No. 167246

FACTS: The parties entered into a Contract of Lease[5]whereby the petitioner agreed to lease, period of two (2) years starting from January 16, 2000, an eight hundred sixty (860)-square-mprime lot located in Ortigas Center, Pasig City owned by the respondent.
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Before the lease contract expired, the respondent filed an unlawful detainer case against thepetitioner before the Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC)-Branch 68, Pasig City, docketed as Civil Case No.8084.[7]The respondent used as a ground for ejectment the petitioners violation of stipulations in thelease contract regarding the use of the property.

MTC granted the ejectment case

RTC Br. 155 affirmed MTC. but case was re-raffled to RTC Br. 267 upon petitioners MR

RTC Br. 267 The RTC-Branch 267 granted the petitioners motion, thereby reversing and settingaside the MTC-Branch 68 decision. Accordingly, Civil Case No. 8084 was dismissed for beingprematurely filed.

During the pendency of the petition for review in the CA, the respondent filed on May 3, 2002 another

case for unlawful detainer against the petitioner before the MTC-Branch 71,Pasig City. The case was

docketed as Civil Case No. 9210.[14]This time, the respondent used as a ground for ejectment the

expiration of the parties lease contract.

MTC Br. 71 adjudged in favor of respondents

RTC-Branch 68 reversed and set aside the decision of the MTC-Branch 71, and dismissed Civil Case

No. 9210 on the ground of litis pendentia

CA CA nullified and set aside the assailed decision of the RTC-Branch 68, and ruled that there was

no litis pendentiabecause the two civil cases have different causes of action.The decision of the MTC-

Branch 71 was ordered reinstated. Petitioners MR was denied.

ISSUE: whether Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 involve the same cause of action.

RULING: Civil Case Nos. 8084 and 9210 involve different causes of action.

Generally, a suit may only be instituted for a single cause of action.[21]If two or more suits

are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment on the merits

in any one is ground for the dismissal of the others.[22]

Several tests exist to ascertain whether two suits relate to a single or common c

action, such as whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and

causes of action[23](also known as the same evidence test),[24]or whether the defenses

case may be used to substantiate the complaint in the other .[25]Also fundamental is the

determiningwhether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the

of the first complaint.[26]

Of the three tests cited, the third one is especially applicable to the present ca

whether the cause of action in the second case existed at the time of the filing of th

complaint and to which the answer is in the negative. The facts clearly show that the f

the first ejectment case was grounded on the petitioners violation of stipulations in th

contract, while the filing of the second case was based on the expiration of the lease cont

the time the respondent filed the first ejectment complaint on October 10, 2000, th

contract between the parties was still in effect. The lease was fixed for a period of two (2

from January 16, 2000, and in the absence of a renewal agreed upon by the parties, th

remained effective until January 15, 2002. It was only at the expiration of the lease contr

the cause of action in the second ejectment complaint accrued and made available

respondent as a ground for ejecting the petitioner. Thus, the cause of action in the secon

was not yet in existence at the time of filing of the first ejectment case.

In response to the petitioners contention that the similarity of Civil Case Nos. 8084 andrests on the reiteration in the second case of the cause of action in the first case, we rule that trestatement does not result in substantial identity between the two cases. Even if therespondent alleged violations of the lease contract as a ground for ejectment in the secondcomplaint, the main basis for ejecting the petitioner in the second case was the expiration of thcontract. If not for this subsequent development, the respondent could no longer file a secondcomplaint for unlawful detainer because an ejectment complaint may only be filed within oneafter the accrual of the cause of action,[27]which, in the second case, was the expiration of the

contract.

Spouses Plaza v. Lustiva, G.R. No. 172909, March 5, 2014
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FACTS:Petitioners, filed a Complaint for Injunction, Damages, Attorneys Fees with Prayer for theIssuance of the Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order against therespondents and the City Government of Butuan. They prayed that the respondents be enjoined fromunlawfully and illegally threatening to take possession of the subject property. According to thepetitioners, they acquired the land from Virginia Tuazon in 1997; Tuazon was the sole bidder andwinner in a tax delinquency sale conducted by the City of Butuan on December 27, 1996.

RTC denied the prayer for a Writ of Preliminary Injunction, and ordered that the possession andoccupation of the land be returned to the respondents.

Petitionersfiled a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA

While the petition for review on certiorari was pending before the CA, the petitioners filed an actionfor specific performance8against the City Government of Butuan. According to the petitioners, theyacquired possession and ownership over the auctioned property when they redeemed it from Tuazon.The City Government of Butuan must therefore issue them a certificate of sale.

CA affirmed the RTCs decision in the first case (denied injunction); found the petitioners guilty offorum shopping, dismissed the case, and referred the case to the Court and to the Integrated Bar ofthe Philippines for investigation and institution of the appropriate administrative action. Rejectedpetitioners MR.

Hence, this case. Petitioners argue that they did not commit forum shopping, as the reliefs prayed forin the present case and in the specific performance case are not the same.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioners are guilty of forum shopping.

RULING: YES, the petitioners committed forum shopping when they filed the specific performancecase despite the pendency of the present case before the CA.

Three ways forum shopping may be committed:

1) through litis pendentia filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with thesame prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet;

2) through res judicata filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the sameprayer, the previous case having been finally resolved; and

3) splitting of causes of action filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but withdifferent prayers the ground to dismiss being either litis pendentia or res judicata.

"The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing thesame interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief beingfounded on the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one,regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res judicata in the other."

The cause of action in the present case (and the main case) is the petitioners claim of ownership ofthe land when they bought it, either from the City Government of Butuan or from Tuazon. Thisownership is the petitioners basis in enjoining the respondents from dispossessing them of the

property. On the other hand, the specific performance case prayed that the City Government oButuan be ordered to issue the petitioners the certificate of sale grounded on the petitionersownership of the land when they had bought it, either from the City Government of Butuan or fTuazon. While it may appear that the main relief prayed for in the present injunction case is diffrom what was prayed for in the specific performance case, the cause of action which serves asbasis for the reliefs remains the same the petitioners alleged ownership of the property aftepurchase in a public auction.

Thus, the petitioners' subsequent filing of the specific performance action is forum shopping of third kind-splitting causes of action or filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action, with different prayers. As the Court has held in the past, "there is still forum shopping even if treliefs prayed for in the two cases are d ifferent, so long as both cases raise substantially the saissues.

Bayang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. L-53564

FACTS: Bayang filed a complaint for quieting of title with damages against Biong in the Court oInstance of Surigao del Norte, Branch 1, docketed as Civil Case No. 1892. 1

While the case was pending, Biong succeeded in dispossessing the p laintiff of the land in questremained there until January 25, 1978. 2

The case was decided in favor of Biong, but the Court of Appeals reversed the trial court, this dbecame final on February 2, 1978.

On February 6, 1978, Bayang filed a second case, docketed as Civil Case No. 2589, with the CFSurigao del Norte, Branch II, seeking to recover from Biong the incomes earned from the samefrom 1970 up to the quarterly incomes from 1978 until the said land was delivered to the plain

Biong filed a motion for summary judgment, reiterating the affirmative defense of res judicatain his answer.

RTC granted respondents motion and rendered a summary judgment.

CA sustained the RTC

ISSUES: Whether or not the appealed decision of Civil Case No. 1892 constitutes resjudicata to bar Civil Case No. 2589?

RULING: There was res judicata.

Requisites for res judicata to apply:

a) the former judgment must be final;

b) it must have been rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and the p
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c) it must be a judgment on the merits; and d) there must be between the first case and the secondcase identity of parties, identity of subject matter and Identity of cause of action

The decision in Civil Case No. 1892 became final and executory on February 2, 1978. There is nodispute that the trial court which rendered that decision had jurisdiction over the subject-matter andthe parties to the proceeding. The case was tried on the merits. The parties to Civil Case No. 1892and the subsequent Civil Case No. 2589 are the same petitioner and private respondent now beforeus.

The petitioner would draw a distinction between the land in dispute in Civil Case No. 1892 and theincome from that land being claimed in Civil Case No. 2589. But that is in our view splitting hairs tosplit a cause of action. The subject-matter is essentially the same in both cases as the income is only

a consequence or accessory of the disputed property. We cannot agree that there are involved heretwo causes of action calling for two separate cases. The claim for the income from the land wasincidental to, and should have been raised by Bayang in his earlier claim for, ownership of the land.

Civil Case No. 2589 is barred by the previous judgment in Civil Case No. 1892. This being so, itshould follow that the trial judge committed no grave abuse of discretion in deciding the latter case bysummary judgment.

De Larena v. Villanueva, G.R. No. L-29155

FACTS: Plaintiffs- owner/lessor of the hacienda

Defendants- lessee

The case at bar is a sequel to case G. R. No. 21706, Josefina Rubio de Larena vs. HermenegildoVillanueva, decided on March 26, 1924. 1 In that case we affirmed a decision of the Court of FirstInstance ordering the rescission of a lease of the Tacgajan Sugar Plantation and the payment by thedefendant-lessee of the unpaid balance of the rent for the agricultural year 1920-1922 in the sum ofP5,949.28 with interest from August 26, 1922, an for P8,000 in rent for the agricultural year 1921-1923. The decision also provided that the possession of the leased land be delivered to the plaintiff.

Shortly after the record was returned to the court below, a writ of execution was issued, but beforelevy was made the parties came to an agreement, under which the money judgment was to besatisfied by the payment of P10,500 in cash and the transfer to the plaintiff of a dwelling housesituated in the municipality of Bais.

In the meantime, the defendant had harvested the sugarcane crop produced in the agricultural year1922-1924, and after having satisfied the aforesaid money judgment, he also continued in possession

of the plantation long enough to appropriate to himself the following ratoon cane crop.

The present action was brought on April 13, 1925, alleging three causes of action against defendant,to wit:

1. defendant was in bad faith on his continued possession of the hacienda despiteknowledge that the lease was declared rescinded by the lower court in the previous cthus, not entitled to the possession of the hacienda

2. defendants failed to comply with the obligations stipulated in the contract of leaseis to use the care of a good father of the family in conserving the tools, agricultural implemendraft animals, and other effects enumerated in an inventory made at the time the defendant enin possession under the lease

3. defendants illegally harvested the sugar canes in the property involved in the case

In his answer to the first and third causes of action, the defendants alleges that according to th

pleadings in case G. R. No. 21706, the two causes of action were included in that case and, themust be considered res adjudicata.

CFI sustained the defendants

ISSUE: whether or not the first and third issue was barred by res judicata?

RULING: There was no res judicata.

The Code of Civil Procedure says:

That only is deemed to have been so adjudged in a former judgment which appears uface to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily included thereinnecessary thereto. (Sec. 307, Code of Civil Proc.)

But the defendant maintains that the plaintiff having had an opportunity to ventilate the matteformer case, she cannot now enforce the same cause of action in the present case. Properly spthis argument does not involve the doctrine of res judicatabut rests on the well-known an, inAmerican law, firmly established principle that a party will not be permitted to split up a single of action an make it the basis for several suits. But that is not this case. The rule is well establithat when a lease provides for the payment of the rent in separate installments, each installmean independent cause of action, though it has been held and is good law, that in an action upona lease for the recovery of rent, the installments due at the time the action brought must be inin the complaint and that failure to do so will constitute a bar to a subsequent action for the paof that rent.

Blossom & Company v. Manila Gas Corp., G.R. No. L-32958

FACTS: Blossom & Co. (plaintiff) and Manila Gas Corporations (defendant) entered into a c

The contract provided for the delivery to the plaintiff from month to month of specified amo

water gas tar. 1 ton of gas was priced at Php65. It was agreed that the price would prevail o

long as the raw materials (coal and crude oil) used by the defendants in the manufacture

should cost the same price as that prevailing at the time of the contract. In the event of an i

or decrease in the cost of raw materials, there would be a corresponding increase or decreas

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The contract was later amended to extend the period for ten years. In consideration of the

modification, the plaintiff agreed to purchase from the defendant a certain p iece of land lying adjacent

to its plant. The defendant sold and conveyed the land to the plaintiff which in turn executed a

mortgage to secure the payment of the balance of the purchase price.

Around 4 years from the execution of the contract, plaintiff filed an action against the defendant to

obtain specific performance and recovery of damages. Plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached

the contract by ceasing to deliver any coal and water gas tar solely because of the increase in price of

tar products and its desire to secure better prices than what the plaintiff paid.

CFI Manila ruled in favor of the plaintiff. The court granted the recovery for damages but refused to

order the defendants to resume delivery but left it with its remedy for damages against the

defendants for any subsequent breach of contract.

Later, plaintiff filed another action for damages on the ground that the defendant breached the

contract once more after refusal to perform its obligation under the same contract.

ISSUES: Whether or not the plaintiff is barred from filing the second action for damages

RULING: Yes, the plaintiff is barred from filing the second action for damages.

Doctrine:

Divisible contracts (as a general rule)

- A contract to do several things at several times is divisible. A judgement for a single breach

of a continuing contract is not a bar to a suit for a subsequent breach.

Entire contract (case at bar)

- When the contract is indivisible and the breach is total, there can only be one action in

which the plaintiff must recover all damages. The recovery of a judgement for damages by

reason of a breach is a bar to another action on the same contract and on account of the

continuous breach.

- The contract between the parties is an entire contract.

- In the case at bar, the defendant terminated the continuing contract by absolute refusal.

The claim for damages is an indivisible demand. Where a former final judgement was

rendered, it is a bar to any damages which plaintiff may thereafter sustain.

Danfoss v. Continental Cement, G.R. No. 143788

FACTS: Respondent Continental Cement Corporation (CCC) filed a complaint for damages agaipetitioner DANFOSS and Mechatronics Instruments and Controls, Inc. (MINCI) before the RegioTrial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80 for the latters failure to deliver two (2) unit 132 KW DanBrand Frequency Converter/Inverter.

Petitioner DANFOSS filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it did not state

of action. It futher says that the allegations neither prove any right of the plaintiffs arising fr

transactions nor a violation of such right. It is submitted that this Honorable Court based

complaint, cannot render a valid judgment against the defendant Danfoss. The plaintiffs c

action against Danfoss or plaintiffs right to demand delivery cannot arise earlier than Novem

1997, which is the last day for the defendant Danfosss principal (Danfoss Denmark) to delitwo (2) units Frequency Converter.

RTC denied the motion to dismiss. Petitioners MR was likewise denied.

CA denied Danfoss petition for lack of merit. The CA likewise denied petitioners MR

ISSUES:whether or not the CA erred in affirming the denial by the court a quoof petitioners

to dismiss the complaint for damages on the ground that it failed to state a cause of action.

RULING: The principle of anticipatory breachenunciated in Blossom & Company, Inc. v.

Gas Corporation[9]does not apply here. In that case, Blossom & Company, Inc. entered

contract with Manila Gas Corporation for the sale and delivery of water gas and coal gas

stipulated prices for a period of four years. On the second year of the contract, Manila Gas w

and deliberately refused to deliver any coal and water gas tar to Blossom and Company, Inc. b

it was asking for a higher price than what had been previously stipulated by them. The price o

products had gone up. We held that:

even if the contract is divisible in its performance and the future periodic

deliveries are not yet due, if the obligor has already manifested his refusal tocomply with his future periodic obligations, the contract is entire and the breachtotal, hence, there can only be one action for damages.[10]
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Thus, the principle contemplates future periodic deliveriesand a willfulrefusal to

comply therewith. Here, the obligation was single and indivisible to deliver two units of frequency

converter/inverter by November 19, 1997. The records do not show that petitioner refused to deliver

the goods on the date agreed upon. On the contrary, petitioner exerted efforts to make good its

obligation by looking for other suppliers who could provide it the parts needed to make timely delivery

of the frequency converter/inverter ordered by respondent.

Bank of America v. American Realty, G.R. No. 133876

FACTS:

ISSUES: Whether or not the filing of the four civil actions barred the petitioners their remedy toforeclose the mortgage?

RULING: Citing Bachrach Motor Co., Inc, vs. Icarangal:

For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single cause ofaction against the debtor. This single cause of action consists in the recovery of thecredit with execution of the security. In other words, the creditor in his action maymake two demands, the payment of the debt and the foreclosure of his mortgage.But both demands arise from the same cause, the non-payment of the debt, and forthat reason, they constitute a single cause of action. Though the debt and themortgage constitute separate agreements, the latter is subsidiary to the former,and both refer to one and the same obligation. Consequently, there exists only onecause of action for a single breach of that obligation. Plaintiff, then, by applying therules above stated, cannot split up his single cause of action by filing a complaint forpayment of the debt, and thereafter another complaint for foreclosure of the

mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first complaint will bar the subsequecomplaint. By allowing the creditor to file two separate complaints simultaneosuccessively, one to recover his credit and another to foreclose his mortgagewill, in effect, be authorizing him plural redress for a single breach of contracmuch cost to the courts and with so much vexation and oppression to the de

Allandale Sportsline v. Good Development Corp, G.R. No. 164521

FACTS: Allandale Sportsline, Inc. (ASI) obtained a loan of P204,000.00 from The Good Development Corpunder a Promissory Note signed by Melbarose R. Sasot (Melbarose) andAllandale R. Sasot (Allandale), Preand Vice-President, respectively, of ASI, with Theresa L. Manipon (Manipon) as one of three co-makers.

To provide additional security, ASI and Melbarose executed in favor of GDC a Deed of Mortgage.

GDC demanded that Melbarose pay the unpaid account of P179,000.00 or surrender the mo

chattels within five days from notice.

When no payment was made, GDC filed with the RTC a Complaint[10]for Replevin and/or Sum of Money witDamagesagainst ASI, Melbarose, Manipon, Florante Edrino and John Doe.

However, while the trial that ensued, GDC disclosed that after it obtained possession of the p

subject of the writs of replevin, it caused the auction sale of some of them and realized proceeds am

to P78,750.00..

RTC decided in favor of GDC. Ordered plaintiff to pay respondents jointly andseverally the amount of P269,611.82 plus legal interest thereon effective to date untilthe full amount is fully paid, and 25% of the total amount due as liquidateddamages.

CA RTC affirmed. MR denied

ISSUES:

RULING: As emphasized at the outset, the reliefs respondent prayed for in its Complaint and Amended C

are in the alternative: delivery of the mortgaged properties preparatory to foreclosure or payment of the

loan.[44]
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Moreover, after respondent acquired possession of the mortgaged properties through the writs

of replevin, it caused the auction sale of assorted sports outfits, one unit Sansio Karaoke, one unit Sony T.V. Set and

one unit Toyota Corona, and earned proceeds amounting to P78,750.00.[45] While it appears that respondent failed

to obtain the other personal properties covered by the Deed of Mortgage and the writs of replevin, there is no doubt

that it had effectively elected the remedy of extra-judicial foreclosure of the mortgage security over the remedy of

collection of the unpaid loan.

The RTC was aware that respondent had elected one remedy. In its Decision, it cited the fact that some

of the mortgaged properties which were delivered to respondent by means of the Writs of Replevin had been sold

on auction, and acknowledged that the proceeds from said auction sale should be deducted from the loan account

of petitioners. The RTC noted:

The seized pieces of personal properties by virtue of the writ of replevin and alias writof replevin were sold in an auction sale where [respondent] realized P78,750.00 from thesale.[46]

x x x x

[Respondent] realized P78,500.00[sic] from the auction sale of the seized personalproperty by virtue of the writ of replevin. The amount realized from the auction sale is clearly

insufficient to cover the unpaid balance, interest, attorneys fees, costs of the suit and otherexpenses incidental to litigation. This amount was deducted from the [petitioners] totalobligation in the amount of P269,111.82 [sic] resulting in the net total obligationof P191,111.82 as of August 24, 1992.[47](Emphasis supplied)

Yet, it is curious that in the dispositive portion of its Decision, the RTC granted respondent the remedy of

collection of sum of money. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision is reproduced below for emphasis:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is rendered in favor of the[respondent] Good Development Corporation against[petitioners] Melbarose Sasot, Allandale Sportsline Inc., and Ma. TheresaManipon ordering themto pay the [respondent] jointly and severally the amount of P269,611.82[sic]plus legalinterest thereon effective to date until the full amount is fully paid, and 25% of thetotal amount due as liquidated damages.

SO ORDERED.

Not only is there no more reference to the conduct of the auction sale of the mortgaged properti

is also no longer any acknowledgment that the proceeds earned from the auction sale should be deducted

total unpaid loan.

This is a glaring error.

InBachrach Motor Co., Inc. v. Icarangal,[48]the Court held that the remedies available to any m

creditor are alternative, not cumulative or successive,[49]viz.:

For non-payment of a note secured by mortgage, the creditor has a single cause ofaction against the debtor. This single cause of action consists in the recovery of the credit withexecution of the security. In other words, the creditor in his action may make two demands,the payment of the debt and the foreclosure of his mortgage. But both demands arise from thesame cause, the non-payment of the debt, and for that reason, they constitute a single cause ofaction. Though the debt and the mortgage constitute separate agreements, the latter issubsidiary to the former, and both refer to one and the same obligation. Consequently, thereexists only one cause of action for a single breach of that obligation. Plaintiff, then, byapplying the rules above stated, cannot split up his single cause of action by filing acomplaint for payment of the debt, and thereafter another complaint for foreclosureof the mortgage. If he does so, the filing of the first complaint will bar thesubsequent complaint. By allowing the creditor to file two separate complaintssimultaneously or successively, one to recover his credit and another to foreclose his mortgage,we will, in effect, be authorizing him plural redress for a single breach of contract at so much

cost to the courts and with so much vexation and oppression to the debtor. (Emphasissupplied)

By causing the auction sale of the mortgaged properties, respondent effectively adopted and pur

remedy of extra-judicial foreclosure,[50]using the writ of replevin as a tool to get hold of the m

properties.[51] As emphasized in Bachrach, one effect of respondents election of the remedy of extra

foreclosure is its waiver of the remedy of collection of the unpaid loan.

Therefore, there was no more legal basis for the RTC to grant respondent the relief of collecti

petitioners the amount of Php269,611.82 [sic] plus legal interest thereon effective to date until the full am

fully paid,nor for the CA to affirm it.

Enriquez v. Ramos, G.R. No. L-16797
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FACTS: The record is to the effect that on 24 November 1958, Rodrigo Enriquez and the spousesUrbano Dizon and Aurea Soriano de Dizon sold to Socorro A. Ramos, by a notarial deed of even date,eleven (11) parcels of land situated in Bago Bantay, Quezon City, and covered by their correspondingcertificates of title, for the stipulated price of P101,000.00. The vendee paid P5,000.00 down,P2,500.00 in cash, and P2,500.00 by a check drawn against the Philippine National Bank, and agreedto satisfy the balance of P96,000.00 within ninety (90) days. To secure the said balance, the vendeeSocorro A. Ramos, in the same deed of sale, mortgaged the eleven parcels in favor of the vendors. Byway of additional security, Socorro A. Ramos, as attorney-in-fact of her children, Enrique, Antonio,Milagros, and Lourdes, and as judicial guardian of her minor child Angelita Ramos, executed anothermortgage on Lot No. 409 of the Malinta Estate.

Because of the vendee-mortgagor's failure to comply with some conditions of the mortgage, thisaction for foreclosure of the mortgage was filed by the vendors-mortgagees in the court below, on 29

April 1959. Defendant Socorro Ramos moved to dismiss, alleging that the plaintiffs previously hadfiled action against her in the Court of First Instance of Manila on 24 February 1959 for the recoveryof P2,500.00 paid by check as part of the down payment on the price of the mortgaged lands; that atthe time this first suit was filed, the mortgage debt was already accrued and demandable; thatplaintiffs were, therefore, guilty of splitting a single cause of action.

RTC denied motion to dismiss. Ruled in favor of the plaintiffs.

Defendant Ramos appealed directly to the SC.

ISSUES: Whether or not plaintiffs were guilty of splitting a single cause of action

RULING: An examination of the first complaint filed against appellant in the Court of First Instance ofManila shows that it was based on appellants' having unlawfully stopped payment of the check forP2,500.00 she had issued in favor of appellees; while the complaint in the present action was for non-

payment of the balance of P96,000.00 guaranteed by the mortgage. The claim for P2,500.00 was,therefore, a distinct debt not covered by the security; and since the mortgage was constituted onlands situated in Quezon City, the appellees could not ask for its foreclosure in the Manila courts. Thetwo causes of action being different, section 4 of Rule 2 does not apply.

Tarnate v. Garcia, G.R. No. L-26266

FACTS: Lucilo U. Garcia filed a complaint for forcible entry against herein petitioner Ramon A. Tarnatein the Municipal Court of Batangas, Batangas, which complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 1083.

On 10 September 1964 respondent Garcia filed another complaint for forcible entry against the samedefendant in the same court, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 1091(reason for filing anothercase: the fence built by petitioner not only intruded upon Lot 85, Batangas Cadastre which is the

subject matter of the first case, but also encroaches upon Lots 57, 59 and 60,BatangasCadastre, which are the subject matter of the case at bar.)

Tarnate moved to dismiss the second case (No. 1091) on the ground of pendency of another actionbetween the same parties for the same cause. Garcia opposed the motion.

MTC denied motion to dismiss

RTCcommanded not to give due course to petitioners petition for prohibition andmandamusto order the dismissal of Civil Case No. 1091.

Hence, the direct recourse to the SC.

ISSUES: whether or not there was a splitting of cause of action in filing the two cases

RULING: While from the strictly technical viewpoint there was a splitting of the cause of actionpursuing the same remedy in two separate complaints notwithstanding the fact that the allegeforcible entry constituted one and the same act, still a realistic and practical approach dictated action taken by the municipal court. It should be remembered that the first complaint wascommenced on 17 August 1964 and had not yet been tried when the second was filed about th

weeks later. The two cases could be tried together as one, or the second complaint could be tras an amendment of the first. Either way the entire controversy between the parties could be

judicially settled, disregarding unessential procedural niceties, especially in the light of the reaexplanation offered by the plaintiff below.

Ada v. Baylon, G.R. No. 182435

FACTS: Petitioners are heirs of the Spouses Baylon who sought for the partition of the Spousesestate. It was alleged that after the death of the spouses, Rita took possession of the parcel ofincluded in the estate and appropriated for herself the income from the same. That from such iRita allegedly purchased two parcels of land Lot No. 47096and half of Lot No. 4706.

In their answer, respondents admitted that there and petitioners are co -owners of the subject

property but only with regards to the 22 out of 43 parcels of land. The rest are owned by Ritaexclusively including Lot No. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706 by which according to them was acby Rita using her own money.

During the pendency of the case, Rita, through a Deed of Donation, conveyed Lot No. 4709 anof Lot No. 4706 to Florante.

Rita died intestate and without any issue. Thereafter, learning of the said donation inter vivos iof Florante, the petitioners filed a Supplemental Pleading, praying that the said donation in favthe respondent be rescinded in accordance with Article 1381(4) of the Civil Code. They further that Rita was already sick and very weak when the said Deed of Donation was supposedly execand, thus, could not have validly given her consent thereto.

RTC declared co-ownership over the 20 parcels of land as heirs of Spouses Baylon (excludinNo. 4709 and half of Lot No. 4706) and directed the partition thereof; declaring a co -ownershi

the properties of Rita Baylon and directing its partition ; and declaring the donation inter vivosrescinded without prejudice to the share of Florante Baylon to the estate of Rita Baylon (RTC fothe donation inter vivos in favor of Florante Baylon was executed to prejudice the plaintiffs righsucceed to the estate of Rita Baylon in case of death)

Florante sought for reconsideration insofar as the rescission but the same was denied by the R
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CAreversed and set aside the decision on the rescission of the Deed of Donation

The petitioners sought reconsideration but it was denied by the CA.

Hence, this petition.

ISSUES: whether the CA erred in ruling that the donation inter vivos of Lot No. 4709 and half of LotNo. 4706 in favor of Florante may only be rescinded if there is already a judicial determination thatthe same actually belonged to the estate of Spouses Baylon

RULING:

On Joinder of Causes of Action:

ajoinder of causes of actionis meant the uniting of two or more demands or rights of action inone action, the statement of more than one cause of action in a declaration. It is the union of two ormore civil causes of action, each of which could be made the basis of a separate suit, in the samecomplaint, declaration or petition. A p laintiff may under certain circumstances join several distinctdemands, controversies or rights of action in one declaration, complaint or petition.

Objective: to avoid a multiplicity of suits

Condition for a Joinder: the joinder shall not include special civil actions governed by specialrules.

Here, there was a misjoinder of causes of action. The action for partition filed by the petitioners

could not be joined with the action for the rescission of the said donation inter vivos in favor ofFlorante. Lest it be overlooked, an action for partition is a special civil action governed by Rule 69 ofthe Rules of Court while an action for rescission is an ordinary civil action governed by the ordinaryrules of civil procedure. The variance in the procedure in the special civil action of partition and in theordinary civil action of rescission precludes their joinder in one complaint or their being tried in asingle proceeding to avoid confusion in determining what rules shall govern the conduct of theproceedings as well as in the determination of the presence of requisite elements of each particularcause of action.

Rules on the Misjoinder of Causes of Action:

1. misjoinder of causes of action is not a ground for dismissal

2. the courts have the power, acting upon the motion of a party to the case or sua sponte, to

order the severance of the misjoined cause of action to be proceeded with separately.

3. However, if there is no objection to the improper joinder or the court did not motu proprio

direct a severance, then there exists no bar in the simultaneous adjudication of all theerroneously joined causes of action

4. the foregoing rule only applies if the court trying the case has jurisdiction over all of thecauses of action therein notwithstanding the misjoinder of the same. If the court trying thecase has no jurisdiction over a misjoined cause of action, then such misjoined cause of actionhas to be severed from the other causes of action, and if not so severed, any adjudicationrendered by the court with respect to the same would be a nullity.

In this case, Florante posed no objection, and neither did the RTC direct the severance of thepetitioners action for rescission from their action for partition. While this may be a patent omisthe part of the RTC, this does not constitute a ground to assail the validity and correctness of idecision. The RTC validly adjudicated the issues raised in the actions for partition and rescissioby the petitioners.

Union Glass Corp. v. SEC, G.R. No. 64013

FACTS: Respondent Hofilea is a stockholder of Pioneer Glass. She obtained loans froDBP. As security for said loan accommodations, Pioneer Glass mortgaged and/or assigned its a

real and personal, to the DBP.

When Pioneer Glass suffered serious liquidity problems such that it could no longer m

Documents

Rules of Court - Rule 2 Case Digests