FIRST DIVISION  EPIFANIO SAN JUAN, JR., G.R. No. 167321Petitioner,Present:- versus - PANGANIBAN, C.J., Chairperson,

YNARES-SANTIAGO,AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,JUDGE RAMON A. CRUZ, CALLEJO, SR., andREGIONAL TRIAL CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.COURT, BRANCH 224,QUEZON CITY and ATTY. Promulgated:TEODORICO A. AQUINO,

Respondents. July 31, 2006x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - x 

D E C I S I O N  CALLEJO, SR., J.: Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Resolution[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 87458 dismissing the Petition for Certiorari with Prayer for Issuance of a Temporary Restraining Order and/or Writ of Preliminary Injunction of petitioner Epifanio San Juan, Jr., as well as its Resolution [2] denying the motion for reconsideration thereof. 

The Antecedents Loreto Samia San Juan executed a Last Will and Testament naming Oscar Casa as one of the devisees therein. Upon Loretos death on October 25, 1988, Atty. Teodorico A. Aquino filed a petition for the probate of the will in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. The case was raffled to Branch 224 of the court and was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 98-36118. While the petition was pending, Oscar Casa died intestate on May 24, 1999. The firm of Aquino, Galang, Lucas, Espinoza, Miranda & Associates entered their appearance as counsel of Federico Casa, Jr., who claimed to be one of the heirs of Oscar Casa and their representative. 

On August 14, 2002, the probate court issued an Order denying the entry of appearance of said law firm, considering that Federico Casa, Jr. was not the executor or administrator of the estate of the devisee, hence, cannot be substituted for the deceased as his representative as required by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. OnNovember 22, 2002, the court issued an order directing Aquino to secure the appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate of Oscar Casa in order that the appointee be substituted in lieu of the said deceased. 

On February 26, 2003, Aquino filed a pleading entitled Appointment of Administrator signed by Candelaria, Jesus, Arlyn, Nestor, Edna, Benhur, Federico, Rafael and Ma.Eden, all surnamed Casa, on February 24, 2003, praying that one of them, Federico Casa, Jr., be designated as administrator of the estate of the deceased and that he be substituted for the deceased. 

NOW THEREFORE, in compliance with the ORDER of the Probate Court, cited above, we, the legal heirs of the deceased OSCAR

CASA, unanimously designate and appoint FEDERICO CASA, JR., as the ADMINISTRATOR of the property to be inherited by the deceased OSCAR CASA, in the WILL of the late LORETO SAMIA SAN JUAN, considering that FEDERICO CASA, JR., is the nearest accessible heir to attend the hearing of the probate of the will and is most competent to assume the responsibilities and the duties of the ADMINISTRATOR. We authorize him to represent us the heirs of the deceased OSCAR CASA, on the hearing of the probate of the will of the testatrix and to perform such duties as might be required by the Probate Court; to take possession of the properties designated in the WILL upon distribution by the appointed ADMINISTRATOR of the Estate of LORETO SAMIA SAN JUAN. (emphasis supplied)[3]

 In compliance with the order of the court, Epifanio San Juan filed a Motion

to Declare Appointment of Administrator As Inadequate or Insufficient. [4] He maintained that the heirs should present an administrator of the estate of Oscar Casa as the representative of the estate in the case. In his reply, Aquino stated that, under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, the heirs of Oscar Casa may be substituted for the deceased without need for appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate. He also claimed that the court is enjoined to require the representative to appear before the court and be substituted within the prescribed period. 

On December 2, 2003, the RTC issued an Order denying the motion of San Juan. Contrary to its Order dated November 22, 2002, the court held that there was, after all, no need for the appointment of an administrator or executor as substitute for the deceased devisee. It is enough, the court declared, that a representative be appointed as provided in Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court.[5]

 San Juan received a copy of the December 2, 2003 Order on December 15,

2003 and filed, on December 30, 2003, a motion for reconsideration thereof. Citing the ruling of this Court in Lawas v. Court of Appeals,[6] he averred that, under Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court, while the court may allow the heirs of the deceased to be substituted in cases of unreasonable delay in the appointment of an executor or administrator, or where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial settlement of the estate, priority is still given to the legal representative of the deceased, that is, the executor or administrator of the estate. Moreover, in case the heirs of the deceased will be substituted, there must be a prior determination by the probate court of who the rightful heirs are. He opined that this doctrine is in line with Article 1058 of the New Civil Code, and the provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 and Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court. In this case, however, the alleged heirs of Oscar Casa did not file any petition for the appointment of an administrator of his estate; hence, Federico Casa, Jr. is not qualified to be appointed as substitute for the deceased devisee. San Juan pointed out that the December 2, 2003 Order of the probate court contravened its August 14, 2002 and November 22, 2002 Orders.[7]

 The motion for reconsideration was denied on February 27, 2004 where the probate court declared that it had carefully evaluated the arguments raised by the parties and found no compelling ground or cogent reason to set aside its December 2, 2003 Order.[8] Petitioner received a copy of the Order on March 18, 2004. 

On May 7, 2004, San Juan filed a Motion to Admit his second motion for reconsideration dated May 6, 2004, appending thereto the December 2, 2003 Order of the RTC.[9] He cited Torres, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,[10] where it was held that the purpose behind the rule on substitution of parties is the protection of the right of

1 | P a g e

every party to due process, to ensure that the deceased party would continue to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. The need for substitution of heirs is based on the right to due process accruing to every party in any proceeding, and the exercise of judicial power to hear and determine a cause presupposes that the trial court acquires jurisdiction over the persons of the parties. San Juan emphasized that it is only in the absence of an executor or administrator that the heirs may be allowed by the court to substitute the deceased party. He averred that the purported heirs simply agreed among themselves to appoint a representative to be substituted for the deceased, which is contrary to the requirement of a prior hearing for the court to ascertain who the rightful heirs are. The Orders of the Court dated December 2, 2003 and February 27, 2004 may be used by purported heirs in order to inherit properties from estates of deceased parties, which will then allow the rules of procedure to be used as an instrument for fraud and undermining due process.[11] San Juan reiterated the rulings of this Court in Dela Cruz v. Court of Appeals[12] and Lawas v. Court of Appeals,[13] that court proceedings conducted or continued without a valid substitution of a deceased party cannot be accorded validity and binding effect. He prayed that the February 27, 2004 Order be reconsidered and a new order be issued as follows: 

(a) declaring the Appointment of Administrator dated February 14, 2003 insufficient or inadequate compliance with the rules of procedure on substitution of a deceased party; (b) directing petitioner to secure from the appropriate court the appointment of an administrator of the estate of the deceased Oscar Casa; and (c) directing that further proceedings in the case be deferred until after the substitution of the deceased Oscar Casa by the court-appointed administrator or executor of his estate. Oppositor prays for other and further reliefs which may be just and equitable.[14]

 On June 11, 2004, the probate court issued an order denying the second motion for reconsideration of San Juan. It noted that the motion merely reiterated the same arguments in his first motion for reconsideration which had already been passed upon. Citing the rulings in Montaano v. Suesa[15] and Riera v. Palmanori,[16] it concluded that there was no need for the appointment of an administrator of the estate of the deceased Oscar Casa at that stage of the proceedings since a legatee is not considered either as an indispensable or necessary party in the probate of a will.[17]

 When San Juan received a copy of the June 11, 2004 Order of the trial court, he filed, on July 23, 2004, a motion for reconsideration thereof. He took exception to the probate courts reliance in the Montaano and Riera cases, as claiming that said rulings were not relevant to the issue of the validity of the appointment of Federico Casa Jr., by the alleged heirs of Oscar Casa, as administrator and substitute for the deceased devisee. He insisted that the cases dealt only with the question of whether or not the probate court can rule on the validity of the provisions of the will; they do not involve the same issue presented by the oppositor, namely, whether or not a substitution of a legatee under the will who died during the probate proceedings may be done by simply submitting an Appointment of Administrator, or whether or not there is a need for a deceased legatee to be substituted by his/her duly appointed legal representative or administrator of his estate.

 San Juan further posited that the estate court, sitting as a probate court, does not only decide on the questions of identity and testamentary capacity of the testator and the due execution of the will; it is likewise charged with the settlement of the estate of the testator after the will has been approved. Thus, the probate court must not only determine the validity of the will, but also the rightful heirs, legatees and devisees for the purpose of settling the estate of the testator.[18]

 Aquino opposed the motion, contending that it was, in fact, a third motion for reconsideration, a prohibited pleading under Section 3, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.[19]

On September 8, 2004, the probate court issued an Order sustaining Aquinos argument and denied the motion for reconsideration of San Juan.[20]

 San Juan, now petitioner, filed a petition for certiorari with the CA on November 22, 2004 for the nullification of the orders issued by the probate court on the following grounds: 

A. THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHICH AMOUNTS TO LACK, OR IN EXCESS, OF JURISDICTION IN RULING THAT THE APPOINTMENT OF ADMINISTRATOR DATED FEBRUARY 14, 2003 MADE BY PRIVATE RESPONDENT IS IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE RULES ON CIVIL PROCEDURE ON PROPER SUBSTITUTION OF PARTIES. B. THE RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHICH AMOUNTS TO LACK, OR IN EXCESS, OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING DUE COURSE TO PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION ON THE GROUND THAT SAID MOTION IS A THIRD MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION WHICH IS A PROHIBITED PLEADING UNDER SEC. 5, RULE 37 OF THE RULES OF COURT.[21]

 On December 1, 2004, the CA dismissed the petition on the ground that it was filed beyond the 60-day period counted from notice to petitioner of the trial courts February 27, 2004 Order. The appellate court declared that the May 6, 2004 motion for reconsideration of petitioner was a pro forma motion because it was a second motion for reconsideration which sought the same relief as the first motion, hence, did not toll the running of the 60-day period.[22] The appellate court cited the ruling of this Court inUniversity of Immaculate Concepcion v. Secretary of Labor and Employment.[23]

 Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution of the CA,

contending that the orders sought to be reconsidered by him were interlocutory, hence, cannot be considered pro forma or forbidden by the Rules of Court. He cited the rulings of this Court in Dizon v. Court of Appeals,[24] Philgreen Trading Construction Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[25] and the cases cited in the latter decision.[26] However, on February 24, 2005, the CA resolved to deny the motion of petitioner.[27]

 Petitioner now seeks relief from this Court, via a petition for review on certiorari, for the reversal of the resolutions of the appellate court. He raises the following issues: 

(A)WHETHER OR NOT THE SIXTY-DAY PERIOD FOR FILING A PETITION FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 OF THE RULES OF COURT IS

2 | P a g e

RECKONED FROM NOTICE OF DENIAL OF THE FIRST MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF AN INTERLOCUTORY ORDER EVEN THOUGH A SECOND AND THIRD MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (WHICH ARE NOT PROHIBITED MOTIONS) OF THE SAME INTERLOCUTORY ORDER HAD BEEN FILED AND WERE LATER DENIED. 

(B)WHETHER OR NOT A PERSON NOMINATED AS ADMINISTRATOR BY PURPORTED HEIRS OF A DEVISEE OR LEGATEE IN A WILL UNDER PROBATE MAY VALIDLY SUBSTITUTE FOR THAT DEVISEE OR LEGATEE IN THE PROBATE PROCEEDINGS DESPITE THE FACT THAT SUCH ADMINISTRATOR IS NOT THE COURT-APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED DEVISEE OR LEGATEE.[28]

 On the first issue, petitioner avers that the reckoning of the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court from the notice of denial of the first motion for reconsideration is applicable only if the subject of the petition is a judgment, final resolution, or order. It does not apply if the subject of the petition is merely an interlocutory order. He points out that the reason for this is that only one motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final order is allowed under Section 5, Rule 37 of the Rules of Court. A second motion for reconsideration of a judgment or final order is a prohibited pleading; hence, the period for filing a petition for certiorari may not be reckoned from notice of denial of such second and prohibited motion for reconsideration. Petitioner asserts that a second (or even a third) motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order is not prohibited; hence, the 60-day period for filing a petition for certiorari may be reckoned from notice of denial of subsequent motions for reconsideration. Petitioner further claims that the Orders dated December 2, 2003, February 27, 2004, June 11, 2004 and September 8, 2004 issued by the RTC are only interlocutory orders. They deal solely with the issue concerning the proper substitution of the deceased Oscar Casa who is one of the devisees and legatees named in the purported will of the testatrix, Loreto San Juan, which is the subject matter of the probate proceedings pending with the respondent court. Said orders did not terminate or finally dispose of the case but left something to be done by the respondent court before the case is finally decided on the merits. The assailed orders do not go into the merits of the probate case, particularly on the due execution and validity of the will. It pertains only to the proper substitution of the parties. Thus, the orders are not final orders from which no second or third motion for reconsideration may be filed.[29] It cannot also be said that the second motion for reconsideration did not toll the running of the reglementary period for filing a petition forcertiorari, considering that there is no prohibition in the filing of a second motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order. Furthermore, there is no intention on the part of petitioner to delay proceedings before the lower court when he filed the third motion for reconsideration, as he only sought to correct the probate courts patently erroneous application of the law. Petitioner emphasizes that he filed the petition for certiorari with the CA in view of the grave abuse of discretion which amounted to lack of or excess of jurisdiction committed by respondent trial court when it wrongfully assumed in its Order denying the third motion for reconsideration that the order sought to be reconsidered is a final order on the merits of the case and that the motion for reconsideration is a third motion for reconsideration of a final order.[30]

 The petition is denied for lack of merit. 

We agree with the ruling of the CA that the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner in the appellate court was time-barred. However, the raison detre for its ruling is incorrect. 

Contrary to the ruling of the CA, the proscription against a pro forma motion applies only to a final resolution or order and not to an interlocutory one. The ruling of this Court in University of Immaculate Concepcion v. Secretary of Labor and Employment[31] involved a final order of the NLRC and not an interlocutory order. In this case, the December 2, 2003 Order of the trial court denying the motion of petitioner to consider insufficient or inadequate respondents compliance with its November 22, 2002 Order is interlocutory. The order does not finally dispose of the case, and does not end the task of the court of adjudicating the parties contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as regards each other but obviously indicates that other things remain to be done. Such order may not be questioned except only as part of an appeal that may eventually be taken from the final judgment rendered in the case.[32] It bears stressing however that while the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner assailing the December 2, 2003 Order of the trial court based on the same grounds as those alleged in his first motion is not  pro forma, such second motion for reconsideration can nevertheless be denied on the ground that it is merely a rehash or a mere reiteration of grounds and arguments already passed upon and resolved by the court. Such a motion cannot be rejected on the ground that a second motion for reconsideration of an interlocutory order is forbidden by law or by the Rules of Court.[33]

 Section 4, Rule 65 of the Rules of Civil Procedure as amended by the resolution of the Court in Bar Matter No. 00-2-03-SC which took effect on September 1, 2000, reads: 

Sec. 4. Where and when petition filed. The petition shall be filed not later than sixty (60) days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution. In case a motion for reconsideration or new trial is timely filed, whether such motion is required or not, the sixty (60) day period shall be counted from notice of the denial of the said motion. The petition shall be filed in the Supreme Court or, if it relates to the acts or omissions of a lower court or of a corporation, board, officer or person, in the Regional Trial Court exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court. It may also be filed in the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in the aid of its appellate jurisdiction, or in the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. If it involves the acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the Court of Appeals. No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except for compelling reason and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days.

 Thus, there are three essential dates that must be stated in a petition for certiorari brought under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court for the nullification of a judgment, resolution or order: (1) the date when notice of the judgment, resolution or order was received; (2) when a motion for a new trial or reconsideration of the judgment, order or resolution was submitted; and (3) when notice of the denial thereof was received by petitioner.

3 | P a g e

 The requirement of setting forth the three (3) dates in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is for the purpose of determining its timeliness, considering that a petition is required to be filed not later than 60 days from notice of the judgment, order or resolution sought to be nullified.[34]

 We agree with the ruling of the CA that the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner with the CA on November 22, 2004 was filed beyond the 60-day period therefor. Petitioner received, on March 18, 2004, the February 27, 2004 Order of the court denying his motion for reconsideration of the December 2, 2003 Order. Petitioner had 60 days from March 18, 2004 or until May 17, 2004 within which to file his petition for certiorari. However, petitioner filed his petition for certiorari with the CA only on November 22, 2004. 

The 60-day period should not be reckoned from petitioners receipt on June 11, 2004 of the denial of his May 7, 2004 second motion for reconsideration. The 60-day period shall be reckoned from the trial courts denial of his first motion for reconsideration, otherwise indefinite delays will ensue.[35]

 We note that the parties articulated their stance in their respective pleadings not only on the timeliness of the petition for certiorari in the CA but also on the validity of the assailed December 2, 2003 Order of the trial court. Ordinarily, in view of the dismissal of the petition because it was time-barred, the Court will no longer delve into and resolve the other issues raised in the petition. However, in this case, we find it appropriate and necessary to resolve once and for all the issue of whether there is a need for the appointment of an administrator of the estate of Oscar Casa, or whether it is enough that he be substituted by his heirs. Section 16, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure reads: 

Sec. 16. Death of party; duty of counsel. Whenever a party to a pending action dies, and the claim is not thereby extinguished, it shall be the duty of his counsel to inform the court within thirty (30) days after such death of the fact thereof, and to give the name and address of his legal representative or representatives. Failure of counsel to comply with this duty shall be a ground for disciplinary action. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint a guardian ad litem for the minor heirs. The court shall forthwith order said legal representative or representatives to appear and be substituted within a period of thirty (30) days from notice. If no legal representative is named by the counsel for the deceased party, or if the one so named shall fail to appear within the specified period, the court may order the opposing party, within a specified time, to procure the appointment of an executor or administrator for the estate of the deceased and the latter shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the deceased. The court charges in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs.

 The rule is a revision of Section 17, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which reads:

 Death of party. After a party dies and the claim is not thereby extinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representative of the deceased to appear and to be substituted for the deceased, within a period of thirty (30) days, or within such time as may be granted. If the legal representative fails to appear within said time, the court may order the opposing party to procure the appointment of a legal representative of the deceased within a time to be specified by the court, and the representative shall immediately appear for and on behalf of the interest of the deceased. The court charges involved in procuring such appointment, if defrayed by the opposing party, may be recovered as costs. The heirs of the deceased may be allowed to be substituted for the deceased, without requiring the appointment of an executor or administrator and the court may appoint guardian ad litem for the minor heirs.[36]

 The second paragraph of the rule is plain and explicit: the heirs may be

allowed to be substituted for the deceased without requiring the appointment of an administrator or executor. However, if within the specified period a legal representative fails to appear, the court may order the opposing counsel, within a specified period, to process the appointment of an administrator or executor who shall immediately appear for the estate of the deceased.[37] The pronouncement of this Court in Lawas v. Court of Appeals[38] (relied upon by petitioner), that priority is given to the legal representative of the deceased (the executor or administrator) and that it is only in case of unreasonable delay in the appointment of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the heirs resort to an extrajudicial settlement of the estate that the court may adopt the alternative of allowing the heirs of the deceased to be substituted for the deceased, is no longer true.[39] In Gochan v. Young,[40] a case of fairly recent vintage, the Court ruled as follows: 

The above-quoted rules, while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits on behalf of the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to cases in which an administrator has already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been instituted, yet no administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait for the appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the administrator appointed would care enough to file a suit to protect the rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and the properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated. The Rules are to be interpreted liberally in order to promote their objective of securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding. They cannot be interpreted in such a way as to unnecessarily put undue hardships on litigants. For the protection of the interests of the decedent, this Court has in previous instances recognized the heirs as proper representatives of the decedent, even when there is already an administrator appointed by the court. When no administrator has been appointed, as in this case, there is all the more reason to recognize the heirs as the proper representatives of the deceased. Since the Rules do not specifically prohibit them from

4 | P a g e

representing the deceased, and since no administrator had as yet been appointed at the time of the institution of the Complaint with the SEC, we see nothing wrong with the fact that it was the heirs of John D. Young, Sr. who represented his estate in the case filed before the SEC. (Emphasis supplied)[41]

 The heirs of the estate of Oscar Casa do not need to first secure the appointment of an administrator of his estate, because from the very moment of his death, they stepped into his shoes and acquired his rights as devisee/legatee of the deceased Loreto San Juan. Thus, a prior appointment of an administrator or executor of the estate of Oscar Casa is not necessary for his heirs to acquire legal capacity to be substituted as representatives of the estate.[42] Said heirs may designate one or some of them as their representative before the trial court. Hence, even on the threshold issue raised in the RTC and in the petition for certiorari in the CA, the assailed order of the RTC is correct. IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED. Costs against petitioner. 

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND SPECIAL DIVISION

G.R. No. 183053               October 10, 2012

EMILIO A.M. SUNTAY III, Petitioner, vs.ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY, Respondent.

R E S O L U T I O N

PEREZ, J.:

The now overly prolonged, all-too familiar and too-much-stretched imbroglio over the estate of Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay has continued. We issued a Decision in the dispute as in Inter Caetera.1 We now find a need to replace the decision.

5 | P a g e

Before us is a Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay (respondent Isabel) of our Decision2 in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010, directing the issuance of joint letters of administration to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III (Emilio III) and respondent. The dispositive portion thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74949 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall issue to both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment by each of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to make a determination and to declare the heirs of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay according to the actual factual milieu as proven by the parties, and all other persons with legal interest in the subject estate. It is further directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.3

We are moved to trace to its roots the controversy between the parties.

The decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay (Cristina) died intestate on 4 June 1990. Cristina was survived by her spouse, Dr. Federico Suntay (Federico) and five grandchildren: three legitimate grandchildren, including herein respondent, Isabel; and two illegitimate grandchildren, including petitioner Emilio III, all by Federico’s and Cristina’s only child, Emilio A. Suntay (Emilio I), who predeceased his parents.

The illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita, were both reared from infancy by the spouses Federico and Cristina. Their legitimate grandchildren, Isabel and her siblings, Margarita and Emilio II, lived with their mother Isabel Cojuangco, following the separation of Isabel’s parents, Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco. Isabel’s parents, along with her paternal grandparents, were involved in domestic relations cases, including a case for parricide filed by Isabel Cojuangco against Emilio I. Emilio I was eventually acquitted.

In retaliation, Emilio I filed a complaint for legal separation against his wife, charging her among others with infidelity. The trial court declared as null and void and of no effect the marriage of Emilio I and Isabel Cojuangco on the finding that:

From February 1965 thru December 1965 plaintiff was confined in the Veterans memorial Hospital. Although at the time of the trial of parricide case (September 8, 1967) the patient was already out of the hospital, he continued to be under observation and treatment.

It is the opinion of Dr. Aramil that the symptoms of the plaintiffs mental aberration classified as schizophernia (sic) had made themselves manifest even as early as 1955; that the disease worsened with time, until 1965 when he was actually placed under expert neuro-psychiatrist (sic) treatment; that even if the subject has shown marked progress, the remains bereft of adequate understanding of right and wrong.

There is no controversy that the marriage between the parties was effected on July 9, 1958, years after plaintiffs mental illness had set in. This fact would justify a declaration of nullity of the marriage under Article 85 of the Civil Code which provides:

Art. 95. (sic) A marriage may be annulled for any of the following causes after (sic) existing at the time of the marriage:

x x x x

(3) That either party was of unsound mind, unless such party, after coming to reason, freely cohabited with the other as husband or wife.

There is a dearth of proof at the time of the marriage defendant knew about the mental condition of plaintiff; and there is proof that plaintiff continues to be without sound reason. The charges in this very complaint add emphasis to the findings of the neuro-psychiatrist handling the patient, that plaintiff really lives more in fancy than in reality, a strong indication of schizophernia (sic).4

Intent on maintaining a relationship with their grandchildren, Federico and Isabel filed a complaint for visitation rights to spend time with Margarita, Emilio II, and Isabel in the same special lower court. The Juvenile Domestic Relations Court in Quezon City (JDRC-QC) granted their prayer for one hour a month of visitation rights which was subsequently reduced to thirty minutes, and ultimately stopped, because of respondent Isabel’s testimony in court that her grandparents’ visits caused her and her siblings stress and anxiety.5

On 27 September 1993, more than three years after Cristina’s death, Federico adopted his illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio III and Nenita.

On 26 October 1995, respondent Isabel, filed before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the issuance of letters of administration over Cristina’s estate docketed as Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. Federico, opposed the petition, pointing out that: (1) as the surviving spouse of the decedent, he should be appointed administrator of the decedent’s estate; (2) as part owner of the mass of conjugal properties left by the decedent, he must be accorded preference in the administration thereof; (3) Isabel and her siblings had been alienated from their grandparents for more than thirty (30) years; (4) the enumeration of heirs in the petition was incomplete as it did not mention the other children of his son, Emilio III and Nenita; (5) even before the death of his wife, Federico had administered their conjugal properties, and thus, is better situated to protect the integrity of the decedent’s estate; (6) the probable value of the estate as stated in the petition was grossly overstated; and (7) Isabel’s allegation that some of the properties are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.

Federico filed a Motion to Dismiss Isabel’s petition for letters of administration on the ground that Isabel had no right of representation to the estate of Cristina, she being an illegitimate grandchild of the latter as a result of Isabel’s parents’ marriage being declared null and void. However, in Suntay v. Cojuangco-Suntay, we categorically declared that Isabel and her siblings, having been born of a voidable marriage as opposed to a void marriage based on paragraph 3, Article 85 of the Civil Code, were legitimate children of Emilio I, who can all represent him in the estate of their legitimate grandmother, the decedent, Cristina.

Undaunted by the set back, Federico nominated Emilio III to administer the decedent’s estate on his behalf in the event letters of administration issues to Federico. Consequently, Emilio III filed an Opposition-In-Intervention, echoing the allegations in his grandfather’s opposition, alleging that Federico, or in his stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate of the decedent, Cristina.

On 13 November 2000, Federico died.

Almost a year thereafter or on 9 November 2001, the trial court rendered a decision appointing Emilio III as administrator of decedent Cristina’s intestate estate:

WHEREFORE, the petition of Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is DENIED and the Opposition-in-Intervention is GRANTED.

6 | P a g e

Accordingly, the Intervenor, Emilio A.M. Suntay, III (sic) is hereby appointed administrator of the estate of the decedent Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay, who shall enter upon the execution of his trust upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P 200,000.00, conditioned as follows:

(1) To make and return within three (3) months, a true and complete inventory;

(2) To administer the estate and to pay and discharge all debts, legatees, and charge on the same, or dividends thereon;

(3) To render a true and just account within one (1) year, and at any other time when required by the court, and

(4) To perform all orders of the Court.

Once the said bond is approved by the court, let Letters of Administration be issued in his favor.6

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed respondent as administratrix of the subject estate:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the assailed decision dated November 9, 2001 of Branch 78, Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan in SPC No. 117-M-95 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the letters of administration issued by the said court to Emilio A.M. Suntay III, if any, are consequently revoked. Petitioner Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay is hereby appointed administratrix of the intestate estate of Cristina Aguinaldo Suntay. Let letters of administration be issued in her favor upon her filing of a bond in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand (P 200,000.00) Pesos.7

As previously adverted to, on appeal by certiorari, we reversed and set aside the ruling of the appellate court. We decided to include Emilio III as co-administrator of Cristina’s estate, giving weight to his interest in Federico’s estate. In ruling for co-administration between Emilio III and

Isabel, we considered that:

1. Emilio III was reared from infancy by the decedent, Cristina, and her husband, Federico, who both acknowledged him as their grandchild;

2. Federico claimed half of the properties included in the estate of the decedent, Cristina, as forming part of their conjugal partnership of gains during the subsistence of their marriage;

3. Cristina’s properties, forming part of her estate, are still commingled with those of her husband, Federico, because her share in the conjugal partnership remains undetermined and unliquidated; and

4. Emilio III is a legally adopted child of Federico, entitled to share in the distribution of the latter’s estate as a direct heir, one degree from Federico, and not simply in representation of his deceased illegitimate father, Emilio I.

In this motion, Isabel pleads for total affirmance of the Court of Appeals’ Decision in favor of her sole administratorship based on her status as a legitimate grandchild of Cristina, whose estate she seeks to administer.

Isabel contends that the explicit provisions of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court on the order of preference for the issuance of letters of administration cannot be ignored and that Article 992 of the Civil Code must be followed. Isabel further asserts that Emilio III had demonstrated adverse interests and disloyalty to the estate, thus, he does not deserve to become a co-administrator thereof.

Specifically, Isabel bewails that: (1) Emilio III is an illegitimate grandchild and therefore, not an heir of the decedent; (2) corollary thereto, Emilio III, not being a "next of kin" of the decedent, has no interest in the estate to justify his appointment as administrator thereof; (3) Emilio III’s actuations since his appointment as administrator by the RTC on 9 November 2001 emphatically demonstrate the validity and wisdom of the order of preference in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court; and (4) there is no basis for joint administration as there are no "opposing parties or factions to be represented."

To begin with, the case at bar reached us on the issue of who, as between Emilio III and Isabel, is better qualified to act as administrator of the decedent’s estate. We did not choose. Considering merely his demonstrable interest in the subject estate, we ruled that Emilio III should likewise administer the estate of his illegitimate grandmother, Cristina, as a co-administrator. In the context of this case, we have to make a choice and therefore, reconsider our decision of 16 June 2010.

The general rule in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent is laid down in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. – If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is not such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.

Textually, the rule lists a sequence to be observed, an order of preference, in the appointment of an administrator. This order of preference, which categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors in the appointment of an administrator, has been reinforced in jurisprudence.8

The paramount consideration in the appointment of an administrator over the estate of a decedent is the prospective administrator’s interest in the estate.9 This is the same consideration

7 | P a g e

which Section 6, Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrator for the estate. The rationale behind the rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, in the alternative, suffer the consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly.10 In all, given that the rule speaks of an order of preference, the person to be appointed administrator of a decedent’s estate must demonstrate not only an interest in the estate, but an interest therein greater than any other candidate.

To illustrate, the preference bestowed by law to the surviving spouse in the administration of a decedent’s estate presupposes the surviving spouse’s interest in the conjugal partnership or community property forming part of the decedent’s estate.11 Likewise, a surviving spouse is a compulsory heir of a decedent12 which evinces as much, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate of a decedent, aside from her share in the conjugal partnership or absolute community property.

It is to this requirement of observation of the order of preference in the appointment of administrator of a decedent’s estate, that the appointment of co-administrators has been allowed, but as an exception. We again refer to Section 6(a) of Rule 78 of the Rules of Court which specifically states that letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving spouse and the next of kin. In addition and impliedly, we can refer to Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court which say that "x x x when an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, x x x."

In a number of cases, we have sanctioned the appointment of more than one administrator for the benefit of the estate and those interested therein.13 We recognized that the appointment of administrator of the estate of a decedent or the determination of a person’s suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment.14

Under certain circumstances and for various reasons well-settled in Philippine and American jurisprudence, we have upheld the appointment of co-administrators: (1) to have the benefits of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented;15 (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased; (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle;16 (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate;17 and when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have another competent person associated with him in the office.18

In the frequently cited Matias v. Gonzales, we dwelt on the appointment of special co-administrators during the pendency of the appeal for the probate of the decedent’s will. Pending the probate thereof, we recognized Matias’ special interest in the decedent’s estate as universal heir and executrix designated in the instrument who should not be excluded in the administration thereof. Thus, we held that justice and equity demands that the two (2) factions among the non-compulsory heirs of the decedent, consisting of an instituted heir (Matias) and intestate heirs (respondents thereat), should be represented in the management of the decedent’s estate.19

Another oft-cited case is Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, where we held that "inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal properties and that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to deprive her of any hand in the administration of the estate prior to the probate of the will would be unfair to her proprietary interests."20

Hewing closely to the aforementioned cases is our ruling in Ventura v. Ventura21 where we allowed the appointment of the surviving spouse and legitimate children of the decedent as co-administrators. However, we drew a distinction between the heirs categorized as next of kin, the nearest of kin in the category being preferred, thus:

In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona while the next of kin are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin" has been defined as those persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the decedent’s property (citations omitted). It is generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is more preponderant, is preferred in the choice of administrator. ‘Among members of a class the strongest ground for preference is the amount or preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred.’" (citations omitted)

As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin of Gregorio Ventura, they are entitled to preference over the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely: Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or persons to be appointed administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in order to represent both interests.22 (Emphasis supplied)

In Silverio, Sr. v. Court of Appeals,23 we maintained that the order of preference in the appointment of an administrator depends on the attendant facts and circumstances. In that case, we affirmed the legitimate child’s appointment as special administrator, and eventually as regular administrator, of the decedent’s estate as against the surviving spouse who the lower court found unsuitable. Reiterating Sioca v. Garcia24 as good law, we pointed out that unsuitableness for appointment as administrator may consist in adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.

In Valarao v. Pascual,25 we see another story with a running theme of heirs squabbling over the estate of a decedent. We found no reason to set aside the probate court’s refusal to appoint as special co-administrator Diaz, even if he had a demonstrable interest in the estate of the decedent and represented one of the factions of heirs, because the evidence weighed by the probate court pointed to Diaz’s being remiss in his previous duty as co-administrator of the estatein the early part of his administration. Surveying the previously discussed cases of Matias, Corona, and Vda. de Dayrit, we clarified, thus:

Respondents cannot take comfort in the cases of Matias v. Gonzales, Corona v. Court of Appeals, and Vda. de Dayrit v. Ramolete, cited in the assailed Decision. Contrary to their claim, these cases do not establish an absolute right demandable from the probate court to appoint special co-administrators who would represent the respective interests of squabbling heirs. Rather, the cases constitute precedents for the authority of the probate court to designate not just one but also two or more special co-administrators for a single estate. Now whether the probate court exercises such prerogative when the heirs are fighting among themselves is a matter left entirely to its sound discretion.

Furthermore, the cases of Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit hinge upon factual circumstances other than the incompatible interests of the heirs which are glaringly absent from the instant case. In Matias this Court ordered the appointment of a special co-administrator because of the applicant's status as the universal heir and executrix designated in the will, which we considered to be a "special interest" deserving protection during the pendency of the appeal. Quite significantly, since the lower court in Matias had already deemed it best to appoint more than

8 | P a g e

one special administrator, we found grave abuse of discretion in the act of the lower court in ignoring the applicant's distinctive status in the selection of another special administrator.

In Corona we gave "highest consideration" to the "executrix's choice of Special Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in her will," for this Court to compel her appointment as special co-administrator. It is also manifest from the decision in Corona that the presence of conflicting interests among the heirs therein was not per se the key factor in the designation of a second special administrator as this fact was taken into account only to disregard or, in the words of Corona, to "overshadow" the objections to the appointment on grounds of "impracticality and lack of kinship."

Finally in Vda. de Dayrit we justified the designation of the wife of the decedent as special co-administrator because it was "our considered opinion that inasmuch as petitioner-wife owns one-half of the conjugal properties and that she, too, is a compulsory heir of her husband, to deprive her of any hand in the administration of the estate prior to the probate of the will would be unfair to her proprietary interests." The special status of a surviving spouse in the special administration of an estate was also emphasized in Fule v. Court of Appeals where we held that the widow would have more interest than any other next of kin in the proper administration of the entire estate since she possesses not only the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent but also a share in the conjugal partnership for which the good or bad administration of the estate may affect not just the fruits but more critically the naked ownership thereof. And in Gabriel v. Court of Appeals we recognized the distinctive status of a surviving spouse applying as regular administrator of the deceased spouse's estate when we counseled the probate court that "there must be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the widow from the administration."

Clearly, the selection of a special co-administrator in Matias, Corona and Vda. de Dayrit was based upon the independent proprietary interests and moral circumstances of the appointee that were not necessarily related to the demand for representation being repeatedly urged by respondents.26(Emphasis supplied)

In Gabriel v. Court of Appeals, we unequivocally declared the mandatory character of the rule on the order of preference for the issuance of letters of administration:

Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of preference in the issuance of letters of administration, it categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator. It would be a grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously set aside and insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and sufficient reason therefor.27

Subsequently, in Angeles v. Angeles-Maglaya,28 we expounded on the legal contemplation of a "next of kin," thus:

Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the law speaks of "next of kin," the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the decedent's property; one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for letters of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action will only result in a multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court acted within bounds when it looked into and passed upon the claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.29

Finally, in Uy v. Court of Appeals,30 we took into consideration the size of, and benefits to, the estate should respondent therein be appointed as co-administrator. We emphasized that where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle, the appointment of co-administrators may be sanctioned by law.

In our Decision under consideration, we zeroed in on Emilio III’s demonstrable interest in the estate and glossed over the order of preference set forth in the Rules. We gave weight to Emilio III’s demonstrable interest in Cristina’s estate and without a closer scrutiny of the attendant facts and circumstances, directed co-administration thereof. We are led to a review of such position by the foregoing survey of cases.

The collected teaching is that mere demonstration of interest in the estate to be settled does not ipso facto entitle an interested person to co-administration thereof. Neither does squabbling among the heirs nor adverse interests necessitate the discounting of the order of preference set forth in Section 6, Rule 78. Indeed, in the appointment of administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator.31 Given Isabel’s unassailable interest in the estate as one of the decedent’s legitimate grandchildren and undoubted nearest "next of kin," the appointment of Emilio III as co-administrator of the same estate, cannot be a demandable right. It is a matter left entirely to the sound discretion of the Court32 and depends on the facts and the attendant circumstances of the case.33

Thus, we proceed to scrutinize the attendant facts and circumstances of this case even as we reiterate Isabel’s and her sibling’s apparent greater interest in the estate of Cristina.

These considerations do not warrant the setting aside of the order of preference mapped out in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court. They compel that a choice be made of one over the other.

1. The bitter estrangement and long-standing animosity between Isabel, on the one hand, and Emilio III, on the other, traced back from the time their paternal grandparents were alive, which can be characterized as adverse interest of some kind by, or hostility of, Emilio III to Isabel who is immediately interested in the estate;

2. Corollary thereto, the seeming impossibility of Isabel and Emilio III working harmoniously as co-administrators may result in prejudice to the decedent’s estate, ultimately delaying settlement thereof; and

3. Emilio III, for all his claims of knowledge in the management of Cristina’s estate, has not looked after the estate’s welfare and has acted to the damage and prejudice thereof.

Contrary to the assumption made in the Decision that Emilio III’s demonstrable interest in the estate makes him a suitable co-administrator thereof, the evidence reveals that Emilio III has turned out to be an unsuitable administrator of the estate. Respondent Isabel points out that after Emilio III’s appointment as administrator of the subject estate in 2001, he has not looked after the welfare of the subject estate and has actually acted to the damage and prejudice thereof as evidenced by the following:

1. Emilio III, despite several orders from the probate court for a complete inventory, omitted in the partial inventories34 he filed therewith properties of the estate35 including several parcels of land, cash, bank deposits, jewelry, shares of stock, motor vehicles,

9 | P a g e

and other personal properties, contrary to Section 1,36paragraph a, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.

2. Emilio III did not take action on both occasions against Federico’s settlement of the decedent’s estate which adjudicated to himself a number of properties properly belonging to said estate (whether wholly or partially), and which contained a declaration that the decedent did not leave any descendants or heirs, except for Federico, entitled to succeed to her estate.37

In compliance to our Resolution dated 18 April 2012 requiring Emilio III to respond to the following imputations of Isabel that:

1. Emilio III did not file an inventory of the assets until November 14, 2002;

2. The inventory Emilio III submitted did not include several properties of the decedent;

3. That properties belonging to the decedent have found their way to different individuals or persons; several properties to Federico Suntay himself; and

4. While some properties have found their way to Emilio III, by reason of falsified documents;38

Emilio III refutes Isabel’s imputations that he was lackadaisical in assuming and performing the functions of administrator of Cristina’s estate:

1. From the time of the RTC’s Order appointing Emilio III as administrator, Isabel, in her pleadings before the RTC, had vigorously opposed Emilio III’s assumption of that office, arguing that "the decision of the RTC dated 9 November 2001 is not among the judgments authorized by the Rules of Court which may be immediately implemented or executed;"

2. The delay in Emilio III’s filing of an inventory was due to Isabel’s vociferous objections to Emilio III’s attempts to act as administrator while the RTC decision was under appeal to the Court of Appeals;

3. The complained partial inventory is only initiatory, inherent in the nature thereof, and one of the first steps in the lengthy process of settlement of a decedent’s estate, such that it cannot constitute a complete and total listing of the decedent’s properties; and

4. The criminal cases adverted to are trumped-up charges where Isabel, as private complainant, has been unwilling to appear and testify, leading the Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44 of Mamburao, Occidental Mindoro, to warn the prosecutor of a possible motu propio dismissal of the cases.

While we can subscribe to Emilio III’s counsel’s explanation for the blamed delay in the filing of an inventory and his exposition on the nature thereof, partial as opposed to complete, in the course of the settlement of a decedent’s estate, we do not find any clarification on Isabel’s accusation that Emilio III had deliberately omitted properties in the inventory, which properties of Cristina he knew existed and which he claims to be knowledgeable about.

The general denial made by Emilio III does not erase his unsuitability as administrator rooted in his failure to "make and return x x x a true and complete inventory" which became proven fact when he actually filed partial inventories before the probate court and by his inaction on two occasions of Federico’s exclusion of Cristina’s other compulsory heirs, herein Isabel and her siblings, from the list of heirs.

As administrator, Emilio III enters into the office, posts a bond and executes an oath to faithfully discharge the duties of settling the decedent’s estate with the end in view of distribution to the heirs, if any. This he failed to do. The foregoing circumstances of Emilio III’s omission and inaction become even more significant and speak volume of his unsuitability as administrator as it demonstrates his interest adverse to those immediately interested in the estate of the decedent, Cristina.

In this case, palpable from the evidence on record, the pleadings, and the protracted litigation, is the inescapable fact that Emilio III and respondent Isabel have a deep aversion for each other.1awp++i1 To our mind, it becomes highly impractical, nay, improbable, for the two to work as co-administrators of their grandmother’s estate. The allegations of Emilio III, the testimony of Federico and the other witnesses for Federico and Emilio III that Isabel and her siblings were estranged from their grandparents further drive home the point that Emilio III bears hostility towards Isabel. More importantly, it appears detrimental to the decedent’s estate to appoint a co-administrator (Emilio III) who has shown an adverse interest of some kind or hostility to those, such as herein respondent Isabel, immediately interested in the said estate.

Bearing in mind that the issuance of letters of administration is simply a preliminary order to facilitate the settlement of a decedent’s estate, we here point out that Emilio III is not without remedies to protect his interests in the estate of the decedent. In Hilado v. Court of Appeals,39 we mapped out as among the allowable participation of "any interested persons" or "any persons interested in the estate" in either testate or intestate proceedings:

x x x x

4. Section 640 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the estate of the deceased "to complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the decedent’s title or interest therein;"

5. Section 1041 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the examination and allowance of the Administrator’s account "to persons interested;"

6. Section 7(b)42 of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice "to the persons interested" before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and

7. Section 1,43 Rule 90, which allows "any person interested in the estate" to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for.44

In addition to the foregoing, Emilio III may likewise avail of the remedy found in Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, to wit:

Sec. 2. Court may remove or accept resignation of executor or administrator. Proceedings upon death, resignation, or removal. – If an executor or administrator neglects to render his account and settle the estate according to law, or to perform an order or judgment of the court, or a duty

10 | P a g e

expressly provided by these rules, or absconds, or becomes insane, or otherwise incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust, the court may remove him, or, in its discretion, may permit him to resign. When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed, the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, unless the court grants letters to someone to act with him. If there is no remaining executor or administrator, administration may be granted to any suitable person.

Once again, as we have done in the Decision, we exercise judicial restraint: we uphold that the question of who are the heirs of the decedent Cristina is not yet upon us. Article 992 of the Civil Code or the curtain bar rule is inapplicable in resolving the issue of who is better qualified to administer the estate of the decedent.

Thus, our disquisition in the assailed Decision:

Nonetheless, it must be pointed out that judicial restraint impels us to refrain from making a final declaration of heirship and distributing the presumptive shares of the parties in the estates of Cristina and Federico, considering that the question on who will administer the properties of the long deceased couple has yet to be settled.

Our holding in Capistrano v. Nadurata on the same issue remains good law:

The declaration of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although the evidence sufficiently shows who are entitled to succeed the deceased. The estate had hardly been judicially opened, and the proceeding has not as yet reached the stage of distribution of the estate which must come after the inheritance is liquidated.

Section 1, Rule 90 of the Rules of Court does not depart from the foregoing admonition:

Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue is made. - x x x. If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.

No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs.45

Lastly, we dispose of a peripheral issue raised in the Supplemental Comment46 of Emilio III questioning the Special Second Division which issued the 18 April 2012 Resolution. Emilio III asseverates that "the operation of the Special Second Division in Baguio is unconstitutional and void" as the Second Division in Manila had already promulgated its Decision on 16 June 2010 on the petition filed by him:

7. The question is: who created the Special Second Division in Baguio, acting separately from the Second Division of the Supreme Court in Manila? There will then be two Second Divisions of the Supreme Court: one acting with the Supreme Court in Manila, and another Special Second Division acting independently of the Second Division of the Supreme Court in Manila.47

For Emilio III’s counsels’ edification, the Special Second Division in Baguio is not a different division created by the Supreme Court.

The Second Division which promulgated its Decision on this case on 16 June 2010, penned by Justice Antonio Eduardo B. Nachura, now has a different composition, with the advent of Justice Nachura’s retirement on 13 June 2011. Section 7, Rule 2 of the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court provides:

Sec. 7. Resolutions of motions for reconsideration or clarification of decisions or signed resolutions and all other motions and incidents subsequently filed; creation of a Special Division. – Motions for reconsideration or clarification of a decision or of a signed resolution and all other motions and incidents subsequently filed in the case shall be acted upon by the ponente and the other Members of the Division who participated in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution.

If the ponente has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself from acting on the motion for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be replaced through raffle by a new ponente who shall be chosen among the new Members of the Division who participated in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution and who concurred therein. If only one Member of the Court who participated and concurred in the rendition of the decision or signed resolution remains, he or she shall be designated as the new ponente.

If a Member (not the ponente) of the Division which rendered the decision or signed resolution has retired, is no longer a Member of the Court, is disqualified, or has inhibited himself or herself from acting on the motion for reconsideration or clarification, he or she shall be replaced through raffle by a replacement Member who shall be chosen from the other Divisions until a new Justice is appointed as replacement for the retired Justice. Upon the appointment of a new Justice, he or she shall replace the designated Justice as replacement Member of the Special Division.

Any vacancy or vacancies in the Special Division shall be filled by raffle from among the other Members of the Court to constitute a Special Division of five (5) Members.

If the ponente and all the Members of the Division that rendered the Decision or signed Resolution are no longer Members of the Court, the case shall be raffled to any Member of the Court and the motion shall be acted upon by him or her with the participation of the other Members of the Division to which he or she belongs.

If there are pleadings, motions or incidents subsequent to the denial of the motion for reconsideration or clarification, the case shall be acted upon by the ponente on record with the participation of the other Members of the Division to which he or she belongs at the time said pleading, motion or incident is to be taken up by the Court. (Emphasis supplied)

As regards the operation thereof in Baguio City, such is simply a change in venue for the Supreme Court's summer session held last April.48

WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration is PARTIALLY GRANTED. Our Decision in G.R. No. 183053 dated 16 June 2010 is MODIFIED. Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay shall solely issue to respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment of a bond to be set by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan, in Special Proceeding Case No. 117-M-95. The Regional Trial Court, Branch 78, Malolos, Bulacan is likewise directed to settle the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay with dispatch. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

11 | P a g e

SECOND DIVISIONALFREDO HILADO, LOPEZ G.R. No. 164108SUGAR CORPORATION, FIRSTFARMERS HOLDING Present:CORPORATION,Petitioners, CARPIO MORALES, J.,*

Acting Chairperson,TINGA,

VELASCO, JR.,- versus - LEONARDO-DE CASTRO,** and

BRION, JJ. THE HONORABLE COURT OFAPPEALS, THE HONORABLE Promulgated:AMOR A. REYES, Presiding Judge,Regional Trial Court of Manila, May 8, 2009Branch 21 and ADMINISTRATRIXJULITA CAMPOS BENEDICTO,Respondents.x----------------------------------------------------------------------------x  

D E C I S I O N 

TINGA, J.:

12 | P a g e

 The well-known sugar magnate Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate

on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino.[1] At the time of his death, there were two pending civil cases against Benedicto involving the petitioners. The first, Civil Case No. 95-9137, was then pending with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioner Alfredo Hilado as one of the plaintiffs therein. The second, Civil Case No. 11178, was then pending with the RTC of Bacolod City, Branch 44, with petitioners Lopez Sugar Corporation and First Farmers Holding Corporation as one of the plaintiffs therein.[2]

 On 25 May 2000, private respondent Julita Campos Benedicto filed with the RTC of Manila a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor, pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court. The petition was raffled to Branch 21, presided by respondent Judge Amor A. Reyes. Said petition acknowledged the value of the assets of the decedent to be P5 Million, net of liabilities.[3] On 2 August 2000, the Manila RTC issued an order appointing private respondent as administrator of the estate of her deceased husband, and issuing letters of administration in her favor.[4] In January 2001, private respondent submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased husband.[5] In the List of Liabilities attached to the inventory, private respondent included as among the liabilities, the above-mentioned two pending claims then being litigated before the Bacolod City courts.[6] Private respondent stated that the amounts of liability corresponding to the two cases as P136,045,772.50 for Civil Case No. 95-9137 and P35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178.[7] Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private respondent to submit a complete and updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the estate.[8]

 On 24 September 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC a Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela,[9] praying that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings. Private respondent opposed the manifestation/motion, disputing the personality of petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings of her husband. Even before the Manila RTC acted on the manifestation/motion, petitioners filed an omnibus motion praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private respondent of the required inventory of the decedents estate.[10] Petitioners also filed other pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of private respondent in her administration of the estate, and assailing the inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and inaccurate.    On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate proceedings.[11] After the Manila RTC had denied petitioners motion for reconsideration, a petition for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. The petition argued in general that petitioners had the right to intervene in the

intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the civil cases they lodged with the Bacolod RTC. On 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision[12] dismissing the petition and declaring that the Manila RTC did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings. The allowance or disallowance of a motion to intervene, according to the appellate court, is addressed to the sound discretion of the court. The Court of Appeals cited the fact that the claims of petitioners against the decedent were in fact contingent or expectant, as these were still pending litigation in separate proceedings before other courts. Hence, the present petition. In essence, petitioners argue that the lower courts erred in denying them the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Roberto Benedicto. Interestingly, the rules of procedure they cite in support of their argument is not the rule on intervention, but rather various other provisions of the Rules on Special Proceedings.[13]

 To recall, petitioners had sought three specific reliefs that were denied by the courts a quo. First, they prayed that they be henceforth furnished copies of all processes and orders issued by the intestate court as well as the pleadings filed by administratrix Benedicto with the said court.[14] Second, they prayed that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof, order the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same. [15] Third, petitioners moved that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administrator of her verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the estate.[16]

 The Court of Appeals chose to view the matter from a perspective solely informed by the rule on intervention. We can readily agree with the Court of Appeals on that point. Section 1 of Rule 19 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an intervenor has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or other disposition of property in the custody of the court x x x While the language of Section 1, Rule 19 does not literally preclude petitioners from intervening in the intestate proceedings, case law has consistently held that the legal interest required of an intervenor must be actual and material, direct and immediate, and not simply contingent and expectant.[17]

 Nonetheless, it is not immediately evident that intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure necessarily comes into operation in special proceedings. The settlement of estates of deceased persons fall within the rules of special proceedings under the Rules of Court,[18] not the Rules on Civil Procedure. Section 2, Rule 72 further provides that [i]n the absence of special provisions, the rules provided for in ordinary actions shall be, as far as practicable, applicable to special proceedings. 

13 | P a g e

We can readily conclude that notwithstanding Section 2 of Rule 72, intervention as set forth under Rule 19 does not extend to creditors of a decedent whose credit is based on a contingent claim. The definition of intervention under Rule 19 simply does not accommodate contingent claims.    Yet, even as petitioners now contend before us that they have the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the reliefs they had sought then before the RTC, and also now before us, do not square with their recognition as intervenors. In short, even if it were declared that petitioners have no right to intervene in accordance with Rule 19, it would not necessarily mean the disallowance of the reliefs they had sought before the RTC since the right to intervene is not one of those reliefs. To better put across what the ultimate disposition of this petition should be, let us now turn our focus to the Rules on Special Proceedings. In several instances, the Rules on Special Proceedings entitle any interested persons or any persons interested in the estate to participate in varying capacities in the testate or intestate proceedings. Petitioners cite these provisions before us, namely: (1) Section 1, Rule 79, which recognizes the right of any person interested to oppose the issuance of letters testamentary and to file a petition for administration; (2) Section 3, Rule 79, which mandates the giving of notice of hearing on the petition for letters of administration to the known heirs, creditors, and to any other persons believed to have interest in the estate; (3) Section 1, Rule 76, which allows a person interested in the estate to petition for the allowance of a will; (4) Section 6 of Rule 87, which allows an individual interested in the estate of the deceased to complain to the court of the concealment, embezzlement, or conveyance of any asset of the decedent, or of evidence of the decedents title or interest therein; (5) Section 10 of Rule 85, which requires notice of the time and place of the examination and allowance of the Administrators account to persons interested; (6) Section 7(b) of Rule 89, which requires the court to give notice to the persons interested before it may hear and grant a petition seeking the disposition or encumbrance of the properties of the estate; and (7) Section 1, Rule 90, which allows any person interested in the estate to petition for an order for the distribution of the residue of the estate of the decedent, after all obligations are either satisfied or provided for. Had the claims of petitioners against Benedicto been based on contract, whether express or implied, then they should have filed their claim, even if contingent, under the aegis of the notice to creditors to be issued by the court immediately after granting letters of administration and published by the administrator immediately after the issuance of such notice.[19] However, it appears that the claims against Benedicto were based on tort, as they arose from his actions in connection with Philsucom, Nasutra and Traders Royal Bank. Civil actions for tort or quasi-delict do not fall within the class of claims to be filed under the notice to creditors required under Rule 86. [20] These actions, being as they are civil, survive the death of the decedent and may be commenced against the administrator pursuant to Section 1, Rule 87. Indeed, the records indicate that the intestate estate of Benedicto, as represented by

its administrator, was successfully impleaded in Civil Case No. 11178, whereas the other civil case[21] was already pending review before this Court at the time of Benedictos death. Evidently, the merits of petitioners claims against Benedicto are to be settled in the civil cases where they were raised, and not in the intestate proceedings. In the event the claims for damages of petitioners are granted, they would have the right to enforce the judgment against the estate. Yet until such time, to what extent may they be allowed to participate in the intestate proceedings? Petitioners place heavy reliance on our ruling in Dinglasan v. Ang Chia,[22] and it does provide us with guidance on how to proceed. A brief narration of the facts therein is in order. Dinglasan had filed an action for reconveyance and damages against respondents, and during a hearing of the case, learned that the same trial court was hearing the intestate proceedings of Lee Liong to whom Dinglasan had sold the property years earlier. Dinglasan thus amended his complaint to implead Ang Chia, administrator of the estate of her late husband. He likewise filed a verified claim-in-intervention, manifesting the pendency of the civil case, praying that a co-administrator be appointed, the bond of the administrator be increased, and that the intestate proceedings not be closed until the civil case had been terminated. When the trial court ordered the increase of the bond and took cognizance of the pending civil case, the administrator moved to close the intestate proceedings, on the ground that the heirs had already entered into an extrajudicial partition of the estate. The trial court refused to close the intestate proceedings pending the termination of the civil case, and the Court affirmed such action. 

If the appellants filed a claim in intervention in the intestate proceedings it was only pursuant to their desire to protect their interests it appearing that the property in litigation is involved in said proceedings and in fact is the only property of the estate left subject of administration and distribution; and the court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil case because of the unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect and have a far reaching consequence in the determination and distribution of the estate. In so taking cognizance of civil case No. V-331 the court does not assume general jurisdiction over the case but merely makes of record its existence because of the close interrelation of the two cases and cannot therefore be branded as having acted in excess of its jurisdiction.

 Appellants' claim that the lower court erred in holding

in abeyance the closing of the intestate proceedings pending determination of the separate civil action for the reason that there is no rule or authority justifying the extension of administration proceedings until after the separate action pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated, cannot be entertained. Section 1, Rule 88, of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that "action to recover real or personal property from the estate or to enforce a lien thereon,

14 | P a g e

and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against the executor or administrator." What practical value would this provision have if the action against the administrator cannot be prosecuted to its termination simply because the heirs desire to close the intestate proceedings without first taking any step to settle the ordinary civil case? This rule is but a corollary to the ruling which declares that questions concerning ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate but claimed by another person should be determined in a separate action and should be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. These rules would be rendered nugatory if we are to hold that an intestate proceedings can be closed by any time at the whim and caprice of the heirs x x x[23] (Emphasis supplied) [Citations omitted]

    It is not clear whether the claim-in-intervention filed by Dinglasan conformed to an action-in-intervention under the Rules of Civil Procedure, but we can partake of the spirit behind such pronouncement. Indeed, a few years later, the Court, citing Dinglasan, stated: [t]he rulings of this court have always been to the effect that in the special proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person, persons not heirs, intervening therein to protect their interests are allowed to do so to protect the same, but not for a decision on their action.[24]

 Petitioners interests in the estate of Benedicto may be inchoate interests, but they are viable interests nonetheless. We are mindful that the Rules of Special Proceedings allows not just creditors, but also any person interested or persons interested in the estate various specified capacities to protect their respective interests in the estate. Anybody with a contingent claim based on a pending action for quasi-delict against a decedent may be reasonably concerned that by the time judgment is rendered in their favor, the estate of the decedent would have already been distributed, or diminished to the extent that the judgment could no longer be enforced against it. In the same manner that the Rules on Special Proceedings do not provide a creditor or any person interested in the estate, the right to participate in every aspect of the testate or intestate proceedings, but instead provides for specific instances when such persons may accordingly act in those proceedings, we deem that while there is no general right to intervene on the part of the petitioners, they may be allowed to seek certain prayers or reliefs from the intestate court not explicitly provided for under the Rules, if the prayer or relief sought is necessary to protect their interest in the estate, and there is no other modality under the Rules by which such interests can be protected. It is under this standard that we assess the three prayers sought by petitioners. The first is that petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and orders issued in connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the administrator of the estate. There is no questioning as to the utility

of such relief for the petitioners. They would be duly alerted of the developments in the intestate proceedings, including the status of the assets of the estate. Such a running account would allow them to pursue the appropriate remedies should their interests be compromised, such as the right, under Section 6, Rule 87, to complain to the intestate court if property of the estate concealed, embezzled, or fraudulently conveyed. At the same time, the fact that petitioners interests remain inchoate and contingent counterbalances their ability to participate in the intestate proceedings. We are mindful of respondents submission that if the Court were to entitle petitioners with service of all processes and pleadings of the intestate court, then anybody claiming to be a creditor, whether contingent or otherwise, would have the right to be furnished such pleadings, no matter how wanting of merit the claim may be. Indeed, to impose a precedent that would mandate the service of all court processes and pleadings to anybody posing a claim to the estate, much less contingent claims, would unduly complicate and burden the intestate proceedings, and would ultimately offend the guiding principle of speedy and orderly disposition of cases. Fortunately, there is a median that not only exists, but also has been recognized by this Court, with respect to the petitioners herein, that addresses the core concern of petitioners to be apprised of developments in the intestate proceedings. In Hilado v. Judge Reyes,[25] the Court heard a petition for mandamus filed by the same petitioners herein against the RTC judge, praying that they be allowed access to the records of the intestate proceedings, which the respondent judge had denied from them. Section 2 of Rule 135 came to fore, the provision stating that the records of every court of justice shall be public records and shall be available for the inspection of any interested person x x x. The Court ruled that petitioners were interested persons entitled to access the court records in the intestate proceedings. We said:

Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records tomonitor prompt compliance with the Rules governing the preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of the Inventory and the submission by the Administratrix of an annual accountingappears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for sum of money against Roberto Benedicto, et al., they have an interest over the outcome of the settlement of his estate. They are in fact "interested persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x[26]

 

 

 

Allowing creditors, contingent or otherwise, access to the records of the intestate proceedings is an eminently preferable precedent than mandating the service of court processes and pleadings upon them. In either case, the interest of the creditor in seeing to it that the assets are being preserved and disposed of in accordance with the rules will be duly satisfied. Acknowledging their right to access the records, rather than entitling them to the service of every court order or pleading no matter how relevant to their individual claim, will be less cumbersome on the intestate court, the administrator and the heirs of the

15 | P a g e

decedent, while providing a viable means by which the interests of the creditors in the estate are preserved. 

Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all interested parties the petitioners as interested parties will be entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be given to interested parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for the application for an order for distribution of the estate residue. After all, even the administratrix has acknowledged in her submitted inventory, the existence of the pending cases filed by the petitioners.    We now turn to the remaining reliefs sought by petitioners; that a deadline be set for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate, and upon submission thereof: the inheritance tax appraisers of the Bureau of Internal Revenue be required to assist in the appraisal of the fair market value of the same; and that the intestate court set a deadline for the submission by the administratrix of her verified annual account, and, upon submission thereof, set the date for her examination under oath with respect thereto, with due notice to them and other parties interested in the collation, preservation and disposition of the estate. We cannot grant said reliefs. Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased within three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an account of his administration within one (1) year from receipt of the letters testamentary or of administration. We do not doubt that there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either duty, but a person whose claim against the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did delay in the performance of these duties in the context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections enforced and available under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent claims against the estate.     

Concerning complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the proper remedy is to seek the removal of the administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82. While the provision is silent as to who may seek with the court the removal of the administrator, we do not doubt that a creditor, even a contingent one, would have the personality to seek such relief. After all, the interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the debt, and the general competence or good faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such purpose.

 All told, the ultimate disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct. Nonetheless, as we have explained, petitioners should not be deprived of their prerogatives under the Rules on Special Proceedings as enunciated in this decision. WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate estate of Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and rights as provided for such interested persons in the Rules on Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons under the Rules on Special Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs. SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

 

G.R. No. 101512 August 7, 1992

NILDA GABRIEL, EVA GABRIEL, EDGAR GABRIEL, GEORGE GABRIEL, ROSEMARIE GABRIEL, MARIBEL GABRIEL, CYNTHIA GABRIEL, RENATO GABRIEL, GERARDO GABRIEL, JOJI ZORAYDA GABRIEL, DANIEL GABRIEL and FELICITAS JOSE-GABRIEL, petitioners, vs.HON COURT OF APPEALS, HON. MANUEL E. YUZON, Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI, and ROBERTO DINDO GABRIEL, respondents.

 

REGALADO, J.:

In its decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 19797 promulgated on August 23, 1991, 1 respondent Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by herein petitioners assailing the orders of the lower court in Special Proceeding No. 88-44589 thereof which effectively sustained the appointment of private respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel as administrator of the estate of the late Domingo Gabriel.

Petitioners' present appeal by certiorari would have this Court set aside that decision of respondent court, hence the need to examine the chronology of

16 | P a g e

antecedent facts, as found by respondent court and detailed hereunder, pertinent to and which culminated in their recourse now before us.

On May 12, 1988, or nine (9) months after Domingo Gabriel died on August 6, 1987, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XI, a petition for letters of administration alleging, among others, that he is the son of the decedent, a college graduate, engaged in business, and is fully capable of administering the estate of the late Domingo Gabriel. Private respondent mentioned eight (8) of herein petitioners as the other next of kin and heirs of the decedent. 2

On May 17, 1988, the court below issued an order 3 setting the hearing of the petition on June 29, 1988, on which date all persons interested may show cause, if any, why the petition should not be granted. The court further directed the publication of the order in "Mabuhay," a newspaper of general circulation, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. No opposition having been filed despite such publication of the notice of hearing, private respondent was allowed to present his evidence ex parte. Thereafter, the probate court issued an order, dated July 8, 1988, appointing private respondent as administrator of the intestate estate of the late Domingo Gabriel on a bond of P30,000.00. 4

Subsequently, a notice to creditors for the filing of claims against the estate of the decedent was published in the "Metropolitan News." As a consequence, Aida Valencia, mother of private respondent, filed a "Motion to File Claim of (sic) the Intestate Estate of Domingo P. Gabriel" alleging that the decision in a civil case between her and the deceased remained unsatisfied and that she thereby had an interest in said estate. 5

On December 12, 1988, private respondent filed for approval by the probate court an "Inventory and Appraisal" placing the value of the properties left by the decedent at P18,960,000.00, which incident was set for hearing on January 16, 1989. 6

On February 2, 1989, petitioners Nilda, Eva, Boy, George, Rosemarie, and Maribel, all surnamed Gabriel, filed their "Opposition and Motion" praying for the recall of the letters of administration issued to private respondent and the issuance of such letters instead to petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter of the deceased, or any of the other oppositors who are the herein petitioners. 7 After some exchanges and on order of the court, petitioners filed an "Opposition to the Petition and Motion," dated May 20, 1989, alleging that (1) they were not duly informed by personal notice of the petition for administration; (2) petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter, should be preferred over private respondent; (3) private respondent has a conflicting and/or adverse interest against the estate because he might prefer the claims of his mother and (4) most of the properties of the decedent have already been relinquished by way of transfer of ownership to petitioners and should not be included in the value of the estate sought to be administered by private respondent. 8

On September 21, 1989, the probate court issued an order denying the opposition of petitioners on the ground that they had not shown any

circumstance sufficient to overturn the order of July 8, 1988, in that (1) no evidence was submitted by oppositor Nilda Gabriel to prove that she is a legitimate daughter of the deceased; and (2) there is no proof to show that the person who was appointed administrator is unworthy, incapacitated or unsuitable to perform the trust as to make his appointment inadvisable under these circumstances. 9 The motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners was likewise denied in an order dated December 22, 1989. 10

From said orders, herein petitioners filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, on the following grounds:

1. The orders of September 21, 1989 and December 22, 1989 are null and void, being contrary to the facts, law and jurisprudence on the matter;

2. Respondent judge, in rendering the aforesaid orders, gravely acted with abuse of discretion amounting to lack and/or excess of jurisdiction, hence said orders are null and void ab initio; and

3. Private respondent is morally incompetent and unsuitable to perform the duties of an administrator as he would give prior preference to the claims of his mother against the estate itself. 11

As stated at the outset, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment dismissing that petition for certiorari on the ground that the appointment of an administrator is left entirely to the sound discretion of the trial court which may not be interfered with unless abused; that the fact that there was no personal notice served on petitioners is not a denial of due process as such service is not a jurisdictional requisite and petitioners were heard on their opposition; and that the alleged violation of the order of preference, if any, is an error of fact or law which is a mistake of judgment, correctible by appeal and not by the special civil action of certiorari. 12

In the petition for review on certiorari at bar, petitioners primarily aver that under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, it is the surviving spouse who is first in the order of preference for the appointment of an administrator. Petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel is the widow and legal surviving spouse of the deceased Domingo Gabriel and should, therefore, be preferred over private respondent who is one of the illegitimate children of the decedent by claimant. Aida Valencia. Secondly, they claim that assuming that the widow is incompetent, the next of kin must be appointed. As between a legitimate and an illegitimate child, the former is preferred, hence petitioner Nilda Gabriel, as the legitimate daughter, must be preferred over private respondent who is an illegitimate son. Thirdly, it is contended that the non-observance or violation per se of the order of preference already constitutes a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

On the other hand, private respondent contends that the court did not commit a grave abuse of discretion in not following the order of preference because the

17 | P a g e

same is not absolute and the choice of who to appoint rests in the sound discretion of the court. He calls attention to the fact that petitioners Nilda Gabriel and Felicitas Jose-Gabriel never applied for appointment despite the lapse of more than nine (9) months from the death of Domingo Gabriel, hence it was not possible for the probate court to have considered them for appointment. Besides, it is not denied that several properties of the deceased have already been relinquished to herein petitioners, hence they would have no interest in applying for letters of administration. Lastly, private respondent submits that it has not been shown that he is incompetent nor is he disqualified from being appointed or serving as administrator.

Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court provides:

Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. — If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

(b) If such husband or wife, as the case may be, or the next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select. (Emphases ours.)

Evidently, the foregoing provision of the Rules prescribes the order of preference in the issuance of letters of administration, categorically seeks out the surviving spouse, the next of kin and the creditors, and requires that sequence to be observed in appointing an administrator. It would be a grave abuse of discretion for the probate court to imperiously set aside and insouciantly ignore that directive without any valid and sufficient reason therefor.

In the appointment of the administrator of the estate of a deceased person, the principal consideration reckoned with is the interest in said estate of the one to be appointed as administrator. This is the same consideration which Section 6 of Rule 78 takes into account in establishing the order of preference in the appointment of administrators for the estate. The underlying assumption behind this rule is that those who will reap the benefit of a wise, speedy and economical administration of the estate, or, on the other hand, suffer the

consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly. 13

This is likewise the same consideration which the law takes into account in establishing the preference of the widow to administer the estate of her husband upon the latter's death, because she is supposed to have an interest therein as a partner in the conjugal partnership. 14 Under the law, the widow would have the right of succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, aside from her share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as much, if not more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin. 15 On this ground alone, petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel, the widow of the deceased Domingo Gabriel, has every right and is very much entitled to the administration of the estate of her husband since one who has greater interest in the estate is preferred to another who has less. 16

Private respondent, however, argues that Felicitas Jose-Gabriel may no longer be appointed administratrix by reason of her failure to apply for letters of administration within thirty (30) days from the death of her husband, as required under the rules.

It is true that Section 6(b) of Rule 78 provides that the preference given to the surviving spouse or next of kin may be disregarded by the court where said persons neglect to apply for letters of administration for thirty (30) days after the decedent's death. However, it is our considered opinion that such failure is not sufficient to exclude the widow from the administration of the estate of her husband. There must be a very strong case to justify the exclusion of the widow from the administration. 17

In the case at bar, there is no compelling reason sufficient to disqualify Felicitas Jose-Gabriel from appointment as administratrix of the decedent's estate. Moreover, just as the order of preference is not absolute and may be disregarded for valid cause 18 despite the mandatory tenor in the opening sentence of Rule 78 for its observance, so may the 30-day period be likewise waived under the permissive tone in paragraph (b) of said rule which merely provides that said letters, as an alternative, "may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors."

On the other hand, we feel that we should not nullify the appointment of private respondent as administrator. The determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of appointment and said judgment is not to be interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in error. 19 Administrators have such a right and corresponding interest in the execution of their trust as would entitle them to protection from removal without just cause. Thus, Section 2 of Rule 82 provides the legal and specific causes authorizing the probate court to remove an administrator.

While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in the removal of an administrator, it must, however, have some fact legally before it in order to justify such removal. There must be evidence of an act or omission

18 | P a g e

on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court which it deems sufficient or substantial to warrant the removal of the administrator. 20 In the instant case, a mere importunity by some of the heirs of the deceased, there being no factual and substantial bases therefor, is not adequate ratiocination for the removal of private respondent. Suffice it to state that the removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate. In addition, the court may also exercise its discretion in appointing an administrator where those who are entitled to letters fail to apply therefor within a given time. 21

On the equiponderance of the foregoing legal positions, we see no reason why, for the benefit of the estate and those interested therein, more than one administrator may not be appointed since that is both legally permissible and sanctioned in practice. 22 Section 6(a) of Rule 78 specifically states that letters of administration may be issued to both the surviving spouse and the next of kin. 23 In fact, Section 2 of Rule 82 contemplates a contingency which may arise when there is only one administrator but which may easily be remediable where there is co-administration, to wit: "When an executor or administrator dies, resigns, or is removed the remaining executor or administrator may administer the trust alone, . . . ." Also, co-administration herein will constitute a recognition of both the extent of the interest of the widow in the estate and the creditable services rendered to and which may further be expected from private respondent for the same estate.

Under both Philippine and American jurisprudence, the appointment of co-administrators has been upheld for various reasons, viz: (1) to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented; 24 (2) where justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of the estate of the deceased; 25 (3) where the estate is large or, from any cause, an intricate and perplexing one to settle; 26 (4) to have all interested persons satisfied and the representatives to work in harmony for the best interests of the estate; 27 and (5) when a person entitled to the administration of an estate desires to have another competent person associated with him in the office. 28

Under the circumstances obtaining herein, we deem it just, equitable and advisable that there be a co-administration of the estate of the deceased by petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel and private respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel. As earlier stated, the purpose of having co-administrators is to have the benefit of their judgment and perhaps at all times to have different interests represented, especially considering that in this proceeding they will respectively represent the legitimate and illegitimate groups of heirs to the estate. Thereby, it may reasonably be expected that all interested persons will be satisfied, with the representatives working in harmony under the direction and supervision of the probate court.

WHEREFORE, the judgment of respondent Court of Appeals is MODIFIED by AFFIRMING the validity of the appointment of respondent Roberto Dindo Gabriel as judicial administrator and ORDERING the appointment of petitioner Felicitas Jose-Gabriel as co-administratrix in Special Proceeding No. 88-4458 of Branch XI, Regional Trial Court of Manila. SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION  

VILMA C. TAN, GERARDO JAKE TAN and GERALDINE TAN, REPRESENTED BY EDUARDO NIERRAS,

Petitioners,

 

- versus -

 

THE HON. FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 12, ORMOC CITY, ROGELIO LIM SUGA and HELEN TAN RACOMA, REPRESENTED BY ROMUALDO LIM,

Respondents.

  G.R. No. 166520  Present:

 YNARES-SANTIAGO,  J.,Chairperson,AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,

CHICO-NAZARIO,

NACHURA, and

REYES, JJ.

 

 

 

 

Promulgated:

 

 

March 14, 2008

x- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

 

 

D E C I S I O N

 

 

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

 

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the Decision[1] dated 29 July 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79335. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals affirmed the Order[2] dated 17 July 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City in SP. PROC. No. 4014-0 denying reconsideration of its Order dated 12 June 2003 whereby it appointed Romualdo D. Lim as special administrator to the estate of the late Gerardo Tan.

19 | P a g e

 

The factual and procedural antecedents of this case are as follows:

 

Gerardo Tan (Gerardo) died on 14 October 2000, leaving no will. On 31 October 2001, private respondents, who are claiming to be the children of Gerardo Tan, filed with the RTC a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration. The Petition was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 4014-0 and was raffled to Branch 12. Petitioners, claiming to be legitimate heirs of Gerardo Tan, filed an Opposition to the Petition.

 

Private respondents then moved for the appointment of a special administrator, asserting the need for a special administrator to take possession and charge of Gerardos estate until the Petition can be resolved by the RTC or until the appointment of a regular administrator. They prayed that their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo D. Lim (Romualdo), be appointed as the special administrator. Petitioners filed an Opposition to private respondents Motion for Appointment, arguing that none of the private respondents can be appointed as the special administrator since they are not residing in the country. Petitioners contend further that Romualdo does not have the same familiarity, experience or competence as that of their co-petitioner Vilma C. Tan (Vilma) who was already acting as de facto administratrix of his estate since his death.

 

On 18 March 2002, Atty. Clinton Nuevo (Nuevo), as court-appointed commissioner, issued directives to Vilma, in her capacity as de facto administratrix, to wit:

 

b.1.) requiring the de facto administratrix Ms. Vilma Tan to deposit in the fiduciary account of the Court all money and or cash at hand or deposited in the bank(s) which rightfully belong to the estate of the decedent within five (5) days from receipt hereof;

 

b.2.) requiring the same administratrix to deposit in the same account the proceeds of all sugarcane harvest or any crop harvest, if any, done in the past or is presently harvesting or about to undertake, which belong to the estate of the decedent;

 

b.3.) relative to the foregoing, the same de facto administratrix is also required to submit a financial report to the Commission as regards the background of the cash at hand or deposited in bank(s), if any, the expenses incurred in

course of her administration and other relevant facts including that of the proceeds of the sugarcane/crop harvest, which submission will be done upon deposit of the foregoing with the court as above-required.[3]

 

More than a year later or on 23 May 2003, the RTC, acting on the private respondents Urgent Ex-parte Motion to resolve pending incident, gave Vilma another 10 days to comply with the directive of Atty. Nuevo. Again, no compliance has been made.

 

Consequently, on 12 June 2003, RTC Judge Eric F. Menchavez issued an Order[4] appointing Romualdo as special administrator of Gerardos Estate, the fallo of which states:

Foregoing considered, the motion for the appointment of a special administrator is hereby GRANTED. Mr. Romualdo D. Lim is hereby appointed as Special Administrator and shall immediately take possession and charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits and estate of the deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards appointed, upon his filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00 and upon approval of the same by this Court.[5]

 

Petitioners filed on 19 June 2003 a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order, claiming that petitioner Vilma should be the one appointed as special administratix as she was allegedly next of kin of the deceased.

 

On 17 July 2003, respondent Judge Francisco Gedorio (Gedorio), in his capacity as RTC Executive Judge, issued an Order[6] denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration.

 

Petitioners instituted with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition assailing the 17 July 2003 Order, again insisting on petitioner Vilmas right to be appointed as special administratix. Petitioners likewise prayed for the issuance of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order (TRO) to enjoin Romualdo from entering the estate and acting as special administrator thereof.

 

On 29 July 2004, the Court of Appeals issued a Decision denying petitioners Petition. On 6 December 2004, the Court of Appeals similarly denied the ensuing Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, to wit:

 

20 | P a g e

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered by us DENYING and DISMISSING the petition filed in this case and AFFIRMING the assailed order in Special Proceeding No. 4014-0.[7]

 

On 22 January 2005, petitioners filed the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari assigning the following errors:

 

I.

 

THE COURT OF APPEALS AND THE COURT A QUO BOTH GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS PLEA TO BE GIVEN PRIMACY IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF THEIR FATHERS ESTATE.

 

 

II.

 

THE COURT OF APPEALS LIKEWISE ERRED IN DENYING PETITIONERS PLEA FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION AND/OR A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS AND THEIR ATTORNEY-IN-FACT.[8]

 

 

On 14 February 2005, this Court issued a Resolution[9] denying the Petition on the ground of late filing, failure to submit an affidavit of service of a copy of the Petition on the Court of Appeals and proof of such service, failure to properly verify the Petition, and failure to pay the deposit for the Salary Adjustment for the Judiciary (SAJ) fund and sheriffs fee. Upon Motion for Reconsideration filed by petitioners, however, this Court issued on 18 July 2005 a Resolution[10] reinstating the Petition.

 

Petitioners contend[11] that they should be given priority in the administration of the estate since they are allegedly the legitimate heirs of the late Gerardo, as opposed to private respondents, who are purportedly Gerardos illegitimate children. Petitioners rely on the doctrine that generally, it is the nearest of kin, whose interest is more preponderant, who is preferred in the choice of administrator of the decedents estate.

 

Petitioners also claim that they are more competent than private respondents or their attorney-in-fact to administer Gerardos estate. Petitioners Vilma and Gerardo Jake Tan (Jake) claim to have lived for a long time and continue to reside on Gerardos estate, while respondents are not even in the Philippines, having long established residence abroad.

 

Petitioners additionally claim that petitioner Vilma has been acting as the administratrix of the estate since Gerardos death on 14 October 2000 and is thus well steeped in the actual management and operation of the estate (which essentially consists of agricultural landholdings).[12]

 

As regards the denial of petitioners plea for the issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction and/or TRO, petitioners argue that such denial would leave Romualdo, private respondents attorney-in-fact, free to enter Gerardos estate and proceed to act as administrator thereof to the prejudice of petitioners.

 

The appeal is devoid of merit.

 

The order of preference petitioners speak of is found in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, which provides:

 

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted.If no executor is named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:

 

(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;

 

(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;

21 | P a g e

 

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other person as the court may select.

 

However, this Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator as provided in the afore-quoted provision does not apply to the selection of a special administrator.[13] The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the next of kin refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of a special administrator, as the appointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable.[14]

 

Not being appealable, the only remedy against the appointment of a special administrator is Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which was what petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals. Certiorari, however, requires nothing less than grave abuse of discretion, a term which implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law.[15]

 

We agree with the Court of Appeals that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent Judge Gedorio in affirming Judge Menchavezs appointment of Romualdo as special administrator. Judge Menchavez clearly considered petitioner Vilma for the position of special administratrix of Gerardos estate, but decided against her appointment for the following reasons:

 

Atty. Clinton C. Nuevo, in his capacity as court appointed commissioner, directed oppositor Vilma Tan in the latters capacity as de fact[o] administratrix, to deposit in the fiduciary account of the court all money and cash at hand or deposited in the banks which rightfully belong to the estate within five days from receipt of the directive. Oppositor Vilma Tan was likewise directed to deposit in the same account the proceeds of all sugarcane harvest or any crop from the estate of the decedent. She was likewise directed to submit a financial report as regards the background of the cash on hand, if any, the expenses incurred in the course of her administration. The directive was issued by Atty. Nuevo on March 18, 2002 or more than a year ago. OnMay 23, 2003, this Court, acting on the urgent ex parte motion to resolve pending incident, gave Vilma Tan another ten days to comply with the directive of Atty. Nuevo. Again, no compliance has been made.

 

This Court is called upon to preserve the estate of the late Gerardo Tan for the benefit of all heirs be that heir is (sic) the nearest kin or the farthest kin. The actuation of oppositor Vilma Tan does not satisfy the requirement of a special administrator who can effectively and impartially administer the estate of Gerardo Tan for the best interest of all the heirs. [16] (Emphases supplied.)

 

Assuming for the sake of argument that petitioner Vilma is indeed better suited for the job as special administratrix, as opposed to Romualdo, who was actually appointed by the court as special administrator of Gerardos estate, the latters appointment, at best, would constitute a mere error of judgment and would certainly not be grave abuse of discretion. An error of judgment is one which the court may commit in the exercise of its jurisdiction, and which error is reviewable only by an appeal. On the other hand, an error of jurisdiction is one in which the act complained of was issued by the court, officer or a quasi-judicial body without or in excess of jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion which is tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.[17] The Court of Appeals could not have reversed a mere error of judgment in a Certiorari petition.

 

Furthermore, petitioners were not able to sufficiently substantiate their claim that their co-petitioner Vilma would have been the more competent and capable choice to serve as the special administratrix of Gerardos estate. Contrary to petitioners bare assertions, both the RTC and the Court of Appeals found that the documented failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the reportorial requirements after the lapse of a considerable length of time certainly militates against her appointment.

 

We find immaterial the fact that private respondents reside abroad, for the same cannot be said as regards their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo, who is, after all, the person appointed by the RTC as special administrator. It is undisputed that Romualdo resides in the country and can, thus, personally administer Gerardos estate.

 

If petitioners really desire to avail themselves of the order of preference provided in Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, so that petitioner Vilma as the supposed next of kin of the late Gerardo may take over administration of Gerardos estate, they should already pursue the appointment of a regular administrator and put to an end the delay which necessitated the appointment of a special administrator. The appointment of a special administrator is justified only when there is delay in granting letters, testamentary (in case the decedent leaves behind a will) or administrative (in the event that the decedent leaves behind no will, as in the Petition at bar) occasioned by any cause.[18] The principal object of the appointment of a

22 | P a g e

temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass into the hands of a person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs.[19]

 

In the case at bar, private respondents were constrained to move for the appointment of a special administrator due to the delay caused by the failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the directives of the court-appointed commissioner. It would certainly be unjust if petitioner Vilma were still appointed special administratix, when the necessity of appointing one has been brought about by her defiance of the lawful orders of the RTC or its appointed officials. Petitioners submit the defense that petitioner Vilma was unable to comply with the directives of the RTC to deposit with the court the income of Gerardos estate and to provide an accounting thereof because of the fact that Gerardos estate had no income. This defense is clearly specious and insufficient justification for petitioner Vilmas non-compliance. If the estate truly did not have any income, petitioners should have simply filed a manifestation to that effect, instead of continuing to disregard the courts orders.

 

Finally, as we are now resolving the case in favor of private respondents, there is no longer any need to discuss petitioners arguments regarding the denial by the appellate court of their prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction and/or TRO.

 

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari is DENIED. The Decision dated 29 July 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79335 affirming the Order dated 17 July 2003 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Ormoc City, in SP. PROC. No. 4014-0 denying reconsideration of its Order dated 12 June 2003, whereby it appointed Romualdo D. Lim as special administrator of the estate of Gerardo Tan, is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-59821 August 30, 1982

ROWENA F. CORONA, petitioner, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS, ROMARICO G. VITUG, AVELINO L. CASTILLO, NICANOR CASTILLO, KATHLEEN D. LUCHANGCO, GUILLERMO

LUCHANGCO, JR., ANTONIO LUCHANGCO, RODOLFO TORRES, REYNALDO TORRES and PURISIMA T. POLINTAN, respondents.

N.J. Quisumbing for petitioner.

Jose F. Tiburcio for respondents Luchangcos, Torres and Polintan.

Ricardo S. Inton for respondents Castillos.

Rufino V. Javier for respondent Vitug.

&

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:1äwphï1.ñët

A Petition to review on certiorari the judgment of the Court of Appeals 1 (CA-G.R. No. 12404-SP) of August 11, 1981, upholding the appointment by the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig, Branch VI, of respondent Romarico G. Vitug, as Special Administrator, although in the Will of his deceased wife, she had disinherited him, as well as the Appellate Court's Resolution of February 17, 1982 denying reconsideration.

On November 10, 1980, Dolores Luchangco Vitug died in New York, U.S.A., leaving two Wills: one, a holographic Will dated October 3, 1980, which excluded her husband, respondent Romarico G. Vitug, as one of her heirs, and the other, a formal Will sworn to on October 24, 1980, or about three weeks thereafter, which expressly disinherited her husband Romarico "for reason of his improper and immoral conduct amounting to concubinage, which is a ground for legal separation under Philippine Law"; bequeathed her properties in equal shares to her sisters Exaltacion L. Allarde, Vicenta L. Faustino and Gloria L. Teoxon, and her nieces Rowena F. Corona and Jennifer F. Way; and appointed Rowena F. Corona, herein petitioner, as her Executrix.

On November 21, 1980, Rowena filed a petition for the probate of the Wills before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI (Spec.Procs. No. 9398), and for the appointment of Nenita P. Alonte as Administrator because she (Rowena) is presently employed in the United Nations in New York City.

On December 2, 1980, upon Rowena's urgent Motion, the Probate Court appointed Nenita P. Alonte as Special Administratrix, upon a P100,000.00 bond.

On December 12, 1980, the surviving husband, Romarico Vitug, filed an "Opposition and Motion" and prayed that the Petition for Probate be denied and that the two Wills be disallowed on the ground that they were procured through undue and improper pressure and influence, having been executed at a time when the decedent was seriously ill and under the medical care of Dr. Antonio P. Corona,, petitioner's husband, and that the holographic Will impaired his legitime. Romarico further prayed for his appointment as Special Administrator because the Special Administratrix appointed is not related to the heirs and has

23 | P a g e

no interest to be protected, besides, the surviving spouse is qualified to administer.

Oppositions to probate with almost Identical arguments and prayers were also filed by respondent (1) Avelino L. Castillo and Nicanor Castillo, legitimate children of Constancia Luchangco, full blood sister of the decedent; (2) Guillermo Luchangco, full blood brother of the decedent; (3) Rodolfo Torres, Reynaldo Torres, and Purisima Torres Polintan, all legitimate children of the deceased Lourdes Luchangco Torres, full blood sister of the decedent.

On December 18, 1980, Nenita P. Alonte posted her bond and took her oath of office before a Notary Public.

On February 6, 1981, the Probate Court set aside its Order of December 2, 1980 appointing Nenita as Special Administratrix, and appointed instead the surviving husband, Romarico as Special Administrator with a bond of P200,000.00, essentially for the reasons that under Section 6, Rule 78, of the Rules of Court, the surviving spouse is first in the order of preference for appointment as Administrator as he has an interest in the estate; that the disinheritance of the surviving spouse is not among the grounds of disqualification for appointment as Administrator; that the next of kin is appointed only where the surviving spouse is not competent or is unwilling to serve besides the fact that the Executrix appointed, is not the next of kin but merely a niece, and that the decedent's estate is nothing more than half of the unliquidated conjugal partnership property.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration with an alternate Motion for the appointment of co-Special Administrators to which private respondents filed their Opposition. Reconsideration having been denied, petitioner resorted to a Petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals to annul, for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion, the Order setting aside the appointment of Nenita as Special Administratrix and appointing in her stead the surviving spouse Romarico.

On August 11, 1981, the Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Probate Court and dismissed the Petition stating that the Probate Court strictly observed the order of preference established by the Rules; that petitioner though named Executrix in the alleged Will, declined the trust and instead nominated a stranger as Special Administrator; that the surviving husband has legitimate interests to protect which are not adverse to the decedent's estate which is merely part of the conjugal property; and that disinheritance is not a disqualification to appointment as Special Administrator besides the fact that the legality of the disinheritance would involve a determination of the intrinsic validity of the Will which is decidedly premature at this stage.

On March 24, 1982, petitioner elevated the case to this Court for review on certiorari after her Motion for Reconconsideration was turned down by the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner stresses that the order of preference laid down in the Rules should not be followed where the surviving spouse is expressly disinherited, opposes probate, and clearly possesses an adverse interest to the estate which would disqualify him from the trust.

The three sets of Oppositors, all respondents herein, in the Comments which they respectively filed, essentially claimed lack of grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Appellate Court in upholding the appointment of the surviving husband as Special Administrator; that certiorari is improper and unavailing as the appointment of a Special Administrator is discretionary with the Court and is unappealable; that co-administratorship is impractical and unsound and as between the surviving husband, who was responsible for the accumulation of the estate by his acumen and who must be deemed to have a beneficial interest in the entire estate, and a stranger, respondent Court had made the correct choice; and that the legality of the disinheritance made by the decedent cannot affect the appointment of a Special Administrator.

This Court, in resolving to give due course to the Petition taking into account the allegations, arguments and issues raised by the parties, is of the considered opinion that petitioner's nominee, Nenita F. Alonte, should be appointed as co-Special Administrator. The executrix's choice of Special Administrator, considering her own inability to serve and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in her Will (Annex "A-1"), is entitled to the highest consideration. Objections to Nenita's appointment on grounds of impracticality and lack of kinship are over-shadowed by the fact that justice and equity demand that the side of the deceased wife and the faction of the surviving husband be represented in the management of the decedent's estate. 2

En passant, it is apropos to remind the Special Administrators that while they may have respective interests to protect, they are officers of the Court subject to the supervision and control of the Probate Court and are expected to work for the best interests of the entire estate, its smooth administration, and its earliest settlement.

WHEREFORE, modifying the judgment under review, the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI, is hereby ordered, in Special Proceedings No. 9398 pending before it, to appoint Nenita F. Alonte as co-Special Administrator, properly bonded, who shall act as such jointly with the other Special Administrator on all matters affecting the estate.

No costs.

24 | P a g e

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-17759           December 17, 1962

ISABEL V. SAGUINSIN, petitioner-appellant, vs.DIONISIO LINDAYAG, ET AL., oppositors-appellees.

Gatchalian and Sison for petitioner-appellant.

Delgado, Flores, Macapagal and Dizon for oppositors-appellees.

DIZON, J.:

On November 10, 1959 Maria V. Lindayag died intestate in Olongapo, Zambales. On May 27, 1960 her sister, Isabel V. Saguinsin filed with the Court of First Instance of said province a verified petition for the issuance in her favor of letters of administration over the estate of said deceased, alleging, among other things, that the latter left real and personal properties situated in the Provinces of Zambales and Bulacan worth approximately P100,000.00; that the names, ages and residences of her surviving heirs were: (1) Dionisio Lindayag, 60 years of age, surviving husband, residing at Olongapo, Zambales, (2) Isabel V. Saguinsin 54 years of age, sister of the deceased, residing at Hagonoy, Bulacan (3) Aurea V. Sacdalan, 46 years of age, sister of the deceased, and (4) Ines V. Calayag, 70 years of age, sister of the deceased, both residing at Paombong, Bulacan; and that, as far as petitioner knew, the decedent left no debts at the time of her death.

On June 21, 1960 Dionisio V. Lindayag, the surviving spouse, in his behalf and in representation of the minors Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag, filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground lack of interest in the estate, she being neither heir nor a creditor thereof. The motion alleged that the late Maria V. Lindayag was survived by her husband — the movant — and their legally adopted minor children named Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag the decedent having left no legitimate natural or illegitimate child. A certified true copy of the decision of the Justice of the Peace of Olongapo, Zambales, dated July 6, 1953 decreeing the adoption of said minors the decedent and her husband was attached to the motion.

In opposing the motion to dismiss petitioner argued that only the facts alleged in the petition should be considered in determining its sufficiency.lawphil.net

On July 28, 1960, after due hearing on the motion aforesaid, the Court issued the following order of dismissal:

It appearing that the herein petitioner is only a sister of the deceased Maria V. Lindayag; that the deceased is survived by her husband and her three (3) adopted children named: Jesus, Concepcion and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag were adopted by the deceased on July 6, 1953; that the herein petitioner is obviously not an heir and has no interest in estate; and that the surviving heirs oppose the instant petition on the ground that they want to settle the estate extra-judicially among them to avoid unnecessary expenses in prosecuting this case, the Court finds the oppositors' opposition to be well taken.

WHEREFORE, let this case be dismissed. No pronouncement as to costs.

Petitioner's motion for the reconsideration of the above order having been denied, she took the present appeal.

The question to be resolved in this appeal is whether petitioner is "an interested person" in the estate of deceased Maria V. Lindayag.

25 | P a g e

According to Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, a petition for letters of administration must be filed an "interested person". An interested party has defined in this connection as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor (Intestate Estate of Julio Magbanwa, 40 O.G. 1171). And it is well settled in this jurisdiction that in civil actions as well as special proceedings, the interest required in order that a person may be a party thereto must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. (Trillana vs. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-3378, August 22, 1951; Espinosa vs. Barrios, 70 Phil. 311)

Petitioner's interest in the estate of the deceased Maria V. Lindayag was disputed, through a motion to dismiss her petition, by the surviving spouse on the ground that said deceased was survived by him and by three legally adopted children — thus excluding petitioner as an heir. In the course of the hearing held in connection with said motion, evidence was introduced in support thereof which, according to the lower court, established that said deceased was survived not only by her husband but by three legally adopted children named Jesus, Concepcion, and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag.

Upon these facts — which petitioner does not dispute — it is manifest that she is not an heir of her deceased sister and, therefore, has no material and direct interest in her estate.

Petitioner's view that when a motion to dismiss a complaint or a petition is filed, only the facts alleged in the complaint or petition may be taken into account is not entirely correct. To the contrary, the rule is that at said hearing said motion may be proved or disproved in accordance with the rules of evidence, and it has been held that for that purpose, the hearing should be conducted as an ordinary hearing; and that the parties should be allowed to present evidence, except when the motion is based on the failure of the complaint or of the petition to state a cause of action (Asejo vs. Leonoso, 44 O. G. No. 10, 3832). In the present case, the motion to dismiss the petition was grounded on petitioner's lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings which, as already stated heretofore, was fully substantiated by the evidence presented during the hearing.

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the order appealed from is affirmed, with costs.

26 | P a g e

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

THIRD DIVISION

 

G.R. No. L-44888 February 7, 1992

PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.FIDEL P. DUMLAO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Agusan Del Norte and Butuan City, BONIFACIO CANONOY, Judicial Administrator of the Estate of Regino Canonoy, CARMEN VDA. DE CANONOY, TEODULO CANONOY, REGINO CANONOY, JR., MARIANITA CANONOY GUINTO and GLORIA CANONOY BASA, respondents.

Dominguez & Paderna Law Offices Co. for petitioner.

Wenceslao B. Rosales for private respondents.

 

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

Brought to focus in this petition are the following issues: (a) whether the jurisdictional facts that need to be stated in a petition for letters of administration under Section 2(a), Rule 79 of the Rules of Court include the specific assertion that the petitioner therein is an "interested person," and (b) whether the administration court may properly and validly dismiss a petition for letters of administration filed by one who is not an "interested person" after having appointed an heir of the decedent as administrator of the latter's intestate estate and set for pre-trial a claim against the said estate

Ricardo M. Gonzalez, District Manager of Shell Philippines, Inc. for Mindanao (hereinafter referred to as Shell), filed on 8 January 1973 a petition entitled "In the Matter of the Intestate Estate of the Deceased Regino Canonoy, Petition for Letters of Administration, Ricardo M. Gonzalez, Petitioner" with the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, praying therein that he be appointed judicial administrator of the estate of the deceased Regino Canonoy. The case was docketed as SP PROC. No. 343 and was raffled to Branch II of the trial court.

On 27 January 1973, Judge Vicente B. Echavez, Jr. of Branch II issued an Order (1) setting the hearing on the petition for 23 March 1973 at 8:30 a.m.; (2) directing that the order be published, at petitioner's expense, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper with a nationwide circulation published regularly by a government agency or entity, or in any newspaper published and edited in any part of the country which is in operation during the existence of the present national emergency and of general circulation in the province of Agusan del Norte and in Butuan City, if any there be; and (3) ordering that copies of the order be sent by registered mail or personal delivery, at the petitioner's expense, to each of all the known heirs of the deceased Regino Canonoy, within the periods prescribed by Section 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court. 1

In their Opposition to the issuance of letters of administration to Gonzalez filed on 21 March 1973, 2 private respondents, who are heirs of Regino Canonoy, allege that: Gonzalez "is a complete stranger to the intestate estate" of Regino Canonoy; he is "not even a creditor" of the estate; he is a resident of Davao City and thus if appointed as administrator of the estate, the bulk of which is located in Butuan City, "he would not be able to perform his duties efficiently;" and he is an employee of Shell Philippines, Inc., an alleged creditor of the estate, and so "he would not be able to properly and effectively protect the interest of the estate in case of conflicts." They, however, "propose" and pray that since Bonifacio Canonoy, one of Regino's sons, enjoys preference in appointment pursuant to Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court, he should "be appointed administrator of the said intestate estate and the corresponding letters of administration be issued in his favor."

On 25 July 1973, after due hearing, the trial court appointed Bonifacio Canonoy as administrator of the intestate estate of Regino Canonoy, 3 having found him competent to act as such. None of the parties moved to reconsider this order or appealed therefrom. On 23 November 1973, herein petitioner Shell, then known as Shell Philippines, Inc., filed its claim against the estate of the deceased Regino Canonoy. The duly appointed administrator, Bonifacio Canonoy, filed on 9 October 1974 a Motion to Dismiss the claim of Shell 4 which the latter contested by filing an Opposition. Shell likewise filed an amended claim against the estate. 5 On 12 May 1975, the administrator filed his Reply to the Opposition to Motion to Dismiss. 6 On 25 May 1975, he filed an Answer to the amended claim filed by Shell. 7 In the said Answer, he interposes compulsory counterclaims for the estate in the amount of P659,423.49 representing rentals for land occupied by the Shell Service Station, lighting allowances, allowances for salaries and wages of service

27 | P a g e

attendants, sales commission due the deceased Regino Canonoy and reasonable attorney's fees. Petitioner filed an answer to the Counterclaim.

Upon joinder of the issues on Shell's claim, the trial court, this time presided over by respondent Judge Fidel P. Dumlao, set the pre-trial for 15 August 1975. 8 This was later re-set to 23 September 1975. 9

On 18 August 1975, petitioner filed a motion to require the judicial administrator to file an inventory of the properties of the deceased. 10

At the pre-trial held on 23 September 1975, counsel for the administrator requested for time to file a Motion to Dismiss the case. In an Order issued on that date, the court granted him ten (10) days to file the motion; opposing counsel was likewise given ten (10) days from receipt of the same to file whatever pleading he may deem proper to file, after which the motion shall be deemed submitted for resolution. 11 The motion was filed on 30 September 1975. It alleges that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject matter and nature thereof because the petitioner therein, Mr. Gonzalez, is not the "interested person" contemplated by Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court. 12 Shell filed its Opposition to the Motion on 16 October 1975 13 on the ground that the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over the case to issue letters of administration as the interest of Gonzalez in the estate is not a jurisdictional fact that needs to be alleged in the petition. If at all, Gonzalez' lack of interest in the estate of the deceased only affected his competence to be appointed administrator. In an Order dated 8 November 1975, respondent Judge, finding the motion to be well-taken and meritorious, dismissed the case. 14 The motion for its reconsideration having been denied by the trial court on 23 January 1976, 15 Shell filed the instant petition which it denominated as a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

In the Resolution dated 6 December 1976, this Court required the respondents to comment on the petition; 16 the latter complied with the same on 31 January 1977. 17 Thereafter, on 7 February 1977, this Court resolved, inter alia, to treat the petition for review as a special civil action under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court and require the parties to submit their respective Memoranda; 18 petitioner filed its Memorandum on 4 April 1977 19 while the respondents filed theirs on 3 June 1977. 20

The petition is impressed with merit; it must perforce be granted.

Under the peculiar circumstances of the case, the trial court clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed SP PROC. No. 343 after having set for pre-trial petitioner's amended claim against the estate. That said dismissal was predicated solely on the ground that petitioner therein, Ricardo Gonzalez, is not an "interested person," and that, since such interest is a jurisdictional requirement, the trial court acquired no jurisdiction over the case, serves only to compound the error.

1. Section 2, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 2. Contents of petition of letters of administration. — A petition for letters of administration must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:

(a) The jurisdictional facts;

(b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the creditors, of the decedent;

(c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;

(d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.

But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.

xxx xxx xxx

The jurisdictional facts alluded to are: the death of the testator, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate court is sitting or, if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, his having left his estate in such province. 21 These facts are amply enumerated in the petition filed by Gonzalez. 22 The fact of death of the intestate and of his residence within the country are foundation facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in the state, and none came into it afterwards, no jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of administration in any county. 23 Clearly, the allegation that a petitioner seeking letters of administration is an interested person, does not fall within the enumeration of jurisdictional facts. Of course, since the opening sentence of the section requires that the petition must be filed by an interested person, it goes without saying that a motion to dismiss may lie not on the basis of lack of jurisdiction on the part of the court, but rather on the ground of lack of legal capacity to institute the proceedings.

This is precisely what happened in Saguinsin vs. Lindayag, 24 where the dismissal of a petition for letters of administration was affirmed because the petitioner "is not an heir of her deceased sister and, therefore, has no material and direct interest in her estate." 25 In the said case, this Court defined an interested party as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor; this interest must be material and direct, not merely indirect or contingent. 26

The Saguinsin doctrine is not, however, without exception. An objection to a petition for letters of administration on that ground may be barred by waiver or estoppel.

Private respondents herein did not file a motion to dismiss the petition filed by Gonzalez on the ground of lack of capacity to sue; 27 they instead filed an Opposition which, unfortunately, did not ask for the dismissal of the petition but merely opposed the issuance of letters of administration in favor of Gonzalez because, among other reasons, he is a

28 | P a g e

stranger to the estate. The Opposition also proposed that Bonifacio Canonoy, one of the children of the deceased Regino Canonoy, be appointed administrator of the latter's intestate estate. The failure to move for a dismissal amounted to a waiver of the above-mentioned ground. Section 8, Rule 15 of the Rules of Court provides that:

A motion attacking a pleading or a proceeding shall include all objections then available, and all objections not so included shall be deemed waived.

However, if a motion to dismiss is not filed, as what obtains in this case, any of the grounds available for such a motion, except for improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense, and a preliminary hearing thereon may be had as if a motion to dismiss had been filed. 28 Excepted from the above rules are the following grounds: (a) failure to state a cause of action which may be alleged in a later pleading if one is permitted, or by a motion for judgment on the pleadings, or at the trial on the merits; and (b) lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action, 29 subject to the exception as hereinafter discussed.

In Insurance Company of North America vs. C.F. Sharp & Co., Inc., 30 this Court ruled:

Finally, appellant would contend that plaintiff has no capacity to sue and is not the real party in interest. It is now too late to raise these objections here. These should have been asserted in the motion to dismiss filed by defendant below. Not having been included therein, they are now barred by the rule on omnibus motion.

By proposing that Bonifacio Canonoy be appointed as administrator instead of Mr. Gonzalez, private respondents have in fact approved or ratified the filing of the petition by the latter.

In Eusebio vs. Valmores, 31 We held that:

xxx xxx xxx

The evidence submitted in the hearing does not satisfactorily prove that the petitioner was legally adopted; hence, he did not have any interest in the properties of the deceased Rosalia Saquitan. Under ordinary circumstances, such defect would authorize the dismissal of the proceedings especially in view of the fact that the surviving spouse of Rosalia Saquitan had filed an affidavit of adjudication under the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules. Counsel for Domingo Valmores, however, had not objected to the application for the appointment of an administrator; he only objected to the appointment of the said stranger Eulogio Eusebio as administrator, claiming to have the right as surviving spouse to be appointed as such administrator. By this act of Domingo Valmores, surviving spouse of the deceased, therefore, the fatal defect in the petition may be considered, as cured. In other words, the filing of the petition for the appointment of an administrator may be considered as having been ratified by the surviving husband, Domingo Valmores, and for this reason the proceedings may not be dismissed.

2. There can be no dispute that the trial court had acquired jurisdiction over SP PROC. No. 343. Immediately after the filing of the case, the trial court complied with Section 3, Rule 79 of the Rules of Court by issuing the Order dated 27 January 1973. At the initial hearing on 25 July 1973, petitioner Gonzalez established the jurisdictional requirements by submitting in evidence proof of publication and service of notices of the petition. Thereafter, it heard the evidence on the qualifications and competence of Bonifacio Canonoy, then appointed him as the administrator and finally directed that letters of administration be issued to him, and that he takes his oath of office after putting up a surety or property bond in the amount of P5,000.00. 32

It is be presumed that Bonifacio Canonoy immediately qualified as administrator because in that capacity, he filed a motion to dismiss petitioner's claim against the estate, 33 a Reply to the Opposition to the motion to dismiss 34 and an Answer to the petitioner's amended claim against the estate wherein he interposed a counterclaim, 35 praying thus:

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court to dismiss the above-mentioned "Amended Claim Against the Estate" and to order the claimant to pay into the intestate estate of Regino Canonoy the said sum of P659,423.49, together with the interest thereon at the legal rate beginning from the date hereof, the reasonable attorney's fees for the prosecution of this counterclaim, and costs;

OR IN THE ALTERNATIVE, in the event that any sum is found due from and payable by the said intestate estate of Regino Canonoy in favor of the said claimant, the said amount be deducted from the above-mentioned sum and, thereafter, to order the claimant to pay the balance remaining unto the said intestate estate of Regino Canonoy, together with interest thereon at the legal rate beginning from date hereof, the reasonable attorney's fees for the prosecution of this counterclaim, and costs.

Clearly, therefore, not only had the administrator and the rest of the private respondents voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court, they even expressly affirmed and invoked such jurisdiction in praying for reliefs and remedies in their favor, namely: (a) denial of Gonzalez' prayer to be appointed as administrator, (b) appointment of Bonifacio Canonoy as administrator, (c) denial of petitioner Shell's amended claim against the estate, and (d) the granting of the counterclaim. Hence, they cannot now be heard to question the jurisdiction of the trial court. While it may be true that jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings, a party who has affirmed and invoked it in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief cannot be allowed to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape penalty.

In Tijam, et al. al. vs. Sibonghanoy, et al., 36 this Court held:

It has been held that a party can not invoke the jurisdiction of a court to secure affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction (Dean vs. Dean, 136 Or. 694, 86 A.L.R. 79). In the case just cited, by way of explaining the rule, it was further said that the question whether (sic) the court had jurisdiction either of the subject-matter of the action or of the parties was not important in such cases because the party is

29 | P a g e

barred from such conduct not because the judgment or order of the court is valid and conclusive as an adjudication, but for the reason that such a practice can not be tolerated — obviously for reasons of public policy.

Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court (Pease vs. Rathbun-Jones etc., 243 U.S. 273, 61 L. Ed. 715, 37 S. Ct. 283; St. Louis etc. vs. McBride, 141 U.S. 127, 35 L. Ed. 659). And in Littleton vs. Burgess, 16 Wyo. 58, the Court said that it is not right for a party who has affirmed and invoked the jurisdiction of a court in a particular matter to secure an affirmative relief, to afterwards deny that same jurisdiction to escape a penalty.

The respondent Judge should have lent his ears to Tijam vs. Sibonghanoy instead of peremptorily granting the motion to dismiss in an Order which does not even care to expound on why the court found the said motion to be meritorious. He exhibited undue haste in removing the case from his docket and in abdicating judicial authority and responsibility. Howsoever viewed, he committed grave abuse of discretion.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the Order of respondent Judge of 8 November 1975 in SP PROC. No. 343 is hereby SET ASIDE. The court below is further ordered to hear and decide petitioner's claim against the estate in said case, unless supervening events had occurred making it unnecessary, and to conduct therein further proceedings pursuant to the Rules of Court until the case is closed and terminated.

Costs against private respondents.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

30 | P a g e

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-11848             May 31, 1962

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED IRENE SANTOS. JOSE D. VILLEGAS, Administrator, ADELA SANTOS GUTIERREZ, movant-appellee, vs.JOSE D. VILLEGAS, and RIZALINA SANTOS RIVERA, oppositors-appellants.

Perkins and Ponce Enrile for movant-appellee.Delgado, Flores and Macapagal for oppositors-appellants.

PAREDES, J.:

On November 11, 1954, Irene Santos died intestate, leaving as her only heirs her surviving spouse Jose D. Villegas and two nieces — daughters of a

deceased brother, Rizalina Santos Rivera and Adela Santos Gutierrez. Thereafter, the surviving spouse filed with the Rizal CFI, Pasay City Branch, a petition for Letters of Administration (Sp. Proc. No. 2100), and was appointed administrator of the estate. In the petition, he named as intestate heirs, besides himself, Rizalina Santos Rivera and Adela Santos Gutierrez. Under date of January 15, 1955, in the above-mentioned Special Proceedings, an unverified manifestation signed by Adela Gutierrez, accompanied by a public instrument entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihan at Salinan", dated January 12, 1955, was presented to the Probate Court, stating among others, the following —

The undersigned hereby solemnly manifests . . . that all her rights, interests and participation in the estate subject of this proceeding now belong to her sister, Rizalina Santos Rivera, and that hereafter she will not take part in the above-entitled proceedings and is not entitled to the service of any pleadings, motion, order or decision filed or promulgated therein.

In a verified manifestation presented before the probate Court on January 25, 1955, Adela averred that the deed of assignment of her rights, participation and interest in the estate of Irene Santos and the first manifestation were obtained thru fraud practiced by the administrator upon her and were vitiated by mistake or undue influence. Therein, she narrated that sometime in December, 1954, due to stringent financial conditions, she (Adela) requested the administrator for an advance of P2,000.00 from the estate. The administrator refused on the ground that it is against the law, but suggested that she might obtain a loan from her sister Rizalina, offering to help. After Christmas of 1954, the administrator informed Adela that he was able to secure the conformity of Rizalina to give her a loan of P10,000.00 instead of only P2,000.00. When Adela expressed surprise over the amount, the administrator replied that he only wanted to help her get started in business. On January 12, 1955, Adela was brought by Villegas and Rizalina to the office of their lawyer, where she was made to sign a document she could not read. On January 13, 1955, the lawyer asked Adela to sign another document, which he said was to be presented in Court and explained the contents of the document signed the day before. It was only then that Adela came to know that said document was a deed of sale.1 When Adela protested, Villegas told her that the matter could be discussed better in his house in Malabon. On arriving at Malabon, Villegas informed Adela that the amount of P50,000.00 which Rizalina was paying for her share in the inheritance, was probably more than what she would get in the estate, because the estate is not valuable and had plenty of debts. Villegas handed to Adela P6,800.00 in cash and a check drawn, by Rizalina on the Prudential Bank for P3,200.00. Although Adela did not want to accept the money, Villegas refused to take them back. When she was made to sign the deed of assignment, Adela did not know the true value of the estate, which she now estimates to be no less than P1,000.000.00. In the same manifestation, Adela stated that a complaint for annulment of the Deed of Assignment was being prepared; that she was tendering the full amount of P10,000.00 to Villegas or Rizalina; that she was placing the above facts within the knowledge of the Court so that no action be taken giving value to the alleged deed of assignment and in order that she (Adela) might be notified of each and all pleadings or orders connected with the proceedings. The administrator Villegas and Rizalina filed exceptions and/or objections to the Manifestation, denying the allegations of fraud, undue influence and the like.

31 | P a g e

In a motion dated September 7, 1955, filed with the CFI of Pasay, Adela asked the Court to transfer Special Proceedings No. 2100, to Branch I (Pasig), alleging that the complaint for the nullity of the Deed of Assignment filed with the Rizal CFI had been assigned to said Branch I; and that the transfer would save time and effort on the part of all concerned. The motion was strongly opposed by the administrator who stated, among others —

That in the final distribution of the estate to the heirs, the share corresponding to the movant Adela Santos Gutierrez may be ordered withheld by this Court (if due motion therefor shall have been presented to this Court) until the validity of the deed of assignment shall have been resolved by Branch I of the Court of First Instance of Rizal.

On September 16, 1955, the motion to transfer was denied.

On February 9, 1956, Adela presented with the Probate Court, a motion praying that the administrator and/or his attorneys be required to furnish her all copies of pleadings filed or to be filed in the intestate proceedings, it appearing that the administrator presented pleadings in Court without serving her copies thereof.

An opposition was interposed by the administrator, who alleged that the movant, although originally a party to the probate proceeding, has voluntarily and expressly desisted from being so, and that having assigned by sale, all her rights, interests and participations in the estate, she has no longer any legal standing in the case. On March 12, 1956, the Court (Judge Emilio Rilloraza, presiding) promulgated the following order —

. . ., the Court is of the opinion that the said motion should be, as it is hereby, granted and the said administrator and/or his attorneys are hereby directed to furnish Adela Santos Gutierrez, through counsel, all copies of the pleadings filed and to be filed in this case, except those mentioned in said motion within a reasonable time upon notice hereof.

The Clerk of Court should see to it that before receiving for filing by the administrator or the other legal heir, Rizalina Santos Rivera, and/or their respective counsel, any pleadings, motion, etc., that copies thereof have been furnished Adela Santos Gutierrez through counsel.

A series of long pleadings were presented by the parties, following a motion of reconsideration, containing arguments and authorities sustaining their respective theories. On June 2, 1956, vacation Judge Jesus Y. Perez, handed down an Order, the material portions of which follow —

x x x           x x x           x x x

The only question for determination in this incident is whether or not Adela Santos Gutierrez has a right to intervene in this probate proceeding. The Administrator contends that she has no such right

because she had already assigned all her rights to her sister, Rizalina Santos Rivera.

Although at the outset, Adela Santos Gutierrez bad the right to intervene herein as one of the legal heirs of the deceased Irene Santos, yet, when she filed her manifestation, accompanied by the Deed of Sale and Assignment, informing this Court that she had assigned all her rights and interest as such heir to her sister, Rizalina Santos Rivera, said Adela Santos Gutierrez had ceased to have any interest in this estate and without such interest, she could no longer intervene in this proceeding. The assignment, it copy of which is attached to the record, is in the form of a public deed which is entitled to be accorded the presumption of validity so that until the same is annulled in the corresponding action filed by Adela Santos Gutierrez in the Pasig Branch of this Court, her interest would merely be a contingent one, that is, depending upon the contingency of a decision declaring such annulment of the deed of assignment. This contingent interest of Adela Santos Gutierrez is not sufficient to make her an interested party in this proceedings, unless otherwise provided by law, the interest required in order that a person may be a party, must be material and direct, and not indirect or contingent (II Moran's Rules of Court, 1952 Ed., pp. 391-92). We quote the following from Moran's Rules of Court:

x x x           x x x           x x x

In the same way, since the interest of Adela Santos Gutierrez to be considered as heir is dependent upon the contingency that she would succeed in her case for annulment of the Deed of Assignment in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, her contingent interest is not sufficient to make her an interested party in this proceeding.

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby sustains the motion for reconsideration filed by the administrator and hereby sets aside the order of March 12, 1956.1äwphï1.ñët

Adela Santos Gutierrez, on June 26, 1956, moved for the reconsideration of the above Order, contending that her motion on February 8, 1956, was not a leave for intervention (Rule 13). At most, the rule on transfer of interestpendente lite (Sec. 20, Rule 3), should be applicable, not that of intervention. On August 10, 1956, Judge Rilloraza, who had already returned from vacation, set aside the order of Judge Perez, stating —

..., this Court is of the opinion that the order of this Court dated June 2, 1956 should be, as it is hereby set aside.

Let the administrator and/or his attorney furnish henceforth Adela Santos Gutierrez, through counsel, copies of all pleadings, motions, etc., to be filed in this case.

32 | P a g e

The above Order is now the subject of the instant appeal, the administrator and Rizalina Santos Rivera assigning three (3) errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, all of which pose a singular issue, viz., whether Adela Santos Gutierrez is still entitled to be furnished with pleadings filed by the administrator in the probate proceedings and orders therein issue by the lower court.

The order appealed from being interlocutory, cannot be the subject of an appeal. Even on this plane alone, the appeal should be dismissed. Of course, appellants cited the case of Tengco v. San Jose, G.R. No. L-8162, Aug. 30, 1955, wherein We considered the appeal as petition for certiorari. That case, however, has no parallel to the one now under consideration. It was one for mandamus for the purpose of compelling the Judge to give due course to an appeal. Considering that in order for certiorari and mandamus to prosper, allegations to the effect that the court has no jurisdiction, or it acted in excess thereof or with grave abuse of discretion, must appear, which is not obtaining in the instant case (because it is an ordinary appeal), it becomes peremptory that the present appeal is not in order.

Moreover, it cannot be successfully denied that Adela Santos Gutierrez is an indispensable party to the proceedings in question. Her interest in the estate is not inchoate, it was established at the time of death of Irene Santos on November 11, 1954. While it is true that she executed a deed of assignment, it is also a fact that she asked the same to be annulled, which action is now pending before the Rizal CFI, Pasig Branch. Although Adela had filed a manifestation dropping herself from the proceedings and presenting therewith the supposed Deed of Assignment, the record, nevertheless fails to show that action thereon had been taken by the probate Court. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction (Art. 1082, NCC). No serious argument can be offered to deny the co-heirship of appellee in the estate under probate. It appearing (if We assume the due execution of the Deed of Assignment), that the transaction is in the nature of extrajudicial partition, court approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over the estate and over their persons, by the mere act of assignment and desistance. Thus, in the case of Sandoval v. Santiago, G.R. No. L-1723, May 30, 1949, this Court said: ". . . and the heirs of the deceased Marquez could not divest the Court of First Instance of its already acquired jurisdiction by the mere fact of dividing and distributing extrajudicially the estate of the deceased among themselves". But even if the partition had been judicially approved on the basis of the alleged deed of assignment, an aggrieved heir does not lose her standing in the probate court.

In our opinion, the court that approved the partition and the agreement in ratification thereof may annul both whenever, as it is here alleged, the approval was obtained by deceit or fraud, and the petition must be filed in the courts of the intestate proceedings, for it is generally admitted that probate courts are authorized to vacate any decree or judgment procured by fraud, not only while the proceedings in the course of which it was issued are pending, but even, as in this

case, within a reasonable time thereafter. (Trillana v. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-3378, Aug. 22, 1951; Espinosa v. Barrios. 70 Phil. 311).

We agree with appellee that the motion in question is not one of intervention, but solely a plea to enforce a right and that is to receive pleadings and orders related to the case. Evidently, the use of the word "intervention" in the manifestation and pleadings presented by Adela was resorted to for want of another appropriate word. In effect, all she wanted to convey was that she should participate or continue taking part in the case for being an original party therein. It was her belief that in filing the manifestation dropping herself from the proceedings (but which she later informed the court to have been secured thru fraud), her standing might have been affected. Intervention as contemplated by the Rules is a proceeding in a suit or action by which a third person is permitted by the court to make himself a party, either joining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting with defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding something adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding by which a third person becomes a party in a suit pending between others; the admission, by leave of court, of a person not an original party to pending legal proceedings, which such person becomes a party thereto for the protection of some right or interest alleged by him to be affected by such proceedings (Judge of Camarines Sur, et al. vs. David, et al., G.R. No. 45454, April 12, 1939, cited in Francisco's Rules of Court, Vol. I, Part I, p. 639, emphasis supplied). The circumstances stated above do not fit the status of Adela in the probate proceedings; she was not a third person; she was an original party therein.

We see no prejudice to be suffered by the administrator and Rizalina, if they are required to furnish copies of their pleadings to appellee. On the contrary, doing so, will give appellee her day in court and provide protection to the administrator himself.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, We find the Order appealed from to be in conformity with the law and jurisprudence. The same should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against the appellants Jose D. Villegas and Rizalina Santos Rivera, in both instances.

33 | P a g e

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

 

G.R. No. L-28248 March 12, 1975

LEONORA PERIDO, joined by husband MANUEL PIROTE, INOCENCIA PERIDO, ALBENIO PERIDO, PAULINO PERIDO, LETIA PERIDO, joined by husband BIENVENIDO BALYAO, LETICIA PERIDO, joined by husband FELIX VILLARUZ, EUFEMIA PERIDO, CONSOLACION PERIDO, ALFREDO PERIDO, GEORGE PERIDO, AMPARO PERIDO, WILFREDO PERIDO, MARGARITA PERIDO, ROLANDO SALDE and EDUARDO SALDE, petitioners, vs.MARIA PERIDO, SOFRONIO PERIDO, JUAN A. PERIDO, GONZALO PERIDO, PACITA PERIDO, MAGDALENA PERIDO, ALICIA PERIDO, JOSEFINA PERIDO, FE PERIDO, TERESA PERIDO and LUZ PERIDO, respondents.

Januario L. Jison, Jr. for petitioners.

Antonio T. de Jesus for respondents.

 

MAKALINTAL, C.J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1

This is an appeal by certiorari from the decision of the Court of Appeals in its CA-G.R. No. 37034-R, affirming the decision of the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental in Civil Case No. 6529.

Lucio Perido of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, married twice during his lifetime. His first wife was Benita Talorong, with whom he begot three (3) children: Felix, Ismael, and Margarita. After Benita died Lucio married Marcelina Baliguat, with whom he had five (5) children: Eusebio, Juan, Maria, Sofronia and Gonzalo. Lucio himself died in 1942, while his second wife died in 1943.

Of the three (3) children belonging to the first marriage only Margarita Perido is still living. Her deceased brother, Felix Perido, is survived by his children Inocencia, Leonora, Albinio, Paulino, Letia, Leticia, and Eufemia, all surnamed Perido. Nicanora Perido, another daughter of Felix, is also deceased, but is survived by two (2) sons, Rolando and Eduardo Salde.

Margarita's other deceased brother, Ismael Perido, is survived by his children, namely: Consolacion, Alfredo, Wilfredo, and Amparo. Susano Perido, another son of Ismael, is dead, but survived by his own son George Perido.

Of Lucio Perido's five (5) children by his second wife, two are already dead, namely: Eusebio and Juan. Eusebio is survived by his children Magdalena Perido, Pacita Perido, Alicia Perido, Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido, while Juan is survived by his only child, Juan A. Perido.

On August 15, 1960 the children and grandchildren of the first and second marriages of Lucio Perido executed a document denominated as "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-judicial Partition," whereby they partitioned among themselves Lots Nos. 458, 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-B, 807, and 808, all of the Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Occidental Negros.

Evidently the children belonging to the first marriage of Lucio Perido had second thoughts about the partition. On March 8, 1962 they filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, which complaint was later amended on February 22, 1963, against the children of the second marriage, praying for the annulment of the so-called "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition" and for another partition of the lots mentioned therein among the plaintiffs alone. They alleged, among other things, that they had been induced by the defendants to execute the document in question through misrepresentation, false promises and fraudulent means; that the lots which were partitioned in said document belonged to the conjugal partnership of the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong, and that the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat were all illegitimate and therefore had no successional rights to the estate of Lucio Perido, who died in 1942. The defendants denied the foregoing allegations.

After trial the lower court rendered its decision dated July 31, 1965, annulling the "Declaration of Heirship and Extra-Judicial Partition." However, it did not order the partition of the lots involved among the plaintiffs exclusively in view of its findings that the five children of Lucio Perido with his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, were legitimate; that all the lots, except Lot No. 458, were the exclusive properties of Lucio Perido; and that 11/12 of Lot No. 458 belonged to the conjugal partnership of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. The dispositive portion of the decision reads as follows:têñ.£îhqwâ£

34 | P a g e

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court renders judgment as follows: declaring the following as the legitimate children and grandchildren and heirs of Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong: Felix Perido, deceased; grandchildren: Inocencia Perido, Leonora Perido, Albinio Perido, Paulino Perido, Letia Perido, Leticia Perido, Eufemia Perido; Nicanora Perido, deceased; great grandchildren: Rolando Salde and Eduardo Salde; Ismael Perido, deceased; grandchildren: Consolacion Perido, Alfredo Perido, Susano Perido, deceased; great grandson: George Perido; Amparo Perido and Wilfredo Perido; and, Margarita Perido; (2) declaring the following as the legitimate children and grandchildren and heirs of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat: Eusebio Perido, deceased; grandchildren: Pacita Perido, Magdalena Perido, Alicia Perido, Josefina Perido, Fe Perido, Teresa Perido, and Luz Perido; Juan B. Perido, deceased; grandson, Juan A. Perido; Maria Perido; Sofronia Perido; and Gonzalo Perido; (3) declaring all lots (471, 506, 511, 509, 513-part, 807, and 808) except Lot No. 458 as exclusive properties of Lucio Perido so that each of them should be divided into eight (8) equal parts: 1/8 belongs to Felix Perido, but because of his death leaving eight (8) children, the same should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/64 to Inocencia Perido of age, widow; 1/64 to Leonora Perido, of age, married to Manuel Pirote; 1/64 to Albinio Perido, of age, married to Honorata Villasana; 1/64 to Paulino Perido, of age, married to Norma Villalba 1/64 to Letia Perido, of age, married to Bienvenido Balyac; 1/64 to Leticia Perido, of age, married to Felix Villaruz; 1/64 to Eufemia Perido, of age, single; 1/64 to Nicanora Perido, but because she is now dead the same should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/128 to Rolando Salde, of age, single; and 1/128 to Eduardo Salde, of age, single; 1/8 belongs to Ismael Perido, but because he is already dead leaving five children, the same should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/40 to Consolacion Perido, of age, widow; 1/40 to Alfredo Perido, of age married to Trinidad Tamargo; 1/40 to Susano Perido, but he is already dead with one son, the same goes to George Perido, of age, single; 1/40 to Wilfredo Perido, of age, single; 1/8 belongs to Margarita Perido, of age, widow; 1/8 belongs to Eusebio Perido, but because he is already dead with seven children, the same should be divided and alloted as follows: 1/56 goes to Pacita Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to Magdalena Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to Alicia Perido, of age, married to Isaias Ruiz; 1/56 goes to Josefina Perido, of age, married to Leopoldo Doloroso; 1/56 goes to Fe Perido, of age, single; 1/56 goes to Teresa Perido, of are single; 1/56 goes to Luz Perido, of age, married to Fidel de la Cruz; 1/8 belongs to Juan B. Perido, but because he is already dead with one child, the same 1/8 goes to Juan A. Perido, of age, married to Salud Salgado 1/8 goes to Maria Perido. of age, married to Julio Pirote; 1/8 goes to Sofronia Perido, of age, widow; and, 1/8 goes to Gonzalo Perido, of age, married to Lacomemoracion Estiller; (4) declaring the 11/12 shares in Lot No. 458 as conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat, which should be divided and alloted as follows: 11/24 goes to Lucio Perido to be divided into eight (8) equal shares and 11/24 goes to Marcelina Baliguat to be divided into five (5) equal shares or 11/120 for each of the children and again to be divided by the children of each child now deceased; (6) declaring Fidel Perido owner of 1/12 share in Lot 458 to be divided among his heirs to be determined accordingly later; and (6) declaring null and void Exhibit "J" of the plaintiffs which is

Exhibit "10" for the defendants, without costs and without adjudication with respect to the counterclaim and damages, they being members of the same family, for equity and justice.

The plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that the trial court erred: (1) in declaring that Eusebio Perido, Juan Perido, Maria Perido, Sofronia Perido and Gonzalo Perido, were the legitimate children of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat; (2) in declaring that Lucio Perido was the exclusive owner of Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509, 513-Part, 807, and 808 of Cadastral Survey of Himamaylan, Negros Occidental, and in not declaring that said lots were the conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita Talorong; and (3) in holding that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat.

Finding no reversible error in the decision of the lower court, the Court of Appeals affirmed it  in toto. The appellants moved to reconsider but were turned down. Thereupon they instituted he instant petition for review reiterating in effect the assignments of error and the arguments in the brief they submitted to the appellate court.

The first issue pertains to the legitimacy of the five children of Lucio Perido with Marcelina Baliguat. The petitioners insist that said children were illegitimate on the theory that the first three were born out of wedlock even before the death of Lucio Perido's first wife, while the last two were also born out of wedlock and were not recognized by their parents before or after their marriage. In support of their contention they allege that Benita Talorong died in 1905, after the first three children were born, as testified to by petitioner Margarita Perido and corroborated by petitioner Leonora Perido; that as late as 1923 Lucio Perido was still a widower, as shown on the face of the certificates of title issued to him in said year; and Lucio Perido married his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat, only in 1925, as allegedly established through the testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido.

The petition cannot be sustained. The Court of Appeals found that there was evidence to show that Lucio Perido's wife, Benita Talorong, died during the Spanish regime. This finding conclusive upon us and beyond our power of review. Under the circumstance, Lucio Perido had no legal impediment to marry Marcelina Baliguat before the birth of their first child in 1900.

With respect to the civil status of Lucio Perido as stated in the certificates of title issued to him in 1923, the Court of Appeals correctly held that the statement was not conclusive to show that he was not actually married to Marcelina Baliguat. Furthermore, it is weak and insufficient to rebut the presumption that persons living together husband and wife are married to each other. This presumption, especially where legitimacy of the issue is involved, as in this case, may be overcome only by cogent proof on the part of those who allege the illegitimacy. In the case of Adong vs. Cheong Seng Gee 1 this Court explained the rationale behind this presumption, thus: "The basis of human society throughout the civilized world is that of marriage. Marriage in this jurisdiction is not only a civil contract, but it is a new relation, an institution in the maintenance of which the public is deeply interested. Consequently, every intendment of the law leans toward legalizing matrimony. Persons dwelling together in apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be in fact married. The reason is that such is the common order of society, and if the parties were not what they thus hold themselves out as being, they would he living in the constant violation of decency and of law. A presumption established by our Code of Civil Procedure is "that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of

35 | P a g e

marriage." (Sec. 334, No. 28) Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio — Always presume marriage."

While the alleged marriage ceremony in 1925, if true, might tend to rebut the presumption of marriage arising from previous cohabitation, it is to be noted that both the trial court and the appellate court did not even pass upon the uncorroborated testimony of petitioner Leonora Perido on the matter. The reason is obvious. Said witness, when asked why she knew that Marcelina Baliguat was married to Lucio Perido only in 1925, merely replied that she knew it because "during the celebration of the marriage by the Aglipayan priest (they) got flowers from (their) garden and placed in the altar." Evidently she was not even an eyewitness to the ceremony.

In view of the foregoing the Court of Appeals did not err in concluding that the five children of Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat were born during their marriage and, therefore, legitimate.

The second assignment of error refers to the determination of whether or not Lots Nos. 471, 506, 511, 509-513-Part, 807 and 808 were the exclusive properties of Lucio Perido. In disposing of the contention of the petitioners that said lots belong to the conjugal partnership of spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong, the Court of Appeals said:têñ.£îhqwâ£

... We cannot agree again with them on this point. It is to be noted that the lands covered by the certificates of title (Exhs. B to G) were all declared in the name of Lucio Perido. Then there is evidence showing that the lands were inherited by Lucio Perido from his grandmother (t.s.n., p. 21, Feb. 20, 1964). In other words, they were the exclusive properties of the late Lucio Perido which he brought into the first and second marriages. By fiat of law said Properties should be divided accordingly among his legal heirs.

The petitioners take exception to the finding of the appellate court that the aforementioned lots were inherited by Lucio Perido from his grandmother and contend that they were able to establish through the testimonies of their witnesses that the spouses Lucio Perido and Benita Talorong acquired them during their lifetime. Again, the petitioners cannot be sustained. The question involves appreciation of the evidence, which is within the domain of the Court of Appeals, the factual findings of which are not reviewable by this Court.

The third assignment of error is with regard to the ruling of the Court of Appeals sustaining the finding of the trial court that 11/12 of Lot 458 was the conjugal partnership property of Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. Said the appellate court:têñ.£îhqwâ£

With respect to Lot No. 458 which is now covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 21769 issued in 1925 the same should be considered conjugally owned by Lucio Perido and his second wife, Marcelina Baliguat. The finding of the lower court on this point need not be disturbed. It is expressly stated in the certificate of title (Exh. L) that Lucio Perido, the registered owner, was married to Marcelina Baliguat unlike in the previous land titles. If the law presumes a property registered in the name of only one of the spouses to be conjugal

(Guinguing vs. Abutin, 48 Phil. 144; Flores vs. Flores, 48 Phil. 288, Escutin vs. Escutin, 60 Phil. 922), the presumption becomes stronger when the document recites that the spouse in whose name the land is registered is married to somebody else, like in the case at bar. It appearing that the legal presumption that the No. 458 belonged to the conjugal partnership had not been overcome by clear proofs to the contrary, we are constrained to rule, that the same is the conjugal property of the deceased spouses Lucio Perido and Marcelina Baliguat.

In impugning the foregoing ruling, the petitioners maintain that they were able to prove that 6/12 of said Lot 458 was the conjugal property of spouses Lucio Perido and his first wife, Benita Talorong, and that the purchase price of the additional 5/12 of said lot came from the proceeds of sale of a lot allegedly belonging to Lucio Perido and his three children of the first marriage. As in the second assignment of error, the issue raised here also involves appreciation of the evidence and, consequently, the finding of the appellate court on the matter is binding on this Court. Indeed, a review of that finding would require an examination of all the evidence introduced before the trial court, a consideration of the credibility of witnesses and of the circumstances surrounding the case, their relevancy or relation to one another and to the whole, as well as an appraisal of the probabilities of the entire situation. It would thus abolish the distinction between an ordinary appeal on the one hand and review on certiorari on the other, and thus defeat the purpose for which the latter procedure has been established. 2

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioners.

36 | P a g e

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-30289             March 26, 1929

SERAPIA DE GALA, petitioner-appellant, vs.APOLINARIO GONZALES and SINFOROSO ONA, opponents-appellants.

Sumulong, Lavides & Hilado for petitioner-appellant.Godofredo Reyes for opponent-appellant Gonzales.Ramon Diokno for opponent-appellant Ona.

OSTRAND, J.:

On November 23, 1920, Severina Gonzales executed a will in which Serapia de Gala, a niece of Severina, was designated executrix. The testatrix died in November, 1926, leaving no heirs by force of law, and on December 2, 1926, Serapia, through her counsel, presented the will for probate. Apolinario Gonzales, a nephew of the deceased, filed an opposition to the will on the ground that it had not been executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure. On April 2, 1927, Serapia de Gala was appointed special administratrix of the estate of the deceased. She returned an inventory of the estate on March 31, 1927, and made several

demands upon Sinforoso Ona, the surviving husband of the deceased, for the delivery to her of the property inventoried and of which he was in possession.

On September 20, 1928, the Court of First Instance ordered Sinforoso Ona to deliver to Serapia de Gala all the property left by the deceased. Instead of delivering the property as ordered, Sinforoso filed a motion asking the appointment of Serapia de Gala as special administratrix be cancelled and that he, Sinforoso, be appointed in her stead. The motion was opposed by both Apolinario Gonzales and by Serapia de Gala, but on March 3, 1928, it was nevertheless granted, Serapia was removed, and Sinforoso was appointed special administrator in her place, principally on the ground that he had possession of the property in question and that his appointment would simplify the proceedings.

In the meantime and after various continuances and delays, the court below in an order dated January 20, 1928, declared the will valid and admitted it to probate. All of the parties appealed, Serapia de Gala from the order removing her from the office of special administratrix, and Apolinario Gonzales and Sinforoso Ona from the order probating the will.

Serapia's appeal requires but little discussion. The burden of the argument of her counsel is that a special administrator cannot be removed except for one or more of the causes stated in section 653 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But that section can only apply to executors and regular administrators, and the office of a special administrator is quite different from that of regular administrator. The appointment of a special administrator lies entirely in the sound discretion of the court; the function of such an administrator is only to collect and preserve the property of the deceased and to return an inventory thereof; he cannot be sued by a creditor and cannot pay any debts of the deceased. The fact that no appeal can be taken from the appointment of a special administrator indicates that both his appointment and his removal are purely discretionary, and we cannot find that the court below abused its discretion in the present case. In removing Serapia de Gala and appointing the present possessor of the property pending the final determination of the validity of the will, the court probably prevented useless litigation.

The appellants Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario Gonzales argue that the will in question was not executed in the form prescribed by section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2645. That section reads as follows:

No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the language or dialect known by the testator and signed by him, or by the testator's name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and of each other. The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet. The attestation shall state the

37 | P a g e

number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.

The principal points raised by the appeal are (1) that the person requested to sign the name of the testatrix signed only the latter's name and not her own; (2) that the attestation clause does not mention the placing of the thumb-mark of the testatrix in the will; and (3) that the fact that the will had been signed in the presence of the witnesses was not stated in the attestation clause but only in the last paragraph of the body of the will.

The first point can best be answered by quoting the language of this court in the case of the Estate of Maria Salva, G. R. No. 26881:1

An examination of the will in question disclosed that it contains five pages. The name of the old woman, Maria Salva, was written on the left hand margin of the first four pages and at the end of the will. About in the center of her name she placed her thumb-mark. About in the center of her name she placed her thumb-mark. The three witnesses likewise signed on the left-hand margin and at the end of the will.

On these facts, the theory of the trial judge was that under the provisions of section 618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, it was essential to the validity of the will that the person writing the name of the maker of the will also sign. Under the law prior to the amendment, it had been held by this court that where a testator is unable to write and his name is signed by another at his request, in his presence and in that of the subscribing witnesses thereto, it is unimportant, so far as the validity of the will is concerned, whether the person who writes the name of the testator signs his own or not. (Barut vs. Cabacungan (1912), 21 Phil., 461). But his Honor, the trial judge emphasizes that the amendment introduced into the law the following sentence: 'The testator or the person requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left margin . . ..' This requirement, it is said, was not lived up to in this instance.

There is, however, an entirely different view which can be taken of the situation. This is that the testatrix placed her thumb-mark on the will in the proper places. When, therefore, the law says that the will shall be 'signed' by the testator or testatrix, the law is fulfilled not only by the customary written signature but by the testator or testatrix' thumb-mark. The construction put upon the word 'signed' by most courts is the original meaning of a signum or sign, rather than the derivative meaning of a sign manual or handwriting. A statute requiring a will to be 'signed' is satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark. (28 R. C. L., pp. 116-117).

The opinion quoted is exactly in point. The testatrix thumb-mark appears in the center of her name as written by Serapia de Gala on all of the pages of the will.

The second and third points raised by Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario Gonzales are sufficiently refuted by quoting the last clause of the body of the will together with the attestation clause, both of which are written in the Tagalog dialect. These clauses read as follows:

Sa katunayang ang kasulatang ito, na may anim na dahon, ay siyang naglalaman ng aking huling tagubilin, at sa hindi ko kaalamang lumagda ng aking pangalan, ipinamanhik ko sa aking pamankin na si Serapia de Gala na isulat ang aking pangalan at apellido, at sa tapat ay inilagda ko ang titik ng kanang daliri kong hinlalaki, sa walkas at sa bawat isa sa anim (6) na dahon ng kasulatang ito, at ito's ginawa niya sa kautusan at sa harap ko at ng tatlong saksing nagpapatutuo sa huli ngayon ika dalawang po't tatlo ng Nobiembre ng 1920.

(Sgd.) SEVERINA GONZALES

Pinatutunayan namin na ang kasulatang ito na binubuo ng anim (6) na dahon na pinirmahan sa harap namin ni Serapia de Gala sa kahilingan ni Severina Gonzales sa wakas at sa mga gilid ng bawa't isa sa anim (6) na dahon at isinaysay na ang kasulatang ito ay siyang huling habilin o testamento ni Severina Gonzales, ay pinirmahan namin, bilang mga saksi sa wakas at sa gilid ng bawa't dahon sa harap at sa kahilingan ng tinurang testadora, at ang bawat isa sa amin ay pumirma sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, ngayon ika dalawang po't tatlo ng noviembre ng taong 1920 ng taong 1920.

(Sgd.) ELEUTERIO NATIVIDAD JUAN SUMULONG 

FRANCISCO NATIVIDAD

The translation in English of the clauses quoted reads as follows:

In virtue of this will, consisting of six pages, that contains my last wish, and because of the fact that I cannot sign my name, I request my niece Serapia de Gala to write my name, and above this I placed my right thumb-mark at the end of this will and to each of the six pages of this document, and this was done at my direction and in the presence of three attesting witnesses, this 23rd of November, 1920.

(Sgd.) SEVERINA GONZALES

We certify that this document, which is composed of six (6) sheets and was signed in our presence by Serapia de Gala at the request of Severina Gonzales at the end and on the margins of each of the six (6) sheets and was declared to contain the last will and testament of Severina Gonzales, was signed by us as witnesses at the end and on the margins of each sheet in the presence and at the request of said

38 | P a g e

testatrix, and each of us signed in the presence of all and each of us, this 23rd day of November of the year 1920.

(Sgd.) ELEUTERIO NATIVIDAD JUAN SUMULONG 

FRANCISCO NATIVIDAD

As will be seen, it is not mentioned in the attestation clause that the testatrix signed by thumb-mark, but it does there appear that the signature was affixed in the presence of the witnesses, and the form of the signature is sufficiently described and explained in the last clause of the body of the will. It maybe conceded that the attestation clause is not artistically drawn and that, standing alone, it does not quite meet the requirements of the statute, but taken in connection with the last clause of the body of the will, it is fairly clear and sufficiently carries out the legislative intent; it leaves no possible doubt as to the authenticity of the document.

The contention of the appellants Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario Gonzales that the fact that the will had been signed in the presence of the witnesses was not stated in the attestation clause is without merit; the fact is expressly stated in that clause.

In our opinion, the will is valid, and the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed without costs. So ordered.

39 | P a g e

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-48585 March 3, 1980

FELICIANO DE GUZMAN, petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE TEOFILO GUADIZ, JR., Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch V, Gapan, and JULIAN VILLEGAS, NATIVIDAD VILLEGAS, GEMINIANO VILLEGAS, CESAR VILLEGAS, MAXIMO MATIAS, ROSARIO VILLEGAS MATIAS, ANA MARIE V. MATIAS, and LOURDES V. MATIAS,respondents.

C. C. Paralejo for petitioner.

A.R. Reyes respondents.

 

FERNANDEZ, J.:

This is a petition for certiorari  instituted b Feliciano de Guzman against Honorable Teofilo Guadiz, Jr. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch V, Gapan, and Julian Villegas, Natividad Villegas, Geminiano Villegas, Cesar Villegas, Maximo Matias, Rosario Villegas Matias, Ana Marie V. Matias, and Lourdes V. Matias, seeking the following relief.

WHEREFORE, petitioner most respectively prays:

a) That respondents be ordered to answer this petition;

b) That after hearing the Order of respondent Judge dated December 23, 1977 denying petitioner's Motion for Appointment of a Special Administrator and consequently, the

Order dated July 15, 1978 denying petitioners Motion for Reconsideration be annulled and that said respondent Judge be declared to have committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in refusing the appointment of the Special Administrator;

c) That respondent Judge be directed to appoint a Special Administrator pending the probate of the Last Will of Catalina Bajacan.

Petitioner respectfully prays for such other relief just and equitable in the premises.

Manila, Philippines, August 14, 1978. 1

On August 31, 1978, without giving due course to the instant petition, this Court adopted a resolution directing the respondents to comment thereon within ten (10) days from notice thereof. 2

The respondents filed on October 10, 1978 their comment dated October 9, 1978. 3

Meanwhile, on September 29, 1978, the petitioner submitted a Constancia manifesting that the respondent judge cancelled the hearing on the petition for probate of the will scheduled on September 20, 1978 "pending the outcome of the case before the Supreme Court." 4

On October 18. 1978, this Court resolved: a) to GIVE DUE COURSE to the petition; and b) to REQUIRE (1) the petitioner to deposit P80.40 for costs and clerk's commission within five (5) days from notice thereof, and (2) both parties to submit simultaneous memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice thereof. 5

Both petitioner and respondents having filed their respective memoranda, 6 on December 6, 1978, this Court resolved to declare this case submitted for decision. 7

The record discloses that on March 16, 1977, the petitioner filed a petition with the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch V, Gapan, docketed as Special Proceeding No. 865 8 for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed by one Catalina Bajacan instituting the herein petitioner as sole and universal heir and naming him as executor; that Catalina Bajacan died on February 3, 1977; that on May 10, 1977, the private respondents filed a motion to dismiss and/or opposition contending, among others, that all the real properties of Catalina Bajacan are now owned by them by virtue of a Deed of Donation Intervivos executed on June 19, 1972 by Arcadia Bajacan and Catalina Bajacan in their favor; 9 that on September 30, 1977, the respondent judge resolved to defer resolution on the said motion to dismiss until the parties shall have presented their evidence; 10 that a motion for the appointment of a special administrator 11 was filed by the petitioner on September 23, 1977 alleging that

40 | P a g e

the unresolved motion to dismiss would necessarily delay the probate of the will and the appointment of an executor; that the decedent's estate consists of eighty (80) hectares of first class agricultural rice land, more or less, yielding fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) worth of rice harvested twice a year; that somebody representing the estate should collect and receive the palay harvests pending the probate of the will; that on December 23, 1977, the respondent judge issued an order denying the motion for appointment of a special administrator, the pertinent portion of which reads:

The appointment of a special administrator is predicated on the necessity of enabling somebody to take care of the properties where there is a considerable delay in the appointment of a regular administrator. In the present case, since the properties covered by the will are undoubtedly in the possession of the oppositors who claim to be the owners thereof, the Court sees no necessity of appointing a special administrator.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby denies the motion for the appointment of a special administrator filed by the petitioner dated September 22, 1977 ... 12

that on June 5, 1978, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order dated December 23, 1977 13 ; that said motion was also denied by the respondent judge in an order dated June 9, 1978 which states:

In a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner on June 5, 1978 praying for a reconsideration of the Order dated Dec. 23, 1977, which denied the motion for appointment of a Special Administrator filed by him, it is alleged that the Court made a premature determination of ownership and possession of the oppositors over the properties of the estate of Catalina Bajacan. This assertion is not accurate. What the Court merely stated in said Order is that the oppositors, who claim to be the owners, are in possession of the properties covered by the Will.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) denies the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner on June 5, 1978. 14

The main issue in this case is whether the respondent judge presiding the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch V. Gapan, acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order dated December 23, 1977 denying petitioner's motion for the appointment of a special administrator and the order dated June 9, 1978, denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

It is the petitioner's contention that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because the facts warrant the appointment of a special administrator of the estate of Catalina Bajacan.

Rule 80, Sec. 1, of the Revised Rules of Court provides:

Section 1 — Appointment of Special Administrator — When there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators appointed.

Under the above rule, the probate court may appoint a special administrator 15 should there be a delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration occasioned by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will. Subject to this qualification, the appointment of a special administrator lies in the discretion of the Court. 16 This discretion, however, must be sound, that is, not whimsical, or Contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle. 17

The basis for appointing a special administrator under the Rules is broad enough to include any cause or reason for the delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration as where a contest as to the will is being carried on in the same or in another court, or where there is an appeal pending as to the proceeding on the removal of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the parties cannot agree among themselves. 18 Likewise, when from any cause general administration cannot be immediately granted, a special administrator may be appointed to collect and preserve the property of the deceased.

It is obvious that the phrase "by any cause" includes those incidents which transpired in the instant case clearly showing that there is a delay in the probate of the will and that the granting of letters testamentary will consequently be prolonged necessitating the immediate appointment of a special administrator.

The facts justifying the appointment of a special administrator are:

(1) Delay in the hearing of the petition for the probate of the win.

(2) The basis of the private respondents' claim to the estate of Catalina Bajacan and opposition to the probate of the will is a deed of donation dated June 19, 1972 allegedly executed by the deceased Catalina Bajacan and her late sister Arcadia Bajacan in their favor. 19

41 | P a g e

There is an immediate need to file an action for the annulment of such deed of donation in behalf of the estate. Precisely, the petitioner filed Civil Case No. 1080 in the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija Branch V, against the herein private respondents. The case was dismissed by the respondent judge in an order dated June 9, 1978 on the ground that the petitioner has no personality to file the action because although he is named heir in the will, the said will is not yet probated. 20 In the meantime there is nobody to sue in order to protect the interest of the estate considering that the probate of the will and the appointment of an executor will take time.

Upon the filing of this petition, the respondent judge, on motion of the private respondents, postponed the hearing of the probate of the will which was then scheduled on August 23, 1978 to September 20, 1978. Again, in view of the motion for reconsideration of the private respondents dated September 4, 1978, the respondent judge issued an order dated September 12, 1978, which in part reads: ... the hearing of this case scheduled on September 20, 1978 is hereby cancelled pending the outcome of the case before the Supreme Court. 21

The reasons for the appointment of a special administrator are:

The reason for the practice of appointing a special administrator rests in the fact that estates of decedents frequently become involved in protracted litigation, thereby being exposed to great waste and losses if there is no authorized agent to collect the debts and preserve the assets in the interim. The occasion for such an appointment usually arises where, for some cause, such as a pendency of a suit concerning the proof of the will, regular administration is .delayed. No temporary administration can be granted where there is an executor in being capable of acting, however. 22

Principal object of appointment of temporary administrator is to preserve estate until it can pass into hands of person fully authorized to administer it for benefit of creditors and heirs. 23

It appears that the estate the properties registered under the Torrens system in the name of the deceased Catalina Bajacan consisting of eighty (80) hectares of first class agricultural land. It is claimed that these 80 hectares produce P50,000.00 worth of palay each harvest twice a year. Obviously there is an immediate need for a special administrator to protect the interests of the estate as regards the products.

All the facts which warrant the appointment of a special administrator in accordance with Rule 80, Sec. 1 of the Revised Rules of Court are present in the case at bar.

The respondent judge opined that there is no need for the appointment of a special administrator in this case because the respondents are already in possession of the properties covered by the will. The respondent judge has

failed to distinguish between the partisan possession of litigants from that of the neutral possession of the special administrator under the Rules of Court. When appointed, a special administrator is regarded, not as a representative of the agent of the parties suggesting the appointment, but as the administrator in charge of the estate, and in fact, as an officer of the court. 24 The accountability which the court. which attaches to the office of a special administrator to be appointed by the court is absent from the personal possession of private respondents.

The only way to test the validity of the alleged donation in favor of the private respondents is to appoint a special adiu administrator who will have the personality to file the corresponding action. In view of all the foregoing, respondent judge committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's motion for appointment of a special administrator.

WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of certiorari is hereby granted and the Order of the respondent judge dated December 23, 1977, denying petitioner's motion for appointment of a special administrator and the order dated June 9, ,978 denying the petitioner's motion for reconsideration are set aside. The respondent judge is ordered forthwith to appointment a special administrator pending the probate of the last will of Catalina Bajacan in Special Proceeding No. 865, without pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

42 | P a g e

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

SECOND DIVISION

 

G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975

In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian. FELIX BALANAY, JR., petitioner, vs.HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch VI; AVELINA B. ANTONIO and DELIA B. LANABAN, respondents.

Roberto M. Sarenas for petitioner.

Jose B. Guyo for private respondents.

 

AQUINO, J.:

Felix Balanay, Jr. appealed by certiorari from the order of the Court of First Instance of Davao dated February 28, 1974, declaring illegal and void the will of his mother, Leodegaria Julian, converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding and ordering the issuance of the corresponding notice to creditors (Special Case No. 1808). The antecedents of the appeal are as follows:

Leodegaria Julian, a native of Sta. Maria, Ilocos Sur, died on February 12, 1973 in Davao City at the age of sixty-seven. She was survived by her husband, Felix Balanay, Sr., and by their six legitimate children named Felix Balanay, Jr., Avelina B. Antonio, Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob, Delia B. Lanaban and Emilia B. Pabaonon.

Felix J. Balanay, Jr. filed in the lower court a petition dated February 27, 1973 for the probate of his mother's notarial will dated September 5, 1970 which is written in English. In that will Leodegaria Julian declared (a) that she was the owner of the "southern half of nine conjugal lots (par. II); (b) that she was the absolute owner of two parcels of land which she inherited from her father (par. III), and (c) that it was her desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties (Par. IV).

Then, in paragraph V of the will she stated that after her husband's death (he was eighty-two years old in 1973) her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal lands (which she described as "my properties") should be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in

that part of her will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will her husband's one half share of the conjugal assets. *

Felix Balanay, Sr. and Avelina B. Antonio opposed the probate of the will on the grounds of lack of testamentary capacity, undue influence, preterition of the husband and alleged improper partition of the conjugal estate. The oppositors claimed that Felix Balanay, Jr. should collate certain properties which he had received from the testatrix.

Felix Balanay, Jr., in his reply to the opposition, attached thereto an affidavit of Felix Balanay, Sr. dated April 18, 1973 wherein he withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will and affirmed that he was interested in its probate. On the same date Felix Balanay, Sr. signed an instrument captioned "Conformation (sic) of Division and Renunciation of Hereditary Rights" wherein he manifested that out of respect for his wife's will he "waived and renounced' his hereditary rights in her estate in favor of their six children. In that same instrument he confirmed the agreement, which he and his wife had perfected before her death, that their conjugal properties would be partitioned in the manner indicated in her will.

Avelina B. Antonio, an oppositor, in her rejoinder contended that the affidavit and "conformation" of Felix Balanay, Sr. were void. The lower court in its order of June 18, 1973 "denied" the opposition and reset for hearing the probate of the will. It gave effect to the affidavit and conformity of Felix Balanay, Sr. In an order dated August 28, 1973 it appointed its branch clerk of court as special administrator of the decedent's estate.

Mrs. Antonio moved for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of June 18, 1973 on the grounds (a) that the testatrix illegally claimed that she was the owner of the southern half of the conjugal lots and (b) that she could not partition the conjugal estate by allocating portions of the nine lots to her children. Felix Balanay, Jr., through his counsel, Hermenegildo Cabreros, opposed that motion. The lower court denied it in its order of October 15, 1973.

In the meanwhile, another lawyer appeared in the case. David O. Montaña, Sr., claiming to be the lawyer of petitioner Felix Balanay, Jr. (his counsel of record was Atty. Cabreros), filed a motion dated September 25, 1973 for "leave of court to withdraw probate of alleged will of Leodegaria Julian and requesting authority to proceed by intestate estate proceeding." In that motion Montaña claimed to be the lawyer not only of the petitioner but also of Felix Balanay, Sr., Beatriz B. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon.

Montaña in his motion assailed the provision of the will which partitioned the conjugal assets or allegedly effected a compromise of future legitimes. He prayed that the probate of the will be withdrawn and that the proceeding be converted into an intestate proceeding. In another motion of the same date he asked that the corresponding notice to creditors be issued.

Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban, through Atty. Jose B. Guyo, in their comments dated October 15, 1973 manifested their conformity with the motion for the issuance of a notice to creditors. They prayed that the will be declared void for being contrary to law and that an intestacy be declared.

43 | P a g e

The lower court, acting on the motions of Atty. Montaña, assumed that the issuance of a notice to creditors was in order since the parties had agreed on that point. It adopted the view of Attys. Montaña and Guyo that the will was void. So, in its order of February 28, 1974 it dismissed the petition for the probate, converted the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding, ordered the issuance of a notice to creditors and set the intestate proceeding for hearing on April 1 and 2, 1974. The lower court did not abrogate its prior orders of June 18 and October 15, 1973. The notice to creditors was issued on April 1, 1974 and published on May 2, 9 and 16 in the Davao Star in spite of petitioner's motion of April 17, 1974 that its publication be held in abeyance.

Felix Balanay, Jr., through a new counsel, Roberto M. Sarenas, in a verified motion dated April 15, 1974, asked for the reconsideration of the lower court's order of February 28, 1974 on the ground that Atty. Montaña had no authority to withdraw the petition for the allowance of the will. Attached to the motion was a copy of a letter dated March 27, 1974 addressed to Atty. Montaña and signed by Felix Balanay, Jr., Beatriz V. Solamo, Carolina B. Manguiob and Emilia B. Pabaonon, wherein they terminated Montaña's services and informed him that his withdrawal of the petition for the probate of the will was without their consent and was contrary to their repeated reminder to him that their mother's will was "very sacred" to them.

Avelina B. Antonio and Delia B. Lanaban opposed the motion for reconsideration. The lower court denied the motion in its order of June 29, 1974. It clarified that it declared the will void on the basis of its own independent assessment of its provisions and not because of Atty. Montaña's arguments.

The basic issue is whether the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.

We are of the opinion that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the petitioner's authorization), the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare with Sumilang vs. Ramagosa, L-23135, December 26, 1967, 21 SCRA 1369; Cacho vs. Udan, L-19996, April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693).1äwphï1.ñët

But the probate court erred in declaring, in its order of February 28, 1974 that the will was void and in converting the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding notwithstanding the fact that in its order of June 18, 1973 , it gave effect to the surviving husband's conformity to the will and to his renunciation of his hereditary rights which presumably included his one-half share of the conjugal estate.

The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the first invalid disposition had not been made" (Art. 792, Civil Code). "Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without

defeating the intention of the testator or interfering with the general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries" (95 C.J.S. 873).

The statement of the testatrix that she owned the "southern half of the conjugal lands is contrary to law because, although she was a coowner thereof, her share was inchoate and proindiviso (Art. 143, Civil Code; Madrigal and Paterno vs. Rafferty and Concepcion, 38 Phil. 414). But That illegal declaration does not nullify the entire will. It may be disregarded.

The provision of the will that the properties of the testatrix should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime but should be kept intact and that the legitimes should be paid in cash is contrary to article 1080 of the Civil Code which reads:

ART. 1080. Should a person make a partition of his estate by an act  inter vivos, or by will, such partition shall be respected, insofar as it does not prejudice the legitime of the compulsory heirs.

A parent who, in the interest of his or her family, to keep any agricultural, industrial, or manufacturing enterprise intact, may avail himself of the right granted him in this article, by ordering that the legitime of the other children to whom the property is not assigned be paid in cash. (1056a)

The testatrix in her will made a partition of the entire conjugal estate among her six children (her husband had renounced his hereditary rights and his one-half conjugal share). She did not assign the whole estate to one or more children as envisaged in article 1080. Hence, she had no right to require that the legitimes be paid in cash. On the other hand, her estate may remain undivided only for a period of twenty years. So, the provision that the estate should not be divided during her husband's lifetime would at most be effective only for twenty years from the date of her death unless there are compelling reasons for terminating the coownership (Art. 1083, Civil Code).

Felix Balanay, Sr. could validly renounce his hereditary rights and his one-half share of the conjugal partnership (Arts. 179[1] and 1041, Civil Code) but insofar as said renunciation partakes of a donation of his hereditary rights and his one-half share in the conjugal estate (Art. 1060[1] Civil Code), it should be subject to the limitations prescribed in articles 750 and 752 of the Civil Code. A portion of the estate should be adjudicated to the widower for his support and maintenance. Or at least his legitime should be respected.

Subject to the foregoing observations and the rules on collation, the will is intrinsically valid and the partition therein may be given effect if it does not prejudice the creditors and impair the legitimes. The distribution and partition would become effective upon the death of Felix Balanay, Sr. In the meantime, the net income should be equitably divided among the children and the surviving spouse.

It should be stressed that by reason of the surviving husband's conformity to his wife's will and his renunciation of his hereditary rights, his one-half conjugal share became a part of his deceased wife's estate. His conformity had the effect of validating the partition made in paragraph V of the will without prejudice, of course, to the rights of the creditors and the legitimes of the compulsory heirs.

44 | P a g e

Article 793 of the Civil Code provides that "property acquired after the making of a will shall only pass thereby, as if the testator had it at the time of making the will, should it expressly appear by the will that such was his intention". Under article 930 of the Civil Code "the legacy or devise of a thing belonging to another person is void, if the testator erroneously believed that the thing pertained to him. But if the thing bequeathed, though not belonging to the testator when he made the will, afterwards becomes his, by whatever title, the disposition shall take effect."

In the instant case there is no doubt that the testatrix and her husband intended to partition the conjugal estate in the manner set forth in paragraph V of her will. It is true that she could dispose of by will only her half of the conjugal estate (Art. 170, Civil Code) but since the husband, after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership, had assented to her testamentary partition of the conjugal estate, such partition has become valid, assuming that the will may be probated.

The instant case is different from the Nuguid case, supra, where the testatrix instituted as heir her sister and preterited her parents. Her will was intrinsically void because it preterited her compulsory heirs in the direct line. Article 854 of the Civil Code provides that "the preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies, shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious." Since the preterition of the parents annulled the institution of the sister of the testatrix and there were no legacies and devises, total intestacy resulted (.Art. 960[2], Civil Code).1äwphï1.ñët

In the instant case, the preterited heir was the surviving spouse. His preterition did not produce intestacy. Moreover, he signified his conformity to his wife's will and renounced his hereditary rights. .

It results that the lower court erred in not proceeding with the probate of the will as contemplated in its uncancelled order of June 18, 1973. Save in an extreme case where the will on its face is intrinsically void, it is the probate court's duty to pass first upon the formal validity of the will. Generally, the probate of the will is mandatory (Art. 838, Civil Code; Guevara vs. Guevara, 74 Phil. 479 and 98 Phil. 249; Fernandez vs. Dimagiba, L-23638, October 12, 1967, 21 SCRA 428).

As aptly stated by Mr. Justice Barredo, "the very existence of a purported testament is in itself prima facie proof that the supposed testator has willed that his estate should be distributed in the manner therein provided, and it is incumbent upon the state that, if legally tenable, such desire be given effect independent of the attitude of the parties affected thereby" (Resolution, Vda. de Precilla vs. Narciso, L-27200, August 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 538, 565).

To give effect to the intention and wishes of the testatrix is the first and principal law in the matter of testaments (Dizon-Rivera vs. Dizon, L-24561, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 554, 561). Testacy is preferable to intestacy. An interpretation that will render a testamentary disposition operative takes precedence over a construction that will nullify a provision of the will (Arts. 788 and 791, Civil Code).

Testacy is favored. Doubts are resolved in favor of testacy especially where the will evinces an intention on the part of the testator to dispose of practically his whole estate. So

compelling is the principle that intestacy should be avoided and that the wishes of the testator should prevail that sometimes the language of the will can be varied for the purpose of giving it effect (Austria vs. Reyes, L-23079, February 27, 1970, 31 SCRA 754, 762).

As far as is legally possible, the expressed desire of the testator must be followed and the dispositions of the properties in his will should be upheld (Estorque vs. Estorque, L-19573, June 30, 1970, 33 SCRA 540, 546).

The law has a tender regard for the wishes of the testator as expressed in his will because any disposition therein is better than that which the law can make (Castro vs. Bustos, L-25913, February 28, 1969, 27 SCRA 327, 341).

Two other errors of the lower court may be noticed. It erred in issuing a notice to creditors although no executor or regular administrator has been appointed. The record reveals that it appointed a special administrator. A notice to creditors is not in order if only a special administrator has been appointed. Section 1, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, in providing that "immediately after granting letters of testamentary or of administration, the court shall issue a notice requiring all persons having money claims against the decedent to file them in the office of the clerk of said court" clearly contemplates the appointment of an executor or regular administrator and not that of a special administrator.

It is the executor or regular administrator who is supposed to oppose the claims against the estate and to pay such claims when duly allowed (See. 10, Rule 86 and sec. 1, Rule 88, Rules of Court).

We also take this occasion to point out that the probate court's appointment of its branch clerk of court as special administrator (p. 30, Rollo) is not a salutary practice because it might engender the suspicion that the probate Judge and his clerk of court are in cahoots in milking the decedent's estate. Should the branch clerk of court commit any abuse or devastavit in the course of his administration, the probate Judge might find it difficult to hold him to a strict accountability. A court employee should devote his official time to his official duties and should not have as a sideline the administration of a decedent's estate.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's orders of February 28, and June 29, 1974 are set aside and its order of June 18, 1973, setting for hearing the petition for probate, is affirmed. The lower court is directed to conduct further proceedings in Special Case No. 1808 in consonance with this opinion. Costs, against the private respondents.

SO ORDERED.

45 | P a g e

SUPREME COURTManila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-20735             August 14, 1965

GLICERIA C. LIWANAG, Special Administratrix of the Estate of PIO D. LIWANAG, petitioner, vs.HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JESUS DE VEYRA, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, and MANUEL AGREGADO, respondents.

C. M. Baltazar and A. P. Narvasa for petitioner.Manuel P. Calanog for respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:

Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals.

Petitioner Gliceria C. Liwanag is the special administratrix of the estate of Pio D. Liwanag, the settlement of which is the subject of Special Proceeding No. 46599 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. On January 9, 1962 respondent Manuel Agregado commenced against her as such special administratrix, Civil Case No. 50897 of the same court, for the foreclosure of a real estate mortgage constituted in his favor by said Pio D. Liwanag during his lifetime. On July 18, 1962, here petitioner moved to dismiss Agregado's complaint, upon the ground that as special administratrix she cannot be sued by a creditor of the deceased. In an order dated August 1, 1962, respondent, Hon. Jesus de Veyra, as Judge of said court, denied the motion, whereupon petitioner filed case CA-G.R. No. 31168-R of the Court of Appeals against respondent Judge and Agregado, to annul said order by writ ofcertiorari and enjoin said Judge from entertaining said Case No. 50897. Upon petitioner's motion, the Court of Appeals issued a writ of preliminary injunction directing respondent Judge to refrain from proceeding with the trial of that case, until further orders. However, subsequently, or on December 3, 1962, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision denying the writ prayed for and dissolving said writ of preliminary injunction, with costs against the petitioner. Hence this appeal taken by petitioner upon the theory that, pursuant to Section 2, Rule 81 of the (old) Rules of Court, "a special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased," and that, accordingly, Agregado has no cause of action against her as a special administratrix.

In as much, however, as the alleged absence of a cause of action does not affect respondent's jurisdiction to hear Case No. 50897, it follows that the

denial of petitioner's motion to the same, even if it were erroneous, is reviewable, not by writ of certiorari, but by appeal, after the rendition of judgment on the merits. Moreover, the theory that a mortgagee cannot bring an action for foreclosure against the special administrator of the estate of a deceased person has already been rejected by this Court. In Liwanag vs. Hon. Luis B. Reyes, G.R. No. L-19159 (September 29, 1964), involving the same petitioner herein, the same estate of the deceased Pio D. Liwanag, a similar action for foreclosure, although of another mortgage and an identical motion to dismiss and issue, we expressed ourselves as follows:

The defendant Gliceria Liwanag filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for foreclosure, on the theory that she may not be sued as special administratrix.

x x x           x x x           x x x

Section 7 of Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court provides that a creditor holding a claim against the deceased, secured by a mortgage or other collateral security, may pursue any of these remedies: (1) abandon his security and prosecute his claim and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; (2) foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security by an action in court, making the executor or administrator a party defendant, and if there is a deficiency after the sale of the mortgaged property, he may prove the same in the testate or intestate proceedings; and (3) rely exclusively upon his mortgage and foreclose it any time within the ordinary period of limitations, and if he relies exclusively upon the mortgage, he shall not...share in the distribution of the assets.

Obviously, the herein respondent has chosen the second remedy, having filed his action for foreclosure against the administratrix of the property.

Now the question arises as to whether the petitioner herein can be sued as special administratrix. The Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit making the special administratrix a defendant in a suit against the estate. Otherwise, creditors would find the adverse effects of the statute of limitations running against them in cases where the appointment of a regular administrator is delayed. So that if We are not to deny the present action on this technical ground alone, and the appointment of a regular administrator will be delayed, the very purpose for which the mortgage was constituted will be defeated.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the petitioner. It is so ordered.

46 | P a g e

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-15388             January 31, 1961

DORA PERKINS ANDERSON, petitioner-appellee, vs.IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, oppositor-appellant.

Ponce Enrile, S. Reyna, Montecillo and Belo for petitioner-appellee.Lazaro A. Marquez and J. D. Quirino for oppositor-appellant.

REYES, J.B.L., J.:

Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceedings No. 29636 authorizing the special administrator of the testate estate of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins to sell at public auction certain personal properties left by the deceased.

It appears that said special proceedings were commenced on May 10, 1956, by a petition presented by Dora Perkin Anderson for the probate of the supposed last will and testament of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins, who died in Manila on April 28, 1956 allegedly possessed of personal and real properties with a probable value of P5,000,000. On the same date of the filing of the aforesaid petition, petitioner Dora Perkins Anderson also filed a urgent petition for the appointment of Alfonso Ponce Enrile as special administrator of the estate, and on the same day, the court issued an order appointing Alfonso Ponce Enrile as such special administrator upon his posting of a bond in the amount of P50,000. On July 9, 1956, Idonah Slade Perkins, surviving spouse of the deceased entered an opposition to the probate of the will presented by petitioner Dora Perkins Anderson. On September 28, 1956 the special administrator submitted an inventory of all the assets which have come to his knowledge as belonging to the deceased Eugene Arthur Perkins at the time of his death.

About two years later, or on September 4, 1958, the special administrator submitted to the court a petition seeking authority to sell, or give away to some charitable or educational institution or institutions, certain personal effects left by the deceased, such as clothes, books, gadgets, electrical appliances, etc., which were allegedly deteriorating both physically and in value, in order to avoid their further deterioration and to save whatever value migh be obtained in their disposition. When the motion was heard on September 25, 1958, the court required the administrator to submit a specification of the properties sought to be sold, and in compliance therewith, the special administrator, on October 21, 1958, submitted to the court, in place of a specification, a copy of the inventory of the personal properties belonging to the estate with the items

sought to be sold marked with a check in red pencil, with the statement that said items were too voluminous to enumerate.

On July 9, 1956, Idonah Slade Perkins filed an opposetion to the proposed sale. Reasons, for the opposition were that (1) most of the properties sought to be sold were conjugal properties of herself and her deceased husband; and (2) that unauthorized removal of fine pieces of furniture belonging to the estate had been made.

The opposition notwithstanding, the lower court, on December 2, 1958, approved the proposed sale, authorizing the Sheriff of Manila to conduct the same. Oppositor Idonah Slade Perkins moved to reconsider this order on the grounds (1) that said order in effect authorized the special administrator to sell the entire personal estate of the deceased, contrary to Rule 81, section 2. Rules of Court; (2) that said order was issued without a showing that the goods and chattels sought to be sold were perishable, pursuant to Rule 81, section 2, Rules of Court; (3) that the personalty sought to be sold represented the lifetime savings and collections of oppositor; (4) that there is evidence on record showing unauthorized withdrawals from the properties of the estate, and the sale of the inventoried lot would prevent identification and recovery of the articles removed; and (5) that there is also evidence showing oppositor's separate rights to a substantial part of the personal estate.

On February 23, 1959, the lower court denied the above motion for reconsideration. Whereupon, oppositor Idonah Slade Perkins appealed to this court.

Appellant first claims that the personal properties sought to be sold not being perishable, the special administrator has no legal authority to sell them. This argument is untenable, because section 2, Rule 81, of the Rules of Court, specifically provides that the special administrator "may sell such perishable and other property as the court orders sold", which shows that the special administrator's power to sell is not limited to "perishable" property only.

It is true that the function of a special administrator is only to collect and preserve the property of the deceased until a regular administrator is appointed (sec. 2, Rule 81; De Gala v. Gonzales, 53 Phil. 104; Collins v. Henry, 118 S.E. 729, 155 Ga. 886; Sqydelko v. Smith's Estate, 244 N.W. 149, 259 Mich. 519). But it is not alone the specific property of the estate which is to be preserved, but its value as well, as shown by the legal provision for the sale by a special administrator of perishable property (Cao vs. Cascade Silver Mines & Mills, et al., 213 P. 109 66 Mont. 488). It is in line with this general power of the special administrator to preserve not only the property of the estate but also its value, that section 2, Rule 81, also empowers such administrator to sell "other proerty as the court ordered sold;" .

There is, however, a serious obstacle to the proposed sale, namely, the vigorous opposition presented thereto the appellant, the surviving spouse of the deceased, on the ground that she is allegedly entitled to a large portion of the personal properties in question, either because the were conjugal property of herself and the deceased, or because they are her own, exclusive, personal

47 | P a g e

property. Indeed the records show that up to the time the propose sale was asked for and judicially approved, no proceeding had as yet been taken, or even started, to segregate the alleged exclusive property of the oppositor-appellant from the mass of the estate supposedly left by the deceased or to liquidate the conjugal partnership property of the oppositor-appellant and the deceased. Until, therefore the issue of the ownership of the properties sought to be sold is heard and decided, and the conjugal partnership liquidated; or, at least, an agreement be reached with a appellant as to which properties of the conjugal partnership she would not mind being sold to preserve their value the proposed sale is clearly premature. After all, most of the items sought to be sold — pieces of furniture, kitchen and dinner ware, electrical appliances, various gadget and books — can easily be protected and preserved with proper care and storage measures in either or both of two residential houses (in Manila and in Baguio City left by the deceased, so that no reasons of extreme urgency justify the proposed sale at this time over the strong opposition and objection of oppositor-appellant who may later be adjudged owner of a substantial portion of the personal estate in question.

The special administrator claims in his brief that t oppositor-appellant should have indicated the alleged "fine furniture" which she did not want sold and that her refusal to do so is an indication of her unmeritorious claim. But it does not appear that appellant was given a reasonable opportunity to point out which items in the inventory she did not want sold. In fact, her opposition to the proposed sale and later her motion for reconsideration to the order approving the same were overruled by the court without so much as stating reasons why the grounds for her opposition were not well-founded; the records do not even show that an inquiry was made as to the validity of the grounds of her opposition.

WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of December 2, 1958 authorizing the special administrator to sell certain personal properties of the estate is set aside, with costs against the special administrator Alfonso Ponce Enrile and petition-appellee Dora Perkins Anderson.

48 | P a g e