JEREZ v NIETES30 SCRA 904 FERNANDO; December 27, 1969 JOEYFACTS-
Oct. 3, 1960: Nicolas Jalandoni died.- Oct. 27, 1960: A special
proceeding for the settlement of his estate was filed before Judge
Nietes, where petitioner Lucrecia Jerez, his widow, was appointed
as administratrix.- June 14, 1966: project of partition and final
accounting was submitted- June 15, 1966: Judge Nietes gave an order
approving the partition.- June 29, 1966: respondent Lucilo
Jalandoni, alleging that he is an acknowledged natural child of the
deceased, and respondent Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta, alleging
that she is an illegitimate daughter, sought to be allowed to
intervene on the ground that they were preterited in the project of
partition which they would have respondent Judge reject for being
contrary to law. - July 8, 1966: Judge gave an order allowing
intervention and reopening the proceedings to permit the movants
"to present whatever evidence they may have to show their right to
participate in the estate of the deceased."- Sept. 21, 1966: CA
sustained CFI order.ISSUESWON CA erred in sustaining CFI orderHELD-
It is within the power of respondent Judge to reopen the
proceedings and allow intervention. The question remains, however,
whether he did so in the appropriate manner. It is not the
existence of the power but the mode of its exercise that is open to
question.- CA judges were split. The majority held that the
determination of a prima facie interest in anestate to justify
reopening proceedings for the settlement thereof is primarily
addressed to the sound discretion and judgment of the probate
court; that, while no supporting documents are appended to the
motion to reopen tending to show the personality to intervene, said
motion is nevertheless verified upon oaths of the claimants of
interest and the probate court has authority to require the
submission of at least a prima facie showing of said interest; that
the motion to reopen was filed before the order closing the
proceedings had achieved finality and during the reglementary
period within which the court still had jurisdiction over the case
and retained full power to amend and control its process and
orders; that, because the closure order had not yet become final,
the requirements of Rule 38 respecting relief from judgment do not
apply and, hence, the failure of the motion to reopen to allege any
of the grounds therein stated is not fatal; that the better
practice in case of the appearance of alleged preterited heirs is
to secure relief by reopening the proceedings by a proper motion
within the reglementary period, it being desirable that all aspects
of a controversy be ventilated in the same proceeding and thus
avoid multiplicity of suits.- The CA minority held that the better
policy is to require the intervenors first to produce prima facie
evidence of the claimed civil status before opening the door and
letting them in. Under Rule 12.2, 'a person may, before or during a
trial, be permitted by the court, in its discretion, to intervene
in an action, if he has legal interest in the matter in
litigation.' The possibility of interlopers getting in for a share
in the estate cannot be totally discounted specially considering
that the present intestate proceedings had been pending for the
last 6 years without a motion to intervene having been filed by the
present claimants in spite of the notice of publication and the in
rem character of the intestate proceedings.On the power to reopen
proceedings and allow intervention- Ramos v. Ortuzar: The only
instance that we can think of in which a party interested in a
probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when
he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or
through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. Even
then, the better practice to secure relief is reopening of the same
case by proper motionwithin the reglementary period, instead of an
independent action the effect of which, if successful, would be, as
in the instant case, for another court or judge to throw out a
decision or order already final and executed and reshuffle
properties long ago distributed and disposed of.- Rather than
require any party who can allege a grievance that his interest was
not recognized in a testate or intestate proceeding to file a
separate and independent action, he may within the reglementary
period secure the relief that is his due by a reopening of the case
even after a project of partition and final accounting had been
approved.On the exercise of the power- The verified motion on the
part of private respondents did not suffice to call into play the
power of respondent Judge to allow intervention. There must be
proof beyond allegations in such motion to show the interest of the
private movants. In the absence thereof, the action taken by
respondent Judge could be considered premature.Dispositive CA
resolution MODIFIED in the sense that Judge Nietes, or whoever may
be acting in his place, is directed to require Lucilo Jalandoni and
Victoria Jalandoni de Gorriceta to present evidence to justify
their right to intervene in SP No. 1562 re Intestate Estate of
Nicolas H. Jalandoni. In the event that they could so justify such
a right, the lower court on the basis of such evidence is to
proceed conformably to law.RAMOS V. ORTUZAR89 PHIL 730 August 21,
1651 CHRIS CAPS
- 1905-1914. Percy Hill cohabited w/ Martina Ramos & had 6
children, incl Richard & Marvin Hill. The others died in
infancy. Percy acquired lands and started improving them until his
death. - 1914. Percy canonically married Livingstone & had 3
children, now in US. Livingstone died.- 1924. Percy married Ortuzar
& had 1 daughter. - 1937. Proceedings for settlement of Percys
estate started. Ortuzar was administratrix.- 1940. Distribution of
estate was made.- 1947. Ortuzar & her daughter, and Percys
children by Livingstone, sold the land to Bustos.- Martina Ramos,
Richard & Marvin Hill brought this action in CFI Nueva Ecija to
annul partition of estate and the sale.- Court found that Ramos had
not been married to Percy, that Richard & Marvin were
acknowledged natural children, that the sale was null and void.
Court allotted estate among Richard & Marvin Hill, and Percys
children by 1st and 2nd wives.- Both parties appealed.ISSUES1. WON
Martina Ramos and Percy Hill were legally married2. WON CFI was
correct in giving course to the action to annul the partitionHELD1.
NO- No certificate of marriage or entry thereof in Civil registry
was presented, nor has explanation of the absence been offered.-
Ramos story: She and Percy were living together when her husband
said he was going to get a helper. Percy came back with a woman who
did not look like a maid at all. Percy begged her to forgive him.
She let the woman stay provided her husband gives her a house where
she can run a store and she continues to manage the lands in
question. Court: This conduct only confirms that they were not
married. And no intelligent man like Percy would be so unmindful
and so reckless to publicly marry twice while first wife was alive
and live with his new wife in plain sight of his former wife &
children.- Also, soon after Ramos and Percy separated, Ramos and
Teodoro Tobias began living together. TCT, mortgage deed, deed of
sale, birth certificates of their children say that Ramos and
Tobias are husband and wife.2. NO- Ramos never entered appearance
in Percys intestate proceedings. She came forward claiming to be
Hills wife 6 yrs after partition & adjudication of estate and
after records have disappeared.- Percy and Livingstone possessed
these properties adversely, exclusively and publicly and in concept
of owners. Whatever right Ramos had has been lost by prescription.
She slept over her alleged right for more than 30 yrs.- It also
appears that in Percys intestate proceedings, Richard & Marvin
Hill intervened or sought to intervene. Hearing was held and
testimony was taken, but the petition to intervene was denied. It
appears that all the facts raised in this present suit were
alleged, discussed and adjudicated in the expediente of Percys
intestate.- Proceeding for probate is one in rem. Court acquires
jurisdiction over all persons interested, thru publication of
notice. Any order that may be entered therein is binding against
all of them. A final order of distribution of estate vests title to
the land of estate in distributees. There is no reason why these
shouldnt apply to intestate proceedings.- The only instance in w/c
a party interested in probate proceeding may have final liquidation
set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond
his control or thru mistake or inadvertence not imputable to
negligence. Even then, the better practice is reopening of the same
case by proper motion w/in the reglamentary period, not an
independent action w/c might have effect of another judge throwing
out a decision already final and executed.PEDROSA v. CA353 SCRA 620
Quisumbing, J.; March 5, 2001 INAFACTS- Ma. Elena Rodiguez Pedrosa
is the adopted child of spouses Rosalina and Miguel Rodriguez. The
spouses had no other children. When Miguel died, his collateral
relatives filed an action in the CFI to annul the adoption of Ma.
Elena. (surprisingly, the adoptive mother was one of the
petitioners there.) The CFI upheld the validity of the adoption.
The collaterals and the widow appealed to the CA; but while the
proceedings were ongoing, they entered into an extrajudicial
settlement of the estate of Miguel, without the participation of
Ma.Elena, who was already of majority age at that time. Eventually,
the CA upheld the validity of the adoption. But by this time, the
collaterals and the widow had partitioned the estate. They
published in a newspaper the fact of partition AFTER theysettled
the partition. (For perspective, the property in question is some
226k sqm.)-Ma. Elena asked the collaterals and the widow for her
share. They refused to give her because shes not a blood relative.
So she filed an action in the CFI to annul the partition. CFI
dismissed for being filed out of time. The action was filed 3 years
10 months after the extrajudicial settlement. CA affirmed CFIs
dismissal.ISSUEWON the period in Rule 74.4 (2 years) applies in
this case.HELDNO.- The 2-year period in Rule 74.4 applies only for
validly executed extrajudicial settlements wherein the one
assailing the same participated. A valid ej settlement, per Rule
74.1, means that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have
taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are represented by
themselves or through guardians. - The contention that Ma.Elena was
represented by the adoptive mom doesnt hold because she wasnt a
minor anymore. The fact that the ej settlement was published after
the partition is also of no value because the notice is supposed to
be given BEFORE the ej settlement, to call all the heirs to
participate. The exclusion of heirs in the ej settlement is
fraudulent.- Clearly, the 2-yr period doesnt apply to Ma. Elena.
The action to annul a deed of "extrajudicial settlement" upon the
ground of fraud may be filed within 4 years from the discovery of
the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said
instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new
certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents
exclusively.- Since Ma. Elena is the adopted child, she along with
the widow are the heirs of Miguel Rodriguez, to the exclusion of
the latters collateral relatives. The collaterals, who got around
90% of the estate in the ej settlement, have no right to the same.
However, the properties that were already transferred to 3rd
persons must be recovered in a separate case because there can be
no collateral attack on Torrens Titles.- Ma. Elena wasnt able to
prove damages due her so the court awarded nominal damages of
P100k.HEIRS OF REYES V REYES AGTARAP V. AGTARAPCUIZON v RAMOLETE129
SCRA 495 GUTIERREZ; May 29, 1984 JOJO- In 1961, Marciano Cuizon
applied for the registration of several parcels of land located at
Opao, Mandaue City. The decree of registration and the OCT was
issued in 1976 in the name of Mariano; and in that same year, a TCT
covering the property in question was issued to his child Irene.-
In 1970, he distributed his property between his two children,
Rufina and Irene Cuizon. Part of the property given to Irene
consisted largely of salt beds which eventually became the subject
of this controversy.- In 1971, Irene executed a Deed of Sale with
Reservation of Usufruct involving the said salt beds in favor of
the petitioners: Francisco & Rosita Cuizon(children of Rufina)
and Purificacion Cuizon. However, the sale was not registered
because the petitioners felt it was unnecessary due to the lifetime
usufructuary rights of Irene.- In 1978, Irene died. In the
extrajudicial settlement of the estate, her alleged half sister and
sole heir Rufina adjudicated to herself all the property of the
decedent including the property in question. After the notice of
the extrajudicial settlement was duly published in a newspaper of
general circulation, Rufina thereafter, executed a deed of
Confirmation of Sale wherein she confirmed and ratified the deed of
sale of 1971 executed by the late Irene and renounced and waived
whatever rights, interest, and participation she may have in the
property in question in favor of the petitioners. Subsequently, a
new TCT was issued in favor of the petitioners.- Thereafter, a
petition for letters of administration was filed before the Cebu
CFI by respondent Domingo Antigua, allegedly selected by the 17
heirs of Irene to act as administrator of the estate of the
decedent. The petition was granted.- Antigua as administrator filed
an inventory of the estate of Irene. He included in the inventory
the property in question which was beingadministered by Juan Arche,
one of the petitioners. In 1979, the probate court granted Antiguas
motion asking the court for authority to sell the salt from the
property and praying that petitioner Arche be ordered to deliver
the salt to the administrator. Subsequently, on 3 different
occasions, respondent Segundo Zambo with the aid of several men,
sought to enforce the order of the court. Hence this petition.- The
thrust of the petitioners' argument is that the probate court, as a
court handling only the intestate proceedings, had neither the
authority to adjudicate controverted rights nor to divest them of
their possession and ownership of the property in question and hand
over the same to the administrator. Petitioners further contend
that the proper remedy of the respondent administrator is to file a
separate civil action to recover the same.- On the other hand, the
administrator contended that the deed of sale of 1971 lost its
efficacy upon the rendition of judgment and issuance of the decree
in favor of Irene Cuizon in 1976.ISSUEWON a probate court has
jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a TCT issued
in favor of owners who are not parties to the intestate proceedings
if the said parcels have been included in the inventory of
properties of the estate prepared by the administrator.HELDNO. It
is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of
proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate
and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All
that the said court could do as regards said properties is to
determine whether they should or should not be included in the
inventory or list of properties to be administered by the
administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there
is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties
have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of
the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do
so.- For the purpose of determining whether a certain property
should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate
court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not
conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate
action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties.-
As held in Siy Chong Keng v CIR, the mere inclusion in the
inventory submitted by the administrator of the estate of a
deceased person of a given property does not of itself deprive the
probate court of authority to inquire into the property of such
inclusion in case an heir or a third party claims adverse title
thereto. To hold otherwise would render inutile the power of that
court to make a prima facie determination of the issue of ownership
recognized in the above quoted precedents. The correct rule is that
the probate court should resolve the issue before it provisionally,
as basis for its inclusion in or exclusion from the inventory. It
does not even matter that the issue is raised after approval of the
inventory because apparently, it is not necessary that the
inventory and appraisal be approved by the Court.- In the instant
case, the property involved is not only claimed by outside parties
but it was sold 7 years before the death of the decedent and is
duly titled in the name of the vendees who are not party to the
proceedings. Having been apprised of the fact that the property in
question was in the possession of third parties and more important,
covered by a TCT issued in the name such third parties, the probate
court should have denied the motion of the administrator and
excluded the property in question from the inventory of the
property of the estate. It had no authority to deprive such third
persons their possession and ownership of the property.- Even
assuming the truth of the private respondents' allegations that the
sale of December 1971 was effected under suspicious circumstances
and tainted with fraud and that the right of Rufina as alleged
half-sister and sole heir of Irene remains open to question, these
issues may only be threshed out in a separate civil action filed by
the respondent administrator against the petitioners and not in the
intestate proceedings.LUZON SURETY COMPANY, INC. vs. PASTOR T.
QUEBRAR, ET AL. MAKASIAR; January 31, 1984 ATHEFACTS- Luzon Surety
issued two administrator's bond in the amount of P15,000.00 each,
in behalf of the Quebrar, as administrator of estates of Chinsuy
and Lipa. In consideration of the suretyship wherein the Luzon
Surety was bound jointly and severally with the defendant Quebrar,
the latter, together with Kilayko, executed two indemnity
agreements.- Defendants paid P304.50 under each indemnity agreement
or a total of P609.00 for premiums and documentary stamps.- CFI
approved the amended Project of Partition and Accounts of
defendant-appellant- Luzon Surety demanded from the defendants-
appellants the payment of the premiums and documentary stamps from
August 9,1955.- The defendants-appellants ordered a motion for
cancellation and/or reduction of executor's bonds on the ground
that "the heirs of these testate estates have already received
their respective shares. The court ordered the bonds cancelled.-
Plaintiff-appellee's demand amounted to P2,436.00 in each case,
hence, a total of P4,872.00 for the period of August 9, 1955 to
October 20, 1962. The defendants-appellants refused to pay the said
amount of P4,872.00 arguing that both the Administrator's Bonds and
the Indemnity Agreements ceased to have any force and effect, the
former since June 6, 1957 with the approval of the project of
partition and the latter since August 9, 1955 with the non- payment
of the stated premiums.ISSUEWON the administrator's bonds were in
force and effect from and after the year that they were filed and
approved by the court up to 1962, when they were cancelled,
therefore, defendants are liable to Luzon SuretyHELDYES. Section 1
of Rule 81 of the Rules of Court requires the
administrator/executor to put up a bond for the purpose of
indemnifying the creditors, heirs, legatees and the estate. It is
conditioned upon the faithful performance of the administrator's
trust (Mendoza vs. Pacheco, 64 Phil. 134).Having in mind the
purpose and intent of the law, the surety is then liable under the
administrator's bond, for as long as the administrator has duties
to do as such administrator/executor. Since the liability of the
sureties is co-extensive with that ofthe administrator and embraces
the performance of every duty he is called upon to perform in the
course of administration it follows that the administrator is still
duty bound to respect the indemnity agreements entered into by him
in consideration of the suretyship.Reasoning:a. It is shown that
the defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar, still had something to
do as an administrator/executor even after the approval of the
amended project of partition and accounts on June 6, 1957.The
contention of the defendants-appellants that the administrator's
bond ceased to be of legal force and effect with the approval of
the project of partition and statement of accounts on June 6, 1957
is without merit. The defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar did not
cease as administrator after June 6, 1957, for administration is
for the purpose of liquidation of the estate and distribution of
the residue among the heirs and legatees. And liquidation means the
determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of all
the debts and expenses (Flores vs. Flores, 48 Phil. 982). It
appears that there were still debts and expenses to be paid after
June 6, 1957.And in the case of Montemayor vs. Gutierrez (114 Phil.
95), an estate may be partitioned even before the termination of
the administration proceedings. Hence, the approval of the project
of partition did not necessarily terminate the administration
proceedings. Notwithstanding the approval of the partition, the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental still had jurisdiction
over the administration proceedings of the estate of Chinsuy and
Lipa.b. The sureties of an administration bond are liable only as a
rule, for matters occurring during the term covered by the bond.
And the term of a bond does not usually expire until the
administration has been closed and terminated in the manner
directed by law Thus, as long as the probate court retains
jurisdiction of the estate, the bond contemplates a continuing
liability notwithstanding the non-renewal of the bond by the
defendants-appellants.The probate court possesses an all-embracing
power over the administrator's bond and over the administration
proceedings and it cannot be devoid of legal authority to execute
and make that bond answerable for the every purpose forwhich it was
filed. It is the duty of the courts of probate jurisdiction to
guard jealously the estate of the deceased persons by intervening
in the administration thereof in order to remedy or repair any
injury that may be done theretoDIEZ v. SERRA51 Phil. 283 VILLAMOR;
December 24, 1927 GLAISAFACTS- Diez applied to the CFI Occidental
Negros for letters of administration of the estate of the deceased
Florencia Diez alleging that he is a brother of the said Florencia
Diez who last resided at Negros; that the deceased at the time of
her death was a widow and left no will; that the deceased left
realty consisting in a share of one- third of lots; that the
deceased left seven children.- Court granted the application,
ordering the appointment of Diez as administrator, upon his filing
a bond in the sum of P5,000. Diez presented an inventory of the
property under his administration.- The administration functioned
for two years until a child of Florencia, Tomas Serra for himself
and as guardian of his six minor brothers and sisters, put in a
special appearance, contesting that court's authority to take
cognizance of this intestate estate, on the ground that the
deceased Florencia Diez resided in the municipality of San Joaquin,
Province of Iloilo, at the time of her death, as evidenced by the
death certificate.- The North Negros Sugar Co., Inc. filed an
intervention in this case, as creditor of the intestate estate for
a mortgage loan granted to the administrator, with the
authorization of the court, maintaining the validity of these
proceedings, and asking for the dismissal of the special appearance
of Tomas Serra et al.- The court denied the petition of the special
appearance.ISSUEWON Tomas Serra et al can contest the competency
and jurisdiction of CFI of Occidental Negros to take cognizance of
and act in the proceeding for the settlement of the intestate
estate of the deceased Florencia DiezHELD- NO. This administration
has functioned for two years, and the appellants after that period
have appeared in this case, too late to avail themselves of the
benefits offered by section 113 of the Code of Civil Procedure, and
it would seem that the only remedy left to them is to ask for the
reopening of the proceedings in the lower court that assumed
jurisdiction.- In order to render valid a grant of letters of
administration the view is generally accepted that certain
jurisdictional facts must exist. These facts are that the person on
whose estate the letters are being granted is in fact dead, and
that at the time of death he was a resident of the county wherein
letters are being granted, or if not a resident that he left assets
in such county. It has been said that the fact of the death of the
intestate and of his residence within the county are foundation
facts upon which all the subsequent proceedings in the
administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was
not an inhabitant of the state at the time of his death, and left
no assets in the state, and none came into it afterwards, no
jurisdiction is conferred on the court to grant letters of
administration in any county. A probate court has jurisdiction to
grant administration of the estate of a person who at the time of
his decease was an inhabitant or resident in the county, without
proof that he left an estate to be administered within the county.-
Section 603 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that the
jurisdiction assumed by a Court of First Instance for the
settlement of an estate, so far as it depends on the place of
residence of a person, or of the location of his estate, shall not
be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that
court, in the original case, or when the lack of jurisdiction
appears in the record. In the present case the lack of jurisdiction
did not appear in the record at the time when the court a quo that
appointed the administrator found itself competent, and no appeal
was taken from the order decreeing said appointment.BASA V
MERCADO61 PHIL 632 GODDARD; July 26, 1935 OWENFACTS- CFI Pampanga
allowed and probated last will and testament of Ines Basa. Atilano
Mercado(respondent) was appointed the administrator and was
declared the only heir of the deceased under the will. The
administration proceedings was closed. Joaquin Basa (petitioner)
filed a motion praying that proceedings be reopened and alleged
that court lacked jurisdiction to act in the matter because there
was a failure to comply with requirements as to the publication of
the notice of hearing and that Ing Katipunan is not a general
circulation in Pampanga as prescribed in the following section of
the Code of Civil Procedure:SEC. 630. Court to appoint hearing on
will. When a will is delivered to a court having jurisdiction of
the same, the court shall appoint a time and place when all
concerned may appear to contest the allowance of the will, and
shall cause public notice thereof to be given by publication in
such newspaper or newspapers as the court directs of general
circulation in the province, three weeks successively, previous to
the time appointed, and no will shall be allowed until such notice
has been given. At the hearing all testimony shall be taken under
oath, reduced to writing and signed by the witnesses."- First
publication: June 6, 1931Third: June 20, 1931Hearing: June 27,
1931NOTE: only 21 days after the date of the FIRST publication
instead of THREE FULL WEEKS BEFORE the day set for the
hearingISSUES1. WON Sec 630 means publication requirement
constitutes three full weeks before the date of hearing2. WON Ing
Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation in PampangaHELD1.
NORatio First publication of the notice need not be made twenty-one
days before the day appointed for the hearing. Reasoning- HISTORY
OF Section 630 > Code of Civil Procedure of State of Vermont. SC
of Vermont stated in In re Warner's Estate:Date of examining and
allowing final account of administration and for decreeing the
residue of the estate to the lawful claimants of the same: December
19, 1919Order to this effect: November 28, 1919Date of Publication:
December 4, 11 and 18, 1919 (three weeks successively)NOTE: This
was 'public notice' to all persons interested of the time and place
of examining and allowing said account and making decree of
distribution, and was sufficient... even though the hearing on the
administrator's final account was set for December 19, only fifteen
days after the date of the first publication.2. YES- record shows
that Ing Katipunan is a newspaper of general circulation as it
is> published for the dissemination of local news and general
information> has a bona fide subscription list of paying
subscribes> published at regular intervals and> trial court
ordered the publication to be made in Ing Katipunan precisely
because it was a "newspaper of general circulation in the Province
of Pampanga."- no attempt has been made to prove that it was a
newspaper devoted to the interests or published for the
entertainment of a particular class, profession, trade, calling,
race or religious denomination- fact that there is another paper
published in Pampanga that has a few more subscribers (72 to be
exact) and that certain Manila dailies also have a larger
circulation in that province is unimportant. No fixed number of
subscribers is necessary to constitute a newspaper of general
circulation.Disposition TC affirmedRODRIGUEZ V BORJA17 SCRA 418
REYES JBL; June 21, 1966 TERRYNATUREPetition for CertiorariFACTS-
Fr. Rodriguez died in Manila. On March 4, 1963, respondents
Pangilinan and Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a
purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez.On March 8,
1963, Maria Rodriguez and Angela Rodriguez filed a petition for
leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will, which was
withdrawn- On March 12, 1963, the Rodriguezes, petitioners herein,
filed before CFI of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the
intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez alleging, among other things,
that Fr. Rodriguez was a resident of Paranaque, Rizal, and died
without leaving a will and praying that Maria Rodriguez be
appointed as Special Administratrix of the estate.- On same day,
Pangilinan and Jacalan filed a petition for the probation of the
will delivered by them on March 4, 1963. It was stipulated by the
parties that Fr. Rodriguez was born in Paranaque, Rizal; that he
was Parish priest of the Catholic Church of Hagonoy, Bulacan, from
1930 up to the time of his death in 1963; that he was buried in
Paranaque, and that he left real properties in Rizal, Cavite,
Quezon City and Bulacan.- The Rodriguezes contend that since the
intestate proceedings in the Court of First Instance of Rizal was
filed at 8:00 A.M. on March 12, 1963 while the petition for probate
was filed in CFI Bulacan at 11:00 A.M. on the same date, the latter
Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition for probate.-
Pangilinan and Jacalan, aver that the CFI of Bulacan acquired
jurisdiction over the case upon delivery by them of the will to the
Clerk of Court on March 4, 1963, and that the case in CFI Bulacan
therefore has precedence over the case filed in Rizal on March 12,
1963.ISSUEWON CFI Bulacan had jurisdiction over the caseHELDYES-
The jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan became vested upon the delivery
thereto of the will of the late Fr Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even
if no petition for its allowance was filed until later, because
upon the will being deposited, the court could, motu proprio, have
taken steps to fix the time and place for proving the will, and
issued the corresponding notices as under Sec 3, Rule 76, of the
Revised Rules of Court- The use of the disjunctive in the words
"when a will is delivered to OR a petition for the allowance of a
will is filed" plainly indicates that the court may act upon the
mere deposit therein of a decedent's testament, even if no petition
for its allowance is as yet filed. Where the petition for probate
is made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to
relate back to the timewhen the will was delivered. Since the
testament of Fr. Rodriguez was submitted and delivered to CFI
Bulacan on March 4, while petitioners initiated intestate
proceedings in CFI Rizal only on March 12, 8 days later, the
precedence and exclusive jurisdiction of CFI Bulacan is
incontestable.- But, petitioners object, section 3 of revised Rule
76 speaks of a will being delivered to "the Court having
jurisdiction," and in the case at bar the Bulacan court did not
have it because the decedent was domiciled in Rizal province. We
can not disregard Fr. Rodriguez's 33 years of residence as parish
priest in Hagonoy, Bulacan (1930-1963); but even if we do so, and
consider that he retained throughout some animus revertendi to the
place of his birth in Rizal, that detail would not imply that the
Bulacan court lacked jurisdiction. As ruled in previous decisions,
the power to settle decedents' estates is conferred by law upon all
CFIs, and the domicile of the testator only affects the venue but
not the jurisdiction of the Court (In re Kaw Singco, 74 Phil. 239;
Reyes vs. Diaz, 73 Phil. 484; Bernabe vs. Vergara, 73 Phil. 676).
Neither party denies that the late Fr. Rodriguez is deceased, or
that he left personal property in Hagonoy, province of Bulacan.
That is sufficient in this case. Disposition Petition for
certiorari is DENIED.
CASTANEDA V ALEMANYGR 1439 WILLARD; March 14, 1904
MAIANATUREAppeal from judgment of CFI Manila allowing will of Dona
Juana MorenoFACTS- the CFI Manila allowed the will of Dona Juana
Moreno, holding that all the legal formalities had been required
with in the execution of the will- appellants (through Alemany,
administrator of the properties of minors Leandro and Paz Gruet,
children of Dona Juana) question this ruling, contending that said
will was not written in the presence and under express direction of
the testatrix as required by Code of Civil Procedure.- on the other
hand, appellees contend that the grounds for the disallowance of a
will are limited to those enumerated in the same codeISSUEWON the
CFI erred in allowing the willHELDNORatio the evidence shows that
the will of Dona Juana Moreno was duly signed by herself in the
presence of three witnesses, who signed it as witnesses in the
presence of the testatrix and of each other. It was therefore
executed in conformity with the law.Reasoning Section 618 of the
Code of Civil Procedure reads: No will xxx shall be valid to pass
any estate, real of personal, nor charge or effect the same, unless
it be in writing and signed by the testator, or by the testator's
name written by some other person in his presence, and by his
express direction, and attested and subscribed by three or more
credible witnesses in the presence of the testator and each of the
other. xxx- all that the quoted provision requires is (a) that the
will be in writing, and (2) either the testator sign it in himself,
or, if he does not sign it, that it be signed by someone in his
presence and under his direction. Who does the mechanical work of
writing the will is a matter of indifference- here, the will was
typewritten in the office of the lawyer, but this fact is of no
consequence (court did not elaborate).- the only purpose of the
proceedings under the code for the probate of a will is to
establish conclusively as against everyone, and once for all, the
facts that a will was executed with the formalities required by law
and that the testator was in a condition to make a will (Sec. 625)-
judgment in such proceedings determines and can determine nothing
more. The court has no power to pass upon the validity of any
provisions made in the will. It can not decide, for example, that a
certain legacy is void and another one valid. It could not in this
case make any decision upon the question whether the testratrix had
the power to appoint by will a guardian for the property of her
children by her first husband, or whether the person so appointed
was or was not a suitable person to discharge such trust. All such
questions must be decided in some other proceeding.- grounds on
which a will may be disallowed are stated the section 634 (now
sec.9, rule 76). Unless one of those grounds appears, the will must
be allowed. They all have to do with the personal condition of the
testator at the time of its execution and the formalities connected
therewith. It follows that neither this court nor the court below
has any jurisdiction in this proceedings to pass upon questions
raised by appellants relating to the appointment of a guardian for
the children of the deceased.- It is claimed by appellants that
there was no testimony to show that the will executed was the same
will presented to the court and concerning which this hearing was
had. It is true that the evidence does not show that the document
in court was presented to the witnesses and identified by them, as
should have been done. However, it appears that it was assumed by
all the parties during the trial that the will about which the
witnesses were testifying was the document then in court. No
suggestion of any kind was then made by the counsel for appellants
that it was not the same instrument.Disposition Petition is denied.
Decision affirmedATILANO G. MERCADO V JUDGE SANTOS66 PHIL
215LAUREL, J: 1938NATUREPetition for review on certiorariFACTSOn
May 28, 1931, the petitioner herein filed in the CFI of Pampanga a
petition for the probate of the will of his deceased wife, Ines
Basa. Without any opposition, and upon the testimony of Benigno F.
Gabino, one of the attesting witnesses, the probate court, on June
27, 1931, admitted the will to probate. Almost three years later,
on April 11, 1934, the five intervenors herein moved ex parte to
reopen the proceedings, alleging lack of jurisdiction of the court
to probate the will and to close the proceedings. Because filed ex
parte, the motion was denied. The same motion was filed a second
time, but with notice to the adverse party. The motion was
nevertheless denied by the probate court on May 24, 1934. On appeal
to this court, the order of denial was affirmed on July 26, 1935.It
appears that on October 27, 1932, i. e., 16 sixteen months after
the probate of the will of Ines Basa, intervenor Rosario Basa de
Leon filed with the justice of the peacecourt of San Fernando,
Pampanga, a complaint against the petitioner herein, for
falsification or forgery of the will probated as above
indicated.ISSUEWON the probate of the will of the deceased wife is
a bar to his criminal prosecution for the alleged forgery of the
said willHELDYES.- Sec. 306 of our Code of Civil Procedure provides
as to the effect of judgment:"SEC. 306. Effect of judgment. The
effect of a judgment or final order in an action or special
proceeding before a court or judge of the Philippine Islands or of
the United States, or of any State or Territory of the United
States, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may
be as follows:"1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific
thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the
administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to
the personal, political, or legal condition or relation of a
particular person, the judgment or order is conclusive upon the
title of the thing, the will or administration, or the condition or
relation of the person: Provided, That the probate of a will or
granting of letters of administration shall only be prima facie
evidence of the death of the testator or intestate:Section 625 of
the same Code is more explicit as to the conclusiveness of the due
execution of a probated will. It says:"SEC. 625. Allowance
Necessary, and Conclusive as to Execution. No will shall pass
either the real or personal estate, unless it is proved and allowed
in the Court of First Instance, or by appeal to the Supreme Court;
and the allowance by the court of a will of real and personal
estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution."In Manahan vs.
Manahan (58 Phil., 448, 451), we held:". . . The decree of probate
is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof and it
cannot be impugned on any of the groundsauthorized by law, except
that of fraud, in any separate or independent action or
proceeding.In 28 R. C. L., p. 377, section 378, it is said:"The
probate of a will by the probate court having jurisdiction thereof
is usually considered as conclusive as to its due execution and
validity, and is also conclusive that the testator was of sound and
disposing mind at the time when he executed the will, and was not
acting under duress, menace, fraud, or undue influence, and that
the will is genuine and not a forgery."The probate of a will in
this jurisdiction is a proceeding in rem. The provision of notice
by publication as a prerequisite to the allowance of a will is
constructive notice to the whole world, and when probate is
granted, the judgment of the court is binding upon everybody, even
against the State. This court held in the case of Manalo vs.
Paredes and Philippine Food Co. (47 Phil., 938):"The proceeding for
the probate of a will is one in rem (40 Cyc., 1265), and the court
acquires jurisdiction over all the persons interested, through the
publication of the notice prescribed by section 630 of the Code of
Civil Procedure, and any order that may be entered therein is
binding against all of them."Through the publication of the
petition for the probate of the will, the court acquires
jurisdiction over all such persons as are interested in said will;
and any judgment that may be rendered after said proceeding is
binding against the world."FLUEMER VS HIXG.R. No. L-32636 MALCOLM;
March 17,1930 MELNATUREAppeal from CFI decision denying the probate
of the document alleged to by the last will and testament of the
deceased.FACTS- Petitioner alleges that the will was executed in
Elkins, West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, byHix who had his
residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Verginia
Code, Annotated, by Hogg, Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p. 1690, and as
certified to by the Director of the National Library. Judge of
First Instance Tuason denied the probate of the document alleged to
by the last will and testament of the deceased.- While the appeal
pending submission in this court, the attorney for the appellant
presented an unverified petition asking the court to accept as part
of the evidence the documents attached to the petition. One of
these documents discloses that a paper writing purporting to be the
was presented for probate on June 8, 1929, to the clerk of Randolph
Country, State of West Virginia, in vacation, and was duly proven
by the oaths of Dana Wamsley and Joseph L. MAdden, the subscribing
witnesses thereto , and ordered to be recorded and filed. It was
shown by another document that, in vacation, on June 8, 1929, the
clerk of court of Randolph Country, West Virginia, appointed Claude
W. Maxwell as administrator, cum testamento annexo, of the estate
of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased. In this connection, it is to be
noted that the application for the probate of the will in the
Philippines was filed on February 20, 1929, while the proceedings
in West Virginia appear to have been initiated on June 8, 1929.
These facts are strongly indicative of an intention to make the
Philippines the principal administration and West Virginia the
ancillary administration.ISSUEWON the will should be
allowedHELDNORatio: No attempt has been made to comply with Civil
Procedure, for no hearing on the question of the allowance of a
will said to have been proved and allowed in West Virginia has been
requested. There is no showing that the deceased left any property
at any place other than the Philippine Islands and no contention
that he left any in West Virginia.Reasoning As stated by the lower
court, the requirements of the law were not met. There was no was
printed or published under the authority of the State of West
Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the
certificate of the officer having charge of theoriginal, under the
sale of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of
the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence was introduced to show
that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the
time the alleged will was executed.- In addition, the due execution
of the will was not established. The only evidence on this point is
to be found in the testimony of the petitioner. Aside from this,
there was nothing to indicate that the will was acknowledged by the
testator in the presence of two competent witnesses, of that these
witnesses subscribed the will in the presence of the testator and
of each other as the law of West Virginia seems to require. On the
supposition that the witnesses to the will reside without the
Philippine Islands, it would then the duty of the petitioner to
prove execution by some other means (Code of Civil Procedure, sec.
633.)- It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the
testator had his domicile in West Virginia and not establish this
fact consisted of the recitals in the CATHY will and the testimony
of the petitioner. Also in beginning administration proceedings
orginally in the Philippine Islands, the petitioner violated his
own theory by attempting to have the principal administration in
the Philippine Islands.DISPOSITION Judgment affirmedSIOCA v
GARCIA44 Phil 711Mar 27, 1923; OSTRAND KOOKYFACTS:- Juan Navas L.
Sioca is the surviving spouse of the deceased Geronima Uy Coque.
The probate court appointed Jose Garcia as the administrator of the
deceaseds estate. Sioca maintains that the court erred in this
respect.ISSUE:WON the probate court erred in not appointing the
deceaseds husband, Sioca, as administrator of the estate.(NOTE: The
SC first held that the question raised is res judicata as there was
no appeal taken from the order of the lower court refusing to
appoint Sioca as administrator. But the SC proceeded to state
another reason why this appeal is without merit.)HELD:NO.- A
probate court cannot arbitrarily and without sufficient reason
disregard the preferential rights of the surviving spouse tothe
administration of the estate of the deceased spouse. But, if the
person enjoying such preferential rights is unsuitable, the court
may appoint another person. The determination of a persons
suitability for the office of administrator rests, to a great
extent, in the sound judgment of the court exercising the power of
appointment and such judgment will not be interfered with on appeal
unless it appears affirmatively that the lower court was in error.-
the probate court based its ruling on the fact that Sioca had
adverse interests in the estate of such character as to render him
unsuitable as administrator. Unsuitableness may consist in adverse
interest of some kind or hostility to those immediately interested
in the estate.Disposition Affirmed.LIM V DIAZ-MILLAREZ18 SCRA 371
October 19, 1966; REGALA- Cirilo Lim, claiming to be a nephew of
the late Jose Millarez who died intestate filed a petition for his
appointment as judicial administrator of the estate of the
deceased.- The petition alleged that the deceased left no relatives
such as descendants, ascendants or surviving spouse, except
collaterals.- Basilisa Diaz-Millarez, claiming to be a widow of the
deceased filed an opposition on two grounds: 1. that the petitioner
has an adverse interest in the estate; and2. that the properties of
the estate are the subject matter of a litigation between her as
plaintiff and Cirilo Lim as defendant- When the case was called for
hearing, both parties manifested the existence of a litigation
between them over the properties of the estate.- TC dismissed
petition.- Failing in his motion for the reconsideration,
petitioner Lim, brought the case to the CA which certified the
appeal to SC.- In the Civil Case: Diaz-Millarez sought to recover
from Lim 1/2 of the total amount of P22,000 allegedly delivered to
him by her and the deceased Millarez on various occasions and to
declare her as the owner of 1/2 of the profits and gains derived
therefrom, on the ground that Jose Millarez and she used to live as
husband and wife for about 23 years and as such she is entitled to
1/2 of the property held in common by them. She asserted further
that since she contributed capital and labor to the tobacco
business in which she and the deceased were engaged and from which
they gave P22,000 in cash to Lim, she would be entitled to 1/2 of
the capital and 1/2 of the proceeds and profits derived from such
capital.ISSUEWON Lim may be appointed as administrator of the
estate of the deceased.HELD- NO. The claim which Basilisa has
against Cirilo in the civil case is based on her declared right to
one-half of the estate of the deceased.- It cannot, therefore, be
denied that Cirilo Lim, as a relative of the deceased has some
interest adverse to that of Basilisa. Shown to have some
liabilities to Basilisa and to the estate as a whole, Cirilo cannot
compatibly perform the duties of an administrator.- In this
jurisdiction, one is considered to be unsuitable for appointment as
administrator when he has adverse interest of some kind or
hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.- The
determination of a person's suitability for the office of judicial
administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgment of
the court exercising the power of appointment and said judgment is
not to be interfered with on appeal unless the said court is
clearly in error. Disposition Order appealed from affirmed.TORRES
vs. JAVIER34 Phil. 383; Moreland; March 24, 1916FACTS-Two women are
claiming to be the legal wife of deceased Tan Po Pic.Marta Torres
objected to the appointment of any except herself.Juan Cailles Tan
Poo, on behalf of the Chinese woman Yu Teng New, opposed the
appointment of Marta Torres.-The probate court being unable to
determine who, if either, was the lawful wife of the deceased,
appointed a disinterested third person (Juan L. Javier) to act as
administrator.-This appeal is taken by Marta Torres from that order
of appointment.ISSUEWON the probate court may validly appoint a
disinterested third person as the administrator of the
estateHELDYES, the court had a right in view of the controversy
between the women to name a disinterested third person as
administrator and leave the controversy between them to be settled
in the administration proceedings at the proper time.-The probate
court did not find as a fact that there was a wife in China. The
court considered the facts and circumstances as they were presented
in the proceedings and upon the wholebelieved it for the best
interest of all concerned to appoint as administrator a
disinterested third person, particularly in view of the fact that
there was likely to be litigation between Marta Torres and the
Chinese wife as to which is in fact his legal wife and entitled to
an interest in the estate of the deceased Tan Po Pic.Disposition
Judgment affirmed. PARAS V NARCISO35 PHIL 244 CARSON; November 16,
1916FACTS:- The trial court denied probate of the will of Mariano
Magsino on the ground that the wil was prepared and signed by the
witnesses after his death.ISSUES:WON the oppositor in the probate
of the will had sufficient interest to be allowed to maintain his
oppositionHELD: YESRatio The admission to probate of a will may be
opposed or contested by, and only by, persons having some interest
in the estate which will be affected and concluded by the probate
of the proposed will. However, the appellant herein did not make an
objection in the trial court as to the intervention of the
oppositor.Reasoning The mere fact that a stranger has been
permitted to oppose or contest the probate of a will is not
reversible error and does not invalidate the proceedings where no
objection is interposed by any of the parties in interest .The
judgment of the court in probate proceedings is not based on the
fact that there is or is not opposition to the probate of the will
but upon the production of evidence which discloses that there are
or are not sufficient grounds for the probate of the will as
propounded; and the reason for the rule excluding strangers from
contesting the will, is not that thereby the court may be prevented
from learning facts which would justify or necessitate a denial of
probate, but rather that the courts and the litigants should not be
molested by the intervention in the proceedings of persons with no
interest in the estate which would entitle them to be heard with
relation thereto.- In the case at bar, no objection was made as to
the intervention of the oppositor. Further, it is to be observed
that the judgment of the court was based on evidence submitted by
the oppositor. No objection was made on the ground that it was
submitted by a stranger. Having been admitted to record without
objection, and being competent, relevant and material, and
conclusive in support of the judgment of the trial court, it would
be absurd for us to hold that the judgment below erred in basing
his judgment thereon, merely on the ground that on appeal it is
made to appear or is admitted that the contestant had no interest
in the estate. Whether the contestant had or had not any right to
intervene, the evidence submitted at the trial without objection,
conclusively sustains the findings of the trial judge on which he
properly based his denial of probate.DURAN V DURANBengzon; June 14,
1967 30 SCRA 331FACTS-Pio Duran died without testament.-Subsequent
to his death, Cipriano Duran, one of the surviving brothers,
executed a public instrument assigning and renouncing his
hereditary rights to the decedent's estate in favor of Josefina
Duran for consideration.-A year later Cipriano Duran filed a
petition for intestate proceedings to settle Pio Duran's estate,
further asking that he be named the administrator. Josefina Duran
filed an opposition, praying for its dismissal upon the ground that
the petitioner is not an "interested person" in the estate, in view
of the deed of transfer and renunciation afore-stated. Replying to
this, Cipriano alleged that Josefina Duran was not the decedents
wife. Anent the deed of assignment, he contended that the same was
procured thru fraud, with gross inadequacy of price and vitiated by
lesion.-Another brother of the decedent, Miguel Duran, filed a
petition to be joined as co-petitioner of Cipriano. Josefina Duran
moved to strike out said petition as an improper attempt to
intervene in the case.-Court of First Instance dismissed the action
for lack of interest in the estate. Said lack of interest was
premised on the deed of transfer executed by Cipriano, regarding
which the court declared itself without power to examine in said
proceedings, collaterally, the alleged fraud, inadequacy of price
and lesion that would render it rescissible or voidable.-Cipriano
appeals relying on In Re Irene Santos.ISSUEWON an assignment by one
heir of his share in the estate to a co-heir amounts to a partition
needing approval by the settlement court to be effective and that
the assigning heir does not lose his status as a person interested
in the estate, even after said assignment is approved by the
court.HELDYes, but such does not apply to the case at bar. -The
situation in the Santos case involves an assignment between
co-heirs pendente lite, during the course of settlement
proceedings, properly and validly commenced. At the time of said
assignment, therefore, the settlement court had already acquired
jurisdiction over the properties of the estate. As a result, any
assignment regarding the same had to be approved by said court. And
since the approval of the court is not deemed final until the
estate is closed, the assigning heir remains an interested person
in the proceedings even after said approval, which can be vacated,
is given.In the present case, however, the assignment took place
when no settlement proceedings was pending. The properties subject
matter of the assignment were not under the jurisdiction of a
settlement court. Allowing that the assignment must be deemed a
partition as between the assignor and assignee, the same does not
need court approval to be effective as between the parties. An
extra judicial partition is valid as between the participants even
if the requisites of Sec 1, Rule 74 for extrajudicial partition are
not followed, since said requisites are for purposes of binding
creditors and non-participating heirs only (Hernandez vs. Andal, 78
Phil. 196). Should it be contended that said partition was attended
with fraud, lesion or inadequacy of price, the remedy is to rescind
or to annul the same in an action for that purpose. And in the
meanwhile, the assigning heir cannot initiate a settlement
proceedings, for until the deed of assignment is annulled or
rescinded, it is deemed valid and effective against him, so that he
is left without that "interest" in the estate required to petition
for settlement proceedings.Miguel Durans petition amounted to a
petition to intervene in the settlement proceedings. As aptly ruled
by the court a quo since there was really no settlement proceedings
in the first place, the petition to intervene must be
denied.Finally, although Josefina Duran prayed to be appointed
administratrix, her doing so did not admit to ratification of the
petition for settlement under the ruling in Eusebio vs. Valmores,
since she did so merely by way of an alternative prayer, should her
motion to dismiss fail. And said motion to dismiss was properly
sustained.Disposition Affirmed
