G.R. No. 147468            April 9, 2003

SPOUSES EDUARDO ARENAS DOMINGO & JOSEFINA CHAVEZ DOMINGO, petitioners, vs.LILIA MONTINOLA ROCES, CESAR ROBERTO M. ROCES, ANA INES MAGDALENA ROCES TOLENTINO, LUIS MIGUEL M. ROCES, JOSE ANTONIO M. ROCES and MARIA VIDA PRESENTACION ROCES, respondents.

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

FACTS: Spouses Cesar and Lilia Roces were the owners of two contiguous parcels of land located on Arayat Street, Mandaluyong, covered by Transfer Certificates of Title Nos. 57217 and 57218. On November 13, 1962, the GSIS caused the annotation of an affidavit of adverse claim on the titles alleging that the spouses have mortgaged the same to it. Subsequently, GSIS wrote a letter to Cesar Roces demanding the surrender of the owner's duplicates of titles. When Roces failed to comply, GSIS filed a petition with the CFI praying that the owner's duplicates in Roces' possession be declared null and void and that the ROD be directed to issue new owner's duplicates to GSIS. The CFI granted the petition and TCT Nos. 57217 (11663) and 57218 (11664) were issued in the name of GSIS.

Cesar Roces died intestate on January 26, 1980. He was survived by his widow, Lilia, and their children: Cesar, Ana, Luis Miguel M. Roces, Jose Antonio and Maria Vida, all of whom are the respondents in this case.

On July 22, 1992, Reynaldo L. Montinola, a nephew of Lilia Roces, executed an affidavit of self-adjudication over the Arayat properties. He alleged that the properties were owned by the spouses Roces, both of whom died intestate, on September 13, 1987 and June 27, 1989, respectively; that the spouses left no heirs except the brother of Lilia Roces, who was his father; that neither of the spouses left any will nor any debts; and that he was the sole heir of the Roces spouses. Montinola succeeded in annulling the titles and was issued TCT No. 7299 in the name of Montinola in lieu of TCT No. 57218 (11664). Montinola later sold the property covered by TCT No. 7299 in favor of petitioner spouses Eduardo and Josefina Domingo. Thereafter, TCT No. 7673 was issued in the names of petitioners.

Both TCT Nos. 7299 and 7673 was subject to the provision of Section 4, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court.

Respondents learned of the sale of the prop erty to petitioners, they filed a complaint against Montinola and petitioners with the RTC. They argued that the affidavit of self-adjudication was fraudulent because Montinola was not an heir of the Roces spouses and it was not true that Lilia Roces was dead. Therefore, the affidavit of self-adjudication, as well as the deed of absolute sale, TCT No. 7299, and TCT No. 7673, all covering the subject property, were null and void.

In their answer, petitioners alleged that they were buyers in good faith and that their action was barred by estoppel and laches.

RTC: Montinola is liable for damages; Petitioner’s counter-claim was dismissed

CA: Affidavit of Self-Adjudication was declared null and void; Transfer Certificate of Title No. 57218 (11664), under the names of Sps Roces was reinstated.

ISSUE: WHETHER SEC. 4, RULE 74 IS AN ENCUMBRANCE WHICH DISQUALIFIES PETITIONERS FROM BEING INNOCENT PURCHASERS FOR VALUE;

WHETHER RESPONDENTS WERE GUILTY OF LACHES

HELD:

The buyer of real property the title of which contain an annotation pursuant to Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court cannot be considered innocent purchasers for value. In the same vein, the annotation at the back of TCT No. 7299 in this case referring to Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court was sufficient notice to petitioners of the limitation on Montinola's right to dispose of the property. The presence of an irregularity which excites or arouses suspicion should prompt the vendee to look beyond the certificate and investigate the title of the vendor appearing on the face thereof. Purchasers of registered land are bound by the annotations found at the back of the certificate of title.

Hence, petitioners cannot be considered buyers in good faith and cannot now avoid the consequences brought about by the application of Rule 74, Section 4 of the Rules of Court.

Laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The essential elements of laches are: (1) conduct on the part of defendant or one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation complained of; (2) delay in asserting complainant's right after he had knowledge of the defendant's conduct and after he has an opportunity to sue; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to the complainant.

On the other hand, estoppel by laches arises from the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it.

In the case at bar, only four months elapsed from the time respondents discovered Montinola's fraudulent acts, sometime in May 1993, to the time they filed their complaint on September 6, 1993. This relatively short span of time can hardly be called unreasonable, especially considering that respondents used this period of time to investigate the transfers of the property. Delay is an indispensable requisite for a finding of estoppel by laches, but to be barred from bringing suit on grounds of estoppel and laches, the delay must be lengthy and unreasonable. No unreasonable delay can be attributed to respondents in this case.

G.R. No. 45904           September 30, 1938

Intestate estate of the deceased Luz Garcia. PABLO G. UTULO, applicant-appellee, vs.LEONA PASION VIUDA DE GARCIA, oppositor-appellant.

IMPERIAL, J.:

FACTS:

This is an appeal taken by the oppositor from the order of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Tarlac appointing the applicant as judicial administrator of the property left by the deceased Luz Garcia.

Juan Garcia Sanchez died intestate, and in the proceedings instituted in the CFI for the administration of his property (special proceedings No. 3475), Leona Pasion Vda. de Garcia, the surviving spouse and the herein oppositor, was appointed judicial administratrix. The said deceased left legitimate children, named Juan, jr., Patrocinio and Luz who, with the widow, are the presumptive forced heirs. Luz Garcia married the applicant Pablo G. Utulo and during the pendency of the administration proceedings of the said deceased, she died in the province without any legitimate descendants, her only forced heirs being her mother and her husband. The latter commenced in the same court the judicial administration of the property of his deceased wife (special proceedings No. 4188), stating in his petition that her only heirs were he himself and his mother-in-law, the oppositor, and that the only property left by the deceased consisted in the share due her from the intestate of her father, Juan Garcia Sanchez, and asking that he be named administrator of the property of said deceased. The oppositor objected to the petition, opposing the judicial administration of the property of her daughter and the appointment of the applicant as administrator. She alleged that inasmuch as the said deceased left no indebtedness, there was no occasion for the said judicial administration; but she stated that should the court grant the administration of the property, she should be appointed the administratrix thereof inasmuch as she had a better right than the applicant. After the required publications, trial court finally issued the appealed order to which the oppositor excepted and thereafter filed the record on appeal which was certified and approved.

ISSUED: WHO AMONG THE APPLICANT AND THE OPPOSITOR HAS A BETTER RIGHT TO BE APPOINTED ADMINISTRATOR TO THE ESTATE OF LUZ GARCIA.

HELD:

Under the provisions of the Civil Code (arts. 657 to 661), the rights to the succession of a person are transmitted from the moment of his death; in other words, the heirs succeeded immediately to all of the property of the deceased ancestor. The property belongs to the heirs at the moment of the death of the ancestor as completely as if the ancestor had executed and delivered to them a deed for the same before his death. In the absence of debts existing against the estate, the heirs may enter upon the administration of the said property immediately. If they desire to administer it jointly, they may do so.

If they desire to partition it among themselves and can do this by mutual agreement, they also have that privilege.

The Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides how an estate may be divided by a petition for partition in case they cannot mutually agree in the division. When there are no debts existing against the estate, there is certainly no occasion for the intervention of an administrator in the settlement and partition of the estate among the heirs. When the heirs are all of lawful age and there are no debts, there is no reason why the estate should be burdened with the costs and expenses of an administrator. The property belonging absolutely to the heirs, in the absence of existing debts against the estate, the administrator has no right to intervene in any way whatever in the division of the estate among the heirs. They are co-owners of an undivided estate and the law offers them a remedy for the division of the same among themselves.

We conceive of no powerful reason which counsels the abandonment of a doctrine so uniformly applied. We are convinced that if the courts had followed it in all cases to which it has application, their files would not have been replete with unnecessary administration proceedings as they are now. There is no weight in the argument adduced by the appellee to the effect that his appointment as judicial administrator is necessary so that he may have legal capacity to appear in the intestate of the deceased Juan Garcia Sanchez. As he would appear in the said intestate by the right of the representation, it would suffice for him to allege in proof of his interest that he is a usufructuary forced heir of his deceased wife who, in turn, would be a forced heir and an interested and necessary party if she were living. In order to intervene in said intestate and to take part in the distribution of the property it is not necessary that the administration of the property of his deceased wife be instituted — an administration which will take up time and occasion inconvenience and unnecessary expenses.

In view of the foregoing, there is no need to determine which of the parties has preferential right to the office of administrator.

G.R. No. L-10474             February 28, 1958

BENNY SAMPILO and HONORATO SALACUP, petitioners, vs.THE COURT OF APPEALS and FELISA SINOPERA respondent.

Clodualdo P. Surio for petitioners.Moises B. Ramos for respondents.

LABRADOR, J.:

FACTS: Teodoro Tolete died intestate in January, 1945. He left 4 parcels of land, lots Nos. 12006, 119967, 14352 and 12176 .He left as heirs his widow, Leoncia de Leon, and several nephews and nieces, children of deceased brothers and sisters. On July 25, 1946, without any judicial proceedings, his widow executed an affidavit stating that "the deceased Teodoro Tolete left no children

or respondent neither ascendants or acknowledged natural children neither brother, sisters, nephews or nieces, but the, widow Leoncia de Leon, the legitimate wife of the deceased, the one and only person to inherit the above properties"

This affidavit was registered in the ROD of Pangasinan. On the same day, she executed a deed of sale of all the above parcels of land in favor of Benny Sampilo for the sum of P10,000. This sale was also registered in the ROD. On June 17, 1950, Benny Sampilo, in turn, sold the said parcels of land to Honorato Salacup for P50,000 and this sale was also registered in ROD.

In March, 1950, Felisa Sinopera instituted proceedings for the administration of the estate of Teodoro Tolete, and having secured her appointment as administratrix, brought the present action on June 20, 1950. Notice of lis pendens was filed in the Office of the Register of Deeds and said notice was recorded on certificates of title covering the said properties on June 26, 1950. This notice, however, was subsequent to the registration of the deed of sale, in favor of Honorato Salacup, which took place on June 17, 1950.

The complaint alleges that the widow Leoncia de Leon, had no right to execute the affidavit of adjudication and that Honorato Salacup acquired no rights to the lands sold to him, and that neither had Benny Sampilo acquired any right to the said properties. Sampilo and Salacup filed an answer alleging that the complaint states no cause of action; that if such a cause exists the same is barred by the statute of limitations (Sec. 4 Rule 74); that defendants are innocent purchasers for value

RTC: declared that the affidavit of adjudication and both the deeds of sale are all null and void

CA: Annulled the affidavit of adjudication; it modified the judgment, declaring that the deeds of sale"are null and void only insofar as the properties thereby conveyed exceed the portion that the responds to Leoncia de Leon.

ISSUE: WHETHER FELISA SINOPERA'S RIGHT OF ACTION TO RECOVER HER AND HER CO-HEIRS' PARTICIPATION TO THE LANDS IN QUESTION HAD NOT PRESCRIBED AT THE TIME THE ACTION TO RECOVER WAS FILED.

HELD: The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 of extrajudicial settlement, or by affidavit, is an ex parte proceeding. It cannot by any reason or logic be contended that such settlement or distribution would affect third persons who had no knowledge either of the death of the decedent or of the extrajudicial settlement or affidavit, especially as no mention of such effect is made, either directly or by implication.

We are of the opinion and so hold that the provisions of Section 4 of Rule 74, barring distributees or heirs from objecting to an extrajudicial partition after the expiration of two years from such extrajudicial partition, is applicable only (1) to persons who have participated or taken part or had notice of the extrajudicial partition, and, in addition, (2) when the provisions of Section 1 of Rule 74 have been strictly complied with, i.e., that all the persons or heirs of the decedent have taken part in the extrajudicial settlement or are

represented by themselves or through guardians. The case at bar fails to comply with both requirements because not all the heirs interested have participated in the extrajudicial settlement, the Court of Appeals having found that the decedent left aside from his widow, nephews and nieces living at the time of his death.

The next contention of appellants is that plaintiff's action is barred by the statute of limitations. The origin of the Provision (Section 4, Rule 74), upon which this contention is predicated, which is Section 596 of Act No. 190, fails to support the contention. In the first Place, there is nothing therein, or in its source which shows clearly a statute of limitations and a bar of action against third person's. It is only a bar against the parties who had taken part in the extrajudicial proceedings but not against third persons not Parties thereto. In the second place, the statute of limitations is contained in a different chapter of Act No. 190, Chapter XL, and if Section 596 of the Act had been meant to be a statute of limitations, it would naturally have been included in the chapter which defines the statute.

But even if Section 4 of Rule 74 is a statute of limitations, it is still unavailing to the defendants. The action is one based on fraud, as the widow of the deceased owner of the lands had declared in her affidavit of partition that the deceased left no nephews or niece, or other heirs except herself. Plaintiff's right which is based on fraud and which has a period of four years (Section 43, par. 3, Act no. 190; Article 1146, Civil Code), does not appear to have lapsed the action was instituted. Judicial proceedings where instituted in March, 1950 and these proceedings must have been instituted soon after the discovery of fraud. In any case, the defendants have the burden of proof as to their claim of the statute of limitations, which is their defense, and they have not proved that when the action was instituted, four years had already elapsed from the date that the interested parties had actual knowledge of the fraud.

G.R. No. 156536             October 31, 2006

JOSEPH CUA, petitioner, vs.GLORIA A. VARGAS, AURORA VARGAS, RAMON VARGAS, MARITES VARGAS, EDELINA VARGAS AND GEMMA VARGAS, respondents.

AZCUNA, J.:

FACTS: A parcel of residential land with an area of 99 square meters located in San Juan, Virac, Catanduanes was left behind by the late Paulina Vargas. On February 4, 1994, a notarized Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was executed by and among Paulina Vargas' heirs, namely Ester Vargas, Visitacion Vargas, Juan Vargas, Zenaida V. Matienzo, Rosario V. Forteza, Andres Vargas, Gloria Vargas, Antonina Vargas and Florentino Vargas, partitioning and adjudicating unto themselves the lot in question, each one of them getting a share of 11 square meters. Florentino, Andres, Antonina and Gloria, however, did not sign the document. Only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed it. The Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs was published for three consecutive weeks.

On November 15, 1994, an Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale was again executed by and among the same heirs over the same property and also with the same sharings. Once more, only Ester, Visitacion, Juan, Zenaida and Rosario signed the document and their respective shares totaling 55 square meters were sold to Joseph Cua, petitioner herein.

According to Gloria Vargas, the widow of Santiago Vargas, she came to know of the two Extra Judicial Settlements only when the original house built on the lot was being demolished sometime in May 1995.  After knowing of the sale of the 55 square meters to petitioner, Gloria Vargas tried to redeem the property but the offer was refused, thus she filed a case for annulment of Extra Judicial Settlement and Legal Redemption.

Respondents claimed that as co-owners of the property, they may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him the price of the sale. They likewise alleged that the 30-day period following a written notice by the vendors to their co-owners for them to exercise the right of redemption of the property had not yet set in as no written notice was sent to them. In effect, they claimed that the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs and the Extra Judicial Settlement Among Heirs with Sale were null and void and had no legal and binding effect on them.

MTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner, dismissing the complaint. On appeal, the RTC affirmed the MTC decision. CA reversed the ruling of both lower courts.

ISSUE: WHETHER HEIRS ARE DEEMED CONSTRUCTIVELY NOTIFIED AND BOUND, REGARDLESS OF THEIR FAILURE TO PARTICIPATE THEREIN, BY AN EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND PARTITION OF ESTATE WHEN THE EXTRAJUDICIAL SETTLEMENT AND PARTITION HAS BEEN DULY PUBLISHED

HELD:

The procedure outlined in Section 1 of Rule 74 is an ex parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, however, that persons who do not participate or had no notice of an extrajudicial settlement will not be bound thereby. It contemplates a notice that has been sent out or issued before any deed of settlement and/or partition is agreed upon (i.e., a notice calling all interested parties to participate in the said deed of extrajudicial settlement and partition), and not after such an agreement has already been executed as what happened in the instant case with the publication of the first deed of extrajudicial settlement among heirs.

The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs who had no knowledge or did not take part in it because the same was notice after the fact of execution. The requirement of publication is geared for the protection of creditors and was never intended to deprive heirs of their lawful participation in the decedent's estate. In this connection, the records of the present case confirm that respondents never signed either of the settlement documents, having discovered their existence only shortly before the filing of

the present complaint. Following Rule 74, these extrajudicial settlements do not bind respondents, and the partition made without their knowledge and consent is invalid insofar as they are concerned.

AS TO THE 30-DAY NOTICE FOR REDEMPTION: It bears emphasis that the period of one month shall be reckoned from the time that a co-heir is notified in writing by the vendor of the actual sale. Written notice is indispensable and mandatory, actual knowledge of the sale acquired in some other manner by the redemptioner notwithstanding. It cannot be counted from the time advance notice is given of an impending or contemplated sale. The law gives the co-heir thirty days from the time written notice of the actual sale within which to make up his or her mind and decide to repurchase or effect the redemption