NPC v. Co, G.R. No. 166973, February 10, 2009

FACTS: The petitioner herein, NPC, is a government corporation created under R.A. No. 6395 to undertake the development of hydroelectric generation of power and the production of electricity from nuclear, geothermal and other sources, as well as the transmission of electric power on a nationwide basis. Its charter grants to petitioner, among others, the power to exercise the right to eminent domain.  

Sometime in June  27, 2001, petitioner filed a complaint with the RTC of San Fernando, Pampanga, for the acquisition of an easement of right-of-way over three (3) lots at Barangay Cabalantian, Bacolor, Pampanga belonging to respondent herein for purposes of construction of its transmission lines for its Lahar Affected Transmission Line Project. 

On March 25, 2002, NPC obtained a writ of possession and on April 15, 2002 they took possession of the property. 

On hearing the RTC appointed 3 commissioners to determine the fair market value of the property as of 15 April 2002. The first two commissioners appraised the property at P1,900.00 per square meter or a total of P1,179,000.00. While the third commissioner peg the value of the property at P875.00 per square meter. 

The RTC rendered its Partial Decision, wherein it declared the validity of the expropriation and ordered petitioner to pay the sum of P1,179,000.00, with interest at 6% per annum beginning April  15, 2002, the date of actual taking, until full payment.  

Not satisfied with the ruling of lower court NPC elevate the case to CA, which the appellate court also rendered Decision holding petitioner liable to pay the full fair market value at the time of actual taking, with interest at 6% per annum from 15 April 2002.  

Aggrieved with the order NPC appealed to SC hence this case. 

RULING:

Eminent domain "is the inherent power of a sovereign state to appropriate private property to particular use to promote public welfare." In the exercise of its power of eminent domain, just compensation must be given to the property owner to satisfy the requirements of Sec. 9, Art. III of the Constitution. Just compensation is the fair market value of the property.

Fair market value is that "sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor." Judicial determination is needed to arrive at the exact amount due to the property owner.

The power to expropriate is legislative in character and must be expressly conferred by statute.

2 Aspects in determining compensation:

1. The first aspect of the compensation issue is the amount to be paid – whether the full fair market value of the property or a mere easement fee.

(In this case, Petitioner is thus liable to pay respondent the full market value of the property because the presence of transmission lines undoubtedly restricts the latter’s use of his property.)

2. The second aspect of the compensation issue relates to the reckoning date for the determination of just compensation.

a. GENERAL RULE: the value of just compensation shall "be determined as of the date of the taking of the property or the filing of the complaint, whichever came first." (Rule 67)

b. Exceptions: i. grave injustice to the

property ownerii. the taking did not have

color of legal authorityiii. the taking of the property

was not initially for expropriation

iv. the owner will be given undue increment advantages because of the expropriation.

c. In this case, since none of the exceptions above are present, the reckoning date for the determination of the amount of just compensation is 27 June 2001, the date when petitioner filed its expropriation complaint.

The determination of "just compensation" in eminent domain cases is a judicial function.

Philippine Veterans Bank v. Bases Conversion Development Authority, G.R. No. 173085, January 19, 2011

FACTS: Sometime in 2003 respondent Bases Conversion Development Authority, a government corporation, filed several expropriation actions before the various branches of the RTC of Angeles City, for acquisition of lands needed for the construction of the Subic-Clark-Tarlac Expressway Project.  Ten of these cases were raffled to Branch 58 of the court which was being the concern of this case. 

 Respondents in Branch 58 cases are Armando Simbillo, Christian Marcelo, Rolando David, Ricardo Bucud, Pablo Santos, Agrifina Enriquez, Conrado Espeleta, Catgerube Castro, Carlito Mercado, and Alfredo Suarez.  All of them are the registered owners of the expropriated lands that they acquired as beneficiaries of the comprehensive agrarian reform program. 

 Land Bank of the Philippines, another respond herein, is the mortgagee of the lands by virtue of the loans it extended for their acquisition.  The lands in these cases were located in Porac and Floridablanca, Pampanga. 

Upon notice of the filing of the case, petitioner herein, move for intervention before the RTC branch 58 which was also denied by said court. 

Page 1 of 10

 PVB then filed its motion for reconsideration but Branch 58 denied the same, prompting the bank to file a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. The CA on its decision rendered dismissed the petition for lack of merit. Hence this case. 

ISSUE:Whether or not the CA erred in holding that PVB was not entitled to intervene in the expropriation cases before Branch 58 of the Angeles City RTC.

RULING: YES, but it is not applicable in this case.

Section 9, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, which authorizes the court adjudicating the expropriation case to hear and decide conflicting claims regarding the ownership of the properties involved while the compensation for the expropriated property is in the meantime deposited with the court.

Section 9 above empowers the court to order payment to itself of the proceeds of the expropriation whenever questions of ownership are yet to be settled. There is no reason why this rule should not be applied even where the settlement of such questions is to be made by another tribunal.

Republic v. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166429, 19 December 2005

FACTS:  There are two cases has been filed, one is Agan v. PIATCO which has been decided on 2004 on the basis of fairness, the same norm that pervades both the Court’s 2004 Resolution in the first case and the latest  expropriation law. The second is this present controversy which involves the matter of just compensation due the contractor for the terminal complex it built. 

 The present controversy has its roots with the promulgation of the Court’s decision in Agan v. PIATCO, which nullified the “Concession Agreement for the Build-Operate-and-Transfer Arrangement of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Passenger Terminal III” entered into between the Philippine Government and the Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. as well as the amendments and supplements thereto. On the ground that the said agreement was contrary to public policy. 

 After the promulgation of the rulings in Agan, the NAIA 3 facilities have remained in the possession of PIATCO, despite the avowed intent of the Government to put the airport terminal into immediate operation. The Government and PIATCO conducted several rounds of negotiation regarding the NAIA 3 facilities. 

 Sometime inDecember  21, 2004, the Government filed a Complaint for expropriation with the Pasay RTC, together with an Application for Special Raffle seeking the immediate holding of a special raffle and sought upon the filing of the complaint the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing it to take immediate  possession and control over the NAIA 3 facilities.  

 The Government also declared that it had deposited the amount of P3,002,125,000.00 in Cash with the Land Bank of the Philippines, representing the NAIA 3 terminal’s assessed value for taxation purposes. 

The case was raffled to the sala of public respondent herein, who issued the same an order directing the issuance of a writ of possession to the Government, authorizing it to “take or enter upon the possession”  

However, on 4 January 2005, the RTC issued another Order designed to supplement its 21 December 2004 Order and the Writ of Possession noting its earlier issuance of its writ of possession was pursuant to Section 2, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. 

 It was found out later that said rule 67 sec. 2 had been amended by R.A. No. 8974 known as “An Act to Facilitate the Acquisition of Right-of-Way, Site or Location for National Government Infrastructure Projects and For Other Purposes”. 

 Accordingly, on the basis of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. No. 8974 and Section 10 of the Implementing Rules, issued another order.  First, it directed theLBP-Baclaran, to immediately release the amount of US$62,343,175.77 to PIATCO. Second, the Government was directed to submit to the RTC a Certificate of Availability of Funds signed by authorized officials to cover the payment of just compensation. Third, the Government was directed “to maintain, preserve and safeguard” the NAIA 3 facilities or “perform such as acts or activities in preparation for their direct operation” of the airport terminal, pending expropriation proceedings and full payment of just compensation. However, the Government was prohibited “from performing acts of ownership like awarding concessions or leasing any part of NAIA-3 to other parties.” 

 The government then filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied by public respondent. Hence a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65 was filed, praying for the nullification of the RTC orders dated January 4, 2005, January 7, 2005, and January  10, 2005, and for the inhibition of Hon. Gingoyon from taking further action on the expropriation case. 

ISSUE: Whether or not Rule 67 prevails over R.A. 8974?  

RULING:

NO. Rule 67 outlines the procedure under which eminent domain may be exercised by the Government. Yet by no means does it serve at present as the solitary guideline through which the State may expropriate private property. 

 Rep. Act No. 8974, which provides for a procedure eminently more favorable to the property owner than Rule 67, inescapably applies in instances when the national government expropriates property “for national government infrastructure projects.”[28] Thus, if expropriation is engaged in by the national government for purposes other than national infrastructure projects, the assessed value standard and the deposit mode prescribed in Rule 67 continues to apply. 

 It is the finding of this Court that the staging of expropriation proceedings in this case with the exclusive use of Rule 67 would allow for the Government to take over the NAIA 3 facilities in a fashion that directly rebukes our 2004 Resolution in Agan. This Court cannot sanction deviation from its own final and executory orders.  

 Thus, at the very least, Rule 67 cannot apply in this case without violating the 2004 Resolution. Even assuming that Rep. Act No. 8974 does not govern in this case, it  does not necessarily follow that Rule 67 should then apply. After all,

Page 2 of 10

adherence to the letter of Section 2, Rule 67 would in turn violate the Court’s requirement in the 2004 Resolution that there must first be payment of just compensation to PIATCO before the Government may take over the property. 

Republic v. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166429, February 1, 2006

FACTS: ibid 

 ISSUE: Is motion for intervention allowed? 

RULING: Since this case originated from an original action filed before this Court, the appropriate time to file the motions-in-intervention in this case if ever was before and not after resolution of this case.  To allow intervention at this juncture would be highly irregular. It is extremely improbable that the movants were unaware of the pendency of the present case before the Court, and indeed none of them allege such lack of knowledge. ‘ 

 Moreover, the requisite legal interest required of a party-in-intervention has not been established so as to warrant the extra-ordinary step of allowing intervention at this late stage. As earlier noted, the claims of Takenaka and Asahikosan have not been judicially proved or conclusively established as fact by any trier of facts in this jurisdiction. Certainly, they could not be considered as indispensable parties to the petition for certiorari.  

Asia’s Emerging Dragon Corporation v. DOTC, G.R. No. 169914, April 18, 2008

FACTS: This is a consolidated case, but in view of the topic of expropriation we focus more in the case of DOTC vs. SalacnibBaternia. 

 In order to better appreciate the case we must first discuss the facts  and rulings in the case ofAgan andGingoyon. 

 In 1995 Asia’s Emerging Dragon (AEDC ),( composed of the 6 most influential businessman in the Philippines mainly John Gokongwei, Lucio Tan, Henry Sy, Andrew Gotianun, George Ty and Alfonso Yuchengco.,) – submitted an unsolicited proposal to the Government through the DOTC for the development of NAIA III under a build-operate-and transfer-arrangement pursuant to RA 6957 as amended by RA 7718. Wherefore the proposal was indeed approved by the Government. 

 Biddings were held, in which in the end the Project was awarded to PIATCO. Objections were raised by AEDC but in the end the Government justified the award to PIATCO mainly because AEDC was not able to match the bid of PIATCO.  

In 2002 the Build-operate-and transfer-arrangement (BOT) between the GOvt. and PIATCO was questioned in the case of Agan. Wherefore the court ruled among others that, in view of anomalies in awarding PIATCO the  BOT , the contract/ award (BOT) was declared null and void. However the court ruled that it was not unmindful of the reality that the structures comprising the NAIA III facility are almost complete and that the funds have been spent by PIATCO in their construction. For the Government to take over said facility, it has to

compensate respondent PIATCO as builder of the said structures. The compensation must be just and accordance with law and equity for the government can not unjustly enriched itself at the expense of PIATCO and its investors. 

 The abovementioned pronouncement of the Court in Agan gave rise to the petition in the GIngoyan case.  The facts of which are as follows .After  the promulgation of the ruling in Agan case, NAIA III was still in the possession of PIATCO, despite the avowed intent of the Government to put the airport terminal into immediate operation. Whereby the Govt. and PIATCO entered into several rounds of negotiation and even appeared before arbitral proceedings before International Chamber of Commerce International Court of Arbitration. 

 Then on, Dec. 21, 2004 the Govt filed a complaint for expropriation with the Pasay RTC. The Govt seeks the issuance of a writ of possession authorizing immediate possession of NAIA III, it also declared that it had deposited the amount of 3 Billion in cash with the Land Bank, representing the NAIA 3 terminal assessed value for tax purposes. The RTC through Judge Gingoyonissued in the same day the Writ of Possession prayed for by the Government citing the case of Manila vs. Serrano  that the RTC had the ministerial duty to issue the writ of possession upon filing of  a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance, and upon deposit made by the Government of the amount equivalent to assessed value of the property subject for expropriation. 

 However, on Jan 4. 2005, the RTC issued another order – the assailed order in this case of Gingoyon- to supplement its earlier order dated Dec. 21, 2004. The RTC noted that the first order was issued pursuant to Sec. 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court. However, it was observed that R.A.8974, had amended Rule 67 in many respects. That there are at least two crucial differences between the respective procedures under RA 8974 and Rule 67. Under the Statute the Govt. is required to make immediate payment to the property owner upon filing of the complaint to be entitled to a writ of possession, whereas in Rule 67, the Govt. is required only to make an initial deposit with an authorized government depositary. Moreover Rule 67 prescribes that the initial deposit be equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of Tax, unlike in RA 8974 which provides, as the relevant standard for initial compensation, the market value of the property as stated in the tax declarations or the current relevant zonal valuation of the BIR, whichever is higher, and the value of the improvements and/or structure using the replacement cost method. 

The Govt. in this case of GiNgoyon questioned the above ruling. 

 The Supreme Court held the validity of the RTC’s ruling. It held among others that 1. RA 8947 applies in this case, particularly insofar as it requires the immediate payment by the Govt. of at least the proferred value of the NAIA III facilities to PIATCO and provides certain valuation standard method for the determination of just compensation. 2. That in applying RA 8974, the implementation of Writ of Possession in favour of the Govt over NAIA is held in abeyance until PIATCO is directly paid the amount of 3 Billion pesos, representing the proferred value of NAIA III 3. The Govt. shall pay the just compensation fixed in the decision of the trial court to PIATCO immediately upon the finality of said decision. 

Finally we tackle the facts of the case of Republic vs. CA and Baterina. Congressman Baterina, together with other member of the Lower House filed a petition for Prohibition in

Page 3 of 10

Intervention with application for TRO. Baterina, et. al believes that the Govt. need not file expropriation proceedings to gain possession if NAIA 3 and that PIATCO is not entitled to just compensation, arguing that PIATCO does not own NAIA 3 because BOT contract do not vest ownership.  That the land in which NAIA 3 is situated is owned by the Government.  

 ISSUE: In essence, Baterina is opposing the expropriation proceedings on the ground that NAIA 3 is already a public property. Hence PIATCO is not entitled to just compensation for NAIA 3. 

 

RULING: PIATCO is entitled to just compensation and that the expropriation proceedings commenced by the Government was proper and valid.. The Government has chosen to resort to expropriation, a remedy available under the law, which has the added benefit of an integrated process for the determination of just compensation and the payment thereof to PIATCO.  We appreciate that the case at bar is a highly unusual case, whereby the Government seeks to expropriated a building complex constructed on land which the State already owns. 

The right of eminent domain extends to personal property and real property, and the NAIA 3 structures, adhered as they are to the soil, are considered real property. The public purpose for the expropriation is also beyond dispute. It should also be noted that Section 1 of Rule 67 recognizes the possibility that the property sought to be expropriated may be titled in the name of the Republic of the Philippines, although occupied by private individuals, and in such case an averment to that effect should be made in the complaint. The instant expropriation complaint did aver that the NAIA 3 complex “stands on a parcel of land owned by the Bases Conversion Development Authority, another agency of the Republic”. Admittedly, eminent domain is not the sole judicial recourse by which the government may have acquired the NAIA 3 facilities while satisfying the requisites in the order held by the SC in the Case of Agan. Eminent Domain though may be the most effective, as well as the speediest means by which such goals may be accomplished. Not only does it enable immediate possession after satisfaction of the requisites under the law, it also has a built-in procedure through which just compensation may be ascertained. Thus, there should be no question as to the propriety of eminent domain proceedings in this case. 

Landbank v. Wycoco, G.R. No. 140160, 13 January 2004, 419 SCRA 67, 80

FACTS: In line with the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP) of the government, Wycoco voluntarily offered to sell the subject land to the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) for P14.9 million. After the DARs evaluation of the application and the determination of the just compensation by the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP), a notice of intention to acquire 84.5690 hectares of the property for P1,342,667.46 was sent to Wycoco. The amount offered was later raised to P2,594,045.39 and, upon review, was modified to P2,280,159.82. The area which the DAR offered to acquire excluded idle lands, river and road located therein. Wycoco rejected the offer, prompting the DAR to indorse the case to the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for the purpose of fixing the just compensation in a summary administrative proceeding. The case was docketed as DARAB VOS Case No. 232 NE 93. Thereafter, the DARAB requested LBP to open a trust account

in the name of Wycoco and deposited the compensation offered by DAR. In the meantime, the property was distributed to farmer-beneficiaries.

DARAB required the parties to submit their respective memoranda or position papers in support of their claim. Wycoco, however, decided to forego with the filing of the required pleadings, and instead filed on April 13, 1993, the instant case for determination of just compensation with the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City, Branch 23. Impleaded as party-defendants therein were DAR and LBP.

Wycoco filed a manifestation in VOS Case No. 232 NE 93, informing the DARAB of the pendency of Agrarian Case No. 91 (AF) with the Cabanatuan court, acting as a special agrarian court. The DARAB issued an order dismissing the case to give way to the determination of just compensation by the Cabanatuan court.

ISSUE:

RULING:

Private respondent’s (Wycoco) direct resort to the Special Agrarian Court is valid.

It is clear from Sec. 57 that the RTC, sitting as a Special Agrarian Court, has original and exclusive jurisdiction over all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners. This original and exclusive jurisdiction of the RTC would be undermined if the DAR would vest in administrative officials original jurisdiction in compensation cases and make the RTC an appellate court for the review of administrative decisions. Thus, although the new rules speak of directly appealing the decision of adjudicators to the RTCs sitting as Special Agrarian Courts, it is clear from Sec. 57 that the original and exclusive jurisdiction to determine such cases is in the RTCs. Any effort to transfer such jurisdiction to the adjudicators and to convert the original jurisdiction of the RTCs into an appellate jurisdiction would be contrary to Sec. 57 and therefore would be void.

In the case at bar, therefore, the trial court properly acquired jurisdiction over Wycocos complaint for determination of just compensation. It must be stressed that although no summary administrative proceeding was held before the DARAB, LBP was able to perform its legal mandate of initially determining the value of Wycocos land pursuant to Executive Order No. 405, Series of 1990. What is more, DAR and LBPs conformity to the pre-trial order which limited the issue only to the determination of just compensation estopped them from questioning the jurisdiction of the special agrarian court. The pre-trial order limited the issues to those not disposed of by admission or agreements; and the entry thereof controlled the subsequent course of action.

NPC v. Angas, G.R. Nos. 60225-26, 8 May 1992, 208 SCRA 542

FACTS: On April 13, 1974 and December 3, 1974, petitioner National Power Corporation, a government-owned and controlled corporation and the agency through which the government undertakes the on-going infrastructure and development projects throughout the country, filed two complaints for eminent domain against private respondents with the Court of First Instance. Both cases were jointly tried

Page 4 of 10

upon agreement of the parties. On June 15, 1979, a consolidated decision in Civil Cases Nos. 2248 and 2277 was rendered by the lower court, declaring and confirming that the lots mentioned and described in the complaints have entirely been lawfully condemned and expropriated by the petitioner, and ordering the latter to pay the private respondents certain sums of money as just compensation for their lands expropriated "with legal interest thereon until fully paid."  

 Two consecutive motions for reconsideration of the said consolidated decision were filed by the petitioner. The same were denied by the respondent court. Petitioner did not appeal the aforesaid consolidated decision, which became final and executory.Thus, on May 16, 1980, one of the private respondents [Sittie Sohra Batara] filed an ex-parte motion for the execution of the June 15, 1979 decision, praying that petitioner be directed to pay her the unpaid balance of P14,300.00 for the lands expropriated from her, including legal interest which she computed at 6% per annum. The said motion was granted by the lower court. Thereafter, the lower court directed the petitioner to deposit with its Clerk of Court the sums of money as adjudged in the joint decision dated June 15, 1979.  

Petitioner complied with said order and deposited the sums of money with interest computed at 6% per annum. On February 10, 1981, one of the private respondents [Pangonatan Cosna Tagol], through counsel, filed with the trial court anex-parte motion in Civil Case No. 2248 praying, for the first time, that the legal interest on the just compensation awarded to her by the court be computed at 12% per annum as allegedly "authorized under and by virtue of Circular No. 416 of the Central Bank issued pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 116 and in a decision of the Supreme Court that legal interest allowed in the judgment of the courts, in the absence of express contract, shall be computed at 12% per annum." 

 On February 11, 1981, the lower court granted the said motion allowing 12% interest per annum. [Annex L, Petition]. Subsequently, the other private respondents filed motions also praying that the legal interest on the just compensation awarded to them be computed at 12% per annum, on the basis of which the lower court issued on March 10, 1981 and August 28, 1981 orders bearing similar import. Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of the lower court's last order dated August 28, 1981, alleging that the main decision had already become final and executory with its compliance of depositing the sums of money as just compensation for the lands condemned, with legal interest at 6% per annum; that the said main decision can no longer be modified or changed by the lower court; and that Presidential Decree No. 116 is not applicable to this case because it is Art. 2209 of the Civil Code which applies. 

 On January 25, 1982, the lower court denied petitioner's, motion for reconsideration, stating that the rate of interest at the time of the promulgation of the June 15, 1981 decision is that prescribed by Central Bank Circular No. 416 issued pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 116, which is 12% per annum, and that it did not modify or change but merely amplified its order of August 28, 1981 in the determination of the legal interest. 

ISSUE: whether or not, in the computation of the legal rate of interest on just compensation for expropriated lands, the law applicable is Article 2209 of the Civil Code which prescribes a 6% legal interest rate or Central Bank Circular No. 416 which fixed the legal interest rate at 12% per annum.

RULING: Art. 2209 of the Civil Code, and not Central Bank Circular No. 416, is the law applicable to the case at bar.

The Central Bank circular applies only to loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits and to judgments involving such loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits. This is evident not only from said circular but also from Presidential Decree No. 116, which amended Act No. 2655, otherwise known as the Usury Law. On the other hand, Art. 2209 of the Civil Code applies to transactions requiring the payment of indemnities as damages, in connection with any delay in the performance of the obligation arising therefrom other than those covering loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits.

In the case at bar, the transaction involved is clearly not a loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits but expropriation of certain parcels of land for a public purpose, the payment of which is without stipulation regarding interest, and the interest adjudged by the trial court is in the nature of indemnity for damages. The legal interest required to be paid on the amount of just compensation for the properties expropriated is manifestly in the form of indemnity for damages for the delay in the payment thereof. Therefore, since the kind of interest involved in the joint judgment of the lower court sought to be enforced in this case is interest by way of damages, and not by way of earnings from loans, etc. Art. 2209 of the Civil Code shall apply.

City of Manila v. Serrano, G.R. No. 142304, June 20, 2001

FACTS: The City Council of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7833 authorizing the expropriation of certain properties in Manila’s First District in Tondo. One of the properties sought to be expropriated was that supposedly owned by respondents. 

 Petitioner City of Manila filed an amended complaint for expropriation, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-72282, with the RTC of Manila, against the supposed owners of the lots, which included herein respondents Oscar, Felicitas, Jose, Benjamin, Estelita, Leonora, Adelaida, all surnamed Serrano. 

 Respondents filed a consolidated answer, in which they alleged that their mother, the late Demetria De Guia, had acquired Lot 1-C from Lee Kian Hui; that they had been the bona fide occupants of the said parcel of land for more than 40 years; that the expropriation of Lot 1-C would result in their dislocation, it being the only residential land left to them by their deceased mother; and that the said lot was exempt from expropriation because dividing the said parcel of land among them would entitle each of them to only about 50 square meters of land. Respondents, therefore, prayed that judgment be rendered declaring Lot 1-C exempt from expropriation and ordering the cancellation of the notice annotated on the back of TCT No. 226048, regarding the pendency of Civil Case No. 94-72282 for eminent domain filed by  petitioner. 

Upon motion by petitioner, the trial court issued an order, dated October 9, 1998, directing petitioner to deposit the amount of P1,825,241.00 equivalent to the assessed value of the properties. After petitioner had made the deposit, the trial court issued another order, dated December 15, 1998, directing the issuance of a writ of possession in favor of petitioner. 

Page 5 of 10

 Respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals, alleging that the expropriation of Lot 1-C would render respondents, who are actual occupants thereof, landless; that Lot 1-C is exempt from expropriation because R.A. No. 7279 provides that properties consisting of residential lands not exceeding 300 square meters in highly urbanized cities are exempt from expropriation; that respondents would only receive around 49 square meters each after the partition of Lot 1-C which consists of only 343.10 square meters; and that R.A. No. 7279 was not meant to deprive an owner of the entire residential land but only that in excess of 300 square meters. 

On November 16, 1999, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision holding that Lot 1-C is not exempt from expropriation because it undeniably exceeds 300 square meters which is no longer considered a small property within the framework of R.A. No. 7279. However, it held that in accordance with the ruling in Filstream International Inc. v. Court of Appeals, the other modes of acquisition of lands enumerated in §§9-10 of the law must first be tried by the city government before it can resort to expropriation. As petitioner failed to show that it had done so, the Court of Appeals gave judgment for respondents and enjoined petitioner from expropriating Lot 1-C. 

ISSUE: WON the CA erred in concluding that the Order of the RTC which authorizes the immediate entry of the City as the expropriating agency into the property sought to be expropriated upon the deposit thereof as tantamount to condemnation of the property. 

RULING: Yes.

A writ of execution may be issued by a court upon the filing by the government of a complaint for expropriation sufficient in form and substance and upon deposit made by the government of the amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property subject to expropriation (Sec. 2, Rule 67). Upon compliance with these requirements, the issuance of the writ of possession becomes ministerial. In this case, these requirements were satisfied and, therefore, it became the ministerial duty of the court to issue the writ of possession.

MCWD v. J. King and Sons, G.R. No. 175983, April 16, 2009

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:

Eminent domain is the right of the state to acquire private property for public use upon payment of just compensation.The power of eminent domain is inseparable in sovereignty being essential to the existence of the State and inherent in government. Its exercise is proscribed by only two Constitutional requirements: first, that there must be just compensation, and second, that no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.

For petitioner to exercise its power of eminent domain, two requirements should be met, namely: first, its board of directors passed a resolution authorizing the expropriation, and; second, the exercise of the power of eminent domain was subjected to review by the LWUA. In this case, petitioners board of directors approved on 27 February 2004, Board Resolution No. 015-2004authorizing its general manager to file expropriation and other cases. Moreover, the LWUA did review and gave its stamp of approval to the filing of a complaint for the expropriation of respondents’ lot. Specifically, the LWUA through its Administrator, Lorenzo H. Jamora, wrote petitioner’s manager, Armando H. Paredes, a letter dated 28 February 2005authorizing petitioner to file the expropriation case against the owner of the five-square meter portion of Lot No. 921-A covered by TCT No. 168805, pursuant to Section 25 of P.D. No. 198, as amended.

The general rule is that upon filing of the expropriation complaint, the plaintiff has the right to take or enter into possession of the real property involved if he deposits with the authorized government depositary an amount equivalent to the assessed value of the property for purposes of taxation. An exception to this procedure is provided by R.A. No. 8974. It requires the payment of one hundred percent (100%) of the zonal value of the property to be expropriated to entitle the plaintiff to a writ of possession.

R.A. No. 8974 provides a different scheme for the obtention of a writ of possession. The law does not require a deposit with a government bank; instead it requires the government to immediately pay the property owner.The provisional character of this payment means that it is not yet final, yet, sufficient under the law to entitle the Government to the writ of possession over the expropriated property.The provisional payment is a prerequisiteand a triggerfor the issuance of the writ of possession.

Indeed, Section 4 of R.A. No. 8974 is emphatic to the effect that upon compliance with the guidelines the court shall immediately issue to the implementing agency an order to take possession of the property and start the implementation of the project.Under this statutory provision, when the government, its agencies or government-owned and controlled corporations, make the required provisional payment, the trial court has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession.

Page 6 of 10

Republic v. Tagle, G.R. No. 129079, December 2, 1998

Executive Order No. 1035(EO 1035) was enacted to facilitate government acquisition of private property to be used for infrastructure or other development projects. Under Section 7 thereof, it is the ministerial duty of courts to issue a writ of possession within five days from the time the government deposits 10 percent of just compensation payable. Moreover, such writ cannot be nullified by an adverse decision in an ejectment proceeding involving the same property and the same parties.

FACTS: Helena Benitez is a registered owner of 2 parcels of land in Bgy. Salwag, Dasmarinas, Cavite. Sometime in Sept. 1982, the Philippine Government, through the Philippine Human Resources Development Center (PHRDC), an agency under the Ministry of Human Settlements, negotiated with the Japanese International Cooperation Agency (JICA) Survey Team on technicalities of the establishment of ASEAN Human Resources Development Project in the Philippines. Among the the 5 main programs of the proposed project was the Construction Manpower Development Center (CMDC), an agency now under the Department of Trade and Industry.  Several transaction and agreements were entered into between Benitez (together with Philippine Women’s University) and the PHRDC with regards to the lease and consequently, the possible sale of the land which did not push through because of Benitez’s desistance. Thereafter, Benitez and PWU demanded from PHRDC the payment of rentals and to vacate the premises. Benitez later filed an unlawful detainer case against PHRDC. In turn, the state through DTI (with GMA as undersecretary), to which CMDF is attached instituted a complaint for Eminent Domain, pursuant to EO 1935. In compliance with Section 2, Rule 67 of the Rules of Court, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 42, DTI deposited with PNB in favor of Benitez P708,490 an amount equivalent to the provisional value of the land sought to be expropriated. Subsequently, DTI filed a Motion for Issuance of Writ of Possession which had been granted but subsequently quashed by MTC Judge Tagle.  

ISSUE: whether the respondent judge may quash a writ of possession on the ground that the expropriating government agency is already occupying the property sought to be expropriated.

RULING: YES, however, in this case, in quashing the writ of possession, respondent judge violated EO 1035 on the quaint and whimsical ground that petitioner was already in actual possession of the property. His assailed decisions are therefore void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.

When the government or its authorized agent makes the required deposit, the trial court has a ministerial duty to issue a writ of possession.

The expropriation of real property does not include mere physical entry or occupation of land. Although eminent domain usually involves a taking of title, there may also be compensable taking of only some, not all, of the property interests in the bundle of rights that constitute ownership.

In the instant case, it is manifest that the petitioner, in pursuit of an objective beneficial to public interest, seeks to realize the same through its power of eminent domain. In exercising this power, petitioner intended to acquire not only physical possession but also the legal right to possess and ultimately to own the subject property. Hence, its mere physical entry and occupation of the property fall short of the taking of title, which includes all the rights that may be exercised by an owner over the subject property. Its actual occupation, which renders academic the need for it to enter, does not by itself include its acquisition of all the rights of ownership. Its right to possess did not attend its initial physical possession of the property because the lease, which had authorized said possession, lapsed. In short, petitioner wanted not merely possession de facto but possession de jure as well.

City of Cebu v. Spouses Dedamo, G.R. No. 142971, May 7, 2002

In cases where Eminent Domain is exercised by the LGUs, just compensation shall be determined based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.(Sec. 19, R.A. No. 7160)

FACTS: On 17 September 1993, petitioner City of Cebu filed a complaint for eminent domain against respondents spouses Apolonio and Blasa Dedamo.  The petitioner alleged therein that it needed the land for a public purpose, i.e., for the construction of a public road which shall serve as an access/relief road of Gorordo Avenue to extend to the General Maxilum Avenue and the back of Magellan International Hotel Roads in Cebu City.  The lower court fixed the amount of just compensation at P20,826,339.50. 

 Petitioner alleged that the lower court erred in fixing the amount of just compensation at P20,826,339.50.  The just compensation should be based on the prevailing market price of the property at the commencement of the expropriation proceedings. 

The petitioner did not convince the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the lower court’s decision in toto.   

ISSUE: whether just compensation should be determined as of the date of the filing of the complaint

RULING:

In the case at bar, the applicable law as to the point of reckoning for the determination of just compensation is Section 19 of R.A. No. 7160, which expressly provides that just compensation shall be determined as of the time of actual taking. The Section reads as follows:

SECTION 19. Eminent Domain. – A local government unit may, through its chief executive and acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power of eminent domain for public use, or purpose or welfare for the benefit of the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation, pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent laws: Provided, however, That the power of eminent domain may not be exercised unless a valid and definite offer has been previously made to the owner, and such offer was not accepted: Provided, further, That the local government unit may immediately

Page 7 of 10

take possession of the property upon the filing of the expropriation proceedings and upon making a deposit with the proper court of at least fifteen percent (15%) of the fair market value of the property based on the current tax declaration of the property to be expropriated: Provided finally, That, the amount to be paid for the expropriated property shall be determined by the proper court, based on the fair market value at the time of the taking of the property.

Spouses Ortega v. City of Cebu, G.R. No. 181562-63, October 2, 2009

FACTS: The Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cebu City enacted City Ordinance No. 1519, giving authority to the City Mayor to expropriate one-half (1/2) portion (2,856 square meters) of the spouses Ortegas land (which is occupied by the squatters), and appropriating for that purpose the amount of P3,284,400.00.

Based on the recommendation of the appointed Commissioners, the value of the land subject to expropriation was fixed at P31,416,000.00.

The Decision of the RTC became final and executory because of Cebu City’s failure to perfect an appeal on time, and a Writ of Execution was issued on September 17, 1999 to enforce the courts judgment.

Cebu City moved to withdraw its complaint for expropriation because the just compensation fixed by the court is too high.

ISSUE:Whether the CA erred in affirming the RTCs denial of Cebu Citys Omnibus Motion to Modify Judgment and to be Allowed to Withdraw from the Expropriation Proceedings.

RULING: No, both the Order of expropriation and the Order fixing just compensation by the RTC can no longer be modified. Hence, Cebu City cannot withdraw from the expropriation proceedings.

An order of expropriation denotes the end of the first stage of expropriation. Its end then paves the way for the second stage the determination of just compensation, and, ultimately, payment. An order of expropriation puts an end to any ambiguity regarding the right of the petitioner to condemn the respondents properties. Because an order of expropriation merely determines the authority to exercise the power of eminent domain and the propriety of such exercise, its issuance does not hinge on the payment of just compensation. After all, there would be no point in determining just compensation if, in the first place, the plaintiffs right to expropriate the property was not first clearly established.

Conversely, as is evident from the foregoing, an order by the trial court fixing just compensation does not affect a prior order of expropriation. As applied to the case at bar, Cebu City can no longer ask for modification of the judgment, much less, withdraw its complaint, after it failed to appeal even the first stage of the expropriation proceedings.

BPI v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160890, November 10, 2004

FACTS:NAPOCOR filed a Complaint for Eminent Domain, seeking to expropriate a portion of petitioner Bank of the Philippine Islands (BPI) property located in Barrio Bucal, Dasmarias, Cavite, for the purpose of constructing and maintaining its Dasmarias-Zapote 230 KV Transmission Line Project.

The trial court fixed the amount of just compensation at Php P753,400.00 based on the fair market value of Php 10,000.00 per square meter as determined by the Commissioners.

After the denial of its motion for reconsideration, NAPOCOR appealed to the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals ordered NAPOCOR to pay defendant-appellant BPI the amount of P3,000.00 per square meter as just compensation for the expropriated land.

Petitioner BPI moved for the reconsideration of the decision of the Court of Appeals, but the same was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for review

ISSUE:Whether the Court of Appeals gravely abused its discretion and seriously erred in fixing the just compensation for the subject property at P3,000.00 per square meter.

RULING:NO because this finding of fact by the CA was sufficiently supported while the rate imposed by the Commissioners is unsubstantiated.

Just compensation is defined as the full and fair equivalent of the property taken from its owner by the expropriator. The measure is not the takers gain, but the owner’s loss. To compensate is to render something which is equal in value to that taken or received. The word just is used to intensify the meaning of the word compensation; to convey the idea that the equivalent to be rendered for the property taken shall be real, substantial, full, and ample.

In eminent domain or expropriation proceedings, the general rule is that the just compensation which the owner of condemned property is entitled to is the market value. Market value is that sum of money which a person desirous but not compelled to buy, and an owner willing but not compelled to sell, would agree on as a price to be given and received therefor.

After a careful perusal of the records, we find no reason to disturb this finding of fact by the Court of Appeals, sufficiently supported as it is, by the evidence on record.

We find that the rate imposed by the Commissioners is unsubstantiated. No official documents were presented to reflect the true market value of the subject lots in the surrounding area. The Commissioners Report merely states that the value of the land is based on sales and listings of comparable property registered within the immediate vicinity without any evidence to support the market data provided.

Page 8 of 10

Bardillon v. Barangay Masili, G.R. No. 146886, April 30, 2003

An expropriation suit is within the jurisdiction of the RTC regardless of the value of the land, because the subject of the action is the governments exercise of eminent domain -- a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

FACTS: Two [C]omplaints for eminent domain were filed by herein respondent for the purpose of expropriating the land owned by petitioner.  

1st [C]omplaint [Civil Case No. 3648] was filed before the MTC on Feb. 23, 1998, following the failure of Barangay Masili to reach an agreement with herein petitioner on the purchase offer of P200,000.00.  The expropriation of Lot 4381-D was being pursued in view of providing Barangay Masili a multi-purpose hall for the use and benefit of its constituents. 

MTC dismissed the case  ‘for lack of interest’ for failure of the [respondent] and its counsel to appear at the pre-trial.   

2nd [C]omplaint [Civil Case No. 2845-99-C] was filed before RTC  on October 18, 1999.  This [C]omplaint also sought the expropriation of the said Lot 4381-D. Petitioner, by way of a Motion to Dismiss, opposed this [C]omplaint by alleging in the main respondent’s cause of action is barred by prior judgment, pursuant to the doctrine of res judicata. 

Judge denied petitioner’s Motion to Dismiss, holding that the MTC which ordered the dismissal of Civil Case No. 3648 has no jurisdiction over the said expropriation proceeding. 2nd complaint was ordered in favor of Barangay Masili. 

Court of Appeals 

CA held that RTC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders.  It ruled that the second Complaint for eminent domain was not barred by res judicata.  The reason is that the MTC had no jurisdiction over the action. 

ISSUE:

RULING:

An expropriation suit does not involve the recovery of a sum of money. Rather, it deals with the exercise by the government of its authority and right to take property for public use.As such, it is incapable of pecuniary estimation and should be filed with the regional trial courts.

It should be stressed that the primaryconsideration in an expropriation suit is whether the government or any of its instrumentalities has complied with the requisites for the taking of private property. Hence, the courts determine the authority of the government entity, the necessity of the expropriation, and the observance of due process. In the main, the subject of an expropriation suit is the governments exercise of eminent domain, a matter that is incapable of pecuniary estimation.

The value of the property to be expropriated being estimated in monetary terms is merely incidental to the expropriation suit.

Republic v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160379, August 14, 2009

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:The procedure for determining just compensation is set forth in Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. Section 5 of Rule 67 partly states that upon the rendition of the order of expropriation, the court shall appoint not more than three (3) competent and disinterested persons as commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the property sought to be taken. However, we held in Republic v. Court of Appeals that Rule 67 presupposes a prior filing of complaint for eminent domain with the appropriate court by the expropriator. If no such complaint is filed, the expropriator is considered to have violated procedural requirements, and hence, waived the usual procedure prescribed in Rule 67, including the appointment of commissioners to ascertain just compensation. In National Power Corporation v. Court of Appeals, we clarified that when there is no action for expropriation and the case involves only a complaint for damages or just compensation, the provisions of the Rules of Court on ascertainment of just compensation (i.e., provisions of Rule 67) are no longer applicable, and a trial before commissioners is dispensable.

In this case, petitioner took possession of the subject property without initiating expropriation proceedings. Consequently, private respondent filed the instant case for just compensation and damages. To determine just compensation, the trial court appointed three commissioners pursuant to Section 5 of Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. None of the parties objected to such appointment.

The trial courts appointment of commissioners in this particular case is not improper. The appointment was done mainly to aid the trial court in determining just compensation, and it was not opposed by the parties. Besides, the trial court is not bound by the commissioners recommended valuation of the subject property. The court has the discretion on whether

Page 9 of 10

to adopt the commissioners valuation or to substitute its own estimate of the value as gathered from the records.

Eusebio v. Luis, G.R. No. 162474, October 13, 2009

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:

where private property is taken by the Government for public use without first acquiring title thereto either through expropriation or negotiated sale, the owners action to recover the land or the value thereof does not prescribe.

Just like in the Forfom case, herein respondents also failed to question the taking of their property for a long period of time (from 1980 until the early 1990s) and, when asked during trial what action they took after their property was taken, witness Jovito Luis, one of the respondents, testified that when we have an occasion to talk to Mayor Caruncho we always asked for compensation. It is likewise undisputed that what was constructed by the city government on respondents property was a road for public use, namely, A. Sandoval Avenue in Pasig City. Clearly, as in Forfom, herein respondents are also estopped from recovering possession of their land, but are entitled to just compensation.

if there are no expropriation proceedings instituted to determine just compensation, the trial court is still mandated to act in accordance with the procedure provided for in Section 5, Rule 67 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, requiring the appointment of not more than three competent and disinterested commissioners to ascertain and report to the court the just compensation for the subject property.

it is settled jurisprudence that where property was taken without the benefit of expropriation proceedings, and its owner files an action for recovery of possession thereof before the commencement of expropriation proceedings, it is the value of the property at the time of taking that is controlling.

In this case, the trial court should have fixed just compensation for the property at its value as of the time of taking in 1980, but there is nothing on record showing the value of the property at that time. The trial court, therefore, clearly erred when it based its valuation for the subject land

on the price paid for properties in the same location, taken by the city government only sometime in the year 1994.

 

However, in taking respondents property without the benefit of expropriation proceedings and without payment of just compensation, the City of Pasig clearly acted in utter disregard of respondents proprietary rights. Such conduct cannot be countenanced by the Court. For said illegal taking, the City of Pasig should definitely be held liable for damages to respondents.

Landbank v. Santiago, G.R. No. 182209, 3 October 2012

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:

Landbank v. Araneta, G.R. No. 161796, 8 February 2012

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:

Landbank v. Peralta, G.R. No. 182704, 23 April 2014

FACTS:

ISSUE:

RULING:

Page 10 of 10