RULE 31- CONSOLIDATION OR SEVERANCE

Sec. 1. Consolidation

Unicapital v. Consing , G.R. Nos. 175277 & 175285, September 11, 2013

It is hornbook principle that when or two or more cases involve the same parties and affect closely related subject matters, the same must be consolidated and jointly tried, in order to serve the best interest of the parties and to settle the issues between them promptly, thus, resulting in a speedy and inexpensive determination of cases. In addition, consolidation serves the purpose of avoiding the possibility of conflicting decisions rendered by the courts in two or more cases, which otherwise could be disposed of in a single suit.

Yu v. Basilio , G.R. No. 138701-02, October 17, 2006

Consolidation of actions is addressed to the sound discretion of the court, and its action in consolidating will not be disturbed in the absence of manifest abuse of discretion. In the instant case, respondent judge did not abuse his discretion in ordering the joint trial of the two cases. There is no showing that such joint trial would prejudice any substantial right of petitioner. Neither does the latter question the court's jurisdiction to try and decide the two cases.

When two or more cases involve the same parties and affect closely related subject matters, they must be consolidated and jointly tried, in order to serve the best interests of the parties and to settle expeditiously the issues involved. Consolidation, when appropriate, also contributes to the declogging of court dockets…

 Inasmuch as the binding force of the Dealership Agreement was put in

question, it would be more practical and convenient to submit to the Iloilo court all the incidents and their consequences. The issues in both civil cases pertain to the respective obligations of the same parties under the Dealership Agreement. Thus, every transaction as well as liability arising from it must be resolved in the judicial forum where it is put in issue. The consolidation of the two cases then becomes imperative to a complete, comprehensive and consistent determination of all these related issues.

 Two cases involving the same parties and affecting closely related

subject matters must be ordered consolidated and jointly tried in court, where the earlier case was filed. The consolidation of cases is proper when they involve the resolution of common questions of law or facts.

 Indeed, upon the consolidation of the cases, the interests of both parties

in the two civil cases will best be served and the issues involved therein expeditiously settled. After all, there is no question on the propriety of the venue in the Iloilo case.

RULE 33- DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE

Sec. 1. Demurrer to Evidence

Gonzales v. Bugaay , G.R. No. 173008, February 22, 2012

 “A demurrer to evidence is a motion to dismiss on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and is presented after the plaintiff rests his case.  It is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue.  The evidence contemplated by the rule on demurrer is that which pertains to the merits of the case.” 

 

          In passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, the court is merely

required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient proof to sustain the judgment. [19]  Being

considered a motion to dismiss, thus, a demurrer to evidence must clearly be filed before the court

renders its judgment. 

Uy v. Ngo Chua , G.R. No. 183965, September 18, 2009

Demurrer to evidence authorizes a judgment on the merits of the case without the defendant having to submit evidence on his part, as he would ordinarily have to do, if plaintiff's evidence shows that he is not entitled to the relief sought. Demurrer, therefore, is an aid or instrument for the expeditious termination of an action, similar to a motion to dismiss, which the court or tribunal may either grant or deny.

Guidelines on when a demurrer to evidence should be granted:

A demurrer to evidence may be issued when, upon the facts and the law, the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. Where the plaintiff's evidence together with such inferences and conclusions as may reasonably be drawn therefrom does not warrant recovery against the defendant, a demurrer to evidence should be sustained. A demurrer to evidence is likewise sustainable when, admitting every proven fact favorable to the plaintiff and indulging in his favor all conclusions fairly and reasonably inferable therefrom, the plaintiff has failed to make out one or more of the material elements of his case, or when there is no evidence to support an allegation necessary to his claim. It should be sustained where the plaintiff's evidence is prima facie insufficient for a recovery.

Enjoas v. Comelec , G.R. No. 129938, December 12, 1997

In election protests, therefore, the protestee should not be permitted to present a motion for dismissal or a demurrer to the evidence of the protestant, unless he waives the introduction of his own evidence in case the ruling on his motion or demurrer is adverse to him, in which case the court that tries the case must definitely decide it.

In the present case, the motion for dismissal filed by the protestee has the effect of a demurrer to the evidence presented by the protestant, he having thereby impliedly waived the introduction of his evidence, for which reason the trial court did not commit an error in sustaining said motion and definitely deciding the case without requiring the protestee to present his evidence.

Capitol Sawmill v. Chua Gaw , G.R. No. 187843, June 9, 2014

Section 1, Rule 33 of the Rules of Court provides that after the plaintiff has completed the presentation of his evidence, the defendant may move for dismissal on the ground that upon the facts and the law the plaintiff has shown no right to relief. Petitioners anchored their demurrer to evidence on respondents’ lack of cause of action against the corporations, in accordance with a court ruling that properties of a corporation cannot be included in the inventory of the estate of a deceased person.

Cause of action is defined as the act or omission by which a party violates a right of another.1âwphi1 The existence of a cause of action is determined by the allegations in the complaint. A complaint is said to assert a sufficient cause of action if, admitting what appears solely on its face to be correct, the plaintiff would be entitled to the relief prayed for. Accordingly, if the allegations furnish sufficient basis by which the complaint can be maintained, the same should not be dismissed, regardless of the defenses that may be averred by the defendants.8

We agree with the Court of Appeals when it decided that the facts in the Lim case are not on all fours with the instant case, thus:

The Lim case should not be applied in this case because it is an intestate probate proceeding while this case is principally for the partition and distribution of the estate of the deceased parents. In the Lim case, the properties involved were real properties registered under the Torrens system in the name of several corporations which are allegedly owned by the decedent, whereas in this case, the same covers all assets, investments and all other rights, titles and interests left by the deceased parents of private respondents which are sought to be collated, partitioned and distributed among the legal heirs. It does not involve particular properties which are owned by petitioners Capitol and Columbia but the totality of investments made by the deceased parents in the said businesses.

RULE 34- JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS

Sec 1:

Asian Construction v. Sannaedle , G.R. No. 181676, June 11, 2014

Judgment on the pleadings is proper when an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading. An answer fails to tender an issue if it does not comply with the requirements of a specific denial as set out in Sections 811 and 10,12 Rule 8 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, resulting in the admission of the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings.13

This rule is supported by the Court’s ruling in Mongao v. Pryce Properties Corporation14 wherein it was held that "judgment on the pleadings is governed by Section 1,Rule 34 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, essentially a restatement of Section 1, Rule 19 of the 1964 Rules of Court then applicable to the proceedings before the trial court. Section 1, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that where an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleading, the court may, on motion of that party, direct judgment on such pleading. The answer would fail to tender an issue, of course, if it does not comply with the requirements for a specific denial set out in Section 10 (or Section 8) of Rule 8; and it would admit the material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings not only where it expressly confesses the truthfulness thereof but also if it omits to deal with them at all."15

Further, in First Leverage and Services Group, Inc. v. Solid Builders, Inc.,16 this Court held that where a motion for judgment on the pleadings is filed, the essential question is whether there are issues generated by the pleadings. In a proper case for judgment on the pleadings, there is no ostensible issue at all because of the failure of the defending party’s answer to raise an issue. The answer would fail to tender an issue, of course, if it does not deny the material allegations in the complaint or admits said material allegations of the adverse party’s pleadings by confessing the truthfulness thereof and/or omitting to deal with them at all.17

Here, it is irrefutable that petitioner acknowledged having entered into a Memorandum of Agreement with respondent and that it still has an unpaid balance of US$615,620.33.

We note that respondent’s complaint for a sum of money is based mainly on the alleged failure of petitioner to pay the balance of US$615,620.33 under the Memorandum of Agreement. Quoting petitioner’s Answer, it is obvious that it admitted the foregoing material allegations in paragraphs 3, 4 and 5 of the complaint.

PNB v. Aznar , G.R. No. 171805, May 30, 2011

Judgment on the pleadings is, therefore, based exclusively upon the allegations appearing

in the pleadings of the parties and the annexes, if any, without consideration of any evidence aliunde.

[14]  However, when it appears that not all the material allegations of the complaint were admitted in

the answer for some of them were either denied or disputed, and the defendant has set up certain

special defenses which, if proven, would have the effect of nullifying plaintiff’s main cause of action,

judgment on the pleadings cannot be rendered.[15]

 

In the case at bar, the Court of Appeals justified the trial court’s resort to a judgment on the

pleadings in the following manner:Perusal of the complaint, particularly, Paragraph 7 thereof reveals:

           “7. That in their desire to rehabilitate RISCO, the

above-named stockholders contributed a total amount of PhP212,720.00 which was used in the purchase of the above-described parcels of land, which amount constituted liens and encumbrances on subject properties in favor of the above-named stockholders as annotated in the titles adverted to above, pursuant to the Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Board of Directors of RISCO approved on March 14, 1961, a copy of which is hereto attached as Annex “E”.

             On the other hand, defendant in its Answer, admitted the aforequoted allegation with the qualification that the amount put up by the stockholders was “used as part payment” for the properties. Defendant further averred that plaintiff’s liens and encumbrances annotated on the titles issued to RISCO constituted as “loan from the stockholders to pay part of the purchase price of the properties” and “was a personal obligation of RISCO and was thus not a claim adverse to the ownership rights of the corporation.” With these averments, We do not find error on the part of the trial court in rendering a judgment on the pleadings. For one, the qualification made by defendant in its answer is not sufficient to controvert the allegations raised in the complaint. As to defendants’ contention that the money contributed by plaintiffs was in fact a “loan” from the stockholders, reference can be made to the Minutes of the Special Meeting of the Board of Directors, from which plaintiffs-appellees anchored their complaint, in order to ascertain the true nature of their claim over the properties. Thus, the issues raised by the parties can be resolved on the basis of their respective pleadings and the annexes attached thereto and do not require further presentation of evidence aliunde.[16]

  

However, a careful reading of Aznar, et al.’s Complaint and of PNB’s Answer would

reveal that both parties raised several claims and defenses, respectively, other than what was cited by

the Court of Appeals, which requires the presentation of evidence for resolution

Municipality of Tiwi v. Betito , G.R. No. 171873, July 9, 2010

Judgment on the pleadings is improper when the answer to the complaint tenders several issues.

 

            A motion for judgment on the pleadings admits the truth of all the material and relevant allegations of the

opposing party and the judgment must rest on those allegations taken together with such other allegations as are

admitted in the pleadings.[14]  It is proper when an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise admits the material

allegations of the adverse party’s pleading.[15]  However, when it appears that not all the material allegations of the

complaint were admitted in the answer for some of them were either denied or disputed, and the defendant has set

up certain special defenses which, if proven, would have the effect of nullifying plaintiff’s main cause of action,

judgment on the pleadings cannot be rendered.[16]

 

In the instant case, a review of the records reveal that respondent (as plaintiff) and petitioners (as

defendants) set-up multiple levels of claims and defenses, respectively, with some failing to tender an issue while

others requiring the presentation of evidence for resolution.  The generalized conclusion of both the trial and

appellate courts that petitioners’ answer admits all the material averments of the complaint is, thus, without

basis.  For this reason, a remand of this case is unavoidable. However, in the interest of justice and in order to

expedite the disposition of this case which was filed with the trial court way back in 1999, we shall settle the

issues that can be resolved based on the pleadings and remand only those issues that require a trial on merits as

hereunder discussed.

 

Preliminarily, it was erroneous for the trial court to rule that the genuineness and due execution of the

Contract of Legal Services was impliedly admitted by petitioners for failure to make a sworn specific denial

thereof as required by Section 8,[17] Rule 8 of the Rules of Court.  This rule is not applicable when the adverse

party does not appear to be a party to the instrument.[18]  In the instant case, the subject contract was executed

between respondent and Atty. Lawenko, on the one hand, and Tiwi, represented by Mayor Corral, on the

other.   None of the petitioners, who are the incumbent elective and appointive officials of Tiwi as of the filing of

the Complaint, were parties to said contract.  Nonetheless, in their subsequent pleadings,[19]petitioners admitted

the genuineness and due execution of the subject contract.  We shall, thus, proceed from the premise that the

genuineness and due execution of the Contract of Legal Services has already been established.  Furthermore, both

parties concede the contents and efficacy of Resolution 15-92.  As a result of these admissions, the issue, at least

as to the coverage of the subject contract, may be resolved based on the pleadings as it merely requires the

interpretation and application of the provisions of Resolution 15-92 vis-à-vis the stipulations in the subject

contract.