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PAUL RICOEUR’S HERMENEUTICS OF APPROPRIATION AS AN
EXPERIMENTAL TOOL TOWARDS THE CLARIFICATION OF THE FILIPINO
IDENTITY THROUGH FAMILY ORIENTATION AS A CORE FILIPINO VALUE
__________
A Dissertation
Presented to the
Graduate Faculty of the
College of Arts and Sciences
University of San Carlos
Cebu City, Philippines
__________
In Partial Fulfillment
of the Requirements for the Degree
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN PHILOSOPHY
__________
by
RUBY S. SUAZO
October 2006
This is to acknowledge the support provided by the Commission on
Higher Education (CHED)
Republic of the Philippines
Commission on Higher Education
Pasig City, Metro Manila
The researcher is a recipient of the Dissertation Writing Grant Program of CHED.
ii
APPROVAL SHEET
The dissertation entitled PAUL RICOEUR’S HERMENEUTICS OF APPROPRIATION AS AN EXPERIMENTAL TOOL TOWARDS THE CLARIFICATION OF THE FILIPINO IDENTITY THROUGH FAMILY ORIENTATION AS A CORE FILIPINO VALUE prepared and submitted by RUBY S. SUAZO in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN PHILOSOPHY has been examined and is recommended for acceptance and approval for ORAL EXAMINATION
DISSERTATION COMMITTEE
FR. HEINZ KULÜKE, SVD, Ph.D. Adviser
BRO. ROMUALDO E. ABULAD, SVD, Ph.D. CLARITA C. FILIPINAS, Ph.D. Member Member FR. RAMON D. ECHICA, S.T.D. AGUSTIN L. SOLLANO, JR., Ph.D. Member Member ________________________________________________________________________
PANEL OF EXAMINAERS
Approved by the committee on Oral Examination with a grade of PASSED.
BRO. ROMUALDO E. ABULAD, SVD, Ph.D. Chair
FR. RAMON D. ECHICA, S.T.D. CLARITA C. FILIPINAS, Ph.D. Member Member FR. HEINZ KULÜKE, SVD, Ph.D. AGUSTIN L. SOLLANO, JR, Ph.D. Adviser Member Accepted and approved in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN PHILOSOPHY. Comprehensive Examination Passed: July 5 & 6, 2002. ELIZABETH M. REMEDIO, Ph.D. Dean Date of Oral Examination: October 18, 2006
iii
A C K N O W L E D G E M E N T
I would like to extend my heartfelt gratitude to the following persons who have “motivated”, “inspired”, “encouraged”, “pushed”, “stirred” and “provoked” me to finish this dissertation:
1. Fr. Heinz Kulüke, S.V.D., Ph.D., my adviser, for guiding me through this work and for his affable support and motivation to have this dissertation finished;
2. Bro. Romualdo E. Abulad, S.V.D., Ph.D., Fr. Ramon D. Echica, S.T.D.,
Agustin L. Sollano, Jr., Ph.D., and Clarita C. Filipinas, Ph.D., the dissertation committee members and at the same breath, the panel of examiners, for their invaluable comments and suggestions, guidance and encouragement from the proposal hearing down to the oral defense;
3. The Commission on Higher Education (CHED) for the Dissertation Grant
Assistance Program that is very helpful in easing out the financial constraint of the researcher in finishing this dissertation;
4. Ester B. Velasquez, Ph.D., Cebu Normal University president, for believing in
my capacity to finish this dissertation, thereby, recommending me to CHED to avail of its Dissertation Assistance Program;
5. Ali, Alvin, Ma’am Amosa, Bernard, Sir Boy, Ma’am Cherry, Franco, Gerry,
Glenn, Greg, James, Lot, Maje, Ma’am Myrna, Rani, and Ryan for their undying encouragement, inspiration and support;
6. Bryan, Glenn, John M., John Z., Levi, Sir Nacs, and Rene for their incessant
support and for constantly pushing me to finish this project;
7. Razel, Zcheri Ayn Margaret, Friedrich Bill Ignatius and to our forthcoming angel, far more than the encouragements, the inspiration has brought me to the culmination of this project;
8. Isabelo, Romana, James Roy, and Annabelle for their moral support.
9. Finally, I would like to bear witness to the infinite goodness of God. My heart
sings of gratitude, praise and worship as I also laud for the powerful intercession of the Virgin Mother.
Daghan Kaayong Salamat Kaninyong Tanan!!!
iv
A B S T R A C T
This study deals with Ricoeur’s theory of interpretation. Consequently, it attempts to utilize his hermeneutic phenomenological approach in general and his hermeneutics of appropriation in particular in clarifying the identity of the Filipino. The attempt to clarify the Filipino identity is done through family orientation as a core Filipino value. The attempt is carried on through an evaluation of three specific areas. First, the author traces the development of the approach that Ricoeur develops in his attempt to think anew the age-old and central question of philosophy as to what it means to be a thinking, reflective subject. Ricoeur develops an approach that is a dialectic between the auto-foundational claims of idealistic philosophies of the self and the skeptical philosophies of the masters of suspicion. As he develops the hermeneutic phenomenological approach to study the subject, he realizes the need of symbolisms as a detour leading to the understanding of his notion of the subject. In fact, he finds out that the different levels of interpreting symbolisms mirror the gradation of the subject’s going into itself. The hierophanic marks the identity of the symbol on the shared experiences of the people thus making it very objective in nature. The oneirotic as the elaboration of dream symbol peers into the experiences of the dreamer to ascertain the dream account through its relationship with the reality of one’s experience. Lastly, the poetic imagination is the articulation of the subject’s own reflection that is being excited by his oneirotic experiences. Because of the latter, a need to shift from the generic hermeneutic phenomenological approach to the hermeneutics of appropriation is set in place. Second, the nature of poetic imagination being forward looking excites the development of the hermeneutics of appropriation. Hermeneutics of appropriation presents the reader’s subjectivity as an extension of the fundamental aspect of discourse. But contrary to the case of dialogue, no vis-à-vis is given in the written situation. The relation is, so to speak created by the work itself. A work opens up its readers and thus creates its own subjective vis-à-vis. As the work involves the interpreter and opens itself up to him, a dialogue is initiated in an existential sense. Moreover, appropriation is dialectically linked to distancing in written discourse. Thanks to the distancing of the text, appropriation no longer bears the mark of affective connection to the author’s intention, and lacks all contemporaneousness with the creative process of agreement with an original intention. Appropriation represents understanding over distance. In other words, appropriating the meaning of the text to one’s self-understanding must not be understood as the culminating point of reading. Reading should end with acting inasmuch as reading effects thought. Ricoeur is convinced about the flexible connection between thought and action. And finally, the researcher sets the clarification of the Filipino identity by way of Ricoeur’s theory of interpretation. Tracing the historical development of the Filipino value system constitutes the phenomenological part of the study. On the same breath, the hermeneutics of suspicion reveals the falsehoods and illusions that the Filipino attaches to the value of the family. A genuine effort to make family orientation become helpful to nation-building is only generated after a critical awareness of the discontinuities and estrangements of the said value. Ultimately, the hermeneutics of appropriation imagines the enormous possibilities of making family orientation as a value that suits into the project of nation-building and national development.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE APPROVAL SHEET ii ACKNOWLEDGEMENT iii ABSTRACT iv CHAPTER ONE INTRODUCTION 1 Rationale of the Study 1 Theoretical Background of the Study 11 The Problem 22 Statement of the Problem 22 Significance of the Study 23 Scope and Limitations of the Study 23 Methodology 24 Definition of Terms 25 TWO THE HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY 28
Dislocation of the Subject 30 The Cartesian Tradition 30 Husserlian Egology 33 Heidegger and the Subject 38 The Masters of Suspicion 42
Symbol and Interpretation 45 Symbol and Its Related Structures 47
1. The Signs 47 2. The Allegories 50 3. The Symbolic Logic 51 4. The Myths 52
The Zones of Emergence of Symbol 53 1. Symbol and the Phenomenology of Religion 53 2. Symbol and Psychoanalysis 57 3. Symbol and Poetic Imagination 58
The Symbolic Categories and Interpretation 60 1. The Hierophanies 62 2. The Oneirotic 66 3. The Poetic Image 70
THREE THE HERMENEUTIC OF APPROPRIATION 76 Reflection as Interpretation 82
vii
The Nature of Discourse 87 Discourse as Saying 89 Discourse as Writing 91 Discourse as Real 92 The Nature of Text 94 Explanation and Understanding 98 Guess as a Holistic But Naïve Grasping of the Text 100 Falsification as Validation: The Explanatory Phase 102 Meaningful Action Considered as a Text 108 Distanciation and Appropriation 112 Appropriation: A New Concept of Interpretation 116 FOUR FAMILY ORIENTATION AS A DETOUR FOR THE
CLARIFICATION OF THE FILIPINO IDENTITY:
APPLYING PAUL RICOEUR’S HERMENEUTICS OF
APPROPRIATION 126 The Quest for the Filipino Identity 128 The Filipino Values in General 134 The Philippine Cultural Systems 142 Historical Development of the Dual Value System 144 Family Orientation as the Core Value 148 The Antagonism Between Family Orientation as a Core Value and Nation Building 152 Family Orientation as a Core Value and Its Implications to Social Institutions 157 Re-understanding Filipino Orientation as a Core Filipino Value 163 FIVE SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATION 181 Summary and Conclusion 181 Recommendation 192 BIBLIOGRAPHY 195 APPENDIX A The Role of Education in Integrative Development 215 APPENDIX B General Framework for the Study of Philippine Society and Culture 216 APPENDIX C Filipino Culture of Insecurity 217 APPENDIX D Integration of Tradition & Modernity 218 APPENDIX E Contrast Between Exogenous and Indigenous Models 219 APPENDIX F DECS Values Education Framework 220 APPENDIX G Culture Clash In Filipino Formal And Non-Formal Organizations 221 CURRICULUM VITAE 222
INTRODUCTION
Rationale of the Study Don Ihde notes that the history of hermeneutics may be seen to have had three
phases: (1) hermeneutics as linked with biblical exegesis and interpretation; (2) modern
hermeneutics as both expanding hermeneutics from its previous more narrow religious
focus and transforming hermeneutics into a method which determines the shape of the
social (or ‘human’) sciences and the humanities; and, (3) the contemporary hermeneutics,
identified with Gadamer, Heidegger, and Ricoeur, extending modern hermeneutics
through the adaptation of Husserlian phenomenology on the one hand, and interpreting
the task of hermeneutics as that of providing an ontology of human existence, on the
other.1
Of the three contemporary hermeneutic philosophers, Ricoeur is found by the
researcher to be the most interesting because of his re-thinking of the central problem of
philosophy which is the human being, particularly the meaning of a thinking, reflective
subject (italics mine).2 At first, Ricoeur’s approach to the problem of subjectivity is
phenomenological and hermeneutical. It is phenomenological, “in that it seeks to clarify
through reflective analysis that which is immediately and indubitably given to
consciousness: the fact of the subject’s own existence, the ‘mineness’ characteristic of
existence.”3 Likewise, it is hermeneutical, “in that this reflective analysis is not
1 Don Ihde, “Paul Ricoeur’s Place in the Hermeneutic Tradition” in Lewis Edwin Hahn, ed., The
Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (Illinois: Open Court: 1995), 60 – 62.
2 G.B. Madison, “Ricoeur and the Hermeneutics of the Subject” in Lewis Edwin Hahn, ed., The
Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 75. 3 Ibid.
2
descriptive in an intuitive or introspective sort of way but is indirect and interpretive and
is, moreover, motivated by the basic goal of all hermeneutics: a heightened self-
understanding.”4
By reflexive analysis, echoing Nabert, Ricoeur means
the recovery of the effort to exist and the desire to be. However, this effort and this desire cannot be grasped immediately in an act of intellectual intuition; they can only be glimpsed through the mirror of the objects and acts, the symbols and signs, wherein they are disclosed. Hence, ‘reflection must become interpretation because [the person] cannot grasp the act of existing except in signs scattered in the world’.5 Reflection cannot speak from nowhere, for it must always begin by interpreting the cultural products of a specific tradition. Such interpretation makes reflection ‘concrete’… [f]or reflection is necessarily self-reflection.6
Aside from reflexive analysis which is phenomenological in nature, Ricoeur resorts also
to hermeneutics because he finds the Husserlian eidetic phenomenology to be less than an
appropriate approach. This is due to Husserl’s notion of ‘a thinking subject called
‘transcendental’, a subject which is not bound up with the accidents of history, a kind of
foundational subject which would be, in the awareness of itself, the source of all
knowledge’.7 Moreover, Ricoeur points out that “there is no self-understanding which is
4 Ibid., 75 – 76. 5 See Paul Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation, translated by Denis
Savage (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970), 46. 6 John B. Thompson, “Editor’s Introduction” in Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences: Essays on Language, Action, and Interpretation, edited., translated, and introduced by John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 17 – 18.
7 Madison, 79. Cf. Ricoeur, “History as Narrative and Practice” (An Interview with Paul Ricoeur
by Peter Kemp), Philosophy Today (Fall 1985), 219.
3
not mediated by signs, symbols and texts;”8 “in the last resort understanding coincides
with the interpretation given to these mediating terms.”9
Ricoeur explains the task of hermeneutics as the deciphering of multiple
significance. “Interpretation,” he says, “is the work of thought which consists in
deciphering the hidden meaning in the apparent meaning, in unfolding the levels of
meaning implied in the literal meaning.”10 Consequently, the surface meaning may be
hidden or concealed or at least contain a less obvious depth meaning which is
nevertheless dependent upon the surface literal meaning.
He approaches the study of the subject in three fields: (1) as mediated by symbols;
(2) as mediated by signs; and (3) as mediated by texts.
As mediated by symbols11, Ricoeur tries to understand the meanings of the
symbols that man sees in dreams; creates in religious rituals and ceremonies; and presents
in poesy. The problem of understanding man through symbols lies in the double-
meaning structure of symbols. This double-meaning structure opens the way to
interpretation. As it turns out, “the problem of interpretation in turn designates all
understanding specifically concerned with the meaning of equivocal expressions. To
interpret is to understand a double meaning.”12 Because of double-meaning, interpreting
8 Ibid. Cf. Paul Ricoeur, “On Interpretation” in From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics, II,
trans. by Kathleen Blamey and John B. Thompson (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1991), 15. 9 Ricoeur, “On Interpretation” in From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics, II, 15. 10 Paul Ricoeur, The Conflict of Interpretations, edited by Don Ihde (Evanston: Northwestern
University Press, 1974), 13. 11 See Ricoeur, “On Interpretation”, 16-17. 12 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 8.
4
the meaning of symbols is necessary for symbols point to something beneath their
appearances.
Aside from symbols, Ricoeur points out also two instances where interpretation is
applied. The more common instance is the use of natural languages in the conversational
situation. Natural languages are polysemic by nature where meaning is determined by
the context of the dialogue. Hence, interpretation is connected to the selective function of
context. It becomes the process by which “interlocutors collectively determine the
contextual values which structure their conversation.”13 The second instance is portrayed
by the text; here meaning is mediated by texts. When the text is considered in itself, “the
meaning contained therein is rendered autonomous with respect to the intention of the
author, the initial situation of discourse and the original addressee.”14 These three
components constitute what Ricoeur calls the ‘site-in-life’ of the text. In interpreting the
text, the interpreter considers only the matter of the text and not the psychology of the
author. With the ‘matter of the text’, the text which is free from its ‘site-in-life’ opens up
the possibility for a multiple interpretation. At this moment, a hermeneutic circle is
formed between “the understanding initiated by the reader and the proposals of meaning
offered by the text.”15
Ricoeur does not disregard the possibility of the interpreter’s misappropriation of
the meaning of the text. In fact, he points out that “the most radical way in which
hermeneutics questions the primacy of subjectivity is to take as its touchstone the theory
13 Ricoeur, “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences:
Essays on Language, Action, and Interpretation, edited., translated, and introduced by John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 107.
14 Ibid., 108. 15 Ibid.
5
of the text; indeed, to the extent to which the sense of a text has become autonomous in
relation to the subjective intention of its author, the essential question is no longer to
rediscover the lost intention behind the text, but to unfold before the text, as it were, the
‘world’ that it opens and uncovers.”16 Consequently, he considers the distanciation-
appropriation cycle in interpretation.
Distanciation, according to Ricoeur, is a variant of phenomenological epoche
whereby meaning is placed at a distance from the lived-experience of people, purely and
simply.17 The consideration of the ‘matter of the text’ apart from the psychology of the
author is established by the hermeneutical function of distanciation. The distanciation
that is constituted by the objectification of the author in the written work makes
interpretation a fundamental reply to this problem. When the act of discourse passes
from oral to written as exemplified by the written text, the work becomes
autonomous with respect to the intention of the author. What the text signifies no longer coincides with what the author meant… The autonomy of the text already contains the possibility that... the ‘matter’ of the text may escape from the finite intentional horizon of its author; in other words,… the “world” of the text may explode the world of the author.
18
The possibility of understanding is made possible by distanciation because “to invoke
distanciation as a principle is to attempt to show the very experience of belonging to
16 Ricoeur, “Intellectual Autobiography” in Lewis Edwin Han, ed., The Philosophy of Paul
Ricoeur, 35. 17 Ibid., 36. 18 Ibid., 139.
6
[which] requires something like externalization in order to apprehend, articulate and
understand itself.”19
Appropriation, as a theory, is more of an “intersubjective relation of mutual
understanding than a relation of apprehension applied to the world conveyed by the
work.”20 Here follows a new theory of subjectivity. Ricoeur emphasizes that, in general,
appropriation is not understood as a theory of subjectivity of which the subject would
possess the key to knowledge. He remarks, “to understand is not to project oneself into
the text; it is to receive an enlarged self from the apprehension of proposed worlds which
are the genuine object of interpretation.”21 Thompson observes that “the act of
appropriation does not seek to rejoin the original intentions of the author, but rather to
expand the conscious horizons of the reader by actualizing the meaning of the text.”22
Consequently, the subject appropriates the meaning of the text “only insofar as he
disappropriates himself and the naïve, uncritical, illusory and deceptive understanding
which [the subject] claims to have himself before being instituted as subject by the very
texts which he interprets.”23
Ricoeur avers that his subjectivity is not the correlate of objectivity, that is, not a
subjectivity that constitutes objectivity but a subjectivity grounded in participation. Both
objectivity and constituting subjectivity are founded on the ontological participation of
19 John W. Van den Hengel, The Home of Meaning: The Hermeneutics of the Subject of Paul
Ricoeur (Washington D.C.: University Press of America, Inc., 1982), 109. 20 Ricoeur, “Appropriation” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 182. 21 Ibid., 182 – 183. 22 Thompson, 18. 23 Ricoeur, “A Response By Paul Ricoeur” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 37.
7
the being-in-the-world. The subject can provide an epistemological justification and
operate methodologically only because it is grounded primordially in participation.
Consequently, Ricoeur’s idea of understanding as self-understanding is not the same as
the idea of a self-conscious subject. The meaning of the consciousness is not derived
from the ego as pointed out by participation and distanciation. It is derived from
something outside itself. Understanding attests to the fact that the subject belongs to
being. The understanding of a text leads to the problem of appropriation of the text
which is its application to the present situation of the interpreter.24 The point of Ricoeur
concerning the hermeneutics of the text is its being a home for meaning. Taking the text
as a home for the truth effects various troubles in interpretation; while the interpretation
of the text that focuses on the truth propagated by the text is very confusing; hat which
focuses on the meaning of the text makes more sense.
Finally, the three phases: (1) phenomenological reduction; (2) hermeneutics; and
(3) appropriation flow directly from one single approach: the hermeneutic
phenomenological approach. The hermeneutic phenomenological approach can be used
to check critically one’s experience within society. It urges deliberate suspension of
judgments and allows experience to unfold and show its relevance. Further, it
admonishes the person to be on guard against trivial matters that conceal the meaningful
and existential understanding of the subject or the person. Ricoeur rediscovers the right
place of the subject in the context of experience. He desires to have a subject that is
certain of the meaning of its experience which is devoid of naiveté.
In connection with this, the researcher wishes to apply Ricoeur’s approach to the
problem of subjectivity to the clarification of the Filipino identity. There is a parallelism
24 Ibid., 143.
8
between Ricoeur’s project and the researcher’s project in that the researcher’s quest for
the Filipino identity is basically a quest for the Filipino self, and this is like that of
Ricoeur’s search for the meaning of self in the self-understanding and self-reflection.
Basically, the question is: What does it mean to be a Filipino? Lapeña opines that
by Filipino, one usually means a person who belongs to a race or culture. Nevertheless,
he further says that the Filipino race contains Malay, Polynesian, Indonesian and other
“basic stock” interwoven with Indian, Chinese, Spanish and more recent American and
Japanese strains and influences. Thus, the percentages of blood and thinking that qualify
one to be a Filipino is a problem.25 Consequently, looking for what exactly is the
meaning of being a Filipino is very problematic.
Furthermore, the pursuit of identity of the Filipino is said to be not a national
concern. It is only the concern of the Filipino elite. Foronda, as quoted by Babor,
explains,
To be sure, the study of Filipino identity has been the pre-occupation of the scholar and the intellectual and not, as expected, of the poor, the unlettered, or the dispossessed. For his part, the poor had the more pressing pre-occupation of keeping body and soul together, his dire poverty, and therefore, his struggle to live is more intense the way, than that of the effete intellectual given to theorizing.26
25 Jose Florencio Fabella Lapeña, Jr., “Halo-halo Reflections: The Filipino Identity and
Interdependence, Our Children and Our Common Future.” Philippine Journal of Education, 69 (March 1991), 438b.
26 Eddie R. Babor, “Heidegger’s Concept of ‘Authentic Existence’ in Being and Time and Its
Applicability to Filipinos” (Unpublished Dissertation: University of San Carlos, Cebu City, 2004), p. 188. Cf. Marcelino Foronda, Jr. “The Filipino and His Society in Philippine History: Some Personal Reflections” in Filipino Thought on Man and Society, ed. by Leonardo Mercado (Tacloban City: Divine Word University Publications, 1980), 2.
9
Corpuz, as cited by Lapeña, opines that the common tao knows that he is a Filipino
though he does not know why he is a Filipino.27 In this connection, the pursuit for the
Filipino identity is still relevant inasmuch as the Filipino elite affect literally the
development and progress of the entire country. If they understand truly the Filipino, they
will have a positive impact on the development of its country.
Nevertheless, the problem is not with who or what is a Filipino. The question
rather is: Why should the Filipino identity be known? The true Filipino identity has to be
known because it serves as “a rallying point for unity, self-discipline, and love and pride
in one’s country.”28 Arguably, knowing the Filipino identity helps the Filipino find a
sense of meaning, thereby, understands his reason for being. Consequently, this gives the
Filipino a sense of direction.
The assumption of this contention is that the moment the Filipino understands
who he is, he can extend such knowledge to the societal level and eventually create a
wave of true national Filipino identity. Consequently, this is the beginning of the true
sense of nationalism. With the individual Filipino becoming nationalistic, he becomes
concerned with the true Filipino interest. Moreover, knowing one’s self is tantamount to
the person’s ability to appropriate his decision upon his own. Consequently, not knowing
one’s self may lead to blindly following what other people tell him, supposing that since
it works with other people it will also work with him. However, his situation might be
different from that of others. So, it does not necessarily follow that what works with
others will also work with him.
27 Lapeña, 438b. 28 Emmanuel Mangubat, “Basic Considerations for Attaining a Truly Filipino National Identity”,
Philippine Journal of Education, 60 (December 1981), 297a.
10
Momentarily, since the Filipino does not yet find his locus of control, he has also
not ascertained yet the direction of his endeavors. Inasmuch as the present Filipino is
formed by his diverse influences, both eastern and western with their opposing
tendencies, he becomes confused. Seeing the best and the worst of both worlds is
supposedly advantageous to the Filipino. But his ignorance about his reason for being
makes him incapable of threshing out the good influences from the bad influences,
something that can drive his nation to the desired stability.
The question, however, about the Filipino identity is ambivalent. Thus, the
researcher proposes a detour. Filipino identity is reckoned to be embedded in the values
that a Filipino holds dear. Among the many values, the Filipino is known for the so-
called close family ties or solidarity.29 The family is discerned “as a defense against a
hostile world and a unit where one can turn to in case [a family member] has a serious
problem.”30 However, this seems to counter the idea of thinking nationally for this tends
to make a Filipino act parochially.
The researcher chooses the family/kinship orientation to be the value where the
Filipino identity can be discerned for the reason that it is considered to be the core
Filipino value. According to Talisayon, the core or central clusters of the Filipino value
system revolve around seven values: (1) family/kinship orientation; (2) makatao/kapwa
tao (personalism); (3) “loob complex” (religious/psychic orientation); (4) social
acceptance; (5) pakikiramdam; (6) pakikisama (group centeredness); and (7) economic
29 Teodoro A. Agoncillo, History of the Filipino People, 8th edition (Quezon City: GAROTECH
Publishing, 1990), 6 -7. 30 Isabel S. Panopio and Realidad Santico Rolda, Society and Culture: Introduction to Sociology
and Anthropology (Quezon City: JMC Press, Inc., 2000), 79. Cf. Jaime Bulatao, Split-level Christianity (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1966), 26.
11
security. He, however, observes that the strongest macroclusters are five, in order of
strength: the relationship macrocluster, loob macrocluster, social macrocluster, livelihood
macrocluster, and optimism.31 Since the strongest macrocluster is the relationship
macrocluster, the researcher identifies the family/kinship orientation as the core value for
the reason that personalism, as the other value pertaining to relationship, can be
considered vis-à-vis the family/ kinship orientation. Curiously, the significance of this
value is overwhelming because the state has strongly recognized the primacy of the
family in Philippine society as enshrined in the Philippine Civil Code and the Philippine
Constitution of 1986.32
If Ricoeur, in his quest for the re-understanding of the meaning of the subject,
specifically as the self in self-understanding and self-reflection, makes a detour to signs,
symbols, and text, so the researcher, in his quest for the clarification of the Filipino
identity, uses also the family/kinship orientation as a point of reference.
Theoretical Background of the Study
The French philosopher Paul Ricoeur is among the philosophers who see the
importance of the subject. Although it was Rene Descartes among the modern
31 Serafin D. Talisayon, “Values In Our Quest for Freedom (1896 – 1898) and Their Application
for Future Development” in Lourdes R. Quisumbing and Felice P. Sta. Maria, Peace and Tolerance: Values
Education Through History, 105. This is a result of Talisayon’s compilation and review of almost a hundred academic, journalist and opinion articles about Filipino values, orientations or attitudes, and idiosyncrasies. He was able to discern commonalities and consensus among various authors, and reduce them into a set of identifiable value clusters with some internal consistency or coherence.
32 Alfred McCoy, “`An Anarchy of Families’: The Historiography of State and Family in the
Philippines” in An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines, edited by Alfred W. McCoy (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1994), 7.
12
philosophers who initiated the discussion with his doctrine “Cogito Ergo Sum”33, Ricoeur
thinks that the subject has not been afforded due recognition since Descartes’ time. Thus,
Ricoeur embarks on a rediscovery of the subject using the hermeneutic
phenomenological approach.
Through this approach, Ricoeur’s desire to re-understand the meaning of the
subject commences. The practical value of Ricoeur’s approach can be seen in its ability
to check critically the meaning of an experience before appropriating it. It urges
deliberate suspension of judgment and allows experience to unfold and show its own
relevance. Furthermore, it admonishes the person to be on guard against those trivial
matters that tend to conceal the meaningful and existential quality of the subject.
Descartes’ Cogito is the subject considered merely as a thinking being, void of
any objectivity and separated from its essential reality.34 What is noteworthy about it is
that it is immediately conscious of itself. Thus, the subject is certain of its existence. At
the same time, on the basis of Cartesian dualism, the subject is uncertain of the existence
of objects outside itself. Thus, the Cartesian Cogito does not represent the subject in its
full meaning.
Ricoeur, subsequently, discovers Gabriel Marcel and this has influenced him
greatly. Contrary to the dichotomy of the subject and the object, Marcel conceives the
ultimate ontological unity of man’s being-in-the-world. He does not reduce the subject or
the object to the other. Rather, he pursues a description of the polar structure of the
33 Rene Descartes, The Philosophical Works of Descartes, trans. by Elizabeth S. Haldine and
G.R.T. Ross (New York: Dover, 1955), 101 ff. & 149 ff. 34 Ibid., 153-57.
13
ultimate unity of the subject and the object.35 Basically, Ricoeur accepts the position of
Marcel, but he looks for a more rigorous and systematic method that will adequately
expand the ontological unity into a systematic philosophy of man’s being-in-the-world.36
He is dissatisfied with the inexactness of Marcel’s journal method.
Ricoeur learns of Husserl’s phenomenological writings that require the
description of the ontological unity of the subject and the object. Intentionality then
becomes central to Ricoeur’s method, providing a disciplined expression for the vague
recognition of the unity of experience through its recognition of consciousness as always
a consciousness of something.37 This implies that the basic datum of experience at its
most immediate level in the intentional unity of subject and object is the reflexive
consciousness. However, by reflection, the intentional unity of experience is polarized
and the object is viewed opposite to the reflecting subject. To deliberately suspend the
objectifying standpoint, phenomenological reduction or bracketing is used as an approach
which separates the essential structure of man’s being-in-the-world from its special
existential characteristics.38 The separation of the essential structure from the special
existential characteristics is necessary in order to understand objectively the meaning of
an experience without any subjective prejudices. Biases and prejudices impede one’s
objective perception or understanding of the object. Nevertheless, this approach of
35 Gabriel Marcel, The Mystery of Being, vol. 1: Reflection and Mystery (Chicago: Henry Regnery
Co., 1950), 114 – 23. 36 Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary, trans. with intro. by Erazim
Kohak (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1966), xxx. 37 Ibid., xiii. 38 Edmund Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, trans. by William P. Alston and George
Nakhnikian, intro. by George Nakhnikian (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964), 4.
14
bracketing prejudices is dubious because freeing oneself from biases is impossible since
the language used in describing is in itself bias.
On this ground, Ricoeur considers the phenomenological reduction as insufficient.
While it describes the essential structures of the subject, it does not say anything about
the latent meaning hidden behind the manifest structure of the subject. Ricoeur surmises
that the ontological unity of the subject and object implies the need to uncover the latent
symbolic and mythical expressions of the subject’s experience. To uncover this latent
meaning Ricoeur goes beyond Husserl’s bracketing and follows Heidegger’s ontological
hermeneutics. Following Heidegger’s ontological hermeneutics, Ricoeur refuses to take
subject as identical to its immediate experiences. Instead of attempting a direct
description of the subject’s experiences, he recognizes the need for a hermeneutic theory
that uncovers the underlying meanings of experience.
Husserl claims that the consciousness of the subject entails its being conscious of
“something”39, but Ricoeur rebuffs this claim on the immediacy of the subject’s
consciousness. In full recognition of the positions of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, he
argues that Husserl’s is a false consciousness.40 To question the reliability of immediate
consciousness is tantamount to saying that not all modes of discourse tell the exact
meaning of experience. The unreliability or falsity of the subject’s immediate
consciousness leads Ricoeur to think that the subject is indeed not certain of itself.
Apparently, the subject is lost when Marx, Nietzsche and Freud contend that
immediate consciousness is an illusion. Ricoeur, for his part, upholds that the subject is
39 Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. by W. R. Boyce Gibson
(New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931), 120. 40 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 33 – 34.
15
not actually lost, only dislocated. To liberate the subject, Ricoeur does not search for the
first truth; instead he searches for that truth that is not naïve. One liberates the subject not
through a presuppositionless philosophy but through a philosophy that regards all its
presuppositions.
Freud, though one of the philosophers who believes that the subject is lost, gives
Ricoeur the idea on how to liberate the subject through interpretation of dreams. To
interpret dreams is not to interpret them literally. Dreams are enigmatic; they convey
meanings behind their literal meanings.41 With this disguise of dreams Ricoeur realizes
that the subject can reestablish the truth of dreams through reflection and distanciation.
In reflection, the dreamer recollects himself and lets the dream unfold in front of him.
After which the dreamer looks for its significance to himself. He thus interprets the
dream. He appropriates to himself its meaning and thereby distances himself from its
content and peeks deeply into its great abyss.
Ricoeur employs Nabert’s philosophy of reflection that is neither direct nor
immediate. Reflection is indirect because Nabert believes that existence is revealed only
in the documents of life and because false consciousness needs a corrective critique
which will lead it from misunderstanding to understanding.42 Reflective philosophy aims
to appreciate in praxis an originary dynamism that grounds human existence. Reflection
recaptures the subject through the expressions of life that objectify it. However, the
textual exegesis of consciousness collides with the initial ‘misinterpretation’ of false
41 Sigmund Freud, The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud, trans. by and intro. by Dr. A.A. Brill,
Book 2: The Interpretation of Dreams (New York: The Modern Library, 1938), 218. 42 Ricoeur, Conflict of Interpretations, 18.
16
consciousness. Thus, hermeneutics is there to rectify what was first a misinterpretation
and makes possible the re-appropriation or recovery of the subject.
Now, the researcher applies Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of appropriation as an
approach in clarifying the meaning of the subject to the clarification of Filipino identity.
There is always the question of who are the Filipinos. It is believed that the Filipinos’
confusion regarding their identity contributes to the stagnation of the Philippines as a
country. Thus, there is a constant clamor for the thoughtful consideration of the Filipino
identity.
De Quiros of the Philippine Daily Inquirer, in his article entitled “A Question of
Identity”, points out the significance of identity saying:
[W]hat's the big deal about identity? Well, look at countries like Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia, and look at us. With nations as with individuals, you have no sense of self, you will never know, and do, what you want. You will only know, and follow, what others tell you to.43
The importance of knowing one’s self depends on the ability of the person to appropriate
his decision upon his own.
Another discussion on the importance of looking into the Filipino’s identity is
found in the article of Michael Tan, “Looking for the Filipino Soul.” Tan observes that
there are people calling for a return to values as the solution to all of the problems that
beset the Filipinos. However, he points out that what the Filipinos need to do first is to
be more introspective and ask themselves: what values? And whose values?44 He adds
by saying that
43 Conrado de Quiros, “A Question of Identity” [article online]; available from http://www.inq7.
net/opi/2002/mar/20/opi_csdequiros-1.htm; accessed September 3, 2003. 44 Michael L. Tan, “Looking for the Filipinos Soul” [article online]; available from http://www.
pinoykasi.homestead.com/files/first_article.htm; accessed September 3, 2003.
17
I am not about to romanticize Filipino culture, praising all that is local as good and pure. Our faults are many and we should be mature enough to talk about them and laugh at ourselves, even as we recognize that we would be so much duller if we didn't have those faults.45
He accentuates the importance of soul-searching and the unraveling of the Filipino
psyche all the more that it is fairly a young nation. Looking into the Filipino soul is
needed in the Filipinos’ search for their identity.46
Roco intimates the same sentiments. In one of his news releases entitled “Making
People Strong: The DepEd under Sec. Raul S. Roco,” he envisions Filipino leaders who
are open to the global environment yet rooted in their national identity. He believes that
“education will arm the Filipino people in a world fueled by knowledge; an education
that develops functional literacy and numeracy, critical and higher thinking, a
commitment to excellence and a love for learning.”47 However, the researcher focuses on
the vision of Roco of Filipino leaders who are deeply in contact with their national
identity.
Tomas Andres, in his book entitled “Understanding Values”, says that the core of
human reality is the self. The superficiality of the Filipino’s action and the
meaninglessness of every moment are eliminated when the Filipino self is discovered.
This makes self-discovery as the basic premise of every meaningful human activity.48 He
persuades the reader, through his book, “to evaluate alternatives and select the one that is
45 Ibid. 46 Ibid. 47 Raul Roco ,“Making People Strong: The DepEd under Sec. Raul S. Roco” [article online];
available from http://www.raulroco.com/news_releases/ newsreleases.htm accessed September 6, 2003. 48 Tomas D. Andres, Understanding Values (Quezon city: New Day Publishers, 1980), viii.
18
right for him so that he can clarify his values, realize his goals, gain self-confidence and
form meaningful relationships with others”; the reader is “encouraged to set up his own
benchmarks against which to measure his own personal search for meaning.”49
The researcher finds this exhortation relevant to the Filipinos in general. He likes
to extend this idea to the search for the true Filipino identity, for through it the Filipinos
are encouraged to set up their own benchmarks against which to measure their communal
search for meaning.
A detour, however, in the clarification of the Filipino identity has to be put in
place. A way to know a nation’s identity is by its values.50 According to Talisayon, the
core or central clusters of the Filipino value system revolve around seven values, with
family/kinship orientation as the core value.51 McCoy shares this observation. In fact,
according to him,
the state recognized the primacy of the family in Philippine society. In curiously loving language, Article 216 of the Philippine Civil Code states that “The family is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects.” In Article 219 the state admonishes its officials to respect the family’s primary responsibility for social welfare: “Mutual aid, both moral and material, shall be rendered among members of the same family. Judicial and administrative officials shall foster this mutual assistance.” Similarly, in Article 2, section 12, the Philippine Constitution of 1986 makes the defense of the family a basic national principle: “The state recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.”52
49 Ibid. 50 Alejandro R. Roces, “A Nation Is Known By Its Values” in Peace and Tolerance: Values
Education Through History, 122-124. 51 Talisayon, 105. 52 McCoy, 7.
19
McCoy also observes that the Filipino family “provides employment and capital,
educates and socializes the young, assures medical care, shelters its handicapped and
aged, and strives, above all else, to transmit its name, honor, lands, capital, and values to
the next generation.”53
Family orientation is indeed very crucial to the Filipino. Historically, Covar
points out that during the formative period of the Philippine history, the Filipino was
concerned with the ginhawa (inner comfort) of the tao and the well-being of the sakop
(ward).54 As the Filipino progressed in the period of Struggle and National
Consolidation, the concern now turned into the civilization of the ‘natives’ as Spanish
mesticillos and little brown Americans who eventually became the ilustrados. Also,
during this time, the Filipino began to think about the national interest. However, the
promise of working for the national interest and general welfare had remained a promise
for the colonizers effectively exploited the Filipino’s family-centeredness by fitting one
family against another family, one region against another region.55
As we now enter the 21st century, social scientists and communicators usually ask,
“What happened to the society and culture during the Formative Period? Were they
wiped out during the Period of Struggle and National Consolidation? Is there anything
left in the indigenous culture and society which we could rally around the Period of
53 Ibid. 54 Prospero R. Covar, “Unburdening Philippine Society of Colonialism” in Peace and Tolerance:
Values Education Through History, 171. 55 Ibid., 171.
20
Cultural Solidarity?”56 Then Covar explains, “Our answers to these questions shall help
guide us in our quest for values beyond 1998.”57
The answer of Ramirez to the questions is affirmative. Indeed, there are still
things left in the indigenous culture and society that pervade in the Period of cultural
solidarity. The traces of the Formative period pervades in what Ramirez calls as the
suppressed culture that operates vis-à-vis the dominant culture imposed by the colonizers.
It might be thought of that the operating values during the Formative period are
insignificant for they are now relegated to the collective unconscious of the people.
However, Ramirez elucidates that they are not insignificant for they have “become the
soil in which any external item from other cultures may be grafted to assume its own
unique growth and evolution.”58 This hidden dimension, she explains further, “is
sometimes more powerful than the external elements of a culture [for it] lives in the
minds and hearts of people.”59
During the Period of Struggle and National Consolidation, the people’s operating
values of the Formative Period were forcefully put on the back burner for the reason that
colonizers imposed religious, social and political systems on the Filipinos. For the Spaniards, colonization was part of their desire to ‘Christianize’ us; for the Americans, it was their plan to establish a politico-economic foothold in Asia, disguised as ‘benevolent assimilation.’ Punitive measures accompanied these impositions. Filipinos who refused to accept the new systems were punished as heretics and insurrectos…. They likewise introduced their values as standards for what is desirable, good,
56 Ibid., 174. 57 Ibid. 58 Mina M. Ramirez, “Toward a Revolution of Mindsets: A Critique of the Present Socio-Cultural
System” Reflections on Culture, an occasional monograph (Manila: Asian Social Institute, 1991), 4. 59 Ibid.
21
true, and beautiful in society. On the other hand, native customary ways were set aside as “primitive.” Conventional practices were labeled as “barbaric.” Indigenous values were described as “backward” and “corrupt.” Native character was seen as “uncouth” and local beliefs were called “superstitions.” Thus viewed, local knowledge, beliefs, and practices became undesirable. They were said to be “barriers to modernization.” Therefore they had to be changed.60
Meaning, with the use of the whip, the people were forced to adopt the value system of
the colonizers without positively understanding the impact of the modern practices to
modernization. They adopted the practices of the colonizers out of fear, practices which
were not completely assimilated and grafted to the indigenous soul of the people. In the
words of Alfred McCoy, citing O.D. Corpuz, although Spain and the United States tried
to forge a strong bureaucratic apparatus based upon their own laws and social practice,
they could not induce compliance through shared myth or other forms of social sanction
because the modern Philippine state did not evolve organically from Filipino society.
They derived their authority from the implied coercion of colonial rule.61 Consequently,
Filipinos became very religious and devout Christians, but the sharing of material goods
to others, most especially to the needy, are quite difficult for them. Also, nowadays, with
free enterprise, people earn more money but it is not necessarily equated with hard work.
People realize that if one is clever enough, one can get money through gambling,
scheming (like in graft and corruption) or some illegal way.62
60 F. Landa Jocano, Filipino Value System: A Cultural Definition (Manila: PUNLAD Research
House, Inc., 1997), 3 – 4. 61 McCoy, 11. Cf. O.D. Corpuz, Bureaucracy in the Philippines (Manila: Institute of Public
Administration, University of the Philippines, 1957), 128 – 213. 62 Ramirez, “Toward a Revolution of Mindsets: A Critique of the Present Socio-Cultural System”,
5. See also, Ramirez, “The Dominant and Popular Cultural Systems in the Philippines” Reflections on
Culture, 19.
22
While conventional practices are labeled as “barbaric,” indigenous values
described as “backward” and “corrupt,” native character seen as “uncouth” and local
beliefs called “superstitions,” the people are able to develop the idea that the indigenous
models are inferior compared to the exogenous models brought by the colonizers.63 As
mentioned above, the simultaneous demands of the two incongruous systems on the
Filipinos create conflict situations which satisfy neither value system fully. Thus, in the
supposed Period of cultural solidarity, there is really no solidarity that happens for the
reason that the operating values in the formative period (the traditional value system) and
those of the period of struggle and national consolidation (the dominant value system) are
continually in conflict in this period of supposed solidarity.
Nevertheless, the Filipino bats for national solidarity. However, the interests of
the family interfere with the interests of the nation, which might be the reason why the
Filipino has the difficulty of achieving a true sense of nationalism. For this reason, to re-
understand family orientation as a core Filipino value is an imperative.
THE PROBLEM
Statement of the Problem This dissertation attempts to clarify the meaning of the Filipino identity through
family orientation as a core Filipino value using Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of appropriation
as an experimental tool. The researcher then resolves to answer the following problems:
1. What is Ricoeur’s hermeneutic phenomenology as a philosophy?
2. How does the hermeneutics of appropriation work?
63 Jocano, 5. See also Ramirez, “The Dominant and Popular Cultural Systems in the Philippines”,
23 – 24.
23
3. How can the hermeneutics of appropriation as a methodology be applied in the
clarification of the Filipino identity?
Significance of the Study The researcher finds a parallelism between Ricoeur’s clarification of the meaning
of the subject and the researcher’s own quest for the clarification of the Filipino’s
identity.
The dissertation brings forward a lesson directed to anybody. As a person and an
inhabitant of the Filipino society, the researcher aims at applying Ricoeur’s hermeneutic
of appropriation to the clarification of the Filipino identity. Phenomenological bracketing
suspends deliberately judgments about the Filipino values and lets it unfold itself and
show its relevance to the Filipino experience. Hermeneutics cautions the Filipinos to
realize the appropriateness of the Filipino values to the present time.
In other words, hermeneutic phenomenological approach can be used to check
critically the Filipinos’ experience within the society. It urges deliberate suspension of
judgments and allows experience to unfold and show its relevance. Further, to rephrase
what has been said above, it admonishes the Filipino to be on guard against trivial matters
that conceal the meaningful and existential understanding of the being of a Filipino.
Scope and Limitations of the Study The aim of this dissertation is not to have a full blown study of the philosophy of
Paul Ricoeur. It zeroes in only on Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of appropriation.
Ricoeur’s hermeneutic phenomenology is studied just to locate the place of the
hermeneutic of appropriation.
24
Furthermore, the clarification of the Filipino identity is done through a detour on
family/kinship orientation as a core Filipino value.
Consciously, Ricoeur’s recovery of the subject using hermeneutics of
appropriation is the same route that this dissertation is following.
Another limitation of the study is that Ricoeur’s writings are in French and the
researcher will have to depend on translation. The name of the translators are listed in
the citations of Ricoeur’s works.
METHODOLOGY
The present study makes an exploratory review of Paul Ricoeur’s hermeneutic
phenomenology, in general, and the hermeneutics of appropriation, in particular.
Subsequently, the researcher explores also the initial understanding regarding Filipino
identity and the common understanding of the Filipino values, in general, and the
family/kinship orientation as a core Filipino value, in particular.
The researcher, at first, utilizes phenomenology to clarify through reflective
analysis the Filipino’s own existence whereby his identity can be deduced. Subsequently,
he makes use of hermeneutics, inasmuch as this reflective analysis is indirect and
interpretive, for it deduces the Filipino identity from the family/kinship orientation as a
core Filipino value. Ultimately, Ricoeur’s hermeneutics of appropriation is utilized in
order to have a proper appreciation of the family/kinship orientation as a core value,
which will then be utilized as a springboard in the making of the new Filipino in the new
millennium.
25
DEFINITION OF TERMS
Appropriation. This theory of interpretation does not imply the secret return of the
sovereign subject. It is the making-one’s-own of the ground of one’s existence. It is the
becoming of the self grounded in participation. Thus, appropriation is more of an
intersubjective relation of mutual understanding.
Close Family Ties. The family has been the unit of society and everything revolves
around it. The Filipino family consists of the grandparents, the parents, and the children.
The father is the head of the family, but while he rules, the mother governs. Over and
above the “ruler” and the “governor” are the grandparents, whose opinions and decisions
on all important matters are sought.64
Filipinos. They are Malay-Indonesian negritos distilled with European and American
cultures and races; individuals well-gifted in friendship, understanding, letters, arts and
sciences, sports and pursuit of excellence; Christian people; an avid lover of democracy;
and a personality gradually discovering his identity.65 Although Agoncillo explains that
the Filipino is difficult, if not impossible to define, he picks out some traits common to
the average Filipino that separates him from the Spaniards and the Americans. These
traits are the following: hospitality, close family ties, respect for the elders, regionalistic,
fatalistic, loyalty, sensitive, tendency to be indolent, lack of initiative, curious,
individualistic, jealous, etc.66
64 Agoncillo, 6 -7. 65 Andres, Understanding Filipinos Values: A Management Approach (Quezon City: New Day
Publishers, 1981). 66 Agoncillo, 5 – 15.
26
Filipino Culture. It is an integrated system of learned behavior patterns that are
characteristic of the members of the Philippine society. It refers to the total way of life of
the Filipinos. It includes everything that the Filipinos think, say, do, or make. It includes
Philippines customs, traditions, language, values, beliefs, and attitudes, concepts of self,
morals, rituals, and manners.67
Hermeneutic phenomenology. Ricoeur rediscovers the right place of the subject in the
context of experience. He desires to have a subject that is certain of the meaning of its
experience which is devoid of naiveté. To do so, Ricoeur grafts Husserl’s bracketing into
Heidegger’s question of being. The result is the hermeneutic phenomenological
approach, an approach to know objectively the nature of experience. Ricoeur finds the
understanding of the subject possible only through things that mediate the subject.
Re-understanding Filipino Values. It means suggesting new ways of looking at the
traditional Filipino values, or re-understanding them so that the Filipinos can harness
them to work for them. This also refers to the need for the Filipinos to shift their value
paradigms – to recast their mindsets and to redefine their perspectives from one which
sees their traditional values as sources of ills to another which sees them as sources of
inner strength and moral will to survive and excel.68
Revolution of Mindsets. It means a change in the school system, Church system, and
communications system. These systems will have to play their role in clarifying values,
67 Andres and Pilar Corazon B. Ilada-Andres, Understanding the Filipino (Quezon City: New Day
Publishers, 1987). 68 Jocano, Filipino Value System.
27
particularly those related to the “economy” in which a great many of the Filipino people
feel much deprived.69
Socio-cultural System is the complex of institutional dynamics, which is but a
manifestation of the collective unconscious (the hidden dimension of a culture) that has
developed through the historical evolution of a people.70
Values. They are the deepest layer of the institutional dynamics of a society that spells
out the structures or the enduring patterns of relationships operating as extensions of
culture.71
69 Mina M. Ramirez, “Toward a Revolution of Mindsets: A Critique of the Present Socio-Cultural
System” Reflections on Culture, an occasional monograph (Manila: Asian Social Institute, 1991). 70 Ibid. 71 Ibid.
CHAPTER TWO
THE HERMENEUTIC PHENOMENOLOGY
The conclusion of Paul Ricoeur’s book The Symbolism of Evil that says “the
symbol gives rise to thought”72 is highly instructive as to his attempt to elucidate the
dimensions of human subjectivity hermeneutically.73 Ricoeur explains that the said
statement enchants him for it says two things: “the symbol gives; but what it gives is
occasion for thought, something to think about.”74 Subsequently, in understanding the
symbol, Ricoeur adds that there is a need for “an interpretation that respects the original
enigma of the symbols, that lets itself be taught by them, beginning from there, promotes
the meaning, forms the meaning in the full responsibility of autonomous thought.”75 For
this reason, “the task of the philosopher guided by symbols would be to break out of the
enchanted enclosure of consciousness of oneself, to end the prerogative of self-
reflection.”76
In connection with this, Madison comments that “one of Ricoeur’s chief
contributions to philosophy in our time is the way in which he enabled us to think afresh
the age-old and central question of philosophy which is ourselves, the question as to what
72 Paul Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, trans. by Emerson Buchanan (Boston: Beacon Press, 1967), 347-357. 73 G. B. Madison, “Ricoeur and the Hermeneutics of the Subject” in Lewis Edwin Hahn, ed. The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (Illinois: Open Court: 1995), 75. 74 Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, 348. 75 Ibid., 350. 76 Ibid., 356.
29
it means to be a thinking, reflective subject.”77 This becomes the focal point of Ricoeur’s
philosophical inquiries as it comes out from the Cartesian understanding of the subject up
to the influenced he got from Jean Nabert, his teacher. Nevertheless, the first philosopher
who has a great influence on Paul Ricoeur is Gabriel Marcel who was his professor from
1935 through the graduate years. Ricoeur holds, with Marcel, a profound respect for the
mystery of being and a deep distrust for any simple reductive explanation of the human
subject. Ricoeur’s modification of this Marcelian theme is one which complements his
respect for mystery.78
Avoiding the dichotomy of subject and object, Marcel formulates an ontological
unity of man’s incarnate existence. Marcel intends to describe the polar structure of the
ultimate unity of the subject and the object rather than reduce the subject or the object to
the other. The germ of Ricoeur’s idea on the unity of the subject and the object is already
found in Marcel. Later in his philosophical career, Ricoeur’s reading of Marx, Nietzsche,
and Freud validates Marcel’s concept of the mystery of being through the mystery of the
consciousness which is inscripted by symbolisms.
The essence of the symbolic enigma hints at a complication between the
consciousness and the object of consciousness. In the writings of Freud, there is no
immediate relationship between the dream and the apparent meaning of the dream. But,
if immediacy between the consciousness and its meaning is untenable, then there occurs a
dissociation of the subject from its consciousness.
77 Madison, 75.
78 Don Ihde, Hermeneutic Phenomenology: The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1986), 8.
30
A. Dislocation of the Subject
To trace the impetus of the dislocation of the subject from the influence of
Descartes is quite appropriate. Through Descartes, philosophers start to investigate the
subject that is the questor itself. The influence of Descartes in modern philosophy is
undeniable. His thought triggers other philosophers to either support or debunk his ideas.
The heritage of Cartesianism is so exemplary that even phenomenology takes its
beginning from it.
The Cartesian Tradition In the history of Western Philosophy, the subject starts to be given full attention
only by Rene Descartes, who proposes that “we reject all such merely probable
knowledge and make it a rule to trust only what is completely known and incapable of
being doubted.”79 In view of this thrust, he employs doubt as a method in order to
ultimately find that entity which is certain and indubitable. He accepts nothing as true
unless he is certain of it. As he tries to doubt everything, he notices that
whilst I thus wish to think all things false, it was absolutely essential that the “I” who thought this should be somewhat, and remarking that this truth I think, therefore I am was so certain and so assured that all the most extravagant suppositions brought forward by the sceptics were incapable of shaking it, came to the conclusion that I would receive it without scruple as the first principle of the philosophy for which I was seeking.80
His proclamation of “Cogito, Ergo Sum” leads, however, to the isolation of the subject
from its environment81 and, in the clarity of itself, the assertion of itself.
79 Descartes, “Rules for the Direction of the Mind”, in The Philosophical Works of Descartes,
trans. by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross (New York: Dover, 1955), 3.
80 Descartes, “Discourse on the Method”, in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, 101. Cf. Descartes, “Meditations on First Philosophy”, in The Philosophical Works of Descartes, 149ff.
81 Cf. Descartes, “Meditations on First Philosophy”, 153-57.
31
The Cartesian Cogito is the unsurpassed starting point of Modern Philosophy, the
historical moment which is also the moment of the subject. The subject has thereby been
instituted through Descartes’ declaration of “Cogito, Ergo Sum.”
The Cartesian methodic doubt is, by its very nature, epistemological. Moreover, it
is necessary to explain it as a jumping board for our quest of the subject. It will be
remembered that the very characteristic of Descartes’ methodic doubt is “his decision to
treat the probable as false, and to distrust the senses as sources of knowledge. He even
went as far as to suppose the existence of some powerful malignant spirit who constantly
deceived him in all that he thought.”82
Nevertheless, the methodic doubt leads Descartes to one indubitable truth: his
own existence. The founding of his own existence as the indubitable truth becomes the
basis of his entire philosophy. He focuses on the importance of analyzing and evaluating
human knowledge and thus stresses the role of the subject in any such study.83
The Cartesian subject, however, remains separated or divorced from its existential
reality for the reason that it is centered on the Cogito and not on the Ego of the Cogito.
In this regard Ricoeur criticizes Descartes, saying:
the celebrated Cartesian cogito... is a truth as vain as it is invincible. I do not deny that it is a truth; it is a truth which posits itself, and as such it can be neither verified nor deduced. It posits at once a being and an act, an existence and an operation of thought: I am, I think; to exist for me, is to think: I exist insofar as I think.84 But this truth is in vain... so long as the ego of the ego cogito has not been recaptured....85
82 Reginald F. O’neill, S.J., Theories of Knowledge (Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, Inc.,
1959), 135. Cf. Descartes, “Meditations on First Philosophy”, 148. 83 Ibid., 136. 84 Cf. Descartes, “Meditations on First Philosophy”, 150-51.
85 Ricoeur, “Existence and Hermeneutics” in The Conflict of Interpretations, 17.
32
The assertion of the Cogito is the assertion that the Cogito is the sole truth of the
consciousness. Since the Cogito is an indubitable truth, the “sum” possesses the certainty
of the consciousness. Henceforth, the Cogito understands intuitively its own existence.
If Descartes considers the Cogito as the most unshakable truth, then it is void of any
doubt. The existence of the Cogito is intuitive, that is, it is an unclouded conception
which the mind gives us so readily and distinctly that it is free from doubt. And so he
concludes that each individual can mentally have an intuition of the fact that he exists,
and that he thinks.86 Thus, Ricoeur is correct when he remarks that
The Cogito is not only a truth as vain as it is invincible...as well, that it is like an empty place which has from all time, been occupied by false Cogito... that so-called immediate consciousness is first of all “false consciousness”. Henceforth it becomes necessary to join a critique of false consciousness to any rediscovery of the subject of the Cogito in the documents of its life....87
The understanding of Descartes of the Cogito as the subject is not yet the subject
which he refers to as “I am”. On the contrary, the subject that is talked about here refers
to the subject as substratum. The subject as the ground or substratum is “that which
gathers everything to itself to become a basis. This subjectum is not yet man and not at all
the ‘I’.”88
Ricoeur emphasizes the difference between subjectum as ground and subjectum as
“I”. The subjectum as ground accentuates the central importance of the Cogito in its
relation to the existent. The certainty of the things outside the Cogito depends on the
86 Cf. Descartes, “Rules for the Direction of the Mind”, 7.
87 Ricoeur, “Existence and Hermeneutics” in The Conflict of Interpretations, 18. 88 Ricoeur, “Heidegger and the Question of the Subject” in The Conflict of Interpretations, 228.
33
Cogito itself. This happens because the Cogito is the model of certitude and consequently
mirrors certitude. The world, in this sense, becomes a picture that stands before the
Cogito. Thus, “the existent as a whole is posited as that with respect to which a man
orients himself, which, therefore, he wishes to bring and have before himself, and thus, in
a decisive sense, re-presents to himself.”89 The representation of the existent emerges as
parallel to the emergence of man as subject.
On the other hand, the understanding of the subjectum as “I”, based on the
previous analysis, becomes a temporal entity. The “I” is an entity that “belongs to an
age, and not only to an age, but to the first age for which the world is made into a
view.”90 This means to say that the Cartesian idea of the Cogito as absolute is now
defunct. The Cogito is actually an entity that belongs to an age, formed by its culture and
environment. When Ricoeur seemingly destroys the Cogito, he does this to justify the
return of the question of the subject. The ego is a temporal entity and not an immediate
consciousness.
The Husserlian Egology
The starting point of Husserl’s philosophy, following the Cartesian tradition, is
the self-evidence of one’s own consciousness.91 If Descartes prides himself on the
immediacy of the Cogito, Husserl, for his part, gives exceptional consideration to
perception. For him, “seeing” is very important. The vagueness of the configuration of
an object in the dark can be made clear through “seeing”. Husserl says that what he
89 Ibid.
90 Ibid., 229.
91 Robert C. Solomon, A History of Western Philosophy. Volume 7: Continental Philosophy Since
1750: The Rise and Fall of the Self (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988), 130.
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wants to achieve is clarity. He writes, “I want to understand the possibility of that
reaching. But this... signifies: I want to come face to face with the essence of the
possibility of that reaching. I want to make it given to me in an act of ‘seeing’.”92 What
Husserl wants to see is the necessary and universal truth of experience.
According to him, the entities that are really clear to his cognition are the
immanent entities since they are within him. The knowledge of the things belonging to
the objective sciences, the natural sciences, and the sciences of culture, as well as those of
the mathematical sciences, is transcendent. Because it is transcendent, it is outside him.
Now he raises the question of the possibility of cognition reaching what is beyond itself.
It seems to be not possible to reach those entities that are not found within the confine of
consciousness.93
Husserl says there is only one indubitable entity, i.e., the genuinely immanent
being. Primarily, the subject may use the genuinely immanent being because it is beyond
questioning. However, he may not yet use the transcendent or the non-genuinely
immanent being. Nevertheless, he can still use it after accomplishing a
phenomenological reduction. The method of phenomenological reduction involves the
exclusion of all that is transcendentally posited.94 Transcendental reduction brings
knowledge to self-evidence and self-givenness. “The idea of phenomenological
reduction acquires a more immediate and more profound determination and a clearer
meaning .... The root of the matter, however, is to grasp the meaning of the absolutely
92 Edmund Husserl, The Idea of Phenomenology, translated by William P. Alston and George
Nakhnikian, intro. by George Nakhnikian (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1964), 4.
93 Ibid., 3.
94 Ibid., 3-4.
35
given, the absolute clarity of the given, which excludes every meaningful doubt, in a
word, to grasp the absolutely “seeing” evidence which gets hold of itself.”95
Consequently, the world is not just a reflection of the Cogito. The world becomes a kind
of a being-for-me. If the first thing that is discovered by the Cartesian methodic doubt is
the ego-cogito, in Husserl’s phenomenology the first discovery is the opening up of the
ego-cogito-cogitatum.96 This is what Husserl meant by the world as a kind of a being-
for-me.
The idea of the being-for-me is the offshoot of the idea of intentionality.
Intentionality is characterized by mental acts such as judgments, beliefs, meanings,
valuations, desires, loves, hatreds, and so on. It is always an act that is “about” or “of”
something.97 All experiences which have these essential properties in common are also
called “intentional experiences”; in so far as they are a consciousness of something, they
are said to be “intentionally related” to.98 Husserl adds,
That an experience is the consciousness of something;..., this does not relate to the experimental fact as lived within the world... but to the pure essence grasped ideationally as pure idea. In the very essence of an experience lies determined not only that, but also whereof it is a consciousness, and in what determinate or indeterminate sense it is this.99
95 Ibid., 4.
96 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology, translated by Dorion
Cairns (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966), 50. 97 Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology , translated by W. R. Boyce
Gibson (New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931), xiii-xiv. 98 Ibid., 119.
99 Ibid., 120.
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In other words, as Kearney describes it, “to say that consciousness is ‘intentional’ is to
recognise that when I perceive or imagine an object my consciousness is already out there
reaching toward the object itself.”100
Husserl’s phenomenological reduction promotes a subject that is the final
justification of all objectivity. It promotes a consciousness that points to the correlative
poles of the conscious act, the object of consciousness which he designates by the term
“noema” and the conscious act that intends the object which he calls “noesis”. These two
poles of the conscious are acts inseparable and they constitute together the two
correlative sides of the pure ego.101 As a consequent, Husserl replaces the traditional
category of “substance” with the category of “relation”.102 This is being the case; the
subject and the object do not exist as if they are two distinct substances existing
independently of each other. On the contrary, they exist, first and foremost, in relation to
each other. They become separated only as they are divided at the reflective level of
logic.103
The moment of bracketing the transcendents to uncover the immanents of the
object involves a new problem in the nature of the subject. The project of Husserl is to
uncover the immanent and this involves “seeing”. Nevertheless, as Jervolino quotes
Ricoeur, “all seeing is already and always understanding-interpreting... The articulation
of the understood, as it takes place in the form of the approach that understands being in
100 Richard Kearney, Modern Movements in European Philosophy, 2nd edition (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1994),, 15. 101 Husserl, Cartesian Meditations, 29.
102 Kearney, Modern Movements in European Philosophy, 13. 103 Ibid.
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the form of the ‘as something’, precedes any thematic statement about the being.”104
Inasmuch as all seeing is already and always understanding-interpreting, then the
presuppositionless philosophy of Husserl is not sufficient. The act of understanding-
interpreting is not void of presuppositions. Instead, it presupposes the historicity of the
subject which already conditions its consciousness.
The main objection of Ricoeur to the transcendental nature of Husserl’s subject is
its position that the subject has an immediate and intuitive consciousness. For Ricoeur,
an immediate and intuitive consciousness of the subject is not convenient. That
transcendental constitution of the subject is what he means by reflection. But, according
to him, reflection is not an intuition.105 The consciousness is not the abode of meaning;
there is something other than the consciousness that is the abode of meaning.106 The very
idea of the Cogito and the transcendental ego implies that subject constitutes meaning.
Ricoeur reasons that the subject should not be identified with the consciousness.
Meaning, the “I am” must not be identified with the “I think”. To understand the subject
does not need intuition. If it is intuited, “the first truth - I am, I think - remains as abstract
and empty as it is invincible; it has to be ‘mediated’ by the ideas, actions, works,
institutions, monuments that objectify it. It is in these objects... that the Ego must lose
and find itself.”107
104 Domenico Jervolino, The Cogito and Hermeneutics: The Question of the Subject in Ricoeur,
trans. by Gordon Poole (Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Klumer Academic Publishers, 1990), 90.
105 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 43.
106 Ibid., 55. 107 Ibid., 43.
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Heidegger and the Subject
Kearney remarks that Heidegger revised Husserl’s phenomenological method so
that it might properly respond to the question of Being. He re-opened the brackets and let
existence back in. But existence was now to be understood neither as mere subjectivity
nor mere objectivity, but as a fundamental openness to the Being of beings.”108
Heidegger denies the possibility of bracketing. To understand Dasein is always mediated
by a foreknowledge which comprises the life-world of the interpreter. Therefore,
suspending that life-world would preclude the possibility of understanding, altogether. As
Bleicher explained, “since Dasein is characterized by its understanding of Being, the
meaning can only be interpreted from within this pre-current understanding.”109
Heidegger reaches this conclusion by contending that as a necessary part of
Dasein, things are perceived according to how they are encountered and used in one’s
everyday routines and tasks. Perception and apprehension are moved from fore-
knowledge to an existential understanding which is largely an unreflective and automatic
grasp of a situation that triggers a response. The meaningfulness of this understanding is
due to Dasein’s being both historical and finite. “It is historical in that understanding
builds from the fore-knowledge accumulated from experience. It is finite due to
“thrownness”, the necessity of acting in situations without the time or ability to grasp the
full consequences of actions or plans in advance.”110 Ricoeur comments that indeed
108 Kearney, Modern Movements in European Philosophy, 30.
109 Josef Bleicher, Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as Method,
Philosophy and Critique, reprint edition (London: Routledge, 1993), 100.
110 John C. Mallery, Roger Hurwitz and Gavan Duffy “Heidegger’s Ontological Hermeneutics” [article on-line]; available from http://www.ai.mit. edu/people/jcma/papers/1986-ai-memo-871/ subsection3_4_1.html; accessed July 22, 1998.
39
“language is so made that it is able to designate the ground of existence from which it
proceeds and to recognize itself as a mode of the being of which it speaks.”111
Although it might appear that hermeneutics opposes phenomenology,
phenomenology is actually not invalidated. As a matter of fact, phenomenology is the
unsurpassable presupposition of hermeneutics.112 Only that, Ricoeur comments, “[F]or
hermeneutics, the problem of ultimate foundation still belongs to the sphere of
objectifying thought, so long as the ideal of scientificity is not questioned as such. The
radicality of such questioning leads from idea of scientificity back to the ontological
condition of belonging, whereby he who questions shares in the very thing about which
he questions.”113
Heidegger develops an ontology of the subject that refutes Descartes’ Cogito. The
Cartesian Cogito, according to Ricoeur, is conceived as a simple epistemological
principle that prioritizes the self-positing or the self-asserting of the Cogito. The
Heideggerian ontology refutes the Cartesian Cogito as a starting point which serves as the
model for certitude. Heidegger’s ontology, which Ricoeur calls the hermeneutics of the
“I am”, speaks of the Cogito as the foundation of Being which is necessarily spoken as
grounding the Cogito.114
111 Ricoeur, “The Question of the Subject: The Challenge of Semiology” in The Conflict of
Interpretations, 266. 112 Jervolino, 87. 113 Ricoeur, “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences:
Essays on Language, Action, and Interpretation, edited, translated, and introduced by John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 106.
114 Ricoeur, “Heidegger and the Question of the Subject” in The Conflict of Interpretations, 223-
225. Grounding here does not refer to the idea of subjectum as ground. Subjectum as ground refers to the Cogito as the epistemological foundation. On the other hand, grounding here refers to the Being of the Cogito which is grounded on its historicity.
40
What is important in the ontology of Heidegger is that “the problem of Being
occurs as a question precisely in the treatment of the concept of ‘question’ in which we
shall discover this reference to a self...”115 The idea of the subject as the questor of Being
does not mean that it is doubting nor is it posited as certain of itself. However, this
Being, which is a being of understanding which Heidegger calls Dasein, is “the subject
that is totally open to the question and the manifestation of Being.”116 The questioning of
the meaning of Being is the mode of being of a possible ego.
The position of the question of Being leads to the positing of the subject. Ricoeur
quotes Heidegger:
Looking at something, understanding and conceiving it, choosing, access to it - all these ways of behaving are constitutive for our inquiry, and therefore are modes of Being of such a particular being..., viz., that which we the inquirers are ourselves....117
Here Paul Ricoeur understands the inquirer as the “I am” and no longer as the “I think” of
Descartes.
The inquirer is not the “I think” of Descartes because the inquirer which he calls
Dasein is a being that has a grounding relation to every subject in the world. Now, every
utterance of Dasein in its quest of Being leads to language. However, prior to the
subservience of Dasein to language, it must first feel the world wherein it is rooted.
115 Ibid., 225.
116 Van den Hengel, 101.
117 Ricoeur, “Heidegger and the Question of the Subject” in The Conflict of Interpretations, 226. Cf. Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper & Row, 1962), 26-27.
41
Hence, understanding, which is a very definitive characteristic of Dasein’s
being118, occurs after its encounter with the world. From the “world” he moves to
“being-in”, then to “being-there”. Understanding is located within the trilogy of
situation, understanding, and interpretation.119
Prior to understanding, which is exteriorized by language, there is first the
situation wherein Dasein finds itself. Before Dasein can talk, it first finds itself rooted in
a situation, in a certain milieu. Within the situatedness of Dasein, understanding arises.
The task of understanding is the orientation of Dasein to its situation. Since
understanding characterizes Dasein, its task is to disclose the possibilities of Dasein.
These possibilities, which have something to do with the projection of Dasein, are
referred to the choices that are open to Dasein in every situation it encounters. It is the
understanding which sees these possibilities as the future of Dasein.120
Using language as an aid to understanding is interpretation. Every act of
understanding involves an act of interpretation. Actually, interpretation is an explication
of understanding. If understanding connotes the incorporation of the things understood
into Dasein’s world, which happens only after interpretation.
Understanding as interpreting means that there are structures to be considered,
structures that are necessary for interpretation. These structures are the fore-structure and
the as-structure.121 The fore structure involves the presuppositions of Dasein. These
118 Ibid. Cf. Heidegger, Being and Time, 32.
119 Ricoeur, “The Question of the Subject: The Challenge of Semiology” in The Conflict of
Interpretations, 266.
120 John Macquarrie, Martin Heidegger (Virginia: John Knox Press, 1969), 22. 121 Ibid., 23.
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presuppositions color every apprehension of something. It follows then that they color the
understanding of something.
The as-structure, on the other hand, is an "interpretation of something as something,
and indeed only can we be said to have apprehended an understanding of it. For instance,
we interpret a moving light in the sky as an aircraft or as a meteorite or in some other
way".122 And this appropriation is based on the person's apprehension of the phenomenon.
Every interpretation is based on some prior understanding of the apprehended
thing and at the same time involves language. Language is typically expressed in a
discourse. This does not mean that language is principally communication; instead, it is a
disclosure of Dasein. Language evolves from the need to manifest the understanding of
Dasein’s Being-in-the-world. Ricoeur says that Heidegger’s destruction of the Cogito as
a self-positing being and an absolute subject is the reverse side of a hermeneutics of the
“I am” as constituted by its relation to Being.123
The Masters of Suspicion Ricoeur gets the idea of the subject as having no immediate and intuitive
consciousness from the three masters of suspicion: Freud, Marx, and Nietzsche. Each of
the three contests the primacy of consciousness that made them decide to look upon the
whole of consciousness as false which contradicts the indubitability of the Cartesian
cogito of Descartes. With the three masters of suspicion, self-consciousness becomes
illusory. As Ricoeur elaborates, he says that
they all attack the same illusion, that illusion which bears the hallowed name of self-consciousness. This illusion is the fruit of a preceding
122 Ibid.
123 Ricoeur, “Heidegger and the Question of the Subject” in The Conflict of Interpretations, 234.
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victory, which conquered the previous illusion of the thing. The philosopher trained in the school of Descartes knows that things are doubtful, that they are not what they appear to be. But he never doubts that consciousness is at it appears to itself. In consciousness, meaning and the consciousness of meaning coincide. Since Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, however, we doubt even this. After doubting the thing, we have begun to doubt consciousness. 124
The goal of their destructiveness is set upon clearing “the horizon for a more authentic
word, for a new reign of Truth, not only by means of a ‘destructive’ critique but by the
invention of an art of interpreting.”125 Ricoeur elaborates that
all three... begin with suspicions about the illusions of consciousness and operate by the guile of decipherment. All three... far from being detractors of “consciousness,” aim at extending it. What Marx wants is to liberate praxis by the awareness of necessity... What Nietzsche wants is to augment man’s power and restore his force... What Freud wants is for the patient to make the meaning which was foreign to him his own and thus enlarge his field of consciousness, live better , and finally, be a bit freer and, if possible, a bit happier. Thus the same doubter who depicts the ego as a “poor wretch”... is also the exegete who rediscovers the logic of the illogical kingdom.126
With the advent of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, to understand becomes
hermeneutics. Hence, “to seek meaning is no longer to spell out the consciousness of
meaning, but to decipher its expressions.”127 They then define the fundamental category
of consciousness to be the relation hidden-shown.128 Consequently, they point to the
124 Ricoeur, “Psychoanalysis and the Movement of Contemporary Culture” in The Conflict of
Interpretations, 148.
125 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 33. Cf. Ricoeur, “Psychoanalysis and the Movement of Contemporary Culture” in The Conflict of Interpretations, 149.
126 Ricoeur, “Psychoanalysis and the Movement of Contemporary Culture” in The Conflict of
Interpretations, 150. 127 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 33. Cf. Ricoeur, “Psychoanalysis and the Movement of
Contemporary Culture”, 149.
128 Ibid., 33-34.
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“process of false consciousness and the method of deciphering.”129 Moreover, the
suspicion concerning the illusions of consciousness becomes the stepping stone in
employing the stratagem of deciphering.130
The hermeneutic task is the deciphering of multiple significance.
“Interpretation... is the work of thought which consists in deciphering the hidden
meaning in the apparent meaning, in unfolding the levels of meaning implied in the
literal meaning.”131
This hermeneutic task is consistent with Ricoeur’s meditation on the
sentence mentioned above: “The symbol gives rise to thought.” The project of the three
critiques of “false” consciousness132 is consistent with what Ricoeur claims:
All criticism “demythologizes” insofar as it is criticism; that is to say, it always adds to the separation of the historical… and the pseudo-historical…. [C]riticism cannot help being a “demythologization”; that is an irreversible gain of truthfulness, of intellectual honesty, and therefore of objectivity.133
The acceleration of the movement of demythologization brings to light the dimension of
the symbol.
Kearney comments that although the hermeneutics of suspicion is a negative
hermeneutics of demystification, “it deals with falsehood and illusion not just in the
subjective context of epistemological error, but as a dimension of our social discourse as
a whole. Thus, Marx conceived of false-consciousness as a reflection of the class
129 Ibid., 34.
130 Ibid.
131 Ricoeur, “Existence and Hermeneutics” in The Conflict of Interpretations, 13.
132 Ricoeur, Psychoanalysis and the Movement of Contemporary Culture” in The Conflict of
Interpretations 148 133 Ricoeur, The Symbolism of Evil, 352.
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struggle; Nietzsche as the resentful vengeance of the weak against the strong; and Freud
as a history of human desire repressed by cultural prohibition.”134 The project of the three
masters is consistent with what Ricoeur perceives to be the task of hermeneutics, i.e., “to
read a text and to distinguish the true sense from the apparent sense, to search for the
sense under the sense.”135
Its further significance, Robinson explains, lies on its “task of 'doing away with
idols,' namely, becoming critically aware of when we project our own wishes and
constructs into texts, so that they no longer address us from beyond ourselves as
‘other’.”136 And as Kearney clarifies also, although the hermeneutics of suspicion is a
negative hermeneutics of demystification, “we cannot affirm the positive ontological
content of our significations – that is, the projection of authentic possibilities of being –
without demythologising their false content.137
B. Symbol and Interpretation
Paul Ricoeur's first notion of interpretation is rooted in his quest to understand
symbol. He observes that there is something in the symbolic that tells more about it. He
defines "symbol and interpretation in their relation to one another."138 This implies that
134 Kearney, Modern Movements in European Philosophy, 105. 135 Charles Reagan and David Stewart, eds., The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur: An Anthology of His
Work (Beacon Press, 1978) as cited by Kearney, Modern Movements in European Philosophy,105.
136 G. D. Robinson, “Paul Ricoeur and the Hermeneutics of Suspicion: A Brief Overview and Critique”, Premise, volume II, number 8 (September 27, 1995), 12ff. [article online]; available from http://capo.org/premise/95/sep/p950812.html; accessed February 20, 2004. 137 Kearney, Modern Movements in European Philosophy, 105. Kearney comments further that “the atheistic critique championed by the ‘masters of suspicion’ is an essential ingredient of the mature faith of modern man.” (Ibid.)
138 Patrick L. Bourgeois, Extension of Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1975), 71.
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his study on symbol leads to the understanding of his notion of the subject. The
interpretation of symbolisms mirrors the gradation of the subject’s going into itself.
He considers three zones which deal with symbols: Phenomenology of Religion,
Psychoanalysis, and Metaphor. These he refers to as the hierophanic, oneiric, and poetic,
respectively. He elaborates them separately in different works. He discusses the
Phenomenology of Religion in the Symbolism of Evil, his investigation on Psychoanalysis
in Freud and Philosophy, and his study on Metaphor in the book entitled The Rule of
Metaphor.
Primarily these areas of study are selected due to their symbolic nature. In other
words, these fields separately interpret symbols. It has to be emphasized, however, that
symbols are expressions with double meaning. The problem with the symbolic lies in
its double meaning structure. The double meaning structure of the symbolic opens the
way to the problem of interpretation. As it turns out, “the problem of interpretation in
turn designates all understanding specifically concerned with the meaning of equivocal
expressions. To interpret is to understand a double meaning.”139 With the advent of the
double meaning, a need for interpretation becomes of utmost necessity. A need for
interpreting the meaning of the symbolic is necessary in order to understand its meaning.
Furthermore, Ricoeur is fascinated with symbol and finds it to be very significant.
Every symbol is not to be taken as it is. It always points to something beneath its
appearance. He considers a symbol to be more than a mere sign or an icon which so
concentrates on the periphery that it becomes ordinary the moment its meaning is
discovered. On the contrary, the symbol provides a food for thought. The first discovery
139 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 8.
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of its meaning leads to further discovery. There is an apparent movement or even a cycle
in the unfolding of the meaning of the symbol.
The sense of the symbol betrays its reference. Unlike the use of a univocal sign,
the ideal sense of the text in a symbolic sign can have a reference that transcends the
sense of the text. If the sense of a univocal sign can be reflected by its reference, the
symbolic sign cannot. The apparent disparity of the sense to the reference of the text
leads to interpretation. This will be further illustrated later by the three symbolic
categories: hierophanic, oneiric, and poetic. At the moment, however, it will be good to
contrast a symbol with other entities having a related structure with it to further
understand its nature.
Symbol and its Related Structures
Ricoeur has in mind an intentional analysis which marks the difference of a
symbol from a series of related structures. The process also shows that, though they are
different, they have an identical nucleus of meaning. Consequently, Ricoeur
differentiates the symbol from the sign, the allegory, the symbolic logic, and the myth.
1. The Signs
Basically, a symbol is a sign. However, not all signs are symbols. A sign
becomes a symbol only if it has a
double meaning or the double intentionality which the symbol conceals in its aim. This is the intentional structure of the symbol, which is so important for Ricoeur, and especially relevant to his theory of interpretation, since it gives rise to the need for interpretation.140
A sign signifies something directly. For instance, sun, as an audible word, is a
signifier. The thing signified by this audible word is the physical object that can be 140 Bourgeois, 71.
48
observed in the sky that shines so brightly. Now, if this thing being signified by this
signifier is revealed, then this sign loses its meaning. In contrast,
symbol conceals in its intention a double intentionality. There is, first, the primary or literal intentionality, which like any meaningful intentionality, implies the triumph of the conventional sign over the natural sign: this is the stain, the deviation, the weight - words which do not resemble the thing signified.141
On the other hand, signs are transparent because they say only "what they mean by
positing the signified."142 On the other hand, symbols are opaque. "The first, literal,
patent meaning analogically intends a second meaning which is not given otherwise than
in the first."143 For instance, the sky, literally, signifies the expanse of space that
surrounds the earth. This literal meaning of the sky signifies the thing. However, the sky,
as a symbol, signifies another thing which is not the literal meaning of the audible word,
“sky”. Inasmuch as “sky” means another thing which is its non-literal meaning, it
becomes opaque. Its opaqueness makes it enigmatic. Its meaning is inexhaustible.
"Signs are expressions that carry a meaning, which is revealed through the intention of
signifying that is conveyed by words.... Every sign is directed to something beyond itself
and stands for this something."144 The transparency of the sign enables man to say what
the sign is by indicating the thing signified by the sign.
This is not the case with symbol. The double intentionality of the symbol leads
the first literal intention to the second intention. Meaning, the first obvious literal
141 Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutics of Symbols and Philosophical Reflection: I, trans. by Denis Savage in The Conflict of Interpretations, 289. 142 Ibid., 290. 143 Ibid. 144 Ricoeur, “The Symbol...Food for Thought”, Philosophy Today, 3 (April 1960), 199.
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meaning itself looks analogically toward a second meaning which is found only in the
first meaning.145 Ricoeur emphasizes that
the symbol in fact is the very movement of the primary meaning which makes us share the hidden meaning and thus assimilates us to the thing symbolized, without our being able to get hold of the similarity intellectually. It is in this sense that the symbol "provides;" it provides, because it is a primary intentionality which yields a second meaning.146
The correspondence that happens in symbols is the same with signs. In signs, the
correspondence is between signifying word and signified thing. But in symbols, the
correspondence is between the first meaning and the second meaning.
In a sign, the signified thing is always the intention of the signifier. If you know
already what is being signified by the signifier, interpretation is no longer needed.
However, in the case of a symbol, the second meaning which is the hidden intention of
the signifier needs interpretation. It must be remembered that the second intention can be
attained only via the first intention of the signifier. This is because what transpires in a
symbol is the very movement from the first intention to the second intention which is
hidden in the first intention. In the example of the “sky” given above, the first intention of
the signifier is its literal meaning. However, as a symbol, it means something more than
the literal meaning of the signifier “sky”. This non-literal meaning is the hidden meaning
of the literal meaning of the signifier “sky”. And this non-literal meaning is the second
intention that is meant by the first intention.
145 Ibid. 146 Ibid., 200.
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2. The Allegories
As the signifier of a symbol signifies something beyond its literal meaning, so
must be with an allegory. However, an allegory and a symbol are not actually the same.
The distinction between symbols and allegories is based on analogy. The analogy
is again applied to the literal meaning. Ricoeur singles out the clarification done by M.
Pepin as regards the problem of analogy. Quoting Pepin, Ricoeur says that
in allegory, the first thing signified (the literal meaning) is contingent, and the second thing signified, the symbolic meaning itself, is sufficiently exterior to be directly accessible. Between the two meanings then there is a relation of translation. Once the translation is made you can let the symbol fall away by the way, since it has become useless.147
The moment an allegory is interpreted, a process of tearing down the disguise takes place.
When the meaning is revealed, the allegory becomes ineffectual. Its usefulness ceases.
As Ricoeur has it, an allegory is more of a modality of hermeneutics than a spontaneous
creation of signs. Allegory in itself is already a hermeneutic. It is always an
interpretation of an idea or event. Such an idea or event is narrated by using
symbolism. An allegory is capable of translation. Meaning, an allegory has a direct
equivalence or a univocal interpretation.
On the other hand, symbol precedes hermeneutics. It must be noted that the
interpretation of the symbolism starts from the symbol itself. The second intention,
which is the hermeneutic meaning, is actually based on the first intention of the given
symbol. The meaning of a symbol is generated in enigma and not in translation. The
multiplicity of meanings of a symbol is already the result of the interpretation of the
147 Ibid.
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symbol that is rooted in its first and literal meaning. Thus, the symbolic meaning, that is,
its multiple meaning, is incapable of translation because it is not univocal.
3. The Symbolic Logic
Ricoeur treats symbolic logic in order to distinguish symbol itself from that of a
symbol in the sense of symbolic logic. He wants to point out that symbol in this sense
has nothing to do with symbol as an enigma. Instead, he wants symbol in the sense of
symbolic logic to be understood as the apex of formalism. In the symbolic logic, the case
is reversed. It replaces the terms of the syllogisms by signs that can stand for anything.
In symbolic logic, the syllogistic expressions are “replaced by letters, by written signs,
which need not be spoken and about which it is possible to calculate, without asking how
they are incorporated into a deontology of reasoning. They are not even abbreviations of
known verbal expressions, but ‘characters’. . . .”148
The symbol, in Ricoeur’s sense, is obviously not a character. Ricoeur emphasizes
that the symbol belongs to thought that is bound up with content and therefore not formal.
Moreover, the symbolic language is an expression of the fullness of language. The
symbol is essentially bound to its primary content and through its primary content to its
second content. In this regard, Ricoeur’s symbol is absolutely the reverse of formalism.
Ricoeur, nevertheless, provides a reason why symbol is used in two ways that
differ so sharply. He writes, “the reason perhaps should be sought in the structure of
signification. On the one hand, signification is related to absence, because it points out
things that are absent. But on the other hand, it is related to presence, because it
148 Ricoeur, The Symbol. . . Food for Thought, 200-201.
52
represents, it renders present, that which is absent.”149 These are the reasons why symbol
is used in two differing forms. He discusses the symbol in the sense of the symbolic
logic to accentuate the sense of the symbol as something beyond the subject of
discussion. So, the symbol, in the sense of the symbolic logic, will not be used as such.
When the symbol is spoken of here, it refers to the meaning of the symbol as bound up
with content. The second meaning is tied up with the primary meaning.
4. The Myths
Of the related structures of symbol, Ricoeur takes myth as the only species of
symbol. Myth is already a symbol in a narrative form. It is in time and in space.
However, it is not bounded by any specific history. In his studies of western myths,
Ricoeur classifies them into four basic types: (1) the drama of creation; (2) the tragic
myths; (3) the “philosophical myths” of the exiled soul; and (4) the eschatological or
anthropological myth of biblical history.150 The first three myths, in relation to the evil
story, put the genesis of evil prior to man. However, the last myth locates evil in man’s
conscious volition. Ricoeur’s analysis of the different myths presents various schema of
evil. The symbolism of evil is invariant. It does not change. What now varies is how
the symbolism of evil is being interpreted. It means that myths are already an
interpretation of the symbolism of evil. Myths vary because the interpretation of the
invariant symbolism varies. This makes myths an interpretation of the symbolism of evil.
If myths are the variant aspect in the analysis of evil, “the symbol is the
invariant.” Don Ihde explains that the “invariance of the symbol... serves more than one
149 Ibid., 201.
150 Ihde, 115-16.
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purpose in this hermeneutics. In its first aspect the invariance is that of the ‘fullness of
language’ which functions clearly at the end as the whole from which all parts are
derived.”151 The implication is that myths are various interpretations of the symbols.
They are already the interpretation of the symbolism. “The myth takes the schema and
provides... its ‘explanation’.... [But] it is symbol which reveals originary experience.”152
The Zones of Emergence153 of Symbol
Ricoeur considers three zones which deal with symbol: Phenomenology of
Religion, Psychoanalysis, and Metaphor. These fields separately interpret symbol. It has
to be emphasized that symbols are expression with “double meaning”. In fact, his
interpretation results in the discovery of the apparent conflict in the interpretations of
symbols. However, before considering that conflict of interpretation, the relationship of
symbol to the three fields will be first examined.
1. Symbol and the Phenomenology of Religion
Ricoeur studies intently and thoroughly the symbolism of avowal. Moreover, this
study is intently related to the symbolisms used in myths and rituals. Reagan comments
that “realizing that symbols are more basic than myth, and focusing on religious symbols
151 Ibid., 128. 152 The symbol is finally the third term which, on Ricoeur’s methodological grounds, is that which unites the double circles (experience-expression and the expression-interpretation cycle) of hermeneutic phenomenology. The symbol reveals experience through expression; the myth interprets the expression which the symbol gives. The hermeneutic problem at this level then becomes one of finding an interpretation which is adequate to the invariance of the symbol. Ihde, 129.
153 Bourgeois, 72.
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expressing the experience of evil, he began to investigate the structure and nature of
symbolic expressions.”154
The phenomenology of religion frequently encounters those “great cosmic
symbols of earth, heaven, water, life, tress, and stones, and with those strange narratives
about the origin and end of things which are the myths.”155 The phenomenology of
religion deals with symbols as the manifestation of the reality. Symbols are always
related to the fundamental reality of human experience, but they always express a reality
that both shows and hides.156 The encounter with the symbolic is an expression of the
revelation of the sacred.
Ricoeur’s voluminous study of the symbolisms of evil points to the human
experience of the avowal of evil. The symbolism of evil has a wide scope and range.
The meaning of evil as a symbol ranges from evil as dealing with the stain image with
magical conception of evil as pollution to the deviation images of the crooked path, of
transgression, of wandering or error in the more ethical conception of sin, to the weight
images of a burden in the more interiorized experience of guilt.157
The study of symbolisms in relation to the sacred involves the relationship of the
primary symbols and the mythical symbols. The former is exemplified by the example
given above with the symbolism of evil. Primary symbols “point out the intentional
154 Charles E. Reagan, ed. Studies in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (Ohio: Ohio University Press,
1979), 85.
155 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 7.
156 Ibid. 157 Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutics of Symbols and Philosophical Reflection: I” in The Conflict of
Interpretations, 289.
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structure of symbols.”158 They pertain to the intended meaning of the symbol of evil for
example. In other words, there is a primary or literal intentionality in every symbol
which implies the triumph of the conventional sign over the natural sign. This is due to
the fact that “upon the first intentionality is built a second intentionality, which, through
the material stain, the deviation in space, the experience of burden, points to a certain
situation of man in the Sacred.159 “This situation, aimed at through the first meaning,”
Ricoeur elaborates, “is precisely stained, sinful, guilty being. The literal and obvious
meaning, therefore, points beyond itself to something which is like a stain, like a
deviation, like a burden.”160
Through this, Ricoeur distinguishes technical signs, which are perfectly
transparent and say only what they mean by positing the signified from symbolic signs
which are opaque because the first, literal meaning analogically intends a second
meaning which is not given otherwise than in the first. This opaqueness is the symbol’s
very profundity, an inexhaustible depth.161 Ricoeur conceives the interpretation of
symbols in the light of the symbolisms of evil as “an amplifying interpretation, by which
[he] means[s] an interpretation attentive to the surplus of meaning included in the
symbol….”162
158 Ibid. 159 Ibid. 160 Ibid., 290. 161 Ibid.
162 Ricoeur, “Intellectual Autobiography” translated by Kathleen Blamey in Lewis Edwin Hahn, ed. The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (Illinois: Open Court: 1995), 20.
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On the other hand, “mythical symbols are more articulated: they leave room for
the dimension of narrative, with its fabled characters, places, and times, and tell the
Beginning and End of the experience of which the primary symbols are the avowal.”163
“Myth can exercise its symbolic function only through the specific means of narrative;
what it wants to say is already drama.”164 Adam, Anthropos, Eve, and the snake are
examples of mythical symbols.
The problem of symbols leads to the problem of language. Symbols are present.
However, they are just empty without language. It is language that makes symbols
relevant. The survival of the archaic symbol depends on the revolutions of experience
and language that engulf it.165 Symbols themselves are not passive. They are dynamic.
For them to survive, they have to destroy prior symbols. Thus, there is a movement
happening from symbols themselves. There is a movement of “breaking with and taking
up.”166 Such that, evil symbolizes no longer just as a sin symbol but also a guilt symbol.
Nevertheless, even if the definition of symbols is continuously anchored on the semantic
structure of double meaning, a new dimension of understanding symbols comes into the
offing. Guilt as a symbolism of evil leads him to tackle Freudian psychoanalysis.
In this schema, there is now the internalization of the evil experience. That
experience is seen in the act of will. There the subject feels that the origin of evil is not from
the outside but from the inside. The schema of guilt is a sort of self-conscious knowledge of
163 Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutics of Symbols and Philosophical Reflection: I” in The Conflict of
Interpretations, 289.
164 Ibid., 293. 165 Ibid., 291.
166 Ibid., 292.
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the evil experience. The subject is fully aware of the repercussion of the act he wills. This
consciousness of the meaning of the guilt symbolism attempts to make it “coincide[s] with
the ‘unconscious’ work of establishing a code which they attributed to the will to power, to
the social being, or to the unconscious psyche.”167 Ricoeur claims that this leads to the
discovery of Freud of On Dreams.
2. Symbol and Psychoanalysis
Dreams themselves are symbolic. They want to say something other than what
the person dreaming likes to say. Ricoeur notes that “the analyst deliberately takes in the
opposite direction the path that the dreamer took, without willing it or knowing it, in his
‘dream work’”.168 Freud believes that dreams are not just dreams, but they portray
something beyond the dream. The dreamer’s claim of knowing the meaning of one’s
dream is suspect. Ricoeur claims:
It is in this mood of suspicion as to consciousness’ claim to original self-knowledge that a philosopher may enter into the company of psychiatrists and psychoanalysts. Anyone who arrives at the correlation between consciousness and the unconscious must first have crossed the arid zones of a double confession: ‘I cannot understand the consciousness from what I know about consciousness or even preconsciousness,’ and ‘I no longer even understand what consciousness is.”169
The implication of this claim is that the person’s dream account can only be ascertained
through its relationship with the reality of one’s experience. The validity and the limits of
167 Ricoeur, “Psychoanalysis and the Movement of Contemporary Culture” in The Conflict of
Interpretations, 149. 168 Ibid. 169 Ricoeur, “Consciousness and the Unconscious” in The Conflict of Interpretations, 99 -100.
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all assertions about the reality of the dream can only be defined by referring to its
essential and non-accidental grounds170
For Freud, dreams serve as a model for the interpretation of culture. They also
expresses of human desires.171 In the interpretation of dream, it is not the dream itself
that is being interpreted; it is the dream as a text – the dream text that manifests the so-
called primitive speech of desire.172 Thus, there is a movement of the analysis from one
meaning to another meaning. This is so because “for Freud the meaning of the dream… is
inseparable from ‘analysis’ as a tactic of decoding.”173
Paul Ricoeur always calls the region of double meaning as symbol.174 Hence, as
the dream text wants to tell something beyond what is said, it enters into its symbolic
function.175
3. Symbol and the Poetic Imagination
According to Ricoeur, it is the poetic imagination that is the least understood
among the three zones of emergence. Frequently, poetic imagination is related with
imagination per se and is referred to as the “power of forming images.”176 Poetic
imagination never reduces itself to forming mental pictures of the unreal. However,
following Bachelard, Ricoeur explains, “the poetic image ‘places us at the origin of
170 Ibid., 107.
171 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 5.
172 Ibid., 6. 173 Ricoeur, “Psychoanalysis and the Movement of Contemporary Culture” in The Conflict of
Interpretations, 149.
174 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 7.
175 Ibid., 12.
176 Ibid., 15.
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articulate being’; the poetic image ‘becomes a new being in our language, it expresses us
by making us what it expresses.’ This word-image, which runs through the
representation-image, is symbolism.”177
The poetic language is very different from the literal language. Poetic language
itself is very rich in meaning. Its literal meaning, that is, the first intention is different
from the second intention. Thus poet shows the birth of the word, the metaphorical word.
The metaphorical makes the poetic symbolic. It is the double-meaning of the
metaphorical word that makes it symbolic.
As symbol emerges from the three aforementioned zones of emergence, it
emerges in three different categories. These symbolic categories are ordered according to
their expressivity: the hierophanies, the oneirotic, and the poetic.178 The three categories
are inherently connected in themselves, but each has its separate interpretation of
symbols. Thus, Ricoeur's interpretation results in an apparent conflict even though a
relationship exists among the three categories in that they explain the growing
internalization of the subject. The three symbolic categories illustrate the gradation of an
interpretation or the giving of a meaning to the various experiences of the subject. In
other words, the three symbolic categories correspond to the different types of
interpretation. The hierophanic corresponds to interpretation as recollection of meaning
while the oneirotic corresponds to interpretation as suspicion. Lastly, the poetic
corresponds to interpretation as appropriation. The internalization is based on how
proximate is the subject to its participation in the realm of being.
177 Ibid., 15 - 16. 178 Cf. Ricoeur, The Symbol…Food for Thought, 197-8.
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His theory of interpretation begins when he is confronted with the problem of
symbol or the problem of double meaning. However, interpreting a symbol or a double
meaning entails various manners of interpretation. In fact, his investigation results in the
discovery of the apparent conflict in the interpretations of symbols. However, before
considering that conflict of interpretations, the relationship of symbol on the three fields
has to be examined first.
The Symbolic Categories and Interpretation
In interpreting a symbol or a double meaning, Ricoeur assigns a field wherein to
limit his field of interpretation. In the hermeneutic field, the area of symbol and the
interpretation confront each other. By hermeneutics, he means a way of understanding
“the theory of the rules that provide over exegesis – that is, over the interpretation of a
particular text, or a group of signs that can be viewed as a text.”179 In the hermeneutic
field wherein symbol and interpretation apparently confront each other, they also
complement each other at the same time. The symbol having a double meaning demands
interpretation. On the other hand, interpretation works at deciphering symbols. Hence,
the double meaning structure of symbol180 makes it legitimate object of interpretation.
Ricoeur enumerates the symbol’s various spheres. First, he uses Mircea Eliade’s
term, hierophanies181, to mark the identity of the symbol being tied in with rites and
179 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 8.
180 Bourgeois says, “Ricoeur uses a brief eidetic description in imaginative variation to derive a
characterization of symbols and hermeneutics in which he defines symbol and interpretation in their relation to one another, thus limiting one by the other.” Bourgeois, “From Hermeneutics of Symbols to the Interpretation of Texts” in Reagan, 85. Cf. Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 8 – 9; Symbolism of Evil, 14 – 18; “Existence and Hermeneutics” in The Conflict of Interpretations, 12 – 13. 181 This is a term that Paul Ricoeur borrowed from Mircea Eliade. Eliade uses the term hierophany to designate the act of manifestation of the sacred. As he said, "it is a fitting term, because it does not imply anything further; it expresses no more than is implicit in its etymological content, i.e., that something sacred
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myths. Hierophanies connote the symbol as the language of the Sacred.182 The second
category is that of the nocturnal and oneirotic. For Sigmund Freud, symbols are not just
representations that stand for something else but oneirotic representations that go beyond
individual history. The last category is the poetics. The poetic imagination is imported
by Ricoeur from M. Bachelard who has shown that “the problem of imagination is not the
problem of the image, not even of the image in relation to the absence or the annihilation
of the real. . . . [Instead], ‘the poetic image. . . brings us to the origin of the being who
speaks.’ And later on: ‘It becomes a new being in our language; it expresses ourselves by
making us into what it expresses.’”183
The three symbolic categories are in themselves representing various modes of
interpretation. They are apparently conflicting with each other. Still, they also signify
the various modes of subjectivity. With hierophany, the experience of the subject is still
very objective; in the oneirotic, the subject suspects the veracity of the manifested
meaning of the symbol. After doing, this becomes very subjective in the sphere of the
poetics inasmuch as the subject appropriates well the meaning of such symbol to his life
project. In other words, the three symbolic categories demonstrate the internalization of
the subject.
The three symbolic categories illustrate how the subject feels about the nature of
its experience. Their meaning will be discussed in relation to the flow of the subject’s
shows itself to us. Mircea Eliade, The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion, trans. from the French by Williard K. Trask. (New York: Harper, 1959), 11. Cf. Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion (New York: Sheed and Ward Inc., 1958), 7 ff.
182 Ricoeur, The Symbol. . . Food for Thought, 197. 183 Ibid., 198.
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affectivity as regards its experience. It will illustrate, through the symbolic categories,
the philosophy of the symbol as expressed in the three stages that “stake out the
movement that leaps from the life in symbols toward thought - thought that truly starts
out from symbols.”184
1. The Hierophanies
The hierophanies, which designate the acts of manifesting the sacred, are very
much related to the phenomenology of religion185 and "tied in with rites and myths."186
The sources of the hierophanies are the religious rites as well as the ancient myths
regarding the Holy.
The religious rites are one of the sources of the hierophanies because they deal
with the sacred or the holy and the rites apply to the worship of the gods and the
goddesses. For instance, the rite of Aiyanar performed by the Dravidian villagers in
South India is done in honor of Aiyanar, a Brahman deity. In this rite, the Dravidian
villagers offer a large terra-cota horses to Aiyanar so that he can ride around the village
and look after its safety.187
Ancient myths, in addition to rituals, are also sources of hierophanies. These are
mostly stories of gods and goddesses. They are always related to the sacred beings, e.g.
184 Ibid., 202.
185 The phenomenology of religion here refers simply to the religious phenomena as perpetuated by the history of religion. As Eliade noted, "Now, in my researches, what have primarily interested me are these facts, this labyrinthine complexity of elements which will yield to no formula or definition whatever. Taboo, ritual, symbol, myth, demon, god - these are some of them; but it would be an outrageous simplification to make such a list tell the whole story. What we have really got to deal with is a diverse and indeed chaotic mass of actions, beliefs and systems which go together to make up what one may call the religious phenomenon [bold mine]." Eliade, Patterns in Comparative Religion, xii.
186 Ricoeur, The Symbol…Food for Thought, 197
187 Joseph M. Kitagawa and Charles H. Long, eds., Myth and Symbols: Studies in Honor of Mircea
Eliade (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1969), 32.
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the Homeric myths, the creation myths, the Adamic myth, and many more. The Homeric
myths tell us about the relation of the gods and goddesses to human beings in the same
way that the creation and Adamic myths tell us the story of God and man. Ancient myths
mirror the relationship between the Holy Other and man.
These religious rites and myths utilize symbols which constitute the language of
the sacred. Religious rites always portray the life story of the gods or goddesses, but
since they can no longer reenact exactly the whole event they use symbolism. For
example, the sky symbolizes the abode of the gods and goddesses. It is usually portrayed
as "the symbol of the most high, of the elevated and immense, of the powerful and well-
ordered, of the shrewd and the wise, of the sovereign and immovable."188 But we can
still add some more symbolisms of the sky, proving that a symbol is boundless and
inexhaustible.
The phenomenology of religion deals with symbols as the manifestation of reality.
Symbols are always related to the fundamental reality of human experience, but they
always express a reality that both shows and hides.189 The symbolic shows the literal
manifestation or the apparent signification of the symbol. However, behind this literal
signification, the symbol hides a second meaning which is the symbolic meaning, such as
the phallic images divinized by the Dravidians. If these images are considered as a
univocal sign, then they represent the phallus as it is. But symbolically, the images that
serve as signifiers do not signify the phallus literally. They instead refer to something
else and that is the god of fertility. The Dravidians cannot conceptualize this in a very
188 Ricoeur, The Symbol… Food for Thought, 198.
189 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 7.
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realistic way. Instead, they conceptualize god symbolically, that is, through the phallus
as a symbol of fertility.
This reality of the symbol that both shows and hides its meaning is like an
analogical statement: A is to B as C is to D. The meaning of the symbol is made up of
the literal meaning of the symbol itself. The sky as a symbol of power is conceived
analogically through this expression. As sky is above and as power is over man, so sky
can be a symbolism for the abode of power. Such symbolism constitutes the reality of
the sky. Thus, analogically, sky and power are related in the sense that just as the sky is
above man, so can power be viewed as over man. In this sense, the symbol manifests a
literal meaning although its analogue is vast and boundless. The sky symbolism can still
have other analogues besides power, but, these analogues are commonly appropriated by
most individuals with a shared belief.
The problem of symbols in the phenomenology of religion leads to the problem of
language. Symbols are present; however, they are empty without language. It is
language that makes symbols relevant. It has to be remembered that the hierophanies
which are manifested by the cosmic symbols are actually experienced symbols. Still,
those experiences are just blind experiences which need to be expressed in language, and
when so expressed their meaning remains to be inexhaustible. Then they can branch out
to other categories.
As hierophanies are tied in to the phenomenology of religion, so are the meanings
of their symbolic images exposed to recollection. Hierophanies in nature are objective.
They are expressed through the common experience of the people. The appropriation of
their meaning depends on the shared experience of the religious people.
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Interpreting the symbols of the sacred is very objective in nature. To ascertain the
meaning of the perceived sky symbolism, for instance, as symbolizing the abode of the
gods, the interpreter tries to compare it to other symbols. The comparison gives the
interpreter the distinct confidence of its veracity. Analogically, the symbol may have the
same interpretation as the other symbol if their range of experienciability is the same.
There is a commonality of understanding inasmuch as shared attributes are given to these
symbols experienced in the phenomenon of religion. The field of participation is external
to the interpreter. Since the expanse of the experience is external, then it must be
objective. The subject does not experience the event itself except as a shared experience.
The process of understanding better the truth of the experience and its extensivity
involves the horizontal understanding of the symbol through phenomenology and
comparative studies. With the horizontal understanding, the subject disregards the
immediacy of its belief. Ricoeur understands that after the horizontal understanding of
the symbol, what transpires is the dynamicity of the symbol. The symbol might be serene
and amicable, but it could mean war and violence. In interpreting, the subject is able to
understand the symbolic meaning anew. This new understanding takes place on the
critical level. Thus, to understand critically, the subject which is now the interpreter
abandons the position of the distant and detached observer. He now participates in the
dynamicity of the symbol.
The experience of the symbol in its dynamicity may excite the subject and thus
have an impact on it. This excitement will lead the subject to pursue the effect of the
experience. Hence, various desires and wishes are formed in the consciousness of the
subject, some of which are attainable and others not, some might be real and others may
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not be. The sentiments that arise from the previous experience of the subject are formed
in the consciousness of the subject.
2. The Oneirotic The second symbolic category that Ricoeur examines is the dream language,
particularly in the work of Freud. He mentions also the contribution of Jung, but he
makes a more thorough investigation of Freud than Jung.
Ricoeur remarks that Freud sees dream language as symbolic, as an oneirotic
representation. As such, dream language must not be interpreted literally, but
symbolically. It is symbolic because what appears in the dream reveals a deeper meaning
than its literal presentation. Since dreams are the disguised fulfillment of repressed
wishes or desires, this leads to the hermeneutics of deciphering. Since desires hide
themselves in dreams, interpretation must substitute the light of meaning for the darkness
of desire. The elaboration of the dream symbol through countless cross-checks leads to
what is called the language of desire or the oneirotic.190 “[D]reams attest that we
constantly mean something other than what we say; in dreams the manifest meaning
endlessly refers to a hidden meaning..,” says Ricoeur.191 But these dream symbols are not
unique to an individual. What is spectacular is that they even coincide with that of an
entire people. Since these symbols go beyond individual history, the arche is not of a
particular individual. It is rooted in the common culture. The content of the proverb,
“What does the goose dream of? Of Maize”, implies that dreams are often culturally
190 Cf. Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 159-60. 191 Ibid., 15.
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based. Thus, the interpretation of dreams is also related to the culture of the people to
which the patient belongs because we have the same, if not similar, wishes or desires.192
In his analysis of dreams Freud points out that a dream is somewhat
incomprehensible and absurd. But even though its meaning is hidden, a dream is actually
meaningful. He says that “the dream is not meaningless, not absurd, does not presuppose
that one part of our store of ideas is dormant while another part begins to awake. It is a
perfectly valid psychic phenomenon, actually a wish-fulfillment. . . We have found that
the dream represents a wish as fulfilled.”193
Categorically, Freud declares that a dream represents a wish that is fulfilled.
Nevertheless, some of Freud’s patients bring to his attention that not all dreams are a
matter of wish-fulfillment. On the contrary, these dreams express the opposite of wish-
fulfillment. These apparent objections lead Freud to say that the basis of his view of the
dream as wish-fulfillment is not the obvious dream content, but the thought-content
which lies behind the dream. This leads him to compare and contrast the manifest and
the latent dream-contents. Obviously, the manifest content of a dream of a most painful
nature distorts the idea of the dream as a wish-fulfillment since nobody of sane mind
wishes to be in pain. However, Freud asserts that if this manifest content of the dream
will be properly interpreted, the analyst will discover that the dream has a latent thought-
content which makes for the possibility that even painful and terrifying dreams are cases
of wish-fulfillment.194
192 Sigmund Freud, The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud, translated and introduced by Dr. A. A.
Brill. Book 2: The Interpretation of Dreams (New York: The Modern Library, 1938), 215. 193 Ibid., 208. 194 Ibid., 218.
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If there is a need to interpret dreams, then dreams do not say directly what they
mean. This presupposes that the phenomenon of distortion is present at the manifest
dream-content, which does not disprove that dreams are wish-fulfillment.
The interpretation of dreams leads to the discovery of the latent dream-content as
an expression of wish-fulfillment. The phenomenon of dream distortion is only an
attempt to disguise or censor the wish. Even a dream with a disagreeable content can still
be analyzed as a wish-fulfillment through the phenomenon of dream distortion. The
disagreeable content serves only to distinguish the thing wished for.195 The truth that the
dream has a hidden meaning, which is a wish-fulfillment, can be proven through analysis.
This analysis is done by peering into the experiences of the dreamer.
For this part, Carl Jung (1875 - 1961) sees symbolism in dreams as a way of
exploring our potentialities. He analyzes dreams as "prospective as well as retrospective
in content, and compensable for aspects of the dreamer's personality that have been
neglected in the waking life".196 Dreams do not only foretell the possibilities for objective
evaluation but also provide themes for meditation and thus pave the way to "becoming
oneself". The forward-looking aspect of symbols is necessary to Ricoeur. He then
connects it with the “cosmo-theological functions of symbols by which man is
reintegrated into his whole sacred past.”197
195 Ibid., 225.
196 Calvin S. Hall and Gardner Lindzey, Theories of Personality, third edition (Manila: National Book Store, Inc. 1978), 143.
197 Ricoeur, The Symbol… Food for Thought, 198.
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Freud sees dreams as a model not only for the interpretation of culture but also for
the expression of human desires. The dream text that manifests the so-called primitive
speech of desire is the text being interpreted by analyzing the symbols.
The interpretation of the dream language is not as objective as that of the
hierophanies. Various subjects have the same dreams, and dreams are the disguised
fulfillment of repressed wishes or desires of these subjects. Actually, the emphasis of the
oneirotic is not on the dream language itself but on the expression of the desires or wishes
or sentiments of the subject. The impact of the religious experience to the subject leads
the subject to long or desire for the fulfillment of what it perceives as the expression of
the meaning it perceives out of that experience. For instance, in the Roman Catholic
religion, a certain subject might have been inspired religiously by the sermon of the
priest. Symbolically, the priest is seen as the other-Christ. With that inspiration, the
subject then wishes or desires to do something that will fulfill what it understands in that
experience.
The desire of fulfilling what the subject perceives as the fulfillment of the inspired
thought coming from the priest is not unique to that subject. The dreams are ways of
exploring the possibilities of fulfilling the inspiration given by the priest. Consequently,
these dreams provide themes that pave the way for the subject to become what it wants to
be. The subject has its own personal interpretation on how to make that dream come true.
To be sure whether the subject’s desire at the moment is indeed the true desire it wishes
to fulfill, an intelligent interpretation must be done.
It is intelligent because interpretation comes under scrutiny. To begin to yield the
knot of the symbolic meaning involves an intelligent deciphering. The understanding of
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the meaning of the symbol in this stage involves a circle wherein the symbol gives up its
meaning as the interpreter interprets. To be able to understand, the interpreter must have
lived in the atmosphere of the meaning that is being looked for. Thus, the subject who
listens to the sermon of the priest and is inspired and decides to become a priest must
have lived to the aura of what he feels to be.
In this regard, Ricoeur agrees with Rudolf Bultmann when the latter said in his
article “The Problem of Hermeneutics”:
Every comprehension, like every interpretation... is forever receiving direction from the way the question is put and what is aimed at. It is never without presuppositions; it is always directed by a precomprehension of the matter about which the text is being consulted. Only from the starting point of this precomprehension can it generally investigate and understand. . . . the presupposition of all comprehension is the vital bond between the interpreter and the matter which the text is talking about, either directly or indirectly.198
The other half of the circle, nevertheless, which is “we can believe only in
interpreting”, has been posited. In this circle, the union between belief and criticism has
been developed. In a criticism which rebuilds rather than destroys, an irrevocable gain for
the truth has been achieved. The union between belief and criticism confers the second
level of interpretation. Hereafter, the symbol begins to provide food for thought, which is
the level of the poetic imagination.
3. The Poetic Image According to Ricoeur, it is the poetic imagination that is the least understood
among the three symbolic categories. Frequently, poetic imagination is related to
imagination per se and is referred to as the "power of forming images."199 Poetic
198 Ibid.
199 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 15.
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imagination is not the forming of mental images of the unreal. Instead, it is the
articulation of the subject’s own reflection that is being excited by his oneirotic
experiences. This oneirotic experience is transformed into a new being which is reflective
in nature. As the subject expresses experience through language, a word-image is formed.
The word-image which is no longer a representation-image200 is what Ricoeur
calls symbol. If the word-image is still consonant to the representation-image, then it is
not yet the symbolic. However, if it already transcends its univocal signification, then the
word-image becomes a symbol. The word-image refers to the thing that is being
signified by the signifier. In the schema of a univocal sign, the signifier has a signified
thing, and that is the only thing it signifies. This thing is now called the representation-
image. For example, in the symbol earth, the signifier is the audible word, the signified
the mental notion of the earth: Thing 1 would be the physical object, the earth itself, and
Thing 2 a “nonliteral” reference. The relation of Thing 2 to the signified is the word-
image and the relation of Thing 1 to the signified is the representation-image. The
relation of Thing 2 to the signified calls for interpretation.201
Ricoeur says that the only difference of poetic images from the other two
categories is
that the poetic image ... shows up at that moment when it is an emergence from language, when it puts language in a state of emergence. Unlike the case of the history of religion, it is not restored in its hieratic stability in the custody of rite and myth. The basic point is that what is born and reborn in the poetic image is the same symbolic structure that runs through
200 Representation-image of the word refers to the literal signification of the word. In the double-meaning structure, the representation-image refers to the thing 1.
201 Matthew Parfitt, “Reading Poetry with Ricoeur’s Dialectical Hermeneutics,” Budhi, No.1 (1997), 96.
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the most prophetic dreams of our inner development and that sustains sacred language in its most archaic and stable forms.202
The poetic imagery only appears when it already emerges from language. Without
language, poetic image has no way of existing. It exists because of language itself. In
contrast, the hierophanies are there prior to language. The sacred is already in the
cosmos, but it becomes symbolic only when it is stated in language. The poetic language
is very different from the literal language. Poetic language is so rich in meaning that its
literal meaning, that is, its first intention, is different from the second intention. Thus, the
poet shows the birth of the metaphorical word that makes it very symbolic.203
Seemingly, the three symbolic categories are not related. Still, they have a
common denominator - language. In all the three categories of the symbol, the problem of
the symbol’s resolution is itself the problem of language. It is language that expresses the
symbol. Even though at each time symbol originates from the expressivity of the
cosmos, the interpretation of the cosmic experience is based on what the interpreter
desires. The imaginative variety of the subjects attests to their unique way of fulfilling or
realizing what they desire. Although the hierophanies originate from the expressiveness
of the cosmos, there must always be a word to take up the cosmos and turn it into a
hierophany. Likewise, the dreamer has to recount his dream for us to know about it; it is
his narration of the dream that introduces to us the problem. Finally, it is the poet who
shows us the birth of the word; it is the power of the poet that shows forth symbols.204
202 Ricoeur, The Symbol… Food for Thought, 198.
203 Ricoeur considers the metaphor as one of those that have a double-meaning. The double-meaning structure of metaphor makes him consider it to be symbolical.
204 Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 16.
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Thus, although symbols might have existed before language, it is language that shows
forth the symbol.
The three symbolic categories present a scattered interpretation of symbol.
However, Ricoeur thinks that amidst scattered manifestations of symbol, the semantic
structure of the symbols shows consistency and unity. In all the three scattered
manifestations of symbol, the semantic structure that is of multiple meaning is what they
have in common. Symbols occur when language produces signs of composite degree in
which meaning, not satisfied with designating some one thing, designates another
meaning attainable only in and through the first intentionality.
The common semantic structure of symbol which is that of multiple meaning
leads Ricoeur to distinguish symbol from the other related structures. He distinguishes
symbol from the sign, the allegory, and the symbol in the sense of the symbolic logic.
Sign, allegory, and the symbol in the sense of the symbolic logic are structurally similar
to symbol. Their literal meaning or signification does not necessarily coincide with what
the sign, allegory, and the symbolic logic want to convey. In the case of the myth,
Ricoeur emphasizes that it is already a symbol. Nonetheless, as a symbol, the myth
interprets already the symbol. Thus, there can be various myths on human evil but
symbolisms of evil are invariable.
Similarly, symbols have a double-meaning structure. But amidst the similarity of
the three symbolic categories, they differ as discussed above. Moreover, as explained
above, the three symbolic categories express the degree of internalization of the meaning
as far as the experience of subject calls for it. The three symbolic categories might be
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common in terms of their semantic structure but this has to do also with how the
experience affects the subject.
The case of the poetics is the apex of Ricoeur’s subjectivity. Ideally, the event of
the discourse happens between the literary text and the reader alone. In reading a literary
piece, the world of the text and that of the reader interact. The experience of the reader
might be similar with other people sharing the same spatio-temporal conditions.
However, the impact of the experience varies from one reader to another. Inasmuch as
no two individuals feel the same impact in a similar situation, the interpretation of the
text varies as well from one interpreter to the other. The meaning of the text depends
solely on the interpreter. The meaning is not a shared experience.
The subject has the last say on how to realize its dream. The subject might
consult others for opinions, but ultimately it decides for itself. At the outset, there is the
first structure or the superstructure. Participating in the same superstructure, various
subjects arrive at a similar understanding of it. To continue its participation in this
superstructure, the subject visualizes a way to participate in the system. The vision might
be the same with others, although they will certainly vary in the actualization of their
visions. This is how the symbolic categories work in the experience of the subject.
The subject, after finding himself in the realm of symbols through the
intermediary of the phenomenology of religion and myths and that of the careful
hermeneutics of individual text, can promote and shape the meaning of the symbol in a
creative interpretation.205 The interpretation of symbols illustrates its growing subjective
understanding and interpretation. At first, the treatment of symbol is very objective.
205 Ricoeur, The Symbol. . . Food for Thought, 205.
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Then it becomes little by little grounded on the understanding of the subject until it
becomes solely the concern of the subject.
CHAPTER THREE
THE HERMENEUTICS OF APPROPRIATION
Ricoeur asks himself regarding the philosophical traditions that characterize his
philosophy. He points out three features that characterize it. They are the reflexive
philosophy206, Husserlian phenomenology and the hermeneutical variation of the
Husserlian phenomenology.207
He traces the origin of reflexive philosophy from the Cartesian cogito as handed
down by way of Kant and the French post-Kantian philosophy. However, this was
strikingly represented, Ricoeur claims, by Jean Nabert.208 Ricoeur explains that
reflexive philosophy considers the most radical philosophical problems to those that concern the possibility of self-understanding as the subject of the operation of knowing, willing, evaluating, and so on. Reflexion is that act of turning back upon itself by which a subject grasps, in a moment of intellectual clarity and moral responsibility, the unifying principle of the operations among which it is dispersed and forgets itself as subject.209
Consequently, it is very appropriate to acknowledge Descartes as the origin of reflexive
philosophy by way of its recognition of the significance of the subject.
The emergence of the subject as an entity that is isolated from its environment but
having clarity through its self-assertion starts from Descartes. Ricoeur believes in the
contribution of Descartes to the Modern Philosophy and he writes that the Cartesian
206 Kathleen Blamey narrates: “In French, the adjective reflexive incorporates two meanings that are distinguished in English by reflective and reflexive. On the advice of the author (Paul Ricoeur) I have chosen to retain the latter in order to emphasize that this philosophy is subject-oriented; it is reflexive in the subject’s act of turning back upon itself. The other possible meaning should, however, also be kept in mind.” Kathleen Blamey in the endnote of Ricoeur, “On Interpretation” in Paul Ricoeur, From Text to
Action: In Hermeneutics, II, trans. by Kathleen Blamey and John B. Thompson (Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1991), 339
. 207 Ricoeur, “On Interpretation” From Text to Action: Essays In Hermeneutics, II, 12. 208 Ibid. 209 Ibid.
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Cogito is an indelible moment in the history of the emergence of being. Nevertheless, he
also recognizes that a new relationship to the subject must be established in our time.
His reading and attendance in the Friday meetings of Marcel triggers the idea of
remodeling the relationship of the subject with the object. His introduction to Marcel’s
method known as the secondary reflection which “consisted in a second-order grasp of
experiences that ‘primary reflection,’ reputed to be reductive and objectifying, was held
to obliterate and rob of their original, affirmative power”210 sustains and strengthens his
interest on the project of remodeling the relationship of the subject with the object.
Marcel’s intuition is “precisely one of an ultimate ontological unity of man’s being-in-
the-world and so stands in clear contrast to the dichotomy of subject and object which
materialism and idealism… take as their datum.”211 However, Ricoeur finds Marcel’s
methodology as insufficient. Although Marcel has a major influence on Ricoeur, he is
dissatisfied with the inexactness of Marcel’s method.
In his search for a methodology, Ricoeur encounters the concept of
intentionality212, which is central to his methodological apparatus. Intentionality, as a
methodological apparatus elaborated by Husserl provides “a disciplined expression for
the vague recognition of unity of experience by recognizing that consciousness is always
a consciousness of . . . .”213 In its least technical sense, intentionality is the “priority of the
210 Paul Ricoeur, “Intellectual Autobiography”, 7.
211 Paul Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature, xii. 212 Ricoeur claims that “it was through the theme of intentionality that Husserlian phenomenology became recognized in France. It was neither the foundational requirement, nor the claim to apodictic evidence belonging to self-consciousness that was first remarked, but instead, that which in the theme of intentionality made a break with the Cartesian identification between consciousness and self-consciousness.” Ricoeur, “Intellectual Autobiography”, 7.
213 Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature, xiii.
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consciousness of something over self-consciousness.”214 Kearney explains that Husserl
endeavors
to recover philosophy’s true vocation as phenomenology by showing how the two poles of objectivity and subjectivity – which positive science tended to segregate in terms of a polar opposition – are in fact inseparable, each being co-determined by the other in a primordial relation. The world is disclosed accordingly as a world that is always for consciousness…. And likewise consciousness is disclosed as a consciousness of something other than itself….215
However, there is a tendency for the intentional unity of experience to be immediately
polarized in thought. The tendency to objectify the intentional correlate of consciousness
and oppose it to the reflecting subject is inevitable. With this circumstance, there is a
difficulty in reaching the level of intentional unity of experience in understanding. To
resolve this problem, the bracketing or phenomenological reduction technique comes into
being. “Bracketing is the deliberate suspension. . . of the objectifying standpoint and of
causal explanation derived from it.”216 This activity, however, catches up
phenomenology “in an infinite movement of ‘backward questioning’ in which its project
of radical self-grounding fades away.”217 As a consequence, “the Lebenswelt (the life-
world) is never actually given but always presupposed.”218
Ricoeur notes that the fading away of phenomenology’s project of radical self-
grounding happens, as according to hermeneutics, “the problem of ultimate foundation
214 Ricoeur, “On Interpretation” in From Text to Action: In Hermeneutics, II, 13.
215 Richard Kearney, Modern Movements in European Philosophy: Phenomenology, Critical
Theory, Structuralism, 2nd ed. (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994), 15.
216 Ricoeur, Freedom and Nature, xiii. 217 Ricoeur, “On Interpretation” in From Text to Action: In Hermeneutics, II, 13 – 14. 218 Ibid., 14.
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still belongs to the sphere of objectifying thought…. The radicality of such questioning
leads from the idea of scientificity back to the ontological condition of belonging,
whereby he who questions shares in the very thing about which he questions.”219
Accordingly, “the theme of the Lebenswelt…,” Ricoeur further explains, “is adopted by
post-Heideggerian hermeneutics no longer as something left over but as a prior condition.
It is because we find ourselves … in a world to which we belong and in which we cannot
but participate that we are then able … to set up objects in opposition to ourselves,
objects that we claim to constitute and to master intellectually.”220
In agreement to Heidegger, Ricoeur intimates that the situation of Dasein is
actually the first condition that shapes understanding. Understanding is understood as
interpretation inasmuch as “interpretation… is the development… [of] an understanding
[that is] always inseparable from a being that has initially been thrown into the world.”221
In doing so, the precedence of being-in-the-world in relation to any foundational project
is discovered.
Although Ricoeur agrees with the Heideggerian desire of immediately
“establish[ing] a fundamental ontology, i.e. through a direct description of Dasein who
exists by the mode of understanding.”222 Nevertheless, Ricoeur reproaches Heidegger’s
“‘short route’ to being… out of commitment to the ‘long route’ of multiple hermeneutic
detours through the exteriorities of sense, instantiated in culture, society, politics, religion
219 Ibid., 30. 220 Ibid., 14. 221 Ibid., 14 – 15.
222 Peter Kemp, “Ricoeur Between Heidegger and Levinas: Original Affirmation Between Ontological Attestation and Ethical Injunction” in Richard Kearney, ed., Paul Ricoeur: The Hermeneutics
of Action (London: Sage Publications, 1996), 47.
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and the human sciences.”223 This commitment leads to a new epistemological
consequence that says “there is no self-understanding that is not mediated by signs,
symbols, and texts; in the last resort understanding coincides with the interpretation given
to these mediating terms.”224 As Ricoeur explains further, the detour he makes through
symbols is his way of questioning the “presupposition common to Husserl and to
Descartes, namely the immediateness, the transparence, the apodicticity of the Cogito.
The subject… does not know itself directly but only through the signs deposited in
memory and in imagination by the great literary traditions.”225
For this reason, interpretation becomes an act of understanding in the sense that
understanding is interpreting that presupposes the consideration of some structures
inherent to signs, symbols, and texts. Consequently, the assertion of the subject having an
immediate and intuitive consciousness is naïve for unfolding the plurivocity of the
aforementioned mediators are possible only in appropriate contexts.
The notion of the non-immediacy of consciousness has been supported by
Ricoeur’s understanding of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, for whom the immediate
consciousness of the subject cannot be relied on. These philosophers of suspicion
unmask the illusion of the subject. Blamey notes specifically that
Ricoeur’s reading of Freud… produces a systematic philosophical interpretation of psychoanalytic analytic concepts and at the same time results in a reworking of Ricoeur’s own theory of interpretation, opening it
223 Richard Kearney, “Introduction” in Richard Kearney, ed., Paul Ricoeur: The Hermeneutics of
Action (London: Sage Publications, 1996), 1.
224 Ricoeur, “On Interpretation” in From Text to Action: In Hermeneutics, II, 15.
225 Ricoeur, “Intellectual Autobiography”, 16.
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up to the deciphering of the concealed, distorted, censored representations of the unconscious by means of a hermeneutics of suspicion.226
Since there is no immediacy of the consciousness, the subject is at odds with the
consciousness. The subject is dispoliated, a circumstance that pushes Ricoeur to liberate
the subject from being lost. He wants to emphasize that although there is no immediate
consciousness, still there is a conscious subject.
The unmasking of the illusion of the subject entails the uncovering of the
suspicions that lurks within the subject. This unmasking is reflected on how man
understands and eventually interprets the varying symbols that intersperse in his
experiences. Madison, for his part, notes that “the net effect of what [Ricoeur] aptly
termed the hermeneutics of suspicion would be to render illusory the goal of his own
restorative hermeneutics which aims not ‘at demystifying a symbolism by unmasking the
unavowed forces that are concealed within it’ but rather at a ‘re-collection of meaning in
its richest, its most elevated, most spiritual diversity.”227
The subject is lost when Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud contend that immediate
consciousness is an illusion. Ricoeur, on the contrary, upholds that the subject is not
actually lost. Immediate consciousness might be an illusion, but knowing something
objectively is still possible. Wanting to liberate the subject, Ricoeur is not in search of
the first truth. Rather, he is searching for that truth that is not naive. Liberating the
subject is not through a presuppositionless philosophy but only through a philosophy that
regards all its presuppositions.
226 Kathleen Blamey, “From the Ego to the Self: A Philosophical Itinerary” in Lewis Edwin Hahn, ed., The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur (Illinois: Open Court:1995), 573. 227 Madison, “Ricoeur and the Hermeneutics of the Subject” in Lewis Edwin Hahn, ed., The
Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur, 79.
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This liberation is made possible through the self’s recognition of itself. And this
recognition of the self of itself is reflection. “The idea of reflexion,” Ricoeur explains,
“carries with it the desire for absolute transparence, a perfect coincidence of the self with
itself, which would make consciousness of self indubitable knowledge….”228
Furthermore, reflection is conceived of as “the recovery of the effort to exist and the
desire to be. However, this effort and this desire cannot be grasped immediately in an act
of intellectual intuition; they can only be glimpsed through the mirror of the objects and
acts, the symbols and signs, wherein they are disclosed. Hence, ‘reflection must become
interpretation because I cannot grasp the act of existing except in signs scattered in the
world.’”229 Furthermore, Madison affirms that “the reflecting subject has meaningful
access to his own existence only through the signs in which gets expressed his effort to
exist and his desire to be.”230
Reflection as Interpretation
The position of the three masters of suspicion dislodges the immediacy of the
consciousness in such a way that subjectivity is not immediately available. Ricoeur
himself makes an extensive study of one of these masters - Freud, who intimates that the
liberation of the subject is possible through interpretation. Through the influences of the
masters of suspicion, Ricoeur, Madison observes, takes reflection also as a critique in
another sense. Madison concurs that “not only is consciousness not accessible to itself in
immediate transparency such that it must seek to know itself through ‘a decipherment of
228 Ibid., 12 – 13. 229 John B. Thompson, “Editor’s Introduction” in Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences: Essays on Language, Action, and Interpretation, edited, translated, and introduced by John B. Thompson (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 17. Cf. Ricoeur, Freud and Philosophy, 46.
230 Madison, “Ricoeur and the Hermeneutics of the Subject”, 79.
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the document of its life, in addition, immediate self-consciousness is more often than not
a false consciousness.”231
Ricoeur writes that all interpretation aims at overcoming the distance between the
past cultural epoch to which the text belongs and the interpreter himself. To overcome
this distance, the interpreter appropriates “its meaning to himself: foreign, he makes it
familiar, that is, he makes it his own. It is thus the growth of his own understanding of
himself that he pursues through his understanding of the other. Every hermeneutics is
thus, explicitly or implicitly, self-understanding by means of understanding others.”232
Self-understanding by means of understanding others signifies reflection which must not
be qualified as a blind intuition. For reflection not to be a blind intuition, it must be
mediated by the expressions in which life objectifies itself. Ricoeur quotes Nabert saying
that
reflection is nothing other than the appropriation of our act of existing by means of a critique applied to the works and the acts which are the signs of this act of existing. Thus, reflection is a critique. . . in the sense that the cogito can be recovered only by the detour of a decipherment of the documents of its life. Reflection is the appropriation of our effort to exist and of our desire to be by means of the works which testify to this effort and this desire..233
Ricoeur employs Nabert’s reflexive philosophy because he believes that “the increase in
subjectivity... goes hand in hand with an increase in reflection and meaning. Subjectivity
is granted us in and through the great variety of experiences that have shaped a cultural
heritage.”234 The aim of reflexive philosophy, Van den Hengel explains, is “to
231Ibid., 80.
232 Ricoeur, “Existence and Hermeneutics” in The Conflict of Interpretations, 16-17. 233 Ibid., 17-18. 234 As cited by John Van den Hengel, 15.
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appropriate in praxis an originary dynamism which grounds human existence and with
which the conscious, practical self does not coincide... According to Ricoeur’s
estimation, Nabert succeeded in linking this original desire to be and the signs in which
that desire is expressed.”235 Through reflection, the subject recaptures itself through the
expressions of life that objectify it. However, Ricoeur writes, “the textual exegesis of
consciousness collides with the initial ‘misinterpretation’ of false consciousness.
Moreover . . . we know that hermeneutics is found wherever there was first
misinterpretation.”236
Nabert’s reflexive philosophy is neither direct nor immediate. In fact, “reflection
must be doubly indirect: first, because existence is evinced only in documents of life, but
also because consciousness is first of all false consciousness, and it is always necessary to
rise by means of a corrective critique from misunderstanding to understanding.”237
Nabert’s ethical philosophy seeks to recapture the primordial source of human existence,
a quest made indirectly possible through the interpretation of the signs in which the
“desire-to-be” is inscripted. This view implies that there is at least a direct relationship
between the understanding of the signs of the “desire-to-be” and self-understanding.
Henceforth, self-understanding passes through the signs in which the self inscribes itself.
Nabert’s indirect approach of understanding the “desire-to-be” counters
Heidegger’s ontological hermeneutics. The implication of Heidegger’s ontology is that
Dasein’s situation shapes its consciousness. Henceforth, language which is a tool for
235 Ibid., 15-16.
236 Ricoeur, “Existence and Hermeneutics” in The Conflict of Interpretations, 18.
237 Ibid.
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Dasein is also shaped by the situation. Thus, we can backtrack to the experience of
Dasein to understand its text. However, for Nabert, human existence can only be
understood through the understanding of the signs representing human existence. This
indirect approach of understanding human existence is Nabert’s contribution to the
philosophy of Ricoeur. Ricoeur believes that there exists a relationship that is frequently
disregarded, the relationship between the act of existence and the signs in which this act
is represented. For Ricoeur, the sign that mediates the subject and its experience is
inscripted in language. Language in turn is also inscripted in the text. Hereafter,
Ricoeur’s indirect ontology takes shape.
Ricoeur’s indirect ontological thrust is linked with reflexive philosophy. The
hermeneutics’ task, in this sense, is to explicate the subject’s desire and effort to be.
“Hermeneutics mediates the re-appropriation or the recovery of the subject. Only
through a hermeneutics of the text is reflection liberated from being abstract. Through
hermeneutics reflection becomes concrete reflection.”238
To be refreshed, Ricoeur’s study of the subject was never direct. Accordingly,
understanding of the self is indirect inasmuch as it is mediated by signs, symbols and
texts. The first two mediations were already discussed extensively in the previous
chapter.
His understanding of the self evolves from understanding it through the mediation
of the sign then to symbol and finally to text. The question arises as to why he shifts
from symbol to text. Ricoeur explains that he
realize[s] that no symbolism, whether traditional or private, can display its resources of multiple meaning (plurivocité) outside appropriate contexts,
238 Van den Hengel, 106.
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that is to say, within the framework of an entire text, of a poem, for example. [Secondly], the same symbolism can give rise to competitive… interpretations, depending on whether the interpretation aims at reducing the symbolism to its literal basis, to unconscious sources or its social motivations, or at amplifying it in accordance with its highest power of multiple meaning. In the one case, hermeneutics aims at demystifying a symbolism by unmasking the unavowed forces that are concealed within it; in the other case, it aims at a re-collection of meaning in its richest, its most elevated, most spiritual diversity. But this conflict of interpretations is also to be found at the level of texts.239
Ricoeur explains further that his shift from symbol to text is also due to the undefinability
of hermeneutics through symbolic interpretation. Nevertheless, he is aware of the two
diverging stages in interpretation – “the linguistic character of experience and the
technical definition of hermeneutics in terms of textual definition.” 240 These stages
imply that self-understanding is not really intuitive in nature. On the contrary, to
understand one’s self is “to take the round-about path of the whole treasury of symbols
transmitted by the cultures within which we have come, at one and the same time, into
both existence and speech.”241
Mediation by text plays a significant role in the hermeneutic game. Although
mediation by text appears to be limited than that of signs and symbols, it nevertheless
obtains intensity in character. The intensity is derived from the characteristic of writing
which opens up new and original resources for discourse. Ricoeur rationalizes that
[t]hanks to writing, discourse acquires a threefold semantic autonomy: in relation to the speaker’s intention, to its reception by its original audience, and to the economic, social, and cultural circumstances of its production. It is in this sense that writing tears itself free of the limits of face-to-face dialogue and becomes the condition for discourse itself becoming-text. It
239 Ricoeur, “On Interpretation” in From Text to Action: In Hermeneutics, II, 16 - 17. 240 Ibid., 17. 241 Ibid.
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is to hermeneutics that falls the task of exploring the implications of this becoming-text for the work of interpretation.242
The questions on the primacy of subjectivity become the reason he makes the “theory of
the text as the hermeneutical axis.”243 By text, it is generally understood as “a unit of
discourse longer than the sentence.”244 Thus, the explanation of the nature of discourse
will illumine the entire textual enterprise.
The Nature of Discourse
Basically, discourse refers to the interaction of two subjects: the speaker and the
listener. This interaction is generally governed by a question and answer relationship.
Ricoeur declares about the subject that
In addressing himself to another speaker, the subject of discourse says something about something; that about which he speaks is the referent of his discourse. As is well known, this referential function is supported by the sentence, which is the first and the simplest unit of discourse. It is the sentence which intends to say something true or something, at least in declarative discourse. The referential function is so important that it compensates, as it were, for another characteristic of language, namely the separation of signs from things. By means of the referential function, language ‘pours back into the universe’… those signs which the symbolic function, at its birth, divorced from things. All discourse is, to some extent, thereby reconnected to the world.245
In this way, the circumstantial milieu of discourse becomes very meaningful inasmuch as
in speech, the interlocutors are present to one another and at the same time to the
242 Ibid. 243 Ricoeur, “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics” in From Text to Action: Essays In Hermeneutics,
II, 35. 244 Ricoeur, “On Interpretation” in From Text to Action: In Hermeneutics, II, 3. 245 Ricoeur, “What is a Text? Explanation and Understanding” in Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences, 147-148.
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situation. This entails the ultimate going back to reality as indicated by discourse. This
going back is characteristic of discourse being an event.
Discourse as an event demonstrates that something happens when someone
speaks. There is a “transition from a linguistics of the code to a linguistics of the
message.”246 Ricoeur understands discourse as an ‘event’, as a temporal realization,
which happens in the present. He contrasts discourse with language in the sense that
language is virtual and outside of time.247
In the instance of a discourse, “the eventful character is now linked to the person
who speaks; the event consists in the fact that someone speaks. Someone expresses
himself in taking up speech.”248 Discourse in itself refers to the world which it claims to
describe, express, or represent. The event, in this sense, is the advent of a world in
language by means of discourse. Messages are exchanged in discourse. Aside from
having a world, discourse has also an interlocutor. The event in this sense is in the
phenomenon of exchange or in the dialogue that transpires between the speaker and the
listener.249
Discourse as an event is in tension with the meaning of discourse. If event is the
realization of discourse, discourse is also understood as meaning. “To mean is both, what
246 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and Surplus of Meaning (Texas: The Texas
University Press, 1976) , 11. 247Paul Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation” in Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences, 133. Cf. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 11 & 198. See also, Ricoeur, “The Model of the Text: Meaningful Action Considered as a Text” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 133.
248 Ibid.
249 Ibid.
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the speaker means, i.e., what he intends to say, and what the sentence means.”250
According to Ricoeur, “what we understood is not the fleeting event, but rather the
meaning which endures.”251
The understanding of discourse surpasses itself as event and meaning. Discourse
as an event refers to the act of saying, while the meaning of a discourse refers to the said.
Ricoeur recognizes the difference between saying and said. According to him, the very
first distanciation is the distanciation of the saying in the said.252
1. Discourse as Saying
In the act of a discourse, the event is surpassed by meaning. Event is fleeting
while meaning is enduring. The event of a discourse refers to the saying. The meaning
that is produced in a discourse refers to the said. Why does the said surpass the saying?
What is said? In clarifying this problem, Ricoeur borrows the theory of speech-act.
According to him, the act of discourse is constituted by a hierarchy of subordinate acts
distributed on three levels.253
The first level is the level of the locutionary or the act of saying. It is also called
the propositional act. The second level is the level of the illocutionary act (or force).
What has been done by the speaker at the moment of saying is the concern of this level.
Lastly, the third level is the level of the perlocutionary act. This refers to what has been
done by the speaker by the fact that he speaks.
250 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 12.
251 Ricoeur, “The Model of the Text”, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 134.
252 Ibid.
253 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 14. Cf. Ricoeur, “The Model of the Text” Hermeneutics and
Human Sciences, 134 - 35.
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In the first level, the focus is on the relation of the action predicate to the subject
of the proposition and to the rest of the predicate. However, aside from the act of saying,
there is also the manner of stating the proposition. Is it said with the force of an order, or
is it said merely as a statement, a wish or promise? Finally, the act of discourse can also
provoke a reaction from the side of the addressee. For example, this reaction could be
fear if a certain proposition is given as an order. Hence, discourse is a sort of stimulus
which produces certain results.254
An act of discourse will not forever be in the form of an oral discourse. The
distanciation of the saying from the said can be surmised through the subordinate acts in
the very act of saying. The meaning of the said will then be further exteriorized in
writing, most especially in the work.
Ricoeur thinks of work as a sequence longer than a sentence. It is submitted to a
form of codification which is applied to the composition itself. Work transforms
discourse into a sort of a literary genre. It has also a unique configuration that reflects the
individuality of the author..255
The notion of meaning in discourse as a work differs from the notion of meaning
in discourse as an act of saying. In oral discourse, the listener can ask the speaker for
clarification or further explanation if he fails to understand the speaker. The meaning of
the said can be clarified from the speaker himself. In work, “the notion of meaning
254 Ibid.
255 Ibid., 136.
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receives a new specification.... There is thus a problem of the interpretation of works, a
problem irreducible to the step by step understanding of sentences.”256
Work is no longer an event between the speaker and the listener. It now happens
between the author or the writer and the reader. Here, the second form of distanciation
takes place.
2. Discourse as Writing In discourse as work, the dialectic of event and meaning can be found in the
realization of the work as an event. The work itself which is already a written text is the
event which is structurally characterized by openings, possibilities, and indeterminacies.
To grasp a work as an event is “to grasp the relation between the situation and the project
in the process of restructuration.”257 The fact that the work is already finished and that
the author, in a sense, is contemporaneous with the meaning of the work as a whole,
objectifies the understanding of the work. It has been objectified by writing.
The distanciation that is constituted by the objectification of the author in the
written work makes interpretation a fundamental reply to this problem. When the act of
discourse passes from oral to written, the work becomes “autonomous with respect to the
intention of the author. What the text signifies no longer coincides with what the author
meant.... The autonomy of the text already contains the possibility that ... the ‘matter’ of
the text may escape from the finite intentional horizon of its author; in other words,... the
‘world’ of the text may explode the world of the author.”258
256 Ibid.
257 Ibid., 137.
258 Ibid., 139.
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The author writes the work according to his own psycho-sociological conditions.
However, the moment the work is finished; it transcends the author’s own psycho-
sociological conditions. Accordingly, the work “opens itself to an unlimited series of
readings, themselves situated in different socio-cultural condition. In short, the text must
be able... to ‘decontextualize’ itself in such a way that it can be ‘recontextualized’ in a
new situation - as accomplished precisely, by the act of reading.”259
Where writing frees the text from the whims of the author, writing and reading
become different from speaking and hearing. The autonomy of the text subjects itself to
the conditions of interpretation.
3. Discourse as Real
In an event of discourse, Ricoeur focuses on what happens to the denotation or the
reference of discourse. The notion of the reference is linked by Ricoeur to the notion of
“the world of the text”.
Frege discusses in On Sense and Reference260 the distinction between the sense
and the reference of any proposition. Ricoeur follows this up. To him, the sense of a
proposition refers to the ideal object or meaning just as the proposition refers to the ideal
object or meaning which the proposition intends. Hence, the sense of the proposition is
immanent in a discourse. On the other hand, the reference of the proposition, which
refers to the truth-value of the proposition, refers also to its claim to reach reality. Thus,
reference distinguishes discourse from language. As Ricoeur says, language “has no
259 Ibid. 260 Gottlob Frege, On Sense and Reference, trans. by Max Black in Translations from the
Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970), 56-78 as cited by Paul Ricoeur in Interpretation Theory, 19.
93
relation with reality, its words returning to other words in the endless circle of dictionary.
Only discourse... intends things, applies itself to reality, expresses the world.”261 Ricoeur
adds that “this notion of bringing experience to language is the ontological condition of
reference.”262 Meaning, the sense of the proposition presupposes reference. The reason
for this is the fact that “there is first something to say, because we have an experience to
bring to language, that conversely, language is not only directed towards ideal meanings
but also refers to what is.”263
Sense and reference are not so problematic in the event of an oral discourse. The
problem of reference can be resolved by pointing out the spatio-temporal situations that
are common to the interlocutors. Reference can be determined by the ability to point out
the reality that they shared. Their situation in the moment of an oral discourse can
determine the situatedness of the reference in reality. Clarifications can be done through
the explanation of the speaker.
On the contrary, when a certain discourse is put to writing, the situation changes.
The commonality of situation between the reader and the writer is no longer there. The
condition of the act of pointing out does not exist since the situations of the reader and
the writer are not the same. The psychological intentions of the writer which are
concealed behind the text can, in this case, no longer be completely defined. Ricoeur
asks, “if we do not reduce interpretation to the dismantling of structures, then what
261 Ricoeur, “What is a Text?”, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 140.
262 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 21.
263 Ibid.
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remains to be interpreted?”264 He answers: “to interpret is to explicate the type of being-
in-the-world unfolded in front of the text.”265
The Nature of Text
In Ricoeur’s theory of the text, there are two elements to be remembered. Ricoeur,
first and foremost, wants to overcome the romantic notion of interpretation as
understanding the intentions of the author behind the text. For Ricoeur, to interpret is to
grasp the world opened up in front of the text. Secondly, Ricoeur develops a concept of
the text as autonomous work, which makes it possible to include a critical moment of
explanation in the process of interpretation.
If discourse is both oral and written, a text is already understood as “any discourse
fixed by writing.”266 This definition exemplifies the fixation by writing of discourse
which is constitutive of the text itself. This implies further that writing is first and
foremost speaking inasmuch as it is first said verbally or mentally. Ricoeur explains
further that this “[f]ixation by writing takes the very place of speech, occurring at the site
where speech could have emerged. This suggests that a text is really a text only when it
is not restricted to transcribing an anterior speech, when instead it inscribes directly in
written letters what the discourse means.”267
Inasmuch as writing transcribes the speech, speech and text are therefore in the
same position with respect to language. This is so because speech is understood as the
264 Ibid., 141.
265 Ibid.
266 Ricoeur, “What is a Text? Explanation and Understanding” in Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences, 145. See also, Ricoeur, “Metaphor and the Central Problem of Hermeneutics” in Paul Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences,166. 267 Ibid., 146.
95
realization of language in an event of discourse. It is the production of an individual
utterance by an individual speaker.268
Although writing is prior to speech, “writing adds nothing to the phenomenon of
speech other than the fixation which enables it to be conserved. Whence the conviction
that writing is fixed speech, that inscription, whether it be graphics or recording, is
inscription of speech – and inscription which … guarantees the persistence of speech.”269
But what happens to discourse when it passes from speaking to writing? The
moment the text replaces speech, a very important incident happens. The circumstantial
milieu of discourse becomes very meaningful inasmuch as in speech, the interlocutors are
present to one another and at the same time to the situation. This entails the ultimate
going back to reality as indicated by discourse. “Thus in living speech, the ideal sense of
what is said turns toward the real reference, towards that ‘about which’ we speak. At the
limit, this real reference tends to merge with an ostensive designation where speech
rejoins the gesture of pointing. Sense fades into reference and the latter into the act of
showing.”270 Furthermore, Ricoeur explains
At first sight, writing seems only to introduce a purely external and material factor: fixation, which shelters the event of discourse from destruction. In fact, fixation is only the external appearance of a problem which is much more important, and which affects all the properties of discourse…. To begin with, writing renders the text autonomous with respect to the intention of the author. What the text signifies no longer coincides with what the author meant; henceforth, textual meaning and psychological meaning have different destinies.271
268 Ibid. 269 Ibid. 270 Ibid., 148. 271 Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation” in Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences,139.
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In this sense, interpretation is put side by side with the moment of ‘understanding’ the
situation of the reader apart from the writer. Interpretation thus becomes the projection
of the ownmost possibilities that the reader can find in the situation. Ricoeur, applying
this to the theory of the text as autonomous, says that “what must be interpreted in a text
is a proposed world which I could inhabit and wherein I could project one of my
ownmost possibilities.”272
Because the meaning of the text is autonomous it escapes from the psychological
intention of the writer. The truth value of the text is now independent from the writer’s
original intention. The sense of the text as envisioned by the author may now have a
reference different from the situation of the reader. The open-endedness of the text may
vary from one interpreter to another inasmuch as they vary in the projection of their
ownmost possibilities. The re-appropriation of the text becomes variable.
The elusiveness of the reference from the sense is illustrated by the notion of
symbol as an enigmatic entity. That is to say, the signification of a symbol may elude its
apparent sense for it may refer to something else.
He explains further that “insofar as the meaning of a text is rendered autonomous
with respect to the subjective intention of its author, the essential question is not to
recover, behind the text, the lost intention but to unfold, in front of the text, the ‘world’ it
opens up and discloses.”273
272 Ibid., 142.
273 Ricoeur, “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics” in Paul Ricoeur, From Text to Action: Essays In
Hermeneutics, II, 35.
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In front of the text, the subject, i.e., both that of the author and the reader,
becomes secondary. 274 What is given primary importance is the matter of the text. By
freeing the text from the subjectivities of the author and the reader, the first task now of
hermeneutics, Ricoeur asserts, is “to seek in the text itself, on the one hand, the internal
dynamic that governs the structuring of the work and, on the other hand, the power that
the work possesses to project itself outside itself and to give birth to a world that would
truly be the ‘thing’ referred to by the text.”275 In short, the task of hermeneutics is
twofold: “to reconstruct the internal dynamic of the text and to restore to the work its
ability to project itself outside itself in the representation of a world that [the reader]
could inhabit.”276 This internal dynamic and external projection constitutes what Ricoeur
calls the work of the text.
As a result, Ricoeur resists the dialectic of understanding and explanation which
is the consequent of the two one-sided attitudes of reducing understanding to empathy
and of reducing explanation to an abstract combinatory system.277 To do so, he elucidates
again the meaning of understanding and explanation as follows: “by understanding I
mean the ability to take up again within oneself the work of structuring that is performed
by the text, and by explanation, the second-order operation grafted onto this
understanding which consists in bringing to light the codes underlying this work of
274 Ricoeur, “On Interpretation” in From Text to Action: Essays In Hermeneutics, II, 17. 275 Ibid. 276 Ibid., 18. See also Paul Ricoeur, “What is a Text? Explanation and Understanding”, From Text
to Action: Essays In Hermeneutics, II, 113. 277 Ibid., 19.
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structuring that is carried through in company with the reader.”278 He explains further that
such a resistance leads him to use the very dialectic of understanding and explanation at
the level of the “sense” immanent in the text to define interpretation. He then claims that
this would be his first contribution to the hermeneutical philosophy out of which he is
working.279
Explanation and Understanding
Ricoeur aims to establish the interrelation of explanation and understanding.
Seemingly, explanation and understanding, in the act of reading, are two distinct
processes that cannot be united. This exclusivism, Ricoeur asserts, is a consequent of
Dilthey’s position that in the act of reading, persons either “`explain’ in the manner of the
natural scientist, or … ‘interpret’ in the manner of the historian.”280 Nevertheless, amidst
this apparent contradiction, Ricoeur is going to deliberately “show that the concept of the
text… demands a renewal of the two notions of explanation and interpretation and, in
virtue of this renewal, a less contradictory conception of their interrelation.”281 Hence, he
is going to search for a “strict complementarity and reciprocity between explanation and
interpretation.”282 He is going to prove that understanding is not sole domain of the
human sciences and that explanation is not limited to the natural sciences.
278 Ibid., 18 – 19. 279 Ibid., 19.
280 Ricoeur, “What is a Text? Explanation and Understanding” in Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences,150. 281 Ibid. Eventually, the explanation-interpretation becomes explanation-understanding inasmuch
as interpretation is a particular province of understanding. 282 Ibid.
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Initially, the apparent contradiction between explanation and understanding, as
mentioned above, is due also to the differences of their objects. The purpose of
explanation is to “explicate or unfold the range of propositions and meanings, whereas in
understanding we comprehend or grasp as a whole the chain of practical meanings in one
act of synthesis.”283 Vis-à-vis discourse, Ricoeur elaborates by way of an analogy saying
that “understanding is to reading what the event of discourse is to the utterance of
discourse and that explanation is to reading what the verbal and textual autonomy is to
the objective meaning of discourse.”284
Ricoeur also observes that “the dichotomy between understanding and
explanation in Romanticist hermeneutics is both epistemological and ontological. It
opposes two methodologies and two spheres of reality, nature and mind. Interpretation is
not a third term, nor… the name of the dialectic between explanation and understanding.
Interpretation is a particular case of understanding. It is understanding applied to the
written expressions of life.”285
Ricoeur exposes the process of the dialectic of explanation and understanding as a
unique process following the route of understanding to explanation and then explanation
to comprehension. The first phase is simply governed by a guessing expedition inasmuch
as its sole purpose is to first grasp the whole meaning of the text. The second phase, on
the other hand, becomes a more sophisticated mode of understanding inasmuch as it is
283 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 72. 284 Ibid., 71 – 72. 285 Ibid., 73.
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now employing explanatory procedures. Thus, from being a mere guess, it will now
satisfy the conditions of appropriation as the new concept of interpretation.
1. Guess as a Holistic but Naïve Grasping of the Text
Guessing the meaning of a text is necessary in relation to the autonomy of textual
meaning. This necessity is very specific to writing because the “verbal meaning of the
text no longer coincides with the mental meaning or intention of the text. This intention is
both fulfilled and abolished by the text, which is no longer the voice of someone
present.”286 However, Clark observes that “although ‘the human fact disappears’ in
writing, the ‘detachment of meaning from the event’ overcomes the transience of the
instance of discourse. The propositional content of the locutionary act is preserved in its
entirety, whereas the immediate force of the illocutionary act only remains in the form of
additional punctuation marks, and the emotional, even physical, impact of the
perlocutionary disappears.287 Consequently, in this situation, understanding is not
“merely to repeat the speech event in a similar event, it is to generate a new event
beginning from the text in which the initial event has been objectified.”288
Ricoeur’s guessing of the meaning of the text is an honest assessment that since
the author is no longer present in front of the reader, the intention of the author is already
beyond its reach. In other words, hermeneutics can no longer be defined as “an inquiry
into the psychological intentions that are hidden beneath the text, but rather as the
286 Ibid., 75.
287 S.H. Clark, Paul Ricoeur (London: Routledge, 1990), 100. 288 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 75.
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explication of the being-in-the-world displayed by the text.”289 In reality, guessing is his
way of showing his opposition to the Romanticist way of interpretation which is “to
understand an author as well as and even better than he understands himself.”290
Inasmuch as writing separates the meaning of the text from the intention of the author, to
put it simply, “the author can no longer ‘rescue’ his work….”291 This is not much of a
problem for Ricoeur. He is in the opinion that the problem of interpretation is on the very
nature of the verbal intention of the text and not on the incommunicability of the mental
intention of the author.292 His position is that
the surpassing of the intention by the meaning signifies precisely that understanding takes place in a nonpsychological and properly semantical space, which the text has carved out by severing itself from the mental intention of its author… [and that] the problem of the correct understanding can no longer be solved by a simple return to the alleged situation of the author…. [To make a guess, therefore, is] to construe the meaning as the verbal meaning of the text.293
Furthermore, Ricoeur enumerates the things realized in guessing. They are as
follows: (1) to construe the verbal meaning of a text is to construe it as a whole; (2) to
construe a text is to construe it as an individual; and, (3) the literary texts involve
potential horizons of meaning, which may be actualized in different ways.294 However,
even then, the caveat is that the guess work is a very subjective interpretation. The
possibility of misunderstanding is very difficult to avoid. Nevertheless, Ricoeur is aware 289 Ricoeur, “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics” in From Text to Action: Essays In
Hermeneutics, II, 36. 290 Ricoeur, “The Task of Hermeneutics” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 46. 291 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 75. 292 Ibid., 76. 293 Ibid. 294 Ibid.,76 – 79.
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that rules for making good guesses are impossible to establish. However, the methods for
validating those guesses abound.295 Thus, he emphasizes “the balance between the
genius of guessing and the scientific character of validation of an interpretation…. Guess
and validation are in a sense circularly related as subjective and objective approaches to
the text.”296 He asserts however that this circle is never vicious since it will break away
from the kind of “‘self-confirmability’ which… threatens the relation between guess and
validation.”297 Whenever there are conflicts among competing interpretations, only the
most probable one will be pursued for interpretations are never equal. With this idea,
Ricoeur is confident that there exists “criteria of relative superiority for resolving
[whatever] conflict, which can easily be derived from the logic of subjective
probability.”298
2. Falsification as Validation: The Explanatory Phase
Here, the logic of validation plays a very important role. Ricoeur explains that
“the logic of validation allows us to move between the two limits of dogmatism and
skepticism. It is always possible to argue for or against an interpretation, to confront
interpretation, to arbitrate between them and to seek agreement, even if this agreement
remains beyond our immediate reach.”299 With the said abounding possibilities, the more
it becomes important to validate whatever guesses the reader makes regarding a text.
Amdal and Reagan, however, cite that by validation, Ricoeur does not mean verification.
295 Ibid., 76. 296 Ibid., 79. 297 Ibid. 298 Ibid. 299 Ibid.
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It rather means “a process of falsification and probable reasoning which aims at
establishing an interpretation as more probable than another. That a text admits of more
than one interpretation does not mean that all interpretations are equal.”300
Ricoeur imports the methodology that the various structural schools of literary
criticism used. He thinks about the legitimacy of their approach inasmuch as they “all
shared the feature of confining themselves to the structures of the text alone, without any
reference to the presumed intention of the author.”301 Consequently, he sees their
approach to be proceeding from the suspension or suppression of the ostensive reference.
From there, “the text intercepts the ‘worldly’ dimension of the discourse – the relation to
a world which could be shown – in the same way as it disrupts the connection of the
discourse to the intention of the author.”302
This approach of reading extends the suspension of the ostensive reference. It also
transfers the reader into the place where the text stands. In doing so, the text is converted
into a closed system of signs. In this way, the text can be subjected to the “explanatory
rules that linguistics successfully applied to the elementary system of signs which
underlie the use of language.”303 However, this structural analysis as applied to text is
only applicable to sequences of signs not longer than a sentence.
300 Reagan, “Words and Deeds” in Lewis Edwin Hahn, ed. The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur
(Illinois: Open Court: 1995), 335 – 336. See also, Geir Amdal, “Explanation and Understanding: The Hermeneutic Arc -- Paul Ricoeur’s Theory of Interpretation” Candidate Philol. Thesis. (Department of Philosophy, University of Oslo: May 2001), 51. [on-line text is accessed on April 5, 2006 at] http://folk.uio.no/geira/thesis/thesis.pdf. Cf. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 79. 301 Ricoeur, “Intellectual Autobiography”, 22. 302 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 81. 303 Ibid., 81.
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As a consequence, a question on the propriety of using structural model to text
arises. However, Amdal explains that
[t]he suppression of the direct relation of the text to an author, a world, a time of creation, makes it possible to analyse it as a closed universe of words and functions, in the same way in which the langue is analysed as a ‘closed universe of signs’. Indeed, the text is discourse and with regard to the langue it has a position which is analogous to that of speech. That is to say, it cannot be conceived as only a structural composition like the language system. On the other hand, it is something essentially different from spoken discourse. The text is the type of discourse which can be analysed in a similar way as the langue. It can be taken as a self-sufficient system of oppositions, combinations, codes. “The unities of higher order than the sentence, are organized in a way similar to that of the small unities of language, that is, the unities of an order lower than the sentence, those precisely which belong to the domain of linguistics.”304
Ricoeur is moved to use structural analysis to texts when he observes that Claude
Levi-Strauss made structural analysis possible to myth, a category of text. Ricoeur notes
that Levi-Strauss hypothesizes that “myth, like the rest of language, is made up of
constituent units. These constituent units presuppose the constituent units present in
language when analyzed on other levels – namely, phonemes, morphemes, and sememes
– but they, nevertheless, differ from the latter in the same way as the latter differ among
themselves; they belong to a higher and more complex order. For this reason, [they shall
be called] gross constituent units.”305 To insist, however, on this semblance, Levi-Strauss
has to call them mythemes306.
304 Geir Amdal, “Explanation and Understanding: The Hermeneutic Arc -- Paul Ricoeur’s Theory of Interpretation”, 20 – 21. Cf. Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 82 – 83; Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 140 & 142. 305 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 82. Cf. Claude Levi-Strauss, Structural Anthropology, trans. Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1967): 208 – 28. 306 “A mytheme is not one of the sentences of a myth. It is, however, an appositive value attached to several individual sentences, which form “a bundle of relations.” It “is only as bundles that these relations can be put to use and combined so as to produce a meaning.” What is here called a meaning is not at all what the myth means, in the sense of its philosophical or existential content or intuition, but rather the
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From this hypothesis, Ricoeur set in motion the structural model to text. The
contention of Ricoeur is that the same rules applicable to the smallest units known to
linguistics can also be applied to larger units, which are at least the same as the sentence,
when they are put together to form a narrative.307 Using structural analysis to myth,
Ricoeur observes that in this process the myth is explained by not necessarily interpreting
it. Through this process, “the structural law of the myth”308 is brought out and here the
text is only taken as a text. For the time being, the meaning is suspended.
Apart from Levi-Strauss, Ricoeur notes also the influences of the Russian
formalist Vladimir Propp, and the French structural analysts Roland Barthes and A.J.
Greimas in the aspect of folklore narrative. From them, Ricoeur realizes that the units of
action in a narrative if segmented and then the parts are integrated in to the whole, “have
nothing to do with psychological traits susceptible of being lived….”309 There is however
a recognition of the “transposition of the commutative method from the phonological
level to the level of the narrative units. The logic of action then consists in linking
together action kernels, which together constitute the narrative’s structural continuity.
The application of this technique results in a ‘dechronologizing’ of the narrative, so as to
make apparent the narrative logic underlying the narrative time.”310 Ultimately, the
arrangement or disposition of the mythemes themselves; in short, the structure of the myth.” Ibid., 83. Cf. Levi-Strauss, 207. 307 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 82. 308 Ibid., 84. 309 Ibid. 310 Ibid., 85.
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purpose of explaining a narrative is “to get hold of this symphonic structure of segmental
actions.”311
From the aforementioned instances of structural analysis of certain categories of a
text, i.e., from a myth and a folklore narrative, Ricoeur is convinced that explanation, in
the rigorous sense of the term, is not only peculiar to the natural sciences but also
applicable to texts for the reason that “it proceeds from the common sphere of language
thanks to the analogical transference from the small units of language (phonemes and
lexemes) to the large units beyond the sentence, including narrative, folklore, and
myth.”312 From the foregoing discussion, structural analysis of the text is seen as an
appropriate methodology in correcting the historicizing and psychologizing tendencies of
the reader as well as adjusting its existential prejudices.
Furthermore, Ricoeur is going to show that explanation still requires
understanding. In fact he contends that in relation to understanding, explanation is
secondary. Secondary in the sense that “explanation, conceived as a combinatory system
of signs, hence as a semiotics, is built up on the basis of a first order understanding
bearing on discourse as an act that is both indivisible and capable of innovation.”313
Understanding is significant in presenting what is beyond structural analysis. Structural
analysis shall not be limited to explaining the logical operation of the text only. Most
importantly, it is expected to lead the reader from a surface semantics to a depth
311 Ibid. 312 Ibid., 86. 313 Ricoeur, “On Interpretation” in From Text to Action: In Hermeneutics, II, 10.
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semantics. Limiting reading to mere structural analysis deprives the text of its life for it
reduces the text merely to a series of meaningless discourses.
If explanation is concerned with the logical operation of the text, understanding is
concerned with the grasping of the “kind of world opened up by the depth semantics of
the text, a discovery, which has immense consequences regarding what is usually called
the sense of the text.”314 Ricoeur explains further, saying
[t]he sense of a text is not behind the text, but in front of it. It is not something hidden, but something disclosed. What has to be understood is not the initial situation of discourse, but what points towards a possible world, thanks to the non-ostensive reference of the text. Understanding has less than ever to do with the author and his situation. It seeks to grasp the world-propositions opened up by the reference of the text. To understand a text is to follow its movement from sense to reference: from what it says, to what it talks about.315
At this junction, to understand is not to understand the intention of the author. It is to
intuitively grasp the intention of the text itself. This is borne by the depth semantics that
structural analysis yields. It yields an invitation “to think of the sense of the text as an
injunction coming from the text, as a new way of looking at things, as an injunction to
think in a certain manner.”316 Consequently, “the text speaks of a possible world and of a
possible way of orienting oneself within it. The dimensions of this world are properly
opened up by and disclosed by the text.”317 Whatever is shown here by the text is at the
same time a creation of a new mode of being. This is what Ricoeur envisions: a model of
314 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 87. 315 Ibid., 87 – 88. 316 Ibid., 88. 317 Ibid.
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the text freed with respects to its author, yet still able to reach beyond pure textuality and
retain its relation to a world.
Meaningful Action Considered as a Text
After Ricoeur develops the phases of explanation and understanding dialectically,
he integrates them in “the field of practice, and in general action human action, the
privileged place of the dialectic between explanation and understanding.”318 In the
general scheme of the theoretical development of action, he places the theory of action at
the middle of the theory of the text and that of history. This positioning signals the very
important place of action in Ricoeur’s understanding of the self. This implies that from
reading a text, the person is compelled to appropriate or disappropriate the meaning of
the text read to action. As Madison reckons,
The task of interpretation or hermeneutics is to reconstruct the internal dynamic of a text so as to make manifest the world which it projects. This world is a possible world, one which I, as reader, could inhabit. In opening up worlds which express possibilities of being, literary texts generate meaning, allow for self-understanding. In revealing possibilities of being, texts further our self-understanding, for what we essentially are is what we can become, the being otherwise and being more that are the objects of effort and desire, the two basic characteristics of the act of existing.319
Now, whether this, mode of appropriation or disappropriation is correct, history is the one
to judge it. It is history that inseparably links text and action together. As Ricoeur
reiterates all over time, he maintains that “the primacy granted to the concept of action is
justified… by an increasingly active attachment to moral and political philosophy.”320 He
318 Ricoeur, “Intellectual Autobiography”, 31. 319 Madison, “Ricoeur and the Hermeneutics of the Subject”, 81. 320 Ricoeur, “Intellectual Autobiography”, 33. Ricoeur explains that the attention he brought to the moral problem, from which he never separated the political problem, is contemporaneous with his choice of the problematic of the will and its development in a meditation on the origin of bad will. He intimates
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backs up this position as he affirms that “moral obligation resides on a level less
fundamental than the personal desire for fulfillment; the call of the other is also forcefully
affirmed….”321
Ricoeur considers the text as a good paradigm for the social sciences. In so doing,
he establishes four characteristics of texts that are also borne by action. First, writing
fixes not the event but the meaning of what is said. In this way, a text inscribes directly
the meaning of discourse. In the same way, Ricoeur points out that “meaningful action is
an object for science only under the condition of a kind of objectification which is
equivalent to the fixation of discourse by writing.”322 The possibility of objectification is
due to the inner trait of action which is similar to the locutionary act of a discourse, i.e.,
“it has a propositional content that can be identified and reidentified as the same.”323
Thus, Reagan comments that “when we speak of an action ‘leaving its mark’, we are
metaphorically referring to one of the ways actions are inscribed.”324
Secondly, if in a written text, its meaning is already detached from the intention of
the author, “an action is [also] detached from its agent and develops consequences of its
own.”325 The social dimension of action, which is due to its being “done by several
agents in such a way that the role of each of them cannot be distinguished from the role
further that it was only after the course at Louvain on the semantics of action (1972) that the analysis of the moral problem is explicitly related to a consideration of the field of practice in its full scope. 321 Ibid., 33- 34. 322 Reagan, “Words and Deeds”, 333. Cf. Ricoeur, “The Model of the Text” in Hermeneutics and
the Human Sciences, 203. 323 Ricoeur, “Model of the Text”, in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 204. 324 Reagan, “Words and Deeds”, 334. 325 Ricoeur, “The Model of the Text” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 206.
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of the others”326, makes it have “consequences and effects which were neither intended
nor foreseen by the agent.”327 Furthermore, this social dimension makes an action
blameworthy only if it leaves an imprint. And, it is here where history plays a very
important role since it is where human action leaves its imprint. Nevertheless, even if the
continuous process of recording human action takes place in history, its fate escapes the
control of individual actors.328
Thirdly, inasmuch as a text “breaks the ties of discourse to all the ostensive
references”329, “a meaningful action is an action the importance of which goes ‘beyond’
its relevance to its initial situation.”330 This goes on to show that non-ostensive references
which are called a ‘world’ develop as a result of this emancipation from the situational
context of the interlocutors and that of the actors. However, this world does not refer to
the concrete world of the interlocutors and actors but the possible world for the reader.
Reagan quotes Ricoeur saying that “for me, this is the referent of all literature; no longer
the Umwelt of the ostensive references of dialogue, but the Welt projected by the non-
ostensive references of every text that we have read, understood, and loved.”331 Thus,
Reagan further comments that “meaningful actions and their consequences, like the
references of texts, have an importance which goes beyond that of the situation in which
they were produced. Historically significant actions like great works of culture can break 326 Ibid. 327 Reagan, “Words and Deeds”, 334. 328 Ricoeur, “The Model of the Text” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 207. 329 Ibid. 330 Ibid. 331 Reagan, “Words and Deeds”, 334. Cf. Ricoeur, “The Model of the Text” in Hermeneutics and
the Human Sciences, 202.
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the bonds with the actual conditions of their production and can be reenacted and
reinterpreted in novel situations.”332 As Ricoeur said it, “an important action… develops
meanings which can be actualised or fulfilled in situations other than the one in which
this action occurred.”333
Lastly, the moment written text escapes the bounds lived by the author, and the
narrowness of ostensive reference, it suddenly addresses anybody who is capable of
reading. “An unknown, invisible reader has become the unprivileged addressee of the
discourse.”334 In the same manner, “the meaning of human action is also something
which is addressed to an indefinite range of possible ‘readers’. The judges are not the
contemporaries, but, as Hegel said, history itself.”335 This makes human action like an
open work that becomes open to new readings. As Ricoeur elaborates his position,
It is because it ‘opens up’ new references and receives fresh relevance from them, that human deeds are also waiting for fresh interpretations which decide their meaning. All significant events and deeds are, in this way, opened to this kind of practical interpretation through present praxis. Human action, too, is opened to anybody who can read. In the same way that the meaning of an event is the sense of its forthcoming interpretations, the interpretation by the contemporaries has no particular privilege in this process.336
After setting up the close analogy between the characteristics of texts and action, Ricoeur
allows the social sciences to adopt the methodology of text-interpretation in order to
understand human action. Madison explains that “it is only by considering action as a text
332 Ibid. 333 Ricoeur, “The Model of the Text” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 208. 334 Ibid., 203. Cf. Reagan, “Words and Deeds”, 334. 335 Ibid., 208. Cf. Reagan, “Words and Deeds”, 334 – 335. 336 Ibid., 208 – 209.
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that we can hope to come to some understanding of it, and thus of that being which is
essentially we are.”337
Furthermore, Madison claims that for Ricoeur, the theory of action is inseparable
from the theory of texts. Madison quotes Ricoeur saying:
The intersection between the theory of texts and the theory of action becomes more obvious when the point of view of the onlooker is added to that of the agent, because the onlooker will not only consider action in terms of its motive, but also in terms of its consequences, perhaps of its unintended consequences. A different way of making sense with actions occurs then, and also a different way of reading it as a quasi-text. Detached from its agent, a course of action acquires an autonomy similar to the semantic autonomy of a text. It leaves its mark on the course of events and eventually it becomes sedimented into social institutions. Human action has become archive and document. Thus it acquires potential meaning beyond its relevance to its initial situation.338
This being the case, understanding the self as an acting being paves the way for utilizing
the same paradigm as understanding the self in front of a text inasmuch as a meaningful
action is considered as a text.
Distanciation and Appropriation “The driving force behind the desire to know is the need to make the world over
in terms that are meaningful.”339 This is the polar force of the reader’s appropriation.
When the reader chooses to engage the otherness as constituted by a text, he nonetheless
enters into a struggle between appropriation and distanciation. This struggle occurs by
virtue of the productive engagement that happens between the text and the reader. This
productive engagement is seen as the process of redescribing the world, first, of the
337 Madison, “Ricoeur and the Hermeneutics of the Subject”, 83. 338 Ibid. 339 Geir Amdal. “Explanation and Understanding: The Hermeneutic Arc -- Paul Ricoeur’s Theory of Interpretation”, 61.
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reader himself and second that of others as inscribed in the text. Amdal considers this as
an interpretive process that “begins with the analytic power of explanation and is then
challenged by the unitary force of understanding.”340 The said engagement of
explanation and understanding is expected to produce the interpretation which in return
responds to the initial need to engage distanciation and appropriation.
Ricoeur employs the theory of the text341 because he finds it as a good guide for
showing that “the act of subjectivity is not so much what initiates understanding as what
terminates it. [Moreover, he takes] this terminal act [as] characteris[ing]
appropriation.”342 To reiterate what has been said above, the rejoining of subjectivity is
not the one that supports the meaning of the text. It only responds to the matter of the text
as proposed meanings unfold in front of the text.
It is from here that distanciation becomes very important. Van den Hengel cites
Ricoeur as saying that “to invoke distanciation as a principle is to attempt to show the
very experience of belonging to. . . requires something like externalization in order to
apprehend, articulate and understand itself.”343 Consequently, the introduction of
distanciation, first, establishes the autonomy of the text with respect to its author, its
situation and its original reader.
340 Ibid. 341 Morrison comments that “a theory of texts is important in Ricoeur's hermeneutic as it offers the interpreter space for the application of critical tools. True appropriation of a text's meaning is a reflexive action realized at the intersection of ontological naiveté and critical distanciation.” Bradley T. Morrison. “A Phenomenology of Marital Dynamics and Pastoral Care” [article on-line]; available from http://www.xcelco.on.ca/~btmorrison/ricoeur/Ricoeur&Systems.html; accessed 7 July 2006. 342 Ricoeur, “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 113. 343 Van den Hengel, 109.
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Ricoeur also confirms the existence of a second distanciation “by which a new
being-in-the-world, projected, is freed from the false evidences of every reality.”344 He
asserts that “distanciation implements all the strategies of suspicion, among which the
critique of ideology is a principal modality. Distanciation, in all its forms and figures,
constitutes par excellence the critical moment in understanding.”345 In other words,
distanciation is understood as more than a mere distance as it implies a creation of
distance, in order to permit a re-description of reality.
Distanciation as a methodology corresponds to what Ricoeur calls as the first way
of reading a text. Ricoeur elaborates that there are
[t]wo ways of reading…. [First,]by reading we can prolong and reinforce the suspense which affects the text’s reference to a surrounding world and to the audience of speaking subjects.346
The first way of reading is referred to as an explanatory attitude. This first reading
confirms the first and second distanciation explained above. Ricoeur, however, explains
that the real aim of reading is borne by the second reading. The second reading becomes
the real aim because the second way of reading “lift[s] the suspense and fulfill[s] the text
in present speech…. [It] reveals the true nature of the suspense which intercepts the
movement of the text towards meaning.”347
The movement of text towards meaning may closely affirm possible imaginative
variation of the ego. With this possibility, a critique of the illusions of the subject is very
344 Ricoeur, “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 113. 345 Ibid. 346 Ricoeur, “What is a Text? Explanation and Understanding” in Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences, 158. 347 Ibid.
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much needed. This happens only if and only if the second way reading a text operates
likes a premature appropriation that is directed against an alienating distanciation.
However, if distanciation is taken as a condition of possible understanding one’s self in
front of the text, then it can aptly be taken as an avenue of the critique of ideology which
organically implies a critique of the illusions of the subject. From this, Ricoeur describes
distanciation as “[d]istanciation from oneself [that] demands that the appropriation of the
proposed worlds offered by the text passes through the disappropriation of the self. 348
Consequently, the critique on the illusions of the subject is critique of false consciousness
that can become an integral part of hermeneutics.349
With distanciation, appropriation is deemed as its counterpart. It is taken as a
response to this double distanciation. This becomes the case for the reason that
distanciation is not abolished by appropriation, but is rather the counterpart of it. Thanks to distanciation… appropriation no longer has any trace of affective affinity with the intention of an author. Appropriation is quite the contrary of contemporaneousness and congeniality: it is understanding at and through distance.350
348 Ricoeur, “Hermeneutics and the Critique of Ideology” in Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences, 94. “[T]he concept of ‘appropriation’… demands an internal critique. For the metamorphosis of the ego… implies a moment of distanciation in the relation of self to itself; hence understanding is as much disappropriation as appropriation. A critique of the illusions of the subject… therefore can and must be incorporated into self-understanding. The consequence for hermeneutics is important: we can no longer oppose hermeneutics and the critique of ideology. The critique of ideology is the necessary detour which self-understanding must take, if the latter is to be formed by the matter of the text and not by the prejudices of the reader.” Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation” in Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences, 144. 349 Ibid., 95. 350 Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation”, in Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences, 143.
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This makes the possibility of integrating appropriation into the theory of interpretation
without introducing again the primacy of subjectivity.351 Ricoeur ascertain this as he
says:
That appropriation does not imply the secret return of the sovereign subject can be attested to in the following way: if it remains true that hermeneutics terminates in self-understanding, then the subjectivism of this proposition must be rectified by saying that to understand oneself is to understand oneself in front of the text. Consequently, what is appropriation from one point of view is disappropriation from another. To appropriate is to make what was alien become one’s own. What is appropriated is indeed the matter of the text. But the matter of the text becomes my own only if I disappropriate myself, in order to let the matter of the text be. So I exchange the me, master of itself, for the self, disciple of the text.352
Thus we must place at the very heart of self-understanding that dialectic of objectification
and understanding which we first perceived at the level of the text, its structures, its sense
and its reference. At all these levels of analysis, distanciation is the condition of
understanding.
Appropriation: A New Concept of Interpretation
In reading a text, the ultimate aim remains the understanding of what the text
means to the reader. To understand the meaning of the text means to interpret the text.
And, by interpretation, Ricoeur means “the concrete outcome of conjunction and
renewal.”353 Conjunction and renewal are necessary characteristics of reading for the
reason that to read is “to conjoin a new discourse to the discourse of the text.
[Furthermore,] this conjunction of discourses reveals… an original capacity for renewal
351 Ricoeur, “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 113.
352 Ibid. See also, Ricoeur, “Intellectual Autobiography”, 35. 353 Ricoeur, “What is a Text? Explanation and Understanding” in Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences, 158.
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which is its open character.”354 Thus Ricoeur asserts that “an interpretation is not
authentic unless it culminates in some form of appropriation (Aneignung), if by that term
we understand the process by which one makes one’s own (eigen) what was initially
other or alien (fremd).”355 As what he further expounds:
By ‘appropriation’, I understand this: that the interpretation of a text culminates in the self-interpretation of a subject who thenceforth understands himself better, understands himself differently, or simply begins to understand himself. This culmination of the understanding of a text in self-understanding is characteristic of the kind of reflective philosophy which… I have called ‘concrete reflection’.356
This disputation, Ricoeur notes, leads to the three misconception regarding
appropriation. Initially, appropriation is usually understood as a circle between two
subjectivities - that of the reader and the author - and as the projection of the subjectivity
of the reader into the reading itself. It first appears as if appropriation is a return to the
Romanticist claim to a “congenial” coincidence with the “genius” of the author. Ricoeur
declares that this is not true. He stresses that what is to be understood and subsequently
appropriated is not the intention of the author or the historical situation common to the
reader and his original readers; not even their understanding of themselves as historical
and cultural phenomena. Instead, what has to be appropriated is “the meaning of the text
354 Ibid. 355 Ricoeur, “Metaphor and the Central Problem of Hermeneutics” in Hermeneutics and the
Human Sciences, 178. See also, Ricoeur, “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics”, Hermeneutics and the
Human Sciences, 113; Ricoeur, “What is a Text? Explanation and Understanding”, Hermeneutics and the
Human Sciences, 159; “Appropriation”, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 185. 356 Ricoeur, “What is a Text? Explanation and Understanding” in Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences, 158.
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itself, conceived in a dynamic way as the direction of thought opened up by the text.”357
In other words,
[w]hat we make our own, what we appropriate for ourselves, is not an alien experience or a distant intention, but the horizon of a world towards which a work directs itself. The appropriation of the reference is no longer modeled on the fusion of consciousness, on empathy or sympathy. The emergence of the sense and the reference of a text in language is the coming to language of a world and not the recognition of another person…. [Furthermore,] if appropriation is the counterpart of disclosure, then the role of subjectivity must not be described in terms of projection. I should prefer to say that the reader understands himself in front of the text, in front of the world of the work. To understand oneself in front of a text is quite the contrary of projecting oneself and one’s own beliefs and prejudices; it is to let the work and its world enlarge the horizon of the understanding which I have myself.358
The second misconception about appropriation is the belief that the hermeneutical
task would be ruled by the understanding of the original addressee of the text. Ricoeur
says that this is a complete misconception. He explains that
[o]nly the dialogue has a “thou” whose identification precedes discourse. The meaning of a text is open to anyone who can read. The omnitemporality of the meaning is what opens it to unknown readers. Hence the historicity of reading is the counterpart of this specific omnitemporality; since the text has escaped its author and his situation, it has also escaped its original addressee. Henceforth it may provide itself with new readers.359
Lastly, Critics surmise that the appropriation of the meaning of a text by an actual reader
would place the interpretation under the empire of the finite capacities of understanding
of this reader. Ricoeur answers that this objection had often been raised against all brands
of “existential” hermeneutics. He notes that the cause of this mistrust is the English (and
357 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 92.
358 Ricoeur, “Metaphor and the Central Problem of Hermeneutics” in Hermeneutics and
the Human Sciences, 178. 359 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 93.
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French) translation of Aneignung by appropriation which supposes that the meaning of
the text is put under the power of the subject who interprets it. Ricoeur, however, is
optimistic that
this objection may be removed if we keep in mind that what is “made one’s own” is not something mental, not the intention of another subject, presumably hidden behind the text, but the project of a world, the pro-position of a mode of being in the world that the text opens up in front of itself by means of its non-ostensive references. [In this way,] interpretation [becomes] the process by which disclosure of new modes of being … gives to the subject a new capacity for knowing himself. If the reference of the text is the project of a world, then it is not the reader who primarily projects himself. The reader rather is enlarged in his capacity of self-projection by receiving a new mode of being from the text itself.360
Appropriation, Ricoeur argues, “implies a moment of dispossession of the egoistic and
narcissistic ego. This process of dispossessing is the work of the kind of universality and
atemporality emphasized in explanatory procedures. … Only the interpretation that
complies with the injunction of the text… initiates a new self-understanding.”361
Furthermore, by appropriation, Ricoeur understands this to be the “interpretation of a text
[that] culminates in the self-interpretation of a subject who thenceforth understands
himself better, understands himself differently, or simply begins to understand
himself.”362
Quoting Ricoeur, Van den Hengel shares that appropriation is “the… making-
one’s-own, of the ground of one’s existence, the home of the subject. Appropriation is the
becoming of the self. Since appropriation is by way of the text and in no sense a direct,
unmediated work, the task of appropriation pertains to the hermeneutical exercise or the
360 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 93 – 94. 361 Ibid., 94. 362 Ricoeur, “What is a Text?” in Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 158.
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work of interpretation. There is no appropriation without interpretation. In fact,
appropriation is interpretation.”363 The moment of appropriation marks the appearance of
the subjectivity of the reader. Thompson agrees with Van den Hengel’s observation that
appropriation marks the appearance of the subjectivity of the reader as he clarifies that
[t]he act of appropriation does not seek to rejoin the original intentions of the author, but rather to expand the conscious horizons of the reader by actualizing the meaning of the text. Although interpretation thus culminates in self-understanding, it cannot be equated with naïve subjectivism. Ricoeur emphasizes that appropriation is not so much an act of possession as an act of dispossession, in which the awareness of immediate ego is replaced by a self-understanding mediated through the text. Thus interpretation gives rise to reflection because appropriation is bound to the revelatory power of the text, to its power to disclose a possible world.364
Even then, following the Husserlian phenomenology, Ricoeur does not consider
subjectivity as correlate of objectivity, that is, a subjectivity that constitutes objectivity.
He, however, takes subjectivity as grounded on the ontological participation of being-in-
the-world. The subject can provide an epistemological justification and operate
methodologically, only because of its primordial grounding in participation.
363 Van den Hengel, 194. 364 John B. Thompson, “Editor’s Introduction” in Ricoeur, Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences, 18 – 19. Thompson further explains that “the culmination of interpretation in an act of appropriation indicates that ontology forms the ultimate horizon of hermeneutics. In endorsing the quest for ontology, Ricoeur reveals his distance from most Anglo-Saxon philosophies of language, as well as his proximity to the work of Heidegger and Gadamer. Like the latter authors, Ricoeur considers hermeneutics to be concerned with the understanding of being and the relations between beings. Nevertheless, Ricoeur wishes to “resist the temptation to separate truth, characteristic of understanding, from the method put into operation by disciplines which have sprung from exegesis”. (See, Ricoeur, “Existence and Hermeneutics”, in The Conflict of Interpretations, 11.) To dissociate method and truth, in the manner proposed by Gadamer, is to disregard the conflict of interpretations within which we perceive the being we seek to understand. It may well follow that the ontology attainable in Ricoeur’s account will remain a fragmented and incomplete formulation of being; but this intrinsic fragmentation of the hermeneutical horizon is no basis for renunciation or despair. For it merely attests to the condition of a philosophy which has acknowledged its fundamental attitude.”
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Ricoeur anchors the subject’s primordial grounding in participation to the
ontological dimension of language. “The concept of participation breaks with any vision
of a self-constituting subjectivity. Participation implies that it is not the subject who is
the source of the unity of meaning, but something that precedes the subject.”365
Subjectivity is derived from participation. Van den Hengel explains that
before we speak, before we structure through language, before language is the product of a subjectivity, I am the being through whom existence, Being, comes to language. To say it in Ricoeur’s words, “The sense of human experience is made through us but not by us. We do not dominate the meaning, but meaning makes us at the same time that we make it...” We apperceive it in situations in which I find myself without consciously having chosen them. There are very deep experiences of human finitude. They are experiences of being affected by things at whose source I do not stand.366
This assures that appropriation is never equivalent to the idea of an imperial subject. This
assurance, furthermore, is anchored on his insistence that appropriation is dialectically
linked to the objective characteristic of the text. He avers that appropriation is
mediated by all the structural objectifications of the text; insofar as appropriation does not respond to the author, it responds to the sense. Perhaps it is at this level that the mediation effected by the text can be best understood. In contrast to the tradition of the cogito and to the pretension of the subject to know itself by immediate intuition, it must be said that we understand ourselves only by the long detour of the signs of humanity deposited in cultural works…. Thus what seems most contrary to subjectivity, and what structural analysis discloses as the texture of the text, is the very medium within which we can understand ourselves.367
365 Van den Hengel, 107.
366 Ibid.
367 Ricoeur, “The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation” in Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences, 143.
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Ricoeur’s idea of understanding as self-understanding is not the same as the idea
of a self-conscious subject. The meaning of the consciousness is not derived from the
ego. It is derived from something outside itself. As Ricoeur explains,
what I appropriate is a proposed world. The latter is not behind the text, as a hidden intention would be, but in front of it, as that which the work unfolds, discovers, reveals. Henceforth, to understand is to understand
oneself in front of the text. It is not a question of imposing upon the text our finite capacity of understanding, but of exposing ourselves to the text and receiving from it enlarged self, which would be the proposed existence corresponding in the most suitable way to the world proposed.368
Thus, understanding attests to the fact that the subject belongs to being. The
understanding of a text leads to the problem of appropriation of the text which is its
application to the present situation of the reader.
For Ricoeur, the appropriation of the subject, which is the completion of
interpretation, is accomplished through the act of reading. Van den Hengel comments,
reiterating what Ricoeur explains, that “interpretation is complete when the objectivity
and the autonomy of the text are transformed once again into an event of discourse for a
reader. The accomplishment of reading is its power to transform the otherness of the text
into an event of discourse for [the subject]. The event of discourse of the reader is a new
event; that is, not a repetition of the original event, but a creation produced at the behest
of the text.”369 The result of appropriation is the drifting away of the text from its original
addressees. In other words, the constitution of the self of the reader is not
368 Ibid., “The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation” 143. 369 Van den Hengel, 201.
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contemporaneous with that of the original addressees but with the constitution of
meaning that the text projects.370
Even though the ultimate aim of all hermeneutics is to render one’s own what was
previously considered as alien, appropriation must not lose its existential force. This is to
be so because the aim of interpretation is to actualize the meaning of the text for the
present reader.371 Ricoeur confers that
[a]ppropriation remains the concept for the actualization of the meaning as addressed to somebody. Potentially a text is addressed to anyone who can read. Actually it is addressed to me, hic et nunc. Interpretation is completed as appropriation when reading yields something like an event, an event of discourse, which is an event in the present moment. As appropriation, interpretation becomes an event.372
Even then, it has to be remembered however, that there are two additional features
underlining appropriation as interpretation. They are: (1) to struggle against
cultural distance, and (2) to underline the ‘present’ character of interpretation
which is the fusing of textual interpretation with self-interpretation. Ricoeur
understands the former as a struggle against the estrangement from meaning as
established by “the system of values upon which the text is based.”373 This
feature of appropriation aptly describes the characteristic of interpretation as
owning what was formerly foreign.
370 Ricoeur, “What is a Text? Explanation and Understanding” in Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences, 159. 371 Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory, 91 – 92. 372 Ibid., 92. 373 Ricoeur, “What is a Text? Explanation and Understanding” in Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences, 159.
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Ricoeur, on the other hand, liken the latter as “the execution of a musical score; it
marks the realization, the enactment, of the semantic possibilities of the text.”374 Ricoeur
considers this as the most important feature of appropriation. He considers it important
because it “fulfills the discourse of the text [as it] finds a surrounding and an audience.
[Consequently,] it resumes the referential movement – intercepted and suspended –
towards a world and towards subjects.”375 The world and the subject that Ricoeur is
referring to here are that of the reader and the reader himself, respectively.
Ultimately, appropriation as an interpretation though commences from reading, it
culminates in a concrete act like that of speech in relation to discourse as its event and
instance. Appropriation starts from looking at the text as having a sense only. It only
looks at its structure. At the moment, it has already a meaning realized in the discourse of
the reading of the subject. The act of appropriating the meaning of the text implies that an
insurmountable responsibility is placed upon the subject as it might “constitute the
primary category of a theory of understanding.”376 Ricoeur assures all over time that
appropriation does not imply the surreptitious return of the sovereign subject. As he
asserts, “[appropriation] does not purport, as in Romantic hermeneutics, to rejoin the
original subjectivity that would support the meaning of the text. Rather it responds to the
matter of the text, and hence to the proposals of meaning the text unfolds.”377
Furthermore, appropriation loses its arbitrariness insofar as it is the recovery of that
374 Ibid. 375 Ibid. 376 Ricoeur, “Intellectual Autobiography”, 35. 377 Ricoeur, “Phenomenology and Hermeneutics” in From Text to Action, 37.
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which is at work, in labor, within the text. What the interpreter says is a re-saying which
activates what is said by the text.378
Appropriating the meaning of the text to one’s self-understanding must not be
understood as the culminating point of reading. Reading should end with acting inasmuch
as reading effects thought. As Ricoeur remarkably points out in his intellectual
autobiography, Mounier convinces him that “a flexible connection between… thought
and action, without separating them or mixing them together”379 must be always be
effected. This conviction leads him later in life to elaborate the answers for the two
remaining points of his later three problematics. The three problematics, Ricoeur says,
are grouped together as “that of the text…, that of action…, and that of history.”380
378 Ricoeur, “What is a Text? Explanation and Understanding” in Hermeneutics and the Human
Sciences,164. 379 Ricoeur, “Intellectual Autobiography”, 9. 380 Ibid., 32.
CHAPTER FOUR
FAMILY ORIENTATION AS A DETOUR FOR THE
CLARIFICATION OF THE FILIPINO IDENTITY: APPLYING
PAUL RICOEUR’S HERMENEUTICS OF APPROPRIATION
The entire project revolves around the project of clarifying through reflective
analysis the fact of the subject’s own existence: a heightened self-understanding. This
reflective analysis, however, is not direct. It follows a long detour. The detour that
Ricoeur follows to understand the self passes through several agencies: “the unconscious
(the semantics of desire); intuition through critical interpretation (hermeneutics of
suspicion); reason through language (linguistics); and reflection through imagination
(poetics).”381
In doing so, Ricoeur employs Nabert’s philosophy of reflection that is neither
direct nor immediate. Reflection is indirect for the reason that only through the
documents of life is existence revealed. Moreover, the observation that the consciousness
of the self is prone to being false that it needs a corrective critique that will lead from
misunderstanding to understanding. Reflective philosophy aims to appreciate in praxis
an originary dynamism that grounds human existence. To recapture the subject through
the expressions of life that objectify it is the goal of reflection. However, the textual
exegesis of consciousness collides with the initial ‘misinterpretation’ of false
consciousness. Thus, hermeneutics is there to rectify what was first a misinterpretation
and makes possible the re-appropriation or recovery of the subject.
In connection with this, the researcher applies Ricoeur’s approach to the problem
of subjectivity to the clarification of the Filipino identity. A parallelism between
381 Richard Kearney, “Introduction” in Richard Kearney, ed., Paul Ricoeur: The Hermeneutics of
Action (London: Sage Publications, 1996), 1.
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Ricoeur’s project and that of the researcher’s is being considered. The parallelism lies in
the idea that the researcher’s quest for the Filipino identity is basically a quest for the
Filipino self. And such quest is like that of Ricoeur’s search for the meaning of self in the
self-understanding and self-reflection.
Consequently, the entire chapter is divided in accordance to its affinity to the
project of Ricoeur. Initially, the importance of the quest for the Filipino identity is
explained in the same way that Ricoeur explains his quest to understand the subject.
Furthermore, Ricoeur endeavors to explain the fact of the subject’s existence not
intuitively but by way of its several mediations: symbolic and textual. The researcher, on
the other hand, sets the clarification of the Filipino identity by way of a detour, i.e.,
through a Filipino value.
Making all of the Filipino values as the detour, however, will be too much a
scope of the study. Thus, a narrowing down to a singular value has been done. The choice
of family orientation as a focal value to be studied is not arbitrary. It is based on what
authorities on Filipino values deem to be the most important value. And, they are
unanimous in selecting family orientation as the most important value.
To explain the intricacy of the chosen value, the researcher embarks to situate it in
the context of the cultural systems of the Philippines. By situating it, an understanding as
to how the Filipino generally feels about his value system in general and that of family
orientation in particular will be realized. Moreover, tracing the historical development of
his value system explains his feelings towards it. This constitutes the phenomenological
part of the study.
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The hermeneutic part commences with the investigation of the apparent conflict
between family orientation and nation building. The nature of the family is explained as
to why is it seen as antagonistic to nation-building. To highlight the antagonism, the
effect of family orientation to some of the social institutions is described. As a result,
situations were family orientation indeed interfere into the functions of the sample
institutions are pointed out.
The hermeneutics of suspicion reveals the falsehoods and illusions that the
Filipino attaches to the value of the family. Thus, family orientation as a core value is
stripped of all its pretenses. A genuine effort to make family orientation become helpful
to nation-building is only generated after a critical awareness of the discontinuities and
estrangements of the said value. The hermeneutics of appropriation works well in the re-
understanding of family orientation as a core value to make it consistent with the genuine
effort to build the nation.
The Quest for the Filipino Identity
Basically, the question is: What does it mean to be a Filipino? Lapeña opines that
by Filipino, one usually means a person who belongs to a race or culture. Nevertheless,
he further says that the Filipino race contains Malay, Polynesian, Indonesian and other
“basic stock” interwoven with Indian, Chinese, Spanish and more recent American and
Japanese strains and influences. Thus, the percentages of blood and thinking that qualify
one to be a Filipino is a problem.382 As Andres also comments, he narrates: “Ask any
382 Jose Florencio Fabella Lapeña, Jr., “Halo-halo Reflections: The Filipino Identity and Interdependence, Our Children and Our Common Future.” Philippine Journal of Education, 69 (March 1991), p. 438b. Cf. Tomas D. Andres, Understanding Filipino Values: A Management Approach (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1981), 4 – 8. See also, Camilo Osias, “The Philippines, A Cultural Laboratory” in The Filipino Way of Life: The Pluralized Philosophy (Boston: Ginn and Company, 1940), 41 – 45.
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Filipino to define a Filipino, and he will be perplexed, confused, stupefied, and
puzzled.”383 These reactions result from the varied answers that a Filipino can generate in
answering the said question. Consequently, looking for what exactly is the meaning of
being a Filipino is likewise very problematic.
Foronda, however, lodges a criticism on the Filipino’s incessant pursuit in
identifying his identity. The criticism is based on the belief that this quest is said to be not
a national concern, i.e., it is only the concern of the Filipino elite. Babor quotes Foronda
saying:
To be sure, the study of Filipino identity has been the pre-occupation of the scholar and the intellectual and not, as expected, of the poor, the unlettered, or the dispossessed. For his part, the poor had the more pressing pre-occupation of keeping body and soul together, his dire poverty, and therefore, his struggle to live is more intense the way, than that of the effete intellectual given to theorizing.384
Corpuz affirms Foronda as the former opines that the common tao knows that he is a
Filipino. The trouble though is that he does not know why he is a Filipino.385
Nevertheless, even if the pursuit for the Filipino identity is indeed only the
concern of the elite, it is still relevant inasmuch as the Filipino elite affect literally the
development and progress of the entire country for they “have or may have the power to
influence the thinking of the citizenry, drive electric charges into the body politic or civil
society to wake us up, alter the power configuration of the nation, in some instances,
383 Tomas D. Andres, Understanding Filipino Values: A Management Approach, 3. 384 Eddie R. Babor, “Heidegger’s Concept of ‘Authentic Existence’ in Being and Time and Its Applicability to Filipinos” (Unpublished Dissertation: University of San Carlos, Cebu City, 2004), 188. Cf. Marcelino Foronda, Jr. “The Filipino and His Society in Philippine History: Some Personal Reflections” in Filipino Thought on Man and Society, ed. by Leonardo Mercado (Tacloban City: Divine Word University Publications, 1980), 2. 385 Lapeña, p. 438b.
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singly or in combination, be able to seize power at the top,”386 quips Benigno. Thus, if
they just understand truly the Filipino identity, they will have a positive impact on the
development of their country if the elite embark on a truly decisive and positive
transformation and realignment of the requisite values for integrative national
development.
Most Filipinos perhaps believe that the Filipinos are already reckoned to fail
because of the misplaced practice of their values. But Osias is very empathic in saying
that “we must not fail; we cannot afford to fail. We must succeed; we must will to
succeed. It is therefore incumbent upon us to formulate a philosophy and adopt a way of
life that serves as a guide to the citizen and the nation – a philosophy that gives cohesion
to individual and collective endeavor and makes life purposive and meaningful.”387
In any way, the problem might not be much with who or what a Filipino is. The
question might rather be: Why should the Filipino identity be known? The conviction
that the Filipino’s confusion regarding his identity contributes to the stagnation of the
Philippines as a country, thus, his actions being unsynchronized and the desired national
development seems to be very farfetched, makes for the thoughtful consideration of the
Filipino identity a constant clamor.
The assumption of this contention is that the moment the Filipino understands
who he is; he can extend such knowledge to the societal level and eventually create a
magical wave of true national Filipino identity. Consequently, the development of a true
386 Teodoro C. Benigno, “The Philippines’ Elites,” in Here’s the Score, The Philippine Star (July 20, 2001). Based on his opinion as to the meaning of elite, Benigno enumerates six types of them in the Philippines: the Filipino Politicians, the Filipino businessmen, the clergy, the military, the media, and the left. 387 Osias, “The Philippines, A Cultural Laboratory” in The Filipino Way of Life: The Pluralized
Philosophy, x.
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sense of nationalism begins. With the individual Filipino becoming nationalistic, he
becomes concerned with the true Filipino interest and not just the vested interest of his
immediate kin. De Quiros affirms this belief as he points out the significance of identity
saying:
[W]hat's the big deal about identity? Well, look at countries like Thailand, Singapore and Malaysia, and look at us. With nations as with individuals, you have no sense of self, you will never know, and do, what you want. You will only know, and follow, what others tell you to.388
The importance of knowing one’s self depends on the ability of the person to appropriate
his decision upon his own. Consequently, not knowing one’s self may lead to blindly
following what other people tell him, supposing that since it works with other people it
will also work with him even if his situation is different from that of others. So, it does
not necessarily follow that what works with others will also work with him.
Another, yet, compelling reason on why should the true Filipino identity be
known is that it serves as “a rallying point for unity, self-discipline, and love and pride in
one’s country.”389 Arguably, knowing the Filipino identity helps the Filipino find a sense
of meaning, thereby, understands his reason for being. Bulatao asserts that the moment
the Filipino found himself, he “discover[s] new springs of energy and interest within
himself and begins to move wholeheartedly as one coordinated whole along a path of his
own choice. He has discovered that he can do things. He acquires a personal sense of
worth. He walks with self-confidence so that instead of pushing away responsibility or
fleeting others out of a sense of inferiority is open to others, can trust, can cooperate, can
388 Conrado de Quiros, “A Question of Identity” [article online]; available from http://www.inq7.net/ opi/2002/mar/20/opi_csdequiros-1.htm; accessed September 3, 2003. 389 Emmanuel Mangubat, “Basic Considerations for Attaining a Truly Filipino National Identity”, Philippine Journal of Education, 60 (December 1981), p. 297a.
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be a full-fledged member of a community.”390 Consequently, this gives the Filipino a
unified sense of direction.
Roco shares the same sentiment for he envisions Filipino leaders who are open to
the global environment yet rooted in their national identity.391 Rootedness to one’s nation
ascertains that the shapers of the nation’s destiny will truly uphold the interests of the
Filipino people and not make them easily succumb to the wish and caprice of any outside
interests nor that of their immediate family only.
Momentarily, since the Filipino does not yet find his locus of control, he has also
not ascertained yet the direction of his endeavors. Inasmuch as the present Filipino is
formed by his diverse influences, both eastern and western with their opposing
tendencies, he becomes confused. Seeing the best and the worst of both worlds is
supposedly advantageous to the Filipino. But his ignorance about his reason for being
makes him incapable of threshing out the good influences from the bad influences, thus,
unable to generate a synthesis that can promote a life for all, something that can drive his
nation to the desired stability. Mendoza cites the case of Japan’s capacity to reconcile
east and west as worth emulating. Although Japan adapts to western values, inasmuch as
western values are purported to be the current key to social progress, it has not
diminished its value system. Western values are adopted only by virtue of their basic
importance and on their instrumental role and at the same time only through their
390 Jaime C. Bulatao, S.J., “Self-Discovery in the Filipino” in Phenomena and Their
Interpretation: Landmark Essays 1957 – 1989 (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1992), 252a. 391 Raul Roco, “Making People Strong: The DepEd under Sec. Raul S. Roco” [article online]; available from http://www.raulroco.com/news_releases/ newsreleases.htm; accessed September 6, 2003.
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capacity to be grafted to the local context.392 This success is anchored on Japan’s
understanding of its reason for being.
The question, however, about the Filipino identity is ambivalent. The
ambivalence lies on the belief that an intuitive grasping of the real Filipino identity is
indiscernible. This moves the researcher to propose a detour in the same way that
Ricoeur does. Since the Filipino identity is reckoned to be embedded in the values that
the Filipino holds dear, the researcher embarks to follow this route.
Michael Tan concurs that though there are people calling for a return to values as
the solution to all of the problems that beset the Filipinos, they need to first do a thorough
introspection and ask themselves: what values? And whose values?393 He adds by saying
that
I am not about to romanticize Filipino culture, praising all that is local as good and pure. Our faults are many and we should be mature enough to talk about them and laugh at ourselves, even as we recognize that we would be so much duller if we didn't have those faults.394
He accentuates the importance of soul-searching and the unraveling of the Filipino
psyche all the more that it is fairly a young nation. Looking into the Filipino soul is
needed in the Filipinos’ search for their identity.395
392 Magdalena L. Mendoza, “The Crisis of Management Culture in the Philippines: Neither East Asian nor Western” (A paper presented at the 3rd EUROSEAS Conference in London, United Kingdom and the 4th European Philippine Studies Conference in Alcoba, Spain on September 2001), 2 & 4. [on-line text is accessed on May 30, 2006 at] http://www.dap.edu.ph/downloads/crisis.pdf. 393 Michael L. Tan, “Looking for the Filipinos Soul” [article online]; available from http://www. pinoykasi.homestead.com/files/first_article.htm; accessed September 3, 2003. 394 Ibid. 395 Ibid.
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Tomas Andres avers that since the core of human reality is the self, the
superficiality of the Filipino’s action and the meaninglessness of every moment are
eliminated when the Filipino self is discovered. This makes self-discovery as the basic
premise of every meaningful human activity.396 He persuades the reader “to evaluate
alternatives and select the one that is right for him so that he can clarify his values, realize
his goals, gain self-confidence and form meaningful relationships with others”; the reader
is “encouraged to set up his own benchmarks against which to measure his own personal
search for meaning.”397
The researcher finds this exhortation relevant to the Filipinos in general. He likes
to extend this idea to the search for the true Filipino identity, for through it the Filipinos
are encouraged to set up their own benchmarks against which to measure their communal
search for meaning.
The Filipino Values in General
A detour in the clarification of the Filipino identity has to be set in place. A way
to know a nation’s identity is by its values.398 This hopes to give rise to economic
development that the Filipino longs for his country and a better life for all of them. This
hope reflects Bago’s stylized framework for development in the Philippines which is
founded on cultural values.399 Based on her framework, the present situation of the
country is a result of the Filipino’s cultural values that serve as the foundation of the
396 Andres, Understanding Values (Quezon city: New Day Publishers, 1980), p. viii. 397 Ibid. 398 Alejandro R. Roces, “A Nation Is Known By Its Values” in Lourdes R. Quisumbing and Felice P. Sta. Maria, Peace and Tolerance: Values Education Through History, pp. 122-124. 399 Adelaida L. Bago, Curriculum Development: The Philippine Experience (Manila: De La Salle University Press, Inc., 2001), 9.
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nation because “they have far greater influence and impact on the way of life of the
people.”400 Her idea corroborates the insight of Ramirez that the values of the people are
reflected on the workings of institutions. This follows from the fact that the workings of
institutions are externalizations of the culture of which the deepest layer are values. 401
This idea has to be embedded as one of the goals of Philippine education, which is
one of the social institutions. Bago argues that one of the goals of Philippine education
should be
to develop desirable values, beliefs, behaviors, and competencies needed by human beings to live in peace and harmony with the rest of creation. The knowledge, attitudes, skills, and other desirable outcomes of learning enable individuals to deal competently with the demands of the changing democratic multi-ethnic environment even as they are to grow in wisdom and faith.402
She believes that the integrative development of the nation can be made possible through
education. This makes the revival of values education in the curriculum very timely for it
can be the most potent vehicle for personal and national development. This means that
the set of desirable values injected to the people will serve as a catalyst for the desired
development that is sustainable, equitable, spiritually uplifting, and socially integrating.
Thus, the time has now come to re-think the different values of the Filipino that
he becomes equipped with “the skills and knowledge, as well as the right values and
attitudes to assure the livelihood of the individual and the country’s survival and
400 Ibid., 8.
401 Mina M. Ramirez, “Toward a Revolution of Mindsets: A Critique of the Present Socio-Cultural System” in Reflections on Culture, Occasional Monograph 2 (Manila: Asian Social Institute, 1991): 3. 402 Bago, p. 9.
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success.”403 Through equipping the people with the aforementioned skills, knowledge,
values and attitudes, they are hoped to learn self-reliance yet are able to work closely
with others. They are expected to become highly competitive individuals yet with a
strong social conscience. They are estimated to become flexible in mind and outlook to
adapt constantly to a rapidly changing world. Ultimately, they must have firm moral
bearings to give them strength in a world of shifting values.
In line with this, Bago notes that this has been the main thrust of the values
education curriculum which is “a response to a general feeling on the need for social
transformation after the February 1986 People Power Revolution.”404 This thrust is
spelled out even more in the goal of the Values Education Program: “to provide and
promote values education at all three levels of the educational system for the
development of the human person committed to the building of a just and humane society
and an independent and democratic nation.”405
Educators likewise hope that this goal produces Filipinos who are: “1. self-
actualized, integrally developed and imbued with a sense of dignity; 2. have a sense of
responsibility for their community and environment; 3. productive and can contribute to
the economic security and development of the family and the nation; 4. have a deep sense
of nationalism and are committed to the progress of the nation; 5. committed to the
403 “The Basis for Survival and Success” [article on-line]; available from http://www.moe.gov.sg/ corporate/mission_statement.htm; accessed May 12, 2004. 404 Bago, 132. 405 Ibid.
137
progress of the world community and to global solidarity; and, 6. manifest in actual life
an abiding faith in God as reflection of his spiritual being.”406
Furthermore, DECS, which is now DepEd, envisions values education to pursue
at all levels, i.e., national, regional, local, and institutional, the following principles and
guidelines: “1. Orientation toward the total person; 2. Consideration of the unique role of
the family in the personal development and integration of individuals in society and
nation; 3. Importance of teachers who a re aware of their inner worth and have the proper
sense of values as well as respect for others.”407
To understand the Filipino values in general, there are several frameworks to
look upon the different values of the Filipino. To name a few, there is the widely
disseminated The DECS Values Education Framework of Minda C. Sutaria, et al.408, the
Filipino Value System framework of Serafin Talisayon409 and the Philippine-Value
System framework of Tomas Andres410. Quisumbing and Sta. Maria likewise study the
Filipino value system whether it is compatible with the UNESCO project for peace and
tolerance.
406 Ibid., 134. 407 Ibid. 408 Minda C. Sutaria, Juanita S. Guerrero and Paulina M. Castaño, eds., “The DECS Values Education Framework” in Philippine Education: Visions and Perspectives (Manila: National Book Store, Inc., 1989), 117 as cited in Bago, 133.
409 Serafin D. Talisayon, “Values In Our Quest for Freedom (1896 – 1898) and Their Application for Future Development” in Lourdes R. Quisumbing and Felice P. Sta. Maria, Peace and Tolerance: Values
Education Through History (Manila: UNESCO National Commission of the Philippines, 1996), 105 & 119. This is a result of Talisayon’s compilation and review of almost a hundred academic, journalist and opinion articles about Filipino values, orientations or attitudes, and idiosyncrasies. He was able to discern commonalities and consensus among various authors, and reduce them into a set of identifiable value clusters with some internal consistency or coherence.
410 Tomas D. Andres, Understanding Filipino Values: A Management Approach, 27. This framework is Andres’ synthesis of the studies conducted by Lynch, Bulatao, Gorospe, Hollnsteiner, Landa Jocano, Mercado, and Quisumbing
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The framework of Sutaria looks into the human person in relation to its self and
community. As self, the human person is divided into four dimensions: physical,
intellectual, moral, and spiritual. The four dimensions in turn aim to develop respectively
the values of health, truth, love, and spirituality. In community, the human person is seen
socially, economically, and politically. Socially, he is taken in terms of its family and
society. Socially, the person is expected to develop the value of social responsibility.
Economically, he is to develop economic efficiency. Politically, he has to develop the
values of nationalism and global solidarity. The values developed are expected to
improve the human dignity of the human person.
Talisayon, on his part, intimates that the core or central clusters of the Filipino
value system revolve around seven values: (1) family/kinship orientation; (2)
makatao/kapwa tao (personalism); (3) “loob complex” (religious/psychic orientation); (4)
social acceptance; (5) pakikiramdam; (6) pakikisama (group centeredness); and (7)
economic security. 411
Lastly, the framework of Andres analyzes the Philippine value system into three
aspects: first, in terms of its aims, goals, and aspirations; second, in terms of belief,
convictions and attitudes; lastly, in terms of principles and norms. He deduces that the
aims, goals and aspirations of the Filipino are social acceptance, economic security and
social mobility. In terms of belief, convictions and attitudes, the Filipino has a
personalistic and a supernaturalistic world-view. He is non-scientific and non-relational.
In terms of his perception of reality, he is non-dualistic, harmonizing, interpersonal,
concrete, poetic, artistic, and intuitive. On matters of principles and norms, structurally,
411 Talisayon, 105.
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he is segmented. There is too much affinity to the family and kin. Age-grading is over-
emphasized. People are divided according to social class, power, region, language, and
even religion. Operationally, emphasis on equivalence, solidarity, reciprocity,
compassion, and non-interference is overdone.
Ultimately, Quisumbing and Sta. Maria, on their part, study intensively the values
of the Filipino and come up with this position:
education for peace, human rights, and democracy, for international understanding and tolerance is essentially a matter of changing values, attitudes, and behavior. Hence the need and importance of values education for our citizenry, especially the youth – at home, in the school, and in the total learning environment of the society – should be our absolute priority if we want our children to live and develop in a genuine of peace and tolerance where people learn to live together in harmony, and where citizens of a nation and of the global community can work together in solidarity and in peace.412
Licuanan affirms the position of Quisumbing and Sta. Maria as she sees a need to pay
attention to the dream of peace because “we face the twenty-first century and the new
millennium with raised hopes of economic development for our country and a better life
for our people.”413 In fact, she adds, “we need to foster a culture of peace, peace that
upholds … economic and social justice, human rights and fundamental freedoms, and
sustainable development.414
In connection with this, the UNESCO has identified tolerance as a tool for
peacekeeping.415 The following are the synonyms of tolerance in Filipino: pagpaparaya,
412 Ibid., xi. 413 Patricia B. Licuanan, “Preface” in Lourdes R. Quisumbing and Felice P. Sta. Maria, Peace and
Tolerance: Values Education Through History, vii. 414 Ibid. 415 Sta. Maria, “Filipino Attitudes Towards Tolerance” in Lourdes R. Quisumbing and Felice P. Sta. Maria, Peace and Tolerance: Values Education Through History, 3.
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pagpapahintulot, pagpapaubaya, pagpapaumanhin, pagpayag, pagtanggap.416
Noticeably, these expressions can be deduced as extensions if not manifestations of one
of the Filipino’s dearest values: SIR (smooth interpersonal relationships) which is closely
related to what Andres says as the aims, goals, and aspirations of every Filipino.
Harmonious social relations are values that are very important to the Filipinos.417 Thus
Mercado says that inasmuch as interpersonalism requires much diplomacy, frankness is
not a cultural value for them418 because, Andres explains, the Filipino wants to avoid
outside signs of conflict.419
Nevertheless, critics see the aforementioned values of the Filipinos as anti-
development. Jocano explains,
Many critics… see Filipino traditional values as something we should not have valued in the first place…. They say that these values have “damaged” our culture, brought about “the ills in our society,” given rise to our “undesirable traits,” brought about “weaknesses in our character” as a people, and have caused the “moral breakdown” of our institutions. Some critics, particularly the foreigners, even see our conformity to traditional norms as “passivity, subservience, and lack of initiative.” The high premium we place on reciprocal obligations is described by them as “scheming,” our concern for consensus as “lack of leadership,” our silence borne out of deference or sensitivity to feelings of others as “concealed dishonesty,” our firmness and discipline as “authoritarianism,” our kinship loyalties as “nepotism,” our gift-giving, as “bribery” and our utang na
loob (debt of gratitude) as “cumbersome system of patronage and major source of corruption.420
416 Ibid. This list of synonyms is provided by the National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA) as assisted by the Commission for the Filipino Language. 417 Ibid., 10. 418 Ibid. Cf. Leonardo Mercado, Elements of Filipino Philosophy (Tacloban City: Divine Word University Publications, 1967), 98. 419 Andres, Understanding Filipino Values: A Management Approach, 17. 420 Jocano, Filipino Value System: A Cultural Definition, 2.
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Andres shares the same sentiment as the most observers and critics alike who believe that
the values of the Filipinos are anti-development but he believes that this attitude is due to
the emphasis of the negative features of the Filipino values. Soler, as cited by Andres,
says that “the principal cause of the present economic conditions may be attributed to the
negativism in the Filipino national personality. This negativism in turn creates a crisis of
national identity and a crisis of national self-confidence.”421
Nevertheless, is there really something wrong with the Filipino values? No, there
is nothing wrong with the Filipino values! “They have to be challenged.”422 It is just a
matter of looking at them in the right perspective. The appropriate application of the said
values to the Filipino’s desired goal will make them good, desirable and positive.
Ramirez charges that “at present, our social institutions are not responding to
people’s life-needs”423 because the people do not fully understand the dynamism of their
value system. Seemingly, the present value system fails them. This observation,
however, has long been answered by Jocano when he told the many critics that they are
wrong. He says that their judgments are not correct and that they have to be challenged
since their judgments of the Filipino values are based upon the values of the colonizers
who earlier wrote about them. There is nothing wrong with the Filipino values, they are
just different. 424 Thus, he emphasizes the “need to free our minds from the biases of the
421 Andres, Positive Filipino Values (Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1999), 7. Cf. Ricardo S. Soler, “A Crisis of National Self-Confidence” in Industrial Philippines (January 1972), 16. 422 Jocano, Filipino Value System: A Cultural Definition, 4. 423 Ramirez, “Toward a Revolution of Mindsets: A Critique of the Present Socio-Cultural System” in Reflections on Culture, 5. 424
Jocano, Filipino Value System: A Cultural Definition, 4.
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old colonial value-models and to build new ones that reflect the best in us. We need to
shift our value paradigms – to recast our mindsets and to redefine our perspectives from
one which sees our traditional values as source of social ills to another which sees them
as sources of inner strength and moral will to survive and excel.”425 Nevertheless, there
is still a pervading confusion that arises among the Filipino people on how to perceive
those values due to the present value system of the Filipinos.
The Philippine Cultural Systems Ramirez observes that the problem that besieged the Philippines today is cultural
by nature. Primarily, by culture she means “the totality of a people’s enduring shared
patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting in response to their life-needs, as made visible
through symbols…. Culture is all pervasive in life. It is imbibed especially through our
primary groups – family, peer, neighborhood and work group. It is projected in
secondary institutions, with the folkways and languages serving as its main vehicles. In
the deepest layer of our culture are our operating values.”426 Accordingly, there are two
cultural systems that operate in the country today that the Filipinos cannot do away with
for they are part of its socio-cultural heritage. They are the popular (traditional) and the
dominant (modern) cultural systems. The former originates in the indigenous roots of the
Filipinos and is relegated to the collective unconscious and lives in their minds and
hearts. The latter, on the other hand, has been imposed by the colonial powers and is
425 Ibid., 5. 426 Ramirez, “The Dominant and Popular Cultural Systems in the Philippines” in Reflections on
Culture, 14.
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explicitly advocated by the modernizing elites of the Philippine society.427
Correspondingly, they also have different sets of operating values.
The traditional value system has pananalig sa diyos, buhay, pakikipagkapwa tao,
hinga, loob, and ginhawa as operating values. On the other hand, the western-imbibed or
modern value-system has Christianity, formal education, free enterprise, and democracy
as the operating values. Nevertheless, although they are different from the standpoint of
the perceiver, they have the same goal or intention, that is, the promotion of life. Thus,
for Ramirez, inasmuch as the two cultural systems that operate in the country today
cannot be done away with for they are part of its socio-cultural heritage, elements of both
value systems operate in every dimension of the Filipino life. Thus, she proposes that “to
have access to life, Filipinos know when to use one or the other value system.”428 This is
for the fact that the failure to realize the dynamics of the dual value system leads to
economic stagnation for its dynamism confused them.
Jocano, as cited by Sta. Maria, has the same observation with Ramirez when he
compares the conflicting foreign-derived and traditional values that simultaneously affect
Filipino behavior. The exogenous model has characteristics of being legal, formal, rigid
(through channels), confrontational, and individual merit. On the other hand, the
indigenous model has characteristics of being customary, non-formal, flexible, non-
confrontational, consensus.429 For that reason, Sta. Maria says, “the two incongruous
systems make simultaneous demands on Filipinos, often forcing the loob into conflict
427 Ibid., 4, 15. 428 Ibid., 22. 429 Sta. Maria, 13.
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situations which satisfy neither value system fully, and jeopardize the local sense of
upright conduct.”430 This is still due to the failure of the people to realize the dynamism
of both models.
Historical Development of the Dual Value System To understand the dynamism of the Filipino value system is to go back to its
historical beginning. Knowing its history makes understanding its vulnerabilities and
constraints instructing. The diachronic and synchronic parameters of Philippine history,
as viewed by Prospero Covar, explain the issue. Diachronically, Philippine history is
divided into three periods, namely: (1) Formative period (0.5 M to 1565; (2) Period of
struggle and national consolidation (1565 – 1898); and (3) Period of cultural solidarity
(1898 -1998 and beyond). Synchronically, the evolution of Philippine society and
culture is viewed using these parameters: (1) allocation of goods and services; (2)
allocation of power and authority; and (3) ideological enculturation.431
The concern, however, on the understanding of the dynamism of dual value
system focuses on the third parameter: the ideological enculturation. According to Covar,
“Ideologically, the Formative Period was concerned with the ginhawa (inner comfort) of
the tao and the well-being of the sakop (ward). The period of Struggle and national
Consolidation was to ‘civilize’ some ‘natives’ as Spanish mesticillos and little brown
Americans who eventually became the illustrados. The promise of working for the
430 Ibid., 14. 431 Prospero R. Covar, “Unburdening Philippine Society of Colonialism” in Lourdes R. Quisumbing and Felice P. Sta. Maria, Peace and Tolerance: Values Education Through History, 169 – 170.
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national interest and general welfare has been the political discourse since the time of the
Propaganda Movement and the first Philippine Republic.”432
Entering the 21st century, “social scientists and communicators,” Covar explains,
“usually ask, ‘What happened to the society and culture during the Formative Period?
Were they wiped out during the Period of Struggle and National Consolidation? Is there
anything left in the indigenous culture and society which we could rally around the
Period of Cultural Solidarity?’”433 Then he adds, “Our answers to these questions shall
help guide us in our quest for values beyond 1998.”434
The answer of Ramirez to the questions is affirmative. Indeed, there are still
things left in the indigenous culture and society that pervade in the Period of cultural
solidarity. The traces of the Formative period pervades in what Ramirez calls as the
suppressed culture that operates vis-à-vis the dominant culture imposed by the colonizers.
It might be thought of that the operating values during the Formative period are
insignificant for they are now relegated to the collective unconscious of the people.
However, Ramirez elucidates that they are not insignificant for they “become[s] the soil
in which any external item from other cultures may be grafted to assume its own unique
growth and evolution. This hidden dimension”, she explains further, “is sometimes more
432 Ibid., 171. 433 Ibid., 174. Jocano shares the same perspective with Covar and Ramirez as to the Filipino’s retaining his old values. Jocano reveals that in the midst of the rapidly changing environment, “the old rural patterns are retrieved and used to handle the pressure of adaptation to the changing environment. This keeps the traditional institutions, values, and sentiments alive. Thus, if one removes the outer trappings of modernity… one discovers that underneath the veneer, the Filipinos are still traditional in their institutional values and community outlook, even if they are in grey flannel suits.” Jocano, Filipino Social
Organization: Traditional Kinship and Family Organization (Manila: Punlad Research House,1998), 3. 434 Ibid.
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powerful than the external elements of a culture [for it] lives in the minds and hearts of
people.”435
During the Period of Struggle and National Consolidation, the operating values of
the people during the Formative Period are forcefully put on the back burner for the
reason that
colonizers imposed religious, social and political systems on the Filipinos. For the Spaniards, colonization was part of their desire to ‘Christianize’ us; for the Americans, it was their plan to establish a politico-economic foothold in Asia, disguised as ‘benevolent assimilation.’ Punitive measures accompanied these impositions. Filipinos who refused to accept the new systems were punished as heretics and insurrectos…. They likewise introduced their values as standards for what is desirable, good, true, and beautiful in society. On the other hand, native customary ways were set aside as “primitive.” Conventional practices were labeled as “barbaric.” Indigenous values were described as “backward” and “corrupt.” Native character was seen as “uncouth” and local beliefs were called “superstitions.” Thus viewed, local knowledge, beliefs, and practices became undesirable. They were said to be “barriers to modernization.” Therefore they had to be changed.436
Meaning, with the use of the whip, the people are forced to adopt the value system of the
colonizers without positively understanding the impact of the modern practices to
modernization. They adopt the practices of the colonizers out of fear. They are not
completely assimilated and grafted to the indigenous practices of the people unlike that of
the Malay, Chinese, Indian, and Arab.
In the words of Alfred McCoy, citing O.D. Corpuz, he clarifies that although
Spain and the United States try to forge a strong bureaucratic apparatus based upon their
own laws and social practice, they can not induce compliance through shared myth or
435 Ramirez, “Toward a Revolution of Mindsets: A Critique of the Present Socio-Cultural System” in Reflections on Culture, 4. 436 Jocano, Filipino Value System: A Cultural Definition, 3 – 4.
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other forms of social sanction because the modern Philippine state does not evolve
organically from the Filipino society. Henceforth, they derive their authority from the
implied coercion of colonial rule.437 Consequently, Filipinos become very religious and
devout Christians but sharing of material goods to others, most especially to the needy,
are quite difficult for them. Also, with free enterprise, people earn more money but it is
not necessarily equated with hard work. People realize that if one is clever enough, one
could get money through gambling, scheming (like in graft and corruption) or by some
illegal way.438
When the conventional practices were labeled as “barbaric,” indigenous values
are described as “backward” and “corrupt,” native character is seen as “uncouth” and
local beliefs are called “superstitions,” the people are able to develop the idea that the
indigenous models are inferior compared to the exogenous models brought about by the
colonizers.439 As mentioned above, the simultaneous demands of the two incongruous
systems on Filipinos create conflict situations which satisfy neither value system fully.
Thus, in the supposed Period of cultural solidarity, there is really no solidarity that
happens for the reason that the operating values in the formative period – the concern for
the ginhawa of the sakop – and that of the period of struggle and national consolidation
are continually in conflict in the supposed period of cultural solidarity.
437 Alfred McCoy, “‘An Anarchy of Families’: The Historiography of State and Family in the Philippines” in An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines, edited by Alfred W. McCoy (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1994), 11. Cf. O.D. Corpuz, Bureaucracy in the
Philippines (Manila: Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1957), 128 – 213. 438 Ramirez, “Toward a Revolution of Mindsets: A Critique of the Present Socio-Cultural
System”, 5 and “The Dominant and Popular Cultural Systems in the Philippines”, 19 in Reflections on
Culture.
439 Jocano, Filipino Value System: A Cultural Definition, 4. See also Ramirez, “The Dominant and Popular Cultural Systems in the Philippines” in Reflections on Culture, 23 – 24.
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Family Orientation As A Core Value
Among the Filipino values, family orientation is very crucial to the Filipino.
Historically, as pointed out above, Covar stresses the rootedness of the Filipinos on the
family even way back during the formative period of the Philippine history. Foremost of
all is the instinct of the family to provide security to its members. The colonizers have
even realized the extreme significance that Filipinos place on the family as they
effectively exploit the Filipino’s family-centeredness by fitting one family against
another family, one region against another region that even if the Filipinos already began
to think about the national interest during the period of national consolidation, the
promise of working for the national interest and general welfare had remained a
promise.440
Furthermore, Jocano also recognizes the importance that the Filipinos give to the
family441 as it gives higher premium to its interest than to the interest of the
community.442 He believes that “the family is basic to the life of Filipinos. It is the center
of their universe. Much of what they do, what they think, and what they idealize, among
others, are first learned within the narrow confines of the family before these are
enriched, modified, or frustrated by other institutions in the larger community.”443
440 Ibid., p. 171. 441 Stella Go says that the Filipino’s stress on the importance of the family can be attested by the voluminous existing literature studying the Filipino family. The Research for Development Department of the Development Academy of the Philippines even compiled in one volume bibliographies together with a directory of agencies and individuals involved in studying or working with the family. Stella P. Go, The
Filipino Family In the Eighties (Manila: Social Development Research Center, De La Salle University, 1993), 2 – 4. 442 Jocano, Filipino Value System: A Cultural Definition, 9. 443 Jocano, Filipino Social Organization, 11.
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Mercado shares the same point of view with Jocano. Mercado even thinks about the
family as reflective of the Philippine society.444
Agoncillo likewise sees that among the many values, the Filipino is known for the
so-called close family ties or solidarity.445 Panopio and Rolda think it so because the
family is discerned “as a defense against a hostile world and a unit where one can turn to
in case [a family member] has a serious problem.”446 As what Bacungan, Vea, and
Ladera point out, aside from giving family members food, clothing, and shelter, it also
“gives security and a sense of belonging and love and affection manifested in the honor
and respect given to parents and elders, in the care given to children, in generosity
towards relatives in need and in the sacrifices endured for the family’s sake.”447 It is also
seen as helping family members “grow healthy minds and bodies and teaches them to
know the right from wrong.”448
Generally, the researcher chooses the family/kinship orientation to be the value
where the Filipino identity can be discerned for the reason that it is considered to be the
core Filipino value. Talisayon underscores that the core of the Filipino value system, as
mentioned above, revolve around the seven values: (1) family/kinship orientation; (2)
makatao/kapwa tao (personalism); (3) “loob complex” (religious/psychic orientation); (4)
social acceptance; (5) pakikiramdam; (6) pakikisama (group centeredness); and (7)
444 Leonardo Mercado, Elements of Filipino Philosophy, reprint edition (Tacloban City: Divine Word University Publications, 1993), 95. 445 Teodoro A. Agoncillo, History of the Filipino People, 8th edition (Quezon City: GAROTECH Publishing, 1990), pp. 6 -7. 446 Panopio and Rolda, Society and Culture, 79. Cf. Bulatao, Split-level Christianity,26. 447 Cleofe M. Bacungan, Agnes B. Vea, and Helen P. Ladera, Values Education (Quezon City: Katha Publishing Co., Inc., 1996), 80. 448 Ibid.
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economic security. He, however, observes that the strongest macroclusters are five, in
order of strength: the relationship macrocluster, loob macrocluster, social macrocluster,
livelihood macrocluster, and optimism.449 Since the strongest macrocluster is the
relationship macrocluster, the researcher identifies the family/kinship orientation as the
core value for the reason that other relevant values such as pakikisama (mutual
cooperation), hiya (shame), utang na loob (lifelong debt to another for some favor
bestowed), and SIR (smooth interpersonal relationship) although seen as the Filipino’s
tendency toward stasis and equilibrium450, they are also maintained for the sake of
maintaining the honor and welfare of the family for it is the most important concern of
the individual.451
Curiously, the significance of this value is overwhelming because the state has
strongly recognized the primacy of the family in Philippine society as enshrined in the
Philippine Civil Code and the Philippine Constitution of 1987.452
McCoy shares this
observation. In fact, according to him,
the state recognized the primacy of the family in Philippine society. In curiously loving language, Article 216 of the Philippine Civil Code states that “The family is a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and protects.” In Article 219 the state admonishes its officials to respect the family’s primary responsibility for social welfare: “Mutual aid, both moral and material, shall be rendered among members of the same family. Judicial and administrative officials shall foster this mutual assistance.” Similarly, in Article 2, section 12, the Philippine Constitution of 1986
449 Talisayon, 105. 450 Reynaldo Clemeña Ileto, Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines, 1840
– 1910 (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1979), 9. 451 Lourdes R. Quisumbing, “The Filipino Family in the 80’s: Retrospect and Prospect” in Christian Family Movement, The Filipino Family: Retrospect and Prospect (Quezon City: CFM, 1981), 20. 452 Alfred McCoy, “`An Anarchy of Families’: The Historiography of State and Family in the Philippines”, 7.
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makes the defense of the family a basic national principle: “The state recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution.”453
McCoy also observes that the Filipino family “provides employment and capital,
educates and socializes the young, assures medical care, shelters its handicapped and
aged, and strives, above all else, to transmit its name, honor, lands, capital, and values to
the next generation.”454
Nolledo, on his part, opines that “to consider the family as a social institution, we
have given importance to the old and tested Filipino tradition of maintaining close family
ties.”455 Furthermore, he quotes that
In the Philippines, the family is the social, economic and residual unit. It is conceded that the family is the most important element in the personality development of the child and in his day-to-day behavior as an adult. Family life revolves around the child…. The child is… trained in the ways of the family and acquires its norms and values…. They trail him wherever he goes and in a way become embedded in his total personality make-up.456
The constitution recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation inasmuch
as “the Filipino family is the nucleus of the barangay and the town and this spirals on to
the nation. Basic in the society is the strength of the family structure.”457 Quiambao even
intimates that “if the little child in the Filipino family is someday to take his rightful place
453 McCoy, p. 7. See also, Belen T. Medina, et al., The Filipino Family: Emerging Structures and
Arrangements (Quezon City: Office of Research Coordination, University of the Philippines, 1996), 2. 454 Ibid.
455 Jose N. Nolledo, The New Constitution of the Philippines Annotated (Mandaluyong City: National Book Store, 1997), 193.
456 “Report of the Committee on Youth, 1971 Constitutional Convention” in Nolledo, 193.
457 Vicente C. Sotto III, The Filipino: Values and Visions (Manila: Mary Jo Educational Supply, 1996), 19.
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as an effective citizen in the modern democratic world, he must be reared and trained for
it.”458 Thus, the family can also become a very potent tool for nation-building.
The Antagonism Between Family Orientation As A Core Value And Nation Building
The significance of the family as a core value cannot be underestimated. In the
annotation of Nolledo of the 1987 constitution, he cites that
Any program designed to prepare the child for responsible citizenship in a changing society should not fail to take into account the family as a most potent influence. Programs designed to facilitate the wholesome development of the child especially during the early stages should be family-based and child-focused. In other words, the family should be protected and strengthened to make it an effective instrument in improving the situation of children and young people.459
Moreover, the family as the foundation of society, “in it various generations come
together and help one another to grow wiser and to harmonize personal rights with the
other requirements of social life.”460 Nevertheless, although the Filipino bats for national
solidarity, the interests of the family usually interfere with the interests of the nation,
which, Quisumbing intimates “have been contributory to the Filipino’s in-group
centeredness and segmentation.”461 The Filipino has the difficulty of achieving a true
sense of nationalism because of its too much loyalty to the family that becomes an
obstacle to national unity and integration.
458 Ermelinda G. Quiambao, “Bringing Up Children for Democracy” in Family Life Workshop of the Philippines, Inc., The Filipino Family: Selected Readings (Quezon City: Alemar-Phoenix Publishing House, 1966), 50.
459 “Report of the Committee on Youth, 1971 Constitutional Convention” in Nolledo, 194.
460 Ibid., 195.
461 Quisumbing, “The Filipino Family in the 80’s: Retrospect and Prospect”, 20.
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All the rhetoric about nation-building and nationalism become unproductive
because the focus on the family makes a Filipino act parochially rather than nationally.
Abueva even points out that
Leaders in government, the private sector and civil society often justify their objectives and actions in terms of selfless, nationalistic ends. In reality, however, protagonists in politics and advocates of nationalism are motivated more or less by their individual as well as collective self-interests. Given this reality, national interest and welfare and the common good which are the professed goals of nationalism and competing ideologies, are served to a greater or lesser degree by the continuing
interplay of the selfish and altruistic interests of political actors as they seek state power and influence the content and implementation of public policy.462
Furthermore, he supports the claim that the family is one of the sources of the weakness
of Filipino nationalism most specially when the government is ineffective and could not
be depended “to provide equal protection, adequate social services, and the policies that
would spur economic development and create employment.”463 This condition all the
more makes the Filipino cling to his family since it can assure him of his well-being and
security. Consequently, “one’s self-interest or one’s family-interest comes first and above
the interest and good of the people or nation.”464
These characteristics are generally similar with that of the formative period – the
economic well-being of the sakop or ward – that Covar mentions. During the period of
struggle and national consolidation, revolutionaries look at the entire nation as one big
family. Thus, Jose Rizal sets up the Liga Filipina in Manila on July 3, 1892 with the aim
462 Jose V. Abueva, ed., Filipino Nationalism: Various Meanings, Constant and Changing Goals,
Continuing Relevance (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1999), 794. 463 Jose Abueva, “Some Indicators and Explanations of the Weakness of Filipino Nationalism” in
Abueva, Filipino Nationalism, 814. 464 Ibid.
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of inculcating moral and political principles among the population in order to attain a
greater unity.465
Moreover, on July 7, 1892, Bonifacio establishes the Katipunan with the aim of
uniting all Filipinos in terms of a single ideology.466 He enables the masses to rally
behind his Katipunan because of his vision to bring back the kasaganaan and the
kaginhawaan that the Pre-Spanish Philippines enjoyed.467 This was the central mantra of
his article published in the one and only issue of Kalayaan, the official publication of the
Katipunan, which they attributed the rapid growth of its membership.468 The cry for
kalayaan, also becomes the driving force for Filipinos to persist in fighting against the
Spanish regime.
Furthermore, Ileto explains that
In “kalayaan,” revolutionists found an ideal term for independence that combined separation from a colonial ruler… and the “coming together” of people in the Katipunan. Katipunan is kalayaan in that it is a recovery of the country’s pre-Spanish condition of wholeness, bliss and contentment, a condition that is experienced as layaw by the individual, who is thus able to leap from the “familial to the “national.”469
465 Cesar Adib Majul, The Political and Constitutional Ideas of the Philippine Revolution, reprint edition (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1996), 3. 466 Ibid., 4. 467 Ileto cites the annotation of Rizal to Morga’s Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas that pointed out the flourishing indigenous civilization in the archipelago even before the arrival of the Spanairds. Ileto, 83. 468 Ileto, 82. Ileto cited Pio Valenzuela, one of the organizers of the katipunan, saying that “hundreds of people nightly joined the Katipunan” after the distribution of the Kalayaan. Ileto intimated that “Bonifacio himself was surprised at the rapid growth of the society. From the time he had founded it in 1892 to the appearance of Kalayaan in January 1896, it had only some three hundred members. But from the middle of March to the outbreak of hostilities against Spain in August 1896, its membership rose sharply to 30,000.” Valenzuela, Ileto said, “attributes the sharp rise in membership to the ‘effect of the periodical on the people.’” Ibid. Cf. “The Memoirs of Pio Valenzuela” (original in Tagalog), in Minutes of
the Katipunan (Manila: national Heroes Commission, 1964), 107; Teodoro Agoncillo, The Revolt of the
Masses (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1956), 96.
469 Ibid., 87.
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However, when the revolution was won, the expected national consolidation of
the Filipino spirit did not materialize because of the illustrado and the principalia’s
jockeying for power and opportunities just to assure the economic security of their own
families. This demoralized the organization from the top down to the rank and file and
eventually resulted to the rift between the illustrado and the masses.470
Majul adjoins that before 1896 all revolts were local and regional for there is no
evidence that these revolts represented a concerted effort to form a Filipino state in which
all the inhabitants were to be united by means of a common government.471 During this
period, although the spirit of nationalism is very pregnant and vibrant, Abueva maintains
that “historically, some heroes and leaders have been inspiring models of a socially
concerned and nationalistic leadership, but many leaders have also used their power and
authority for their own benefit and for perpetuating their power and dominance in society.
The latter reinforce the common tendency of citizens to be selfishly individualistic and
family-oriented.”472
Likewise, Agoncillo, as cited by McCoy, accuses the educated illustrados of
Manila’s nineteenth-century elites for betraying the Revolution of 1898 and collaborating
thereafter with American colonialism saying:
When one studies the Revolution in its first and second epochs one finds that … the middle class as a group betrayed the Revolution by a negative attitude: they refused to lift a finger to support the mass-movement
470 Bonifacio irks the leading citizens because they believe that if he is to progress, the existing
boundaries and hierarchies in the province would be threatened. Mabini, as Cabinet President of the Malolos government, was subjected to harassment because he was born to very poor parents. Ileto, 111 & 117.
471 Ibid., 14 -15.
472 Abueva, “Some Indicators and Explanations of the Weakness of Filipino Nationalism” in Abueva, Filipino Nationalism, 814.
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because they did not believe it would succeed… In the second epoch, the betrayal was consummated by positive action: they now entered the government by the front door and tried to sabotage it by the back door….473
Agoncillo takes the first epoch as forgivable but the second is not. “When they accepted
the high positions in the government they were, both from the legal and moral
standpoints, expected to be loyal to that government…. [T]hey accepted the positions…
but by insidious means undermined its foundations – through financial manipulations or
through secret understandings with the Americans.”474 The betrayal of the “Haves” can
be judged as their way of assuring themselves that they will be able to maintain the
comfort of their lives that they were already enjoying.
Similarly, in recent times, F. Sionil Jose assails also this undoing of some elite
members of the society as a cause of the Filipino’s poverty. He conveys that
“[w]e are poor because our elite from way back had no sense of nation - they collaborated with whoever ruled - the Spaniards, the Japanese, the Americans and in recent times, Marcos. Our elite imbibed the values of the colonizer. And worst of all, these wealthy Filipinos did not modernize this country, they sent abroad their wealth distilled from the blood and sweat of our poor. The rich Chinese to China, to Taiwan, to Hong Kong, the rich mestizos to Europe, and the rich Indios like Marcos to Switzerland and the United States - money that could have developed this nation.475 In the period of cultural solidarity, the Filipinos are already granted their
independence and there is no more inherent fear for the colonizers. At this time,
however, they go back all the more to the ideological enculturation of the formative
473 McCoy, 2. Cf. Teodoro A. Agoncillo, Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic (Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1960), 644-45. See also Renato Constantino, The Philippines: A Past
Revisited (Quezon City: Tala Publishing Services, 1975), 232.
474 Ibid. 475 F. Sionil Jose, “Hindsight” (a speech delivered by the author at the University of the
Philippines, Diliman, on Nov. 23, 2004) [article on-line]; available from http://femba.blogspot. com/2004_12_01_femba_archive.html; accessed June 16, 2006.
157
period: the economic well-being of the sakop or ward instead of continuing the started
efforts for national interest and general welfare. The one that has been relegated to the
unconscious has now resurfaced.
It can be deemed that most of the political leaders and economic elite are
concerned only in maintaining the social status and economic security of their immediate
family. Thus, the maintenance of political dynasties, nepotism, cronyism, and family
corporations are prevalent.
Family Orientation as a Core Value and Its Implication to Social Institutions
The Filipino’s overemphasis on the well-being of his family creeps also into the
different institutions of the society. This foreboding malady is even recognized by the
primers of the 1987 Philippine constitution. The 1987 Philippine Constitution even
includes a provision prohibiting political dynasties found in Article II “Declaration of
Principles and State Policies”, sec. 26: “The State shall guarantee equal access to
opportunities for public service, and prohibit political dynasties as may be defined by
law.” Nolledo says that he explains
in the 1986 Constitutional Commission, political dynasties constituted social maladies that have limited the opportunities of young, talented but poor candidates to climb the political ladder. Political dynasties… have made political positions subject to inheritance, have spawned graft and corruption, and have resulted in proliferation of little monarchies in various parts of our country.476
Moreover, he reveals that “the rule of equal opportunities for public service can well
cover appointments to public offices. In such a case, such appointments should be based
on merits rather than on patronage or nepotism.
476 Nolledo, 238.
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The 1987 Constitution, moreover, abhors appointing members of one family to
the same or different positions in the government. There is no monopoly of expertise and
knowledge.”477 Consequently, the Guingona and the Palacol Bill are introduced in the
Senate and in the House of Representatives respectively on January 1995. Both bills seek
the ban on political dynasties. However, these enabling legislations that would have lent
meaning to constitutional directives are shelved.478 Alejo Jose Sison recounts that when
Esplanada asked Speaker Jose De Venecia, Jr. about the passing of the Palacol Bill, the
latter explains that it will not be easy for there are the Asistios, Gordons, Osmeñas,
Shahanis, Duranos, Marcoses, and many others who will be affected by the said bill.479
In the analysis of Sison, one of the explanations for the prevalence of political
dynasties is the very strong family ties. He cites David Timberman as saying that in
enumerat[ing] the following hallmarks of contemporary Philippine political culture: the primacy of kinship ties, the importance of reciprocity and patron-client relationships, the emphasis on smooth interpersonal relationships and pervasive poverty insofar as it affects values and behavior. With the exception of the last characteristic, all the others may be subsumed under the heading of “very strong family ties”.480
Going back to the stylized framework of Bago, the only hope that can transform
the country is through education along with communication. However, the working of
the educational system as an institution is also affected by the value of family orientation.
477 Ibid., 238 – 239. 478 Alejo Jose G. Sison, “The Public and the Private in Contemporary Philippine Society. A Study on Political Dynasties” [article on-line]; available from http://www.unav.es/empresayhumanismo/2activ/ seminario/miembros/ sison/ii18/default.html; accessed May 12, 2004. Cf. Randolf S. David, “Political Dynasties: Major Poll Issue”, Philippine Daily Inquirer (April 24, 1995). 479 Ibid. Cf. Jerry Esplanada, “Challenge to Ramos: Ban Political Dynasties – RAM”, Philippine
Daily Inquirer (December 26, 1994). 480 Ibid. Cf. David Timberman, A Changeless Land: Continuity and Change in Philippine Politics (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies).
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Pertierra observes that amidst the disheartening result of the latest survey of Asian
universities where Philippine universities fared badly, “Filipinos and particularly
politicians do not seem to appreciate the seriousness of this neglect of education.”481
Pertierra even asks himself the question: Why is education so poorly valued in the
Philippines? His answer is that
[l]argely because its economic and political elite have little use for it. They can send their children abroad for a good education or keep them home and yet ensure their futures through personal networks. The notion of a highly competent and competitive workforce only applies to members of a small middle class. Poor people rarely enter the race, while the rich or powerful do not have to worry about competence to succeed.482
Meinardus confirms this observation as he also construes that there is an educational
crisis in the Philippines which is a crisis of the public education since 95 per cent of all
elementary students483, who basically belong to the lower strata of the society, attend
public schools while “the wealthy can easily send their offspring to private schools, many
of which offer first-class education to the privileged class of pupils.”484
There is a crisis in public education because there is an under-investment in the
education sector. Although there is an increase in the budgetary allocation of the DepEd
481 Raul Pertierra, “The Miseducation of the Filipino”, Philippine Daily Inquirer (July 14, 2000). In the said survey, the best place that our universities landed on is 48th place by U.P. followed by DLSU(71), ADMU (72), and UST (74). The seriousness of the problem in education is also reflected in the result of the Third International Mathematics and Science Study whereby the Philippines placed second and third from the bottom, respectively in Science and Mathematics out of 42 participating countries. Cf. Bago, 41 – 42. 482 Ibid.
483 Meinardus, “The Crisis of Public Education in the Philippines” [article on-line]; available from http://www.fnf.org.ph/liberalopinion/2003-06-30.htm; accessed June 16, 2006. Based on the data published by DepEd, from SY 2000 – 2001 to SY 2004 – 2005, an average of 12,924,287 students enrolled in all the elementary schools in the Philippines for both public and private, out of which, 11,998,791 or 93% enrolled in the public elementary schools. Cf. Department of Education, “Fact sheet: Basic Education Statistics” [data on-line]; available from http://www.deped.gov.ph/cpanel/uploads/issuanceImg/factsheet2006(Mar28). pdf; accessed June 26, 2006.
484 Meinardus, “The Crisis of Public Education in the Philippines” [article on-line].
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from 1986 – 1989, this has not been sustained in the succeeding years. SEAMEO-
INNOTECH observes that starting in 1990 the real per capita expenditures on education
declined. It has to be noted however that the 70% growth of the education budget has
been allocated for the salary increase of the teachers. 485 Meaning, only the remaining
30% has been appropriated for the building of classrooms, training of teachers,
purchasing of textbooks and other instructional materials.
Aside from under-investment, the poor quality of education is also attributed “to
deficiencies in pre-service training and in-service training of teachers, and unqualified
teachers teaching subjects outside their areas of specialization.”486 It is observed that only
half of the teachers teaching mathematics in high school really majored on this subject
and only 4% of the physics teachers really majored on this subject.
Meinardus quotes Undersecretary Luz saying that “[t]he quality of Philippine
education has been declining continuously for roughly 25 years [and that] [o]ur schools
are failing to teach the competence the average citizen needs to become responsible,
productive and self-fulfilling. We are graduating people who are learning less and
less.”487 The former adds that this is supposed to be “a devastating report card for the
politicians who governed this nation in the said period. From a liberal and democratic
angle, it is particularly depressing as this has been the period that coincides with
485SEAMEO-INNOTECH, “The Financing of Education” in Philippines [article on-line]; available from http://www.seameoinnotech.org/resources/seameo_country/educ_data/philippines/philippines_ibe. htm; accessed May 16, 2006. The last time this website has been updated was on May 2003. 486 Ibid. 487 Meinardus, “The Crisis of Public Education in the Philippines” [article on-line].
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democratic rule that was so triumphantly and impressively reinstalled after the dark years
of dictatorship in 1986!”488 Even then, they never lift a finger to truly solve this problem.
As regards with communication as a tool for education, having a national
language is very important. According to Ramirez, “there is nothing that can give our
people identity other than our languages. The way ordinary Filipinos think, feel and act
must be expressed in the languages they speak.”489 She furthermore argues that “our
dependence on a foreign language has enhanced our dependency in all ways because we
have been conditioned to think in the categories of other cultural contexts. This is a
significant factor in our impoverishment”490 Rubrico concurs that having a national
language “will bring about unity and identity among Filipinos, as they can now express
themselves and communicate with each other in a common language.”491
The sentiment of having a common language as a means of inter-communication
of ideas in the entire archipelago so that ideas, sentiments, and aspirations of the
inhabitants of the Philippines can be transmitted was felt already during the Philippine
Assembly of 1908. However, it was unfortunate that the Philippine Assembly through
Leon Ma. Guerrero, its Chairman on Public Instruction opted to adopt a foreign language
instead of the native ones.492
488 Ibid. 489 Ramirez, “Toward a Revolution of Mindsets: A Critique of the Present Socio-Cultural System” in Reflections on Culture, 9. 490 Ibid., 10. 491 Jessie Grace U. Rubrico, “The Metamorphosis of Filipino as National Language”, [article on-line]; available from http://www. seasite.niu.edu/Tagalog/essays_on_philippine_languages. htm; accessed May 19, 2004. 492 Ibid.
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Lope K. Santos revived the issue of having a national language when he
addressed the First Independence Congress on February 30, 1930 by expounding on “The
Vernacular as a Factor in National Solidarity and Independence.” However, the initiative
encountered a problem in 1965 when “some congressmen took the cudgels against the
propagation of Pilipino, which to them is ‘puristang Tagalog,’ as the national language….
[Thus], in 1969, some non-Tagalog speakers, like the Madyaas Pro-Hiligaynon Society
and some Cebuano groups complained against the movement of Manila toward
‘purismo.’ This gave rise to the problems that needed to be resolved before the non-
Tagalog speakers could accept Tagalog as their own ‘wikang pambansa’.”493 The issue
until now has not been resolved. There are still those who refused to accept Filipino as
the national language though it is not anymore “puristang Tagalog”.
The bottom line of the issue can again be traced to the people’s taking pride of the
language of their region. This is a manifestation of outright regionalism which is defined
as “a tendency to emphasize and value, oftentimes to extremes, the qualities and
characteristics of life in a particular region.”494 This regionalistic tendency of the Filipino
makes him think only in terms of regional oneness rather than of national unity.495 In
addition, Andres said, citing Agoncillo and Alfonso, “regionalism is [once again] an
extension of the closeness of family ties.”496
493 Ibid. 494 Andres, Understanding Filipino Values: A Management Approach, 23. 495 Ibid. 496 Ibid. Cf. Teodoro Agoncillo and Oscar Alfonso, A Short History of the Filipino People (Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1961), 9.
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Re-understanding Family Orientation As A Core Filipino Value
The Filipino family considered as the most important and highly valued segment
in the Philippine society is really a hindrance to the country’s sustainable development if
the Filipino family is continuously viewed as baranganic and clannish in nature. This
attitude towards the family impinges on institutions with supposedly universalistic value
assumptions.497 This has also been recognized by the Moral Recovery Program of 1992
spearheaded by Ramos-Shahani as one of the weaknesses of the Filipino.498
Since the elite has the power to influence the thinking of the citizenry and can
alter the power configuration of the nation, the Filipino is forced to have faith on the few
modernizing elite. The significance of the elite as a catalyst for change has been tested
already during EDSA I, when the strongman rule of Pres. Marcos was toppled down from
power after being a president for over twenty years, and EDSA II, when Pres. Estrada
was forced to resign due to alleged massive corruption. The success of the two EDSA’s
can be attributed largely to the alliance of elite forces, noticeably, the military and the
church. However, the so-called Poor People Power of May 1, 2001 did not succeed.
The reason is quite obvious, the elite were not there. Likewise, the recent turn of
events during the Pres. Arroyo’s incumbency with the allegations of electoral fraud and
also massive corruption, the possibility of another People Power uprising is very
pregnant. Nevertheless, it never happens yet for the military and the church, were wishy-
washy about their stand on the foregoing issues.
497 Ramirez, “Toward a Revolution of Mindsets: A Critique of the Present Socio-Cultural System” in Reflections on Culture, 10.
498 Handbook on Moral Recovery Program, (n.d., n.p.), 51.
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Indeed, the influence of the elite is insurmountable. Anyway, the success of an
EDSA type uprising is a collective effort of the elite and the masses as exemplified by the
failure of the Poor People power and the failed Oakwood mutiny. Nevertheless, after the
two EDSA’s, seemingly, the Philippines is still going nowhere. The reason for this is that
the united elite of EDSA 1 and EDSA 2 are now disunited due to shifting alliances
among themselves for again; their narrow and selfish interests are placed over and above
the collective interests of the people. In other words, the old protracted struggle for power
in the Philippines pervades.499
Henceforth, inasmuch as the elite are still governed by familistic behavior, the
former must really be re-educated or forced to take Nationalism 101. This being the
situation, the interest of the nation will always be jeopardized since they are first
motivated to secure their own family over and above the other families, much more that
of the nation.500 As what Murphy suggested, it is now high time that the rich are the one
to be studied instead of the poor being studied all the time.501 This comment is very
relevant because, as McCoy cited, “despite the oft-cited significance of elite families in
499 Herbert Docena, “People Power and the Perils of Democracy Elite” [article on-line]; available
from http://www.pcij.org/i-report/6/democracy.html, accessed July 21, 2006.
500 Ramirez, “Toward a Revolution of Mindsets: A Critique of the Present Socio-Cultural System” in Reflections on Culture, 10.
501 Dennis Murphy, “Time to Study the Rich” in Commentary, The Philippine Daily Inquirer (May 18, 2004). This reaction of Murphy is based on the result of the study of the Ateneo de Manila University – Institute of Philippine Culture as regards the voting culture of the poor. The study found that “poor people have the same criteria in voting as middle class people do. Like the rest of society, they are also influenced in their voted mainly by the media, the family and the Church or mosque.” (Ibid.) Furthermore, Murphy claims that “almost all recent research on the urban poor contradicts the old stereotypes that the poor are ignorant, opportunistic and lacking in any sense of the common good.” (Ibid.) Studies regarding the poor are already very many but not much can be found about the rich.
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Philippine politics, historical and contemporary analysis of their role remains
superficial.”502
The pervasiveness of family orientation underscores the constitution of political
dynasties, family corporations and “profit-making educational family corporations [that]
even religious organizations are not saved from the encroachment of family interests.”503
The elite Filipino family’s broad control of the economic, political, and social functions
tilts the balance only unto their favor. Consequently, Paul Hutchcroft, as cited by
McCoy, said
The Philippine bureaucracy… has long been penetrated by particularistic oligarchic interests, which have firm independent economic base… yet rely heavily upon their access to the political machinery in order to promote private accumulation…. Because the state apparatus is unable to provide the calculability necessary for advanced capitalism, one finds instead a kind of rent capitalism based, ultimately, on the plunder of the state apparatus by powerful oligarchic interests.504
With this kind of set-up, the workings of the institutions are compromised inasmuch as
national political leaders rely on provincial warlords and political families to deliver the
vote and the economic elites to hand over the dough during the campaign period.
Nevertheless, even if the Moral Recovery Program of 1992 found the family as one of the
weaknesses of the Filipino, it has also found family orientation as one of its strengths.505
As a resolution therefore, it is now the right time to expand the Filipino’s idea of
family, with special emphasis to that of the political leaders. As Ramirez imparts,
502 McCoy, 1 – 2. 503 Mina Ramirez, Understanding Philippine Social Realities through the Filipino Family: A
Phenomenological Approach (Manila: Asian Social Institute, 1984), 43. 504 McCoy., 13. Cf. Paul D. Hutchcroft, “The Political Foundations of Booty Capitalism in the Philippines” (paper delivered at the annual meetings of the American Political Science Association, Chicago, Illinois, September 1992), 4.
505 Handbook on Moral Recovery Program, (n.d., n.p.), 48.
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the main challenge to this observation… lies in the answer to a crucial question. In what way may we adapt this small group or family orientation, seen as a cultural reality in our social organizational network, in a way that its workings will not hamper the operations of the larger system? As long as leaders themselves still consider their position as instruments for their own ends, no amount of change of systems and structures will redound to the good of the larger majority.506
Instead of understanding family as that of the immediate kin only, it now has to be
extended into that of the whole nation. In that way, looking into the diagram of
Talisayon, instead of setting nationalism into the side-line, it must now be placed in the
core. With this new way of looking into the family as a national family, social
institutions of the country are hoped to work accordingly.
The Filipino’s extreme family centeredness has been known a long time ago. In
recognition of this great tendency of the Filipino, Osias sets in motion the need to erect a
guiding philosophy. After many years of colonialism, the Filipinos are required to
shoulder the obligations of leadership and followership. “They must exercise proper
initiative and intelligent self-direction. All citizens must be trained for active participation
in group activities.”507 As a consequence thereof, he embarks to develop a pluralized
philosophy.
The pluralized philosophy intends to capitalize on the idea of interdependence.
This philosophy is anchored on the “recognition of this interdependence and upon a
consciousness of the organic unity and continuity of common interests.”508 Osias
illustrates this concept by studying the intricacies of the language that he knows best: the
506 Ramirez, Understanding Philippine Social Realities through the Filipino Family, 44. 507 Camilo Osias, “Introduction” in The Filipino Way of Life: The Pluralized Philosophy, xi. 508 Ibid, xiii.
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Ilocano language. He works out on four personal pronouns, first person under the
nominative case. They are as follows: Siac, which means “I,” singular number; Data,
which means “we two,” dual number; Dacami, which means “we three or more,” the
intermediate plural or the plural exclusive number; and, Datayo, which means “we all,”
the superlative plural or the plural all-inclusive number.509
Correspondingly, Osias uses the four pronouns as indicators of the development,
attitude, and outlook of the Filipino. Thus, the Filipino has to undergo four major stages
in the process of broadening his concept. He calls them as the Siac stage, the Data stage,
the Dacami stage, and the Datayo stage. He envisions for a Filipino moving out of the
Siac stage and growing up to the Datayo stage. He trusts that the development of the
mind of the individual will also effect a development of its social mind. As he explains,
“until the social mind becomes thoroughly pluralized there will be clashes between
classes and classes, groups and groups, communities and communities, nations and
nations, regions and regions, races and races, or combinations of some and combinations
of others, even as there are conflicts between individuals and individuals, groups of
individuals and groups of individuals.”510
Osias further concludes that feuds, divisions and prejudices among families
indicate the pervading selfishness and singularness in a social group. Inasmuch as the
idea of a nation is an extension and expansion of the smallest social unit which is the
509 Ibid., “The Tayo Concept” in The Filipino Way of Life: The Pluralized Philosophy, 3 – 4. 510 Ibid., 9.
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family, unity eludes them as long as they have not reach yet the last stage, “the stage of
disinterestedness.”511
This paradigm of extending the family to a larger, that of a country, has been
recommended by the academic think tank that Jose Ma. Crisol convened during the
Marcos presidency. The report entitled Towards the Restructuring of Filipino Values
recommends to Marcos the exploitation of the Filipino family paradigm in purging the
country of negative values. It reports,
What is recommended therefore is an expansion of the family to a larger group – the country. We should treat the country as our very own family, where the President of the Republic is the father and all the citizens as our brothers. From this new value we develop a strong sense of oneness, loyalty to the country, and a feeling of nationalism. Because all Filipinos are brothers, we become just and sincere. There will develop in us a feeling of trust such that values, such a lamangan. pakitang-tao, bahala na, etc. will be eliminated from our system….512
Incidentally, Marcos heeds to the report of Ma. Crisol as he immediately organized the
youth organization Kabataang Barangay led by Imee, his eldest daughter. However, his
paying attention to the report was only limited to this.
McCoy claims that instead of sincerely capitalizing the finding of Ma. Crisol to
promote development, Marcos coalesced with rent-seeking families to solidify his
position in the political sphere. Later on, through martial law, he punished the oligarchs
who were his enemies and gifted his kins and cronies that results to unprecedented
511 Ibid., 8. 512 Jose Ma. Crisol in McCoy, 16. Cf. Jose Ma. Crisol, Towards the Restructuring of Filipino
Values (Manila: Office of Civil Relations, Philippine Army, n.d.), 47.
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private wealth. This was the complete opposite of his promise to eradicate political
corruption.513
Likewise, Corazon Aquino, in her desire not to commit the same mistake of
Marcos, barred presidential relatives from public office as enshrined in Article 7, section
13 (2) of the 1987 constitution.514 She, nevertheless, succumbed to political pressure,
thereby, unable to prevent relatives from jockeying over juicy positions in the
government, thus the label Kamag-anak, Inc., as much as preventing them from running,
and eventually winning, in the May 1987 elections although she strongly supported the
abolition of political dynasties in the country.515
Lastly, Fidel Ramos also promised the same thing by attacking the pervasiveness
of rent-seeking families in politics, thus, promised to reform. But again broke his resolve
to reform by granting Ramon del Rosario, his confidante and at the same time a leading
cement producer, a great leverage on manufacturing cement when the former signed
Executive Order No. 1, i.e., granting cement manufacturers a three-year duty-free on
imported cements. Purportedly, this order has been drafted by Del Rosario himself as an
incoming finance secretary.516
Indeed, having the above mentioned conditions as the case, there really is an
immediate need to transform the Filipino’s value of the family inasmuch as the behavior
513 McCoy, “An Anarchy of Families”, 17. 514 “The spouse and relatives by consanguinity or affinity within the fourth civil degree of the
President shall not during his tenure be appointed Members of the Constitutional Commission, or the Office of Ombudsman, or as Secretaries, Undersecretaries, chairmen or heads of bureaus or offices, including government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries.” Ibid., 18. Cf. Nolledo, 1359.
515 Ibid., 18 – 19.] 516 Ibid., 19.
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of the family reflects Philippine society.517 Mabini is right when he proposed to have an
internal revolution as self-interest, jealousy, and favoritism among self-proclaimed
revolutionaries518 crept unto their blood, thus, “a veritable blood-letting is necessary in
order to shed so much vitiated and corrupt blood, inoculated in your veins by your
stepmother in order to bind you to eternal thankfulness.”519 This simply reiterates the
desire of Bonifacio for inner transformation, most specifically from among the leaders of
Katipunan, as a condition to win the revolution. He also attributes the defeat of the
Katipunan to the “infighting and lack of unity among the leaders who continue to have
hardness of loób (matitigas ang kaloóban) while ordinary people suffer.”520
Kanoy opines that the key to success is selfness. He means by selfness as “that
self which springs from one’s best and true nature; it is the result of the simultaneous,
parallel, economical, coordinating, integrating, evoking self-development of the
individual’s physical, intellectual, and emotional well-being.”521 The development of a
healthy self-concept diffuses into that of the extended self to advance the development of
a healthy society whereby only the truest of all the interests is the concern of every
individual.
517 Leonardo N. Mercado, Elements of Filipino Philosophy, 95. 518 Mabini is referring to the “many illustrados, wealthy principales, and mestizos who had
generally been unsympathetic or hostile to the 1896 struggle” but were force to join the Katipunan when they felt the imminent defeat of the colonizers in the hands of the Katipunan. Ileto, 117. See also, Ileto, 217.
519 Ibid. 520 Ileto, 112. Cf. Teodoro Agoncillo, The Writings and Trial of Andres Bonifacio (Manila:
Bonifacio Centennial Commission, 1963), 82-86,88,91. 521 Julito M. Kanoy, “Selfness: The Key to Success”, Philippine Values Digest, volume 5, no. 1
(1990): 17.
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The problem, however, of Kanoy is on the process of identifying and pursuing the
person’s self-interest. This is problematic because Kanoy finds the situation of the
Filipino confusing. He construes that the Filipino’s “purportedly ascetic religion and
culture have indoctrinated him with the idea that self-sacrifice and blind obedience are
the highest virtues, and that morality is synonymous with religiosity, blind faith, and
selflessness. Hence, any suggestion of self-interest offends his sanctimonious sensibilities
and gives him guilt twinges.”522
By this means, the injunction of Ramirez on the need to revolutionize the mindset
of the Filipino is very timely. Most potently, a change on the Filipino’s idea of the family
is very helpful. This is helpful in the sense that in an atmosphere of insecurity, family
security becomes the highest value. This attitude contributes to the development of a
mentality that will make the family as an obstacle to development and nation-building. Its
being an obstacle is a result of its encroachment unto the spheres of politics, economics,
education, and religion by making them as an extension of the family affairs.523
This inner transformation must be done in the context of the family. The family as
a microcosm of the society can serve as the jump off point for the re-understanding of the
family as a core Filipino value. Reflecting on the thoughts of Confucius on the
parallelism between running a state and running a family is very instructive.
The proper relation between a ruler and his minister or between a parent and child, while not being reciprocal as between equals, still benefited by the proper attitude and conduct in each case. The political and family
522 Ibid. 523 Mina Ramirez, “The Paradox of the Filipino Family: A Phenomenological Approach” in
Felicidad M. Dacayanan and Josefina Dy R. Isaac, Towards Building The Filipino Family Today (Quezon City: Bustamante Press, Inc., 1974), 32.
172
situations were treated as being analogous. The ruler or parent should love his people or children, while the minister or son should be loyal to the ruler or parent. Confucius explains the proper behavior of each. "How can he be said truly to love, who exacts no effort from the objects of his love? How can he be said to be truly loyal, who refrains from admonishing the object of his loyalty?" Confucius summarizes the art of the ruler as follows: “A country of a thousand war-chariots cannot be administered unless the ruler attends strictly to business, punctually observes his promises, is economical in expenditure, loves the people, and uses the labor of the peasantry only at the proper times of year.”524
This is one way of saying that a head of the family or that of the state is only
believable if there is consistency between his words and deeds. Understandably, for the
Chinese, to philosophize is “to measure one’s words for his deeds. In the words of
Confucius, the superior man is he who ‘acts before he speaks and then speaks according
to his action.’”525
Applying the Confucian edict to Bacungan’s attribution to the thinking of the
family as a microcosm of society: “a decision-making body; an economic group, a social
unit; and an anthropological unit”,526 is likewise very helpful.
Firstly, the family as a decision-making body should train the children to make
simple decisions to prepare them to make the big ones. Training them to make decisions
is training them for independence. Independence exists in different forms all throughout
the life of a person. It can mean standing up on one’s own two feet, making one’s own
524 “Confucius” [article online]; available from http://www.san.beck.org/CONFUCIUS4-What.html ; accessed June 2, 2005. Cf. Analects, 14:8 and 1:5. 525 Manuel B. Dy, Jr. “Philosophy and the Just Man” in Manuel B. Dy, Jr., Philosophy of Man:
Selected Readings, 2nd edition (Makati: Goodwill Trading Co., Inc, 2001), 26. Cf. Confucius, Analects II: 13.
526 Cleofe M. Bacungan, et al., 81. Cf. Lawrence Senesh, “Orchestration of Social Sciences in the Curriculum” in Irving Morrisett and William W. Stevens, Jr. (eds.), Social Science in the Schools: A Search
for Rationale (New York: Holt, Rhinehart and Winston, Inc., 1971).
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decisions, and may also mean taking responsibility for those decisions.527 Ultimately,
“independence rests on a foundation of skills that parents must help their children
practice every day.”528
Making a decision is not an effect only of how the subject perceives himself. It
has to manifest also the person’s perception of his “ability to perform in relation to
others….”529 Decision-making usually emphasizes the decision-maker’s taking
responsibility of the consequent of his action. Thus, accountability with one’s action is
given primary importance. Negatively, however, an act might have been done to the
detriment of the other. Holding accountability is praise-worthy. But, having the ability to
respond to the objective demand of the situation is more note-worthy. This idea of
responsibility is due to the person’s sincere care for the other. In like manner, when the
child becomes a grown-up and given a chance to become a leader, he can be expected to
treat his subordinates fairly and humanely.
In the Philippines, as a patriarchal society, decision-making as well as imposing
discipline is centered on the father. Psychologically, Mangubat explains that “the Filipino
is that, like a nail he needs a hammer to pound his head. We can never discipline him if
we are not firm and resolute. Freedom to him means freedom to do anything he wants.
Some amount of coercive power is needed to make him feel that over his head is a
hammer ready to pound his head if he does not conform.”530
527 Ibid., 82. 528 Ibid. Cf. Katherine C. Kersey, “Fostering Your Child’s Independence,” Better Homes and
Gardens (March 1986).
529 Paul Lewis, 40 Ways to Teach Your Child Values (Manila: Christian Literature Crusade, 2000), 21. 530 Mangubat, 298a.
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Seemingly, this contradicts the principles of democracy for it has a semblance of
authoritarianism. Nevertheless, Mendez and Jocano insist that authoritarianism as a
principle of socialization and communication is not wrong per se if it is understood in the
proper context of the Filipino. They clarify that “if we take authority to mean the right to
command, enforce obedience, then the Filipino family is no less authoritarian than any
other family in all known cultures. Thus to single it out and make it as a unique principle
as though it were dominantly and typically Filipino, is to show less familiarity.”531
Nevertheless, if by family, it is understood as the primary source of social and
economic support, then the patriarch has all the right to enforce loyalty among its
member inasmuch as to think of one’s good apart from that of the entire family is
inconceivable. Bearing in mind, however, the Confucian behavior of a ruler, the subject
will not mind being “coerced” by a just and humane ruler who always sees the good of
all. As what Lee Kwan Yew highlighted, the efficacy of instilling discipline to all is only
made possible by those who are in themselves disciplined.532
Secondly, the family, as an economic group, aside from being a producer,
distributor and consumer of goods and services, is also expected to inculcate appropriate
values and goals in dealing with money matters. The behavior of the family on matters of
spending and saving money affects the member’s valuation of it. In other words, “the
economic behavior of families can contribute to the strength and well-being of the nation
because the economy looks to the family as a market for its goods and services and as a
531 Paz Policarpio Mendez and F. Landa Jocano, The Filipino Family In Its Rural and Urban
Orientation: Two Case Studies in Culture and Education (Manila: Centro Escolar University Research and Development Center, 1974), v. 532 Benigno, “Nation Still In Denial” in Here’s the Score, The Philippine Star (March 10, 2004).
175
source of capital for not only business enterprises but also government programs and
services.”533
Moreover, in the establishment of a family business enterprise, its success, Lee-
Chua observes, is determined by three factors: a strong marital alliance, parents’
consistency and fair treatment of the children, and a good sibling relationship.534 She
perceives that a healthy family is directly proportional to a healthy family business. The
strong and loving marital alliance musters a healthy business atmosphere. This
atmosphere is more effected by sibling functions anchored on mutual regulation and
direct services brought forth by equally capable and experienced siblings. Business
usually collapses due to parents’ playing favorites in relegating responsibilities to favored
children instead of basing it on legitimate qualifications.535
In like manner, government economy cannot soar high if the government plays
favoritism as well. For instance, during the almost 14 years of authoritarian rule of Pres.
Marcos, Sison detects that
during his mandate, he did not only have a stranglehold on government, the military, and politics, but on the economy as well. He oversaw the distribution of highly lucrative virtual monopolies (trade in sugar, coconut, banana and tobacco), sensitive, government-protected industries (electricity, water, telecommunications, air transport) and infrastructure projects to his relatives and friends (many of whom were in the military as well), in a system later called "crony capitalism." As a result in 1984 and 1985, the final years of the Marcos administration, the national economy had contracted by 9% and 7.2% respectively.536
533 Bacungan, 83.
534 Queena N. Lee-Chua, Successful Family Businesses: Dynamics of Five Filipino Business
Families (Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1997), 217 – 225. 535 Ibid., 218 – 221. 536 Sison, “Business and Culture in the Philippines: A Story of Gradual Progress” (Instituto Empresa y Humanismo, Universidad de Navarra), [article on-line]; available from http://www.unav.es/ empresayhumanismo/2activ/seminario/miembros/sison/ii26/ ; accessed December 6, 2005. Cf. Donna S.
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Familism should not be taken as automatically inconsistent with economic
development as Max Weber537 perceived it. Mendoza identifies Taiwan as exemplifying
the ability to mix together family centeredness, anchored on a Confucian ethic, and
economic prosperity through what Kwang-Kuo calls as the guanxi network538. The
former further reveals that “typical organizations established in Taiwan are family
businesses, including small and medium enterprises that support big companies within
the export-processing industry. The managers and most workers in such plants are
members of the family and relatives, and as such are expected to do their share and take
only what they need from the company.”539
Thirdly, the family, as a social unit, expects its members to play their respective
roles effectively and efficiently. The playing of roles is according to which dyadic
relationship a certain member belongs. The Filipino family has three dyadic relationships,
namely, husband-wife/father-mother, parent-child, and sibling-sibling. Likewise, in the
state, Confucius perceives that the rectification of names generates good governance as to
when Duke Ching of Ch’i asked him on how to govern well, and the former said: “Let the Cueto, “Ombudsman Violation. Crony Cases Don't Lapse Under Charter”, Philippine Daily Inquirer (Nov., 19, 1998). See also, Christine Herrera, & Cueto, Donna “De Guzman: I'm A Victim Of Conspiracy”, Philippine Daily Inquirer (Oct. 29, 1998). 537 Sison takes Weber as saying that an “overly restrictive family bonds constrain the development of universal values and impersonal social ties necessary for modern business organizations. Family ties have to weaken before economic progress occurs: from the extended families of agricultural societies to the nuclear families of industrial societies, and further on to the single-parent families of post-industrial welfare societies.” Ibid. Cf. Max Weber, The Religions of China: Confucianism and Taoism (New York, The Free Press, 1951). 538 The guanxi network refers to the interlocking of Taiwanese business which has been responsible for its rapid advance. This concept does not have a universal application in the Philippines except in the Filipino-Chinese business communities. Magdalena, 12 -13. Cf. H. Kwang-Kuo, Easternization: Socio-Cultural Impact on Productivity (Tokyo, Japan: Asian Productivity Organization, 1995). 539 Ibid., 8.
177
ruler be a ruler, the minister be a minister, the father be a father, and the son be a son.”540
This means that a good government results from “the mutual discharge of
respective duties as dictated by the individual’s moral conscience and social station.”541
In other words, “with the mutual understanding between the ruler and the ruled, the
government can be conducted in complete harmony.”542 Ultimately, the ruler carries the
greatest burden of governance on his shoulders. Co explains that “Kong Zi (Confucius)
exhorted the ruler to be virtuous and to lead his people by example and moral rectitude.
Otherwise he loses his mandate to rule.”543
Ultimately, a good government is discernible whenever the leader is able to
promote the common good. By common good, it means “‘the sum total of social
conditions which allow people, either as groups or as individuals, to reach their
fulfillment more fully and more easily.’ The common good concerns the life of all.”544
Most importantly, it necessitates the exercise of prudence from each person. However,
more prudence is being asked from those who exercise the office of authority.545
Lastly, the family, as an anthropological unit, differs from one another. The
distinction is based on the differences of ideas and customs, sizes, economic status,
540 Analects (XII: 11) as cited by Prisciliano T. Bauzon, Essentials of Values Education
(Mandaluyong City: National Book Store, 1994), 75. See also, Alfredo P. Co, Philosophy of Ancient China, reprint edition (Manila: UST Publishing House, 2002), 115.
541 Co, 115. 542 Ibid. 543 Ibid., 116.
544 Rev. Robert A. Sirico and Rev. Maciej Zięba, O.P., eds. The Social Agenda: A Collection of
Magisterial Texts (Vatican City: Pontifical Council for Justice and Peace, Libreria Editrice Vaticana, 2000), 87; [book online]; available from www.thesocialagenda.org/pdfs/english.pdf; accessed April 10, 2006. Cf. Gaudium et Spes, n. 26. See also, Catechism of the Catholic Church, nn. 1906 – 1909. 545 Ibid.
178
geographical locations, and structures of the family. The aforementioned variables are
deemed “to affect experience and shape behavior”546 of the family. According to
researches, Bacungan claims that on matters of moral maturity development, and hence
proper values formation, “the best family is that which is mildly authoritarian; that is,
democratic within the structure of a stable hierarchy of authority.”547 Meaning, a family
that is excessively permissive and overly autocratic would develop a child with distorted
self-image which would likely forbid the moral maturity development of the child. On the
one hand, excessive permissiveness is expected to bring forth misconduct on the child for
lack of proper guidance. And on the other hand, an overly autocratic upbringing would
curtail the child’s chance for independent thinking, hence, being lost in the absence of
adults.
This condition makes education and civilization a primordial task of the family.
They, being a life-long process, entail “great understanding and sympathy to see children
as creatures who grow and change, who will need much tender loving care, who will
need to be disciplined or repressed at times and a great deal of judicious leaving
alone.”548 Thus, today’s father plays a very important role in the growing up of the
children for the reason that “he must stand firm as head of the family and yet radiate
546 Bacungan, 89. 547 Ibid., 89 - 90. 548 Dr. Estefania Aldaba – Lim, “The Parents in the Family” in The Filipino Family: Selected
Readings (Quezon City: Alemar – Phoenix Publishing House, 1966), 39.
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humility, understanding, kindness, sympathy, and love in the home [and] he must set an
exemplary life of honesty, integrity, and high morality.”549
Generally, even if Confucius takes running a family and running a state as
parallel, he does not stop at the family isolating it from the state. In fact, he admonishes
that “people not only loved their own parents and children, but loved the parents and
children of others as well…. All men shared their social responsibilities, and all women
had their social responsibilities and respective roles. Natural resources were fully used to
benefit all, and were not appropriated for selfish ends. People wanted to contribute their
strength and ability to society for public gain.”550 In the same end, Pope John Paul II
preaches that “by means of his work man commits himself, not only for his own sake but
also for others and with others. Each person collaborates in the work of others and for
their good. Man works in order to provide for the needs of his family, his community, his
nation, and ultimately all humanity.”551
Ultimately, even with the many infirmities of family orientation as a core value, it
still has several praiseworthy and noteworthy characteristics such as the promotion of
“sobriety, education, skills, diligence, devotion to the group rather than individual
interests, unconditional respect for hierarchy and emphasis on non-confrontational
approaches towards human relations.”552 Even so, the triumph of making the family as a
549 Dr. Gumersindo Garcia, Sr., “The Father of Today: His Role in Family Life” in Family Life
Workshop of the Philippines, Inc., The Filipino Family: Selected Readings (Quezon City: Alemar – Phoenix Publishing House, 1966), 60.
550 Co, 116.
551 Pope John Paul II, Laborem Exercens, n. 10 in Rev. Robert A. Sirico and Rev. Maciej Zięba, O.P., eds., 112. 552 Sison, “Business and Culture in the Philippines: A Story of Gradual Progress”; [article online]. Cf. Government of Singapore, Shared Values, CMD N║ 1 (1991); Anwar Ibrahim, "Complete the Asian
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national, if not an international, family depends on the positive contribution and
leadership of the elite.
Revolution", The Asian Wall Street Journal (Aug. 27, 1996);, Mohamad Mahathir, "Address to Heads of European Governments", The Economist (March 9, 1996); Kishore Mahbubani, "The Pacific Impulse", Survival, 37-1 (1995) and Can Asians Think? (Singapore, Times Books International, 1998); Tommy Koh, The Quest for World Order (Singapore: Federal Publications,1998) ; Fareed Zakaria, "Culture is Destiny: A Conversation with Lee Kuan Yew" Foreign Affairs, 73 (1994).
CHAPTER FIVE
SUMMARY, CONCLUSION, RECOMMENDATION
Summary and Conclusion
The emergence of the subject as an entity that is isolated from its environment but
having clarity through its self-assertion starts from Descartes. Ricoeur believes in the
contribution of Descartes to the Modern Philosophy and he writes that the Cartesian
Cogito is an indelible moment in the history of the emergence of being. Nevertheless, he
also recognizes that a new relationship to the subject must be established in our time.
This recognition is the impetus that drives Ricoeur in his philosophical career.
His reading of Marcel triggers the idea of remodeling the relationship of the
subject. Marcel’s intuition epitomizes ontological unity of man’s being-in-the-world.
However, Ricoeur finds Marcel’s methodology as insufficient. Although Marcel has a
major influence on Ricoeur, Ricoeur is dissatisfied with the inexactness of Marcel’s
method.
In his search for a methodology, Ricoeur encounters the concept of intentionality,
which is central to his methodological apparatus. Intentionality provides a disciplined
expression for the vague recognition of unity of experience by recognizing that
consciousness is always a consciousness of something other than itself. However, there is
a tendency for the intentional unity of experience to be immediately polarized in thought.
The tendency to objectify the intentional correlate of consciousness and oppose it to the
reflecting subject is inevitable. With this circumstance, there is a difficulty in reaching
the level of intentional unity of experience in understanding. To resolve this problem, the
bracketing or phenomenological reduction technique comes into being. With bracketing,
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the subject chooses to view experience as it in fact immediately presents itself. After
bracketing, the subject lists down faithfully its observations.
Listing down one’s observations entails using language as a medium. Here comes
Heidegger, for whom language is biased. According to him language is pre-determined
by experience. The situation of Dasein is actually the first condition that shapes
understanding which is exteriorized by language. Understanding Dasein becomes
interpretation because it always involves an act of understanding. If understanding as
interpreting presupposes the consideration of some structures, then the assertion of the
subject having an immediate and intuitive consciousness is naive.
The notion of the non-immediacy of consciousness has been supported by
Ricoeur’s understanding of Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud, for whom the immediate
consciousness of the subject vanished. For this reason, the subject is at odds with
consciousness as the latter is culturally tied. The subject is dispoliated, a circumstance
that pushes Ricoeur to liberate the subject from being lost. He wants to emphasize that
although there is no immediate consciousness, still there is a conscious subject. These
philosophers of suspicion help Ricoeur unmasks the illusion of the subject as
immediately conscious as the latter uncovers the varying symbols that intersperse in the
experiences of the subject that is reflective of the degrees of internalization of its
consciousness.
Ricoeur’s intense desire to understand the symbol is anchored on his desire to revive
the subject. Ricoeur observes that there is something in the symbolic that tells him more
about it. He defines symbol and interpretation in their relation to one another. This implies
that his study on symbols significantly leads to a more enlightened understanding of the
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subject. The interpretation of symbolisms mirrors the gradation of the subject’s going into
itself.
Ricoeur is fascinated with the symbol and finds it to be very significant. He
considers a symbol to be more than a mere sign or an icon which so concentrates on the
periphery that it becomes ordinary the moment its meaning is discovered. On the contrary,
the symbol provides food for thought. The first discovery of its meaning leads to further
discovery. There is an apparent movement or even a cycle in the unfolding of the meaning
of the symbol.
The sense of the symbol betrays its reference. Unlike the use of a univocal sign,
the ideal sense of the text in a symbolic sign can have a reference that transcends the
sense of the text. If the sense of a univocal sign can be reflected by its reference, the
symbolic sign cannot. The apparent disparity of the sense to the reference of the text
leads to interpretation. Symbolism is a very common human experience and is expressed
by the different myths and stories of the people. The very situation of a human being is
the source of such a symbolism. Experience is so vast and meaningful that oftentimes
language becomes limited and unable to express the fullness of that experience. The
profundity of human experience leads man to use symbolisms. Symbolisms are so
profound in meaning that they form an enigma whose meaning is inexhaustible. Even
then, inasmuch as a symbol hides the meaning, it can only be discovered by
interpretation. Interpretation of this kind can be deemed as backward interpretation for it
focuses more on the archaic as illustrated by the subsequent symbolic categories.
The subsequent symbolic categories are the path followed in the revival of the
subject. The three symbolic categories are the hierophanic, the oneirotic, and the poetic. The
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hierophanic exemplifies the grounding moment or interpretation as recollection. The
oneirotic embodies the moment of distanciation or interpretation as suspicion. Lastly, the
poetic demonstrates the moments of appropriation or interpretation as appropriation.
The hierophanic exemplifies the grounding moment of symbol inasmuch as it is
always related to the fundamental reality of human experience. In other words, the
interpretation of the meaning of the hierophanies must be based totally on the context or
culture of the people where the symbol is embedded because, by nature, they are objective.
They are objective because they are expressed through the common experience of the
people. Henceforth, the appropriation of their meaning depends on the shared experience of
the people.
The oneirotic, the language of desire that a dream expresses, exemplifies the
moment of distanciation because its interpretation is not solely based on the culture of the
dreamer but also on its personal human desire. Understanding the meaning of the dream
symbol is firstly anchored on the context of the dreamer for the sign of the symbol is an
expression of the common experience of the locale. However, it has to be exploded for
what appears in the dream reveals a deeper meaning than its literal presentation since
dreams are the disguised fulfillment of repressed wishes or desires.
Lastly, the poetic is the least objective and the most subjective of the three
symbolic categories. In a sense, it completely explodes the objective anchorage of the
symbol. As the articulation of the subject’s own reflection that the oneirotic excited, the
poetic expresses the linguistic nature of symbol for it places the subject at the origin of
articulate being. The image that the poetic forms becomes the new being formed in the
language of the subject. It expresses the subject by making the subject what it expresses.
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Ultimately, the poetic shows the possibility of bringing interpretation from being
backward looking or archaic to being forward looking or projective.
This being the situation, Ricoeur shifts his interest from symbol to text because of
the latter’s inherent bias to the archaic. Compared to a symbol, a text appears to be
limited. Nevertheless, it acquires intensity in character. The intensity is derived from the
characteristic of writing which opens up new and original resources for discourse.
Ricoeur has done the most to show us that reality lives by text. Technically, it is a written
discourse that is not within the control of the author. It, however, makes its own
testimony and insists upon an interpretation that appropriates in the here and now the
intention of the text or the world of the text. The said intention does not come from the
author of the text but from within the text itself. This enables the text to describe a reality
in a certain way and progressively shape it. Nonetheless, a plurality of texts is to be
expected from different competing texts. This is not a reason to be alarmed but to take
that as a possibility of re-describing the reality. This makes interpretation not anymore
archaic but forward looking.
Ricoeur’s model of the text emphasizes the idea of an interpretation that
commences at the end of a dialogue. The essential difference between the oral
conversation and the process of interpreting texts leads to the three levels of distanciation
that have a profound influence on the process of interpretation. The three levels of
distanciation are: (1) the distanciation of the text from its author; (2) the distanciation of
the text from its original audience; and, (3) the distanciation of the text from its original
situation. Among other things, this closes off the possibility of ostensible reference, that
is, the capacity of the language to refer directly to its subject matter as present. Speakers
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are understood when they point to someone and say "you or I", however in the case of the
text it may be possible to decipher who was originally meant, but the reference is no
longer limited to this original referent.
The good thing with the model of the text is on its ability to project a world.
Nevertheless, the world that the text foresees is dependent on the context of the readers.
This notion of a text, likewise, alters the usual conceptions of explanation and
understanding as dichotomous, whereby the former is conceived as the sole methodology
of the natural sciences and the latter, that of the human sciences. They now, however,
become less contradictory but complementary.
At first, in relation to explaining a text, it is simply explained in terms of its
internal relations, i.e., its structure. This orientation does not recognize the fact that the
text is born out of a certain cultural or historical context that generates it. However, as it
is said, the suspense created by explanation can be lifted and fulfill the text in speech, in a
living communication. In other words, the text is interpreted and interpretation has taken
the feature of appropriation inasmuch as in appropriation, the interpretation of a text
culminates in the self-interpretation of a subject who, from that time on, understands
himself better. To interpret now becomes following the path of thought opened up by the
text. Meaning, the subject now places itself en route towards the direction of the meaning
of the text.
This reflects what Ricoeur constantly emphasized as the ability of the text to
produce a comprehension of its phenomenon and at the same time casts light onto the
subject’s own life situation. The significance of Ricoeur's theory of interpretation lies on
its ability to combine the critique of naive consciousness with the conceptualization of
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human actions as intentional, communicative events. It therefore goes a long way towards
bridging some of the deepest objections raised by the scientistic outlook against the
method of verstehen, while retaining the latter's emphasis on a hermeneutic
understanding of social life. This bridge has been built without resorting to the
objectivism of the natural sciences and by pursuing the logic of a method that is in
concert with the unique object-subject of the human sciences.
Ultimately, the entire project of Ricoeur revolves around the project of clarifying
through reflective analysis the fact of the subject’s own existence: a heightened self-
understanding. As illustrated in the previous part of this chapter, this reflective analysis,
however, is not direct. It follows a long detour. To understand the subject, Ricoeur
follows the detour that passes through the unconscious (the semantics of desire); intuition
through critical interpretation (hermeneutics of suspicion); reason through language
(linguistics); and reflection through imagination (poetics).
Similarly, the researcher endeavors to seek a clarification on the identity of the
Filipino. Understanding the true identity of the Filipino is like understanding the meaning
of the self and is expected to help catapult the Filipino’s desired national development.
The conviction that the Filipino’s confusion regarding his identity leads to the stagnation
of the Philippines as a country , thus, his actions being unsynchronized and the desired
national development seems to be very farfetched, makes for the thoughtful consideration
of the Filipino identity a constant clamor.
Nevertheless, doing an intuitive understanding on the identity of the Filipino is
very superficial and impossible. Looking into the basic stock that makes a Filipino is next
to impossible. Looking into the characteristics that make a Filipino a 100 per cent
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Filipino is indiscernible inasmuch as the Filipino contains multi-racial influences from
Malay, Polynesian, and Indonesian to Indian, Chinese, Spanish and more recently
American and Japanese strains altogether. Henceforth, a detour has been proposed.
The Filipino value system is chosen to be the detour based on the thought of
Alejandro Roces that a nation is known by its values. His proposal is duly reflected on
Adelaida Bago’s stylized framework for integrated development in the Philippines which
anchors it on cultural values because they are seen to be greatly influential on the way of
life of the people. Mina Ramirez also corroborates her idea when the latter opines that the
values of the people are reflected on the workings of institutions inasmuch as these
institutions are externalizations of the culture of which the deepest layer are values.
Phenomenologically, the entire spectrum of the value system of the Filipino is explored.
Based on the different perspective of known authorities on Filipino value system, the
researcher comes to the point of having family orientation as the value whereby the
clarification of the Filipino identity is anchored upon.
Specifically, family orientation as a value has been chosen based on the study that
Talisayon conducted placing family orientation as the most important among the seven
clusters of Filipino values. Choosing this value is based on the idea that the importance of
the remaining six clusters of values are perceived in relation to the furtherance of the
most important value cluster – the family or kinship orientation.
Based on the analysis of various authors, family orientation as a value is seen as a
hindrance to the desired national development of the Philippines when it interferes with
the workings of institutions with supposedly universalistic value assumptions. The
pervasiveness of family orientation underscores the constitution of political dynasties,
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nepotism, family corporations and profit-making educational family corporations and
even religious organizations are not saved from the encroachment of family interests.
Corruption is likewise a disease traceable to the desire of the Filipino to secure his own
family. The aforementioned instances are known hindrances to national development.
In like manner, the aforementioned instances are under the hands of the Philippine
elite. Inasmuch as an elite is defined as those which have or may have the power to
influence the thinking of the citizenry, drive electric charges into the body politic or civil
society to wake us up, alter the power configuration of the nation, in some instances,
singly or in combination, be able to seize power at the top, then the initiative of
concretely redirecting the nation falls under their hands.
Nevertheless, education, the best avenue whereby change can be effected to the
entire body politic, is taken for granted by the elite. It has been taken for granted because
of the elite’s unconscious desire to keep the great majority of the people stay uneducated.
If they remain uneducated, then they can always be manipulated easily to whatever ends
the elite may have. If ever there is education, they are not really educated in the real sense
of the word; they are only schooled. At school, pupils are seldom taught how to think.
They are almost always asked to memorize data, concepts or information without even
knowing what they really mean. Henceforth, poverty remains pervasive in the Philippines
not because people have no money but because they remain powerless and dependent.
The great majority is used as a qualifier inasmuch as 95% of the pupils who
belong to the lower strata of the society attend the public school system. And it is a
known fact that the public school system of the Philippines is very inadequate. Politicians
do nothing about to arrest the degradation of this very important institution of the nation.
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This sector has been neglected because they have no use of it. Anyway, they send their
children to best and expensive schools to assure the latter of good education.
The family, although seen as the focal point of the Philippines’
underdevelopment, is also seen to be the facilitator of genuine national development.
Taking the cue from Camilo Osias, reflecting on one of the Filipino languages, the
Ilocano language, he realizes that an all-inclusive consciousness is imbedded in the
psyche of the Filipino waiting to be roused up. His analysis of the four personal
pronouns, first person under the nominative case of the Ilocano language comes out with
four levels that can be made as indicators of the development, attitude, and outlook of the
Filipino. Going into the four major stages in the process of broadening his concept, the
Filipino may graduate from what he calls as the Siac stage to the Data stage then to the
Dacami stage, and ultimately, to the Datayo stage. His vision is for a Filipino to move
out of the Siac stage and grow up to the Datayo stage.
This inner transformation must be done in the context of the family. The family as
a microcosm of the society can serve as the jump off point for the re-understanding of the
family as a core Filipino value by appropriating the thoughts of Confucius on the
parallelism between running a state and running a family to the Filipino thought
experience.
The success of this endeavor is seen to be decisive when the transformation is
spearheaded by the elite forces of the society. When the elite forces of the Philippine
society will lead the Philippines accordingly, that is, when there is consistency between
their words and deeds will the Philippines achieve its perennial dream of a developed
nation.
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The threefold pathway of Ricoeur’s hermeneutic phenomenology: from Husserl’s
phenomenology to the hermeneutic suspicion and eventually to the hermeneutic
appropriation is helpful in making the Filipino thoroughly understands himself. The
phenomenology of Husserl as a mode of going back to the thing itself is primarily helpful
in describing the value system of the Filipino looking at it from different angles.
Moreover, the overwhelming inferiority complex and colonial mentality of the Filipino
can be traced to the period of struggle and national consolidation whereby the ideology
that has been enculturated was the civilization of the natives. Meaning, the Filipino is
uncivilized or barbaric before the coming of the Spaniards. This has been proven
otherwise by the Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas of Morga as annotated by Rizal. This must
be one of those things to be demythologized.
Secondly, hermeneutics is like a two-pronged fork as it is animated by a double
motivation. Although it has the inherent willingness to suspect, it is nevertheless willing
to listen. In other words, as a hermeneutic of suspicion, it is concerned with the task of
smashing away the idols of false consciousness. After which, a genuine reconstruction of
the desire of the Filipino can be started. An appropriation is only made possible after an
open listening to symbol and to narrative. Consequently, creative events occur in front of
the text and will have their effect on the Filipino.
Utilizing hermeneutics of suspicion, it tries to unmask and demystify the family
being the source of almost everything in life: economic support, social status, religious
guidance, psychological assistance especially during crises and old age. The unmasking
and the demystification processes commence in order to thresh out any extraneous
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motives that make family orientation detrimental to the pursuit of nation-building and
national development most especially among the elite sector of the Philippine society.
Finally, the hermeneutics of appropriation imagines the enormous possibilities of
making family orientation as a value that suits into the project of nation-building and
national development. Appropriating the instruction of Confucius on the parallelism
between running a state and running a family makes great sense. Applying the Confucian
precepts on the fourfold function of the family – as a decision-making body, an economic
group, a social unit, and an anthropological unit, the family orientation as a core value is
never repugnant to nation-building and national development. This has been proven by
the guanxi network of Taiwan. Likewise, Japan is able to reconcile east and west value
systems because it understands its reason for being.
Recommendation
As a result of this study, the researcher states the following as its
recommendations.
A unified and clear cut study on Ricoeur’s threefold path – Husserl’s eidetic
phenomenology, hermeneutic of suspicion, and hermeneutic of appropriation – as an
approach in understanding any salient issue must be undertaken. Meaning, a sincere
utilization of this approach is helpful in threshing out the loopholes of any problem. This
is due to the fact that Ricoeur’s approach includes both an archaeological and teleological
arcs of hermeneutic inquiry.
A study utilizing Ricoeur’s approach to truly understand the role of the elite
forces of the Philippines should be made to be able to diagnose the true disease of the
Philippine society. There has been many studies already conducted to the poor sectors of
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the society but not much on the rich. Furthermore, the threefold path can also be utilized
to test whether the elite do not really lack nationalism. Looking into the history of the
Philippines, there were several instances that the elite pull back the Philippines whenever
the latter decisively attempts to move toward a nationalistic orientation. Their hand is
patently present in derailing effort towards a genuine national consolidation starting from
the days of the Katipunan to the oligarch’s persistence to maintain their economic
stranglehold and to the inability of past presidents to keep their election promises of
bringing the whole nation to its ultimate aspiration: a kasaganaan and kaginhawaan for
all people.
In the development of a syllabus in the teaching of Philippine History, the
threefold path of Ricoeur is also useful. The syllabus vis-à-vis the teaching of Philippine
History must mirror a descriptive account of Philippine history, i.e., interpreting
Philippine in a recollective manner. Secondly, historical proclamations, ordinances, and
other related edicts must be subjected to suspicion by scrutinizing them to unmask them
of ill intents. Lastly, appropriation is illustrated in allowing students to think ahead to not
make the same events recur. For instance, the ideology perpetuated during the period of
struggle and national consolidation (1565 – 1898), that is, to civilize the natives and as
taught usually by history teachers should be repudiated. Instead, the flourishing
indigenous civilization in the Philippine archipelago that Morga vividly described in the
Sucesos de las Islas Filipinas even before the coming of the Spaniards must be
accentuated. The idea that they owe their civilization from the Spaniards and other
colonizing heathens should be flushed out from their system. Through this, the Filipino
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will gain confidence unto what he can do as a person believing that he can be prosperous
as he was prosperous already even before the coming of the colonizers.
In the schools, the value of nationalism should be intensified and amplified. All
the other values should be looked at carefully as to their positive contribution to the
enhancement of nationalism as the core value taught in every school. In other words, all
the facets of nationalism – political, economic, and socio-cultural – must be inculcated
into the psyche of every Filipino, most especially to the elite. Ultimately, a continuous
battle in the framework of an unfinished revolution, i.e., nation-building and national
development must be waged and should be spearheaded and embodied by the elite.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
A. Books
Abueva, ed., Jose V. Filipino Nationalism: Various Meanings, Constant and
Changing Goals, Continuing Relevance. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1999. Agoncillo, Teodoro A. History of the Filipino People. 8th edition. Quezon City: GAROTECH Publishing, 1990. _____. Malolos: The Crisis of the Republic. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1960. _____. The Revolt of the Masses. Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1956. _____. The Writings and Trial of Andres Bonifacio. Manila: Bonifacio Centennial Commission, 1963. _____ and Oscar Alfonso. A Short History of the Filipino People. Quezon City: University of the Philippines, 1961. Alejo, Albert E., S.J. Tao Po. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University, 1990. Andres, Tomas D. Positive Filipino Value. Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1999. _____. Understanding Filipino Values: A Management Approach. Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1981. _____. Understanding the Positiveness of Filipino Values. Manila:Rex Book Store,
1996. _____.Understanding Values. Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1980. _____ and Pilar Corazon B. Ilada-Andres. Understanding the Filipino. Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1987. Antonio, Lilia F. and Ligaya Tiamson-Rubin. Sikolohiya ng Wikang Filipino.
Quezon City: C & E Publishing, Inc., 2003. Bacungan, Cleofe M., Agnes B. Vea, and Helen P. Ladera. Values Education. Quezon City: Katha Publishing Co., Inc., 1996.
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Bago, Adelaida L. Curriculum Development: The Philippine Experience. Manila: De La Salle University Press, Inc., 2001. Bauzon, Prisciliano T. Essentials of Values Education. Mandaluyong City: National Book Store, 1994. Bleicher, Josef. Contemporary Hermeneutics: Hermeneutics as Method, Philosophy
and Critique. Reprint Edition. London: Routledge, 1993. Bourgeois, Patrick L. Extension of Ricoeur’s Hermeneutics. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1975. Bulatao, Jaime. Split-level Christianity. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1966. _____. Phenomena and Their Interpretation: Landmark Essays 1957 – 1989.
Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1992. Christian Family Movement. The Filipino Family: Retrospect and Prospect. Quezon City: CFM, 1981. Church, Austin Timothy and Marcia S. Katigbak. FilipinoPersonality: Indigenous
and Cross-Cultural Studies. Manila: Dela Salle University Press, 2000. Clark, S.H. Paul Ricoeur. London: Routledge, 1990 Co, Alfredo P. Philosophy of Ancient China. Reprint edition. Manila: UST Publishing House, 2002. Constantino, Renato. The Philippines: A Past Revisited. Quezon City: Tala Publishing Services, 1975. Corpuz, Onofre D. Bureaucracy in the Philippines. Manila: Institute of Public Administration, University of the Philippines, 1957. Dacayanan, Felicidad M. and Josefina Dy R. Isaac. Towards Building The Filipino
Family Today. Quezon City: Bustamante Press, Inc., 1974. De La Costa, Horacio, S.J. “The Chinese Philosophers” in Readings in Chinese
Philosophy. Quezon City: Philosophy Department, Ateneo de Manila University, 1993. Descartes, Rene. The Philosophical Works of Descartes. Translated by Elizabeth S. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross. New York: Dover, 1955. Dy, Manuel B. Jr. Philosophy of Man: Selected Readings. 2nd edition. Makati: Goodwill Trading Co., Inc, 2001.
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Eliade, Mircea. Patterns in Comparative Religion. Translated by Rosemary Sheed. New York: Sheed and Ward, Inc., 1958. ______. The Sacred and the Profane: The Nature of Religion. Translated from the French by Williard K. Trask. New York: Harper, 1959. Enriquez, Virgilio G. Indigenous Psychology: A Book of Readings. Quezon City: Akademya ng Sikolohiyang Filipino, 1990. _____. From Colonial to Liberation Psychology: The Philippine Experience. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1992. Family Life Workshop of the Philippines, Inc. The Filipino Family: Selected
Readings. Quezon City: Alemar-Phoenix Publishing House, 1966. Fodor, James. Christian Hermeneutics: Paul Ricoeur and the Refiguring of
Theology. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995. Frege, Gottlob. On Sense and Reference. Trans. by Max Black in Translations from
the Philosophical Writings of Gottlob Frege. Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1970. Freud, Sigmund. The Basic Writings of Sigmund Freud. Translated, Edited, and Introduced by Dr. A. A. Brill. Book 2: The Interpretation of Dreams. New York: The Modern Library, 1938. Gadamer, Hans-Georg. “The Hermeneutics of Suspicion” in Hermeneutics:
Questions and Prospects. Edited by Gary Shapiro and Alan Sica. Amherst: The University of Massachusetts Press, 1984. Go, Stella P. The Filipino Family In the Eighties. Manila: Social Development Research Center, De La Salle University, 1993. Gonzalez, Andrew B., F.S.C. Language and Nationalism: The Philippine Experience
Thus Far. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1980. Gorospe, Vitaliano R., S.J. Filipino Values Revisited. Manila: National Book Store, Inc., 1988. Hahn, Lewis Edwin, ed. The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. Illinois: Open Court: 1995. Hall, Calvin S. and Gardner Lindzey. Theories of Personality. Third Edition. Manila: National Book Store, Inc., 1978. Handbook on Moral Recovery Program. No date of Publication. No publisher.
198
Heidegger, Martin. Being and Time. Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper & Row, 1962. Husserl, Edmund. Cartesian Meditations: An Introduction to Phenomenology. Translated by Dorion Cairns. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966. ______. Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology. Translated by W. R. Boyce Gibson. New York: The Macmillan Company, 1931. ______. The Idea of Phenomenology. Translated by William P. Alston and George Nakhnikian. Introduction by George Nakhnikian. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1964. Ihde, Don. Hermeneutic Phenomenology: The Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1986. Ileto, Reynaldo C. Pasyon and Revolution: Popular Movements in the Philippines:
1840 – 1900. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1979. Jervolino, Domenico. The Cogito and Hermeneutics: The Question of the Subject in
Ricoeur. Translated by Gordon Poole. Dordrecht, The Netherlands: Klumer Academic Publishers, 1990. Jocano, F. Landa. Filipino Value System: A Cultural Definition. Manila: PUNLAD Research House, Inc., 1997. _____. Filipino Social Organization: Traditional Kinship and Family Organization. Manila: Punlad Research House,1998. Karnow, Stanley. In Our Image: Americas Empire in the Philippines. New York: Random House, 1989. Kearney, Richard. Dialogues with Contemporary Continental Thinkers: The
PhenomenologicalHeritage: Paul Ricoeur, Emmanuel Levinas, Herbert
Marcuse, Stanislas Breton, Jacques Derrida. Manchester, U.K.: Manchester University Press, 1986. _____. Modern Movements in European Philosophy: Phenomenology, Critical
Theory, Structuralism. 2nd Edition. Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1994. ______. Paul Ricoeur: The Hermeneutics of Action. London: Sage Publications, 1996.
______. Twentieth-Century Continental Philosophy: Routledge History of Philosophy. Volume 8. London: Routledge, 1994.
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Kitagawa, Joseph M. and Charles H. Long, eds. Myths and Symbols: Studies in Honor of
Mircea Eliade. Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1969. Lee-Chua, Queena N. Successful Family Businesses: Dynamics of Five Filipino
Business Families. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1997. Levi-Strauss, Claude. Structural Anthropology. Translated by Claire Jacobson and Brooke Grundfest Schoepf. Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1967. Lewis, Paul. 40 Ways to Teach Your Child Values. Manila: Christian Literature Crusade, 2000. Lowe, Walter James. Mystery and the Unconscious: A Study in the Thought of Paul
Ricoeur. ATLA Monograph Series, No. 9. New Jersey: The Scarecrow Press, Inc. and The American Theological Library Association, n.d. Lynch, Frank and Alfonso de Guzman II. Four Readings on Philippine Values. Third edition, revised and enlarged. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1970. Macquarrie, John. Martin Heidegger.Virginia: John Knox Press, 1969. Majul, Cesar Adib. The Political & Constitutional Ideas of the Philippine Revolution. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 1967. Marcel, Gabriel. The Mystery of Being. Volume 1: Reflection and Mystery. Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1950. Ma. Crisol, Jose. Towards the Restructuring of Filipino Values. Manila: Office of Civil Relations, Philippine Army, n.d. Maslog, Crispin C. Communication, Values and Society. Quezon City: New Day Publishers, 1992. McCoy, Alfred, ed. An Anarchy of Families: State and Family in the Philippines. Quezon City: Ateneo de Manila University Press, 1994. Medina, Belen T.G. The Filipino Family. Quezon City: University of the Philippines Press, 2001. _____ et al. The Filipino Family: Emerging Structures and Arrangements. Quezon City: Office of Research Coordination, University of the Philippines, 1996. Mendez, Paz Policarpio and F. Landa Jocano. The Filipino Family In Its Rural and
Urban Orientation: Two Case Studies in Culture and Education. Manila: Centro Escolar University Research and Development Center, 1974.
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Mercado, Leonardo N. Elements of Filipino Philosophy. Tacloban: Divide Word University Press, 1974. _____. Filipino Thought on Man and Society. Edited by Leonardo Mercado. Tacloban City: Divine Word University Publications, 1980. _____. The Filipino Mind: The Philippine Philosophical Studies II. Manila: The Council for Research in Values and Philosophy and Divine Word Publications, 1994. Miranda, Fr. Dionisio M., SVD. Buting Pinoy: Probe Essays on Value as Filipino.
Manila: Divine Word Publications, n.d. _____. Loob: The Filipino Within. Manila: Divine Word Publications, 1989. Nolledo, Jose N. The New Constitution of the Philippines Annotated. Mandaluyong City: National Book Store, 1997. O’neill, Reginald F., S.J. Theories of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice- Hall, Inc., 1959. Osias, Camilo. The Filipino Way of Life: The Pluralized Philosophy. Boston: Ginn and Company, 1940. Panopio, Isabel S. and Realidad Santico Rolda. Society and Culture: Introduction to
Sociology and Anthropology. Quezon City: JMC Press, Inc., 2000. Quimat, Lina. Glimpses in History of Early Reprint Edition. Cebu. Cebu City: Lina Quimat, 1998. Quisumbing, Lourdes R. and Felice P. Sta. Maria. Values Education Through
History: Peace and Tolerance. Pasay City: UNESCO National Commission of the Philippines, 1996. Quito, Emerita. The State of Philosophy in the Philippines. Manila: De la Salle University Press, 1983. Ramirez, Mina. Understanding Philippine Social Realities through the Filipino
Family: A Phenomenological Approach. Manila: Asian Social Institute, 1984. Rasmussen, David M. Mythic-Symbolic Language and Philosophical Anthropology:
A Constructive Interpretation of the Thought of Paul Ricoeur. The Hague: Nijhoff, 1971. Reagan, Charles E., ed. Studies in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur. Ohio: Ohio University Press, 1979.
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Ricoeur, Paul. A Ricoeur Reader: Reflection and Imagination. Edited by Mario J. Valdes. New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, 1991.
_____. The Conflict of Interpretations: Essays in Hermeneutics. Edited by Don Ihde. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1974. _____. Fallible Man: The Philosophy of the Will. Translated by Charles Kelbley. Chicago: H. Regnery, 1965.
_____. Freud and Philosophy: An Essay on Interpretation. Translated by Denis Savage. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1970. _____. Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary. Translated with an Introductionby Erazim V. Kohak. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1966. _____. From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics, II. Evanston, Illinois: Northwestern University Press, 1991. _____. Hermeneutics and the Human Sciences: Essays on Language, Action, and
Interpretation.Edited, Translated, and Introduced by John B. Thompson. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. _____. Husserl: An Analysis of His Phenomenology. Translated by Edward G. Ballard and Lester E. Embree. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1962.
_____. Interpretation Theory: Discourse and Surplus of Meaning. Texas: The Texas University Press, 1976. _____. The Symbolism of Evil. Translated by Emerson Buchanan. Boston: Beacon Press, 1967. Schirmer, Daniel B. and Stephen Rosskam Shalom, eds. The Philippines Reader: A
History of Colonialism, Neocolonialism, Dictatorship, and Resistance.
Reprinted edition. Quezon City: Ken Incorporated, 1987. Solomon, Robert C. A History of Western Philosophy. Volume 7: Continental
Philosophy Since 1750: The Rise and Fall of the Self. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1988. Sotto III, Vicente C. The Filipino: Values and Visions. Manila: Mary Jo Educational Supply, 1996. Sutaria, Minda C., Juanita S. Guerrero and Paulina M. Castaño, eds. Philippine
Education: Visions and Perspectives. Manila: National Book Store, Inc., 1989.
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Thompson, John B. Critical Hermeneutics: A Study in the Thought of Paul Ricoeur
and Jurgen Habermas. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. Timbreza, Florentino T. Filipino Values Today. Mandaluyong City: National Book Store, 2003. _____. Pilosopiyang Pilipino. Manila: Rex Book Store, 1982. Van den Hengel, John W. The Home of Meaning: The Hermeneutics of the Subject
of Paul Ricoeur. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, Inc., 1982. Weber, Max. The Religions of China: Confucianism and Taoism. New York, The Free Press, 1951. B. Periodicals
Abel, Olivier. “Ricoeur’s Ethics of Method.” Philosophy Today 37 (Spring 1993): 23 – 30. Abueva, Jose Veloso. “Ang Wikang Pambansa Bilang Instrumento ng Repormang Panlipunan at Pagkakaisa ng Bayan.” CEAP Perspective 10 (March 1990): 26 – 29. _____. “What Are We in Power For?: The Sociology of Graft and Corruption.” Philippine Sociological Review 18, nos. 3 – 4 (July – October 1970): 203 – 208. Alegre, Edilberto N. “Language and Power.” Philippine Studies 32 (1984): 77 – 106. Amyot, Jacques. “The problem of Values in Social Anthropology.” Philippine
Sociological Review 7, no. 4 (October 1959): 1 – 6. Banzon – Bautista, Ma. Cynthia Rose. “Culture and Urbanization: The Philippine Case.” Philippine Sociological Review 46, no. 3 & 4 (1998): 21 – 45. Barral, Mary Rose. “Paul Ricoeur: The Resurrection as Hope and Freedom” Philosophy Today 29 (Spring 1985): 72 – 82. Bednarsky, Jules. “Two Aspects of Husserl’s Reduction: Bracketing and Reflection.” Philosophy Today 4 (1960): 208-223. Benigno, Teodoro. “Quo vadis, Philippines?” Here’s the Score, The Philippine Star. September 1, 2003. _____. “Nation Still In Denial.” Here’s the Score, The Philippine Star. March 10, 2004.
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_____. “The Philippines’ Elites.” Here’s the Score, The Philippine Star. July 20, 2001. Borlaza, Gregorio. “Ang Pag-unawa at Pag-alam sa Kapaligirang Sikolohikal ng Pilipino.” PchU Journal of Educational Research 13 (March 1977): 2 – 12. Bourgeois, Patrick L. “Ethics at the Limit of Reason: Ricoeur and Deconstruction” Philosophy Today 41 (Supplement 1997): 142 – 152. _____. “Hermeneutics of Symbols and Philosophical Reflection: Paul Ricoeur.” Philosophy Today 15 (Winter 1971): 231-241. _____. “Paul Ricoeur’s Hermeneutical Phenomenology.” Philosophy Today 16 (Spring 1972): 20 – 27. _____. “The Intent and the Living Present: Ricoeur and Derrida Reading Husserl” Philosophy Today 37 (Spring 1993): 31 – 37. Bourgeois, Patrick L. and Frank Schalow. “Hermeneutics of Existence: Conflict and Resolution.” Philosophy Today 31 (Spring 1987): 45-53. Buenaventura, Amparo S. “Socio-Cultural Aspect of Language.” Philippine
Sociological Review 13, no. 4 (October 1965): 219 – 222. Bulatao, Jaime S.J. “Split-Level Christianity.” Philippine Sociological Review 13, No. 2 (April 1965): 119 – 121. Carino, Ledivina V. “The Values We Live By: The Congruence and Distribution of Values in Academe with Filipino Values and Goal of National Development.” Philippine Sociological Review 45, nos. 1 – 4 (January – December 1997): 159 – 188. Cartagenas, Aloysius Lopez. “An Ethical Inquiry on the Social Relevance of Liberal Education.” USC Graduate Journal XVI, no. 2 (February 2000): 11 – 26. Cullen, Vincent G. “National Development Versus the People’s Welfare: The Case of Bukidnon.” Philippine Studies 32 (1984): 335 – 43. Cushner, Nicholas P. and John A. Larkin. “Royal Land Grants in the Colonial Philippines (1571 – 1626): Implications for the Formation of a Social Elite.” Philippine Studies 26 (1978): 102 – 11. Daigler, Matthew A. “Being as Act and Potency in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur” Philosophy Today 42 (Winter 1998): 375 – 85.
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Dauenhauer, Bernard P. “Ricoeur and Political Identity.” Philosophy Today 39 Spring 1995): 47 – 55. David, Randolf S. Political Dynasties: Major Poll Issue. Philippine Daily Inquirer. April 24, 1995. De Zamora, J.P. “The Conquerors As Seen By the Conquered.” Translated by William Henry Scott. Philippine Studies 34 (1986): 493 – 506. Epstein, Fanny. “Beyond Determinism and Irrationalism: Reflections On Ricoeur’s Freedom and Nature: The Voluntary and the Involuntary.” Philosophy Today 11 (Spring 1967): 38-46. Esplanada, Jerry. Challenge to Ramos: Ban Political Dynasties – RAM. Philippine
Daily Inquirer. December 26, 1994. Estioko, Leonardo R. “Liberal and Nationalist Higher Education.” USC Graduate
Journal 12, No. 2 (March 1996): 63 – 70. Evangelista, Susan. “Carlos Bulosan and Third World Consciousness.” Philippine
Studies 30 (1982): 44 – 58. Friend, Theodore. “Revolution in the Philippines, 1983 – 86: Forces, Sources, and Perspectives.” Philippine Studies 35 (1987): 357 – 68. Gerhart, Mary. “Imagination and History in Ricoeur’s Interpretation Theory.” Philosophy Today 23 (Spring 1979): 51 – 69. Gisel, Pierre. “Paul Ricoeur: Discourse Between Speech and Language.” Philosophy
Today 21 (Winter 1977): 446-457. Gonzalez, Andrew, F.S.C. “English Language Teaching and the New Constitution: Problems and Prospects.” Philippine Studies 36 (1988): 485 – 93. Gorospe, Vitaliano R. “Philippine Church and Government on Population.” Philippine Studies 36 (1988): 233 – 40. _____. “Power and Responsibility: A Filipino Christian Perspective.” Philippine Studies 36 (1988): 75 – 87. Guerrero, Milagros C. “Understanding Philippine Revolutionary Mentality.” Philippine Studies 29 (1981): 240 – 56. Healy, Gerald W. “Is Revolution Always Contrary to Morals?” Philippine Studies 27 (1979): 521 – 526.
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Hollnsteiner, Mary R. “Some Principles of Culture Change and Their Relation to the Philippines.” Philippine Sociological Review 6, no. 1 (January 1958): 1 – 7. Ileto, Reynaldo C. “Critical Issues in ‘Understanding Philippine Revolutionary Mentality’.” Philippine Studies 30 (1982): 92 – 119. Jocano, F. Landa. “Experience and Perspective in a Slum Neighborhood: An Anthropological View.” Philippine Sociological Review 21, nos. 3 – 4 (July – October 1973): 223 – 228. Jose, F. Sionil., ed. “Culture Change and Philippine Values” [Solidarity Seminar Series]. Solidarity, nos. 108 – 109, 1986. Joy, Morny. “Rhetoric and Hermeneutics.” Philosophy Today 32 (Winter 1988): 273- 285. Kanoy, Julito M. “Selfness: The Key to Success.” Philippine Values Digest 5, no. 1 (1990): 13 – 23. Kellner, Hans. “`As Real As It Gets….’ Ricoeur and Narrativity” Philosophy Today 34 (Fall 1990): 229 – 242. Lapeña, Jose Florencio Fabella Jr. “Halo-halo Reflections: The Filipino Identity and Interdependence, Our Children and Our Common Future.” Philippine
Journal of Education 69 (March 1991): 438 – 440, 473 – 75, 478. Ligo-Ralph, Vivian. “Some Theses Concerning the Filipino Value System.” Philippine Quarterly of Culture and Society 18 (1990): 149 – 161. Mangubat, Emmanuel. “Basic Considerations For Attaining a Truly Filipino National Identity.” Philippine Journal of Education 60 (December 1981): 297 – 298. Mataragnon, Rita H. “God of the Rich, God of the Poor.” Philippine Studies 32 (1984): 5 – 26. McCoy, Alfred W. “Culture and Consciousness in a Philippine City.” Philippine Studies 30 (1982): 157 – 203. Miralao, Virginia A. “The Family, Traditional Values and the Sociocultural Transformation of Philippine Society.” Philippine Sociological Review 45, Nos. 1 – 4 (January – December 1997): 189 – 215. Montaño, Galo A. “Estioko’s ‘The Philippines: Privileged and Confused – Some Insights.” USC Graduate Journal 14, No. 2 (March 1998): 48 – 54.
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Mulder, Niels. “Cultural Process in Lowland Christian Filipino Society.” Philippine
Studies 40 (1992): 348 – 60. _____. “Filipino Culture and Social Analysis.” Philippine Studies 42 (1994): 80 – 90. _____. “Localization and Philippine Catholicism.” Philippine Studies 40 (1992): 240 – 54. _____. “Philippine Textbooks and the National Self-Image.” Philippine Studies 38 (1990): 84 – 102. Muldoon, Mark. “Ricoeur’s Ethics: Another Version of Virtue Ethics? Attestation is not a Virtue?” Philosophy Today 42 (Fall 1998): 301 – 309. Murphy, Dennis. “Time to Study the Rich” in Commentary. The Philippine Daily
Inquirer. May 18, 2004. Ocampo, Ambeth. “Rizal’s Morga and Views of Philippine History.” Philippine Studies 46 (1998): 184 – 214. Parfitt, Matthew. “Reading Poetry with Ricoeur’s Dialectical Hermeneutics.” Budhi, no. 1 (1997): 79-99. Pellauer, David. “Time and Narrative and Theological Reflection” Philosophy Today 31 (Fall 1987): 262 – 286. Pertierra, Raul. “The Miseducation of the Filipino.” Commentary, The Philippine Daily
Inquirer. July 14, 2000. PJE Point of View. “The Dilemma of Our Search for National Identity.” Philippine
Journal of Education 53 (March 1975): 509 – 10. Rafael, Vicente L. “Revising Colonial History.” Philippine Studies 37 (1989): 367 – 71. Reagan, Charles E. “The Self as an Other” Philosophy Today 37 (Spring 1993): 3 – 22.
Ricoeur, Paul. “From Existentialism to the Philosophy of Language.” Philosophy Today 17 (Summer 1973): 88-96. _____. “From Metaphysics to Moral Philosophy” Philosophy Today 40 (Winter 1996): 443 - 58. _____. “History as Narrative and Practice” Philosophy Today 29 (Fall 1985): 213 – 222.
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_____. “In Memoriam Emmanuel Levinas” Philosophy Today 40 (Fall 1996): 331 – 333. _____. “Narrated Time” Philosophy Today 29 (Winter 1985): 259 – 272. _____. “Structure-Word-Event.” Philosophy Today 12 (Summer 1968): 114-129. _____. “The Fragility of Political Language.” Philosophy Today 31 (Spring 1987): 35-44. _____. “The Power of Speech: Science and Poetry” Philosophy Today 29 (Spring 1985): 59 -70. _____. “The Symbol… Food For Thought.” Philosophy Today 3 (April 1960): 196- 207. Rodell, Paul A. “Image Versus Reality: A Colonialist History.” Philippine Studies 37 (1989): 509 – 16. Romualdez, Norberto. “Our Common Tongue.” Philippine Sociological Review 8, no. 4 (December 1936): 301 – 307. Romulo, Carlos P. “Our National Identity.” University College Journal 5 (First Semester 1963 – 64): 3 – 12. Rosario-Braid, Florangel. “Communication, Peace and Understanding in a Philippine Context.” Philippine Studies 32 (1984): 441 – 57. San Juan, Eric A. “Making Filipino History in a ‘Damaged Culture’.” Philippine
Sociological Review 37, No. 1 – 2 (January – June 1989): 1 – 11. Santiago, Cayetano Jr. “Welfare Functions of the Filipino Family.” Philippine
Sociological Review 1, no. 1 (August 1953): 12 – 15. Schwalbenberg, Henry M. “Class Conflict and Economic Stagnation in the Philippines: 1950 – 72.” Philippine Studies 37 (1989): 440 – 50. Scott, William H. “Class Structure in the Unhispanized Philippines.” Philippine Studies 27 (1979): 137 – 59. _____. “Filipino Class Structure in the Sixteenth Century.” Philippine Studies 28 (1980): 142 – 75. Shahani, Leticia R. “National Character and National Development.” Focus
Philippines 1 (July 1973): 6 – 7.
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Singh, Tej Pratap. “Some Impressions on Indian and Filipino Value Systems.” Philippine Sociological Review 13, no. 4 (October 1965): 210 – 215. Smitheram, Verner. “Man, Mediation and Conflict in Ricoeur’s Fallible Man.” Philosophy Today 25 (Winter 1981): 357 – 369. Stewart, David. “Paul Ricoeur and the Phenomenological Movement.” Philosophy
Today 12 (Winter 1968): 227-35. Stewart, John David. “Paul Ricoeur’s Phenomenology of Evil.” International
Philosophical Quarterly IX, no. 4 (December 1969): 572-89. Suazo, Ruby S. “English Language Teaching: A Philosophical Consideration.” Nexus VII, no. 2 (July 2002): 67 – 70. _____. “Paul Ricoeur on Appropriation: The Way to Rediscover the Role of Subjectivity in Understanding.” USC Graduate Journal 16, No. 2 (February 2000): 53 – 63. _____. “Ricoeur’s Hermeneutic Phenomenology”. Diwa: Studies in Philosophy and
Theology 29, No. 1 (May 2004): 74 – 95. _____. “The Appropriation of the Meaning of Written Discourse: The Way to Liberate the Subject.” Nexus, VI, No. 1 (January 2001): 10 – 19. Sweeney, Robert. “A Survey of Recent Ricoeur – Literature.” Philosophy Today, 29 (Spring 1985): 38 – 58. Szanton, M. Cristina Blanc. “The Uses of Compadrazgo: Views From a Philippine Town.” Philippine Sociological Review 27, no. 3 (July 1979): 156 – 175. Tan, Allen L. “Values Research in the Philippines.” Philippine Studies 45 (1997): 560 – 69. Terrenal, Quintin C. “`Why is Pinoy Pinoy?’ (The Root of Filipino Identity)” USC
Graduate Journal 10, No. 1(September 1993): 1 – 2-. Van den Hengel, John W. “Can There Be A Science of Action?” Philosophy Today, 40 (Summer 1996): 235 – 250. Ventura, Elizabeth R. “What Are Families For?” Philippine Sociological Review, 42, no. 1 – 4 (January – December 1994): 9 – 15. Vergote, Antoine. “Folk Catholicism: Its Significance, Value and Ambiguities.” Philippine Studies 30 (1982): 5 – 26.
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C. Monograph
Ramirez, Mina. “Dominant and Popular Cultural Systems in the Philippines.” Reflections on Culture. Occasional Monograph 2. Manila: Asian Social Institute, 1991. _____. “Toward a Revolution of Mindsets: A Critique of the Present Socio-Cultural System.” Reflections on Culture. Occasional Monograph 2 Manila: Asian Social Institute, 1991.
D. Book Reviews
Kaplan, Roberto B. Review of Language and Nationalism: The Philippine
Experience Thus Far, by Andrew B. Gonzalez, F.S.C. Philippine Studies 30 (1982): 120 – 24. Lynch, Frank. Review of Compradrinazgo: Ritual Kinship in the Philippines, by Donn V. Hart. Philippine Studies 27 (1979): 104 – 107.
E. Dissertation Abstracts
Afzal, Cameron Charles. “Time Revealed: The Eschatology of the Book of Revelation Chapters 6 -7.” Dissertation Abstract International. 55 (September 1994): 603A. Anderson, Pamela. “Paul Ricoeur’s Philosophy of the Will: The Contribution of Ricoeur’s Philosophical Project to Contemporary Theological Reconstruction.” Dissertation Abstract International. 53 (January 1993): 2420A. Brown, David Donald. “Ricoeur’s Narrative Methodology and the Interpretation of Life History Texts.” Dissertation Abstract International. 51 (January 1991): 2540A. Cobb, Kelton Alexander. “Theology of Culture: Reflections on the Ethics of Tillich, Troeltsch, and Ricoeur.” Dissertation Abstract International. 56 (October 1995): 1399A. Dimare, Philip Christopher. “Hermeneutical Suspicions: The Movement within Paul Ricoeur’s Phenomenology.” Dissertation Abstract International. 53 (December 1992): 1970A. Elkins, William Wesley. “Learning to Say Jesus. Narrative, Identity, and Community: A Study of the Hermeneutics of Josiah Royce, Hans Frei, George Lindbeck,
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Paul Ricoeur and the Gospel of Mark.” Dissertation Abstract International. 54 (December 1993): 2191A. Gross, Nancy Lammers. “A Re-examination of Recent Homiletical Theories in Light of the Hermeneutical Theory of Paul Ricoeur.” Dissertation Abstract
International. 53 (November 1992): 1546A. Keat, Marilyn Sterner. “Moral Education: Toward New Foundations in the Hermeneutic Synthesis of Aristotle and Kant.” Dissertation Abstract
International. 52 (July 1991): 108A. Kim, Duk Ki. “A Postmodern Ethical-Political Interpretation of Jesus’ Sayings and Parables in Light of Derrida, Foucault, and Ricoeur.” Dissertation Abstract
International. 53 (December 1992): 1960A. Knutsen, Mary M. “Beyond God the Father: Toward a Trinitarian Theology of the Cross. The Challenge of Mary Daly and Resources in the Works of Juergen Habermas and Paul Ricoeur for Contemporary Christian Theology.” Dissertation Abstract International. 57 (January 1997): 3086A. Kubias, Craig Owen. “The Emergence of Metaphor Thoery in Religious Thought: 1965 – 1980.” Dissertation Abstract International. 52 (November 1991): 1781A. McLean, Mary Lehman. “Portrait of the Artist as an Old Woman: Tillie Olsen’s Metaphor in ‘Tell Me A Riddle’ as Understood Through Paul Ricoeur’s ‘Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Surplus of Meaning’.” Dissertation
Abstract International. 52 (August 1991): 550A. Payne, Michael W. “The Bible as ‘Poem’. Reconnoitering Ricoeur: From Symbol to Metaphor to narrative, the Poetic Function of Religious Language in the Philosophy of Paul Ricoeur.” Dissertation Abstract International. 52 (November 1991): 1789A. Price, David Walter. “Heresiarchs of History: Carlos Fuentes, Michael Tournier, and Salman Rushdie.” Dissertation Abstract International. 53 (October 1992): 1152A. Pucci, Edi. “The Longing of the Self: Ricoeur on Personal Identity.” Dissertation
Abstract International. 55 (May 1995): 3536A. Reed, Donald E. “Naming God in Paul Ricoeur: The Religious Uses of Metaphor and Analogy.” Dissertation Abstract International. 59 (August 1998): 526A. Rogers Horn, Patrick Neil. “The Unity of Language and Religious Belief: Gadamer and Wittgenstein.” Dissertation Abstract International. 60 (December 1999): 2089A.
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Salsman, Scott Alexander. “Paul Ricoeur’s Three-fold Mimesis: A Paradigm for Narrative Preaching.” Dissertation Abstract International. 58 (September 1997): 937A. Theodorou, Stephanie. “Epistemology, Ontology and Semantics: A Critique of Paul Ricoeur’s Theory of Metaphor.” Dissertation Abstract International. 59 (January 1999): 2565A. Turnau, Theodore Arthur III. Re-imagining Ricoeur: Popular Culture As Discursive Text, metaphor, and Narrative.” Dissertation Abstract International. 60 (December 1999): 2098A. Venema, Henry Isaac. “Paul Ricoeur’s Interpretation of Selfhood and Significance for Philosophy of Religion.” Dissertation Abstract International. 59 (February 1999): 3040A.
F. Unpublished Materials
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215
APPENDIX A
The Role of Education in Integrative Development
Adapted from Adelaida Bago, Curriculum Development: The Philippine Experience. Manila: De La Salle University Press, Inc., 2001.
Economic Growth
Environmental Protection
Social Justice
Peace & Order
Health
International Cooperation
INTEGRATED
DEVELOPMENT
E
D
U
C
A
T
I
O
N
C
O
M
M
U
N
I
C
A
T
I
O
N
CULTURAL
VALUES
Sustainable Equitable
Spiritually uplifting Socially Integrating
216
APPENDIX B
Adapted from Prospero R. Covar. “Unburdening Philippine Society of Colonialism” in Lourdes R. Quisumbing and Felice P. Sta. Maria. Values Education Through History: Peace and Tolerance. Pasay
City: UNESCO National Commission of the Philippines, 1996.
Diachronic
General Framework
for the Study of
Philippine Society
and Culture
Formative Period
0.5 N – 1565
Period of Struggle
and National
Consolidation
1565 - 1898
Period of Cultural
Solidarity
1898 – 1998
and beyond
Allocation of goods
and services
Communalistic Exploitative and
Commercial
Efforts towards equitable distributive system
Allocation of Power and authority
Consensual Authoritarian Pendulum shift: Centralization to Decentralization
Sy
nch
ron
ic
Ideological Enculturation
Well-being of the
Sakop or ward
“Civilizing of the
Natives”
National interest and general welfare
217
APPENDIX C
FILIPINO CULTURE OF INSECURITY
(System of Patterned Response in Coping with Insecurities)
HISTORICAL
DIMENSIONS
OF PHILIPPINE
SOCIAL REALITY
BARANGAY FORM
OF SOCIAL
ORGANIZATION
(Source of Small Group-Orientation)
LONG COLONIAL
STATUS
(Confused self-identity)
UNBALANCED
SOCIAL
STRUCTURES
(Family Insecurity)
DESIRABLE
VALUES
(IDEAL CULTURE)
• Extended Family
• Harmonious Relationships
• Smooth Inter-Personal Relationships
(pakikisama) • Bayanihan
(Mutual Help)
• Christianity
• Democracy
• School Education (formal schooling)
• Family Self-sufficiency
• Family
Security
AS VALUES
OPERATE
(REAL CULTURE)
• Distrust of other groups/ families (tayo-tayo; kanya-kanya)
• “Pakikisama” –
a way to prevent conflict
• Participation in
institutions subordinated to interest of small groups
• Emulation of Western forms, approaches, products
• Attitude of
uncritical imitation
• Educated or
modernizing elite alienated from the great majority
• Indigenous and western-imbibed values subordinated to value of economic security.
• Exploitation of
religious sentiments
• Democratic
forms (like elections/ committees) may be used for interests of families or small groups
Adapted from Mina Ramirez, Understanding Philippine Social Realities through the Filipino Family: A
Phenomenological Approach (Manila: Asian Social Institue, 1984), 40.
218
APPENDIX D
INTEGRATION OF TRADITION & MODERNITY
(The Two Value Systems)
• PROMOTION OF LIFE FOR ALL
Adapted from Mina M. Ramirez, “The Dominant and Popular Cultural Systems in the Philippines” in Reflections on Culture (Manila: Asian Social Institute, 1991), 20.
DEMOCRACY GINHAWA
PANANALIG SA DIYOS
WESTERN-IMBIBED (LOWLAND PHILIPPINES)
TRADITIONAL
SYNTHESIZING VALUES
FREE ENTERPRISE PAKIKIPAGKAPWATAO HINGA LOOB
FORMAL EDUCATION BUHAY
CHRISTIANITY
MAKA-TAO MAKA-DIYOS
MAKA-BAYAN
219
APPENDIX E
DIAGRAM SHOWING CONTRAST BETWEEN
EXOGENOUS AND INDIGENOUS MODELS
Surface Model
(Conscious)
Deeper Model
(Subconscious)
Legal Formal “rigid” (thru channels Confrontational Individual merit
Internal incongruence
Customary Non-formal Flexible Non-confrontational consensus
220
APPENDIX F
DECS VALUES EDUCATION FRAMEWORK
Source: Minda C. Sutaria, Juanita S. Guerrero and Paulina M. Casiño, eds. Philippine Education: Visions
and Perspectives. The DECS Values Education Framework (Manila: National Bookstore, 1989), 117 as adapted by Adelaida L. Bago, Curriculum Development: The Philippine Experience (Manila: De La Salle University Press, Inc., 2001), 133.
PHYSICAL HEALTH Physical Fitness Cleanliness Harmony with material universe Beauty and Art
INTELLECTUAL TRUTH Knowledge Creative and Critical Thinking
MORAL LOVE Integrity / Honesty Self-Worth / Self-esteem Personal Discipline
A S S E L F
SPIRITUAL SPIRITUALITY Faith in God
SOCIAL Family
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY Mutual Love / Respect Fidelity Responsible Parenthood
Society Concern for others / Common Good Freedom / Equality Social Justice / Respect for Human Rights Peace / Active Non-violence Popular Participation
ECONOMY ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY Thrift / Conservation of resources Work Ethic Self-reliance Productivity Scientific and Technological knowledge Vocational Efficiency Entrepreneurship
H U M A N
P E R S O N
I N C O M M U N I T Y
POLITICAL NATIONALISM Common identity National Unity Esteem of National Heroes Commitment Civic Consciousness / Pride “Bayanihan” / Solidarity Loyalty to country GLOBAL SOLIDARITY International Understanding and Cooperation
H U M A N
D I G N I T Y
221
APPENDIX G
CULTURE CLASH IN FILIPINO FORMAL AND
NON-FORMAL ORGANIZATIONS
I. Institutional Demands
Cultural Interpretations
A. Community (non-formal)
Bureaucracy (formal)
Kinship loyalty Familism Friends Prompt service Elderly concern Strictness (discipline)
Nepotism Favoritism Cronies Personalism Autocratism Authoritarianism
B. Bureaucracy (formal)
Community (non-formal)
According to rules Thru channels Individualism Frankness According to merit
Red tape Bureaucratic Unconcerned Rudeness No sympathy
II. Cultural Demands
Institutional Interpretations
A. Community (non-formal)
Bureaucracy (formal)
Gift-giving Social obligations Facilitating things Conformity Bahala (responsibility) Sangguni (consultation) Asa (hope) Awa (sympathy) Utang-na-loob (obligation)
Bribery Unreasonable demands Influence-peddling Lack of initiatives Fatalism Lack of leadership Dependency Petty sentimentalism Corruption
CURRICULUM VITAE
Name: RUBY S. SUAZO Date of Birth: JANUARY 9, 1975 Place of Birth: DAVAO CITY
EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT:
DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY IN PHILOSOPHY University of San Carlos, Cebu City 2006 M.A. PHILOSOPHY Christ the King Mission Seminary, Quezon City 1998 A.B. PHILOSOPHY Christ the King Mission Seminary, Quezon City 1996 SECONDARY EDUCATION Assumption Academy of Compostela Compostela, Compostela Valley Province 1991 ELEMENTARY EDUCATION Compostela Central Elementary School Compostela, Compostela Valley Province 1987
WORK EXPERIENCE:
2004 – present Assistant Professor II Philosophy Department University of San Carlos, Cebu City 1999 – present Instructor I Department of Humanities, Social Sciences, and Electives Cebu Normal University, Cebu City 1997 – 1999 Junior Instructor Philosophy Department University of San Carlos, Cebu City