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OLIVIER ROY

Globalised IslamThe Search for a New Ummah

HURST & COMPANY, LONDON


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6THE MODERNITY OF AN ARCHAICWAY OF THINKING:

NE0 FUNDAMENTALISM

If contemporary forms of religiosity among Muslims (and Chris-tians too) have a number of patterns in common (individualisation,the quest for self-realisation, the rethinking of Islam outside theframework of a given culture, and the recasting of the Muslimummah in non-territorial terms), how do we distinguish betweenopen and liberal forms of Islam on the one hand and fundamen-talist and radical ones on the other? From Pakistan's madrasas toIslamic bookshops in Paris or mosques in London, via hundreds ofwebsites, a specific form of fundamentalism is spreading, which Icall neofundamentalism.'By neofundamentalism I mean a common intellectual matrix

that can nevertheless be manifested in various political attitudes.If all radical Islamic groups are indisputably neofundamentalist inreligious terms, many fundamentalist elements are simply conser-vative and law-abiding, even if they explicitly condemn the wes-ternisation of Islam. I refer here not to a structured movementarticulated around a coherent doctrine, but to a form of religiositythat has spread among different milieus. Moderate Muslims callit Wahhabism by referring to the official creed of Saudi Arabia,while most of thos'e involved prefer to call themselves Salafis (thatis;'followers of the pious ancestors'). But others (like the Tablighi)reject such .denominations and simply call themselves Muslims.Neofundamentalists by definition reject the idea that there can bedifferent schools of thought and consider themselves the only trueMuslims, refusing to.be labelled as one specific group among the

1. Olivier Roy, The Failure of Po l it ic a l I s lam , Cambridge, MA: Harvard Univer-sity Press, 1995.232

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The Moderni ty o f a n A r ch aic W ay o f Thinking 233others. Their claim goes with their propensity for polemics andanathema among people who have a lot in common (for example,Salafiscriticising Tablighi, andWahhabis criticising self-proclaimedWestern Salafis).Without doubt the most-used nomenclature nowadays is'Salafi'.

The term Salafismwasused atthe end ofthe nineteenth century todesignate a reform movement initiated byJamal ad-Din aI-Afghani.He strove to reform Islam in order to adapt it to the challenge ofcolonisation and westernisation. But Afghani was more an activistthan a theologian. His callfor a return to the true tenets of Islamwas a means of castigating the backwardness of the religious estab-lishment rather than an appeal for the implementation of sharia . Infact there is little in common between Jamal ad-Din al-Afghaniand Mullah Omar, leader of the Taliban,The historical Salafimovement was the forerunner of the Mus-

lim Brotherhood and the Islamists,for whom it remains a referencepoint. In his book Aux sources du r e nou u ea u mu sulman , Tariq Rama-dan advocates a return to the 'founding fathers', from al-Afghanito al-Banna, with a view to integrating Muslims in the West.2Salafismwas originally meant to answer the challenge of the West.But 'Salafi' no longer refers to a global political project to reformand modernise Muslim societies. The idea is to ignore the West,Salafismis now associated with a conservative program of purify-ing Islam from cultural influences (from traditional Muslim socie-ties aswell as from the West). Contemporary Salafis have little incommon with their predecessors, but much in common with theWaliliabis.They often explicitly condemn the traditional Salafiyya(seethe work of the Yemeni Sheikh Muqbil).3 Thus the use of theterm 'Salafi' is historically misleading and I prefer the less elegantbut more accurate 'neofundamentalism',Why 'neo'? The callfor a return to the true tenets ofIslam isnot

new. Rejection of sectarian affiliations, of the different schools oflaw,of theology and philosophy, in favour of a strict return to theKoran and the Sunnah is a perennial feature of Islamic fundamen-talism. But there are some new elements that make a difference:

2. Tariq Ramadan, A ux s ou rc es d u r en ou ve au m us ul ma n, Paris: Fayard, 1998.3. Prancois Burgat and Muhammad Sbitli, 'Les SalafisauYemen ou ... Iamod-

emisation malgre tout' [ 'Salafis in Yemen or ... Modernisation after All'],Ch r o ni que s y e rm l n it e s, 2002 ( ).


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23 4 The Modernity o f a n A r ch aic W ay o f T hi nk in gcontemporary neofundamentalism is coping with deterritorialisa-tion - the end of Dar-ul-Islam as a geographical entity. Even ifit retains a traditional terminology, neofundamentalism explicitlydealswith a new situation. The discrepancy between, on the onehand, its 'closed' terminology and vision and, on the other, thetotally new situation it addressesis not a contradiction. As we shallsee,neofundamentalisrn is even better adapted to globalisation thanmany other forms of Islam. It has internalised and addressed thechanging forms of religiosity.It deals with a westernisation that isnow at the core and no longer at the frontiers ofIslam. Conversely,it is also dealing with a religion that is no longer embedded in agiven society and thus is open to reformation. There are,of course,many other new elements, many of which we have already dis-cussed (individualisation, the crisisof authority and knowledge). Inany case,the debate on the differences in formal identity of tradi-tional forms of Islamic fundamentalism and neofundamentalism isobscuring a profound mutation in religiosity.

SOURCES AND ACTORS OF NEOFUNDAMENTALISMNeofundamentalism isnot a structured organisation or even a pre-ciseschool of thought; it isa trend, a state ofmind, a dogmatic rela-tion to the fundamentals of the religion. It thrives in very differentand evenopposing contexts, from former Muslim Brothers to theTablighi Jama'at and Wahhabis.The main trend calls itself Salafi,and includes the SaudiWahhabis, even ifmany Salafiswould notaccept being called by that name. (By the same token,Wahhabismis not self-named; outsiders bestowed the term on the followersofAbdul Wahhab.) The Salafifamily includes most of the militantgroups, such asthe Taliban inMghanistan, or the Ahl-i Hadith inPakistan, but also more integrated and conservative associations,like the different Ahl al Sunnah wal jama'at in Britain and the-United States.The politically radical wing of neofundamentalismincludes the Qutbist movements of the 1970s (from SayyidQutb),the Algerian GIA, Al Qaeda and the Pakistani radical groups likeJayash-e-Muhammad or Sipah-e-Sahaba, which consider jihad tobe a personal religious duty, and are therefore often accurately re-ferred to as 'Salafi-jihadist'." Many independent and sometimes4. The expression is common in the Pakistani pr ess, but is now widely used

S o ur ce s a nd a ct or s c if necifundamentalism 23 5self-taught preachers are neofundamentalist, whether conservativeor jihadi (such asAbu Harnza al-Masri and Ornar Bakri Muham-mad in London). Other less-known preachers havebuilt their con-stituency mainly through the internet, and of these, interestinglymany areconverts and often black:Sheikh Zarabozo, Sheikh Quick,Sheikh Bilal Philips,Jamaaluddin Haidar and Sheikh Abdullah el-Faisal(aBritishJamaican who was sentenced in 2003 to nine yearsin prison for his callto violence).They use English astheir linguafranca. Salafiideas are also to be found on many student websites,either collective or individual,Two of the main neofundamentalist movements, the Tablighi

and theWahhabis, had till the 1960s a limited territorial basis (re-spectivelythe Indian subcontinent and Saudi Arabia),but gained asupranational worldwide audience through a policy of extensivepropaganda.The Tablighi, who do not refer to themselves as Salafi,launch

short-term campaign tours by missionary teams comprising multi-national lay preachers+ They instruct their members to avoid en-tanglement in local politics, to promote the veiling of women, toclose coeducational schools, and to ban social interaction withnon-Muslims, al l the while insisting on prayers and piety.Know-ledge of local languages has never been a prerequisite of khuru] (amissionaryjourney that al l members are supposed to undertake atleast once, on a model borrowed from the Mormons), althoughtheir propaganda ismainly oral and based on the team's exemplarymanners and conduct (hence the importance of etiquette and dresscodes).The internet and written publications are not the main me-dia of propaganda for the Tablighi,which is based on verbal anddoor-to-door personal contact. Ulama do not play a role in theTablighi movement. 6

outside Pakistan by journalists; for Saudi Arabia, see Ehsan Ahrari, 'WhitherSaudi Arabia?', T ime A s ia , 6 August 2002; for Morocco, see Francois Soudan,'Le Sabre et le Co r an' ,Jeune A f t iq u e I : In t e ll i ge n t (independent Paris newsmagazine), 12-25 August 2003.

5. Tablighijama'at was launched in 1926 in Delhi by Mohammad Ilyas .6. Their core text is R iy a d h a s -S a li h in (Gardens of the Righteous) , writ ten by

the Syrian Shafi 'i scholar Muhyi ad-din Abu Zakariyya'Yahya (born Sharafan-Nawawi, 1233-78), which is a su=ry of 'dos' and 'don'ts', Nawawi,Imam, Gardens r1t he R ig h te o u s: Th e R iy a d h a s -S a li hi n . r1I m am N aw aw i (trans. byMuhammad Zafrulla Khan), 2nd edn, New York: Olive Branch Press, 1989.


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236 T he M o de rn ity o j a n A rc ha ic W ay if ThinkingBy contrast, Saudi Wahhabism is centred around a cluster of

learned sheikhs who rarely travel outside the Gulf states.They ex-tend their influence through an intensive outpouring ofJatwas andshort conferences or lectures, spread through the internet, televi-sion stations (such as Iqra) or via cheap booklets. Their productsform an important part of the curriculum of worldwide Muslimreligious institutions that are subsidised by Gulf money. Throughinformal networks of disciples and former students, they reach alay audience far larger than the madrasas in which they teach.Butone should not exaggerate the 'Saudi' dimension of the Wabhabi;most of the best-known so-called 'Medina sheikhs' are not SaudiWahhabis by birth, aswe shall see.Many recently created teaching networks have a Saudi connec-

tion, because their founders either studied in the Kingdom or havebenefited from Saudi funding, directly or through one ofthe manyinstitutions created or sponsored by the Saudis (such asthe Rabitaal-Alam al-Islami,or Muslim League,established in 1963).Scholar-ships and pilgrimages to Mecca continue to provide new recruitsfor Saudi-sponsored networks. Each Saudi embassy has a depart-ment of religious affairsresponsible for funding Islamicinstitutions.Even if the Saudis do not openly promote Wahhabism, they pushfor the 'Salafisation' of teaching and preaching wherever they havea say.The reference to the classicalHanbali school of law allowsthem to reach beyond strictWahhabi circles and thus avoid beingseen asmembers of an extremist sect. Changes in the curriculumof the Pakistani Deobandi madrasas over the past thirty years are agood example of thisWahhabisation of more traditional schoolsof thought? As we have seen, this process accompanies a contrac-tion of the curriculum and therefore of the time spent inreligiousschools; there is less to teach, once one rejects all non-religious

7. The personal library of an Afghan alim t ra ined in a Deobandi school dur-ing the 19405 and 1950s included poetry, mathematics, dream-interpretation,alchemy, 'Greek' medicine and mysticism (personal 0bservarion at the libraryof Mawlawi Mirajuddin,Astana, Panjshir valley, in 1982; see also footnote 23,page 162). The curriculum of the madrasa included lay disciplines; in fact i tcovered a whole culture and knowledge. From the 19805,inTaliban madrasas,the curricu lum was reduced to purely rel ig ious matters, with an insis tenceon Hadith and fiqh. The extension of a secular educational system entaileda negative side-effect: rel igious schools gave up general teaching to restrictthemselves to being purely religious occupational schools.

S o ur ce s a nd a ct o rs if neojundamentalism 237sciences,all schools of thought except that ofIbn Hanbal and mostof the classicaldebates on Islam,in favour of ibadat (devotion),fiqhand Hadith.8 Cycles of study are closer toWestern curricula: fromthree to five years (and shaped and often named along the linesof US and British BA, MA and PhD courses), instead of the tento twenty years an authentic alim used to spend in religious study.The main intellectual task of the sheikhs is to research tafsir (in-terpretation of the Koran) and Hadith (identifying and collectingauthentic Hadith, asopposed to weak:ones), and to produce Jatwasand lectures or essayson what islicit or illicit.Devotion, rituals andlaw are the pillars of their conception of Islam.The relationship between theWahhabiclergyand the Saudimon-

archy is ambiguous. Each needs the other, the monarchy for legiti-macy,the clergy for funding and to ensure its religious hegemonyinthe kingdom (againstShias and other Sunnis).The clergy enjoywide autonomy; it is dominated by the Sheikh family,while thereare no members ofthe Saud family among the ulama. Some sheikhsare openly critical of the Sauds;a few havebeen gaoled (al-Awda,al-Hawali and Said al-Zuair), but the highest religious authoritiesalwaysendeavour to negotiate the release of the detainees and cor-responding political restraint on the part of the imams. The predica-ment of the Saudi monarchy is that the main contestation of itsauthority comes from within its basisof legitimacy: theWahhabis.However regular the crackdowns against the dissidents, the espri td e co rps of the Wahhabi clergy ensures a paradoxical freedom ofexpression.The amount of subsidiesprovided by the monarchy toradical religious groups is the object of polemics, but it is clear thatmainstreamWahhabis, who can spread very fundamentalist ideas,are openly and directly subsidisedby the monarchy?Another interesting caseis that of the Hizb ut-Tahrir, a form ofUFO (Unidentified Fundamentalist Object). Is it a neofundamen-talist party? In a sense,no. The Hizb ut- Tahrir eschews the appli-cation of sharia asits top priority and retains many elements of itsMuslim Brotherhood past,such asitsuse ofthe term 'ideology'; its8. Sheikh Muqbil openly advocates short courses and self-teaching (Burgat and

Sbitli,'Les Salafis auYemen').9. See R el ig io us F re ed om in t he K in gd om o f S au di A ra bia , a report by the Saudi

Ins ti tute, 30 January 2002, which gives a li st of donat ions publ ished by theofficial Saudi press, including Sheikh Bin Baz's official website ( ).


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23 8 T h e Mo d er n it y r : i f a n Ar c ha ic r-tay o f T h in ki nginsistence on building an Islamic state in the form of a caliphatethat will rule over the whole ummah; and its organisation as a po-litical movement (especially its use of cells).But it has becomean uprooted and deterritorialised movement, with no thought oftaking power in a given country.The caliphate it wants to establishhas no territorial basis.Hizb ut-Tahrir usespseudo-Koranic termi-nology,taken out of context, with no consideration of history andsocial circumstances.Its concept ofKhilafat haslittle to dowith thehistorical Caliphate; even if the party sees 1924 asthe yearwhenit ended, this does not mean that it wishes to revivethe Ottomanpolitical system. In fact, for Hizb ut-Tahrir the Caliphate is not areal geographical entity and has no territorial or sociological roots.It has to be established as soon as possiblefor the whole ummahand not on a specificterritory. This global and abstract conceptionof the ummah is typical of neofundamentalism. The developmentof Hizb ut- Tahrir exemplifies how a former Islamistparty turnedneofundamentalist, even if it differs from all other neofundamen-talistmovements.Irrespective oftheir shared commitment to a strict return to thetrue tenets of Islam and the decontextualisation of religious prac-tices, neofundamentalists are divided. Wahhabis and SalafisdisliketheTablighis''innovations': for instance, the central concept of khu-ruj, or 'going forth', and the role of the sheikh (which means herenot an alim but the group leader, who should be obeyed blindly,something similar to the relationship between monks and theirelected abbot). They also criticise the Tablighi for their disdainof knowledge and their view that one does not need to be verylearned to preach, a position similar to that held by many Protes-tant fundamentalists.Wahhabisalsoopenly scorn other preachers who callthemselves

Salafis (self-proclamation is common among all sorts of modernpreachers). In the' attacks by Medina sheikhs,on 'deviant' schoolsthere is often, beyond theological differences, an underlying vin-dication of a religious corporate establishment against newcom-ers,self-taught clerics (often converts) and independent preachers,who consider that one need not be highly educated to preach.(Sheikh al-Albani isparticularly vehement in denouncing asigno-rant many preachers likeJamaalal-Din Zarabozo.}" Yemeni Salafis10. Abdullah Lahmarni, A Refutation r1 Some of the Statements if Jamal ud-Din

S o ur ce s a nd a ct or s 0 / neofundamental ism 239are, conversely, quite critical of the Wahhabis.Yahya al Hajuri, awell-known Yemeni Salafi,wrote afatwa politically supporting theTaliban while calling them maturidi (a derogatory term meaning'rationalist'). He also criticised Bin Laden for being a j ihadi and atakfiri, in deviation from true doctrine." Such important issuesasj ih ad , t ak fi r and leadership are surrounded by disagreement. TheTaliban, despite their similarity to Wahhabis, never destroyed thegraves of pirs (holy men) and emphasised dreams as a means ofrevelation,which is not aWahhabi trait.But what would a neofundamentalist corpus look like, and

where would we find it? Perhaps one should set out by lookingat severalwebsites that are the most often referred to or are linkedto each other. These are put up either by an organisation or byindividuals (mainly students, aswe shall see below).When search-ing for 'Islam' or sharia or suchlike on the internet, search enginesoften return Salafi sites among the first hits. Islamic bookshops,which are not necessarily Salafibut sellthe products that are mostin demand, are another good place to turn to.Whatever the neo-fundamentalist medium, the references one encounters are eclec-tic, from Ibn Taymiyya (thirteenth century), one of the very few'classical'authors favoured by fundamentalists, to a cluster of con-temporary Wahhabi sheikhs, and even some Islamist authors suchasMaududi and Sayyid Qutb." Contemporary preachers usuallyprefer to produce video and audio-tapes instead of books, and doso inWestern languages,in order to addressthe largestpossible au-dience, thereby transcending ethnic divides, and to address a newgeneration of Western-born Muslims (for instance the SouthM-rican muft i Desai writes in English,as doesAhmed Deedat). Thereistherefore a huge amount of translation taking place (theMedinaWahhabi sheikhs alwayswrite or speak in Arabic).Any given text

Zarabozo, Birmingham: Salafi Publications, 2002, This pamphlet, in AdobePDF format, can be found at .

1L 'Yemeni Scholars Re-enforce the Call for Jihad' ,Jatwa translated by AqeelWalker and publ ished on Poli tical Islam Diffusion List , 25 January 2002.(This ispublished on a dosed discussion list managed by Kamran Bokhari atthe University of Austin, Texis.)

12 . A signif icant li st of selected scholars who are favourites of the Salafi s i s tobe found on . Most of the li stedscholars are contemporary; but some classical authors are also listed, such asIbn Taymiyyah, asare some Islarnists such asMaududi.


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240 The Mo d er ni ty o f a n A r ch ai c Way of Thinking(such as aJatwa or a conference address) by aWahhabi sheikh mayappear in different translations on various websites. Such occur-rences are also a good indicator of the popularity of a text or of aJatwa.13 Translators ~ or, more precisely, people who are fluent inArabic and aWestern language ~ playa key role in making availableMiddle Eastern authors to aWestern audience, such as Abu Mar-yam Isma'eel Alarcon, from the Salafi Society of North America.Pakistanis and South Africans, who usually have a better masteryof English than their Saudi counterparts, are spearheading thistrend. Younger authors and those based in the West write directlyin Western languages, which means that their impact may be re-stricted to a specific country for linguistic reasons, like Iquioussenin France who writes only in French, while others have a globalaudience. Some non- Wahhabi Sunni authors such as Abdul FattahAbu Ghudda (died 1997, a former leader of the Syrian Hanafibrotherhood who wrote on 'Islamic manners') also have a largeaudience among neofundamentalists.

As usual the internet serves as a circulatory system of ideas thatare reaffirmed by dint of repetition: the same set of references re-appear again and again, while some authors are mentioned sys-tematically.!" The websites of students' associations are also a goodvector for Salafi propaganda, specifically in the West. Most suchwebsites are located in Western universities, mainly in the Unit-ed States, Britain and Canada. IS For instance, that of the MuslimStudents' Association of the University of Southern California"has a page borrowed from the Department of Islamic Affairs ofthe Saudi Arabian embassy in Washington (,Understanding Islamarid the Muslims', 2003). In 1999 the website of the Muslim Stu-dents' Associat ion at the Universi ty of Houston.'? carried a lengthy13. For instance, Sheikh Naasir-Ud-Deen Al-Albaanee (or Nasir ud-Din al-Al-

bani), Munatharat: lira' t a nt h eem a l -j ih a d a l -I s lam i , audiotape, 2 vols.The Englishtranslation of this debate between al-Albani and an anonymous supporterof j ihad, edited by a group supporting the former, isto be found on atleastseven different websitcs (such as


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242 The Modernity o f a n A rc ha ic Wa y oj Thinkingsocieties like the al-Qur' an was-Sunnah Society of North Ameri-ca,20or Ahlus-Sunnah wal-Jamaa'ah, based in Britain.The OpenUniversity inAlexandria,Virginia, and a publishing house in Leices-ter,England, are linked to this movement. The sheikhs quote eachother, eulogise each other's students, and write in defence of thosefollowers who are criticised or even arrested. Sheikh Naasir al-Aqlwrote a booklet entitled Ahlus Sunnah wai-jamaa'ah. (published bythe society of the same name) for the Muslims living in Britain;he quotes Safar al-Hawali and Fawzan al-Burak approvingly" Thislast example demonstrates that the solidarity of ideas between thesheikhs goes further than political disagreement. Sheikh al-Ha-wali is considered a radical, critical of the Saudi monarchy and asupporter of the Taliban and Bin Laden (he took a more moder-ate stand after 9/11); with his colleague Sheikh Salam al-Odeh

, (in Arabic, by Sheikh Abdur-Rahman Abdul-Khaliq's fol-lowers, often criticised by other Salafis), (Atlan-ta, GA), , , ; and in French, , and .

20. . The site is the expression of the al-Qur'an was-Sunnah Society of North Americ a (QSS) ,which describes itself asfollows: 'Awell known organization in North America which adopts the SalafiManhaj[method]. It was officially established in 1986 by Ihyaa ut- Turaath of Kuwait.I t became independent from i t in 1989. I t was chaired by Mahmood Muradfrom 1986 to 1991, and by Muhammad al-Jibaly from 1991 to present. Itholds annual conventions each year in December . .. I t i swel l known to al lthe Salafi scholars overseas, and has written and verbal tazkiyah from manyof them ..Examples: QSS invited Sheikh Saalih al-Fawzaan to its conventionin 1993. He asked Shakh Ibn Baaz for pe rmission to attend, and the lattertold us that he to ld him, "Yes , these are our Brothers and we know them, goto them!" Unfortunately, some personal circumstances prevented al-Fawzaaufrom attending.This year, Abu al-Hasan al-Misr i a l-Ma'r ibee, one of thestrongest students of knowledge of our time, asked al-Albani asto whetherto accept an invi ta tion to attend the convention. The latter told us that al-Albani gave us a strong tazkiyah and said, "By al l means, these are our broth-ers .You must go to them!" Unfor tunately, Abu al-Hasan was not granted avisa. QSS has many publications, inArabic and English, which centre aroundthe subjects ofAqeedah, Fiqh, Tarbiyah, and Manhaj. Examples, Tamaam ul-Minnah, Magnificent Journey, Celebrations in Islam, Imitation of Kuifaar,the Night Prayer, ... ' (2003).

21. Sheikh Naasir Al-' Aql, G en er al P r ec ep ts o f ' Ah lu s -S u nn ak w a l- ja m aa ' a h, London:Message ofIslam, 1999.

T he b as ic t en et s o f neofundamentalism 243(Awdeh), he was gaoled by the Saudi government from 1994 to1999 but retained the protection of Bin Baz.nThe same mixture of political radicalism, Salafi rigour and

closeness to the religious and even political establishment is to befound with the Yemeni Salafi school created by Sheikh MuqbilBin Hadi alWadi'i (died 2001), who was not aWahhabi, but re-tained strong ties with such Wahhabis as Rabi Ibn Hadi and wasburied close to Bin Baz. He established the Dar ul Hadith mad-rasa where the 'American Talib' John Walker Lindh studied.Twoof his disciples,Mohammed al-Imam andYahya al-Hajuri, cameout strongly in favour of the Taliban and against the US interven-tion in Afghanistan and Iraq, while maintaing a working relation-ship with the Yemeni government. The leader of the IndonesianJemaah Islamiah,Abu Bakar Bashir, also enjoyed the same sort ofleniency from the government inJakarta till the Bali bombings ofOctober 2002.In Pakistan theAhl-i Hadith movement, with itsmilitary branch

Lashkar-e-Taiba, has the same traits. It is part of the religious es-tablishment, and its huge compound in Muridke, near Lahore, wasbuilt on a plot given by the then President General Zia ul-Haq. Ithas developed a high-level network of religious schools and helpedsustain the Kashmir jihad. It alsosupported theTaliban.In fact Salafisare well entrenched in many parts of the Mus-

lim clerical establishment - SaudiArabia,Yemen and Pakistan, andWestern Muslim organisations.

THE BASIC TENETS OF NEOFUNDAMENTALISM

The neofundamentalists, and specificallythe Salafis," stressthe ab-solute unity of God (tawhid): they oppose any sort of innovation(bid'a), associationism (shirk) and 'blind imitation' (taqlid). Hencethey reject all accretions to a strict and literalist reading of Koranand Sunnah. The SalafisandWahhabis support ijtihad (interpreta-tion) as a way of bypassing the tradition of the different religious22. 'We fear only Allah the almighty', stated Bin Baz on 16 October 1994.

'SheikhAbdelAziz Bin Baz defends Salman and Safar', Mesanews , 17 October1994. See also Mamoun Fandy, S au di A ra bi a a nd t he P ol it ic s o j D is se nt , NewYork: St Martin's Press, 1999.

23. For a good summary in English of the Salafiv iew, see 'An Introduction to theSalafiDa'wah', on .


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244 1 /1e Modern i ty ifa n A r c ha ic Wa y o j T Il in ki ngschools,and not asa way of adapting to new situations." They tryto reduce the accepted Sunnah to what they see asthe authenticHadith (sayingsof the Prophet), discarding many popular Hadithasbeing 'weak' (that is, inauthentic). Hadith (real or forged) havealwaysbeen the way to open, enlarge and adapt the religious ten-ets of Islam to different situations and cultures. In this sense theSalafi'reformist' approach consistsof discardingpragmatic tools foradaptation and compromise. Neofundamentalists are obsessed bybid'a, or innovation, which for them amounts to heresy,even ifthenovelty is of no consequence or importance (hence a continuingdebate on how to dressor brush one's teeth).The observer is oftensurprised by the time neofundamentalists spend discussingappar-ently mundane issues.They are prone to imitate the Prophet onall matters, including the most mundane ones, thus all actions, at-titudes and behaviour should be referred to a religious norm. Neo-fundamentalisrs see religion as a code and life as a kind of ritual.Tazkia (purification of the self)is a key concept. This sacralisationof dailylifeis to be found acrossthe spectrum of neofundamental-ists (from the Tablighi to the instructions for Al Qaeda terrorists).Neofundamentalists oppose the existence of different schools

oflaw and consider themselves,by definition, to be the only 'trueMuslims'.This entails a debate on takfir: should one declare infidela nominal Muslim who does not follow the true path? Mainstreamneofundamentalists oppose takfir and advocate dawah to return de-viant Muslims to the true path.25 Conversely the proponents oftakfir usually support jihad asa permanent and individual duty,forthe very reason that there isno longer a true Islamicruler or evena true ummah that could callfor jihad. Whatever their position ontakfir, Salafiwebsites are replete with condemnations of 'deviantsects'r" They oppose the concept of 'national cultures' and localIslamand reject Sufism as bid'a.24 . That is certainly the big dif ference in the modern Shia or the Sunni lib-

eral concept of ij tihad, which could allow some innovations rejected by theWahhabis.25. See The Creed ojlmaamAI-Albaanee onTakfirandApostasy, October2000, .

26. The website l is ts the fol lowing deviantMuslim groups (note the eclectic character of the selection): Ahmediyyah,Ansaru Allah, Moors, Warith-deen, Bahaul1ah, Nation of Islam, Shiites, Baat-iniyyah, Boharas Dawoodi, Boharas Nusayris, Druzes, Agakhaani, Jamaat-

Th e ba si c t en e ts ifneofundamentai ism 245They also reject theology C i lm a l- ka lam) because they see it as

either redundant or constituting some sort of a 'rival' intellectualconstruction that ends by being a substitute for the true corpus.They oppose philosophy aswell as literature. They consider thathistory is only the history of deviance and has no relevance exceptfor teaching lessonsabout what iswrong.They logicallyignore theconcept of 'modernity' .27They reject what they call asabiyya (identification with a sub-

community, like a tribe, a nation, a race or an ethnic group) andhizbiyya Gaining a political party, including an Islamic one). Con-sequently they dismissthe notion of an 'Islamicparty', which putsthem at odds with the Islamists,Neofundamentalists advocate the strict implementation of sharia ,

with no concession to man-made law.By definition this pushesthem to discard the modern state and to share a kind of modern'libertarian' view of the state,which is considered a lesser evil butnot asa tool for implementing Islam.They consider that there is nothing positive to be borrowedfrom the West and nothing to discuss with Christians and Jews

except calling them to Islam, although mainstream Salafis agreethat one should treat non-belligerent infidels leniently." Islam isfor neofundamentalists an all-encompassing religion, but mainly inso far as the daily life of the individual is concerned. They rejectthe concept of'Islamic ideology' that has been soprevalent amongIslamists.They believe they should not borrowWestern conceptualcategories (like economy, constitution, political party, revolutionor socialjustice), even by giving them an Islamic slant.Neofunda-mentalists do not care about socialissues;they do not try to playon a specificsocial constituency, asthe Islamistsdid.They refuse to

e-Islami, Sufism, Tableegi-Jamaat, Deobandism, Bareilwiyat, Naqshabandis,Ikhwani,Jihaadis, Qur' amtes, Qadariyyah, Khawariji,J ahmiyyah, Ash' ariyyah,Matrudiyyah, Murji'ah, Khalifites (1gers),Takfiris and Habashis.

27 . SeeJamaal al-Din Zarabozo, a US convert who became an imam in Califor-nia. He delivered a speech entit led 'Modernism in Islam' (from an audiotapeseries available from Dar Makkah, Denver, Colorado). The speech is to befound on many websites, such as


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246 T h e Mod er ni ty rif a n A r ch ai c W ay o f T hi nk in gtake into consideration social sciences and philosophy (Islamists,on the other hand, do readWestern philosophy, evenif in a criticalway or through abridged textbooks). Neofundamentalists use tra-ditional Islamic legal categories (halallharam, or lawful/prohibited)without endeavouring to modernise them or even admitting thatthe world has changed since the time ofthe Prophet." They pep-per their speeches and conversation with traditional religious ter-minology, and discuss at length classicaltopics like slavery,despitesuch subjects being outdated or irrelevant."Nevertheless, one should not underestimate the mystical di-

mension of neofundamentalism. The Islamists,busy with buildingan Islamic state,have a more worldly mindset and are driven byoptimism. They believe one could build a truly positive Islamicsociety through the actions and determination of humankind. Butthe neofundamentalists, more aligned this time with the Qutbistapproach, remain pessimistic.The world is an immense pitfall forthe believer, and there is little he can achieve by himself. Neo-fundamentalists advocate total reliance on God and insist on faith( iman) and salvation.This insistence on salvation is consistent with their focus on theindividual.An extreme legalisticapproach goes hand in hand withextolling faith, a stresson salvation,and even a kind of mysticism.Salvation is often linked with God's riza, or satisfaction.Radicalsinsist that action is more important than the result. Undertakingj ihad is more important than victory,which is presented as a plus

29. See Zarabozo, 'Modernism in Islam'; '1) everything in accordance withQur'an and Surma isHaq (truth) and what disagrees with it isfaIse(somemodernists disagree with this).Also, statements consistent with the Qur'anand Sunna are accepted; 2) Ijmaa (consensus) of the sahaaba (and early gen-erations) is a hujja (proof) for al l Muslims. Modernists say sahaaba are menand we are men, 'and even matters agreed on by them are open to ijtihaad;3) anything in the Qur'an and Surma cannot be 'opposed by 'aql, rationalthought, opinion, or qiysas.This is supported in the Qur'an and isnot opento discussion or vote. One modernist saidcutting off the hand ofthe thief isa "Khomeini Islam" and isunethical: Note the systematic use in English ofArabic technical terms.30. The last chapter ofAl-Jaza'iry's Minhaj Al-Muslim is entirely devoted to therules concerning slavery,something one would not find in al-Banna or Kho-meini, Given that the French translation ofthis work isone ofmost popularguidebooks for French born-again Muslims, one wonders what conclusionsthe reader could draw from this chapter.

N e of un d am e nt al is ts a nd I sl am is ts 247but should not be the motivation of the warrior, hence the ten-dency among radicals towards sacrificialand even suicide missions.This is alsoconsistent with the lack of a political program: the aimisto please God, not to achieve a specific agenda. It would be pre-posterous to think that man'swill can achieve God's sovereignty onearth.The victory will come only when God decides.Beyond their religious radicalism, neofundamentalists tend toignore or despisepolitics, which paradoxically pushes them to ac-cept the present political order without bestowing any legitimacyon it.Their religious radicalismpushes them towards political neu-trality (except for the jihadists, even if they do not have a politicalagenda either). This may explain why they accept and even sup-port regimes like that of Saudi Arabia,but alsowhy they are moreadapted to living in theWest than true Islamists.

NEOFUNDAMENTALISTS AND ISLAMISTSThe main divide between neofundamentalists and Islamistsis overthe state and politics.While in theory they consider that Muslimsshould live under an Islamic state, the neofundamentalists rejectthe political struggle as a means of establishing such a state.Theybelieve that an Islamic state should result from the re-Islamisationof the ummah and not be a tool for this re-Islamisation." Politicalactivism, according to neofundamentalists, overshadows the needto reform the self.The issue isnot one of being either moderate orradical.Mainstream neofundamentalists oppose radical and moder-ate Islamists (including supranational jihadists aswell as those whosupport a shiftto democracy and multipartism).They condemn thevery concepts of democracy, human rights and freedom, whereasIslamiststry to show how Islamrepresents the best form of democ-racy (through the concept of shura, or consultation) and the bestprotection for human rights (includingwomen's rights).Neofunda-mentalists refuse to express their views in modern terms borrowedfrom theWest.They consider that indulging in politics, even for agood cause,will by definition lead to bid'a and shirk (the giving ofpriority to worldly considerations over religious values).While Islarnists consciously borrowed many concepts from

Western political sciences (ideology,revolution, political party) or31. See comments by Muqbil in Burgat and Sbitli,'LesSalafisauYemen', p.7.


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248 711eModern i ty c f a n A r ch a ic W l cl yo j T h in ki ngtwisted some Koranic terms to give them a modern sense (Hezbol-lah, or God's party; mostazajin, or deprived people; and hakimiyya,or sovereignty), neofundamentalists pretend to ignore the West andto live in some sort of intellectual autarky. They refuse to borrowanything from the West, considering this to be bid' a. Indeed theyreject the very concept of modernisation, which is coherent withtheir refusal to admit that history has some meaning. Salafiyya isnot a 'movement' because 'a movement is meant to indicate some-thing temporal or reactionary' . 32Mainstream neofundamentalists regard politics as irrelevantwhile ever most Muslims have not been brought back to the truetenets of Islam through propaganda. Reform of the soul shouldprecede reform of the state. Politics does not help to purify thesoul. Propaganda should take precedence over polit ical act ion (theHizb ut- Tahri r shares this view), dawah (invit ing people to Islam)over j ihad. 33Neofundamentalists feel no urge to bui ld specific 'Islamic' insti-tutions (from a constitution to a parliament) because that wouldimply that sharia is not sufficient. When the Taliban ran Afghani -stan, they cared nothing for building state institutions. For the Tal-ibs the very concept of an Islamic state meant that something hadto be added to shasta. For neofundamentalists the aim of actionis salvation, not revolution. Their objective is the individual, notsociety. One should first return to the true path as an individualMuslim before taking political action: 'A true Salafi ... knows thatvictory is not possible without true tawhid and that shirk cannot be

32. 'An Introduction to the SalafiDa'wah', .33. 'The Party defined itsmethod ofwork into three stages:' Th e F i rs t S t ag e: Th e stageof culturing to produce people who believe in theideaand the method ofthe Party;sothat they form the Party group.'The Second Stage:The stageof interaction with the Ummah, to let the Um-mah embrace and carry Islam,so that the Umrnah takesit up asitsissue,andthusworks to establishit in the affairsoflife.' 1 11 e 111 ir d S t age : The stageof establishinggovernment, implementing Islamgenerallyand comprehensively,and carryingit asa messageto the world.'The Party started the first stagein al-Quds in 1372 AH (1953 CE) underthe leadershipof its founder, the honourable scholar,thinker, ablepolitician,qadi in the Court ofAppealsin al-Quds,Taqiuddin al-Nabhani (may Allah'smercy be upon him).' .

Neojundamentalis ts an d Is lamis ts 249fought with the lik.es of it. '34There is even some arrogance, accord-ing to neofundamentalists, in striving to establi sh an Islamic State:the 'Ikhwan program' (that is, the Musl im Brotherhood) supposesthe purity of ones [ s i c ] own soul, since it implies that we have fulfi lledthe conditions for victory to be granted to us, and deserve to be givenestablishment upon the earth - even though the kaafirs sti ll have theupper hand over us.With such a negat ive atti tude we shall neglect tocultivate our souls and neglect to take account of our own selves."Sheikh al-Hilali, in an often-quoted speech, states the priority: backto the Koran and the Sunnah according to the Salaf. In this speechthere is not a word on jihad, politics, party, ideology, state, socialaction, and so on. But there is a constant theme: never imitate theunbelievers. Al-Hilali quotes one of the favourite Koranic sura ofthe neofundamentalists: 'Never will the Jews and the Christians besatisfied with you, until you fol low their way' (Sura al -Baqarah 2.120) .36 Quot ing Shanqeeti, Sheikh Zarabozo writes:The problem itself actually lies in the hearts and souls of the Muslims. Thesolution therefore lies in their turning sincerely to Allah, strengtheningtheir faith and putting their trust inAllah, theAll-Mighty, theAll-Powerful,the one with control over all things. The one who truly belongs to Allah'sparty can never be overcome by any of the disbelievers, no matter howstrong they seem to be. [1 CfAl-Shanqeeti, vol. 3,pp. 452-457.p7

The domination of the kafir is a consequence of the loss of thetrue faith. Sheikh al-Hilali writes: 'When the Muslims neglectedthe obedience to Allaah, He gave the Jews the power and they tookPalestine, and when they were negligent about that which theywere reminded of, Allaah established the Christians over them andthey took Spain; and when they were negligent yet again, Allaah34. 'An Introduction to the SalafiDa'wah', .35. Anonymous article (which neverthelessquotes Sheikh al-Albani) entitled'The True Understanding of Politics in Islaam (as-Siyaasah)',.36. Sheikh Saleem al-Hilaalee, 'The State of the Ummah in the Light of theProphecies of the Prophet (saw)',speech deliveredat the Qu'ran and Sun-nah Society Conference in the United Statesin 1993. This speech is tobe found on inany websites, such as 37. jamaal ud-Deen Zarabozo,'The Plight ofthe MuslimNationToday', .


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250 T he M od er nity o f an A r cha ic W ay o j Thinkingput the Christians in control in Bosnia. '38This means that victorywill be bestowed by God only upon 'good' Muslims; it is point-less to opt for jihad before returning to the true tenets of the faith.Sharia is thus more important than state (the contrary was true forKhomeini, for example). As al-Albani states in A Rifutation ifSomeif th e S ta te me nts o f J am al u d-D in Z ar ab oz o: 'Establish Islam in yourheart and it will, in turn, be established for you in your land.' Theideas of the Islamists are often portrayed as some sort of deviantreligious thinking. Sheikh Muqbil blasts 'Suroorism', while Salafipublications denounce Bannaawism, Qutbism and Suroor isrn.PNevertheless, beyond this clear-cut condemnation of the Islam-ist agenda, relations between Islamists and neofundamentalists areambivalent. Their analyses of the state of the ummah are not verydifferent: the ummah isin a state of despair, and Islam ispolit icallyand culturally besieged by the West. The enemy is theWest. Theydiffer on how to respond, however. The neofundamentalists' an-swer is usually dawah (or da'wat), sometimes jihad, but never politi-cal action. The Islamists' answer is the 'Islamic state'.The ambivalence of their relationship isreflected in the Wahhabicondemnation ofSayyid Qutb.'? Paradoxically his books are foundeverywhere and mentioned on most neofundamentalist websites.He fascinates Islamists and certain neofundamentalists for differentreasons. His political message of revolt and action appeals to radicalIslarnists,but his more pessimistic views on the modern world, hisradical contempt and hatred for the West, and his mystical approachresonate more with neofundamentalists, who are obsessed by Helland salvation."38. Hilaalee, 'The State of the Ummah'; see also ,,

, . ".39. See . which in 2004 contained thirty-three articles opposing Qutubis (Qutbists) and Surooris.40. Sheikh~Uthaymeen (Othaymeen), for instance. See .41. The 'Qutbi st' movement , f rom Farag to Islambuli, is more s imi lar to nco-fundamentalism, even if i t has regularly been categorised as Islamist for i tspolit ical involvement. However, nei ther the Qutbists nor Bin Laden evercared to bui ld a true poli ti cal movement , and they never cared about the dayafter (for example, the assassination of Sadat, or 9/11). It is not by chance

f~: :I!

Neo fu n damen ta li st s a n d I s lam is ts 251Logically the condemnation of any sort of Islamic politics en-tails a more vocal rejection of non-Muslim politics. Most neo-fundamentalists vow to remain aloof from 'kafir' politics. 'Rulingby Kufr is Haram', wrote Sheikh al-Masri (a Saudi Salafi who isclose to Hizb ut- Tahrir).But such a radical rejection of political in-

volvement does not necessarily mean open revolt. It may signify anapolitical position, a neutral and even indifferent attitude towardspolitics, which can also mean tactical accommodation (for exam-ple, Sheikh Muqbil inYemen) or participation at the local level (inmunicipal affairs). N eofundamentalists agree not to endorse anyWestern political system, but debate whether interaction with suchsystems is permissible." This ambivalence is, as we shall see,at thecore of Western distrust of neofundamentalists. On the one hand,they express a rejection of the West that goes beyond that of theIslamists;on the other hand, they do not wage a polit ical struggleand are open to accommodation.But the dividing line between Islarnists and neofundamentaliststends to be blurred by the individual paths ofmany Muslim Broth-ers,who have given up political activism, disheartened by the stale-mate or even by the advanced age of their leaders (for example,in Egypt). Others adopted a neofundamentalist agenda mainlybecause that was where the momeritum lay.The Taliban saga inMghanistan had an impact on Pakistani politics, where the jamaat-i-Islarni (whose ideology was very close to that of the MuslimBrotherhood) jumped on to the neofundamentalist bandwagon byjoining the Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA, a coali tion of pro-Taliban movements). Having won the elections in the North-West

that the survivors of the Qutbist movement joined Bin Laden and not theIslamist movements.42. See, for ins tance, the posit ion of the Hizb ut- Tahrir asshown by 'The Rul -

ing on Participating in Parliamentary Elections' ('), about Yemen,in which participation isallowed only ifi t isa means offinding a springboardfor 'dawa'at' (dawah). Omar Bakri and Abu Hamza (in London) both opposeparticipation in 'kufr politics' and refuse to participate in British elections.A pos ting by ' truth1' on the ' Is lam.corn Discuss ion Forum' on Tuesday, 25November 2003 (


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252 Th e Mod e r ni ty oj an Archaic Way oj ThinkingFrontier Province in October 2002, the MMA has since beenpushing for a purely neofundamentalist agenda - implementingsharia, banning television and films, and so on - but without bring-ing into question the central federal state. Some other Islamiststurned neofundamentalist when their prospects of exercising statepower faded because of political repression or the migration ofmilitants to countries where Muslims are in a minority. More-over, in the course of searching for jobs or political asylum theybecame internationalised and thus deprived of a specific nationalpoli tical environment (while the Turkish Islamists have maintaineda local presence). Some are employed by neo-Salafi institutions,under the umbrella of the Rabita.The grandsons of Hassan al-Ban-na, Hani and Tariq Ramadan, are a good example of the diffusionof the Muslim Brotherhood to the diaspora. Born in Switzerlandand citizens of that country, they express the two faces of modernSalafism: Hani is a neofundamentalist and Tariq seeks some sort ofaccommodation between a 'Muslim community' (defined by itsculture and values) and a secular Western environment.

In any country social advancement and polit ical empowermentcan entail a shift from revolutionary Islam to a more conservativeand neofundamentalist approach, as embodied by the conservativesin Iran.

'While the Muslim Brotherhood may become Salafi, some neo-fundamentalists, conversely, may put an end to their 'splendid iso-lation' and engage in social activism, even if they are still reluc-tant to become involved in state politics. This is the case in Francewith members of the Tablighi Jama'at who consented to join theConseil Francais du Culte Musulrnan, while in Yemen dissidentsaligned with Sheikh Muqbil also engaged in social activit ies." Thecategories we are using in this book are not permanent labels tobe stuck on people. One should not neglect personal trajectories: aformer Islamist turned Salafi might adopt a more open and flexibleMuslim identity. Labels do not give a fair account of the complex-ity of personal paths and histories .

Conversely, Muslim Brothers who have shunned the quest foran Islamic state do not necessarily become neofundamentalists.Many, l ike Sheikh al-Qaradawi, have become akind of conservativeliberal. By that I mean that they insist on ethical values more than43. Burgat and Sbitli, 'Les Salafis auYemen'.

Neofundamentaiists and Islamists 253. o n a strict adherence to sharia, rej ect violence and accept debate.Al....Qaradawi is not a neofundamentalist, although he has beenread as such by many born-again Muslims through the widespreadtranslations into Western languages of his book AI . .. . a Ia l wal . .. . a ramfi t Islam (The Lawful and the Prohibited in Islam). Nevertheless,his recent more conciliatory approach towards the West (he issuedcondemning the terror attacks on the World Trade Center)

antazomsed many ofhis latter-day admirers. Negative crit iquesof al-Qaradawi's book are recurrent in Salafi sites and have in-creased since 9/11.44 He is considered too liberal and permissive;his book became jokingly known as H ala l w al H ala l (The Lawfuland the Lawfiil)." One should remember that the book was brieflybanned in France in 1995 for being too radical.This confusion between Salafis , moderate conservatives, Muslim

Brothers and even some liberals is reflected in many of the websitesMuslim associations in the West, which might juxtapose Salafi

lectures with advertisements and invitations concerning socialevents that are quite contrary to the Salafi approach. We touchhere the complexity of the religious sphere that we have referredto under the appellation 'post-Islarnism'. Let us take an example:The website of a local Muslim community in Canada, the IslamicInformation Society of Calgary;" promotes 'karate for brothers

sisters', women's soccer (although indoors) and the sermonsBaz and Othaymeen. One might guess that women's soccernot be the sort of entertainment approved of for women in

Medina. Itmay mean that the people who manage the differentof the website simply do not follow the same philosophies,

apparently they get along with one another.The blurring of the divide between Muslim Brothers, neofiinda-mentalis ts and conservatives has polit ical and stra tegic dimensions.

How does one assess the threats or possibil it ies of fmding stabilising

See different critiques from Sulayman ibn SilihAl ....Kharrashi, Sheikh 'Abdul ....Hamid Tamhaz and Sheikh Othayrnine, (in French); Bin Laden is condemned too.See


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254 The Modernity o f an Archaic Way if T71inkingelements among conservativeMuslims?What is the role of SaudiArabia? The reciprocal instrumentalisation of Saudi Arabia andMuslim Brothers to counter Arab nationalism, communism andIranian Islamismin the 1980s has in fact paved the way for moreradical movements.If we consider that most violent Islamist groups share somesort of neofundamentalist outlook, the issueof violence should be

addressed.

NEOFUNDAMENTALISTS AND RADICAL VIOLENCEThe main dividebetween mainstreamneofundamentalists andradi-cal groups has to do with jihad: Is it compulsory? Is it an individualduty? Is it now time to engage in a jihad against the enemy?Andwho is the enemy? Of course the radicalsall conclude that jihadis a permanent and personal religious duty and that 'the Crusadersand the Jews' arethe enemy,asBin Laden put it. On the other sideof the coin, the Salafimainstream ulama consider jihad a collec-tive rather than an individual duty," They also believe that even ifthere isjihad, there are rules of conduct during war that should be47. 'Quest,:o't: Isjihaad in til ls t ime a collective or an individual obligation? Whatis the difference between the two and what are the conditions for them

both? Response: Jihaad, primarily, is a collective obligation and, as such, ifit isundertaken by sufficien t enough people i t is no longer obligatory upon therest. For this reason the Prophet, (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wa sallam) would fightjihaad himself and send out detachments and raiding par ties whi le the res tof the Muslims would remain behind to take care of other affairs and needs .However, j ihaad could become an individual obligation if the Imaam cal lsupon whoever isfit and suitable for i t ... The Prophet (sal-Allaahu 'alayhe wasallarn) said:"If you are called to go to fight, then answer the call."It also be-comes an individual obligation ifan enemy attacks any of the Musl im lands.Itbecomes an individual obl igat ion on the Musl ims to repel the enemy andsave the country from them, ashappened in Afghanistan. The third situationwhere i t becomes an indiv idual obligation iswhen' a man is either amongs tthe ranks of the Musl ims f ighting the enemy or when the Musl ims are l iningup in preparation to f ight the enemy.At th is t ime he must not deser t them orflee but rather, he must fight with Illsbrothers and be steadfast . Other than inthese situations,jihaad is Sunna and is one of the most virtuous of deeds. In-deed i t i s the bes t act ion that man can undertake because i ts v ir tue, over andabove other deeds , has been mentioned in texts. ' Sheikh Ibn Baaz, al-Aqal-!iyaal al-Muslimalt [The Musl im Minority] , Fatwa 1,p . 24, cit ed at ('TheObligation ofJihaad'). Grammar and punctuation are asper the original.

Necfundamentaiis ts a nd r ad ic al violence 255respected.f Sheikh al-Albani is clear on that topic:jihad might bean individual duty only for people belonging to a specific threat-ened group (Chechen, Mghans), but it needs a leader (emir) andan organisation.There is no question of askingindividuals from alloverthe world to go to fight in some remote place:We said that jihad is two kinds: f o rd k if ay ah , which only a small groupofMuslims can do, and if a group do it, the rest of the Muslims arenotquestioned about it.This kind ofjihad, individuals can do on their own.F ar d 'a yn which al l the Muslimshave to do it in a specificarea.Todo thiskind ofjihad, do we not need anAmeer to lead the Muslims?49He went further, stressingthe priority of dawah over jihad:History repeats itself. Everybody claims that the Prophet is their rolemodel. Our Prophet (salallaahu'alayheewasallarn) spent the first half ofhis message in making da'wa, and he started with it not with jihad. TheProphet ( sa lal laahu ' a layheewasal1arn) first raised his companions withIslamic education like he educated them to saythe word oftruth and notbe afraidof it, he ( sa lal laahu ' a layheewasallarn) also taught them the Islamicteachings.We know that our Islam today is not like it was when Allahrevealed'today I have completed your religion', many things haveindeedbeen added to Islam,do you not agree?50Jihad may havea pedagogic effectin purifying the soul,but it isnotan aim in itself.The priority of dawah over jihad is the watershedbetween mainstream neofundamentalists and radical groups.Mostof theWahhabi ulama, the TablighiJama'at and even the Hizb ut-Tahrir consider that jihad is not on the agenda, except for defense.On the other hand, many Wahhabi sheikhs openly supported

radical groups that were at oddswith the Saudi monarchy yet stillbenefited from official complacency.The sheikhs Awda and al-Hawali, although openly supportive of Bin Laden and the Tali-ban, have been defended by Grand Mufti Bin Baz.51 They were48. Al-Qaradawi and the new grand m~i of Saudi Arabia, Abdou! 'Aziz ibn

'Abdillah ibn Mohammed al-Sheikh, issued fatwas condemning the attackon the World Trade Center. The Islamic brigade of the Bosnian a rmy hadrules of engagement that clearly forbade attacks on monks and civil ians, andmistreatment of prisoners. Conversely, the GIA and Bin Laden consider anytargets legitimate.

49. Al-Albaanee, Munatharak Ina' tantheem al-jihad a/-Islami.50. Al-Albaanee, Munatharah. Ina' tantheem at-jihad al-Islami.51. 'Sheikh Abdel Aziz Bin Baz defends Salman and Safar.' See alsoFandy, Saudi

Arabia and the Polit ics o f Dissent.


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256 The M odernity o f an Archaic W ay c if Thinkingfreed from gaol in Saudi Arabia in 1999.Al-Hawali adopted a moremoderate stand after 9/1 L The sheikhs Hammoud bin 'Uqla al-Shu'aybi (died January 2002), Saleh Bin Othaymeen (died 2001),Nassir al-Buraq and Salih Ibn Fawzan al Fawzan also supportedthe Taliban.F Shu'aybi's role came to light when the attack on aRiyadh housing compound in May 2003 was attributed to someof his disciples: Ali al-Khudair, in his fifties, Nasser al-Fahd, in .his forties, and Ahmad al-Khalidi, in his thirties, were drawn to-gether by their belief in the ideas of Shu'aybi, who was based inBuraydah, a town famous for its strict piety. But during his lifehe spent only two weeks in gaol and two years under house ar-rest, although he regularly criticised the Saudi monarchy. AnotherWahhabi Sheikh Naser Bin Hamad Al-Fahad wrote a fatwa ap-proving the use of weapons of mass destruction against the 'Kafer?( k c i f i r ) . 5 3 He went into hiding before the US attack on Iraq. Ananonymous Saudi who conducted a videotaped conversation withOsama Bin Ladin mentioned that Sheikh Sulayman Ibn Nasir al-'Ulwan had handed down afatwa refusing to condemn the 9/11terrorist attacks." Although less well-known than the other Sau-di sheikhs (a1-Albani, Munajjid and Bin Baz), he is spoken of onan equal footing with them in some Salafi- Wahhabi websites.PIn Yemen, Yahya al-Hajuri (a disciple of Sheikh Muqbi1) alsowrote a fotwa in support of the Taliban, while strongly opposingthe 'Qutbists'.

The Hizb ut- Tahrir position against the launching of jihad ispurely tactical. The organisation believes that the time has not yetcome for jihad, but that it is a compulsory duty for any Muslim.

52. In a series o i f a tw a s i ssued in September and October 2001, Sheikh Ham-moud bin 'Uqla al-Shu'aybi, opposing the US campaign in Afghanistan, de-clares 'anybody who supports infidels against Muslims is himself an infidel '.He previously stated that'Mghanistan ... isthe only country in the world inwhich there are no man-made laws and legislation' (so much for Saudi Ara-bia). 29 November 2000, 2d Ramadan, 1421 hijri , .53. 'Resalat fihukm cstckhdarn al-eslahat ai-damar al-shamdl zed al kufir ' (rabial awal1424), .The domain name for this websiteseems to be sti ll registered, but it i scurrently not in use.54. An English translation is available at .

55. For example, . See also .

My i s n eo fu n dam en ta li sm s uc ce ss fo l? 257choice of whether to use or reject violence is not

with the basic tenets of neofundamentalism. It is a politi-cal decision, formulated (after the decision to use lethal action has

made) in religious terms, which could even be considered asor innovation (the perception of jihad as ford, or individualis typically a bid'a). There is not necessarily a 'theology of.When ulama take a position on violence, it is usually for

!-'U,'H,J. ....dJ. reasons, even if they cast their choice in terms of a reli-discourse. Ulama from the same school of thought may take

drverzent positions on violence.We have seen how mainstream Salafis reject the ideas ofSayyid

56 But others who are strongly opposed to 'Qutbism' for re-reasons nevertheless support jihad, terrorism and Al Qaeda

purely political reasons (hatred of the West). In short, there issystematic link between a radical political position and theo-

thinking. This is part icularly obvious among the Saudi Wah-of whom some will hold very radical positions even thoughreligious thinking differs not at all from that of their more"." 'V ' .. ...""" colleagues. Moreover, even in case of strong poli tical dis-

";;" "LH.~U'.',the corporate solidari ty and e sp rit d e c or ps of the ulamamaintain ties and protection. The ambivalence of the Saudi estab-."li,Ul."""LChas probably been the most puzzling discovery by the USa.'-UUJ.U!~W."L,"IH following 9/11.

WHY IS NEOFUNDAMENTALISM SUCCESSFUL?spread of neofundamentalist influence raises many important

'"Iu.....C!VJ.J~ How can such a narrow and unsophisticated vision takeamong modern educated Muslims? How can it spread amongdi fferent sociological mi lieus, from Taliban Pashtun t ribes-

men to the wealthy Saudi Arabian middle class, moving throughimpoveri.shed suburbs of Western Europe or Morocco while reach-ing a supranational intelligentsia and even converts? What explainsthe plastici ty of the neofundarnentalis t matrix?

56. See , among many other texts, 'Abu A'laa Mawdudi, Qutb and the Proph-ets of Allaah' (


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258 T h e Mo d e rn it y ifa n Ar c h ai c Way o j T h in k in gA to o l c if decul turat ionNeofundamentalism is both a product and an agent of globalisa-tion, first of all because it embodies in itself an explicit processof deculturation. It rejects the very concept of culture,' whetherconceived of asarts and intellectual productions or asan integratedsystem of socially acquired values, beliefs and rules of conduct, asdefined by anthropology. It looks at globalisation as a good op-portunity to rebuild the Muslim ummal i on a purely religious basis,not in the sense that religion is separated from culture and politics,but to the extent religion discardsand even ignores other fieldsofsymbolic practices.Neofundamentalism promotes the decontextu-alisation of religious practices. In this sense it is perfectly adaptedto a basic dimension of contemporary globalisation: that of turn-ing human behaviour into codes,and patterns of consumption andcommunication, delinked from any specific culture.YAn ongoing debate among neofimdamentalists concerns culture:

beyond faith, how to define a purely religious system of behaviourand norms, decoupled from any surrounding culture. Culture iseither redundant or misleading, and has no value in itself. It is atbest obscuring and at worst distorting the true tenets of Islam.T he r ej ec ti on c if 'c ul tu ra l I sl am ' - a pp ra is in g d ec ul tu ra ti on . The pri-mary targets of the neofundamentalists are the so-called Mus-lim cultures;Western culture is a secondary objective. However,the West is not rejected in favour of any sort of 'Islamic culture'.57. For many globalisarion means westernisation; for others it means Americani-

sation (atypical view in France, where McDonald's is considered to epito-miseUS culture). In both cases the globalisation process is seen asaccultura-tion; that is, the adopting of a new culture (Western or US culture). But Ibelieve that what circulates under the name ofUS orWestern culture islessaspecific culture, with a content (art,literature), than a form comprising codesand products of consumption. The English language, which has become theworld medium of communication, is not the vector of the English culture(Shakespeare e t a l .) , but a tool of communication that could convey differ-ent systems of representations. The debate on multiculturalism in theWest israrely a debate on languages, at least from the side of English-speakers, forwhom diversity isexpressed in English.Many British and US liberals or mul-ticulturalists are,for instance, very critical towards the way Quebecois or theFrench try to preserve their languages.But the same people will, at the sametime, condemn the French refusal to allow schoolgirls to wear the Islamichijab (which is seen asa rejection of multiculturalism).

My i s n e oJundamen ta li sm s uc c es sf ul ? 259consider Islam not as a form of culture buta , 'mere' religion that loses its purity and holistic dimension if

.">JlU-''-''''~'-Uin a specific culture. Islam, as preached by the Taliban,dUlldUl~ and Bin Laden's radicals,is hostile even to cultures that

in origin.Whatever such fundamentalism hasdestroyedMuhammad's tomb, the Barniyan statues of the Buddha or the

Trade Center - it expressesthe same rejection of material",-,""..VHand culture.Neofundamentalists dream of a t ab ula r as a .58 They do not valueclassicalgreatMuslim civilisationssuch asthe Umayyad or the

"V1H


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260 T he Mod er ni ty ifa n A r ch aic W ay o j T hi nk in gspecific burial rituals.s' Quite evidently they also forbid partici-pation in pagan or secular celebrations. For example, the popu-lar Persian Nowruz festival (21April) was banned by the Taliban,and the Saudi Council of Fatwa ruled against a traditional festival(Grayqaan or Quraiqa'an), in which children from the Gulf coastused to knock on doors and collect treats.FThe Taliban went very far in their struggle against traditionalAfghan culture.As is the practice of all neofundamentalists, theyfirst targeted 'bad Muslims', whileWestern culture came only sec-ond.They had quite good relations with the United States till theautumn of 1997 and did not bother to expel Western NGOs, laterturning anti-US for purely political reasons. Instead they tooka hard line on Afghan customs and culture. They banned music,films, dancing and kite-flying (because someone climbing a treeto remove a kite might end up watching, even inadvertently, anunveiled women in an adjacent house or garden). Pet songbirdswere outlawed because they might nullify a believer's prayer by

www.islam-qa.com/BooksIMuharamaat/enghsh.shtrnl#3. In Iraqi Kurdi-stan the group Ansar al-Islam desecrated the graves of Sheikh Husam ai-Din,Sheikh Baha aI-Din, and Sheikh Si raj al-Din, known guides of the Naqsh-bandi order, inJuly 2002. The head of the group, Mullah Krekar, isa penna-nent resident of Norway (another good example of the relationship betweenneofundamentalism and globalisation).

61. Among others the Pakistan i cus toms of qu i, c h eh l um , khatm-i Koran (recitationof the Koran at cer ta in .periods after a person 's death) are rejected asnon-Musl im ( 'But r ites l ike "Qul" and "Chehlum" are al l of Hindu origin towhich the ignorant Muslims have taken a fancy. Simi larly , Qur 'an readingmeant to transmit reward to a dead man's soul is against the Prophet 's exam-ple.' Nawawi, Imam, Gardens of the Righteous:The Riyadh as-Salihin o f Imam Na-wawi, trans.'by Muhanunad Zafrulla Khan, 2nd edn, New York: Olive BranchPress, 1989, Chapter 162.) In his wil l, Muhammad Atta asked not to be bur-ied 'according Egyptian customs' (that is, followed by third- and fortieth-daycommemorations); 'because it has no basis in the Qoran and the Sunnah'.

62. Fa rwa 15532,24/11/1413 AH (1993). The council considered this to be aShia celebration (even if Sunnis also participate).Why forbid such a customin the 1990s? Maybe because it is too s imilar to Hal loween, the spread ofwhich is another s ign of globalisat ion? I t i s interes ting to note that the Is-l amic regime in Iran never banned tradi tional cul ture, or nowmz, even i f i tdemoted such culture in favour of religious ceremonies. Mter some debateFerdowsi Street inTehran was not renamed. Ferdowsi, or Pirdausi, was a clas-sical tenth-century Persian poet, who wrote the Shahnama (Book of Kings),in which there i sno reference to Islam. In general , all Islamists acknowledgethe concept of culture, although they stress its religious dimension.

J iVh y i s n e cf undamenta li sm s u cc e ss fu l? 261him. Moreover the Taliban destroyed the statues of the

'..,J...u,~+\..UL


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262 Th e Mod e rn it y ifa n A r ch aic W ay o f T hin kin gNigeria, local Salafis vow to replace state law and customary lawwith sharia.This onslaught on tradition goes hand in hand with theemergence of a new leadership and often with the recasting of tra-ditional solidarity groups (clans) into more ideologically motivatedgroups: leaders and notables, aswell asnewcomers and competitors,recast their struggle using current political idiom.t" Many fellowtravellers of the neofundamentalists are motivated by social andeconomic strategies as well as by the fear of damnation - politicsmakes a comeback, even if this is not acknowledged as such bythe protagonists.Neofundamentalists do not articulate an antimodernist reaction

from among traditional sectors of society. They are actors of de-culturation and change inside traditional societies. Neofundamen-talism contributes to the collapse (or the adaptation) of traditionalsocieties and paves the way for other forms of westernisation andglobalisation, including in the economic sphere. But it also appealsto uprooted people.This deculturation is all the more effective when traditionalsocieties have already been destabilised by different processes of

modernisation such as migration, the free market and education.Neofundamentalists use deculturation as a tool for propaganda,while other ulama are confounded by it. Traditional fundamental-ist ulama have been the bearers of ' traditional Muslim cultures' ,as is obvious in Central and South Asia. Sunni ulama in CentralAsia (Afghanistan and Bukhara), where almost no secular cultureexisted till the 19205, used to transmit the tenets of Islam and of a

compensation in a blood feud, officials said Saturday. A decree banning thetwo traditional practices in the Mghan society was issued Friday, they said.Omar ruled that no fami ly shall force the widow of one of it smale memberstomarry another member of the same family against her will. The decree alsoforbids the practice of of fering a woman to the heir of a murde r victim asblood-money or compensation.' (Agence France Presse (AFP), 12 September1998.) The last-mentioned custom was a traditional way to settle blood feuds.Forbidding it means that one has to look for another code of law, which,given the Taliban's policy, could not be state law (qamrn) but only sharia.

66. Olivier Roy; 'Groupes de sol idarit es au Moyen-Orient et en Asie cent rale .Etats, territoires et reseaux', Les Cahiets du CERI, 16 (1996); Patrick Haenni,'Banlicues indociles? Sur la politisation des quartiers peri-urbains du Caire',PhD dissertation, Instirut d'


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264 H e M od ern ity rf a n A rc ha ic W ay if ThinkingCouncil of Mosques opposed the performance of bhangra musicin schools. This music is a creation of young 'Asian' bands mix-ing Punjabi and Western rhythms, some of which explicitly as-sert a 'Muslim' identity (the group called Fun-da-mental claimsto be Islamic), but the Council of Mosques considered that whatthey were doing was simply not Islamic at all.69 In France Islamicmilitants reject ra i (a hybrid of North African musical styles) asimmoral, but sometimes resort to rap music to spread the messageamong the young. B an gh ra , r ai and rap all express aWestern youthsubculture and a creolisation of musical traditions. In this sensethey combine to express a reconstructed westernised protest ofMuslim identity." Neofundamentalists conversely cannot acceptthis recasting of Muslim identity into cultural terms. For them theonly themes that can define such a community are purely religiousand they should not be borrowed either from Western or pristineidentities. By contrast modern youth culture is a combination ofboth. Neofundamentalism rejects subcultures that are a by-productof acculturation, creolisation and recasting of cultural elements tak-en from pristine cultures into the dominant culture, even if thesesubcultures use the term Muslim.Neofundamentalists push for the use either of the language of

the host country (generally English) or of Arabic, but not of pris-tine languages. In Moscow during the peres troika era the imams ofthe two recognised mosques, who were Tatars, decided to use theTatar language instead of Russian, but met with the oppositionof their non-Tatar congregations (Caucasians and Central Asians),who campaigned for the use of Russian, the only language theyhad incommon.Neofundamentalists therefore are not interested in creating or

asserting a 'Muslim' culture. They reject the concept, even if theysometimes use the term to find a common language with Western

69. Philip Lewis, I sl am i c B r it ai n: R el ig io n, P o li ti cs a nd I de nt it y a m on g B r it is h M u sl im s ,London:l.B. Tauris, 1994, pp. 180-1.

70. A radical rap song called'Dirty Kuffar' appeared on a website run by Saudidissident Muhammad al-Massari (Antony Barnett, 'Islamic rappers' messageof terror', Observer , 8 February 2004). In France a rap CD released in 2003,entitled La conception, ismarketed by publishing house Tawhid (inLyon)withthe comment: 'La conception est un CD de RAP dont les paroles sont em-preintes d'une ethique rnusulmane' (L a conception isa rap CD whose wordsare impregnated with a Muslim ethic).

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Vl'hy i s n e of un d am e ni al is m s u cc es s fu l? 265societies, where the language of multiculturalism isthe main idiomthrough which we deal with otherness. Conspicuous by their ab-sence are neofundamentalist novelists, poets, musicians, filmmakersor comedians. By stressing the gap between culture and religion, bystriving to establish a pure religion, separated from secular and layelements, neofundamentalists contribute to the paradoxical secu-larisation of modern society, because they isolate religion from theother dimensions of social life that they would like to, but cannot,ignore or destroy.F rom c ul tu re t o c o de ,j rom c o ll ec ti ve i de nt it y t o i nd iv id u al w o rs hi p. Howdo neofundamentalists conceive of religion? As we have seenthey insist on shar ia , J iqh , Hadith and ihadat (rituals of worship).For them religion is above all a strict code of explicit and objec-tive norms of conduct, the respect for which is a prerequisite forsalvation. Neofundamentalists produce many books, websites andvideos explaining what should be done and what is forbidden, aswell as collections of fatwas issued to adjust the code to new situ-ations arising from living in non-Muslim societies. There is thus astrong link between the collapse of the social authority of normsand the obsession with such norms. Such a need for a permanentelaboration of norms governing everyfield of activity arises fromthe fact that they are no longer internalised as cultural patterns,but have to be defined as explicit and external rules about howwe should act, think and feel - such norms are no longer 'natural'or obvious. We have seen how the passage of Islam to the Westentails a need to 'objectify' Islam, to redefine and reconstruct itin explicit terms. Neofundamentalism presents a dear answer tothis challenge. The objectification of religion is often embodied inthe believer's body, while the personage of the Prophet provides atimeless model of behaviour. The Taliban, as we know, enforced astrict code of mimetic dressing and behaviour (physical imitationof the Prophet); for them religion is reduced to a code of ritualsand of' dos' and' don'ts'. Norms aim to sanctify everyday life. Allgestures or actions, including the most mundane, have to be madeunder a specific norm and experienced as devotion (for example,by uttering prayers or sura).Norms have always been an issue in Islam, but because they

are no longer embedded in a given everyday culture, in customsand social authority, every action, every move and item of social


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266 Th e Modernity o f anA rchau:Way of Thinkingconduct has to be thought upon and elaborated:'Living in a non-Muslim society,Muslims have to be careful of every step they take.They must be conscious of what they are doing at all times."!How should one wake in the morning, dress,eat, sit,walk, speakto another person, and so on? Sheikh al-Albani wrote extensivelyon the obligation to wear a beard and the sort ofbeard it shouldbeJ2.fu:nong the documents left by the 9/11 hijackers was a smallguidebook giving precise instructions about which prayer or surato utter at every step of the mission (embarking on a plan, going tosleep).TablighiJama'at published an almost obsessivelist of gestures,deeds and sentences. It lists,for instance, twenty-six norms on theetiquette of eating and drinking: 'Always use three fingers wheneating ... alwaysdrink water while sitting with the right hand andin three pauses.T'The book Riyadh as-Salihin is full of such recom-mendations (seeChapter 3, called'The Book about the EtiquetteofEating').Thus there is an expanding process offatwa production:when social norms are no longer the product of a given culture,every step and action of daily life has to be elaborated under anexplicitly formulated norm.Interestingly,thishassome impact on the statusof women, which

in traditional Muslim societies is usually seen as low due to thecombination of a patriarchal structure and legal Islamicnorms. Butas every anthropologist knows, there is alwaysa gap, some leewaybetween avowednorms and realpractices.Women are transmittersof traditions and actorswho can strive to bend these traditions anddeploy a strategy of reappropriation, especiallywhen the transmis-sion is oraland thus not in the hands of an all-male corporation ofthe learned. 74Tradition maintains a space of ambiguity.Converselythe establishment of a univocal system of explicit norms reduces71. Fazeela Hanif, 'Being A Muslim in Great Britain', Moon Research Centre

(UK), was published on (hard copy inpossessionclmili~. .72. The Web page (Muslim Students' Association,University of Houston) is full of suchexplanations.

73. The text is called S ix P o in ts o fT ab li gh , and the chapter concerned is 'De-sired Manners of Eating and Drinking', apparently written byMaulana Mo-hammad Ilyas,'the founder of the movement. It has appeared on differentwebsites, such as (now closed) and .

74. Eva Rosander, 'Introduction; The Islamization of Tradition and Modernity'

l iVhy i s n e o fu ndamen ta li sm s uc c es sf u l? 267the autonomy of actors in favour of compulsory and standard-ised attitudes.The Taliban deprived Mghan women of the smallspace of autonomy provided by traditional society.But born-againMuslim women, as well as women who fall under a neofunda-mentalist-imposed socialorder,have to reconstruct and recomposetheir way of being a woman by dealing with strict regulations.Awoman's body is reshaped by norms. The dress issue becomescentral in modernised societies,while traditional ones offer somecompromise between norms and customs.This is a good indicator of how neofundamentalism is a tool for

the foundation of an artificialsocial order that deliberately ignoresthe gap between explicit rules and practical conduct. Any actionhas to be explained and elaborated. Discourse precedes action.Thelogic of neofundamentalism is embodied in the question it ad-dressesto nominal Muslims (acommon technique when aTablighiteam knocks at the door of an 'ordinary' Muslim): 'Is your behav-iour coherent with your faith?' And the answer is by definitionnegative: no human behaviour can be reduced to explicit norms.The guilt that goeswith that acknowledgement, coupled with theconstant reminders of Hell and salvation,isa strong inducement toturn one's mind to haram and halal.What isreconstructed here isnot only religion: it isthe selfitself,

in some sort of permanent representation and staging of the self.Believers (and especiallyconverts and born-again Muslims) act insuch a way as to stage their own faith: a sort of'exhibitionism' isoften manifested among many neofundamentalists, who use de-liberate markers of their own religious identity (specific dress andalso terms, usuallyArabic ones, frequently occur in their speech- brother,jazakallah, bismillah, and so on).This stresson the indi-vidual and interest in the selfis quite modern. Many non-Muslimsects(such asHare Krishna) transform individuals into actors whoperform their faith using the street as a stage.The individual hasto be 'constructed'. This construction is based on a set of markerswith little content but with high differentiation value (frombeardsto toothbrushes).Because it addressesindividuals in search of the self,neofunda-

mentalismhasa strong appealfor disfranchisedyouths. It givessensein DavidWesterlund and Eva Evers Rosander (eds),A ft ic an Is la m a nd I sla m i nA f ri ca : E n co u nt er s b et we en S u fi s a n d I s/ am i st s, London: Hurst, 1997,p. 7.


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2 68 T he M o de rn ity o f a n A rc ha ic Way o f Thinkingto generational conflict: by discarding the religion of the elders as'cultural' Islam, it valorises the quest of youth for autonomy (andeven rupture) vis-a-vis their parents and family (as we shall see,many AI Qaeda militants split from their Muslim families.) To bea talib (that is, a student) and not an alim (alearned scholar) is seenas positive, as shown by the denomination retained by the Tali-ban.The social and generational dimensions of neofundamentalismshould never be underestimated.By freeing the believer from the bonds of pristine societies,

families, tribes, social status and ethnic solidarities, but also fromthe bonds of brotherhoods, religious institutions and traditions,neofundamentalism favours individualism, or more precisely it sac-ralises the experience of individualisation. By appealing to youthsover the heads of their parents, by ignoring ulama in favour of a di-rect approach to the texts, and by encouraging a personal return tothe true tenets of Islam, neofundamentalists contribute to the pro-motion of the individual as opposed to any sort of group or hier-archy. The individual who has severed hi s links with any previoussocial group is prized. Nevertheless, it does not reject the idea ofcommunity or ummah: such a community has to be reconstructed,starting with individuals.N eofundamentalists, contrary to Islamists, are not concerned

with social issues, because they care only about individuals and notexisting societies. As one scholar puts it,The exclusive focus of the Tablighi Jama'at is individual. It has beenassumed that an individual can sustain his/her moral character even ina hostile social environment. It is on the basis of this assumption thatthe jama'at does not seem to have concerned itself with issues of socialsignificance and has not addressed itself to the problems of reformingpolitical and social institutions while transforming individuals.PThis stress on the individual and indifference towards social issuesis to be found in most Christian neofundamentalist revivalist de-~nominations (the Universal Church in Brazil, for instance, as wellas the Christian Right in the United States).N eofundamentalists strive to constrnct,from a collection ofindi-

vidual born-again Muslims, a true um mah - that is, a homogeneous

75. MurntazAhmad, 'Great Movements of the 20th Century No. 3:TheTablighlJama'at', .

liVhy is neo fu ndamen ta l ism s u c ce s sj u l? 269community of equals, delinked from their natural milieu and de-voted to the sole aim of practising a true Islam. Such a constructiv-ist approach to the concept of a religious community recurs amongnew forms of religious revival everywhere." The new communityis based on a personal, individual and voluntary adherence, not onan inherited cultural legacy.The weakness and the strength of suchconununities is that they do not exist outside free and personalchoices. Norms and transgression are two sides of the same coin:how does one enforce the norm ifthere is no external authority?Implementation of norms isin everyone's hands. Fanaticism is oneof the consequences of being insecure about the limits of the com-munity. Disillusionment with political instances of religious controlhas caused the responsibility for keeping the true path and main-taining the integrity of the community to be devolved to al l of thatcommunity's members. Hence the permanent display of normativeattitudes. Telling others what isright and wrong ( am r b il ma 'a ru f ... )isnot new, but it has suddenly become a permanent and individualduty, because there are no longer any obvious social rules. Livingin the West compels Muslims, as we have said, to reiterate normsand to impose them upon every detail of daily life. Mention ofdamnation and Hell is also a way to enforce rules upon individualswho are not under social pressure. Insistence on salvation is also aconsequence of the individualisation of religious discourse.Th e audience. Neofundamentalism does not target communitieswith ties to a culture of origin but is aimed at individuals who havedoubts about their faith and identity. In the West it appeals to anuprooted, often young and well-educated but frustrated and alreadydisgruntled youth. For such uprooted individuals, fundamentalismoffers a system for regulating behaviour that can fit any situation,from Mghan deserts to US college campuses. No wonder neo-fundamentalism attracts the losers from deculturation. But 'loser'should not be understood in purely socioeconomic terms: it isnot amatter of poverty but of self-identity. Neofundamentalism has evenmade a breakthrough among an educated middle class that is notrevolutionary and is looking for respectability while experiencing

76. About French Christians: 'such communal aspirations thrive on the veryground of individualism'. DanieleHervieu-Leger, La r el ig io n p o ur m im o ir e,Paris:Editions du Cerf, 1993.


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270 The Moderni ty ifa n A r c ha ic Wa y ifThinkingsome form of acculturation. In Egypt and Pakistan, for example,neofundamentalism reaches many workers returning from the Gulfstates.F'They engage in grassrootsactivitieswhere charities,businessand social advancement are heavily intertwined with what couldbe called a parallel Islamic economic sector." In Europe neofunda-mentalism attracts second-generation Muslims who have brokenwith the pristine culture of their parents but do not feel integratedintoWestern society,although they havemastered its languagesandconsumption habits. Neofundamentalism also suits Muslim uni-versity students and school dropouts, and sometimes former drugaddicts, who find in it discipline and a new community. It alsoattracts young converts. Gaol is a recruiting ground because it en-tailsisolation, loneliness and a severance of social ties that favoursself-reflection.The breakthrough of neofundamentalism (the SalafiorWahhabi version) in tribal societies is also striking (for example,in northern Nigeria and northern Yemen, and among Afghan andPakistani Pashtuns), aswe shall see later.

In this senseneofundamentalism is unwittingly working to adaptIslam to modern models of individualisation and the freemarket, asdid the US brand of Protestant fundamentalism.N eo fu nd am en ta lis m a s a p ro d uc t a nd a t oo l o f g l ob ali sa tio n. Neofun-damentalism valorises the uprootedness of uprooted people. Bypretending to ignore the cultural context and by providing a codeof conduct that functions in a similar manner in any part of theworld, it is a perfect tool of globalisation. It works along the samelines asglobalisation- individualisation, deculturation and deterri-torialisation - and promotes a reconstructed identity based on thehomogenisation ofpatterns of conduct.Religion, conceived of asa decontextualised set ofnorms, can beadapted to anysociety,precisely because it hasseveredits links with

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