Round Table Meeting in connection with the RSA-Conference ... · 2:00 p.m. Introduction 2:10 p.m. Trusted Infrastructures Steve Lipner, Microsoft, USA 2:40 p.m. Embedded TC: Trustworthy

www.teletrust.de

2:00 p.m. Introduction2:10 p.m. Trusted Infrastructures

Steve Lipner, Microsoft, USA2:40 p.m. Embedded TC: Trustworthy Infrastructures in the Mobile World?

Ammar Alkassar, Sirrix AG, Germany3:10 p.m. Securing the Core with an Enterprise Key Management

InfrastructureArshad Noor, StrongAuth, Inc., USAAndreas Philipp, Utimaco AG, Germany

3:40 p.m. TC InfrastructuresMonty Wiseman, Intel Corporation,

4:10 p.m. Smart Card Security for Mobile Data and ApplicationsRon Porcello, certgate GmbH, Germany

4:40 p.m. Discussion5:00 p.m. End of workshop

Round Table Meetingin connection with the RSA-Conference 2008Support for Mobility - Trusted Infrastructures

Steven B. LipnerSenior DirectorSecurity Engineering StrategyTrustworthy ComputingMicrosoft Corporation

SLIDES NOT DISTRIBUTED, Sorry for that: Arno

Sirrix AG security technologies

Round Table – prior RSA Conference7. April 2008 | San Francisco © 2008 Sirrix AG

Sirrix AGsecurity technologies

EmbeddedEmbeddedTrusted ComputingTrusted Computing

Trustworthy Infrastructures in the Mobile World?Ammar Alkassar, Christian Forler, Thomas Quirin

Round Table, San Francisco © 2008 Sirrix AG


Sirrix AG security technologiesSirrix AG security technologiesExcellence in Trusted ComputingExcellence in Trusted Computing

Founded in 2000 as Spin-Off ofGerman Research Center for Artificial IntelligenceFocus: Cutting-Edge Technology in Information Security

Many Key Developments in Trusted ComputingTURAYA™ First Security Kernel with TC-SupportTPM Compliance Test SuiteTrustedGRUB Bootloader, TPM-Manager, …First E1-Interface-Card with TPM supportFirst VPN and IEEE802.1x port authentication with TC-Support

Upcoming Studies in 2008:CC Protection Profile on High-Assurance Security Kernel (HASK)Study on security technologies, alternative and/or supporting TC

Worldwide CustomersInfineon, ST Microelectronics, SAP, NATO, BSI, ND-Satcom Defense, Scotty, Thales Defense, Commissariat à l‘Energie Atomique (CEA), SCA, Bechtle, T-Online, WincorNixdorf, Trusted Computing Group, Inc. …

Embedded Trusted

Computing?



Embedded Trusted ComputingEmbedded Trusted ComputingAreas of InterestAreas of Interest

Mobile ComputingMobile ComputingSmart Phones, Mobiles, PDAs

Car ElectronicsCar ElectronicsIncreasing security of access control etc.Online activation of purchased features

Manufacturing Systems Manufacturing Systems Intellectual Property protection of manufacturing systemsCurrently not addressed by TCG, TPM not sufficient

AdhocAdhoc/Mesh/Mesh--NetworksNetworksTrusted Nodes in ubiquitous computing

Home Networks Home Networks Smart home infrastructures

Addressed in „EMSCB“European MultilaterallySecure Computing Base

To be addressed in EU FP7-Project Ubisec&Sens II



Embedded Trusted ComputingEmbedded Trusted ComputingAreas of InterestAreas of Interest

Mobile ComputingMobile ComputingSmart Phones, Mobiles, PDAs

Car ElectronicsCar ElectronicsIncreasing security of access control etc.Online activation of purchased features

Manufacturing Systems Manufacturing Systems Intellectual Property protection of manufacturing systemsCurrently not addressed by TCG, TPM not sufficient

AdhocAdhoc/Mesh/Mesh--NetworksNetworksTrusted Nodes in Ubiquitous Computing

Home networks Home networks Smart home infrastructures

Addressed in „EMSCB“European MultilaterallySecure Computing Base

To be addressed in EU FP7-Project Ubisec&Sens II

Don’t we have already

solutions?



UICCsUICCs as Deployed Security Anchoras Deployed Security Anchor

Mobile Device

Carrier

Service Provider

UICC cannot provideAny end-to-end securityAuthentication without carrier’s helpUsually available inside cellular networksAny integrity protection of the softwareAny statement on the integrity nor on the configuration of the platform

UICC

UICC can provideEnd-point authentication by mobile carrierPoint-to-point encryption of over-the air communication

What do we expect from Mobile TC



Mobile Trusted ComputingMobile Trusted Computing

Mobile Computing: Mobiles, Mobile Computing: Mobiles, SmartphonesSmartphones, , PDAsPDAs

Threats to be addressedThreats to be addressedKnown threats from the computing world (Worms, Trojan H., Viruses)

New threats, e.g. stolen equipment with sensitive key material and data



Mobile Trusted ComputingMobile Trusted ComputingUse CasesUse Cases

User Data Protection and PrivacyUser Data Protection and PrivacyEnable the protection of user’s personal information, such as identity and address books, from access or copying by unauthorized parties.

Platform IntegrityPlatform IntegrityEnsure device operation occurs with only authorized operating system(s) and hardware.

Prove Platform/Application Integrity to End Prove Platform/Application Integrity to End UserUser

Provide the ability for the user to verify, either at boot time or on application start up, the trustworthiness of the device and/or application.

Device AuthenticationDevice AuthenticationEnsure that 1) device authentication may be used to assist in end user authentication, and 2) that it may prove the identity of the device itself.

SIMLockSIMLock / Device Personalization / Device Personalization Ensure that subsidized mobile devices remain locked to the appropriate network until unlocked in an authorized manner.

Robust DRM ImplementationRobust DRM ImplementationEnsure any implementation of a DRM specification can be trusted to protect the data that users acquire and the content and service providers require .

Secure Software DownloadSecure Software DownloadEnable the secure download of application software or updates, firmware updates or patches to protect against attacks.

Software UsageSoftware UsageAssure that software applications retain their integrity against attacks, adhere to device user policies, and cannot interfere with other device functions.

Secure channel between device and UICCSecure channel between device and UICCProvide shared functioning for security sensitive applications (e.g., an m-commerce application) that must implemented partly in the UICC and partly in the device.

Mobile TicketingMobile TicketingEnable new services based on a user purchase of an electronic ticket which is downloaded to the mobile device and used for entry to an event or access to a service.

Mobile PaymentsMobile PaymentsEnable the mobile device to serve as a user’s wallet or purse for electronic payments to point of sale devices.




How can the mobile world benefit from TC? How can the mobile world benefit from TC?

Providing a security anchor with integrity proofProviding a security anchor with integrity proofenabling new business models (carrier support not required)

standardized and interoperable

Increasing trustworthiness forIncreasing trustworthiness forsensitive applications (e.g. legal binding signatures, m-payment)

business applications (protection against Trojan Horses etc.)




How can the mobile world benefit from TC? How can the mobile world benefit from TC?

Providing a security anchor with integrity proofProviding a security anchor with integrity proofenabling new business models (carrier support not required)

standardized and interoperable

Increasing trustworthinessIncreasing trustworthiness forforsensitive applications (e.g. legal binding signatures, m-payment)

business applications (protection against Trojan Horses etc.)

1. Security Anchor



TCG: Mobile Trusted Platform Module (MTM)TCG: Mobile Trusted Platform Module (MTM)

MTM: Specified June 2007MTM: Specified June 2007Goal: Standardized, interoperable, vendorGoal: Standardized, interoperable, vendor--independentindependentMain differences to Trusted Platform Module (TPM) conceptMain differences to Trusted Platform Module (TPM) concept

MTM supports Secure Boot – TPM just measures integrity

MTM is a functionality rather than a physical module

Parallel instances of MTM on the same device possible

Currently, no implementation, but Currently, no implementation, but MTM Emulator by Nokia Research, Helsinki

Soldered TPM on Samsung Smartphone (Samsung/Infineon)

MTM Compliance Test Suite by Sirrix AG

2. Increasing Trustworthines

s



TURAYA: HighTURAYA: High--Assurance Security Kernel Assurance Security Kernel

PerseusPerseus: Separation Kernel, developed since 1999: Separation Kernel, developed since 1999Provides strong isolation and mandatory policy enforcement on compartment level

Turaya: TPMTuraya: TPM--support added in EMSCBsupport added in EMSCB--Project (2005Project (2005--2008)2008)Partners: Infineon, SAP, Bosch/Blaupunkt, IFIS, RUB, TUD,…

Currently underlying security core of Currently underlying security core of Projects: OpenTC, TECOM, TRUCOM, VERISOFT, …Products: TrustedVPN, TrustedIEEE802.1x, …

Supports different types of Hypervisors/MicrokernelSupports different types of Hypervisors/MicrokernelL4/TUD, OKL4/Sydney, P4/Sysgo, XEN

Applying to mobile systemsApplying to mobile systems



Mobile Trusted Platform Module (MTM)Mobile Trusted Platform Module (MTM)An ExampleAn Example

Security-Enabled Processor (e.g., TI M-Shield, Qualcomm SecureMSM)

Security Kernel

Virtualization

Legacy Mobile OS

Security critical applications

Secure Boot and MRTM set up

secure, signature-based bootsecure on-chip keys/secretslimited access to on-chip keys

Signed firmwaresecure processing environment e.g., ARM TrustZone or Security Kernel

Process isolationMandatory policy enforcementUser MTM with mandatory and discretionary access control

Proprietary Boot

Abort on Failure

Current Activities in

Embedded TC



Projects on Mobile/Embedded Trusted Computing Projects on Mobile/Embedded Trusted Computing

TECOMTECOM--Project (EU FPProject (EU FP--7), 01/2008 7), 01/2008 ––Partners: Infineon AG, EADS Defense&Security, SYSGO AG, Sirrix AG, Amtec S.p.a., Trango Virtual Processors, Aonix, Trusted Logic, and more

Focus on mobile phones and carrier/service provider

MoTrustMoTrust--Project (German BSI), 2008/2009Project (German BSI), 2008/2009Focus on mobile devices and sensitive applications

TRUCOMTRUCOM--Project (German National), 2006Project (German National), 2006--20082008Focus on mobile devices and media protection/DRM


© 2008 Sirrix AGRound Table | San Francisco

Contacts:

Liese-Meitner-Allee 444801 BochumTel +49 234 61007-0Fax +49 234 61007-111

Im Stadtwald, Geb. D3 266123 SaarbrückenTel +49 681 936251-0Fax +49 681 936251-500

[email protected]

QuestionsQuestions??

mailto:[email protected]

Arshad Noor, Andreas Philipp

Securing the Core with Enterprise Key Management

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Who we are? StrongAuth, Inc.

7 year-old, private company based in Sunnyvale, CaliforniaFocus on:

• Enterprise Key Management

• PKI-based Identity Management

• Compliance Workflow Management

Arshad Noor, CTO, StrongAuth, Inc.

Utimaco Safeware AG25 year-old, public company based in Oberursel, Germany

Focus on:• Data Security Soultion

Andreas Philipp; Head of HSM Business.

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Business ChallengeRegulatory Compliance

PCI-DSS, HIPAA, FISMA, SB-1386, etc.Impending Massachusetts H213 bill

Avoiding finesChoicePoint $15M, Nationwide Building Society $2M

Avoiding lawsuits – BofA, TJX, HannafordAvoiding negative publicity

Hannaford, VA, IRS, TJX, E&Y, Citibank, BofA, WF, Ralph Lauren, UC, and 300+ others

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•Generate•Encrypt•Decrypt•Escrow•Authorize•Recover•Destroy•Audit

The Encryption Problem





.........and on and on

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Key Management Silos

DecryptEncryptKey-Handling





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What is an EKMI?An Enterprise Key Management Infrastructure is:“A collection of technology, policies and procedures for managing the life-cycle of all cryptographic keys in the enterprise.”

CharacteristicsA single place to define EKM policyA single place to manage all keysStandard protocols for EKM servicesPlatform and Application-independentScalable to service millions of clientsAvailable even when network failsExtremely secure

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The EKMI Model

DecryptEncrypt

DecryptEncrypt

DecryptEncrypt

DecryptEncrypt

DecryptEncrypt

DecryptEncrypt

Symmetric Key Service (SKS) Server GenerateProtectEscrowAuthorizeRecoverDestroyAudit

PKI Issue and Manage Credentials

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EKMI Components

EKMI

PKI SKMS

PKI (Public Key Infrastructure)

“A collection of technology, policies and procedures for managing the life-cycle of asymmetric cryptographic keys in the enterprise.”

SKMS (Symmetric Key Management System)

“A collection of technology, policies and procedures for managing the life-cycle of symmetric cryptographic keys in the enterprise.”

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SKMS Big-Picture

1.) Client Application makes a request for a symmetric ke2.) SKCL makes a digitally signed request to the SKS3.) SKS verifies SKCL request, generates, encrypts, digitally signs & escrows key in

DB4.) CryptoServer HSM provides security for RSA Signing & Encryption keys of SKS5.) SKS responds to SKCL with signed and encrypted symmetric key6.) SKCL verifies response, decrypts key and hands it to the Client Application7.) Native (non-Java) applications make requests through Java Native Interface

DB ServerApplicationServer

CryptoServer

SKCL

C/C++Application

RPGApplication

JavaApplication

Key Cache

JNIRPGNI

ServerClient

HTTPNet work

1

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Conclusion

“Securing the Core” should have been Plan A from the beginning

But its not too late

OASIS Enterprise Key Management Infrastructure Technical Committee is driving new key management standards that cuts across platforms, applications and industries.

Members include Visa, Wells Fargo, Red Hat, US Dept. of Defense plus 25+ other companies/individuals (including the world's largest software company, world's largest database software company, world's two largest security software companies, etc.) SKSML standard anticipated in Summer/Fall 2008

Slide #1Copyright© 2007 Trusted Computing Group - Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners.

Permission grated to distribute to members of INCITS CS1 and ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27 for the purpose of standards development

TPM and the TC Infrastructure7 April, 2008

Monty WisemanTrusted Computing Group

Chair: PC Client WG

Slide #2Copyright© 2007-8 Trusted Computing Group - Other names and brands are properties of their respective owners.


TCG Mission

Develop and promote open, vendor-neutral, industry standard specifications for trusted

computing building blocks and software interfaces across multiple platforms.



PromotersAMDHewlett-PackardIBMInfineonIntel CorporationLenovoMicrosoftSun Microsystems, Inc.

TCG Membership140Total Members as of March 24, 2008

8 Promoter, 80 Contributor, 52 AdopterContributorsAmerican Megatrends, Inc.Aruba NetworksAtmelAuthenTec, Inc.Broadcom CorporationCerticom Corp.Citrix Systems, IncDecruDell, Inc.DPHI, Inc.Emulex Design and ManufacturingEnterasys NetworksEricsson Mobile Platforms ABETRIExtreme NetworksFrance Telecom GroupFreescale SemiconductorFujitsu LimitedFujitsu Siemens ComputersGemalto NVGeneral Dynamics C4 SystemsGiesecke & DevrientGreen Hills SoftwareHID GlobalHitachi, Ltd.Huawei Technologies Co., Ltd.Identity Engines

ContributorsInfobloxInsyde Software Corp.InterDigital Communications, LLCITE Tech Inc.Juniper Networks, Inc.Lancope, Inc.Lexar Media, Inc.Lexmark InternationalLockheed MartinLSI LogicMarvell Semiconductor, Inc.Matsushita Electric IndustrialMcAfee, Inc.Mirage NetworksMobile Armor, inc.Motorola Inc.NECNeoscale SystemsNokiaNokia Siemens Networks GmbHNortel NTRU Cryptosystems, Inc.NVIDIANXP SemiconductorsOxford SemiconductorsPhoenixPMC-SierraRenesas Technology Corp.Ricoh Company LTD

ContributorsRSA, The Security Division of EMCSafeNet, Inc.Samsung Electronics Co.SanDisk CorporationSeagate TechnologySECUDE IT Security GmbHSharp Electronics CorporationSiemens AGSMSCSony CorporationSpansion LLCStepNexus, IncStillSecureSTMicroelectronicsSymantecSymbian LtdToshiba CorporationTrapeze NetworksUnisysUPEK, Inc.Utimaco Safeware AGVMware, Inc.Vodafone Group Services LTDWave SystemsWestern Digital



TCG Membership 140 Total Members as of March 24, 2008

8 Promoter, 80 Contributor, 52 AdopterAdoptersLink-A-Media DevicesLockdown NetworksMazu NetworksMoSys, Inc.Nanjing Byosoft, LtdnSolutions, Inc.O2 MicroPatchLink CorporationPenza Research Electrotechnical InstituteQ1 LabsSafeBootSafend LTD.Shavlik TechnologiesSignaCert, Inc.Sirrix AG Security TechnologiesSkyRecon SystemsSoftex, Inc.Stonewood ElectronicsTELUSThales CommunicationThe Boeing CompanyTrust DigitalUNETsystemValicore Technologies, Inc.ViaSat, Inc.Vormetric, Inc.Winbond Electronics Corporation

AdoptersApani NetworksAUCONET GmbHAvenda SystemsBioscrypt Inc.Bit9, Inc.BlueCat NetworksBlueRidge NetworksBlueRISC, Inc.Bradford NetworksConSentry NetworksCMS ProductsCPR Tools, Inc.Cranite Systems, Inc.Credant TechnologiesCryptomathic Ltd.CryptoMill TechnologiesDartmouth CollegeFireScope Inc.ForeScout TechnologiesHangzahou Synochip Technology Co. Ltd.High Density DevicesICT Economic Impact, Ltd.IDEX ASAInsight International CorpIntellasys



TCG: The “BIG” Picture

Desktops & Notebooks

Hardcopy

Mobile Phones

Networking

Security Hardware

Applications•Software Stack

•Operating Systems•Web Services•Authentication•Data Protection

Storage

Servers

Virtualized Platform

Authentication



Platform Authentication

• Applications tend to focus on “user authentication”• But how does the IT infrastructure know which

platform is being used?– Is it authorized to be attached to the network?

?



Platform Attestation

• Applications tend to assume they have not been attacked– Especially true of “monitoring” or “defensive” apps

• But how does the IT infrastructure know if the platform is executing the application as authorized?

?



Protecting Secrets

• OS and Applications use software to protect keys and secrets– They lack a standardized and isolated place to create, store

and use them

• All software can be attacked– Offline attacks are not difficult



Functional TPM Diagram• Root of Trust for Reporting

(RTR)– Provides cryptographic

mechanism to report on TPM shielded locations

– Source of uniqueness of TPM• Root of Trust for Storage (RTS)

– Provides cryptographic mechanism to store shielded information outside of TPM

• TPM has limited internal storage

• Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM)– Platform component that

provides identity of platform state

• Note that any entity outside of the TPM must use a protected capability to access a shielded location

TPM

Protected Capabilities

Shielded Locations

RTR

RTS

RTM



One Example of a Virtual Environment

VMM

Virtual Machine

Virtual Machine

Virtual Machine

vTPM

vTPMvTPM

TPM

TPM Manager



Domains in a Trusted Mobile Platform

Device Owner’sMandatory Domain

Engine

Engine

Engine

Device Owner’sDiscretionary Domain

Engine

Engine

Engine

Device Manufacturer’sMandatory Domain

Engine

Engine

Engine

Device Manufacturer’s Engine



Operating System

MTM Example Platform

RTE

Allocated RoTs

CommsCarrier

Trusted Services

Engine - A

Service Provider

Trusted Services

Engine - B

User

Trusted Services

Engine - C



Root and Chain of Trust

• Goal is to gain trust in Entity C

• Must first trust a root– A Root of Trust is an entity that must be trusted as there is no mechanism available to measure the

entity– In TCG we call this the Root of Trust for Measurement (RTM)

• Operational standpoint is that RTM launches A; A launches B and B launches C– To trust C one must trust B– To trust B one must trust A– To trust A one must trust the RTM

• A to B to C to RTM creates a “Chain of Trust”

• Another term in use for this is “Transitive Trust”– Trust is transitive from A to B to C– It does not invert, trusting A does NOT imply that I must trust C– Trusting C REQUIRES me to trust A and B and, of course, the RTM

Entity A Entity B Entity CRTM



Broker TransactionUntrusted Platform

2. Accept < $5,000 Xaction from any platform

1. Request Xation < $5,000

3. Acknowledge Xaction

UnTrustedUnTrustedPlatformPlatform

11

33

StockBroker.comStockBroker.com

22



Broker TransactionUntrusted Platform

2. Xaction > $5,000 must provide strong proof of user authentication

1. Request Xation > $5,000

3. Request trust state of authentication mechanism


11

33


22

44

55

4. Cannot provide

5. Deny request



Broker TransactionTrusted Platform

2. Xaction > $5,000 must provide strong proof of user authentication

1. Request Xation > $5,000

3. Request trust state of authentication mechanism


TPMTPM

AttestationID Key

11

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22

44

55

4. AIK signs trust state

5. Accept request



Multiple AIK UsageTrustedTrustedPlatformPlatform

TPMTPM

Gateway to Gateway to InternetInternet

Mail Mail ServerServer

External External VendorVendor

Internal Internal TTPTTP

External External TTPTTP

AIK 1AIK 1

AIK 2AIK 2

AIK 3AIK 3

someService.comsomeService.com

AIK 4AIK 4

Acme Acme CorporationCorporation



TNC Building BlocksAccess Requestor PolicyEnforcement

Point

VerifiersVerifiers

tCollectorCollector

Integrity MeasurementCollectors

Integrity MeasurementVerifiers

Network Access

Requestor

PolicyEnforcement

Point

Network AccessAuthority

TNCServer

Policy DecisionPoint

Supplicant/VPN Client, etc.

Switch/ Firewall/VPN Gateway

TSS

TPM

IntLog.

Platform TrustService (PTS)

TNCClient

AAA Server, Radius,Diameter, IIS, etc.

Peer Relationship

Peer Relationship



Questions:Contact: [email protected]

1

microSD Smart Card Solutions

29th of February, 2008

2

Agenda

1. Perceived Mobile Threats2. Mobile Security3. Security made Easy4. Advantages of smart cards5. Uses of Smart Cards6. Putting Smart Cards and Telephones together7. What is certgate8. What we do for the Mobile World9. Mobile Security 2.0

3

Perceived Mobile Threats

4

Mobile Security

E-mail Security

Virtual Private NetworkFirewall

Internet Security

Digital Signature

Banking

Digital Rights ManagementAuthentication

&Device Data

Security

NFC & Payment

http://images.google.de/imgres?imgurl=http://www.geek.com/images/geeknews/2007June/htctouch.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.geek.com/news/geeknews/2007June/bpd20070605005847.htm&h=821&w=440&sz=56&hl=de&start=1&tbnid=XVt4wJxcJuGeNM:&tbnh=144&tbnw=77&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dhtc%2Bwindows%2Bmobile%26gbv%3D2%26svnum%3D10%26hl%3Dde%26sa%3DG

5

Smart Card Security

****

CHIP + PIN

• Easy AND Secure• Military / Bank level security• Key to Security

+

http://images.google.de/imgres?imgurl=http://www.hsbc.com.br/wcm/neutro/seguranca/img/smartcard.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.hsbc.com.br/common/seguranca/artigo-seguranca-criptografia-autenticada.shtml&h=173&w=283&sz=18&hl=de&start=1&tbnid=L8lpRSziOwZSaM:&tbnh=70&tbnw=114&prev=/images?q=smartcard&svnum=10&hl=de&lr=&sa=G

6

Smart Card Applications

E-mail Security

Authentication&

Device Data Security


Internet Security

Digital Signature

Payment & Banking

Digital Rights Management

http://images.google.de/imgres?imgurl=http://www.hsbc.com.br/wcm/neutro/seguranca/img/smartcard.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.hsbc.com.br/common/seguranca/artigo-seguranca-criptografia-autenticada.shtml&h=173&w=283&sz=18&hl=de&start=1&tbnid=L8lpRSziOwZSaM:&tbnh=70&tbnw=114&prev=/images?q=smartcard&svnum=10&hl=de&lr=&sa=G

7

Smart Cards on Mobile Devices?

E-mail Security


Internet Security

Digital Signature

Banking


&Device Data

Security

NFC & Payment

http://images.google.de/imgres?imgurl=http://www.hsbc.com.br/wcm/neutro/seguranca/img/smartcard.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.hsbc.com.br/common/seguranca/artigo-seguranca-criptografia-autenticada.shtml&h=173&w=283&sz=18&hl=de&start=1&tbnid=L8lpRSziOwZSaM:&tbnh=70&tbnw=114&prev=/images?q=smartcard&svnum=10&hl=de&lr=&sa=Ghttp://images.google.de/imgres?imgurl=http://www.geek.com/images/geeknews/2007June/htctouch.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.geek.com/news/geeknews/2007June/bpd20070605005847.htm&h=821&w=440&sz=56&hl=de&start=1&tbnid=XVt4wJxcJuGeNM:&tbnh=144&tbnw=77&prev=/images%3Fq%3Dhtc%2Bwindows%2Bmobile%26gbv%3D2%26svnum%3D10%26hl%3Dde%26sa%3DG

8

Mobile Security Innovation

Where to put the smart card in the phone?


9

certgate Smart Card microSD

E-mail Security


Digital Signature

Banking


&Device Data

Security

Internet Security

NFC & Payment


10

Smart Card in microSD Format

11


Smart Card with Memory Function

One card in many form factors!

Mobility

Security

Smart Card

Flash Memory

12

Secure Data & Communication

Server Systemcertgate

Smart Card microSD

InternetGSM, WLAN

Secure remote applications:

• Smart Card Login

• Encrypt data on PDA

• Secure data communication

• Strong Authentication

• Digital Signature


13

• Banking & Finance

• Government

• Industry

• Corporate Security (Security Policy)

• Transportation

• Telematics

• NFC – Mobile Payment

• Health

• Telecommunications

• Content providers

Who uses certgate?


14

• Banking Services and Software (Savings Banks, Credit Institutions)Secure Access, data encryption, digital signature

• Accounting - Data Processing (DATEV)mobile VPN, PDA Access and data encryption, E-Mail Push, Registry Protector, SD Card Encryption

• Informatics Center (State of Lower Sachsony)mobile VPN, PDA Access and encryption

• Car Manufacturer (Porsche)mobile VPN, PDA Access and data encryption, E-Mail Push

• Government Authorities (Germany, The Netherlands, Singapore)mobile VPN, PDA Access and encryption, E-Mail Push

Exemplary Reference Projects

The certgate Smart Card is in more than 250 customersworldwide in operation and pilot projects!

15

Device / OS Support

Plun-n-play

Plun-n-play

Coming soon…

http://www.thelinuxstore.ca/index.php?main_page=product_info&cPath=41_168&products_id=766&zenid=4667d916bacc3c85d29637e2476077cfhttp://images.google.de/imgres?imgurl=http://www.aculab.com/newsletter/images/cpe20/linuxlogo+penguin.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.aculab.com/newsletter/cp_issue_020.html&h=316&w=741&sz=36&hl=de&start=14&um=1&tbnid=RX_kEFvovvRHcM:&tbnh=60&tbnw=141&prev=/images?q=linux+logo&svnum=10&um=1&hl=de&sa=Ghttp://images.google.de/imgres?imgurl=http://matthiaspath.de/wiki/_media/apple-logo.jpg&imgrefurl=http://matthiaspath.de/wiki/mac&h=480&w=424&sz=21&hl=de&start=101&tbnid=zR03bdjsf55eAM:&tbnh=129&tbnw=114&prev=/images?q=mac+apple&start=84&gbv=2&ndsp=21&svnum=10&hl=de&sa=Nhttp://images.google.de/imgres?imgurl=http://www.geek.com/images/geeknews/2007June/htctouch.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.geek.com/news/geeknews/2007June/bpd20070605005847.htm&h=821&w=440&sz=56&hl=de&start=1&tbnid=XVt4wJxcJuGeNM:&tbnh=144&tbnw=77&prev=/images?q=htc+windows+mobile&gbv=2&svnum=10&hl=de&sa=Ghttp://images.google.de/imgres?imgurl=http://www.funambol.com/blog/capo/uploaded_images/nokia-n800-744974.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.funambol.com/blog/capo/2007_05_01_archive.html&h=380&w=525&sz=48&hl=de&start=4&tbnid=aJz2WJ1Ce5p7HM:&tbnh=96&tbnw=132&prev=/images?q=pocket+linux+tablet+nokia&gbv=2&svnum=10&hl=dehttp://images.google.de/imgres?imgurl=http://www.handy-discount.de/nokia/nokia_9300_c.jpg&imgrefurl=http://www.handy-discount.de/nokia/nokia_9300.htm&h=343&w=285&sz=30&hl=de&start=20&tbnid=_QjEvxYz-WLV5M:&tbnh=120&tbnw=100&prev=/images?q=nokia+communicator&gbv=2&svnum=10&hl=dehttp://images.google.de/imgres?imgurl=http://www.cnet.co.uk/story_media/49277891/htc.jpg&imgrefurl=http://crave.cnet.co.uk/mobiles/0,39029453,49277891,00.htm&h=331&w=350&sz=51&hl=de&start=2&tbnid=l5f2XWbuHk4aaM:&tbnh=113&tbnw=120&prev=/images?q=htc+windows+mobile&gbv=2&svnum=10&hl=de

16

certgate Smart Card microSD PKI (JCOP2.3)

certgate Smart Card microSD SIGN (TCOS3.0)

certgate Smart Card microSD FINANCE for FinTS/HBCI based Banking (RDH, TAN-Generator)

certgate CSP & PKCS#11 Software for Windows Mobile and Windows

certgate API for access to card functions

certgate Smart Card AdminTool for the administration of cards and certificates

certgate Smart Card Registry Protector for the protection of registry settings under Windows Mobile

certgate Smart Card SD Card Encryption for the encryption of SD cards, denies the usage of not encrypted SD cards

certgate Products

17

• Works on any device: Phone and PC

• Comes in many sizes

• Made in Germany

• Patented Technology (pending)

• Security Certifications: Common Criteria (HW EAL 5+)

• Partners: NCP(D), Utimaco(D), Subsembly(D), Microsoft(US)

Features

18

Features

• Works on any device: Phone and PC

• Comes in many sizes

• Made in Germany

• Patented Technology (pending)

• Security Certifications: Common Criteria (HW EAL 5+)

• Partners: NCP(D), Utimaco(D), Subsembly(D), Microsoft(US)

This is not an optional device for Security. This is the basis of security on the telephone.

19

Exchange Security

E‐Mail Signature

E‐Mail Encryption

Pocket Outlook –Email Security

20

Pocket IE – SSL Security

Server and Client Authentication with

Hardware Certificates

welcome to your protected content

21

SafeGuard PDA – Utimaco

User smart card authentication

Data encryption

Single Sign On (SSO) with other applications

central administration of rights and certificates

Device Security & Data Encryption

22

VPN Secure CE Client – NCP

Authorized Remote Access to Virtual Private Network

IPSec

Virtual Private Network


23

FinPocket – Subsembly

Mobile Banking for Pocket PCs using HBCI/FinTS security process

FinPhone – Subsembly

Mobile Banking for Smartphones using HBCI/FinTS security process

Secure Mobile Banking

24

PKI-Appliance – ECOS

Loading of certificates to certgate Smart Card

Lifecycle Management for certgate Smart Card

User-Synchronization with any Directory

PKI Appliances

25

certgate Architecture


SD Commands

ISO7816 Commands

Terminal(PC, PDA, Smartphone)

Application

certgate APIcertgate API

SD‐Slot

Device Driver

CSP

CSP

PKCS#11

PKCS#11

Server User

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• Smart card usage for Windows Mobile, Pocket Linux applications via microSD-, miniSD-, or SD/MMC-Slot (Symbian, BlackBerry in work)

• Smart card usage for MS Windows, Linux for Desktop & Notebook applications via a USB-card-reader OR via ActiveSync / USB / Bluetooth / WLAN directly in the mobile device microSD, miniSD or SD/MMC slot

• Certificate, public and private key upload to smart card (8 general purpose key stores)

• On-card secure key generation (RSA 2048 bit)

• On-card secure signature generation with private key (RSA)

• On-card secure public key encryption / private key decryption (RSA)

• On-card secure random number generator, user accessible

• Speed: RSA 2048 Bit signature < 0,5s;

Functions and Features

27

certgate Smart Card microSD JAVA:

• SD flash memory card standard

• JavaCard 2.2, JavaCard 2.3 and Global Platform 2.1 compliant

• on card secure random number generator FIPS PUB 140-2 and BSI AIS 31 compliant

• RSA 2048 bit on-card security algorithms;

• Smart Card CC EAL5+ compliant

• Smart Card and JavaCard 2.3 CC EAL4+ compliant

• OEM Products available

Card Standards (Java Card)

Compliant to legal requirements for IT security

28

• Identification, authentication, and authorization with Smart Card functionality now alsofor PDA, Smartphone or Handhelds (Hardware-Level Security)

• Mobile financial transactions, mobile VPN, E-Mail, mobile access to internet and personal data in compliance to highest security levels

• Assurance of an increased hardware based security level for mobile phones

• One security token in most different devices: Desktop, Notebook and in the powerful and cost effective mobile devices like PDA or Smartphones

• Usage of cost effective base technologies: GPRS, UMTS, MMC/SD-interface

• Independence from SIM-card-based security (SIM, SAT, SMS)

• Dynamic and Over the Air (OTA) load of new smart card applications and administration

Advantages

Effective Security for all devices with

currently the world’s only smart card in the form factor of microSD

29

Thank you!

certgate GmbHRollnerstr. 142 90408 Nuremberg, Germany

Tel: +49 911 93 52 3 - 0mailto: [email protected]

www.certgate.com

mailto:[email protected]://www.certgate.de/

TTT-Agenda.ppt2:00 p.m.Introduction�2:10 p.m.Trusted Infrastructures�Steve Lipner, Microsoft, USA�2:40 p.m.Embedded TC: Trustworthy Inf

1_Toward Trusted Infrastructure_only_title.ppt2_RSA_RoundTable.April2008.pptEmbedded�Trusted ComputingSirrix AG security technologies�Excellence in Trusted Computing�Embedded Trusted Computing�Areas of InterestEmbedded Trusted Computing�Areas of InterestUICCs as Deployed Security Anchor�Mobile Trusted Computing�Mobile Trusted Computing�Use CasesMobile Trusted Computing�Mobile Trusted Computing�TCG: Mobile Trusted Platform Module (MTM)�TURAYA: High-Assurance Security Kernel �Mobile Trusted Platform Module (MTM)�An ExampleProjects on Mobile/Embedded Trusted Computing �

3_2008-04-key_mng-ekmi-AN-Modified.pptWho we are? Business ChallengeThe Encryption ProblemKey Management SilosWhat is an EKMI?The EKMI ModelEKMI ComponentsSKMS Big-PictureConclusion

4_Monty_Wiseman_080407_FINAL2.pptTPM and the TC Infrastructure�7 April, 2008TCG MissionTCG MembershipTCG Membership TCG: The “BIG” PicturePlatform AuthenticationPlatform AttestationProtecting SecretsFunctional TPM DiagramOne Example of a Virtual EnvironmentDomains in a Trusted Mobile PlatformMTM Example PlatformRoot and Chain of TrustBroker Transaction�Untrusted PlatformBroker Transaction�Untrusted PlatformBroker Transaction�Trusted PlatformMultiple AIK UsageTNC Building Blocks

5_certgate Mobile Device Security Overview.pptmicroSD Smart Card SolutionsAgendaPerceived Mobile ThreatsSmart Card SecuritySmart Card in microSD Format

Documents

Round Table Meeting in connection with the RSA-Conference ... · 2:00 p.m. Introduction 2:10 p.m. Trusted Infrastructures Steve Lipner, Microsoft, USA 2:40 p.m. Embedded TC: Trustworthy