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Forthcoming custom title

Compiled by Richard Rose

University of Minnesota - Morris

PLSC 3261

SPRING 2012


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Forthcoming custom title

A Custom Book Compiled by

Richard Rose

University of Minnesota - Morris

PLSC 3261

Spring 2012


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CONTENTS

1. INTEREST GROUPSINTHE STATES 1

Anthony J. Nownes, Clive S. Thomas and Ronald J. Hrebenar. FromPolitics in the American States: A Comparative Analysis, 9th Edition.

2. THE INITIATIVE PROCESS 33

Shaun Bowler and Todd Donovan. FromPolitics in the American

States: A Comparative Analysis, 9th Edition.

Page iii


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Page iv


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CHAPTER

1INTEREST GROUPSINTHE STATES

BY ANTHONY J. NOWNES, CLIVE S. THOMASAND RONALD J. HREBENAR

Excerpted from Virginia Gray, Russell L. Hanson, POLITICS IN THE AMERICAN STATES: ACOMPARATIVE ANALYSIS, 9TH EDITION (Washington: DC, CQ Press, 2008), pp. 98-126.

CQ Press Custom Books - Page1


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9 8

Organized interests (also known as interest groups) and their lobbyists are active at

all levels of government (local, state, and federal), but they are particularly active at

the state level. Historically some interest groupsthe Anaconda Copper Company in

Montana and the DuPont Corporation in Delaware come to mindvirtually dom-

inated politics in their states. Even today there are some states in which one group

or a small handful of groups dominate state politics. In Utah, for example, the Mor-

mon Church is extraordinarily powerful, while gaming interests are predominant in

Nevada, and coal companies loom large in West Virginia. And even in large and di-

verse states with large and diverse interest group communities (for example, Califor-

nia, New York, Illinois), interest groups are prominent and potent players in state

politics.

In short, by any measure interest groups are profoundly important and influentialactors in state politics. Thus, to understand state politics fully one must understand in-

terest group politics. In this chapter we provide a brief but comprehensive overview of

interest group politics in the states. We begin with a brief prcis on interest groups and

lobbying. We define key terms and concepts and provide a thumbnail sketch of the in-

terest group universe. From here, we examine variations in state interest group sys-

tems. We make the general point that interest group politics vary substantially across

states. Next, we take a close look at lobbyiststhe individual political actors who act

on behalf of interest groups. We pay special attention to what sorts of things lobbyistsdo to affect government decisions in the states. From here we examine interest group

c h a p t e r 4

Interest Groups in the States

a n t h o n y j . n o w n e s , c l i v e s . t h o m a s , a n d

ro n al d j . h re be n ar



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power in the states.1 Specifically, we provide a typology of interest group systems

that categorizes all states according to the amount of power groups wield within

them. We also provide new data on which types of groups are most influential inthe states. In our penultimate section, we take a brief look at how states attempt to

regulate the behavior of interest groups and to what effect. Finally, we conclude

with a few general observations about interest group politics in the states.

the basics: terms and concepts

There is no single agreed upon definition of interest group. Many studies of

state politics define the term narrowly to include only those groups required to reg-

ister under state interest group registration laws. Yet many organizations that en-

gage in lobbying are not required to register. The most important are those repre-

senting the various levels and agencies of government. Many states do not require

public officials at any level of government to register as lobbyists. In light of all this,

a broad definition of interest group is clearly appropriate: an interest group is an as-

sociation of individuals or organizations or a public or private institution that at-

tempts to influence government decisions. This definition embraces the three broad

categories of interest groups active in the American states.

Types of Interest Groups

First, there are traditional membership groups, which are groups made up of

individuals promoting economic, social, or political concerns (or some combina-

tion thereof) such as senior citizens, environmentalists, schoolteachers, farmers, stu-

dents, and anti-tax advocates. Among the types of traditional membership groups

active in the states are citizen groups (groups that any citizen can join, such as envi-

ronmental or anti-tax groups), labor unions (for example, state teachers unions),

and professional associations (groups comprising individuals active in a single spe-

cific profession, such as state bar associations). Second, there are organizational in-

terests, which are organizations composed not of individuals but of organizations

such as businesses or labor unions. Among the types of organizational interests

active in the states are trade associations (groups of business firms, such as state

chambers of commerce) and coalitions of labor unions such as the AFL-CIO. Fi-

nally, there are institutional interests, which are not really groups at all, but rather

Interest Groups in the States 9 9

1. Our assessments of overall interest power and interest group system power (which are foundlater in this chapter) rely upon data (overall interest power) and assessments (interest group systempower) gathered over the past twenty-five years as part of a study of interest groups in all fifty states co-ordinated by two of this chapters authors (Hrebenar and Thomas) and involving 112 contributing re-searchers. We conducted the original study between 1983 and 1988 and updated the study five timesin 1990, 1994, 1998, 2002, and 20062007. The results of the original project can be found in Hrebenarand Thomas (1987; 1992; 1993a; 1993b). Syntheses can be found in Thomas and Hrebenar (1990;

1991; 1992; 1996; 1999; 2004). Those contributing to the 20062007 update were: Alabama: Cynthia J.Bowling and Kathleen Hale (Auburn University); Alaska: Clive S. Thomas (University of Alaska,Juneau); Arizona: David R. Berman (Arizona State University); Arkansas: Arthur English (University of



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are nonmembership organizations such as business firms, local governments, hos-

pitals, state and federal agencies, think tanks (that is, research institutes), and uni-

versities and colleges. As interest group scholar Robert Salisbury (1984) points outfor Washington, D.C., and as state politics experts Virginia Gray and David Lowery

(1996, 2001) note for the states, most interest groups active in American politics are

institutional entities. Today institutional interests constitute the largest category of

interest groups operating in state capitals (Gray and Lowery 2001, 272).

Lobbying, and the Concept of the State Interest Group System

Interest groups operate in the state political process bylobbying, which is the in-

teraction of an individual, interest group, or interest with government decision mak-

ers, either directly or indirectly, for the purpose of influencing current government

decisions or creating a relationship conducive to shaping future government deci-

sions to the benefit of that individual, group, or interest. Thus a lobbyist is a person

who represents an interest group in an effort to influence government decisions.

The decisions most often targeted by interest groups and their lobbyists are those

concerning public policies; but they also include other types of decisions, such as

those about who gets elected and appointed to make those policies. Lobbyists in-clude not only those required to register by law but also those representing nonreg-

istered organizations.

Finally, there is the concept of a state interest group system. This is the array of

groups and organizations, both formal and informal, and the lobbyists who represent

them working to affect government decisions within a state. The idea of a state inter-

est group system is an abstraction, of course, because even though there are relations

between various groups and lobbyists representing various interests, never do all the

groups in a political system act in concert to achieve one goal. However, the charac-

teristics of the interest group systemits size, development, composition, methods of

operating, and so onas elements of the socioeconomic and political life of the state

relating to the economy, society, and government are particularly important for de-

termining such things as the political power structure, which public policies are pur-

sued and which are not, and the extent of representation and democracy.

1 0 0 c h a p t e r 4

Arkansas at Little Rock); California: Timothy A. Hodson (California State University, Sacramento[CSU]), A. G. Block (University of California Sacramento Center [CSUC]), John M. Griffing, (CSUC),and Michael Semler (CSU); Colorado: John A. Straayer (Colorado State University); Connecticut:Sarah M. Morehouse (University of Connecticut, Stamford, retired); Delaware: Joseph A. Pika andJanet B. Johnson (University of Delaware); Florida: Eric Prier and Kevin M. Wagner (Florida AtlanticUniversity); Georgia: Scott H. Ainsworth (University of Georgia); Hawaii: Ira S. Rohter (University ofHawaii, Manoa); Idaho: Jasper M. LiCalzi (Albertson College of Idaho); Illinois: Kent Redfield (Univer-sity of IllinoisSpringfield); Indiana: David J. Hadley (Wabash College); Iowa: Arthur Sanders (DrakeUniversity); Kansas: Allan J. Cigler (University of Kansas); Kentucky: Donald A. Gross (University ofKentucky); Louisiana: Wayne T. Parent (Louisiana State University); Maine: Kenneth T. Palmer (Uni-versity of Maine, Orono); Maryland: James Gimpel (University of Maryland, College Park); Massachu-

setts: John C. Berg (Suffolk University); Michigan: Gregory Neddenriep (Northeastern Illinois Univer-sity, formerly of Western Michigan University); Minnesota: Michael G. Bath (Concordia College);Mississippi: David A. Breaux (Mississippi State University); Missouri: James W. Endersby (University ofMissouri, Columbia); Montana: Kenneth L. Weaver (Local Government Associates, Inc., and MontanaState University, retired); Nebraska: Loree G. Bykerk and Patrick Hermes (University of Nebraska



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variations in state inter est group systems

Interest group activities across the states show many similarities. For example, all

fifty states have a variety of active interest groups, and all states regulate interest groupactivity to some extent. Nonetheless, state interest group systems also show important

differences. In fact,no two state interest group systems are exactly alike. In this section

we examine how and why state interest group systems vary. We begin with three brief

case studies, then we use these case studies to highlight some of the ways that state in-

terest group systems differ from one another. We acknowledge that each of our case

studies is incomplete. Our goal here is not to tell you everything you need to know

about the interest group systems we describe, but rather to highlight some of the waysthat state interest group systems differ. After we present our case studies, we examine

three factors that help explain variations in state interest group systems.

Interest Groups in New York

Two things stand out about the New York state interest group system. First, it

contains a very large number of groups and lobbyists. How large? In 2006 there

were 5,117 lobbyists registered with the [New York Temporary State] Commission

[on Lobbying] representing 3,277 clients (New York Temporary State Commissionon Lobbying 2007). The New York Temporary State Commission on Lobbying

tracks interest groups and lobbyists that lobby local governments as well as state

government, so these numbers probably overstate to some extent how many lobby-

ists and interest groups are active in Albany (the state capital). Nonetheless, it is

clear that few states are home to as many interest groups and lobbyists as New York.

Second, the New York state interest group system contains a large diversity of

groups. For example, among the most active interest groups in 2006 in New Yorkwere citizen groups (Natural Resources Defense Council), labor unions (New York

State United Teachers, the Public Employees Federation), professional associations

(Medical Society of the State of New York, the New York State Trial Lawyers Associ-

ation), trade associations (Greater New York Hospital Association), and, of course,

business firms (Forest City Ratner Companies [a real estate developer] and Verizon)

Interest Groups in the States 1 0 1

Omaha); Nevada: Eric B. Herzik (University of Nevada, Reno); New Hampshire: Michelle Anne Fistekand Robert Egbert (Plymouth State University); New Jersey: Barbara A. Salmore (Eagleton Institute,Rutgers University); New Mexico: Timothy B. Krebs (University of New Mexico); New York: David L.Cingranelli (Binghamton University, SUNY); North Carolina: Andrew Taylor (North Carolina StateUniversity); North Dakota: Theodore B. Pedeliski and Lloyd B. Omdahl (University of North Dakota,both are now retired); Ohio: Chase M. Ritenauer (University of Akron); Oklahoma: Jason F. Kirksey(Oklahoma State University); Oregon: William M. Lunch (Oregon State University); Pennsylvania: G.Terry Madonna (Franklin & Marshall College); Rhode Island: Maureen Moakley (University of RhodeIsland); South Carolina: Robert E. Botsch (University of South Carolina at Aiken); South Dakota:Robert V. Burns (South Dakota State University); Tennessee: Anthony J. Nownes (University of Ten-nessee, Knoxville); Texas: Keith E. Hamm (Rice University); Utah: Ronald J. Hrebenar and Dan Jones

(University of Utah); Vermont: Anthony Gierzynski (University of Vermont); Virginia: John T. Whelan(University of Richmond); Washington: Stephen F. Johnson (Washington Public Utilities DistrictsAssociation); West Virginia: Daniel Masters (University of North Carolina, Wilmington, formerly ofMarshall University) and Allan S. Hammock (West Virginia University); Wisconsin: David G. Wegge(St. Norbert College); Wyoming: James D. King (University of Wyoming).



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(New York Temporary State Commission on Lobbying 2007). As interest group

scholar Rogan Kersh (2006, 105) notes:

From the Uniformed Firefighters Association and the Neighborhood Retail Alliance(representing bodegas, greengrocers, and independent supermarkets) to the Coalitionfor the Homeless and the New York Nannies Association, every imaginable group,concern, or collection of like-minded individuals occasionally seeks to influence NewYorks government. . . .

It is hard to say just how powerful interest groups are in New York. On the one

hand, it is clear that state government officialsthe governor, members of the state

legislature, and executive agency officialsare important players in state politics;they have autonomous bases of power and are anything but subordinate to lobby-

ists and interest groups. On the other hand, the state was racked by several lobbying

scandals in the 1990s and early 2000s, which suggests that lobbyists are puissant

powerbrokers capable at least on occasion of bending state government to their

whims. For example, in 2003 a developer named Tamir Sapir admitted to a panel of

state legislators that he had paid a lobbyist (former U.S. senator Alfonse DAmato)

$500,000 to lobby a state agency to help him secure a $230 million loan to continueconstruction on the MTAs [Metropolitan Transit Authority] new headquarters. . . .

(Kersh 2006, 103). On the whole, it appears that interest groups in New York are im-

portant but not dominant players.

As for which specific groups are most powerful, it appears that the diversity of

the states interest group community keeps any one group or handful of groups

from dominating. Although it is true that some interest groups are more powerful

than others (our impression is that business giant Verizon, the Healthcare Associa-

tion of New York State, and state public employee unions are particularly powerful),it appears that no specific group consistently has the upper hand and can always

count on getting its way in state politics. Nonetheless, as is the case in most states,

business firms and trade associations are extremely powerful.

Interest Groups in Oregon

According to the Center for Public Integrity (2006), in 2005 a total of 607 lobby-

ists and 815 lobbyist employers registered to lobby in Oregon, and lobbyist spend-ing totaled $24.4 million. These numbers put Oregon in the middle of the pack

among states for level of interest group activity. Oregon, like New York, is home to a

large variety of interests. In their assessment of interest group activity in Oregon,

Russ Dondero and William Lunch (2005, 8486, 9596) note that business firms

(for example, Regence Blue Cross Blue Shield of Oregon),2 citizen groups (Oregon

Taxpayers United), coalitions of government entities (League of Oregon Cities),

government entities (the City of Portland),3 labor unions (Oregon Education Asso-

1 0 2 c h a p t e r 4

2. This is our example, not Dondero and Lunchs.3. This is our example, not Dondero and Lunchs.



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ciation), professional associations (Oregon Bar Association, Oregon Medical Asso-

ciation), and trade associations (Associated Oregon Industries) all exercise consid-

erable power in state politics.4 In short, Oregon has a moderately large, relatively di-verse interest group community.

As for the power of interest groups, close observers have concluded that interest

groups wield considerable power in Oregon state politics. In recent years, for exam-

ple, conservative populist citizen groups including Oregon Taxpayers United and

Oregon Citizens for a Sound Economy have set the fiscal agenda for both state and

local governments . . . and thus are extremely powerful (Dondero and Lunch 2005,

95). Recently, one prominent vehicle for interest group influence has been the state

initiative processa process that allows interest groups (and citizens) to place

measures directly on the ballot for citizen approval. But even within ordinary gov-

ernment channels, conservative populist citizen groups as well as more liberal-

leaning labor unions, environmental citizen groups, and Native American tribal or-

ganizations have successfully pressed their cases.

While there is some diversity in the Oregon interest group community, clearly

some groups are much more powerful than others. Dondero and Lunch (2005, 95)

note that conservative populist groups, particularly Oregon Taxpayers United(OTU), are considered by political insiders to be among the most influential in

Oregon. . . . These conservative populist organizations have successfully fought tax

increases and increased business regulation. In the second tier of influence are gen-

eral business groups (especially Associated Oregon Industries, a peak business trade

association) (Dondero and Lunch 2005, 9597). Finally, a variety of other organiza-

tions including individual business firms in the health care industry, the Oregon

Education Association, the City of Portland, and several environmental groups have

won important victories in recent years.

Interest Groups in Arkansas

According to the Center for Public Integrity (2006), in 2005, 429 lobbyists and 587

lobbyist employers registered to lobby in Arkansas. Arkansas consistently ranks

among the bottom 20 percent of states in level of interest group activity (Blair and

Barth 2005, 127).Although it is true that Arkansas is home to a variety of types of in-

terest groups, it appears that interest groups representing business firms and tradeassociations loom larger in Arkansas than they do in either New York or Oregon.

Close observers of Arkansas politics note that virtually all of the most powerful inter-

est groups in the state are business organizations and that there is a noticeable dearth

of powerful labor unions and citizen groups in the state (Blair and Barth 2005, 129).

When it comes to overall levels of power, there is little doubt that interest groups

are very powerful in Arkansas politics. It appears that lobbyists and interest groups

in Arkansas exercise considerably more power than lobbyists and interest groups in


4. For information on which groups are most active in Oregon, see also Oregon Government Stan-dards and Practices Commission (2007).



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1 0 4 c h a p t e r 4

many other states, especially states outside the South, including New York and Oregon.

When it comes to individual group power,business firms including Southwestern Bell,

Entergy (a large utility), and Alltel (a telephone company) as well as trade associationsincluding the Arkansas Poultry Federation and the Arkansas Bankers Association ap-

pear to be the most powerful (Blair and Barth 2005, 129130). Beyond this, the occa-

sional government agency (for example, the Arkansas State Highway and Transporta-

tion Department), labor union (Arkansas Education Association), and citizen group

(the NAACP) is capable of exerting some influence over state policymakers.5

Summary of Three Case Studies

Our three mini case studies make four things clear. First, there are similarities in

interest group systems across the states. In all three states, scores of interest groups

are active, interest groups wield considerable power, and there is some diversity in

interest group representation. Second, there are differences in levels of interest

group activity across states. For example, New York has more lobbyists and interest

groups than Oregon, which has more lobbyists and interest groups than Arkansas.

Third, some interest group systems are more diverse than others. New Yorks in-

terest group community shows considerable diversity, Oregons a bit less, andArkansas shows relatively little. Finally, the relative balance of power between types

of interest groups varies among states. While conservative populist organizations

are prevailing powers in Oregon, business firms and trade associations are the dom-

inant group players in Arkansas, and group power is somewhat dispersed in New

York (although business firms are very powerful there, too).6

Similarities and Differences in State Interest Group Systems

Our case studies beg the following question: What factors account for differencesin state interest group systems? We will briefly examine three of the factors.

Economy. First, there is the nature of a states economy. In general, the larger a

states economy is (as measured by its gross state product), the more interest groups

(and thus more lobbyists) it has. This is the case because, as interest group scholars

David Lowery and Holly Brasher (2004, 87) note: States with large economies are

likely to have more farms, firms, environmentalists, and every other type of poten-

tial member or sponsor of organizations than smaller states. Thus one of the rea-sons that New York has so many more interest groups than Arkansas and Oregon is

that New Yorks economy is so much larger than the economies of these other two

states. It is important to note, however, that the relationship between the size of a

states economy and the number of interest groups active within it tends not to be

linear. David Lowery and Virginia Gray (1993, 1994) note that the relationship is

roughly linear up to a point, but that at some point economic growth ceases to have

much impact on the size of a states interest group community.

5. We base this on the work of Blair and Barth (2005) as well as our own analysis of state interestgroup activity.

6. We should also note that state interest group systems change, sometimes rapidly. Thus, what istrue in each of our three states today may not be true next year or even next month.



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The nature of a states economy also affects the diversity of interest groups active

within it. It is no surprise that states with diverse economies have more diverse in-

terest group communities than states with not-so-diverse economies. New York, forexample, is a more economically diverse state (it has large numbers of farms as well

as large numbers of investment banks) than either Arkansas or Oregon, and this is

one of the reasons it has a more diverse interest group community.

Political Culture. Another factor that accounts for differences in state interest

group systems is state political culture. Two of us (Hrebenar and Thomas 1987;

1992; 1993a; 1993b) conducted a fifty-state study of interest groups during the

1980s and 1990s and found that political culture profoundly affects the nature of

state interest group systems. Take, for example, New York. Daniel Elazar (1984)maintains that New York has a combination individualistic and moralistic political

culture. This helps to explain why so many interest groups are active in New York

state politicscitizen participation is viewed by many as legitimate, and all sorts of

citizens join interest groups. However, it also explains the periodic lobbying scan-

dals that have rocked New York over the years. There is an undercurrent of cynicism

about politics in New York, and every now and then this manifests itself in lobbyist

chicanery. As for Arkansas, its traditionalist political culture explains a lot about itsinterest group system. Many citizens simply choose not to participate in state poli-

tics. This partially explains the relatively low number of interest groups active in

Arkansas. Moreover, the lack of citizen interest and involvement in Arkansas poli-

tics explains why business firms dominate the states interest group system. Because

citizens view politics as somewhat illegitimate and as the purview of good ol boy

elites, there are few large individual membership groups (citizen groups and labor

unions, for example) to challenge the views of the business elites who run business

firms and trade associations in the state. Finally, Oregons moralistic political cul-ture helps explain its unique interest group system. First, it explains why Oregon

politics are relatively cleanover the years, there have been few lobbying scandals

in the state. In addition, it explains why citizen groupsespecially populist conser-

vative groups and environmental groupsare so prominent in the states interest

group system. Politics are viewed by Oregonians as a legitimate enterprise, and citi-

zens of all kinds view political involvement as acceptable and perhaps even ad-

mirable. Oregons moralistic culture also helps explain why the state has such a widevariety of active interest groups.

Governmental Activity. An additional factor that accounts for differences in state

interest group systems is the level of governmental activity, which we define here as

the extent to which a states government is active in the lives of the states citizens.

One measure of level of governmental activity is state government spending per

capita. In 2004 (a recent year for which we were able to find reliable data for all three

states) per capita state government spending in New York amounted to $11,375

(Public Policy Institute of New York State, Inc. 2006). The figures for Oregon andArkansas were $7,857 and $5,936, respectively (Public Policy Institute of New York

State, Inc. 2006).These spending figures indicate that the New York state government

is much larger and more active than the governments of either Oregon or Arkansas.




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1 0 6 c h a p t e r 4

In other words, the state government of New York regulates more activities and has

more, and more expensive, social programs than the government of either Oregon or

Arkansas. This is important because scholars have found that government activityoften acts as a spur to group activity. If the government begins to regulate nursing

homes, for example, nursing home operators become politically active to keep

abreast of new government regulations and to try to affect future regulations. Simi-

larly, if a state government adopts new environmental regulations, citizens who are

interested in environmental protection are likely to band together to press their con-

cerns on state government (Loomis and Cigler 2007, 1216). In short, the large size

of the New York state government helps explain why New York has such a large and

diverse interest group community. In contrast with New York, Arkansas has a small

and rather homogenous interest group community. Part of the reason for this is that

the government of Arkansas is relatively small and inactive. Oregon, which has a

larger state government than Arkansas but a smaller state government than New

York, has a larger and more diverse interest group community than Arkansas and a

smaller and less diverse interest group community than New York.

lobbying and lobbyists in the states

The reason political scientists and students of politics study interest groups is

that they are political actorsthey seek to affect what state government does. How

do interest groups attempt to affect state government decisions? And who are state

lobbyists, and what do they do? In this section, we address these and other ques-

tions related to lobbying and lobbyists in the states.

Techniques of Lobbying

If there is one thing we have learned about lobbying in the states, it is that lobby-

ists have a large number of techniques at their disposal. State lobbyists utilize three

main types of lobbying techniques: direct techniques, such as testifying before the

legislature or meeting with bureaucrats, that involve direct contact with govern-

ment officials; indirect techniques that target citizens rather than government offi-

cials; and electoral techniques that are designed to affect the outcome of an election.

To explore the full range of techniques state lobbyists use, we collected some new

data on lobbying in the states. Specifically, during the summer of 2006, as part of alarger study, we surveyed 266 lobbyists in two statesOhio and West Virginia.7 We

asked respondents to tell us which of a large number of lobbying techniques they

used; the results are shown in Table 4-1.

7. We used lobbyist registration lists to construct a list of lobbyists in each state. For West Virginia,we sent surveys to 363 lobbyistsevery lobbyist on the list for whom (we believed) we had a current

and correct address. For Ohio, we randomly selected 800 lobbyists from a larger list. In the end, we re-ceived 170 completed surveys from Ohio and 96 from West Virginia. Taking into account surveys thatwere returned for various reasons, our response rates were 28 percent for Ohio (196 surveys were re-turned as undeliverable) and 27 percent for West Virginia (10 surveys were returned as undeliverable).



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As Table 4-1 shows, each of the top five most commonly used lobbying tech-

niques is a direct lobbying technique. The top five are: meeting personally with statelegislators (98 percent), meeting personally with state legislative staff (97 percent),

helping to draft legislation (91 percent), meeting personally with executive agency

personnel (90 percent), and meeting personally with members of the governors staff

(89 percent). Another two of the top ten lobbying techniques are direct techniques

testifying at legislative committee hearings (88 percent) and submitting written

testimony to legislative committees (83 percent). Moreover, many other direct lobby-

ing techniques such as submitting written comments on proposed rules and regu-

lations; engaging in informal contacts (for example, wining, dining) with state leg-islators; engaging in informal contacts with state legislative staff; and helping to draft

regulations, rules, or guidelines are used by the vast majority of lobbyists surveyed.

Table 4-1 Lobbying Techniques Used by Lobbyists in Two States

Percentage using this technique

Overall Ohio West Virginia

Techniquea (N=266)b (N=170)b (N=96)b

1. Meeting personally with state legislators 98 97 99

2. Meeting personally with state legislative staff 97 95 99

3. Helping to draft legislation 91 86 98

4. Meeting personally with executive agency personnel 90 86 97

5. Meeting personally with members of the governors staff 89 84 97

6. Entering into coalitions with other organizations 89 86 96

7. Testifying at legislative committee hearings 88 88 90

8. Submitting written testimony to legislative committees 83 86 78

9. Talking with people from the media 82 79 87

10. Inspiring letter-writing, telephone, or e-mail campaigns to

state legislators 78 74 87

11. Submitting written comments on proposed rules/regulations 77 71 87

12. Making personal monetary contributions to candidates for office 77 74 81

13. Helping to draft regulations, rules, or guidelines 77 73 84

14. Interacting with special liaison offices within the governors office 72 65 83

15. Issuing press releases 72 69 78

16. Engaging in informal contacts with state legislative staff 67 58 8417. Engaging in informal contacts with state legislators 65 57 79

18. Serving on advisory committees and/or boards 65 61 73

19. Meeting personally with the governor 64 50 89

20. Working on campaigns for candidatesc 62 58 70


the governor 62 58 68

22. Writing op-ed pieces for newspapers 60 54 70

23. Testifying at executive agency hearings 59 56 63

24. Making personal monetary contributions to political parties c 54 53 56

25. Engaging in regulatory negotiations 53 49 60

26. Campaigning for or against a state initiative or referendum 51 52 4927. Doing favors for legislators 50 50 49

28. Holding press conferences 49 44 58

29. Doing favors for legislative staff 46 43 52

(table continues on next page)



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30. Engaging in informal contacts with members of the

governors staff 47 39 60


executive agencies 46 42 54

32. Appearing on radio programs 46 43 52

33. Delivering PAC money (that is, money from an organization

rather than personal funds) to candidates for officec 43 41 47

34. Appearing on television programs 43 38 51

35. Petitioning for a rule-making 39 38 43

36. Filing suit or otherwise engaging in litigation 37 34 44

37. Running advertisements in the media 31 23 44

38. Seeking permits from executive agencies 25 21 31

39. Engaging in informal contacts with the governor 22 7 48

40. Seeking to put a measure on the ballot as an initiative 19 21 15

41. Engaging in protests and/or demonstrations 19 16 25

42. Doing favors for members of the governors staff 17 12 26

43. Doing favors for executive agency personnel 15 13 19

44. Doing favors for the governor 14 8 25

45. Giving gifts to state legislators 9 10 7

46. Giving gifts to state legislative staff 8 6 13

S O U R C E : Authors survey.

N O T E : The numbers in the table represent the percentage of respondents who reported using the lobbying technique inquestion. These percentages include all responses of occasionally and regularly. To conserve space, we did not report thepercentage of lobbyists who engaged in several other techniques about which we asked.

a. We used the following survey item to construct this table (for all techniques except 20, 24, and 33): As you know, lobby-ists use many different techniques to try to influence what goes on in state government. Below you will find a list of such tech-niques. Looking at the list, please tell us how often you use each techniquenever, occasionally, or regularly.

b. Nmay vary by survey item owing to missing data.c. For techniques 20, 24, and 33, we used the following survey item: We know that lobbyists differ in the extent to whichthey get involved in elections and campaigns. Below you will find some electoral activities. Please indicate how often you en-gage in each of the following activities-never, occasionally, or regularly.

Table 4-1 Continued

Percentage using this technique

Overall Ohio West Virginia

Techniquea (N=266)b (N=170)b (N=96)b

1 0 8 c h a p t e r 4

In short, the most commonly used lobbying techniques are direct lobbying tech-

niquesthose that entail direct face-to-face contact with government officials.

As for indirect techniques, Table 4-1 shows that the most common such technique

used by lobbyists in the survey is talking with people from the media (82 percent). Theother most commonly used indirect lobbying techniques are inspiring letter-writing,

telephone, or e-mail campaigns to state legislators (78 percent) and issuing press re-

leases (72 percent).Another less common but still widespread indirect technique is in-

spiring letter-writing, telephone, or e-mail campaigns to the governor (62 percent).

The most common electoral lobbying technique is making personal monetary

contributions to candidates for office (77 percent).8 This suggests that money, while

8. Here and in Table 4-1 we distinguish between the making of a personal contribution to a candidateor a party and the delivery of a PAC contribution (money from an interest group) to a candidate orparty.



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not the primary weapon in the lobbyists arsenal, is still an important one. It is not

exactly clear what money buys a lobbyist, but the fact that contributing money is so

common suggests that it does indeed buy something. Working on campaigns forcandidates (62 percent) is also a relatively common electoral lobbying technique, as

is making personal monetary contributions to political parties (54 percent). Finally,

one of the lobbying techniques we asked our respondents about does not fit easily

into one of our three categoriesentering into coalitions. This is an almost univer-

sal technique (89 percent).

Rise of Indirect and Media Lobbying. For many years it was the conventional wisdom

that direct techniques dominated the state lobbying business. In fact, it is fair to say

that until well into the 1970s direct techniques were virtually the onlykinds of tech-niques that many state lobbyists used. Table 4-1 shows that things have changed in the

past thirty-five years. While the use of direct lobbying techniques is still more wide-

spread than the use of indirect techniques, it is clear that indirect techniques are now

part and parcel of the typical state lobbyists tool kit. Although indirect lobbying has

been around literally for centuries, it has exploded in the states since the mid-1970s.

Indirect lobbying is today as big a part of state politics as it is of national politics.

Perhaps even more surprising than the prominence of indirect lobbying is theprominence of media techniquesthat is, indirect lobbying techniques that involve

the news media. Well over half of our respondents reported talking with people

from the media, issuing press releases, and writing op-ed pieces for newspapers.

Moreover, nearly half of our respondents reported holding press conferences (49

percent), appearing on radio programs (46 percent), and appearing on television

programs (43 percent). In short, while state lobbying used to be limited primarily to

direct insidetechniques, it is now a highly variegated phenomenon that comprises

numerous indirect and media techniques.Relevance and Value of Personal Connections. Despite the prevalence and growth

of indirect and media lobbying, however, Table 4-1 reminds us that state lobbying

remains an intensely personal business. The essence of the art of lobbying is still in-

terpersonal communication. As Table 4-1 shows, the most common lobbying tech-

niques are still direct techniques. Previous studies of lobbying suggest that even

with the rise of indirect lobbying techniques, lobbyists believe that personally meet-

ing with government officials is still the most effective way to influence governmentdecisions (Nownes 2006, 201202; Rosenthal 2001, chap. 6).

Three important general points about the techniques of influence that state lob-

byists use need to be emphasized. First, as Table 4-1 makes clear, state lobbyists

lobby all three branches of state government as well as the public. While most peo-

ple think of lobbyists as focusing their efforts on the legislature, our data (and lots

of previous studies) show that lobbyists lobby the executive branch, the judicial

branch, and the public as well as the legislature. Second, we wish to emphasize that

monetary contributions to candidates (and to political parties) are less commonthan many people think. Popular and media treatments of lobbying and lobbyists

emphasize the degree to which lobbyists rely upon money to get what they want.




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1 1 0 c h a p t e r 4

Indeed, the prototypical lobbyist is portrayed in the media as a rather corpulent

man carrying a large sack of money. The data we present here indicate that al-

though many state lobbyists do indeed contribute money to elected officials andpolitical parties, monetary contributions are simply not all that important to most

lobbyists. Indeed, none of the top ten most commonly used lobbying techniques we

studied has anything to do with the exchange of money. Moreover, contributing

money to candidates is far less common than a slew of other more mundane and

less controversial lobbying techniques. Finally, we wish to note that the typical lob-

byist does not tend to specialize in one or a small group of lobbying techniques. In-

stead, the typical lobbyist tends to use literally dozens of lobbying techniques to get

the job done (Nownes and Freeman 1998b, 93). In fact, studies of state lobbyingconsistently show that most lobbyists do anything and everything they can to affect

government decisions. This means using a variety of different techniques, meeting

with a variety of government officials (and perhaps citizens), and refusing to rule

out the use of any specific lobbying technique.

Who Are the Lobbyists?

Thus far, we have said little about the actual people who lobby state governmentthe state lobbyists. There are various types and categories of state lobbyists, an im-

portant fact because different types of lobbyists bring different assets and liabilities

to the table and are perceived differently by state government officials and the pub-

lic at large. These perceptions affect the extent of a lobbyists ability to affect govern-

ment decisions as well as the way a lobbyist accomplishes the job. There are many

ways to categorize lobbyists (for example, full-time vs. part-time, male vs. female).

Here, in an attempt to understand state lobbyists more fully, we divide lobbyists

into five categories (Hrebenar and Thomas 1987; 1992; 1993a; 1993b).Contract Lobbyists. These are the hired guns, lobbyists who are not employees

of a single organization, but instead have a number of clients . . . (Rosenthal 2001,

18). Contract lobbyists are the types of lobbyists about whom the public hears the

most, primarily because their high salaries, cultivated connections, and presumed

ability to influence government make good copy for news organizations. Some con-

tract lobbyists are independent agents, while others work for public relations firms,

law firms, or consulting firms. While contract lobbyists tend to get more attentionthan other types of lobbyists, we estimate that they typically comprise well under 15

percent of the lobbyist community in most states.

In-House Lobbyists. These lobbyists work for a single specific organization. Many

in-house lobbyists have duties and responsibilities that extend beyond lobbying

(Rosenthal 2001, 18). In the ranks of in-house lobbyists are the executive directors,

presidents, and employees of a virtual plethora of organizations including environ-

mental groups, state AFL-CIO affiliates, school board associations, state chambers

of commerce, trade associations, state bar associations, and business firms. In-houselobbyists were the first types of lobbyists to appear on the state political scene. In

the mid-1800s, in-house lobbyists for railroads and other early business interests



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became powerful actors in a number of states. Today there is no question that most

lobbyists in the states (perhaps as many as 50 percent) are in-house lobbyists. And

this probably has always been the case. Because the term lobbyist has negativeconnotations, in-house lobbyists often go by other honorifics such as legislative liai-

son, government relations specialist, representative, agent, or government affairs

specialist.

Volunteer Lobbyists. These lobbyists are often referred to as citizen lobbyists or

cause lobbyists, and as their title implies, they are often ordinary citizens who work

for small single-issue, service provision, charitable, social welfare, or community

groups on a not-for-pay basis. Many groups use volunteer lobbyists because they

cannot afford professional in-house or contract lobbyists. Many others use volun-teer lobbyists in addition to professional lobbyists, hoping that ordinary citizens can

bring a certain legitimacy and immediacy to their interests and goals. We estimate

that 1020 percent of state lobbyists are volunteer lobbyists.

Government Lobbyists. These people are employees of state, local, or federal

agencies or entities who, as part of or all of their jobs, represent the agency or entity

before state government (for example, the state legislature). Examples of govern-

ment lobbyists include the head of a state agency, the legislative liaison who worksfor a public university, or the mayor of a city or county. Technically, virtually all

government lobbyists are in-house lobbyists, but we give them their own category

here because they are unique among lobbyiststhey represent one part or entity of

government to some other part or entity of government. Government lobbyists

comprise approximately 2535 percent of lobbyists in most states.

Private-Individual Lobbyists. These lobbyists act on their own behalf, not on be-

half of an organization as an official representative.9 Private-individual lobbyists

generally lobby for pet projects or direct personal benefits, or for or against a spe-cific policy proposal they are particularly interested in. It is difficult to say just how

many state lobbyists are private-individual lobbyists, but we estimate that such lob-

byists comprise 5 percent or less of state lobbyists.

Lobbyists Skills and Roles

Research suggests that different types of lobbyists have different skill sets. Typical

contract lobbyists, for example, possess specialized knowledge of certain parts orprocesses of government (for example, the budget process, the inner workings of a

specific state agency), close personal connections with state government officials, or

a combination of areas of expertise (Rosenthal 2001, chap. 2). Many contract lobby-

ists are former government officials who learn about the political system and de-

velop close ties with government officials while they serve in government (Rosen-

thal 2001, chap. 2). In most cases, contract lobbyists are facilitators of dialogue

between their clients and public officials. Contract lobbyists often have considerable

9. Many political scientists do not consider private-individual lobbyists to be lobbyists at all. Wemention them here because they are active and occasionally influential in all fifty states.



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1 1 2 c h a p t e r 4

influence over how their clients disburse campaign funds. In fact, many contract

lobbyists organize fund-raisers for candidates and work on behalf of candidates

during election season.The major political asset of most in-house lobbyists is an unequaled knowledge

of a particular issue. An in-house lobbyist for a telecommunications firm, for exam-

ple, may not be particularly well-connected politically and may not know the rules

of the state legislature inside and out, but such a person probably knows more

about the telecommunications industry and state telecommunications law than al-

most anyone else in the state capital. Similarly, an in-house lobbyist for an environ-

mental group may not be chums with state legislative leaders or the head of the

state agency that enforces (and may write) environmental regulations, but probablyknows a great deal about state environmental conditions and the disposition of pro-

posed environmental laws and regulations. Like contract lobbyists, in-house lobby-

ists often make monetary contributions to candidates for state office. They also (if

they represent membership organizations such as citizen groups, labor unions, pro-

fessional associations, or trade associations) mobilize their members whenever pos-

sible to put pressure on government officials.

Government lobbyists are uniquely situated in state politics. They are often well-connected (after all, they themselves are government employees), they often have

specialized knowledge of the government (especially the part of government in

which they work), and they often possess tremendous knowledge of the policy

area(s) in which they work. A lobbyist who works for a state university, for example,

may know many state government officials personally, may know a great deal about

how state education policy is made, and may have an encyclopedic knowledge of

state higher education policies. Government lobbyists also often use their con-

stituent groups to their advantage. For example, a lobbyist for the state departmentof education may work (unofficially) with state parent-teacher groups and other

client groups (such as those representing handicapped or gifted children) to secure

increased funding for public education.

As for volunteer lobbyists, they usually rely upon moral persuasion, coupled with

the mobilization of their membership, to sell their causes. For example, a volunteer

lobbyist for an anti-abortion group may meet with state legislators and argue that

abortion is a sin. This volunteer may also encourage the groups members to sende-mails or letters to the same state legislators stating their opposition to abortion.

Volunteers generally lack the insider status of the government lobbyist, the connec-

tions and inside knowledge of the political process of the contract lobbyist, and the

technical expertise of the in-house lobbyist. The volunteer lobbyist does, however,

have a certain amount of legitimacy that other types of lobbyists do not have. A

plucky volunteer lobbyist may be able to make up for some of these deficiencies

with hard work and perseverance.

Finally, private-individual lobbyists, unless they are state bigwigs (celebrities ormoguls), have few assets at their disposal. The private-individual lobbyist must rely

primarily upon perseverance and powers of persuasion.



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Lobbyists Personal Characteristics

Few studies take a close look at the makeup of the lobbyist universe in the states,

but it seems clear that the typical state lobbyist is a white male in his 40s or 50s withgovernment experience. We do not have particularly reliable estimates, but the evi-

dence suggests that less than 25 percent of state lobbyists are women, and very few

(probably fewer than one in ten) are nonwhite (on female lobbyists, see Nownes and

Freeman 1998a). In addition, the typical state lobbyist is well-educated and well-paid.

In short, in all fifty states people who are not white, not male, and not particu-

larly well-educated and who do not have government experience are profoundly

underrepresented in state lobbyist communities. Does this matter? The answer to

this question depends on your point of view. On the one hand, many critical ob-servers of state politics see this as a problem. An elite monolithic lobbyist commu-

nity, they maintain, is bound to underrepresent the views of large numbers of peo-

ple, especially people who are already disadvantaged in society. This, in the end,

might bias public policy toward the interests of well-off white men. On the other

hand, less critical observers note that lobbying is like most other highly professional

occupationsit is dominated by well-educated, affluent, ambitious individuals.

Moreover, some observers maintain that well-educated and affluent Americans arenot precluded from representing the interests of people who are not like them

poor people, for example. In the end, the question of whether the biased nature of

state lobbyist communities is a bad thing is an open one.

The Bottom Line on Lobbying: Lobbying = Information

Despite considerable variation in both lobbying and lobbyists, there is one thing

that virtually all state lobbyists have in common: they rely primarily upon informa-

tion to make their cases.A lobbyists stock in trade is information. In other words, a lobbyist at work

whether lobbying a government official or the publicalmost always provides in-

formation to the target of the lobbying, and the information is designed to convince

the recipient that the lobbyist is right. The assumption that lobbyists are primarily

information providers is at the center of political scientist John R. Wrights commu-

nications theory of lobbying(Wright 1996; see also Esterling 2004). Wrights con-

tribution is vital for a full understanding of lobbying, so we will discuss it here.In Interest Groups and Congress: Lobbying, Contributions, and Influence, Wright

(1996, 82) takes a close look at lobbying in Congress and begins by assuming that

legislators have three goals. The first goal is reelection. Reelection is the overriding

goal because a legislator who is not reelected to office cannot achieve any additional

goals. Second, legislators want to make good public policy. Legislators, despite their

bad reputations, generally want to make policy that benefits the people they serve.

The third and final goal of the legislator is to exercise influence within the legisla-

ture. Legislators, Wright notes, desire power within the legislative body because theywant to be able to propose and pass legislation. Without power it is hard for legisla-

tors to accomplish anything.



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1 1 4 c h a p t e r 4

After Wright establishes that legislators generally have three overarching goals, he

argues that legislators are forced to pursue these goals in a very uncertain and ever-

changing environment (Wright 1996, 82):The attainment of these goals is complicated by the fact that legislators cannot be cer-tain about how voters will react to their policy decisions, how policies will actuallywork once implemented, or what kinds of political complications might arise duringthe legislative process.

In short, legislators are in a bind; while they have explicit and straightforward

goals, they do not know precisely how to achieve these goals. According to Wright,

this is where lobbyists come in. The job of a lobbyist is to provide information togovernment officialsinformation that will (hopefully) affect the way these gov-

ernment officials behave. The information that lobbyists provide to government of-

ficials is designed to reduce uncertainty and help legislators learn how best to

achieve their goals.Wright (1996, 75) sums it up like this: lobbyists, he says, achieve

influence in the legislative process by strategically providing information to change

or reinforce legislators beliefs about legislative outcomes, the operational effects of

policies, and the electoral ramifications of their actions.Information: How Lobbyists Use It. To show you what Wright is talking about, we

present a brief example: A member of your state legislature, lets say a state senator,

is considering how to vote on a pending bill that bans a certain type of handgun in

your state. In considering the upcoming vote, the senator may wonder: How do my

constituents feel about this bill? If I vote for the bill, will it hurt me or help me when

I stand for reelection next year? What are the policy implications of the bill? Will it

lead to an increase in crime? Or will it lead to a decrease? Does the bill actually have

a chance to pass? How close is the vote likely to be? Will my vote even matter? Whenthe bill goes to the floor of the state senate, will I have a chance to offer an amend-

ment? How are other senators planning to vote? Who are the bills sponsors and

cosponsors? In sum, this hypothetical state senator is likely to ask a variety of ques-

tions while trying to decide how to vote.

Now lets imagine there is a lobbyist in the middle of all this. In our example, lets

make this lobbyist one who supports the gun ban. The lobbyist, according to the

communications theory of lobbying, tries to be successful (that is, tries to convincepeople to support the ban) by providing information to help legislators (like our

senator) answer the myriad questions they face. For example, the anti-gun lobbyist

may present poll results to the senator that show that the senators constituents sup-

port the gun ban. In addition, the lobbyist may present sophisticated data showing

that gun bans decrease crime and violence by taking guns out of the hands of vio-

lent criminals. Finally, the lobbyist might present information to the senator sug-

gesting that all the other members of the senators political party support the ban

and would be upset if the senator opposed it.It is important to note that while the anti-gun lobbyist is hard at work, a pro-gun

lobbyist may be just as hard at work as well. For example, the pro-gun lobbyist may



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be presenting the senator with conflicting informationinformation that, for ex-

ample, shows that the senators constituents actually oppose gun control, that gun

bans actually increase crime, and that many other state senators oppose gun bans.In both cases, however, the idea is the same: the lobbyist attempts to win by provid-

ing information to government officials.

Information: What Kinds Lobbyists Use. Although Wright applies his theory only

to legislative lobbying, his basic theory can be applied to virtually all state govern-

ment officials as well as to the public. Specifically, we can state the communications

theory of lobbying generally as follows: when state lobbyists lobby, they seek to af-

fect state government decisions by providing information to the people they lobby.

Lobbyists provide three types of information in particular. First, they provide politi-

cal information, which is broadly defined as information about the status and

prospect of a proposed or potential government decision. Second, lobbyists provide

what we call career-relevant information, which is information about the implica-

tions of a particular course of action for a government officials prospects of staying

in office or advancing in a career. Finally, lobbyists provide policy-analytic informa-

tion, which is information about the likely economic, social, or environmental

consequences . . . of a particular course of action (Wright 1996, 88).In short, lobbying is largely about providing information.Although many people

tend to think of lobbying as providing money, gifts, food, or booze, in most cases it

is information that lobbyists provide to government officials when they lobby. Even

when lobbyists lobby the public through indirect lobbying, they generally rely upon

information.

interes t group power in t he states

Although the public and the press often hold a simplistic view of interest group

powersuch as the richest groups are the most influential or the good ol boys

always winassessing actual interest group power is exceedingly difficult. It is dif-

ficult because many factors determine group power, and these factors change as po-

litical circumstances change.

Three Perspectives on Group Power

Group power can be viewed in various ways. One way is as the ability of a spe-

cific group to achieve its goals as that group and its leaders define them, which we

can term single group power. Group power can also be seen in terms of the most

powerful groups in a society; this we can call overall interest power. These first two

perspectives are not the same. A group may be very successful in getting what it

wants, but it may never be seen as particularly powerful in the political system over-

all. In contrast, a group may be viewed as very influential in the society overall but

may often lose political battles. A third way to view group power is group systempowerthe overall influence of interest groups relative to political parties and

other political institutions and actors.



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1 1 6 c h a p t e r 4

Despite the difficulties in definitively determining group power, research con-

ducted in the American states is enlightening in explaining why some groups, inter-

ests, and group systems are more powerful than others. We will now say a few wordsabout each type of interest group power.

Single Group Power. Because single group power is the ability of a specific group

or coalition to achieve its goals as it defines them, the only way to assess single

group power is through an internal evaluation by the group itself. Unfortunately,

this means that outside observers (political scientists, for example) can never really

know how powerful any single interest group truly is. One thing we do know, how-

ever, is that many groups that consider themselves powerful and effective are not

viewed as particularly powerful by the public officials (or the public) they lobby.There are several reasons why a group may be very successful in achieving its

goals yet be viewed as relatively weak by public officials. First, a group may be only

intermittently active and thus may simply not be on many public officials radar

screens. This might be the case, for example, for an association of truck owners that

works to defeat increased restrictions on truck weight limits on highways every time

they are proposed by state officials. Second, a group may be an ad hoc coalition that

comes together on one issue and then disbands when it achieves success. This mightbe the case, for example, for a coalition of churches and citizen groups that forms to

defeat a same-sex marriage bill in the legislature. Third, a group may focus on an is-

sue that is far from public view and of minor public concern. This may be the case,

for example, for a professional association of beauticians that works with an execu-

tive agency to write regulations concerning the occupational licensing process.

Rarely are beauticians seen as powerful interests in the states, but a professional as-

sociation representing beauticians may be very successful in achieving its limited

goals. Many groups involved in the regulatory process are very successful becausethey have captured their area of concern through dependence of bureaucrats on

their expertise. The last thing most of these groups want is public attention and to

be singled out as an effective group.

Overall Interest Power. This is the aspect of interest group power that most fasci-

nates the press and the public, both of which are less concerned about the minutiae

of government than with high-profile issues and questions such as: Whos running

the state? or Who has real political clout? Although the only important assess-ment of a single groups power is internal to the group, overall interest power can be

assessed by informed observers.

Researchers have used three methods, singly or in combination, to assess overall

interest power: (1) asking public officials; (2) drawing on the expertise of political

scientists; and (3) consulting academic and popular literature on the states. Our as-

sessment draws upon the Hrebenar-Thomas fifty-state study, which combined

quantitative and qualitative techniques employing the first two methods. The 2006

2007 assessment is found in Table 4-2, along with a comparison of rankings fromthe early 1980s. Our assessments enable us to examine trends in overall interest

power over the past quarter century.


I t t G i th St t


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First, we must be clear on exactly what these assessments do and do not reveal.

Theydo reveal the interests that are viewed by policymakers and political observers

as the most effective in the states over the five-year period prior to the 20062007

assessment. For this reason the interests listed tend to be the most active groups or

those with a high profile. The assessments do notindicate that the interests near the

top of the list always win or even win most of the time. In fact, the top interests may

win less often than some low-profile interests and groups not listed. The place of an

individual interest in the ranking indicates simply its level of importance as a playerin state politics over the period assessed and the extent of its ability to bring politi-

cal clout to bear on the issues that affect it.

Table 4-2 Ranking of the Forty Most Influential Interests in the Fifty States in 20062007, Compared

with Overall Ranking in the Early 1980sa

Number of states in 20062007in which interest ranked among:

Ranking of interest groups in 20062007 Most Second level Less/not

(rank in early 1980s in parentheses) effective b of effectiveness effective

1 (2) General business organizations 39 14 5 c

(state chambers of commerce, etc.)

2 (1) Schoolteachers organizations (NEA, AFT) 31 17 2 d

3 (6) Utility companies and associations 28 22 9

(electric, gas, water, telephone, telecommunications)

4 (4) Manufacturers (companies and associations) 25 18 145 (17) Hospital and nursing homes associations 24 18 10

6 (13) Insurance: general and medical 22 16 14

(companies and associations)

7 (11) Physicians, state medical associations 21 16 14

8 (22) Contractors, builders, developers 21 12 27

9 (9) General local government organizations 18 18 15

(municipal leagues, county organizations, elected officials)

10 (8) Lawyers 20 13 18

(predominantly trial lawyers, state bar associations)

11 (14) Realtors associations 20 10 20

12 (10) General farm organizations (state farm bureaus) 14 17 19

13 (3) Bankers associations 15 14 21

14 (19) Universities and colleges (institutions and employees) 14 14 23

15 (5) Traditional labor associations (predominantly the AFL-CIO) 15 11 24

16 (15) Individual labor unions (Teamsters, UAW) 13 11 26

17 (36) Gaming interests (race tracks, casinos, lotteries) 13 9 28

18 (7) Individual banks and financial institutions 11 11 28

19 (29) State agencies 10 13 30

20 (23) Environmentalists 8 17 25

21 (16) K-12 education interests (other than teachers) 12 8 31

22 (18) Agricultural commodity organizations 8 12 30

(stock growers, grain growers)

23 (37) Tourism, hospitality interests 11 7 33

24 (21) Retailers (companies and trade associations) 10 7 33

25 (12) State and local government employees 9 9 32

(other than teachers)

(table continues on next page)


8


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1 1 8 c h a p t e r 4

In a comparison of the listings over the years, what stands out is the relative sta-

bility of both the types of interests that make the list and the rankings. When

changes in ranking occur or new groups or interests appear on the list, the changes

appear to be influenced by the prominence of issues at the time and by partisan

control and the ideological persuasion of state government. Gaming, health, and in-

surance interests, for example, have steadily increased in perceived influence as lot-

teries and casinos (including Indian gaming), health care, and tort reform, respec-

tively, have become more important issues in state politics. Environmental and

other liberal groups wax and wane in strength according to who is in power in state

government (that is, these groups rise in power when Democrats are in charge).Business and development interests have seen a boost in their rankings since GOP

successes in state elections in 1994.

26 (35) Sporting issues, hunting and fishing 8 10 32

(includes anti-gun-control groups)

27 (34) Religious interests (churches and religious right) 7 12 31

28 (25) Liquor, wine, and beer interests 6 11 33

29 (24) Individual cities and towns 9 4 37

30 (37) Pro-life groups 7 7 36

31 (26) Mining companies and associations 8 1 4132 (20) Oil and gas (companies and associations) 7 3 40

33 (38) Taxpayers interest groups 6 5 40

34 (NR) Pharmaceutical interests (manufacturers and distributors) 7 2 41

35 (30) Forest products companies, associations 5 6 39

36 (28) Liberal causes, public interest, good government groups 2 12 36

(Common Cause, League of Women Voters, ACLU, PIRGs)

37 (27) Truckers and private transport interests 4 7 39

(excluding railroads)

38 (40) Miscellaneous social issue groups 1 11 38

(antidrunk driving, anti-smoking, anti-poverty groups,

child welfare)39 (31) Senior citizens/AARP 0 12 38

40 (39) Pro-tobacco interests 2 4 44

S O U R C E S : Authors analysis; compiled by the authors from the 20062007 fifty-state update of the Hrebenar-Thomasstudy; and Clive S. Thomas and Ronald J. Hrebenar, Interest Groups in the States, in Politics in the American States: A Compar-ative Analysis, 5th ed., ed. Virginia Gray, Herbert Jacob, and Robert B. Albritton, 123158 (Glenview, Ill: Scott, Foresman,1990). See note 1 in this chapter for a list of the researchers who gathered the data on which this table is based.

a. This table is based on a ranking of individual interests in the fifty states conducted by political scientists during fall and win-ter of 20062007. We asked each researcher to put interests into two categories: (1) most effective and (2) second level of ef-fectiveness. We finalized rankings by allocating 2 points for each most effective ranking an interest received, and 1 point foreach second level ranking an interest received, and we then added the totals. Where a tie in total points occurred, we

ranked interests according to the number of most effective placements or the overall number of states in which they areeffective.b. In some cases the totals for an interest add up to more than fifty. This is because groups within an interest category some-times appear within both the most effective and the second level category in a state. For example, utilities are ranked inboth categories in Arkansas and in several other states. Therefore, they are counted once for each category.c. These five states are Georgia, Hawaii, Maryland, Rhode Island, and Virginia.d. These two states are Georgia and Hawaii.

Table 4-2 Continued

Number of states in 20062007

in which interest ranked among:

Ranking of interest groups in 20062007 Most Second level Less/not

(rank in early 1980s in parentheses) effective b of effectiveness effective




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Until the early 2000s, two interests outstripped all others in their perceived influ-

ence and vied for the top ranking. These were general business organizations

(mainly state chambers of commerce), and schoolteachers (mainly state affiliates ofthe National Education Association [NEA]). These are still ranked one and two in

the 20062007 survey; but general business organizations are now clearly the num-

ber one interest even though schoolteachers are listed among the most powerful

groups in more states (mentioned in 48 states compared with 45 states for busi-

nesssee listing in Table 4-2). Utility interests have been consistently in third place

and in 20062007 came very close to the NEA in influence. In short, these three in-

terests now clearly surpass all others.

Other than hospitals, contractors, and universities, the top fifteen interests aslisted in 20062007 are those that were listed as most effective in the early 1980s.

These top fifteen interests are the only ones mentioned as effective (both in the first

and second rank) in more than half the states. This means that the so-called advo-

cacy explosion (that is, the large increase in the number of interest groups active in

the states) of the past thirty years has not been paralleled by a broad range of

groups being viewed as effective in most states. It is also worth noting that despite

the advocacy explosion, there is only one public or citizen interest ranked in thetop twenty. This is the environmental lobby, which reached the top twenty for the

first time in the 20062007 survey. The top twenty listing (and, indeed, the entire

listing) is and has always been dominated by economic interests, especially business,

professional, and labor interests, with governments, universities, and school boards

the only interests in any way representing what might be considered the broad pub-

lic interest. The rankings of groups from fifteen to forty have also remained fairly

stable over the years. In all, the six surveys confirm what we have known since the

first study of the power of state interest groups conducted by Zeller (1954) morethan fifty years ago: Business and the professions are the most effective interests in

the states.

Which interests have made the most gains and losses during the past twenty-five

years and six surveys? The major gains have been made by gaming interests, which

moved from 36 to 17. Contractors and developers and the tourism and hospitality

industry each gained fourteen places (22 to 8, and 37 to 23, respectively). Hospitals

moved up twelve spots (17 to 5), and state agencies moved up ten (29 to 19). The

three biggest losers have been state employees (dropping thirteen places, 12 to 25),

oil and gas interests (dropping twelve, 20 to 32), and individual banks and financial

institutions (dropping eleven, 7 to 18). Banking associations, the AFL-CIO, and pri-

vate transport interests each dropped ten places. Only one interest on the current

listpharmaceuticalswas not on the list in 1985. Railroads, newspapers and the

media, and women and minorities have dropped from the rankings entirely since the

early 1980s. These minor changes attest to the stability of the rankings over the years.

Group System Power. Although the power of single groups and the overall impactof particular interests is observed in their political mobilization and their ability to

achieve their goals, group system power is much more abstract. The method most


1 2 0 c h a p t e r 4


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1 2 0 c h a p t e r 4

frequently used to determine group system power has been to garner the observa-

tions of political practitioners and political scientists regarding the importance of

the players involved in the policymaking process in each of the fifty states (see, forexample, Morehouse [1981] and Zeller [1954]). This was the method used during

the past twenty-five years by the Hrebenar-Thomas study.

Early assessments of group system power used only three categories: strong,

moderate, and weak (Morehouse 1981; Zeller 1954). The five categories developed

by the Hrebenar-Thomas study improve on this categorization. Table 4-3 presents

these five categories and lists each of the fifty states according to the strength of its

interest group system in 20062007, with an indication of changes since the 1985

survey. States listed as dominant are those in which groups as a whole have an over-whelming and consistent influence on policymaking. Groups in states listed as com-

plementary tend to work in conjunction with, or are constrained by, other aspects

of the political system. Most often interest groups are constrained by the party sys-

tem; but they also may be constrained by a strong executive branch, competition

between groups, political culture, or a combination of these factors. Montana, for

example, which for many years was a state with very strong, even dominant, interest

groups, has over the past few years seen the power of its group system diluted by a

strong governor (Democrat Brian Schweitzer, who took office in 2004). A subordi-

nate group system is one in which interest groups are consistently subordinated to

other aspects of the policymaking process.

Currently, the group system is not subordinate in any state. There has, in fact,

never been a state that we categorized as having a subordinate interest group sys-

tem. The dominant/complementary and the complementary/subordinate columns

contain those states whose group systems combine elements of the two categories

or are in the process of moving from one of these categories to the other.Comparisons between the first survey in the early 1980s and the latest one in

20062007 reveal three major things about group system power in the states over

the past quarter century. First, changes in group system power are gradual (if they

occur at all). Fifty-six percent of states (28) have remained in the same category.

Moreover, of the twenty-two states that have moved categories, twenty have moved

only one category from the first survey, of which seventeen moved only once. Only

five states (10 percent) have moved three times during the past twenty-five years.

And only Kentucky and Delaware are two categories removed in 20062007 from

where they were in the early 1980s. Second, most movement between categories oc-

curred around the dominant/complementary category, which showed the only in-

crease in the number of states during the period under study (from eighteen in

1985 to twenty-six in 2002 and 20062007). Overall, the general movement has

been toward stronger but not dominant interest group systems. Third, in all six sur-

veys, the South is the region with the most powerful interest group systems, al-

though the gap between the South and the other regions has narrowed considerablysince the mid-1980s. The Northeast remains the region with the least powerful in-

terest group systems.




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p

A Concluding Word on Group Power in the States

One final point needs to be made about interest group power in the states: Al-

though there are some common influences across the states, the impact of groups in

a particular state is a product of the unique ways in which these influences interact

and change (the case of Montanas strong governor is one example). In some states

the power of certain single groups and the perception of the power of individual in-

terests may hold firm or even increase at a time when the same groups and interestsare declining in other states. The number of states that have seen increases in group

system power in the past twenty-five years is close to the number in which group

Table 4-3 Classification of the Fifty States According to the Overall Impact of Interest Groups in

20062007, Compared with Classifications in 1985

States where the overall impact of interest groups is:

Dominant/ Complementary/

Dominant complementary Complementary subordinate Subordinate

(4) (26) (15 ) (5) (0)

Alabama Alaska Colorado Kentucky

Florida Arizona +/ Connecticut Michigan

+/ Hawaii Arkansas Indiana Minnesota

+ Nevada California Maine South Dakota

++ Delaware Massachusetts Vermont a

Georgia +/ MontanaIdaho New Hampshire

+ Illinois New Jersey

+ Iowa New York

+ Kansas North Carolina

Louisiana North Dakota

+ Maryland Pennsylvania

Mississippi + Rhode Island

+ Missouri Washington

Nebraska Wisconsin

New Mexico

OhioOklahoma

Oregon

South Carolina

Tennessee

Texas

Utaha

Virginia

West Virginia

Wyoming

S O U R C E S : Authors analysis; compiled by the authors from the 20062007 fifty-state update of the Hrebenar-Thomasstudy; and Clive S. Thomas and Ronald J. Hrebenar, Interest Groups in the States, in Politics in the American States: A Compar-ative Analysis, 5th ed., ed. Virginia Gray, Herbert Jacob, and Robert B. Albritton, 123158 (Glenview, Ill: Scott, Foresman,1990). See note 1 in this chapter for a list of the researchers who gathered the data on which this table is based.

N O T E S : The symbols +/, ++, and indicate that a state has moved across three adjacent categories since the first surveyin 1985. If a state has moved up and down, it is designated with +/; if it has moved up only, it is designated with ++; and if ithas moved down only, it is marked by . The symbols + and indicate movement of one category only, up or down, sincethe 1985 survey.

a. Utah and Vermont are in the same categories they occupied in 1985, but both states have moved twice since 1985intothe complementary category and then back to their original categories.


1 2 2 c h a p t e r 4


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4

power has declined. Thus, although some common denominators do exist across

the states, changes in single group power, overall interest power, and group system

power often depend on the individual circumstances in a state.concerns and problems:

regulation of intere st groups i n the states

In 2005 lobbying on the state level became a billion-dollar business for the first

time. Over 40,000 registered lobbyists representing 50,000 organizations sought to

influence the 40,000 laws and $1.4 trillion in appropriations made by the various

state legislatures in 2005 (Laskow 2006). While interest groups and lobbyists are in-

dispensable to vibrant liberal democracies including those in the American states,they can and often do have negative effects on a political system (Thomas 2004b).

There are four specific concerns about interest groups in the American states.

First, as vehicles of representation, interest groups are far from ideal in that they

do not represent all segments of society equally. Their bias is toward the better-

educated, higher-income, majority culture (whites in most states), and toward

the males of the population. Minorities, women, and individuals with lower socio-

economic status are underrepresented by interest groups. Second, resources

mainly moneydo matter, and those groups th

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