In Sears, D. Huddy, L. and Jewis, R. (2003). Handbook of Political Psycholo~y. New York: Oxford University Press.

20 Ervin Sfaub and Daniel Bar-Tal

Genocide, Mass Killing, and Intractable Conflict

Roots, Evolution, Prevention, and Reconciliation

The twentieth century, as many commentators have noted, was a century of gea t mass violence in which many millions of people were killed. During the second half of the century, much of this violence was within states, between groups differing in ethnicity, religion, political ideology and agenda, and power and privilege. The Minorities at Risk study noted substantial decline in the number of new ethnically based protest campaigns and re- bellions since 1992, as well as a decline in the intensity of the ongoing ones (Gurr, 2001). But in spite of this observation, mass violence was very sub- stantial in the 1990s, as is shown by the cases of Rwanda, the former Yugoslavia, Sri Lanka, Angola, Sierra Leone and other places in Africa, violence in the Middle East, and elsewhere. One might predict that with - -

continuous great changes in the world in technolog, information systems, values, social organization, and political systems; with great differences be- tween rich and poor; with overpopulation, aspirations by groups for greater rights or self-determination; and with an increase in fun- damentalism, conflicts and violence between groups will be a significant problem in the new century (Staub, 1999a).

In view of this prediction, the prevention of mass violence and espe- cially intractable conflicts, genocides, and mass killings becomes an essential task. Beyond creating great human suffering at one place, conflict and vi- olence between groups often spill across borders, threatening the security of ocher nations as well as the moral status of the international community, which is frequently passive, even complicit, in cases when some nations support the perpetrators. Social scientists can geatly contribute to the un- derstanding of the origins, dynamics, and consequences of mass violence. They can and must also develop conceptions for and engage in efforts to bring about their prevention.

Intergroup mass violence is a broad category, with many acts and pro- cesses involved (see, for example, Brass, 1996; Brubaker & Laitin, 1998). It refers to two or more groups harming each other: minimally, one group acting against another, or two groups acting against each other, with these acts claiming a large number of lives. Acts by individuals who injure, kill, and murder may be considered intergroup violence when the individuals act as group members.

Genocide. MJSS Killing, a n d Inti-.mable Contlict 71 1

The focus of this chapter is on intractable conflict and on genocide1 mass killing. It is surprising, in view of the significant connections between these two phenomena, that there has been relatively little integration in studying them (Brown, 1995). We will attempt to provide connections between the two realms as we describe their origins, dynamics, cessation, and prevention. Taking an interdisciplinary approach, which is central to political psychology, we will identify influences that operate at the level of the system: structural conditions such as power arrangements and institu- tions, current social conditions, cultural factors, and particularly psycholog- ical dynamics involving beliefs, values, feelings, and motivations shared by group members. We will then consider the prevention of !genocide and intractable conflict. We will especially focus on the role of bystander nations, and on healing and reconciliation after intractable conflict or genocide, which are important to prevent their recurrence.

k Definitions and Central Concepts

In tractable Conflict

Conflicts between ethnic, religious, or political groups, societies, or nations, which arise when their goals, intentions, values and/or actions are perceived as incompatible (Bar-Tal, Kruglanski, & Klar, 1989; Mitchell, 1981; Rubin, Pruitt, & Kim, 1994), are an integral part of intergroup relations. They are usually over tangible matters involving territory, material resources, and ac- cess to opportunity, power, and privilege (Gurr, 2001). But many of them also involve and may become primarily rooted in intangible issues or psy- chological forces such as values, ideals, identity mistrust or perceived threat from the other (Ross, 1993: Staub, 1989). Our concern here is with con- flicts that are intense and involve mass violence, like those in Northern Ireland between Protestants and Catholics, in Turkey between Turks and Kurds, in Rwanda between Hutus and Tutsis, in Kashmir, and in the Mid- dle East. These are the kind of conflict that have been described as pro- tracted (Azar, 1990; Brecher & Wilkenfeld, 1988; Crighton & MacIver, 1990), as enduring rivalries (e.g., Goertz & Diehl, 1993; Huth & Russett, 1993; Mor & Maoz, 1999), and as deep rooted (e.g., Burton, 1987; Mitch- ell, 1981). They have also been called ethnopolitical conflict or warfare (Chirot & Seligman, 2001). We will call these conflicts intractable, meaning that they involve mass violence and have not yielded to resolution either by negotiation or the use of force. We view intractability as the end point of a dimension. Kriesberg (1993, 1998b) identified the first four elements described here that place conflicts on the intractable end of this dimension, and Bar-Ta1 (1998) added the three that follow.

(1) Intractable conflicts are protracted. They last at least a generation, with many confrontations over time that generate much hatred and ani-

Genocide and Mass Killing

( ;cnocidc anel /or n u t s killing m a y dcvc lo l i o u t of ' c o n l l i c t , c \ l u i , ~ l l y i n -

t r ;~c t ;~ l> lc c o n f l i c t . ;IS in t h e cnsc of ' I<\v:lncl.~. 1111t i t 111.1,. I)c I icq)c~r. i tcc l

\ v i t h o ~ i t rc;tI c o n f l i c t l > c t \ v c c ~ ~ groups , xs ill r l l c c.;i\e, o f . t l ~ e g c ~ i o < i c t c ; ~ g ; ~ i n s t

the IC\VS. Some o f t h e processes dcscril,cd 1)clow. such n\ t l c v . ~ l u . ~ r i o ~ i a d

sc;lpcgoatir ig, c a n lead t o t h e sc lcc t ion of n g r o r ~ p .I< ;In idcci logic.[ l c r i c r n y

even \ v I l e ~ i t l ~ c r c is n o rc;il c o n f l i c t .

C ; c ~ ~ o c i d c is ; in ;III~III~ t o c l i ~ ~ ~ i ~ i ~ t c ;I u410le~ gr0111) o!' ~ ) c ~ ~ ~ i l c ~ c ~ i t l i c r

t l i r c c t l y hy killing t l ~ c m , o r i n d i r e c t l y I?!. crc ;~ r i r ig c o n d i t i o n s t h ~ t Ie.ltl t o

t l i e i r d e ; ~ t l i or p ~ . c \ ~ c ~ i t r r p r o d u c t i o l ~ (e.!:.. \ ~ : ~ r \ . ; i t i r ~ n 01 p r c v e w t i ~ ~ g h i r t l i s ) .

' l ' hc UN gcnoc i t l c c o n \ . c n t i o ~ i c o n r i d e n gcnoc i t l c t o l i e . ~ c r \ c c ~ ~ ~ i ~ ~ i i r r c ~ l w i t h

LII IJCI 1 1 1 ~ g c ~ ~ o ~ . i ~ I e ~(111vcntio1i but can nonetheless be considered genocide, .11t11ou~11 I [ I I J \ .11o I1cc11 I-elkrred to as j)oliticide (Harff & Gurr, 1990).

. l ' l~c gcnocilc convention refers to the destruction of a group "in part" , I \ gcrlociJc. I fo\vc.vc,r, killing largc numbers of people without the apparent i l ~ t c l ~ t to c.liminatc ;I whole gl-oup may best be regarded as nznss killing T h e ~ ~ ~ o r i v . ~ t i o n h r 1n.Iss killing may be similar to that for genocide (see below). l)u[ i t III.I\. ;lho lie prin~arily t o intimidate and establish dominance either TI ;I suI>group of society, by eliminating its leadership o r intimidating its I I I C I I I ~ ) C I . S , or over a whole society. Mass killing may also be an aspect of intr;lctalile conf ict. In mass killing, the specification of who is to be killed may lie less precisc than in genocide. T h e number of people killed may be ~cl ;~t ivcly small or largc. A great deal of scholarly effort has focused on the ctcfi~litio~l of genocide (see, for example, Bauer, 1984; Chalk and Jonassohn, 1000; I)adrian, 1074; Dobkowski & Wallimann, 1992; Fein, 1993; Hirsch, 1095; Krcssel, 2002; Lemkin, 1944) as well as on naming mass killings (e.g, politicidc; rlcnlocide-see Rummel, 1994). A simple but effective definition was pro\,iclcct by Chalk and Jonascohn (1900, p. 23): "Genocide is a form of one-sidccl mass killing in which the state o r other authority intends to d c s t ~ o ~ the group, as that group and membership in it are defined by the perI)ctr;~tors." (:onsistcnt with our view, this definition includes political ~ I O I I ~ S u~lrlcr the term grrlocinP and both direct and irldirect means o f de- struction.

O n c hcncfit of a precise definition might be that when violence against ;I group is dclined as the international community, moved by the n1or.11 in~per;~t ivc of the genocide convention, would be more likely to act to stop r l ~ e killings. Uut a precise definition may also mean less feeling of oliligation to nct in response to "mere" mass killing. This was dramatically - s h o \ r ~ i i l l 1994, when the international community, including the United St.~tcs, strongly resisted identifying the ongoing extermination of Tutsis in I< \va~da ns genocide, apparently to avoid the moral obligation to act (des I'orgcs, 199'9; Gourevich, 1998, Powers, 2001, 2002).

An irilportant reason to distinguish between genocide and mass killing would be to develop the best theory of the origins and prevention of each. tlo\vcver, the influences leading to them are usually similar. Genocide is oticn the outconic of a n evolution, with mass killing a way station to it (Stnul). 1989). I:or example, there were mass killings in decades preceding the both in 3urkey against the Arnmenians and in Rwanda against the ' l i~tsis. While p o d theory can be the basis for assessing the conditions that predict the likelihood of group violence in a particular instance, the exact form of it is prob;lhly not possible to predict.

A numhcr of scholars have offered categorizationd of genocides. For cxa~nlilc, Smith ( I 990) 1 1 ~ proposed five types, with different primary mo- tivc.: rctriliutivc (nlotiv;~tccl hy blaming victims and revenge), institutional (gulocidc that is I-outinized, part of conquest o r warfare), utilitarian (its purpose S O I ~ C li1r111 of gain, as in the case of colonial doniination), nlo

\vritc~: "tlic n1mt [ I - T ~ I I ~ I I ~ W I I I C ~ (11. ge11ocit1~ i l l 111c I \ \ V I I I I C I I I ~ C . I I ~ U I \ . I I ; I C l ~ e 1 1 [lie ~ i l o ~ ~ < ) ~ ~ o l i , : ~ t i o ~ ~ 01. lv)\vcr" (1000. 11. - - I . I l ~ i \ I \ ( ~ I I \ I \ I C , I I I ~virh 1:cin's (190.3) conc lwio~i I I I . I I c I ~ I ~ , I I ~ ~ ~ I I ~ ~ u I ) o ~ c l i ~ ~ , ~ t t ~ yot11)\ 101 stcater rights and more resources have I x r n the mozt I r c q u c ~ ~ t \ot~ric . of pmocide since World W;lr I I . In zuch c;lscs. g c n o t ~ d c ;~p~ 'c , t r \ ro yro\v out ol'cc111tlict.

It is i111prtmit ro i ~ r ~ ~ I c r s r : ~ n d the cIrit.iilg Io rco I~cI~ir id .I p r t i ~ d ~ r violcnr conflicr, so thar cflictivc policy rcspmsc\ c.ln I I C tlc\.cdopcd. I3ut consisrent with the preceding disc~issiorl. in our view i t i ( I~c{c to dcvclop a general conception of'both origins and prcvcntion, \rith c.1rcI11l ,ipplic.;~tion to specific instances. A general conception, combined wit11 c-on\~clcr.~tion of the cpecific clcnlcnts of a s i t i~at ion, can t w i t indic;~rc \ v l l i ~ I ~ c I c ~ ~ ~ c ~ l ~ ~ nligllt l ~ c cspccially important iri a partirulnr inst;lrlcc.

k The Origin, Dynamics, and Maintenance of Mass Violence

On the hasic of our own work ( c . ~ . . h r - ' l i l . I c ) O H , LOOOh, i l l ~ ) r c \ z - ; ~ ; Staub, 1989: 19001>; I 990a; in press-I>; scc also rcfcrcrlccs) and tlic uwrk of' others (c.g.. <:balk and Jonassohn. 1900; Dadrian, 1005; 1:cin. 1070. 100.3; Harff Pr <;urr, 1988: Mclson; 1W2: Smith, 1000: scc alzo ( : h ; ~ r n ~ , IOW). w e will Jcscribc societal condirions, psychological processes, and culturnl clcnients that contribute ro genocide, as well as mass killing anti the usi~nllv mutual violence rhar is part of irltractablc conflict, refirring to them .IS niass vio- Icricc. T h e fdlowing analysis si~ggcsts a prolmbilistic conception: the more o f the i~~f lucnces we descrihe are present and the grcarcr their inte~lsity, the more likely i t is that extreme violcncc will occur.

Instigating Conditions and Basic Human Needs

( h a i n social condiriotls arc ticqncnt srarting points. ' 1 ' 1 ~ ~ I>;\vc powerful pvcllological e f tc t s . ' 1 ' 1 ~ ~ f'rusrratc important need$, which cvcrltiially may give rise to ~ y c h o l o g i c a l and societal processes t l i ; ~ t hcgin ;In evolution townrd nuss violence. I t is prini;lril y in the prcscncc 01' prcdisposint: culti~ral charactcrictics (see later scctiorl) tliat instigarors arc likely ro hnvc silch ef- fects.

Difficult Life Conditions

'I'his is a summary term (Sraul,, IWY) t o tlcscribc econon~ic h;~rdship, po- litical tcnsion and disorganization, and grcar and rapid social change that separately and especially in combination are s tx t ing points for processes thar may lead to mass violence. . l l ~ c s c dif t i rc~lr social conditions

. ~ r c p o ~ ~ l ) c ( l togctlicr Ixxausc they can have similar psychological impact on i~idi \ . id~i .~ls . I I I C ~ ;IF ;I result may generate similar social processes in groups.

I\\ ,111 example. diflicult life conditions were greatly involved in bringing llic N.wi p.~rry to power in (krmany, the first phase uf the genocidal process. ( ; c rm.~ny I o ~ t \VJS \Vorlrl I , a peace treaty was imposed on Germany that rcdt~ccd living standards and that Germans found humiliating, and there Ii)ll~nvcd ;I revolution anti system change, hyperinflation and depression, - - . g r c ~ t iiitcrnal politicai conflict, with private armies fighting against each other. ;111tl Inore (Craig, 1982; DeJonge, 1978; Staub, 1989). In Rwanda difficult life conditions and intractable conflict jointly exerted influence. 'l'I1c1-c were severe economic problerns, related to overpopulation and the cuhsr;~riti;~l rlccline in the price of coffee and tin in world markets, Rwanda's primary cxp)r ts . There were also deep political dissatisfaction and demands fi)r cllangc. .l'licrc. was ;dso an intractable conflict between Hutus and liltsis tliar tur~lcd into a civil war (des Forges, 1999; I'runier, 1995; Staub, 1999a).

( ; o v c r n n w ~ t or statc fiailure has been described as a contributor to gcnocirlc (Mclson, 1092: Harff and Gurr, 1990). A failing government means diflicult liie conclitions, such as econon~ic problems, or political dis- org.~r~iz;~t ion anti conflict that leaders are unable to manage. T h e failure i n ~ p c ~ s Iwrh the population and the leaders themselves. W h a t may be . .

rcg;~rdcd ;IS government or state failure has preceded genocide in a number of' instances, for example the Armenians in Turkey (Melson, 1992), Hitler coming to power in Germany, the Tutsis in Rwanda (des Forges, 1999).

Basic Human Needs

1)iflicult life conditions frustrate fundamental psychological needs. These needs arc universal, although their exact form is shaped by culture, by the socialization of individuals and life experience in particular groups (Staub, 1989, I996b, 1999b, 2001b, in press-b; see also Burton, 1990; Kelman, 1090). O n e basic need is the need for security, to feel that oneself, one's firnilY important others, one's whole group are safe from physical as well as p ~ c h o l o g i c a l harm and that they will have food, shelter, and other basic necessities for survival. Another basic need is for a positive identity, for oneself and, to the extent that one is dependent on or identifies with one's group, for the group as well. Still another is the need for a feeling of cffcctivcness and control, the ability to protect oneself and one's family and group fro111 harrn and to achieve important goals. Another need is for con- nection t o other individuals, as well as a con ln~uni ty or group. A less evident lx~sic need is for a comprehension of reality that makes the world and one's own place in it urlderstandable. Finally, people also have spiritual needs, for 111c;lning and for transcendence, to go beyond themselves, which can be deeply frustrated by difficulties of life and violence. . .

Difficdt life conditions make people feel insecure, ineffective, and not in control, with their sense of self diminished. People tend to focus o n

. .

reactions that lesscr~ sccurit!. (Stnub. 10001). ill p r c \ \ - I ~ ) . I n \ t i y r c ~ r s c;in give

rise t o social p y c l ~ o l o g i c a l prcxxstec in gro t ip r of pcol>lc- rid t o the c\,olu-

t i o n of societal h c l i c t i t h ; ~ t he lp t \ ~ l t i l l h.~qic ~ i c c d s 1)111 ; i t tlir LII~IC t i r l ie

r l lovc t he g r o u p to\vard t u r n i n g :~g,~insr ;~ r i o thc r g r o u p or. \ \ - l i C r l tltcl-e is already g r o u p cor i f l ic t . inter is i fy ;~r i ragor~ isn i .

Conflict Between Groups

( :o r~ f l i c ts ~;III l lccor i ic v i o l c r ~ t ;111d/or i n t r . ~ c t ; ~ l l l c \v i rh \ i g n i f ~ c . ~ t i r \ . i o I e ~ ~ c e

a n d c;ln ~ ~ l t i r n n t c l y evolve i n t o gcriocirlc. In ;III intr.~cr;il)lc. c o r ~ l l i c t , a g roup

corisidcrs i ts go;~ls as o f 'ex ic rent i .~ l i m p r t ; ~ n z c ; l r i c l v ic\v\ r l i c c ~ r l ~ c r g r o u p as

p r e v c r ~ t i r ~ g t l ~ r i r ; ~ i h i e v e r n c r ~ t (see \Vil l inrl ls, lO'P4). ' l ' h c pil) I ) c . ~ \ v c u ~ con-

f l i c t i r ~ g goals is v i e ~ w d ;IS i m n ~ r n s c , n o t possildc t o rcsolvc t l ~ r o r r ~ l i com-

proni isc. Such pe rcep t i o r~ ni;iy Ix gerieratcd s p w l i l > . ( \cc ; ~ l \ o (:olernan,

2000) by words (statertients abou t i n ten t i ons o r dcrnnncls) o r ;~c t ions (em-

OarRo o r attack).

i3ut intractable conf l ic ts rnny also evolve t l o \ v l y t h r o u g h idcat tha t de-

f ine t he goals and interests o f t l ie t w o groups as con t r ; d i c to ry (seeing one's

g r o u p as exploi ted, d iscr iminated against, o r dcservir ig sel f -c lctcrminar ion o r

independence), as in the case o f con f l i c t be tween I';~lcstini;lns a n d Israelis

o r in S o u t h Afr ica. 3'he ideas ( the epistemic basis t o the conf l i c t ) m a y b e

init iareci by a smal l g r o u p of 'I'hey m a y lead t o protect (Staub a n d

Kosenthal , 1094) and t hen t o v io len t act ions t o achieve g r o u p goals. T h e

act ions threaten the interests and secur i ty o f t he o t h c r g r o u p and create . .

v io lent responses. Conceptua l iza t ions o f the con f l i c t o r idcologics (see be-

low) t levclop ius t i f i c ;~ t io r~s and rationales h u t also f i ~ r t l ~ c . r m o t i v a t i o n fo r

act ion. (;roup n ~ c m l ~ c r s h e c o r ~ i c \v i i lc ly m o l i l i ~ c c l .11ic1 c o r ~ ~ n i i r r c d t o g r o u p

goals.

A n iritr;~ct,~I,le c o r ~ f l i c t may hegir l \ v i t l ~ \mal l -sc;~lc v io lence t h t c la ims

l i lc . I.oss of l i f i n a con l l i c t has grcat c n ~ o t i o n a l rnc .~r i i r~g , o f t en be ing

vic\vcd ;IS a result of t l ie o the r g r o u p \ i o l a t i n g a f i ~ n d a n i c n r ; ~ l m o r a l code.

I ' h c suf'fc.ring cnuscd b y the v io lcncc is pcrccivccl ;IS n collcc.tivc issue, a n d

the g r o u p takes the responsibi l i ty t o treat ;id cornpcr~s.~rc t l ie victinls, to

prevent t he recurrence o f physical violence, a n d t o take revcnge f;)r i t (Bar-

.I.:II, i n press-;I; Fri jcl;~, 1904). l l i u ~ v io lent . ~ c ~ i o n \ ;111cl r e t r i l ) t ~ t i e ) r~ \ e x a t e

\ L : I ~ i~icrc>.l\c.\ rlic likelihood of genocide. l ' h c genocide of the l i ~ t s i s in 1(\\..11it1.1 ~ o o k l h c c i l l rlic context of ;I civil war, althougli dul-ing a cease- I ~ r c . l l tc~ \ccrlii~igly \ucccs~ituI peace ricgotintions ( I k s l:orges, 1999; Staub, l ' ) L ) ' ) . ~ I . ( ;c~iocidc I ~ I J ! ~ take plnce not against the enemy in the war but .~g.lili\t ;I deeply rlcvalt~ed group or icleological enemy, as in the case of the I I o I o ~ ~ u \ t , \vI i i~h took pI;ice during \Vorld \War 11, a n d the genocide of the i\rnicni.lnr tlurirlg World \Unr I. War may provide a cover for such violence, I I K violc~ice o f ~ v a r m,ly lessen inllibitio~is, and the frustration of basic needs i l l \v.~r I I I . I \ ~ ;iclcI to the ~lwrivational base out of which genocide arises.

'l'he p~cceding discussio~l prim;uily clcscribes the nature and dynamics o I ' i ~ ~ r r ; ~ c t . ~ l ~ l e co11llic.t. I t c origins, and the conditions ~ ~ n d e r which it is likely I O le.1~1 I O ~ I I I ~ I I S C \ i o I e ~ ~ c e . will Ix further identified hereafter. O n e of them i \ ;I \.it.il ~onf l ic t of interest that is difficult to resolve. This may be partly . .

101 I I I ; I I ~ ~ I , I I SC , I \OI IY ~crr i tory ~ ~ e e i l c d 1)oth parties for living space; scarce w . ~ r c ~ \ r~pply nectlcd Iy I)otll g r o u p s e n t w ~ ~ c h c d d i f i ~ r ~ ~ l c ~ s in power, \vc.ll[li. ; I I I ~ opp) r tu r~ i ty . I t is also for psychological reasons: the territory Iwing \ C C I I ,IS 1x11-t 0 1 ' the group's identity; worldviews or legitimizing ide- ologic,~ cl.li~ning rl i ; l t the power diffkrenccs are right (Sictanius & I'ratto, I O O H ) ; ;I I~istory of'dcvaIu;itior~ a11d fear of the other; hopelessness about [lie r c s o l ~ t i o ~ i of' co~itlict by peaceful means; and evolving ideology and group Idicfs that intensify enmity.

I:rcquwtl~., conflict and d i i f i d t life conditions operate together. Struc- tur-.il coriflicr, such as inequalities in a society, may not be perceived as unjust and may not lead to action until life conditions contribute to the difficulties of life and intensib the experience of relative deprivation of an ;il~c;ldy less pri\~ilcgecl group (Leathcr~nan, DeMars, Caffney, & Vayrynen, IOO9). Alrcrnatcly, intractable conflicts create difficulties in life conditions. 'I'licy are by tlicir nature strcssfi~l, threatening, create uncertainty, and de- I I ~ ; I I I ~ I;irge eco~iornic and military investments (Bar-Tal, 1998). They make i t difficult to fulfill basic needs, like the needs for security, positive identity , 1 1 1 ~ 1 c o ~ ~ i ~ > r e I i c ~ i s i o ~ ~ of ~-c;llity (see I ~ U S I O I ~ , 1090; Lederer, 1980; Kelrrlan, 1 Oc)O; S r ~ u l ) ~ I 080, I WOa, I 99911, in press-11).

Self-interest

Sclt~intercst, o r greed, call also lead to mass violence, even when the interests of' one group, ;IS Ilistoric;~lly defined, have not been in conflict with those of' .i~iotllcr gl-oup. 1 lo\vcvcr, one group ~ i o w wants sotnething that another gr-oup possesses. 'l'he want often expresses greed rather than need. A com- 111011 hi\toric;~I ~ I I S ~ ; I I I C C is w;irknre for the sake of conquest. Self-interest has

Psychological and Societal Processes and Cultural Characteristics That Contribute to Mass Violence

Strong Identification with a Group

I ~ l s t i g a t i n g c o r ~ d i t i o ~ i s make i t d i t l i cu l t I b r pcop lc t o SI~IIICI o n t l w i r o w n

at l t l t o face the p roh l cms they encounter ns i n t l i v i du .~ l \ . I 'coplc t c ~ ~ r l t o shift away f . r o r ~ ~ an indiv ic iual i den t i t y tha t has 1)ccome I u r d c ~ i r o n ~ c . ; ~ s they are

unah lc t o p rov ide f;)r thetiiselves and t hc i r f ;~~n i l i cs o r .Ire ~ o n l i ~ s c d by the

po l i t i ca l ;and social chnos a r o u n d thcrn o r arc tI irc.,~rcr~ctl I,!. the conf l i c t

w i t h the o thc r g r o u p (Kec~nanov i c . 1006; Stauh. 7001h ; \'i'orchcl, 1999). ' l ' l icy t u r n t o a n ideological rnovcrncnt I i ) r ident i t \ ; l i ke t l l c K h r n c r Rouge

i n Cambod ia , o r increase thc i r ident i f i ca t ion \v i th arl ethnic. pol i t ical , o r

rel igious g r o u p they have p r e \ h ~ s l y I x c n m c n l t r r s ol: l<,~t l icr r hnn be ing

i n d i v i d r d s , they become N x i s o r communis ts , o r m o r e (;crm.ln, Serb,

t l u t t r , Israeli, o r Palestinian than they have 11ce11 I d o r c ( w e ~ l s o chapter

15) . 111 response t o the attacks o n the \Vor ld ' l r , ~dc (:c.ntcr and Pentagon,

pcop lc i n the LJn i red States hecnme m o r e A ~ n c r i c . ~ ~ ~ . Thi\ .;trcne~hens iden-

t i t y a n d connect ion , provir lcs sorl lc feel ing ol'wcurit!., a n d Ilclps fi~lfill the

o t l l c r I x ~ s i c needs ;IS \veII. T I i c n , as social identit!' thcor i<ts I~.I\T suggested

( ' I i j fe l , 1078, 1 ' ) H I ) , indivicluals elevate t hc i r g roup, in i t id l ! . 11,. psycholog-

ic ;~ l ly d i ~ i ~ i t i i < h i n g the o thc r t h r o u g h t ie \x lu ;~ t ion , 2 n d ul t in~.~rcl ! . Iy h a r m i n g

the o t h c r (see ( : r ighton Pc i v l ; ~ c l \ w , 1000).

Scapegoating

1 1 1 ! : IOLI I ) I ) ( : I i ~ f ' t l l . l ( Oic 0 1 1 1 ~ 1 - is at fault. Helieving that one is not responsible I 0 1 ~ x o ~ l o ~ l i i c ;11111 otlicr ~lif'ficulties of life strengthens individual identity, 11c..11c\ L O I I I I C C I ~ ~ I I . S I I I C C we11 blaming is a group process, and helps people g.1111 .I ~ o ~ ~ i l ) r c h c n i o n of'currcnt reality T h e Germans blamed the Jews for rllc lo\\ oI \ \ \~r ld \S';ir 1. 'l 'hc Nazis added to this by blaming them for the tl11c.11 o ( c o ~ i i ~ ~ i ~ ~ ~ l i \ r l i . ,is well as any and all problems that affected Germans ( ( '1.11s. 1082: I k l o ~ i g . 1978). Hutus blamed Tbtsis for economic and po- I ~ t i c . i l I i r o l ) l c ~ ~ ~ \ in I<w,~nd;i, as well as for the civil war (tles Forges, 1999; S[ .~c~li . IOOO.1) . WJhen conflict leads to n ~ u t u a l harln-doing, it is common L I ~ c.1cl1 g10~111 1 0 l1l.1111~ the other and not to acknowledge or even be aware 01' I I \ o\vri cx~r~rriliution.

Ideologies a n d Societal Beliefs

A \cc*rili~l~lj. 1111i\.cvs;il c&ct uf instigating conclitions is the adoption or c r c : i ~ i o ~ ~ oI';in ideology ( ( : d l , 11N6; C;dt~111g~ 1990; S t a ~ h , 1989, 1999a). Idcologicr ;Ire dcfinctl Ilcrc ;IS visions of ideal societal arrangement. People need positivc virions in difficult times, hut the ideologies that are precursors to g r o i ~ p violence arc destructive in that they identify enemies who stand . .

i r i [lie tvny of the ideology's fulfilln~ent. Such ideologies seem always to be pw\c*~it i l l gcnocidc. Somctimcs the vision descrihcs an ideal arrangement IOr :ill huni;l~iirj,, s i d i as conirnunism, a "better world ideology" (Staub, 108')). .l'lic C.lnihodian communists, the Khmer Rouge, were guided by a Ixdicf in tot;~l societ;d cql~aliry (Staub, 1989). At other times it is nation- ;~listic, in rhc sense of the desire to create one's own state or, more often in the c x e of genocide, to enhance its power, prestige, o r purity. T h e Young ' l i~rks, the organizers of the genocide against the Arnmenians (Staub, 1989), h.id ;I vision of Turkey's renewed greatness. Often the ideology includes elcmcnts of both, as in the case of the Nazi ideology with its vision of racial prit!. ns well as more living space for Germany (Hilberg, 1961).

I'owerfid groups often protect their power and privilege by developing .i \rorldview or ideology-a legitimizing ideology (Sidanius & Pratto, 1998) or Oelicf in comliarative superiority (Gurr, 2001)-that makes it right for tlleni to have p w c r and privilege. As they act against the demands of a s i ~ l i o ~ ~ l i n ; ~ t e group, they are defending not only their privilege but also their worltI\icw (St;tul~. 1989). Ideologies of development have been used to c.l:iiti~ tllc Innd of and justify harmful actions against indigenous populations (f-litchock and l ivedt , IW7) .

I ~ l c o l o ~ i c s arc a h r m of societal beliefs. Societal beliefs, which develop i l l c \ u y society (llnr-Td, 2000b), can provide building bocks for destructive ideologies. (;erman .inti-Scrnitism and desire for expansion were incorpo- rated into the Nazi ideology. Societal beliefs are beliefs shared by members of n socicty on topics and issues that are of special concern for the society: go;lls. myths, collccrive mernor): self-image, views of other groups, and so on. . l l ~ c y i o r ~ t r i l ~ ~ ~ t e to the sense of ~ ~ n i q u e n e s s of the group (Bar-Tal,

. . l7ers' idc~l t i t \~, J I I C I provide dirccrio~\ ;111ci g0~11\ tor i ~ ~ c i i i , ~ ( i \ ~ < t l J I I ~ group I)ch,~vior ( l h r - ' l ; ~ l k Oren. 2000). C : rntr ,~I vlcirt.11 I K . I I c I ~ I ~ I > I C ~ W ~ I ~ ~ ,I v ~ c ~ i c t d

A History of Devaluation

Iritcnsc hostility and violence l~ct\vecn groul>\ nl,t\. ~ t o t 1 ~ . p ) \ \ ~ l > l r . intrac- tal)le conflict is not likely to evolve. \vithout .I h ~ r p ~ l i I t ~ r ~ ~ ~ t t i . ~ ~ i o ~ ~ Iwtween "us ; I I ~ chew" 2nd intense devaluation of "thcm." \ ' . ~ r ~ c d concepts have l~ccrt usctl to describe dcvaluntion. a n d a numl>cr of dirtinc~iottc have been made nntong its types. O n e scholar, while ackno\vlctlsing the. contribution of socictnl problems (difficult life conditions in our terminology) in Ger- many, has suggested that ;I special furm ot'dcv;tIuntion, climinnrionist anti- Seniirisn~, was the c;tuse of the t-loloc;tust ( ( ;olJ l~,~gen. I 'M)) .

I ' r~ found dc\.aluarion is present in all genocides. Intense cIcv;~luation is especially likely to co~irri\)utc ro gcnocidc if the dcv.~lucti group does rela- tively well in terms of rn;tterial wcll-bcing ; ~ n d st;ttus, .lr \\.;IS the case with Armenians in *Ii~rkcy, Ic\vs in C;ermany, artd 'Ii~tsis in I<\vn~ltin, their relative \\~cll-hcing intensitling hostility in the ficc of' instigating cortdirions (Staub, 1989, I 9OOb. I990a). However, while clcv;tlu;~tion ic cc~t tr .~l l \ . in~portant , it is o n r of a variety o f conditions in the gcr~cr.~rion of gcrlocidc, as well as in making ;I contlict i~~rrnctahle .

'I ' l~c d i f f rentiation bcrwccn " i~s" ; I I ~ " r l ~ c r t ~ " ('I';ijkl. 1078; Brewer & Camplxll, 1076) and etl~noccntrism, the teridcniy to ;tcccpt the ingroup and reject the outgroup (Sumner IOOG), arc corllmon human tendencies - . (see also chapter 16). Ethnoccntrisn~ is one basis for the dc \dua t ion of anothcr group and for its exclusion from the norm;~l hurn;tn cornniurrity ( h r - ' l h l , 1990; I3rcwcr. 1970). 1)cvnluation of' ;tnother g r o ~ ~ p i n n become . .

p r t of ;I group's C I I I I I I ~ C in response to n v;~liety of'situ.ttion\: r l t~c to the d i f te rc~~t r~css of' the utller; a group beconling more powerful and using and exploiting the other, which has to he justified; a group intent to create a separate idcr~tity, a likely source of C:i~risti;~n anti-Semitism as Christians scl~arated rhcrnsclves from their Jenrish origins: diKhculr life conditions lead- ing to sc;~pcgo;tting; or conflict bct\vccn groups(Stauh, 1080, I W6h: Wist- richa 1000).

I3;1r-'1;71 ( I 980, 1 ' )W) has described dc-/c;qitirniz,rtro,,. ;IS ; I I I extreme form of devaluation. I t is ;In cxtrcrnc neg;~ti\re c,ttcgorirnrio~l o t ' a group, in five

\\. .I\.\: c / ~ . / ~ ~ ~ r j ~ i r ~ ~ i ~ ~ l l i n r ~ (c.g., savage, primitive, monster), ontcasti~zg (e.g.. I I I I I I ~ ~ I C I ~ . tliicvcs. p ~ y e l ~ ( ~ l ~ ; ~ t l ~ ~ ) , t ~ i t c /~ i zr~c ter i~n t io t~ (e.g., aggressors, id- iot>. I ~ I - ; ~ \ ~ I c F ) , w e of'/)o/itic,z/ / I I ~ / P / J (e.g., Nazis, fascists, communists), and

of y 0 1 1 p I " ' O I ~ I / I , W ~ ~ I (c.g., Vandals or Huns) . I n essence, delegitimization \rlgl:c\rs t l i . ~ t :I p u p violntes hasic human norms and values and denies its l i l ~ ~ i ~ . ~ ~ i i t ! . . wliicl~ ;111o\vs violence against them (see also Randura, 1999; K ~ ~ I I I A I I , 107.3; Opoto\v, 1900; Stad,, 1989, 1990).

I ~ ~ J i g c ~ i o u s g r c ~ ~ p s Ii;~vc hrquently been the object of extreme devalu- . I [ i o ~ ~ ( A l ~ i l q u c r , 1004; UcuL 1977; For lm, 1964), because of differentness, iu\tilic;1rion of'cxploitation and bad treatment, and so on. l 'he devaluation I i . i \ 111.1dc tllCrn c:~s!. targets for violence, inclrrding violence motivated by wll-intcrc\t. Oficn the names of despised animals have been applied to tI1c11i. I:;~~iiili :~r cxan~ples include Native Americans in the United States (Aln1.1~~1cr . 1004; 11cl1f; 1077; Stnub, 20003) and in the Americas in general . ~ n d I k ~ c k pcoplc in Sour11 Africa, where apartheid was justified by seeing I)l;~ck people ;IS prin~itivc, infcrior, savage, and backward (Cornevin, 1980; I .rvcr, I 078) .

I )cv;lluation, and l a l d i n g of an adversary group, play an essential func- tion in intractable conflict (see Kelrnan 1997; Rieber, 1991). They help cxpl;lin to group nieml,crs why the conflict erupted, why it still continues, ; ~ n d \vhy i t is violent. They justify the violence and destruction inflicted on the riv;~l group (Ihr-7:,11. 1090). Cecil (1993) and Hunter, Stringer, and \V:ltson ( I OO I ) showcd n ~ u t u a l delegitimization of Protestants and Catholics in Nortlicrn Ircl;~nd, and Bar-7'al and Teichman (in press) Arab delegitim- imtiori in the Israeli society.

In c;~ses of intractable conflict, the other often conles to be seen as a 111ortnl enemy a n d the identity of one's own group as partly defined by its c n ~ n i t y to the other. S tad , has called this an ideology of antagonism. This crcntcs [he xro-surn psychology described earlier, in which a loss to the o r l i c~ is seen ns p i n t o the self. T h e ideal vision of the world is one without r l ~ c group tI1.1r is itlentified as the enemy. H u t u power, a movement in I<\v.lnd.~ wirh n ''3i.n Comniandnlents" that called for violent action against 'lutsis, cxcmplifics such an ideology of antagonism (des Forges, 1999; Staub, I ~)00;1).

Past Victimization and Collective Memory

C ; r o u p ~ I i ; ~ t have s u f i r e d great trauma, especially great harm and violence inllictcd on them, are deeply affected (Montville, 1993; Staub, 1 9 9 8 ~ ) . Since i tdividl~al identity is deeply rooted in group membership (Tajfel and 'lirrncr, 1075); Bar-,131 and Staub, 1997), this is true not only of direct survivors Iwt ;dso of niemlms of groups who have not been physically ~ v c x n t ; ~ t [lie violent events (Staub, 1998a). Trauma, and especially intense vier imiz;~t ion, diminishes people. Even if they consciously know that they arc not ~r l iu l t , at some level they tend to feel that sonlething must be

cdnrss ar id p;lsr irliwsricc t h r o ~ l g h generations ( I - la l l ls \v;~chc. IOO2; Cot iner -

ton , 1089) . V o l k ; ~ n ( l O c I i ) suggests t l i ;~ t g r o u p t C d t o I i ~ c u s 0 1 1 ;I chosen

trauma, tha t hecornrs ;In i m p o r t a n t gu ide 101- IU~III-c ; ~ c t \ . Scrh v io lence in t he course o f the hrc;~kclo\vri o f Yugos l .~v i ;~ is one c x . r r ~ ~ p l c of' the role o f

pa" v ic t i rn i7a t ion a n d collective m e m o r y (see C;Icnny. 1002; 1)rnich. 1994).

I ' h c t r . ~ i ~ n ~ n t i c collective rncmories arc usctl t o pro\ , i t Ic interpretation fhr a n d me. ln ing t o cor l renlporary events ; ~ n d ex l~cr icnccs ( (hnne r ton ,

1080; t la l lnvachs, 1092; t i a m r n e ~ ~ . I O') I ). I n .~c ld i t io r l t o insecurity, they

c;ln gi\-c rise t o unciue self-reliance, tlisrcg,lrcl of' i n t c r l i . ~ r i onn l rules, a n d

violence ns self-tleicrlse ( t i rystal , 1008; I 'cnnctxtkcr, I'sc;r, c9( Rime, 1997).

111 extreme cases, p s t experiences m a y give rise t o a siege mentality, a core

societ;d I>cl ief tha t o ther groups hnvc neg;~ t ivc in rcn t io r ls t oward the group,

w h i c h stands alone i n a host i le w o r l d (see Rnr-' l ' :~l. 2000h ) . I h s s i a n society

f;)llo\ving the intcrnat ion; l i i n te rven t i on i n a rlomesric w;lr ; ~ i t c r the Bolshe-

v i k r c v o l u t i o r ~ i n 1'117 ( K c ~ i t l . ~ n , 1060) a d Isr ;~cl i w c i c t ! i t 1 the wake of an t i -Scn~ i t i sn i , the Ho locaust ( I k b m a n , 1'978; Stein, 1078). . ~ n d early Arab

attacks seern cx;lmplcs of socierics w i t h such siege n~cn ta l i t i c s .

Strong Respect for Authority

1 ' )H ' ) ; ti~cs.;cl. L O O L ) . I'cople accustomed to follow seem to find it more ~ I ~ I i ~ c u l t to st.111d 011 tlicir ow11 in the face of life prolllerns or group conflict. ' l . l~c\ . . I I C likely to Oc I ~ O I - c ;~ftcctecl by them and to respond more by looking ( 0 1 1~..1~1e1\ t o Ii)llo\v and obey and l ~ y giving then~selves over to a group.

I he\ . I I C .rI\o ICM likely to oppose immoral, ~lcstrucrivc policies and prac- ticc\. . ~ l l o \ v i ~ ~ g [lie c v o l u t i o ~ ~ of v i o l ~ l ~ c e to 1111folJ. Finally, they are more likcl! t o i h c Y direct orclcrs by authorities to h ~ r m others (Milgram, 1974).

h t r o ~ i g rcslicct for authority may be part of the culture, and may be ~ I I ~ I ~ o ( I I C C I i l l tlic I~icr;lrcliical nature of institutions. For example, in I<w,~rid.~. i~url~oritics were appointed at many levels of society, starting with ;I 111 ;111 gr011p of f>milies in c;ich villagc. T h e tradition of obedience to these .~utlioritirs \ v ; I ~ ;11i i n ~ p o r t ; ~ n t rcxon for the participation by many memhers 01 [lie p y ' u l , ~ r i o ~ i in the killings dul-ing the genocide of 1994. People were ot J C S C ~ to ki l l at t imcs as a ILI-111 of C I I F ~ ( I I I ~ ; ~ ~ C O I I ~ I I I ~ I I ~ ~ ~ labor (des Forges,

1 ')')'I; I 1 ~ ~ r ~ r i e r , 1005 ; S t ~ u b , 199%).

Monolithic, Nondemocratic Societies

'I'Iic ; I C C ~ ~ I : I I I C ~ of v;iricd I'eliefF, the free expression of views and public clig.lgcmcnt wit11 issues, and the access of all groups to the public domain 11i;lkc~ i t prol) ;~l~lc r l ~ ; ~ t there will be opposition to policies and actions that I1ar111 s011ie group (Staub, 1989). This makes an evolution toward mass killirig or g c ~ ~ o ~ i d e lcss likely. I'luralism also makes the transformation of conflict Irorn one that is seeriiingly resolvable to one that is intractable less - .

likely. hloreovcr, in repressive societies that are also traditional, great culture c l ~ ; ~ n ~ c s are especi;~lly difficult to integrate, thus frustrating basic needs (St;~ul', in press-3).

I<csc;~rch o n democratic and nondemocratic societies has found that clcmocracies are unlikely to engage in mass violence against a subgroup of t l~cir o w n population (Iiumrnell, 1994, 1997). T h e greatest mass killings of the twentieth century have taken place in totalitarian societies, such as cor~lnlu~iis t c o i ~ ~ ~ t r i e s and Nazi Germany, and to a lesser extent in less re- str-ictivc, authoritarian societies. According to Rummel (1994, 1999; see also (:harny, 1 W 9 ; I'ilisuk & Wong, 2002), the more absolute the power of a governmelit arid the elite associated with it, the more likely it is to engage in \vh;~r he c;~lls Jernocicle, the killing of masses of people in war, mass killing, o r gcnocidr. 'I'here are many reasons for this; one is that in such societies a t t e~npts 10 reclre~s grievances often lead to violent responses. Mass killing a n d genocide are least likely in mnture denlocracies (Staub, 1999a), witll pluralistic c u l t ~ ~ r e s , and institutions of civic society that help maintain fillly democratic systems. Weimar Germany, where this was not the case, coll;~psed in the f k of intensely difficult life conditions. In Colombia, \\.liere ~ ~ I I I O C S ; I C ~ is shallow, there has been great violence between different \ C ~ I I ~ ~ I ~ I S of society. 111 A r g e n t i ~ ~ a , where elected governments were regularly S ~ ~ ~ ~ I . I ~ C ~ I I)!. tlic rnilit;lry, x i d differc~~ccs bet wee^^ rich and poor were ex-