Rogger Jmpaper

8/11/2019 Rogger Jmpaper

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http://www.danrogger.com/mailto:[email protected]://www.danrogger.com/


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A

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t >0 t


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Vk1 (e= 1) Vk0 V

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k k

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A


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decentralizationicn = 1membershipic + 2competitionc + 3membershipic competitionc

+ 4PCij + 5CCc + j + icn

i

c

n

Decentralizationicn

Membershipic

competitionc

membershipic competitionc

P Cij

CCij

j


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1 0

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2+ 3


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1 3


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Informal incentivesicn = 1distancen + 2competitionc + 3distancen competitionc

+ 4PCij + 5CCc + j + icn

i c n

Inf ormal incentivesicn

Distancen

competitionc

distancen competitionc

P Cij

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j


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1

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competition

P Cij CCij

j

1

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k

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http://www.imf.org/weo


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http://www.nigeriancongress.org/assembly/committees1_2003.htm


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http://data.worldbank.org/data-catalog/world-development-indicatorshttp://esa.un.org/unpd/wpp/index.htm


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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of Nigeria's Federal Organizations, by TierMeans, standard deviations, and p-values of differences with centralized organizations

(1) Centralized (2) Decentralized

p-value of

difference

between (1)/(2)

Number of organizations 7 47 -

- -

Total budget (millions of US$) 190 11 0.05

(187) (11)

Capital budget (millions of US$) 130 7 0.07

(150) (11)

Personnel budget (millions of US$) 17 3.6 0.04

(13) (2.8)

Overheads budget (millions of US$) 11 0.41 0.16

(17) (0.26)

Number of staff at organization 5,700 720 0.09

(6,400) (480)

Distance to Abuja (km) 0 310 0.00

(0) (170)

Federal constituencies served in OPEN data 48 15 0.08

(88) (38)

Number of projects 822 2,187 -

- -

Average project budget (millions of US$) 0.18 0.11 0.00

(0.53) (0.48)

Average project complexity 0.40 0.23 0.00

(0.24) (0.17)

Proportion focused on rehabilitation 0.27 0.18 0.00

[0.14] [0.19]

Proportion focused on construction 0.82 0.85 0.07

[0.56] [0.57]

Proportion never started 0.50 0.31 0.00

[0.36] [0.30]

Average level of progress of organization projects 0.34 0.57 0.00

[0.49] [0.56]

Proportion completed conditional on being started 0.68 0.83 0.00

[0.49] [0.56]

Proportion fully completed 0.20 0.44 0.00

[0.34] [0.39]

Proportion started with satisfactory quality 0.73 0.83 0.00

[0.37] [0.56]

Notes: Standard deviations are in round parentheses. In square parentheses are corresponding averages for the variable in question weighted by theproject budget. Abuja is the capital city of Nigeria. Organization budget data are an average of organization budget figures for the years 2006-7.Data on number of staff are mainly from administrative data. In the few cases where I do not have the staff numbers explicitly, I estimate them fromthe personnel expenditures, which are correlated with staff numbers with a magnitude of over 0.9. Centralized organizations are main ministrieswhich act as the central organizing authority for the sector. Decentralized organizations are 'parastatals', with day-to-day running largely independent

of the central authority. Figures are rounded to two decimal places. T-tests are performed under the assumption of equal variances when the chi-squared test statistic is less than or equal to 3.84, and under the assumption of unequal variances otherwise. I have weighted organizations equally.

Organization characteristics

OPEN projects


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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics of Political Interactions with Bureaucrats, by Tier

Means, standard deviations, and p-values of differences with centralized organizations

(1) All

organizations(2) Centralized (3) Decentralized

(4) p-value of

difference

between (2)/(3)

Proportion of bureaucrats who state politicians impact projects significantly 0.54 0.38 0.60 0.00

(0.16) (0.08) (0.13)

Proportion of managers who state politicians impact projects significantly 0.52 0.40 0.57 0.00

(0.16) (0.04) (0.16)

Proportion of non-managers who state politicians impact projects significantly 0.53 0.27 0.63 0.00

(0.24) (0.15) (0.18)

Proportion of projects involving personal engagement of member of National Assembly 0.14 0.08 0.16 0.00

(0.07) (0.05) (0.07)

Organizations 54 7 47

Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. Decentralized organizations are 'parastatals', with day-to-day running largely independent of the central authority. Figures are rounded to two decimal places. T-testsare performed under the assumption of equal variances when the chi-squared test statistic is less than or equal to 3.84, and under the assumption of unequal variances otherwise. I have weighted organizations by thenumber of projects they implement in the OPEN data set so to reflect t he intensity of interaction between politicians and bureaucrats.


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Table 4: Delegation by Politicians to Centralized and Decentralized Organizations

Robust Standard Errors

OLS Estimates

(1) No interaction (2) Interaction(3) Politician

controls

(4) Constituency

controls(5) Reduced form

(6) Total

constituency

resources

(7) Number of

projects in

constituency

Politician member of relevant committee [yes=1] 0.00 -0.12*** -0.13*** -0.11*** -0.06*** -52.3 3.29

(0.01) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (96.10) (2.23)

Level of political competition 0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 0.01 -5.86 2.21

(0.02) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (94.20) (1.51)

Politician member of relevant committee x level of political competition 0.18*** 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.08*** 138 -3.48

(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (145) (3.02)

Project controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Politician controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Constituency controls No No No Yes Yes Yes Yes

Mean of dependent variable 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 0.73 173 9

Adjusted R-squared 0.59 0.59 0.59 0.61 0.81 0.31 0.27

Observations 3,009 3,009 3,009 3,009 3,009 345 345

Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All columns report OLS estimates. The analysis in columns 1-4 is at the project level. The dependent variable in columns 1-4 is a binary variable reflectingwhether a project is decentralized or not, which takes the value 1 when the project is implemented by a decentralized organization. Decentralization refers to whether the organization is an agency, with day-to-day running largely i ndependent of the central authority, rather

than a centralized ministry, the central organizing authority for the sector. The level of political competition is measured as one minus the difference between the winner's vote share and the runner's up vote share. Project controls are comprised of project-level controls for

the log of the project budget; binary variables indicating whether the project is new or a rehabilitation, and whether it was implemented in 2006 or 2007; assessments of its aggregate complexity, national and local information requirements by Nigerian engineers; and project

type fixed effects. Project type fixed effects relate to whether the primary classification of the project is as an advocacy, building, borehole, canal, dam, financial, procurement, research, road or training project. The analysis in columns 5 and 6 is at the constituency level.

The dependent variable in column 5 is the total resources allocated to a constituency in the OPEN data in millions of Ni gerian Naira. In column 6, the dependent variable is the total number of projects allocated to a constituency in the OPEN data. The committee

membership variable is defined as that proportion of projects within the constituency where the politician sits on the relevant committee. Project controls are comprised of constituency-level averages for the log of the project budget, binary variables indicating whether the

project is new or a rehabilitation, and whether it was implemented in 2006 or 2007, assessments of its aggregate complexity, national and local information requirements by Nigerian engineers, and the fraction of projects in the constituency classed as an advocacy, building,

borehole, canal, dam, financial, procurement, research, road or training project. For both sets of specifications, politician controls are comprised of constituency-l evel controls for the sex, age, years of education and tenure in congress of the relevant politician. In the verysmall number of cases in which age or years of education are missing, I replace the missing value with the mean of the rest of the politicians and include a dummy variable to indicate the missing data. Constituency characteristics are comprised of the means and standard

deviations of the following indices: the proportion of poor in the constituency measured by a national poverty index, the average years of education of the household head, the proportion of constituents with access to potable water, the average time in minutes to the nearest

primary school, and the average time in minutes to the nearest secondary school. Means and standard deviations of the following indices are also included to refl ect the frequency with which constituents benefit from a public project of the named type in the five years

preceding 2006: construction of electrification infrastructure, rehabilitation of electrification infrastructure, well/borehole, construction of piped water infrastructure, rehabilitation of piped water infrastructure, sanitation, school construction project, school rehabilitation, health

facility construction, health facility rehabi litation, road construction, tarring/grading of roads, transportation services, and agricultural -inputs schemes. Finally, constituency characteristics incl ude a set of indicators of the economic dynamics of the constituency, comprised of

indicators of improvements in opportunities for employment, the availability of agricultural inputs, number of buyers of agriculture produce, the availabi lity of extension services, the availability of credi t facilities, and the availabili ty of consumer goods. All specifications

include an indicator of the 'grade' of the committee under which the project falls, which is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the committee is perceived to be of high political weight or 0 otherwise. Figures are rounded to two decimal places.

Dependent Variable Cols 1-4: Indicator of decentralization [decentralization=1]; Column 5: Sum of project budgets within relevant federal constituency

(in millions of Naira); Column 6: Count of projects within relevant federal constituency


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Table 5: Interactions between Politicians and Bureaucrats

Dependent Variable: Proportion of implementing organization bureaucrats who state politicians impact projects significantly


OLS Estimates

(1) No interaction (2) Interaction(3) Politician

controls

(4) Constituency

controls

(5) Decentralized

organizations(6) Reduced form

Distance to Abuja (net of distance to state capital) 0.028*** 0.010** 0.009* 0.010** -0.057*** 0.010**

(0.003) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)

Level of political competition 0.045*** 0.051*** 0.049*** 0.041*** 0.027*** 0.030***

(0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.010)

Distance to Abuja x level of political competition 0.026*** 0.027*** 0.031*** 0.038*** 0.031***

(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)

Project controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Politician controls No No Yes Yes Yes Yes

Constituency controls No No No Yes Yes Yes

Mean of dependent variable 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.54 0.60 0.54

Adjusted R-squared 0.58 0.58 0.58 0.68 0.66 0.68

Observations 3,009 3,009 3,009 3,009 2,187 3,009

Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All columns report OLS estimates. The dependant variable in all specifications is a continuous variable on the

unit interval that reflects the proportion of bureaucrats at the organization in which the project is implemented who state that politicians have a significant impact on the implementation of projects there. The distance to capitalcity is a variable constructed as follows: I measure the geodesic distance between the organization and the capital city of Nigeria, Abuja, where the Parliament sits. I then regress this on the geodesic distance between the

organization implementing the project and the capital city of the state in which the organization sits, and take the residuals of that regression as the measure used here. The level of political competition is measured as oneminus the difference between the winner's vote share and the runner's up vote share. Project controls are comprised of project-level controls for the log of the project budget; binary variables indicating whether the project isnew or a rehabilitation, and whether it was implemented in 2006 or 2007; assessments of its aggregate complexity; national and local information requirements by Nigerian engineers; and project type fixed effects. Project type

fixed effects relate to whether the primary classification of the project is as an advocacy, building, borehole, canal, dam, financial, procurement, research, road or training project. Politician controls are comprised ofconstituency-level controls for the sex, age, years of education and tenure in congress of the relevant politician. In the very small number of cases in which age or years of education are missing, I replace the missing value withthe mean of the rest of the politicians and include a dummy variable to indicate the missing data. Constituency characteristics are comprised of the means and standard deviations of the following indices: the proportion of poorin the constituency, measured by a national poverty index, the average years of education of the household head, the proportion of constituents with access to potable water, the average time in minutes to the nearest primaryschool, and the average time in minutes to the nearest secondary school. Means and standard deviations of the following indices are also included to reflect the frequency with which constituents benefit from a public project ofthe named type in the five years preceding 2006: construction of electrification infrastructure, rehabilitation of electrification infrastructure, well/borehole, construction of piped water infrastructure, rehabilitation of piped water

infrastructure, sanitation, school construction project, school rehabilitation, health facility construction, health facility rehabilitation, road construction, tarring/grading of roads, transportation services, and agricultural-inputsschemes. Finally, constituency characteristics include a set of indicators of the economic dynamics of the constituency, comprised of indicators of improvements in opportunities for employment, the availability of agriculturalinputs, number of buyers of agriculture produce, the availability of extension services, the availability of credit facilities, and the availability of consumer goods. Columns 1 to 4 utilize the full sample of projects in my data, whilstcolumn 5 restricts the sample to those projects implemented by decentralized organizations only. Figures are rounded to two decimal places.


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Table 6: Consequences of Delegation and Engagement at Different Levels of Political Competition

Dependent Variable: Proportion of Project Completed


OLS Estimates in Columns 1 to 3; IV Estimates in Columns 4 and 5

(1) Decentralized (2) Incentives (3) Both (OLS) (4) IV (influence) (5) IV (engage)

Decentralization [decentralized=1] 0.27*** 0.24*** 0.40*** 0.48***

(0.03) (0.03) (0.09) (0.09)

Degree of politician influence on project implementation 0.51*** 0.17** -0.08 -0.01

(0.07) (0.08) (0.66) (0.01)

Level of political competition -0.01 -0.02 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01

(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04)

Project, politician and constituency controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Mean of dependent variable 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.50

Adjusted R-squared 0.34 0.32 0.34 0.33 0.33

F-statistic - - - 140 328

Observations 3,009 3,009 3,009 3,009 3,009

Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. The dependant variable in all specifications is the proportion of the project completed(that is a continuous measure between zero and one). Decentralization refers to whether the organization is a 'parastatal', with day-to-day running largely independent of the central authority, ratherthan a centralized ministry, the central organizing authority for the sector. The degree of politician influence on project implementation is an organizational-average of the bureaucrat responses to thequestion 'Rate the influence you think [member(s) of the National Assembly] have on the success of a typical project implemented by your organization' where I code a bureaucrat's response as 1 ifthey answer 'Significant influence' or 'Most influence' and 0 otherwise. The level of political competition is measured as one minus the difference between the winner's vote share and the runner's upvote share. Project controls are comprised of project-level controls for the log of the project budget; binary variables indicating whether the project is new or a rehabilitation, and whether it wasimplemented in 2006 or 2007; assessments of its aggregate complexity; national and local information requirements by Nigerian engineers; and project type fixed effects. Project type fixed effects

relate to whether the primary classification of the project is as an advocacy, building, borehole, canal, dam, financial, procurement, research, road or training project. Politician controls are comprisedof constituency-level controls for the sex, age, years of education and tenure in congress of t he relevant politician. In the very small number of cases in which age or years of education are missing, Ireplace the missing value with the mean of the rest of the politicians and include a dummy variable to indicate the missing data. Constituency characteristics are comprised of the means and standarddeviations of the following indices: the proportion of poor in the constituency, measured by a national poverty index, the average years of education of the household head, the proportion ofconstituents with access to potable water, the average time in minutes to the nearest primary school, and the average time in minutes to the nearest secondary school. Means and standard deviationsof the following indices are also included to reflect the frequency with which constituents benefit from a public project of the named type in the five years preceding 2006: construction of electrificationinfrastructure, rehabilitation of electrification infrastructure, well/borehole, construction of piped water infrastructure, rehabilitation of piped water infrastructure, sanitation, school construction project,school rehabilitation, health facility construction, health facility rehabilitation, road construction, tarring/grading of roads, transportation services, and agricultural-inputs schemes. Finally, constituencycharacteristics include a set of indicators of the economic dynamics of the constituency, comprised of indicators of improvements in opportunities for employment, the availability of agricultural inputs,number of buyers of agriculture produce, the availability of extension services, the availability of credit facilities, and the availability of consumer goods. All specifications include an indicator of the'grade' of the committee under which the project falls, which is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the committee is perceived to be of high political weight or 0 otherwise. The F-statistics reported for theinstrumental variables specifications in columns 4 and 5 is the lower of the two first stage regressions corresponding to the two endogenous variables. Figures are rounded to two decimal places.


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Means and standard deviations

Constituencies

Number of constituencies 345

-Number of local governments in a constituency 2.03

(0.79)

Population (2006) 370,000

(130,000)

Winning vote share (2003 elections) 0.62

(0.15)

Runner's up vote share (2003 elections) 0.29

(0.12)

Proportion of constituencies run by ruling party 0.63

-

Proportion of constituencies ruling party is runner up 0.34

-

OPEN funds per constituency (US$) 1,100,000

(1,900,000)

Number of OPEN projects by constituency 9

(7.1)

Number of OPEN project types by constituency 3

(1.5)

Number of sectors in constituency 3(0.9)

Average project budget (US$) 130,000

(150,000)

Average project complexity (proportion) 0.29

(0.10)

Proportion of constituency projects never started 0.41

(0.25)

Average level of progress of constituency projects 0.46

(0.25)

Level of progress conditional on being started 0.76

(0.22)

Proportion of constituency projects fully completed 0.32

(0.28)

Proportion started with satisfactory quality 0.78

(0.31)

Proportion implemented by decentralized organizations 0.73

(0.24)

Notes: Standard deviations are in parentheses. In the OPEN data, I do not observe projects in 15 of

Nigeria's 360 federal constituencies, so the descriptives provided here are for the restricted set of 345constituencies only. Population data is from the 2006 Census. Election data is from the Independent

National Electoral Commission official record for the 2003 election. Centralized organizations areministries which act as the central organizing authority for the sector. Decentralized organizations areagencies whose day-to-day running is largely independent of the central authority. Budget figuresoriginally in Nigerian Naira are converted to US dollars at a rate of US$1:N150. Figures are rounded to twodecimal places where relevant. I have weighted constituencies equally.

OPEN projects

Table A1: Descriptive Statistics of Nigeria's Political

Constituencies


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Table A2: Politician Characteristics across Committees

OLS Estimates

(1) Age of

politician

(2) Sex of

politician

[female=1]

(3) Years of

education

(4) Political

competition in

constituency

(5) Index of

poverty in

constituency

Constant 47.35*** 0.03** 16.22*** 0.69*** 0.23***

(0.61) (0.01) (0.14) (0.02) (0.01)

Finance Committee -0.37 -0.03 0.01 0.04 -0.01

(1.21) (0.03) (0.28) (0.04) (0.03)

Appropriation Committee 0.12 -0.05* 0.29 -0.01 0.00

(1.16) (0.03) (0.27) (0.04) (0.02)

Water Committee 1.50 -0.02 -0.07 0.00 0.01(1.11) (0.03) (0.25) (0.04) (0.02)

Agriculture Committee 1.28 0.02 -0.42 -0.05 -0.01

(1.19) (0.03) (0.27) (0.04) (0.03)

Health Committee -0.79 0.02 -0.13 0.04 0.02

(1.23) (0.03) (0.28) (0.05) (0.03)

Education Committee 2.83** 0.00 0.31 0.01 -0.02

(1.19) (0.03) (0.27) (0.04) (0.03)

Environment Committee 0.21 -0.03 0.29 -0.09** 0.01

(1.2) (0.03) (0.27) (0.04) (0.03)

Housing Committee -0.24 -0.04 0.08 -0.07* -0.03

(1.11) (0.03) (0.26) (0.04) (0.02)

Women and Youth Committee 0.22 0.63*** -0.53 0.05 -0.04

(1.46) (0.04) (0.33) (0.05) (0.03)

FCT Committee -1.69 -0.01 -0.41 0.03 0.00

(1.2) (0.03) (0.28) (0.04) (0.03)

H0: All coefficients equal [p-value] 0.27 0.00 0.28 0.34 0.91

H0: All coefficients bar Women and

Youth equal [p-value]- 0.51 - - -

Observations 345 345 345 345 345

Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. All columns report OLS estimates. The dependentvariable in column 1 is the age of the politician. In column 2, it is a binary variable reflecting the sex of the politician, which takes the value 1 if the politician is female. Incolumn 3, the dependent variable is the years of education of the politician. In column 4, it is my measure of politi cal competition (one minus the difference between thewinner and runner up vote shares) in the constituency that the politician represents. In column 5, it is the proportion of poor i n the politician's constituency, measured by anational poverty index. The 'FCT Committee' refers to the Federal Capital Territory Committee that has jurisdiction over the building of infrastructure within the FederalCapital Territory, the municipal area in which the capital, Abuja, sits. At the foot of the table, I r eport the p-value on the null that the coefficients in each column are ofequal magnitude. I also report the p-value on the null that the coefficients in column 2, excluding that on the Women Affairs and Youth committee, are of equalmagnitude. Figures are rounded to two decimal places.


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Table A3: Investigating the Determinants of Committee Membership

Dependent Variable: System of Ten Equations in Membership of Sectoral Committees


Estimates by Maximum Likelihood to Fit a SUR Model

Member of

Finance

Committee

Member of

Appropriation

Committee

Member of

Water

Committee

Member of

Agriculture

Committee

Member of

Health

Committee

Member of

Education

Committee

Member of

Environment

Committee

Member of

Housing

Committee

Member of

Women/Youth

Committee

Member of

FCT

Committee

Politician has relevant qualifications/experience [yes=1] 0.30*** 0.36*** 0.50*** 0.54*** 0.77*** 0.54*** 0.69*** 0.65*** 0.17** 0.79***(0.06) (0.05) (0.09) (0.06) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08)

Level of political competition 0.09 0.02 -0.04 -0.20*** 0.06 -0.03 0.05 -0.10 0.07 0.06

(0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.05) (0.05)

Index of poverty 0.35 -0.15 0.02 -0.55*** -0.26 -0.24 -0.21 0.22 0.17 -0.01

(0.29) (0.26) (0.33) (0.2) (0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.3) (0.21) (0.21)

Politician and constituency controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Correlation of residuals in SUR system:

Appropriation -0.22

Water -0.01 0.07

Agriculture -0.11 0.02 -0.10

Health -0.04 -0.09 0.01 -0.07

Education 0.02 -0.05 -0.13 -0.21 -0.04

Environment 0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.02 0.09 0.06

Housing 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.04 0.05 -0.01 -0.02

Women/Youth -0.02 0.18 0.06 -0.01 0.01 -0.05 0.15 -0.14

FCT 0.02 -0.07 -0.04 -0.06 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.14 0.00

Observations 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345

Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Columns report maximum likelihood estimates to fit a SUR model for the ten sectoral committees. The dependent variable in all specifications is a binary variable reflecting whether apolitician is a member of the committee for the named sector, taking the value 1 when t he politician is a member. The 'FCT Committee' refers to the Federal Capital Territory Committee that has jurisdiction over the building of infrastructure within the Federal Capital Territory, the municipal area in

which the capital, Abuja, sits. Politician controls are comprised of constituency-level controls for the sex, age, years of education and tenure in congress of the relevant politician. In the very small number of cases in which age or years of education are missing, I replace the missing value withthe mean of the rest of the politicians and include a dummy variable to indicate the missing data. Constituency characteristics are comprised of the means and standard deviations of the following indices: the proportion of poor in the constituency, measured by a national poverty index, theaverage years of education of the household head, the proportion of constituents with access to potable water, the average time in minutes t o the nearest primary school, and the average time in minutes to the nearest secondary school. Means and standard deviations of the following indicesare also included to reflect the fr equency with which constituents benefit from a public project of the named type in the five years preceding 2006: construction of electrification infrastructure, rehabilitation of electrification infrastructure, well/borehole, construction of piped water infrastructure,

rehabilitation of piped water infrastructure, sanitation, school construction project, school rehabilitation, health facility construction, health facility rehabilitation, road construction, tarring/grading of roads, t ransportation services, and agricultural-inputs schemes. Finally, constituency characteristicsinclude a set of indicators of the economic dynamics of the constituency, comprising indicators of improvements in opportunities for employment, the availability of agricultural inputs, number of buyers of agriculture produce, the availability of extension services, the availability of credit facilities,and the availability of consumer goods. All specifications include dummies for five of the s ix geo-political zones and an indicator of the 'grade' of t he committee under which the project falls, which is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the committee is perceived to be of high political weight or 0otherwise. Figures are rounded to two decimal places.


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Table A4: Investigating the Determinants of Politicians' Qualifications and Experience

Dependent Variable: System of Nine Equations in Sector of Politician's Qualifications and Experience


Estimates by Maximum Likelihood to Fit a SUR Model

Finance

SectorWater Sector

Agriculture

SectorHealth Sector

Education

Sector

Environment

Sector

Housing

Sector

Women/Youth

Sector

FCT (city

building)

Sector

Level of political competition 0.04 -0.02 -0.02 -0.04 -0.11 -0.10 -0.23*** -0.03 0.03

(0.12) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) (0.08)

Index of poverty -0.44 0.23 0.08 0.46 -0.26 -0.05 0.14 -0.03 0.31(0.35) (0.29) (0.08) (0.31) (0.25) (0.17) (0.29) (0.03) (0.29)

Proportion of constituents with access to potable water 0.19 -0.04 -0.02 -0.10

(0.14) (0.11) (0.08) (0.06)

Time in minutes to nearest secondary school 0.01 0.00

(0.00) (0.00)

Existing tarred road infrastructure investments 0.08 -0.01

(0.28) (0.22)

Politician and constituency controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Correlation of residuals in SUR system:

Water 0.13

Agriculture -0.12 0.11

Health -0.12 -0.05 -0.08

Education 0.10 -0.03 -0.09 -0.06

Environment -0.02 0.17 0.24 -0.15 -0.04

Housing 0.06 0.31 0.09 -0.04 -0.05 0.12

Women/Youth 0.13 -0.02 -0.03 -0.05 -0.03 -0.06 -0.05

FCT 0.09 0.28 0.06 -0.03 -0.05 0.07 0.23 -0.02

Observations 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345 345

Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Robust s tandard errors are in parentheses. Columns report maximum likelihood estimates to fit a SUR model for the nine sectors. The dependent variable in all specifications is a bi nary variable reflecting

whether a politician has qualifications and/or experience in the named sector, taking the value 1 when the poli tician has relevant qualifications and/or experience. The 'FCT Committee' refers to the Federal Capital Territory Committee that has jurisdiction over the building of

infrastructure within the Federal Capital Territory, the municipal area in which the capital , Abuja, sits. Politician controls are comprised of constituency-level controls for the sex, age and years of education of the relevant poli tician. In the very small number of cases in which

age or years of education are missing, I replace the missing value with the mean of the rest of the politicians and include a dummy variable to indicate the missing data. Constituency characteristics are comprised of the means and standard deviations of the followingindices: the proportion of poor in the constituency, measured by a national poverty index, the average years of education of the household head, the proportion of constituents with access to potable water, the average time in minutes to the nearest primary school, and the

average time in minutes to the nearest secondary school. Means and standard deviations of the following indices are also included to reflect the frequency with whic h constituents benefit from a public project of the named type in the five years preceding 2006: construction

of electrification infrastructure, rehabilitation of electrification infrastructure, well/borehole, construction of piped water infrastructure, rehabilitation of piped water infrastructure, sanitation, school construction project, school rehabilitation, health facility construction, health

facility rehabilitation, road construction, tarri ng/grading of roads, transportation services, and agricultural-inputs schemes. Finally, constituency characteristics incl ude a set of indicators of the economic dynamics of the constituency, comprising indicators of improvements in

opportunities for employment, the availability of agricultural inputs, number of buyers of agriculture produce, the availabi lity of extension services, the availabili ty of credit facilities, and the availabil ity of consumer goods. Figures are rounded to two decimal places.


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Table A6: Robustness of Delegation Findings

Dependent Variable: Indicator of decentralization [decentralization=1]

Robust Standard Errors in All Columns Bar 2 and Clustered at the Politician Level in Column 2

OLS Estimates

(1) Baseline

specification

(2) Clustering at

politician level

(3) Organization

controls

(4) Chairperson

dummy

(5) Excludingchairperson

projects

(6) Two-term

dummy

(7) Excluding two-

term projects

(8) Excludingunqualified

agriculture

Politician member of relevant committee [yes=1] -0.11*** -0.11** -0.05** -0.11*** -0.12*** -0.11*** -0.17*** -0.09***

(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)

Level of political competition -0.03 -0.03 0.04 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.02

(0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03)Politician member of relevant committee x level of political competition 0.18*** 0.18** 0.08** 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.25*** 0.17***

(0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.06) (0.04)

Chairpersons [yes=1] -0.14***

(0.04)

Politician in second term at congress [yes=1] 0.01

(0.01)

Aggregate complexity index -0.46***

(0.06)

National information index -0.08***

(0.01)

Local information index 0.08***

(0.02)

Project, politician and constituency controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Adjusted R-squared 0.61 0.61 0.71 0.61 0.60 0.61 0.62 0.60

Observations (clusters) 3,009 3,009 (345) 3,009 3,009 2,962 3,009 2,161 2,980

Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors are in pare ntheses. They are robust in all columns bar 2 and clustered by politicians in Column 2. The dependent variable in all specifications is a binary variable reflecting whether a project isdecentralized or not, which takes the value 1 when the project is implemented by a decentralized organization. Decentralization refers to whether the organization is a 'parastatal', with day-to-day running largely independent of the central authority, rather than a centralized ministry, thecentral organizing authority for the sector. The level of political competition is measured as one minus the difference between the winner's vote share and the runner's up vote share. In Column 3 we include organizational-level variables that measure the average years of education ofbureaucrats, a proxy for their intrinsic motivation, and a measure of what determined their posting at the organization that implements the project. In Column 4, we include a dummy for whether the project is located in a constituency represented by the chair of the relevant sectoral

committee for that project. Column 5 restricts our specification to those projects that are not implemented in constituencies in which the politician is the chair of the relevant sectoral committee. In Column 6 we include a dummy for whether the project is located in a constituency in whichthe politician is in their second term at congress. Column 7 restricts our specification to those projects that are not implemented in constituencies in which the politician is in their second term of congress. Column 8 restricts our specification to those projects that are not implemented inconstituencies in which the politician did not have relevant qualifications or experience in agriculture, but was a member of the agriculture committee. Project controls are comprised of project-level controls for the log of the project budget, binary variables indicating whether the project isnew or a rehab ilitation, and whether it was implemented in 2006 or 2007, assessments of its aggregate complexity, national and local information requirements by Nigerian en gineers, and project type fixed effects. Project type fixed effects relate to whether the primary classification of theproject is as an advocacy, building, borehole, canal, dam, financial, procurement, research, road or training project. Politician controls comprise constituency-level controls for the sex, age, years of education and tenure in congress of the relevant politician. In the very small number ofcases in which age or years of education are missing, I replace the missing value with the mean of the rest of the politicians and include a dummy variable to indicate the missing data. Constituency characteristics are comprised of the means and standard d eviations of the followingindices: the proportion of poor in the constituency, measured by a national poverty index, the average years of education of the household head, the proportion of constituents with access to potable water, the average time in minutes to the nearest primary school, and the average timein minutes to the nearest secondary school. Means and standard deviations of the following indices are also included to reflect the frequency with which constituents benefit from a public project of the named type in the five years preceding 2006: construction of electrificationinfrastructure, rehabilitation of electrification infrastructure, well/borehole, construction of piped water infrastructure, rehabilitation of piped water infrastructure, sanitation, school construction project, school reh abilitation, health facility construction, health facility rehabilitation, roadconstruction, tarring/grading of roads, transportation ser vices, and agricultural-inputs schemes. Finally, constituency characteristics include a set of indicators of the economic dynamics of the constituency, comprised of indicators of improvements in opportunities for employment, theavailability of agricultural inputs, number of buyers of agriculture produce, the availability of extension services, the av ailability of credit facilities, and the availability of consumer goods. All specifications include an indicator of the 'grade' of the committee under which the project falls,which is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the committee is perceived to be of high political weight or 0 otherwise. Figures are roun ded to two decimal places.


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Table A7: Robustness of Engagement Findings

Dependent Variable: Proportion of implementing organization bureaucrats who state politicians impact projects significantly

Robust Standard Errors in All Columns Bar 2 and Clustered at the Politician Level in Column 2

OLS Estimates

(1) Baseline

specification

(2) Clustering at

politician level

(3) Organization

controls

(4) Chairperson

dummy

(5) Excluding

chairperson

projects

(6) Two-term

dummy

(7) Excluding two

term projects

(8) Excluding

unqualified

agriculture

Distance to Abuja (net of distance to state capital) 0.010** 0.01 0.012*** 0.010** 0.010** 0.010** 0.019*** 0.009**

(0.004) (0.009) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.006) (0.004)

Level of political competition 0.041*** 0.041*** 0.043*** 0.040*** 0.039*** 0.041*** 0.022** 0.041***

(0.008) (0.016) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.011) (0.008)

Distance to capital city x level of political competition 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.023*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.022*** 0.033***(0.005) (0.011) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.005)

Chairpersons [yes=1] 0.023*

(0.013)

Politician in second term at congress [yes=1] 0.009**

(0.004)

Aggregate complexity index -0.042***

(0.015)

National information index 0.034***

(0.004)

Local information index 0.023***

(0.004)

Project, politician and constituency controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes

Adjusted R-squared 0.68 0.68 0.72 0.68 0.68 0.68 0.70 0.68

Observations (clusters) 3,009 3,009 (345) 3,009 3,009 2,962 3,009 2,161 2,980

Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10% level. Standard errors are in parentheses. They are robust in all columns bar 2 and clustered by sectors within each constituency in Column 2. The dependent variable in all specifications is a continuousvariable on the unit interval that reflects the proportion of bureaucrats at the organization in which the project is implemented who state that politicians have a significant impact on the implementation of projects there. The distance to Abuja is a variable constructed asfollows: I measure the geodesic distance between the organization and the capital city of Nigeria, Abuja, where the Parliament sits. I then regress this on the geodesic distance between the organization implementing the project and the capital city of the state in which

the organization lies and take the residuals of that regression as the measure used here. In Column 3 we include organizational-level variables that measure the average years of education of bureaucrats, a proxy for their intrinsic motivation, and a measure of whatdetermined their posting at the organization that implements the project. In Column 4, we include a dummy for whether the project is located in a constituency represented by the chair of the relevant sectoral committee for that project. Column 5 restricts our specificationto those projects that are not implemented in constituencies in which the politician is the chair of the relevant sectoral committee. In Column 6 we include a dummy for whether the project is located in a constituency in which the politician is in their second term atcongress. Column 7 restricts our specification to those projects that are not implemented in constituencies in which the politician is in their second term of congress. Column 8 restricts our specification to those projects that are not implemented in constituencies inwhich the politician did not have relevant qualifications or experience in agriculture but was a member of the agriculture committee. Project controls are comprised of project-level controls for the log of the project budget, binary variables indicating whether the project isnew or a rehabilitation, and whether it was implemented in 2006 or 2007, assessments of its aggregate complexity, national and local information requirements by Nigerian engineers, and project type fixed effects. Project type fixed effects relate to whether the primaryclassification of the project is as an advocacy, building, borehole, canal, dam, financial, procurement, research, road or training project. Politician controls are comprised of constituency-level controls for the sex, age, years of education and tenure in congress of therelevant politician. In the very small number of cases in which age or years of education are missing, I replace the missing value with the mean of the rest of the politicians and include a dummy variable to indicate the missing data. Constituency characteristics arecomprised of the means and standard deviations of the following indices: the proportion of poor in the constituency, measured by a national poverty index, the average years of education of the household head, the proportion of constituents with access to potable water,the average time in minutes to the nearest primary school, and the average time in minutes to the nearest secondary school. Means and standard deviations of the following indices are also included to reflect the frequency with which constituents benefit from a publicproject of the named type in the five years preceding 2006: construction of electrification infrastructure, rehabilitation of electrification infrastructure, well/borehole, construction of piped water infrastructure, rehabilitation of piped water infrastructure, sanitation, schoolconstruction project, school rehabilitation, health facility construction, health facility rehabil itation, road construction, tarring/grading of roads, transportation services, and agricultural-inputs schemes. Finally, constituency characteristics include a set of indicators of theeconomic dynamics of the constituency, comprised of indicators of improvements in opportunities for employment, the availability of agricultural inputs, number of buyers of agriculture produce, the availability of extension services, the availability of credit facilities, andthe availability of consumer goods. All specifications include an indicator of the 'grade' of the committee under which the project falls, which is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the committee is perceived to be of high political weight or 0 otherwise. Figures are roundedto two decimal places.


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