Roger A. Pielke, Jr. Center for Science and Technology Policy Research University of Colorado/CIRES, Boulder, Colorado, USA 3 Dec 2001 Forecasts and Responsibilities

3 Dec 2001 Roger A. Pielke, Jr.Center for Science and Technology Policy ResearchUniversity of Colorado/CIRES, Boulder, Colorado, USA

Forecasts and Responsibilities in the1997 Red River Floods

Roger A. Pielke, Jr.Center for Science and Technology Policy ResearchUniversity of Colorado/[email protected]

COMETBoulder, CO3 December 2001


Outline

I. IntroductionII. ContextIII. 1997 Red River FloodsIV. LessonsVI. Concluding Thoughts


“We only learn from experience that whilethe forecasting efforts of a charlatan are judged by their occasional successes, it is the occasionalfailures of a governmental department whichare remembered against it.”

Sir Gilbert Walker (1935)


Some definitions:

Uncertainty: Occurs when more than one outcomeis consistent with expectations Pielke (2001)

Communication: Who, say What, to Whom, How, and with What EffectLasswell (1948)

Forecast: A combination of an EVENT anda PROBABILITY Fischoff (1994)


“The decision making process is best served when uncertainty is communicated as precisely as possible, but no more precisely than warranted"

(Budescu and Wallsten 1987, 76)






1997 Red River Floods

•US$1-$2 billion in total damages•Greatest per capita losses in US history•4 deaths (none in Grand Forks)



















“With proper advance notice we could have protected the city to almost any elevation . . . if we had known [the final flood crest in advance], I'm sure that we could have protected a majority of the city”

Grand Forks city engineer Ken Vein4 May 1997


"They [NWS] missed it, and they not only missed it, they blew it big”

Lynn Stauss, Mayor East Grand Forks28 April 1997


“The inability to get realistic flood numbers certainly hindered the communities' ability to prepare”

U.S. Representative Earl Pomery (D-ND)4 May 1997








Placing the 1997 outlook into historical context, indicates that the 1997 prediction was worse than average in terms of feet, but perhaps more importantly, better than average in terms of percentage.


Understandings of the Flood Predictions

•Early outlook: 47.5 feet and 49 feet•Interpretation of the outlook

•Range•Not-to-be-exceeded•Exact•Uncertain (by how much?)


"[NWS] experts are still forecasting a maximum 49-foot crest for the Red at East Grand Forks”

The Grand Forks Herald8 April 1997


Chronology of 1997 Flood Forecasting at East Grand Forks




Other explanations:

•“The NWS Blew It”•“An $800 Million Dollar Miscommunication”


Red River, E. Grand Forks

USGS


Wallsten et al. 1986


Heideman et al. 1993


Predict Communicate Decide

The Linear Model of Prediction

• Product focused

• Pipeline metaphor


• Process focused• Decision Focused• Symphony metaphor

Hooke and Pielke (2000)

An Alternative


•We must move beyond the linear -- “end-to-end” -- conception of the relationship of prediction with decision.

•Think symphony orchestra not assembly line!!!



“Results from a preliminary Departmentof Interior investigation laid the blame not on the precision of the data or theaccuracy of the calculations but on matters of human judgment. The factthat strong prevailing winds were on thehorizon was left out of a National WeatherService report, and no one asked for themissing data. Compounding this oversight,planners at Bandelier underestimated the potential complexity of the situation – how many people and how much equipmentthey would need if the fire didn't behave asit was supposed to.” New York Times, 21 May 2000


Red River Flood: Conclusions

•Forecasts share information, NOT for compellingparticular decisions

•Communication of forecasters’ completeknowledge is lacking

•Whose responsibility?•Product Development Lab?

Documents

Roger A. Pielke, Jr. Center for Science and Technology Policy Research University of Colorado/CIRES, Boulder, Colorado, USA 3 Dec 2001 Forecasts and Responsibilities