Fr. Robert Reyes Vs. CA and Sec. Raul Gonzales

FACTS:Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November 30, 2007. In the morning of November 30, 2007, petitioner together with fifty (50) others, were brought to Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings. In the evening of the same day, the Department of Justice (DOJ) Panel of Prosecutors, composed of Emmanuel Y. Velasco, Phillip L. Dela Cruz and Aristotle M. Reyes, conducted inquest proceedings to ascertain whether or not there was probable cause to hold petitioner and the others for trial on charges of Rebellion and/or Inciting to Rebellion.

On December 1, 2007, upon the request of the Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG), respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner of Immigration to include in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name of petitioner and 49 others relative to the aforementioned case in the interest of national security and public safety.

On December 2, 2007, after finding probable cause against petitioner and 36 others for the crime of Rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code, the DOJ Panel of Prosecutors filed an Information docketed as I.S. No. 2007-1045 before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 150 of Makati City.

On December 7, 2007, petitioner filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable Cause and Release of the Accused Fr. Reyes Upon Recognizance asserting that the DOJ panel failed to produce any evidence indicating his specific participation in the crime charged; and that under the Constitution, the determination of probable cause must be made personally by a judge.

On December 13, 2007, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge for Rebellion against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause.

On December 18, 2007, petitioner’s counsel Atty. Francisco L. Chavez wrote the DOJ Secretary requesting the lifting of HDO No. 45 in view of the dismissal of Criminal Case No. 07-3126.

On even date, Secretary Gonzales replied to petitioner’s letter stating that the DOJ could not act on petitioner’s request until Atty. Chavez’s right to represent petitioner is settled in view of the fact that a certain Atty. J. V. Bautista representing himself as counsel of petitioner had also written a letter to the DOJ.

On January 3, 2008, petitioner filed the instant petition claiming that despite the dismissal of the rebellion case against petitioner, HDO No. 45 still subsists; that on December 19, 2007, petitioner was held by BID officials at the NAIA as his name is included in the Hold Departure List; that had it not been for the timely intervention of petitioner’s counsel, petitioner would not have been able to take his scheduled flight to Hong Kong; that on December 26, 2007, petitioner was able to fly back to the Philippines from Hong Kong but every time petitioner would present himself at the NAIA for his flights abroad, he stands to be detained and interrogated by BID officers because of the continued inclusion of his name in the Hold Departure List; and that the Secretary of Justice has not acted on his request for the lifting of HDO No. 45. Petitioner further maintained that immediate recourse to the Supreme Court for the availment of the writ is exigent as the continued restraint on petitioner’s right to travel is illegal.

Issue:

The petition for a writ of amparo is anchored on the ground that respondents violated petitioner’s constitutional right to travel. Petitioner argues that the DOJ Secretary has no power to issue a Hold Departure Order (HDO) and the subject HDO No. 45 has no legal basis since Criminal Case No. 07-3126 has already been dismissed.

Held

The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another.[20] As we have stated in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan,[21] “xxx a person’s right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the court’s sound discretion.”

Here, the restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.

In Canlas et al. v. Napico Homeowners Association I – XIII, Inc. et al.,[23] this Court ruled that:

This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the protection of the highest possible rights of any person, which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this nature. However, the Court will also not waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ.

We find the direct recourse to this Court inappropriate, considering the provision of Section 22 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo which reads:

Section 22.Effect of Filing of a Criminal Action. – When a criminal action has been commenced, no separate petition for the writ shall be filed. The reliefs under the writ shall be available by motion in the criminal case.

The procedure under this Rule shall govern the disposition of the reliefs available under the writ of amparo.

Pursuant to the aforementioned Section 22, petitioner should have filed with the RTC-Makati a motion to lift HDO No. 45 in Criminal Case No. 07-3126. Petitioner, however, did not file in the RTC-Makati a motion to lift the DOJ’s HDO, as his co-accused did in the same criminal case. Petitioner argues that it was not the RTC-Makati but the DOJ that issued the said HDO, and that it is his intention not to limit his remedy to the lifting of the HDO but also to question before this Court the constitutionality of the power of the DOJ Secretary to issue an HDO.[24] We quote with approval the CA’s ruling on this matter:

The said provision [Section 22] is an affirmation by the Supreme Court of its pronouncement in Crespo v. Mogul[25] that once a complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case such as its dismissal or its continuation rests on the sound discretion of the court. Despite the denial of respondent’s MR of the dismissal of the case against petitioner, the trial court has not lost control over Criminal Case No. 07-3126 which is still pending before it. By virtue of its residual power, the court a quo retains the authority to entertain incidents in the instant case to the exclusion of even this Court. The relief petitioner seeks which is the lifting of the HDO was and is available by motion in the criminal case. (Sec. 22, Rule on the Writ of amparo, supra).[26]

Even in civil cases pending before the trial courts, the Court has no authority to separately and directly intervene through the writ of amparo, as elucidated in Tapuz v. Del Rosario,[27] thus:

Where, as in this case, there is an ongoing civil process dealing directly with the possessory dispute and the reported acts of violence and harassment, we see no point in separately and directly intervening through a writ of amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or securitythe personal concern that the writ is intended to protectis immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. We see no legal bar, however, to an application for the issuance of the writ, in a proper case, by motion in a pending case on appeal or on certiorari, applying by analogy the provisions on the co-existence of the writ with a separately filed criminal case.

Additionally, petitioner is seeking the extraordinary writ of amparo due to his apprehension that the DOJ may deny his motion to lift the HDO.[28] Petitioner’s apprehension is at best merely speculative. Thus, he has failed to show any clear threat to his right to liberty actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo. The absence of an actual controversy also renders it unnecessary for us on this occasion to pass upon the constitutionality of DOJ Circular No. 17, Series of 1998 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance of Hold Departure Orders); and Circular No. 18, Series of 2007 (Prescribing Rules and Regulations Governing the Issuance and Implementation of Watchlist Orders and for Other Purposes).

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed Decision of the CA dated February 4, 2008 in CA-G.R. No. 00011 is hereby AFFIRMED.

MARCOS vs. MANGLAPUS

GR 88211, Sept. 15, 1989

FACTS:

February 1986, Ferdinand E. Marcos was deposed from the presidency via the non-violent "people power" revolution and forced into exile. In his stead, Corazon C. Aquino was declared President of the Republic under a revolutionary government.

Now, Mr. Marcos, in his deathbed, has signified his wish to return to the Philipppines to die. But Mrs. Aquino, considering the dire consequences to the nation of his return at a time when the stability of government is threatened from various directions and the economy is just beginning to rise and move forward, has stood firmly on the decision to bar the return of Mr. Marcos and his family. Petitioners assert that the right of the Marcoses to return to the Philippines is guaranteed under the following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. xxxxxx x Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law. Furthermore, they contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance the view that before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the government, there must be legislation to that effect. The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family to return to the Philippines is guaranteed.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:

Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state. (2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country. Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been ratified by the Philippines, provides:

Article 12 1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence. 2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own. 3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security, public order (order public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present Covenant. 4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.

ISSUES:

Whether or not the President has the power under the Constitution, to bar the Marcoses from returning to the Philippines.

Whether or not the President acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when she determined that the return of the Marcose's to the Philippines poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and decided to bar their return.

HELD:

SC well-considered opinion that the President has a residual power which justifies her act of banning the return of the Marcoses and she did not act arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that the return of former President Marcos and his family at the present time and under present circumstances poses a serious threat to national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their return to the Philippines. It must be emphasized that the individual right involved is not the right to travel from the Philippines to other countries or within the Philippines. These are what the right to travel would normally connote. Essentially, the right involved is the right to return to one's country, a totally distinct right under international law, independent from although related to the right to travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Humans Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights treat the right to freedom of movement and abode within the territory of a state, the right to leave a country, and the right to enter one's country as separate and distinct rights. The Declaration speaks of the "right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each state" [Art. 13(l)] separately from the "right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country." [Art. 13(2).] On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees the "right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence" [Art. 12(l)] and the right to "be free to leave any country, including his own." [Art. 12(2)] which rights may be restricted by such laws as "are necessary to protect national security, public order, public health or morals or enter qqqs own country" of which one cannot be "arbitrarily deprived." [Art. 12(4).] It would therefore be inappropriate to construe the limitations to the right to return to one's country in the same context as those pertaining to the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

The right to return to one's country is not among the rights specifically guaranteed in the Bill of Rights, which treats only of the liberty of abode and the right to travel, but it is our well-considered view that the right to return may be considered, as a generally accepted principle of international law and, under our Constitution, is part of the law of the land [Art. II, Sec. 2 of the Constitution.] However, it is distinct and separate from the right to travel and enjoys a different protection under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights, i.e., against being "arbitrarily deprived" thereof [Art. 12 (4).]

Although the 1987 Constitution imposes limitations on the exercise of specific powers of the President, it maintains intact what is traditionally considered as within the scope of "executive power." Corollarily, the powers of the President cannot be said to be limited only to the specific powers enumerated in the Constitution. In other words, executive power is more than the sum of specific powers so enumerated.

To the President, the problem is one of balancing the general welfare and the common good against the exercise of rights of certain individuals. The power involved is the President's residual power to protect the general welfare of the people. It is founded on the duty of the President, as steward of the people.

The Constitution declares among the guiding principles that "[t]he prime duty of the Government is to serve and protect the people" and that "[t]he maintenance of peace and order, the protection of life, liberty, and property, and the promotion of the general welfare are essential for the enjoyment by all the people of the blessings of democracy." [Art. II, Secs. 4 and 5.]

More particularly, this case calls for the exercise of the President's powers as protector of the peace. The power of the President to keep the peace is not limited merely to exercising the commander-in-chief powers in times of emergency or to leading the State against external and internal threats to its existence. The President is not only clothed with extraordinary powers in times of emergency, but is also tasked with attending to the day-to-day problems of maintaining peace and order and ensuring domestic tranquility in times when no foreign foe appears on the horizon. Wide discretion, within the bounds of law, in fulfilling presidential duties in times of peace is not in any way diminished by the relative want of an emergency specified in the commander-in-chief provision. For in making the President commander-in-chief the enumeration of powers that follow cannot be said to exclude the President's exercising as Commander-in- Chief powers short of the calling of the armed forces, or suspending the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus or declaring martial law, in order to keep the peace, and maintain public order and security.

The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged from within by a well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao, rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men, police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The documented history of the efforts of the Marcose's and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos.

The State, acting through the Government, is not precluded from taking pre- emptive action against threats to its existence if, though still nascent they are perceived as apt to become serious and direct. Protection of the people is the essence of the duty of government. The preservation of the State the fruition of the people's sovereignty is an obligation in the highest order. The President, sworn to preserve and defend the Constitution and to see the faithful execution the laws, cannot shirk from that responsibility.

We cannot also lose sight of the fact that the country is only now beginning to recover from the hardships brought about by the plunder of the economy attributed to the Marcoses and their close associates and relatives, many of whom are still here in the Philippines in a position to destabilize the country, while the Government has barely scratched the surface, so to speak, in its efforts to recover the enormous wealth stashed away by the Marcoses in foreign jurisdictions. Then, We cannot ignore the continually increasing burden imposed on the economy by the excessive foreign borrowing during the Marcos regime, which stifles and stagnates development and is one of the root causes of widespread poverty and all its attendant ills. The resulting precarious state of our economy is of common knowledge and is easily within the ambit of judicial notice.

SILVERIO VS. CA 195 SCRA 760 (1991)

Digest version

Facts: Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 2 (4) of the revised securities act. Respondent filed to cancel the passport of the petitioner and to issue a hold departure order. The RTC ordered the DFA to cancel petitioner’s passport, based on the finding that the petitioner has not been arraigned and there was evidence to show that the accused has left the country with out the knowledge and the permission of the court.

Issue: Whether or Not the right to travel may be impaired by order of the court.

Held: The bail bond posted by petitioner has been cancelled and warrant of arrest has been issued by reason that he failed to appear at his arraignments. There is a valid restriction on the right to travel, it is imposed that the accused must make himself available whenever the court requires his presence. A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return (Constitutional Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p. 138). So it is also that "An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd

par. ]).

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party (See Salonga vs. Hermoso& Travel Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).

Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes.

FULL TEXT version

RICARDO C. SILVERIO, petitioner,

vs.

THE COURT OF APPEALS

On 14 October 1985, Petitioner was charged with violation of Section 20 (4) of the Revised Securities Act in Criminal Case No. CBU-6304 of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu. In due time, he posted bail for his provisional liberty.

On 26 January 1988, or more than two (2) years after the filing of the Information, respondent People of the Philippines filed an Urgent ex parte Motion to cancel the passport of and to issue a hold-departure Order against accused-petitioner on the ground that he had gone abroad several times without the necessary Court approval resulting in postponements of the arraignment and scheduled hearings.

Overruling opposition, the Regional Trial Court, on 4 April 1988, issued an Order directing the Department of Foreign Affairs to cancel Petitioner's passport or to deny his application therefor, and the Commission on Immigration to prevent Petitioner from leaving the country. This order was based primarily on the Trial Court's finding that since the filing of the Information on 14 October 1985, "the accused has not yet been arraigned because he has never appeared in Court on the dates scheduled for his arraignment and there is evidence to show that accused Ricardo C. Silverio, Sr. has left the country and has gone abroad without the knowledge and permission of this Court" (Rollo, p. 45). Petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration was denied on 28 July 1988.

Petitioner's Certiorari Petition before the Court of Appeals met a similar fate on 31 January 1990. Hence, this Petition for Review filed on 30 July 1990.

After the respective pleadings required by the Court were filed, we resolved to give due course and to decide the case.

Petitioner contends that respondent Court of Appeals erred in not finding that the Trial Court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in issuing its Orders, dated 4 April and 28 July 1988, (1) on the basis of facts allegedly patently erroneous, claiming that the scheduled arraignments could not be held because there was a pending Motion to Quash the Information; and (2) finding that the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other than the "interest of national security, public safety or public health."

We perceive no reversible error.

1) Although the date of the filing of the Motion to Quash has been omitted by Petitioner, it is apparent that it was filed long after the filing of the Information in 1985 and only after several arraignments had already been scheduled and cancelled due to Petitioner's non-appearance. In fact, said Motion to Quash was set for hearing only on 19 February 1988. Convincingly shown by the Trial Court and conformed to by respondent Appellate Court is the concurrence of the following circumstances:

1. The records will show that the information was filed on October 14, 1985. Until this date (28 July 1988), the case had yet to be arraigned. Several scheduled arraignments were cancelled and reset, mostly due to the failure of accused Silverio to appear. The reason for accused Silverio's failure to appear had invariably been because he is abroad in the United States of America;

2. Since the information was filed, until this date, accused Silverio had never appeared in person before the Court;

3. The bond posted by accused Silverio had been cancelled twice and warrants of arrest had been issued against him all for the same reason –– failure to appear at scheduled arraignments.

In all candidness, the Court makes the observation that it has given accused Silverio more than enough consideration. The limit had long been reached (Order, 28 July 1988, Crim. Case No. CBU-6304, RTC, Cebu, p. 5; Rollo, p. 73).

Patently, therefore, the questioned RTC Orders, dated 4 April 1988 and 28 July 1988, were not based on erroneous facts, as Petitioner would want this Court to believe. To all appearances, the pendency of a Motion to Quash came about only after several settings for arraignment had been scheduled and cancelled by reason of Petitioner's non-appearance.

2) Petitioner's further submission is that respondent Appellate Court "glaringly erred" in finding that the right to travel can be impaired upon lawful order of the Court, even on grounds other than the "interest of national security, public safety or public health."

To start with, and this has not been controverted by Petitioner, the bail bond he had posted had been cancelled and Warrants of Arrest had been issued against him by reason, in both instances, of his failure to appear at scheduled arraignments. Warrants of Arrest having been issued against him for violation of the conditions of his bail bond, he should be taken into custody. "Bail is the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, conditioned upon his appearance before any court when so required by the Court or the Rules (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, Rule 114, Secs. 1 and 2).

The foregoing condition imposed upon an accused to make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction of his right to travel (Manotoc, Jr. vs. Court of Appeals, et al. No. 62100, 30 May 1986, 142 SCRA 149). A person facing criminal charges may be restrained by the Court from leaving the country or, if abroad, compelled to return (Constitutional Law, Cruz, Isagani A., 1987 Edition, p. 138). So it is also that "An accused released on bail may be re-arrested without the necessity of a warrant if he attempts to depart from the Philippines without prior permission of the Court where the case is pending (ibid., Sec. 20 [2nd

par. ]).

Petitioner takes the posture, however, that while the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of the Courts to curtail the liberty of abode within the limits prescribed by law, it restricts the allowable impairment of the right to travel only on grounds of interest of national security, public safety or public health, as compared to the provisions on freedom of movement in the 1935 and 1973 Constitutions.

Under the 1935 Constitution, the liberty of abode and of travel were treated under one provision. Article III, Section 1(4) thereof reads:

The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired.

The 1973 Constitution altered the 1935 text by explicitly including the liberty of travel, thus:

The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court or when necessary in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health (Article IV, Section 5).

The 1987 Constitution has split the two freedoms into two distinct sentences and treats them differently, to wit:

Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

Petitioner thus theorizes that under the 1987 Constitution, Courts can impair the right to travel only on the grounds of "national security, public safety, or public health."

The submission is not well taken.

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should be interpreted to mean that while the liberty of travel may be impaired even without Court Order, the appropriate executive officers or administrative authorities are not armed with arbitrary discretion to impose limitations. They can impose limits only on the basis of "national security, public safety, or public health" and "as may be provided by law," a limitive phrase which did not appear in the 1973 text (The Constitution, Bernas, Joaquin G.,S.J., Vol. I, First Edition, 1987, p. 263). Apparently, the phraseology in the 1987 Constitution was a reaction to the ban on international travel imposed under the previous regime when there was a Travel Processing Center, which issued certificates of eligibility to travel upon application of an interested party (See Salonga vs. Hermoso& Travel Processing Center, No. 53622, 25 April 1980, 97 SCRA 121).

Article III, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution should by no means be construed as delimiting the inherent power of the Courts to use all means necessary to carry their orders into effect in criminal cases pending before them. When by law jurisdiction is conferred on a Court or judicial officer, all auxillary writs, process and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such Court or officer (Rule 135, Section 6, Rules of Court).

Petitioner's argument that the ruling in Manotoc, Jr., v. Court of Appeals, et al. (supra), to the effect that the condition imposed upon an accused admitted to bail to make himself available at all times whenever the Court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on the right to travel no longer holds under the 1987 Constitution, is far from tenable. The nature and function of a bail bond has remained unchanged whether under the 1935, the 1973, or the 1987 Constitution. Besides, the Manotoc ruling on that point was but a re-affirmation of that laid down long before in People v. UyTuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).

Petitioner is facing a criminal charge. He has posted bail but has violated the conditions thereof by failing to appear before the Court when required. Warrants for his arrest have been issued. Those orders and processes would be rendered nugatory if an accused were to be allowed to leave or to remain, at his pleasure, outside the territorial confines of the country. Holding an accused in a criminal case within the reach of the Courts by preventing his departure from the Philippines must be considered as a valid restriction on his right to travel so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. The offended party in any criminal proceeding is the People of the Philippines. It is to their best interest that criminal prosecutions should run their course and proceed to finality without undue delay, with an accused holding himself amenable at all times to Court Orders and processes.

WHEREFORE, the judgment under review is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner, Ricardo C. Silverio.

CAUNCA VS. SALAZAR [82 PHIL 851; NO.L-2690; 1 JAN 1949]

Facts: This is an action for habeas corpus brought by BartolomeCaunca in behalf of his cousin Estelita Flores who was employed by the Far Eastern Employment Bureau, owned by Julia Salazar, respondent herein. An advanced payment has already been given to Estelita by the employment agency, for her to work as a maid. However, Estelita wanted to transfer to another residence, which was disallowed by the employment agency. Further she was detained and her liberty was restrained. The employment agency wanted that the advance payment, which was applied to her transportation expense from the province should be paid by Estelita before she could be allowed to leave.

Issue: Whether or Not an employment agency has the right to restrain and detain a maid without returning the advance payment it gave?

Held: An employment agency, regardless of the amount it may advance to a prospective employee or maid, has absolutely no power to curtail her freedom of movement. The fact that no physical force has been exerted to keep her in the house of the respondent does not make less real the deprivation of her personal freedom of movement, freedom to transfer from one place to another, freedom to choose one’s residence. Freedom may be lost due to external moral compulsion, to founded or groundless fear, to erroneous belief in the existence of an imaginary power of an impostor to cause harm if not blindly obeyed, to any other psychological element that may curtail the mental faculty of choice or the unhampered exercise of the will. If the actual effect of such psychological spell is to place a person at the mercy of another, the victim is entitled to the protection of courts of justice as much as the individual who is illegally deprived of liberty by duress or physical coercion.

KANT KWONG and YIM KAM SHING, petitioners,

vs.

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, SECRETARY RAMON A. DIAZ and COMMISSIONER MARY CONCEPCION BAUTISTA, respondents.

FACTS

In this original action for Mandamus, petitioners pray that respondent Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG, for short) be commanded to lift without delay the Hold-Orders issued against them by the said entity for being in violation of their right to travel and for having been issued in grave abuse of authority since they are in no way involved in ill-gotten wealth nor in transactions connected therewith.

Petitioners are foreign nationals who are the representatives of the Hongkong-Chinese investors who own 33% of the shares of stock in two domestic garment corporations, namely, De Soleil Apparel Manufacturing Corporation and American Inter-Fashion Manufacturing Corporation, which firms were ordered sequestered by the PCGG on 25 March 1986 on the thesis that the Marcoses, through nominees and dummies, appear to control 67 % of the firms' shareholdings.

On 13 February 1987 respondent Ramon A. Diaz, then Secretary of the PCGG, wrote the Minister of Public Information advising the latter that petitioners had been included in the Hold-Order list of the PCGG (Annex "L" Petition).

On 12 March 1987 petitioners filed before the PCGG an Urgent Motion to Lift Hold-Order with the request that the Motion be set for hearing on 16 March 1987 (Annex "M," Petition). The Motion, however, was not calendared for hearing on said date. On 19 March 1987 the PCGG denied the Motion to Lift in an Order reading as follows:

An "Urgent Motion to Lift Hold Order" dated March 12, 1987 was filed by Kant Kwong and YimKamShing. These are the official representatives of the Hongkong investors in these two sequestered corporations. Based on records/evidence in the possession of the Commission, all made known to their principals, such as unexplained withholding of documents covering substantial past shipments, deliberate delay in cashing letters of credit resulting in the lapse thereof, failure to remit payments due for past shipments, their obvious and unmitigated campaign to obstruct the release of funds needed for operations of the two garment firms, and orchestrated acts to discredit the Officer-in-Charge of the garments firms and the Commission and to obstruct the smooth operations of the garment firms, there is need for their presence in this country to resolve the above- enumerated issues, in order that operations of the corporations are not obstructed, production will not be delayed and corporate funds may be released. The Commission therefore denies the motion for lack of merit.

Issue

The Hold-Order issued against the petitioners is a gross and unlawful violation of their constitutional right of travel and locomotion.

HELD

the PCGG has not given petitioners any opportunity to contest the Hold-Orders issued against them. After their issuance, no hearing had been set; a request for the same had been disregarded. Petitioners' Motion to Lift the Hold-Orders was summarily denied. The "issues" spelled out against petitioners have remained unresolved over a period of nine (9) months. The PCGG must thus be faulted for a disregard of the requirements of "fairness and due process" expressly mandated by Executive Order No. 14, reading:

WHEREAS, the overriding considerations of national interest and national survival require that the Presidential Commission on Good Government achieve its vital task efficiently and effectively, with due regard to the requirements of fairness and due process (5th Whereas clause),

Under the environmental circumstances of the case, the Hold-Orders against petitioners preventing them "from leaving the country cannot be prolonged indefinitely." The right to travel and to freedom of movement is a fundamental right guaranteed by the 1987 Constitution 5 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights to which the Philippines is a signatory. 6 That right extends to all residents regardless of nationality. And "everyone has the right to an effective remedy by the competent national tribunals for acts violating the fundamental rights granted him by the Constitution or by law.

While such right is not absolute but must yield to the State's inherent police power upon which the Hold-Orders were premised, no "good reasons" have been advanced which could justify the continued enforcement of the Hold-Orders.

Petitioners are foreign nationals. Their 33% interest in the sequestered firms is recognized by the PCGG itself. There is no showing that those interests appear prima facie to be ill-gotten wealth. No charges have been filed against them before the Sandiganbayan. They face no criminal indictment nor have they been provisionally released on bail that their right to travel might be restricted.

Although, as averred by respondents, the recognized rule is that, in the performance of an official duty or act involving discretion, the corresponding official can only be directed by mandamus to act but not to act one way or the other, "yet it is not accurate to say that the writ will never issue to control his discretion. There is an exception to the rule if the case is otherwise proper, as in cases of gross abuse of discretion, manifest injustice, or palpable excess of authority. 8

In this case, for reasons already stated, we find that the PCGG acted with gross abuse of discretion in maintaining the Hold-Orders against petitioners for an indefinite length of time. By so doing it has arbitrarily excluded petitioners from the enjoyment of a fundamental — right the right to freedom of movement — to which they are entitled. 9 mandamus lies.

WHEREFORE, in the interest of the early and full restoration of petitioners' right to travel, the Court hereby LIFTS the Hold-Orders issued by respondent Presidential Commission on Good Government against petitioners, effective immediately, upon the condition that they shall hold themselves available if and whenever needed by said Commission in the performance of its task.

Manotoc vs. CA | May 30, 1986

FACTS:

Ricardo Manotoc Jr. was one of the two principal stockholders of Trans-Insular Management Inc. and the Manotoc Securities Inc. (stock brokerage house). He was in US for a certain time, went home to file a petition with SEC for appointment of a management committee for both businesses. Such was granted. However, pending disposition of a case filed with SEC, the latter requested the Commissioner of Immigration not to clear him for departure. Consequently, a memorandum to this effect was issued.

There was a torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities Inc which was suspected to be fake. 6 of its clients filed separate criminal complaints against the petitioner and Leveriza, President and VP respectively. He was charged with estafa and was allowed by the Court to post bail.

Petitioner filed before each trial court motion for permission to leave the country stating his desire to go to US relative to his business transactions and opportunities. Such was opposed by the prosecution and was also denied by the judges. He filed petition for certiorari with CA seeking to annul the prior orders and the SEC communication request denying his leave to travel abroad.

According to the petitioner, having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the courts that granted him bail nor SEC, which has no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right to travel.

ISSUE: WON petitioner’s constitutional right to travel was violated.

HELD: NO

The court has power to prohibit person admitted to bail from leaving the country because this is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond. The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his constitutional right to travel. In case he will be allowed to leave the country without sufficient reason, he may be placed beyond the reach of courts.

Furthermore, petitioner failed to satisfy trial court and CA of the urgency of his travel, duration thereof, as well as consent of his surety to the proposed travel. He was not able to show the necessity of his travel abroad. He never indicated that no other person in his behalf could undertake such business transaction.

Article 3 Sec6: “The liberty of abode and of changing the same… shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court….” According to SC, the order of trial court in releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such lawful order as contemplated by the provision on right to travel.

Villavicencio vsLukban

G.R. No.L-14639 March 25, 1919ZACARIAS VILLAVICENCIO, ET AL. vs. JUSTO LUKBAN, ET AL.

Issue:

The writ of Habeas Corpus was filed by the petitioner, with the prayer that the respondent produce around 170 women whom Justo Lukbanet, al deported to Davao. Liberty of abode was also raised versus the power of the executive of the Municipality in deporting the women without their knowledge in his capacity as Mayor.

Facts:

Justo Lukban as Manila City's Mayor together with Anton Hohmann, the city's Chief of Police, took custody of about 170 women at the night of October 25 beyond the latters consent and knowledge and thereafter were shipped to Mindanao specifically in Davao where they were signed as laborers. Said women are inmates of the houses of prostitution situated in Gardenia Street, in the district of Sampaloc.

That when the petitioner filed for habeas corpus, the respondent moved to dismiss the case saying that those women were already out of their jurisdiction and that , it should be filed in the city of Davao instead.

The court ruled in favor of the petitioner with the instructions;

For the respondents to have fulfilled the court's order, three optional courses were open: (1) They could have produced the bodies of the persons according to the command of the writ; or (2) they could have shown by affidavit that on account of sickness or infirmity those persons could not safely be brought before the court; or (3) they could have presented affidavits to show that the parties in question or their attorney waived the right to be present.

Held:

The court concluded the case by granting the parties aggrieved the sum of 400 pesos each, plus 100 pesos for nominal damage due to contempt of court. Reasoning further that if the chief executive of any municipality in the Philippines could forcibly and illegally take a private citizen and place him beyond the boundaries of the municipality, and then, when called upon to defend his official action, could calmly fold his hands and claim that the person was under no restraint and that he, the official, had no jurisdiction over this other municipality.

We believe the true principle should be that, if the respondent is within the jurisdiction of the court and has it in his power to obey the order of the court and thus to undo the wrong that he has inflicted, he should be compelled to do so. Even if the party to whom the writ is addressed has illegally parted with the custody of a person before the application for the writ is no reason why the writ should not issue. If the mayor and the chief of police, acting under no authority of law, could deport these women from the city of Manila to Davao, the same officials must necessarily have the same means to return them from Davao to Manila. The respondents, within the reach of process, may not be permitted to restrain a fellow citizen of her liberty by forcing her to change her domicile and to avow the act with impunity in the courts, while the person who has lost her birthright of liberty has no effective recourse. The great writ of liberty may not thus be easily evaded.

Roan v. Gonzales, 145 SCRA 687 (1986)

F: The challenged SW was issued by the resp. judge on 5/10/84. The petitioner''s house was searched 2 days later but none of the articles listed in the warrant was discovered. The officers conducting the search found 1 colt Magnum revolver & 18 live bullets w/c they confiscated. They are now the bases of the charge against the petitioner. RULING: Search warrant issued by resp. judge is hereby declared null and void and accordingly set aside. The petitioner claims that no depositions were taken by the resp. judge in accordance w/ Rule 126, Sec. 4 of the ROC, but this is not entirely true. Depositions were taken of the complainant''s 2 witnesses in addition to the affidavit executed by them. It is correct to say, however, that the complainant himself was not subjected to a similar interrogation. By his own accounts, all that resp. judge did was question Capt. Quillosa on the contents of his affidavit only "to ascertain among others, if he knew and understood the same," and only bec. "the application was not yet subscribed and sworn to." The suggestion is that he would not have asked any questions at all if the affidavit had already been completed when it was submitted to him. In any case, he did not ask his own searching questions. He limited himself to the contents of the affidavit. He did not take the applicant''s deposition in writing and attach them to the record, together w/ the affidavit presented to him. Such written deposition is necessary in order that the Judge may be able to properly determine the existence or non-existence of the probable cause, to hold liable for perjury the person giving it if it will be found later that his declarations are false. (Mata v. Bayona.) The applicant was asking for the issuance of the SW on the basis of mere hearsay and not of info. personally known to him. His application, standing alone, was insufficient to justify the issuance of the warrant sought.

It was, therefore, necessary for the witnesses themselves, by their own personal info., to establish the applicant''s claims. Even assuming then that it would have suffied to take the deposition only of the witnesses and not of the applicant himself, there is still the question of the sufficiency of their depositions. A study of the deposition taken from witnesessEsmaelMorada and Jesus Tohilida, who both claimed to be "intelligence informers," shows that they were in the main a mere restatement of their allegations in their affidavits, except that they were made in the form of answers to the questions put to them by the resp. judge. One may well wonder why it did not occur to the resp. judge to ask how the witness could be so certain even as to the caliber of the guns, or how far he was from the window, or whether it was on the first floor or second floor, or why his presence was not noticed at all, or if the acts related were really done openly, in the full view of the witnesses, considering that these acts were against the law. These would have been judicious questions but they were injudiciously omitted. Instead, the declaration of the witnesses were readily accepted and the warrant sought was issued forthwith. SOL-GEN ARGUES THAT THE PETITIONER WAIVED WHATEVER DEFECT WHEN THE PETITIONER VOLUNTARILY SUBMITTED TO THE SEARCH AND MANIFESTED HIS CONFORMITY IN WRITING. We do not agree. What we see here is pressure exerted by the military authorities, who practically coerced the petitioner to sign the supposed waiver .

JOVITO R. SALONGA, Petitioner,

vs.

CAPTAIN ROLANDO HERMOSO, TRAVEL PROCESSING CENTER, and GENERAL FABIAN VER, Respondents.

FACTS and HELD

This is not the first time petitioner Jovito R. Salonga came to this Tribunal by way of a mandamus proceeding to compel the issuance to him of a certificate of eligibility to travel. In the first case, Salonga v. Madella, 1 the case became moot and academic as the Office of the Solicitor General, in its answer to the petition, stated that the travel eligibility certificate was not denied and, as a matter of fact, had been granted. Nonetheless, a brief separate opinion was filed, concurring in the resolution, and worded thus: "Clearly this petition had assumed a moot and academic character. Its dismissal is thus indicated. May I just add these few words as my response to the plea of petitioner in his Manifestation and Reply dated October 28, 1978. This is how I would view the matter not only where petitioner is concerned but in all other similar cases. Respondent Travel Processing Center should discharge its injunction conformably to the mandate of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the right to travel. One of the highlights of the keynote address of President Marcos in the Manila World Law Conference in celebration of the World Peace Through Law Day on August 21, 1977 was the lifting of 'the ban on international travel.' There should be fidelity to such a pronouncement. It is the experience of the undersigned in his lectures abroad the last few years, in the United States as well as in Malaysia, Singapore and Australia, that respect accorded constitutional rights under the present emergency regime had elicited the commendation of members of the bench, the bar, and the academe in foreign lands. It is likewise worthy of notice that in his keynote address to the International Law Association, President Marcos made reference to martial law being instituted in accordance with law and that the Constitution had been applied in appropriate cases. As an agency of the executive branch, therefore, the Travel Processing Center should ever be on its guard, lest the impression be created that such declarations amount, to paraphrase Justice Jackson, to no more than munificent bequests in a pauper's will. Petitioner, to my mind, is justified, the more so in the light of the Answer of Acting Solicitor General Vicente Mendoza, to an affirmative response to his prayer in his Manifestation and Reply 'that under the circumstances mentioned in the Petition, Petitioner is entitled to travel abroad, and that it is in recognition of this right that Respondents have issued his Certificate of Eligibility to Travel, as mentioned in the Answer.

The present petition is likewise impressed with a moot and academic aspect. In the motion to dismiss of the Solicitor General dated April 21, 1980, it was stated that the certificate of eligibility to travel had been granted petitioner. A xeroxed copy was enclosed. A resolution for dismissal is, therefore, in order.

From the docket of this Court, it appears that other petitions of this character had been filed in the past, namely, Santos v. The Special Committee on Travel Abroad, 3 Pimentel v. Travel Processing Center, 4 and Gonzales v. Special Committee on Travel. 5 In the aforesaid cases, as in this and the earlier Salonga petition, there was no occasion to pass on the merits of the controversy as the certificates of eligibility to travel were granted. The necessity for any ruling was thus obviated. Nonetheless, in view of the likelihood that in the future this Court may be faced again with a situation like the present which takes up its time and energy needlessly, it is desirable that respondent Travel Processing Center should exercise the utmost care to avoid the impression that certain citizens desirous of exercising their constitutional right to travel could be subjected to inconvenience or annoyance. In the address of President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos before the American Newspaper Publishers Association last Tuesday April 22, 1980, emphasized anew the respect accorded constitutional rights The freedom to travel is certainly one of the most cherished. He cited with approval the ringing affirmation of Willoughby, who, as he noted was "partial to the claims of liberty." 6 Burdick 7 and Willis, 8 both of whom were equally convinced that there be no erosion to human rights even in times of martial law, likewise received from President Marcos the accolade of his approval. It would appear, therefore, that in case of doubt of the Officer-in-Charge of the Travel Processing Center, the view of General Fabian Ver should immediately be sought. It goes without saying that the petition for such certificate of eligibility to travel be filed at the earliest opportunity to facilitate the granting thereof and preclude any disclaimer as to the person desiring to travel being in any way responsible for any delay.

WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed for being moot and academic.

HAZEL MA. C. ANTOLIN

Petitioner

- versus –

ABELARDO T. DOMONDON,

JOSE A. GANGAN, and VIOLETA J. JOSEF

Respondents

FACTS:

Petitioner took the accountancy licensure examinations (the Certified Public Accountant [CPA] Board Exams) conducted by the Board of Accountancy (the Board) in October 1997.[1] The examination results were released on October 29, 1997; out of 6,481 examinees, only 1,171 passed. Unfortunately, petitioner did not make it. When the results were released, she received failing grades in four out of the seven subjects.[2]

Convinced that she deserved to pass the examinations, she wrote to respondent Abelardo T. Domondon (Domondon), Acting Chairman of the Board of Accountancy, and requested that her answer sheets be re-corrected.[3] On November 3, 1997, petitioner was shown her answer sheets, but these consisted merely of shaded marks, so she was unable to determine why she failed the exam.[4] Thus, on November 10, 1997, she again wrote to the Board to request for copies of (a) the questionnaire in each of the seven subjects (b) her answer sheets; (c) the answer keys to the questionnaires, and (d) an explanation of the grading system used in each subject (collectively, the Examination Papers).[5]

Acting Chairman Domondon denied petitioner’s request on two grounds: first, that Section 36, Article III of the Rules and Regulations Governing the Regulation and Practice of Professionals, as amended by Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) Resolution No. 332, series of 1994, only permitted access to the petitioner’s answer sheet (which she had been shown previously), and that reconsideration of her examination result was only proper under the grounds stated therein:

Sec. 36 An examinee shall be allowed to have access or to go over his/her test papers or answer sheets on a date not later than thirty (30) days from the official release of the results of the examination. Within ten (10) days from such date, he/she may file his/her request for reconsideration of ratings. Reconsideration of rating shall be effected only on grounds of mechanical error in the grading of his/her testpapers or answer sheets, or malfeasance.[6]

Second, Acting Chairman Domondon clarified that the Board was precluded from releasing the Examination Papers (other than petitioner’s answer sheet)

After a further exchange of correspondence,[8] the Board informed petitioner that an investigation was conducted into her exam and there was no mechanical error found in the grading of her test papers.[9]

Issues

Before us, petitioner argues that she has a right to obtain copies of the examination papers so she can determine for herself why and how she failed and to ensure that the Board properly performed its duties. She argues that the Constitution[29] as well as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees[30] support her right to demand access to the Examination Papers. Furthermore, she claims that there was no need to exhaust administrative remedies, since no recourse to the PRC was available, and only a pure question of law is involved in this case. Finally, she claims that her demand for access to documents was not rendered moot by her passing of the 1998 CPA Board Exams.

Our Ruling

Propriety of Writ of Mandamus

At the very outset let us be clear of our ruling. Any claim for re-correction or revision of her 1997 examination cannot be compelled by mandamus. This much was made evident by our ruling inAgustin-Ramos v. Sandoval,[31] where we stated:

After deliberating on the petition in relation to the other pleadings filed in the proceedings at bar, the Court resolved to DENY said petition for lack of merit. The petition at bar prays for the setting aside of the Order of respondent Judge dismissing petitioners’ mandamus action to compel the other respondents (Medical Board of Examiners and the Professional Regulation Commission) “to reconsider, recorrect and/or rectify the board ratings of the petitioners from their present failing grades to higher or passing marks.” The function of reviewing and re-assessing the petitioners’ answers to the examination questions, in the light of the facts and arguments presented by them x xx is a discretionary function of the Medical Board, not a ministerial and mandatory one, hence, not within the scope of the writ of mandamus. The obvious remedy of the petitioners from the adverse judgment by the Medical Board of Examiners was an appeal to the Professional Regulation Commission itself, and thence to the Court of Appeals; and since they did not apply for relief to the Commission prior to their institution of the special civil action of mandamus in the Regional Trial Court, the omission was fatal to the action under the familiar doctrine requiring exhaustion of administrative remedies. Apart from the obvious undesirability of a procedure which would allow Courts to substitute their judgment for that of Government boards in the determination of successful examinees in any administered examination – an area in which courts have no expertise – and the circumstance that the law declares the Court of Appeals to be the appropriate review Court, the Regional Trial Court was quite correct in refusing to take cognizance of an action seeking reversal of the quasi-judicial action taken by the Medical Board of Examiners.[

For a writ of mandamus to issue, the applicant must have a well-defined, clear, and certain legal right to the thing demanded. The corresponding duty of the respondent to perform the required act must be equally clear.[33] No such clarity exists here; neither does petitioner’s right to demand a revision of her examination results. And despite petitioner’s assertions that she has not made any demand for re-correction, the most cursory perusal of her Second Amended Petition and her prayer that the respondents “make the appropriate revisions on the results of her examination” belies this claim.

Like the claimants in Agustin, the remedy of petitioner from the refusal of the Board to release the Examination Papers should have been through an appeal to the PRC. Undoubtedly, petitioner had an adequate remedy from the Board’s refusal to provide her with copies of the Examination Papers. Under Section 5(a) of Presidential Decree No. 223,[34] the PRC has the power to promulgate rules and regulations to implement policies for the regulation of the accounting profession.[35] In fact, it is one such regulation (PRC Resolution No. 338) that is at issue in this case. In addition, under Section 5(c), the PRC has the power to

review, coordinate, integrate and approve the policies, resolutions, rules and regulations, orders or decisions promulgated by the various Boards with respect to the profession or occupation under their jurisdictions including the results of their licensure examinations but their decisions on administrative cases shall be final and executory unless appealed to the Commission within thirty (30) days from the date of promulgation thereof.

Petitioner posits that no remedy was available because the PRC’s power to “review” and “approve” in Section 5(c) only refers to appeals in decisions concerning administrative investigations[36] and not to instances where documents are being requested. Not only is this position myopic and self-serving, it is bereft of either statutory or jurisprudential basis. The PRC’s quasi-legislative and enforcement powers, encompassing its authority to review and approve “policies, resolutions, rules and regulations, orders, or decisions” cover more than administrative investigations conducted pursuant to its quasi-judicial powers.[37] More significantly, since the PRC itself issued the resolution questioned by the petitioner here, it was in the best position to resolve questions addressed to its area of expertise. Indeed, petitioner could have saved herself a great deal of time and effort had she given the PRC the opportunity to rectify any purported errors committed by the Board.

One of the reasons for exhaustion of administrative remedies is our well-entrenched doctrine on separation of powers, which enjoins upon the Judiciary a becoming policy of non-interference with matters falling primarily (albeit not exclusively) within the competence of other departments.[38] Courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience, should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and the proper authorities have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative forum. [39]

However, the principle of exhaustion of administrative remedies is subject to exceptions, among which is when only a question of law is involved.[40] This is because issues of law – such as whether petitioner has a constitutional right to demand access to the Examination Papers – cannot be resolved with finality by the administrative officer.[41]

Issues of Mootness

We now turn to the question of whether the petition has become moot in view of petitioner’s having passed the 1998 CPA examination. An issue becomes moot and academic when it ceases to present a justiciable controversy, so that a declaration on the issue would be of no practical use or value.[42]

In this jurisdiction, any citizen may challenge any attempt to obstruct the exercise of his or her right to information and may seek its enforcement by mandamus.[43] And since every citizen possesses the inherent right to be informed by the mere fact of citizenship,[44] we find that petitioner’s belated passing of the CPA Board Exams does not automatically mean that her interest in the Examination Papers has become mere superfluity. Undoubtedly, the constitutional question presented, in view of the likelihood that the issues in this case will be repeated, warrants review.[45]

The crux of this case is whether petitioner may compel access to the Examination Documents through mandamus. As always, our inquiry must begin with the Constitution. Section 7, Article III provides:

Sec.7. The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Together with the guarantee of the right to information, Section 28, Article II promotes full disclosure and transparency in government, viz:

Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

Like all the constitutional guarantees, the right to information is not absolute. The people’s right to information is limited to “matters of public concern,” and is further “subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.” Similarly, the State’s policy of full disclosure is limited to “transactions involving public interest,” and is “subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law”. The Court has always grappled with the meanings of the terms “public interest” and “public concern.” As observed in Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission:[46]

In determining whether x xxa particular information is of public concern there is no rigid test which can be applied. “Public concern” like “public interest” is a term that eludes exact definition. Both terms embrace a broad spectrum of subjects which the public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives, or simply because such matters naturally arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen. In the final analysis, it is for the courts to determine on a case by case basis whether the matter at issue is of interest or importance, as it relates to or affects the public.

We have also recognized the need to preserve a measure of confidentiality on some matters, such as national security, trade secrets and banking transactions, criminal matters, and other confidential matters.[47]

We are prepared to concede that national board examinations such as the CPA Board Exams are matters of public concern. The populace in general, and the examinees in particular, would understandably be interested in the fair and competent administration of these exams in order to ensure that only those qualified are admitted into the accounting profession. And as with all matters pedagogical, these examinations could be not merely quantitative means of assessment, but also means to further improve the teaching and learning of the art and science of accounting.

On the other hand, we do realize that there may be valid reasons to limit access to the Examination Papers in order to properly administer the exam. More than the mere convenience of the examiner, it may well be that there exist inherent difficulties in the preparation, generation, encoding, administration, and checking of these multiple choice exams that require that the questions and answers remain confidential for a limited duration. However, the PRC is not a party to these proceedings. They have not been given an opportunity to explain the reasons behind their regulations or articulate the justification for keeping the Examination Documents confidential. In view of the far-reaching implications of this case, which may impact on every board examination administered by the PRC, and in order that all relevant issues may be ventilated, we deem it best to remand these cases to the RTC for further proceedings.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions are GRANTED. The December 11, 2006 andFebruary 16, 2004 Decisions of the Court of Appeals in CA-GR SP No. 76546 and CA-GR SP No. 76498, respectively, are hereby SET ASIDE. The November 11, 2002 and January 30, 2003 Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 33, in Civil Case No. 98-86881 are AFFIRMED. The case is remanded to the Regional Trial Court for further proceedings.

Province of North Cotabato v. Government of the Republic of the Philippines(G.R. Nos. 183591, 183752, 183893, 183951, & 183962) (14 October 2008)

Facts:On 8 August 2008, the Government of the Republic of the Philippines (GRP), represented by the GRP Peace Panel and

the Presidential Adviser on the Peace Process (PAPP), and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) were scheduled to sign the Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) Aspect of the previous GRP-MILF Tripoli Agreement on Peace of 2001 in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.

The MOA-AD included, among others, a stipulation that creates the Bangsamoro Juridical Entity (BJE), to which the GRP grants the authority and jurisdiction over the ancestral domain and ancestral lands of the Bangsamoro—defined as the present geographic area of the ARMM constituted by Lanao del Sur, Maguindanao, Sulu, Tawi-Tawi, Basilan, and Marawi City, as well as the municipalities of Lanao del Norte which voted for inclusion in the ARMM in the 2001 plebiscite. The BJE is then granted the power to build, develop, and maintain its own institutions. The MOA-AD also described the relationship of the GRP and the BJE as

“associative,” characterized by shared authority and responsibility. It further provides that its provisions requiring “amendments to the existing legal framework” shall take effect upon signing of a Comprehensive Compact.

Before the signing, however, the Province of North Cotabato sought to compel the respondents to disclose and furnish it with complete and official copies of the MOA-AD, as well as to hold a public consultation thereon, invoking its right to information on matters of public concern. A subsequent petition sought to have the City of Zamboanga excluded from the BJE. The Court then issued a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on 4 August 2008, directing the public respondents and their agents to cease and desist from formally signing the MOA-AD.

Issues and Ruling:1. W/N the President has the power to pursue reforms that would require new legislation and constitutional

amendments.YES. However, the stipulation in the MOA-AD that virtually guarantees that necessary changes shall be effected upon the legal framework of the GRP must be struck down as unconstitutional as it is inconsistent with the limits of the President’s authority to propose constitutional amendments. Because although the President’s power to conduct peace negotiations is implicitly included in her powers as Chief Executive and Commander-in-Chief, and, in the course of conducting peace negotiations, may validly consider implementing even those policies that require changes to the Constitution, she may not unilaterally implement them without the intervention of Congress, or act in any way as if the assent of that body were assumed as a certainty.

2. W/N there is a violation of the people’s right to information on matters of public concern (1987 Constitution, Art. III, Sec. 7) under a state policy of full disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest (1987 Constitution, Art. II, Sec. 28), including public consultation under RA No. 7160 (Local Government Code of 1991).

YES. At least three pertinent laws animate these constitutional imperatives and justify the exercise of the people’s right to be consulted on relevant matters relating to the peace agenda:

a. EO No. 3, which enumerates the functions and responsibilities of the PAPP, is replete with mechanics for continuing consultations on both national and local levels and for a principal forum for consensus-building. In fact, it is the duty of the PAPP to conduct regular dialogues to seek relevant information, comments, advice, and recommendations from peace partners and concerned sectors of society;

b. RA No. 7160 (LGC) requires all national offices to conduct consultations before any project or program critical to the environment and human ecology including those that may call for the eviction of a particular group of people residing in such locality, is implemented therein. The MOA-AD is one peculiar program that unequivocally and unilaterally vests ownership of a vast territory to the Bangsamoro people, which could pervasively and drastically result to the diaspora or displacement of a great number of inhabitants from their total environment;

c. RA No. 8371 (IPRA) provides for clear-cut procedure for the recognition and delineation of ancestral domain, which entails, among other things, the observance of the free and prior informed consent of the Indigenous Cultural Communities/Indigenous Peoples (ICC/IP).

3. W/N the GRP Peace Panel and the PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.

YES. The PAPP committed grave abuse of discretion when he failed to carry out the pertinent consultation process, as mandated by EO No. 3, RA No. 7160, and RA No. 8371. The furtive process by which the MOA-AD was designed and crafted runs contrary to and in excess of the legal authority, and amounts to a whimsical, capricious, oppressive, arbitrary, and despotic exercise thereof. It illustrates a gross evasion of positive duty and a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined.

4. W/N the MOA-AD is constitutional.NO. It cannot be reconciled with the present Constitution and laws. Not only its specific provisions, but the very concept underlying them, namely, the associative relationship envisioned between the GRP and the BJE, are unconstitutional, for the concept presupposes that the associated entity is a state and implies that the same is on its way to independence. While there is a clause in the MOA-AD stating that the provisions thereof inconsistent with the present legal framework will not be effective until that framework is amended, the same does not cure its defect. The inclusion of provisions in the MOA-AD establishing an associative relationship between the BJE and the Central Government is, itself, a violation of the Memorandum of Instructions From The President addressed to the government peace panel. Moreover, as the clause is worded, it virtually guarantees that the necessary amendments to the Constitution and the laws will eventually be put in place. Neither the GRP Peace Panel nor the President herself is authorized to make such a guarantee. Upholding such an act would amount to authorizing a usurpation of the constituent powers vested only in Congress, a Constitutional Convention, or the people themselves through the process of initiative, for the only way that the Executive can ensure the outcome of the amendment process is through an undue influence or interference with that process.

5. W/N the GRP can invoke executive privilege.NO. Respondents effectively waived such defense after it unconditionally disclosed the official copies of the final draft of the MOA-AD, for judicial compliance and public scrutiny.

Carpio-Morales, J.The people’s right to information on matters of public concern under Sec. 7, Art. III of the Constitution is in splendid symmetry with the state policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest under Sec. 28, Art. II of the Constitution.

The right to information guarantees the right of the people to demand information, while the policy of public disclosure recognizes the duty of officialdom to give information even if nobody demands.

The IPRA does not grant the Executive Department or any government agency the power to delineate and recognize an ancestral domain claim by mere agreement or compromise.

An association is formed when two states of unequal power voluntarily establish durable links. In the basic model, one state, the associate, delegates certain responsibilities to the other, the principal, while maintaining its international status as a state. Free associations represent a middle ground between integration and independence.

The recognized sources of international law establish that the right to self-determination of a people is normally fulfilled through internal self-determination—a people’s pursuit of its political, economic, social, and cultural development within the framework of an existing state. A right to external self-determination (which in this case potentially takes the form of the assertion of a right to unilateral secession) arises only in the most extreme of cases and, even then, under carefully defined circumstances.

That the authority of the President to conduct peace negotiations with rebel groups is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution does not mean that she has no such authority.The President has authority, as stated in her oath of office, only to preserve and defend the Constitution. Such presidential power does not, however, extend to allowing her to change the Constitution, but simply to recommend proposed amendments or revision. As long as she limits herself to recommending these changes and submits to the proper procedure for constitutional amendments and revision, her mere recommendation need not be construed as an unconstitutional act.

Public statements of a state representative may be construed as a unilateral declaration only when the following conditions are present: the statements were clearly addressed to the international community, the state intended to be bound to that community by its statements, and that not to give legal effect to those statements would be detrimental to the security of international intercourse. Plainly, unilateral declarations arise only in peculiar circumstances.

AKBAYAN VS. AQUINO

Facts:

The signing of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) at the sidelines of the Asia-Europe Summit in Helsinki in September 2006 was hailed by both Japanese Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi and Philippine President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo as a “milestone in the continuing cooperation and collaboration, setting a new chapter of strategic partnership for mutual opportunity and growth (for both countries).”JPEPA which has been referred to as a ‘mega treaty’ is a comprehensive plan for opening up of markets in goods and services as well as removing barriers and restrictions on investments. It is a deal that encompasses even our commitments to the WTO.The complexity of JPEPA became all the more evident at the Senate hearing conducted by the Committee on Trade and Commerce last November 2006. The committee, chaired by Senator Mar Roxas, heard differing views and perspectives on JPEPA. On one hand the committee heard Government’s rosy projections on the economic benefits of JPEPA and on the other hand the views of environmental and trade activists who raised there very serious concerns about the country being turned into Japan’s toxic waste basket. The discussion in the Senate showed that JPEPA is not just an issue concerning trade and economic relations with Japan but one that touches on broader national development concerns.

Issues:

1. Do the therein petitioners have standing to bring this action for mandamus in their capacity as citizens of the Republic, as taxpayers, and as members of the Congress

2. Can this Honorable Court exercise primary jurisdiction of this case and take cognizance of the instant petition.

3. Are the documents and information being requested in relation to the JPEPA exempted from the general rules on transparency and full public disclosure such that the Philippine government is justified in denying access thereto.

Rulings:

The Supreme Court en banc promulgated last July 16, 2008 its ruling on the case of “Akbayan Citizens Action Party et al vs. Thomas G. Aquino et al” (G.R. No. 170516). The Highest Tribunal dismissed the Petition for mandamus and prohibition, which sought to compel respondents Department of Trade Industry (DTI) Undersecretary Thomas Aquino et al to furnish petitioners the full text of the Japan-Philippines Economic Partnership Agreement (JPEPA) and the lists of the Philippine and Japanese offers submitted during the negotiation process and all pertinent attachments and annexes thereto.

In its Decision, the Court noted that the full text of the JPEPA has been made accessible to the public since 11 September 2006, and thus the demand to be furnished with copy of the said document has become moot and academic. Notwithstanding this, however, the Court lengthily discussed the substatives issues, insofar as they impinge on petitioners' demand for access to the Philippine and Japanese offers in the course of the negotiations.

The Court held: “Applying the principles adopted in PMPF v. Manglapus, it is clear that while the final text of the JPEPA may not be kept perpetually confidential – since there should be 'ample opportunity for discussion before [a treaty] is approved' – the offers exchanged by the parties during the negotiations continue to be privileged even after the JPEPA is published. It is reasonable to conclude that the Japenese representatives submitted their offers with the understanding that 'historic confidentiality' would govern the same. Disclosing these offers could impair the ability of the Philippines to deal not only with Japan but with other foreign governments in future negotiations.”

It also reasoned out that opening for public scrutiny the Philippine offers in treaty negotiations would discourage future Philippine representatives from frankly expressing their views during negotiations. The Highest Tribunal recognized that treaty negotiations normally involve a process of quid pro quo, where negotiators would willingly grant concessions in an area of lesser importance in order to obtain more favorable terms in an area of greater national interest.

In the same Decision, the Court took time to address the dissent of Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno. It said: “We are aware that behind the dissent of the Chief Justice lies a genuine zeal to protect our people's right to information against any abuse of executive privilege. It is a zeal that We fully share. The Court, however, in its endeavour to guard against the abuse of executive privilege, should be careful not to veer towards the opposite extreme, to the point that it would strike down as invalid even a legitimate exercise thereof.”

[A.M. No. 09-8-6-SC : June 13, 2012]

RE: REQUEST FOR COPY OF 2008 STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES AND NETWORTH [SALN] AND PERSONAL DATA SHEET OR CURRICULUM VITAE OF THE JUSTICES OF THE SUPREME COURT AND OFFICERS AND EMPLOYEES OF THE JUDICIARY.

FACTS

In a letter,[1] dated July 30, 2009, Rowena C. Paraan, Research Director of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ), sought copies of the Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Networth (SALN) of the Justices of this Court for the year 2008. She also requested for copies of the Personal Data Sheet (PDS) or the Curriculum Vitae (CV) of the Justices of this Court for the purpose of updating their database of information on government officials.

In her Letter,[2] dated August 13, 2009, Karol M. Ilagan, a researcher- writer also of the PCIJ, likewise sought for copies of the SALN and PDS of the Justices of the Court of Appeals (CA), for the same above-stated purpose.

The two requests were ordered consolidated by the Court on August 18, 2009.[3] On the same day, the Court resolved to create a special committee (Committee) to review the policy on requests for SALN and PDS and other similar documents, and to recommend appropriate action on such requests.[4]

On November 23, 2009, the Committee, chaired by then Associate Justice Minita V. Chico-Nazario submitted its Memorandum[5] dated November 18, 2009 and its Resolution[6] dated November 16, 2009, recommending the creation of Committee on Public Disclosure that would, in essence, take over the functions of the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) with respect to requests for copies of, or access to, SALN, and other personal documents of members of the Judiciary.

HELD

Like all constitutional guarantees, however, the right to information, with its companion right of access to official records, is not absolute. While providing guaranty for that right, the Constitution also provides that the people’s right to know is limited to “matters of public concern” and is further subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

Jurisprudence[54] has provided the following limitations to that right: (1) national security matters and intelligence information; (2) trade secrets and banking transactions; (3) criminal matters; and (4) other confidential information such as confidential or classified information officially known to public officers and employees by reason of their office and not made available to the public as well as diplomatic correspondence, closed door Cabinet meetings and executive sessions of either house of Congress, and the internal deliberations of the Supreme Court.

This could only mean that while no prohibition could stand against access to official records, such as the SALN, the same is undoubtedly subject to regulation.

Considering the foregoing legal precepts vis-à-vis the various requests made, the Court finds no cogent reason to deny the public access to the SALN, PDS and CV of the Justices of the Court and other magistrates of the Judiciary subject, of course, to the limitations and prohibitions provided in R.A. No. 6713, its implementing rules and regulations, and in the guidelines set forth in the decretal portion.

The Court notes the valid concerns of the other magistrates regarding the possible illicit motives of some individuals in their requests for access to such personal information and their publication. However, custodians of public documents must not concern themselves with the motives, reasons and objects of the persons seeking access to the records. The moral or material injury which their misuse might inflict on others is the requestor’s responsibility and lookout. Any publication is made subject to the consequences of the law.[56] While public officers in the custody or control of public records have the discretion to regulate the manner in which records may be inspected, examined or copied by interested persons, such discretion does not carry with it the authority to prohibit access, inspection, examination, or copying of the records.[57] After all, public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must, at all times, be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.[58]

WHEREFORE, the Court resolves to GRANT the requests

CAMILO L. SABIO vs. GORDON, G.R. No. 174340, October 17, 2006, 504 SCRA 704

The Facts:

On February 20, 2006, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago introduced Philippine Senate Resolution No. 455 (Senate Res. No. 455),[1][4] “directing an inquiry in aid of legislation on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippines Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and PHILCOMSAT Holdings Corporation (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in their operations by their respective Board of Directors.”

The pertinent portions of the Resolution read:

WHEREAS, in the last quarter of 2005, the representation and entertainment expense of the PHC skyrocketed to P4.3 million, as compared to the previous year's mere P106 thousand;

WHEREAS, some board members established wholly owned PHC subsidiary called Telecommunications Center, Inc. (TCI), where PHC funds are allegedly siphoned; in 18 months, over P73 million had been allegedly advanced to TCI without any accountability report given to PHC and PHILCOMSAT;

WHEREAS, the Philippine Star, in its 12 February 2002 issue reported that the executive committee of Philcomsat has precipitately released P265 million and granted P125 million loan to a relative of an executive committee member; to date there have been no payments given, subjecting the company to an estimated interest income loss of P11.25 million in 2004

WHEREAS, there is an urgent need to protect the interest of the Republic of the Philippines in the PHC, PHILCOMSAT, and POTC from any anomalous transaction, and to conserve or salvage any remaining value of the government's equity position in these corporations from any abuses of power done by their respective board of directors;

WHEREFORE, be it resolved that the proper Senate Committee shall conduct an inquiry in aid of legislation, on the anomalous losses incurred by the Philippine Overseas Telecommunications Corporation (POTC), Philippine Communications Satellite Corporation (PHILCOMSAT), and Philcomsat Holdings Corporations (PHC) due to the alleged improprieties in the operations by their respective board of directors.

Adopted.

(Sgd) MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO

On May 8, 2006, Chief of Staff Rio C. Inocencio, under the authority of Senator Richard J. Gordon, wrote Chairman Camilo L. Sabio of the PCGG, one of the herein petitioners, inviting him to be one of the resource persons in the public meeting jointly conducted by the Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services. The purpose of the public meeting was to deliberate on Senate Res. No. 455.[2][6]

On May 9, 2006, Chairman Sabio and other commissioners of the PCGG declined the invitation because of prior commitment.[3][7] At the same time, they invoked Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1

On September 12, 2006, at around 10:45 a.m., Major General Balajadia arrested Chairman Sabio in his office at IRC Building, No. 82 EDSA, Mandaluyong City and brought him to the Senate premises where he was detained.

Hence, Chairman Sabio filed with the Supreme Court a petition for habeas corpus against the Senate Committee on Government Corporations and Public Enterprises and Committee on Public Services, their Chairmen, Senators Richard Gordon and Joker P. Arroyo and Members.

I S S U E S and HELD

Perched on one arm of the scale of justice is Article VI, Section 21 of the 1987 Constitution granting respondent Senate Committees the power of legislative inquiry. It reads:

The Senate or the House of Representatives or any of its respective committees may conduct inquiries in aid of legislation in accordance with its duly published rules of procedure. The rights of persons appearing in or affected by such inquiries shall be respected.

On the other arm of the scale is Section 4(b) of E.O. No.1 limiting such power of legislative inquiry by exempting all PCGG members or staff from testifying in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding, thus:

No member or staff of the Commission shall be required to testify or produce evidence in any judicial, legislative or administrative proceeding concerning matters within its official cognizance.

To determine whether there exists a clear and unequivocal repugnancy between the two quoted provisions that warrants a declaration that Section 4(b) has been repealed by the 1987 Constitution, a brief consideration of the Congress' power of inquiry is imperative.

The Congress' power of inquiry has been recognized in foreign jurisdictions long before it reached our shores through McGrain v. Daugherty,15 cited in Arnault v. Nazareno.16 In those earlier days, American courts considered the power of inquiry as inherent in the power to legislate. The 1864 case of Briggs v. MacKellar17 explains the breath and basis of the power, thus:

Where no constitutional limitation or restriction exists, it is competent for either of the two bodies composing the legislature to do, in their separate capacity, whatever may be essential to enable them to legislate..It is well-established principle of this parliamentary law, that either house may institute any investigation having reference to its own organization, the conduct or qualification of its members, its proceedings, rights, or privileges or any matter affecting the public interest upon which it may be important that it should have exact information, and in respect to which it would be competent for it to legislate. The right to pass laws, necessarily implies the right to obtain information upon any matter which may become the subject of a law. It is essential to the full and intelligent exercise of the legislative function..In American legislatures the investigation of public matters before committees, preliminary to legislation, or with the view of advising the house appointing the committee is, as a parliamentary usage, well established as it is in England, and the right of either house to compel witnesses to appear and testify before its committee, and to punish for disobedience has been frequently enforced..The right of inquiry, I think, extends to other matters, in respect to which it may be necessary, or may be deemed advisable to apply for legislative aid.

Remarkably, in Arnault, this Court adhered to a similar theory. Citing McGrain, it recognized that the power of inquiry is "an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function," thus:

Although there is no provision in the "Constitution expressly investing either House of Congress with power to make investigations and exact testimony to the end that it may exercise its legislative functions advisedly and effectively, such power is so far incidental to the legislative function as to be implied. In other words, the power of inquiry - with process to enforce it - is an essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function. A legislative body cannot legislate wisely or effectively in the absence of information respecting the conditions which the legislation is intended to affect or change; and where the legislation body does not itself possess the requisite information - which is not infrequently true - recourse must be had to others who possess it."

Dispelling any doubt as to the Philippine Congress' power of inquiry, provisions on such power made their maiden appearance in Article VIII, Section 12 of the 1973 Constitution.18 Then came the 1987 Constitution incorporating the present Article VI, Section 12. What was therefore implicit under the 1935 Constitution, as influenced by American jurisprudence, became explicit under the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions.

Notably, the 1987 Constitution recognizes the power of investigation, not just of Congress, but also of "any of its committee." This is significant because it constitutes a direct conferral of investigatory power upon the committees and it means that the mechanisms which the Houses can take in order to effectively perform its investigative function are also available to the committees.

It can be said that the Congress' power of inquiry has gained more solid existence and expansive construal. The Court's high regard to such power is rendered more evident in Senate v. Ermita,21 where it categorically ruled that "the power of inquiry is broad enough to cover officials of the executive branch." Verily, the Court reinforced the doctrine in Arnault that "the operation of government, being a legitimate subject for legislation, is a proper subject for investigation" and that "the power of inquiry is co-extensive with the power to legislate."

Considering these jurisprudential instructions, we find Section 4(b) directly repugnant with Article VI, Section 21. Section 4(b) exempts the PCGG members and staff from the Congress' power of inquiry. This cannot be countenanced. Nowhere in the Constitution is any provision granting such exemption. The Congress' power of inquiry, being broad, encompasses everything that concerns the administration of existing laws as well as proposed or possibly needed statutes.22 It even extends "to government agencies created by Congress and officers whose positions are within the power of Congress to regulate or even abolish."23 PCGG belongs to this class.

Certainly, a mere provision of law cannot pose a limitation to the broad power of Congress, in the absence of any constitutional basis.

Furthermore, Section 4(b) is also inconsistent with Article XI, Section 1 of the Constitution stating that: "Public office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty, and efficiency, act with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives."

The provision presupposes that since an incumbent of a public office is invested with certain powers and charged with certain duties pertinent to sovereignty, the powers so delegated to the officer are held in trust for the people and are to be exercised in behalf of the government or of all citizens who may need the intervention of the officers. Such trust extends to all matters within the range of duties pertaining to the office. In other words, public officers are but the servants of the people, and not their rulers.24 chanroblesvirtuallawlibary

Section 4(b), being in the nature of an immunity, is inconsistent with the principle of public accountability. It places the PCGG members and staff beyond the reach of courts, Congress and other administrative bodies. Instead of encouraging public accountability, the same provision only institutionalizes irresponsibility and non-accountability. In Presidential Commission on Good Government v. Peña,25 Justice Florentino P. Feliciano characterized as "obiter" the portion of the majority opinion barring, on the basis of Sections 4(a) and (b) of E.O. No. 1, a civil case for damages filed against the PCGG and its Commissioners. He eloquently opined:

The above underscored portions are, it is respectfully submitted, clearly obiter. It is important to make clear that the Court is not here interpreting, much less upholding as valid and constitutional, the literal terms of Section 4 (a), (b) of Executive Order No.1. If Section 4 (a) were given its literal import as immunizing the PCGG or any member thereof from civil liability "for anything done or omitted in the discharge of the task contemplated by this Order," the constitutionality of Section 4 (a) would, in my submission, be

open to most serious doubt. For so viewed, Section 4 (a) would institutionalize the irresponsibility and non-accountability of members and staff of the PCGG, a notion that is clearly repugnant to both the 1973 and 1987 Constitution and a privileged status not claimed by any other official of the Republic under the 1987 Constitution. x xx.

x xxxxx

It would seem constitutionally offensive to suppose that a member or staff member of the PCGG could not be required to testify before the Sandiganbayan or that such members were exempted from complying with orders of this Court.

Chavez v. Sandiganbayan26 reiterates the same view. Indeed, Section 4(b) has been frowned upon by this Court even before the filing of the present petitions.

Corollarily, Section 4(b) also runs counter to the following constitutional provisions ensuring the people's access to information:

Article II, Section 28

Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law, the State adopts and implements a policy of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

Article III, Section 7

The right of the people to information on matters of public concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to documents, and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as may be provided by law.

These twin provisions of the Constitution seek to promote transparency in policy-making and in the operations of the government, as well as provide the people sufficient information to enable them to exercise effectively their constitutional rights. Armed with the right information, citizens can participate in public discussions leading to the formulation of government policies and their effective implementation. In Valmonte v. Belmonte, Jr.27 the Court explained that an informed citizenry is essential to the existence and proper functioning of any democracy, thus:

An essential element of these freedoms is to keep open a continuing dialogue or process of communication between the government and the people. It is in the interest of the State that the channels for free political discussion be maintained to the end that the government may perceive and be responsive to the people's will. Yet, this open dialogue can be effective only to the extent that the citizenry is informed and thus able to formulate its will intelligently. Only when the participants in the discussion are aware of the issues and have access to information relating thereto can such bear fruit.

Consequently, the conduct of inquiries in aid of legislation is not only intended to benefit Congress but also the citizenry. The people are equally concerned with this proceeding and have the right to participate therein in order to protect their interests. The extent of their participation will largely depend on the information gathered and made known to them. In other words, the right to information

really goes hand-in-hand with the constitutional policies of full public disclosure and honesty in the public service. It is meant to enhance the widening role of the citizenry in governmental decision-making as well as in checking abuse in the government.28 The cases of Tañada v. Tuvera29 and Legaspi v. Civil Service Commission30 have recognized a citizen's interest and personality to enforce a public duty and to bring an action to compel public officials and employees to perform that duty.

Section 4(b) limits or obstructs the power of Congress to secure from PCGG members and staff information and other data in aid of its power to legislate. Again, this must not be countenanced. In Senate v. Ermita,31 this Court stressed:

To the extent that investigations in aid of legislation are generally conducted in public, however, any executive issuance tending to unduly limit disclosures of information in such investigations necessarily deprives the people of information which, being presumed to be in aid of legislation, is presumed to be a matter of public concern. The citizens are thereby denied access to information which they can use in formulating their own opinions on the matter before Congress - opinions which they can then communicate to their representatives and other government officials through the various legal means allowed by their freedom of expression.

A statute may be declared unconstitutional because it is not within the legislative power to enact; or it creates or establishes methods or forms that infringe constitutional principles; or its purpose or effect violates the Constitution or its basic principles.32 As shown in the above discussion, Section 4(b) is inconsistent with Article VI, Section 21 (Congress' power of inquiry), Article XI, Section 1 (principle of public accountability), Article II, Section 28 (policy of full disclosure) and Article III, Section 7 (right to public information).

Sec. 19. Privilege Against Self-Incrimination

A witness can invoke his right against self-incrimination only when a question tends to elicit an answer that will incriminate him is propounded to him. However, he may offer to answer any question in an executive session.

No person can refuse to testify or be placed under oath or affirmation or answer questions before an incriminatory question is asked. His invocation of such right does not by itself excuse him from his duty to give testimony.

In such a case, the Committee, by a majority vote of the members present there being a quorum, shall determine whether the right has been properly invoked. If the Committee decides otherwise, it shall resume its investigation and the question or questions previously refused to be answered shall be repeated to the witness. If the latter continues to refuse to answer the question, the Committee may punish him for contempt for contumacious conduct.

The same directors and officers contend that the Senate is barred from inquiring into the same issues being litigated before the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan. Suffice it to state that the Senate Rules of Procedure Governing Inquiries in Aid of Legislation provide that the filing or pendency of any prosecution of criminal or administrative action should not stop or abate any inquiry to carry out a legislative purpose.

Let it be stressed at this point that so long as the constitutional rights of witnesses, like Chairman Sabio and his Commissioners, will be respected by respondent Senate Committees, it their duty to cooperate with them in their efforts to obtain the facts needed for intelligent legislative action. The unremitting obligation of every citizen is to respond to subpoenae, to respect the dignity of the Congress and its Committees, and to testify fully with respect to matters within the realm of proper investigation.

In fine, PCGG Chairman CamiloSabio and Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, NarcisoNario, Nicasio Conti, and Tereso Javier; and Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni, PCGG's nominees to Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, as well as its directors and officers, must

comply with the Subpoenae Ad Testificandum issued by respondent Senate Committees directing them to appear and testify in public hearings relative to Senate Resolution No. 455.

WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 174340 for habeas corpus is DISMISSED, for being moot. The petitions in G.R Nos. 174318 and 174177 are likewise DISMISSED.

Section 4(b) of E.O. No. 1 is declared REPEALED by the 1987 Constitution. Respondent Senate Committees' power of inquiry relative to Senate Resolution 455 is upheld. PCGG Chairman Camilo L. Sabio and Commissioners Ricardo Abcede, NarcisoNario, Nicasio Conti and Tereso Javier; and Manuel Andal and Julio Jalandoni, PCGG's nominees to Philcomsat Holdings Corporation, as well as its directors and officers, petitioners in G.R. No. 174177, are ordered to comply with the Subpoenae Ad Testificandum issued by respondent Senate Committees directing them to appear and testify in public hearings relative to Senate Resolution No. 455.