ROBERT K KRICK was born...ROBERT K KRICK was born in California, and has been responsible for the preservation of several battlefields in Virginia for more than 30 years. He is the

ROBERT K KRICK was bornin California, and has beenresponsible for the preservationof several battlefields in Virginiafor more than 30 years.He is the author of a dozenbooks and more than 100published articles. HisStonewall Jackson at Cedar

Mountain won the DouglasSouthall Freeman Award forBest Book in Southern History.

PROFESSOR ROBERT O'NEILL,AO D.Phil, is the ChicheleProfessor of the History of Warat the University of Oxford andSeries Editor of the EssentialHistories. His wealth ofknowledge and expertise shapesthe series content, and providesup-to-the-minute researchand theory. Born in 1936 anAustralian citizen, he served inthe Australian army (1955-68)and has held a number ofeminent positions in historycircles. He has been ChicheleProfessor of the History of Warand a Fellow of All SoulsCollege, Oxford since 1987.He is the author of many booksincluding works on the Germanarmy and the Nazi party, andthe Korean and Vietnam wars.

Essential Histories

The American Civil WarThe war in the East 1863-1865

First published in Great Britain in 2001 by Osprey Publishing,

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01 02 03 04 05 10 9This volume is one of four books on the American Civil War in

the Osprey Essential Histories series

Contents

Introduction

Chronology

Warring sides

From innocents to warriors

The fighting

The war without Jackson to Lee's last stand

Portrait of a soldier

McHenry Howard's war

The world around war

T h i s h o r r i d a n d senseless w a r ...'

Portrait of a civilian

Ella Washington and the Federal Army

How the war ended

From Appomattox to Liverpool

Conclusion and consequences

Recovery and reconstruction

Further reading

Index

7

12

14

17

76

81

83

88

89

93

94

The U

nited States in I860

Introduction

Robert Penn Warren, Pulitzer Prize winnerand American Southerner, has suggested thatthe Civil War rivets the attention of readersbecause of the striking human images itoffers for contemplation - 'a dazzling arrayof figures, noble in proportion yet human,caught out of Time as in a frieze, in stancesso profoundly touching or powerfullymythic that they move us in a way no mereconsideration of "historical importance" evercould.' Most of those towering figures whocarry a special aura functioned in the war'sEastern Theater, which is the focus of thisvolume. Lee, Jackson, Grant, and others ofthe American soldiers who fought that warcontinue to fascinate modern students.

The Osprey Essential Histories seriesdivides the story of the American Civil Warinto four volumes. The rupture of the UnitedStates into two nations in 1861, detailed inThe American Civil War: The war in the East1861-May 1863, by Gary Gallagher, led to avast internecine war. Hundreds of thousandsof young men eagerly embraced theadventure of war. They joined volunteerunits near their homes and cheerfully,innocently, headed away to what seemedsurely to be a short, clean conflict. It wouldend, they felt certain, in victory forwhichever of the contending sides theyembraced. The frolicsome aspect of wardissipated in the intense mayhem along BullRun, on the plains of Manassas, in July 1861.For months thereafter, thousands of boys inboth armies died of disease. Many of therustic youngsters-turned-soldiers had neverbeen far from rural homes and they fell preyin droves to common childhood diseasessuch as measles.

Gallagher, The American Civil War,presents the story of the first half of the warin Virginia. After a relatively quiet first yearof the war, the spring of 1862 ushered in

months of steady campaigning in Virginiaand Maryland, across the narrow swath ofcountry between the contending capitalcities of Washington, DC, and Richmond,Virginia. General Robert E. Lee assumedcommand of the Confederate Army ofNorthern Virginia on 1 June 1862, and withit drove the besieging Federal Army of thePotomac away from Richmond. During the11 succeeding months, Lee steadily defeatedan array of opposing generals: George B.McClellan, John Pope, Ambrose E. Burnside,and Joseph Hooker. The arenas in which Leeconquered that succession of enemies areamong the most famous in Americanmilitary history: the Seven Days' Campaign,Second Manassas (or Bull Run), Antietam,Fredericksburg, and Chancellorsville.

This second volume covers the war inthe Eastern Theater from June 1863 to thesurrender at Appomattox in April 186S. Inthe aftermath of Chancellorsville, the warin Virginia was about to undergo afundamental change in tenor. The enormousNorthern advantages in industrial might andpopulation numbers would affect operations.With his invaluable lieutenant, 'Stonewall'Jackson, dead, Lee would find his optionsnarrowed. Hoping to retain the initiative,Lee grasped the momentum offered byChancellorsville and surged northward intoenemy territory. When he returned afterGettysburg, the nature of the war in Virginiawould trend steadily away from Confederateopportunities, and toward eventualUnionist victory.

The great Battle of Gettysburg opened thissecond phase of the story. From Wildernessand Spotsylvania Court House the nextspring, the contending armies moved to anextended siege of Petersburg, and eventuallyto the Confederate surrender at Appomattox.The Confederate Army of Northern Virginia

8 Essential Histories • The American Civil War

Introduction 9

(Public domain)

Introduction 11

followed General Robert E. Lee through theentire period. That army's sturdy, if ill-led,counterpart was the Union Army of thePotomac. General George G. Meade tookover the Army of the Potomac just a fewhours before its great victory at Gettysburg,and retained that command to the end ofthe war. The arrival of the commander of allUnion armies, General U. S. Grant, in thefield near the Army of the Potomac in thespring of 1864 overshadowed Meade and henever has received the immense credit thathe deserves for winning the war.

Wars invariably generate momentum oftheir own, leading to results that neither sideenvisioned, or would have tolerated, at theoutset. By 1864 the old-fashioned war of1861-63, caparisoned with the trappings ofantique chivalry, had given way to whataptly has been called 'the first modern war.'Railroads for the first time played anessential role. Industrial and mechanicalmight weighed in as heavily as tacticalprowess and strategic skill. Troops who hadbeen scornful of earthworks in 1861frantically dug dirt in 1864 at everyopportunity, to protect themselves. Perhapsmost significantly, most in the modern vein,civilians and their property became thetargets of military power.

As have most attempts to winindependence and freedom over thecenturies, the efforts to create a Confederatenation had to rely upon wearing down thewill of their foe. Southerners had nothingremotely like the means to (or any interest in)subjugate their opponents as a vassal state;they merely longed to be let alone. Perhapsthe most important day in the second half ofthe war, therefore, was 8 November 1864,when the Northern populace voted a secondterm for President Abraham Lincoln - whohad been certain a few weeks earlier that hewould lose. With the aggressive war party stillin power in the North, determined to win thewar, Confederates had no hope of beating anenemy with thrice the military populationand virtually all of the continent'sindustrial capacity.

The surrender at Appomattox followedinevitably, leaving behind legendarybattles and leaders who remain among themost-studied military topics in the Englishlanguage. The war also left a ghastly harvestof more than 620,000 dead men in its wake,by far the largest proportional loss inAmerican history; freed several million blackmen and women from slavery; and createdan unmistakable watershed in UnitedStates history.

From June 1862 to May 1863. Confederate GeneralRobert E. Lee had steadily defeated an array of opposingFederal generals. (Author's collection)

Chronology

1863 10 May Confederate General'Stonewall' Jackson dies9 June Cavalry battle at BrandyStation14-15 June Second Battle ofWinchester28 June General George G. Meadereplaces Joseph Hooker in commandof the Federal Army of the Potomac inthe midst of the campaign, just beforethe war's largest battle1-3 July Battle of Gettysburg13-14 July Lee's Confederates recrossthe Potomac river into Virginia,ending the main phase of theGettysburg campaign. At the sametime, frenzied mobs in New York Cityriot in opposition to conscription,killing or wounding hundreds ofvictims, many of them black citizensresented as a visible cause of the warand the draft.8-14 September Lee detaches GeneralLongstreet with one-third of thearmy's infantry to go west andreinforce Confederate operations inGeorgia and Tennessee. Meade movessouth against Lee, but only heavyskirmishing results.14 October Battle of Bristoe Station7 November Battle of RappahannockStation19 November President Lincolndelivers the Gettysburg Address26 November-2 December Battle ofMine Run8 November President Lincoln issuesa Proclamation of Amnesty andReconstruction, offering pardons toany Confederate willing to take anoath of allegiance

1864 9 March Grant is commissioned

lieutenant-general, to command allFederal armies. He would make hisheadquarters with the Army of thePotomac, and soon exert virtuallydirect command over it.4-6 May Battle of the Wilderness8-21 May Battle of SpotsylvaniaCourt House11 May Battle of Yellow Tavern;General J. E. B. Stuart is mortallywounded and dies the next day15 May Battle of New Market23-27 May Battle of the North AnnaRiver1-3 June Battle of Cold Harbor5 June Battle of Piedmont12 June Army of the Potomac startsmove to cross James river15-18 June Opening engagementsaround Petersburg, while ConfederateGeneral Jubal Early arrives nearLynchburg to launch his longand crucial campaign in theShenandoah valley22-23 June Battle for the WeldonRailroad near Petersburg9 July Battle of Monocacy11-12 July Early's Confederates standon the outskirts of Washington;President Lincoln comes underlong-range fire24 July Second Battle of Kernstown30 July Dramatic explosion of mineat Petersburg turns into the Battle ofthe Crater18-25 August Battles of the WeldonRailroad and Reams' Station23 August Lincoln submits to hiscabinet a sealed memo stating that 'itseems exceedingly probable that thisAdministration will not be re-elected,'and pledging support after the electionto the president-elect

Chronology 13

14-17 September The Beefsteak Raid19 September Third Battle ofWinchester22 September Battle of Fisher's Hill29 September-7 October Fightingaround Richmond and Petersburg atFort Harrison, Chaffin's Bluff, NewMarket Heights, Darbytown Road, andBoydton Plank Road9 October Cavalry fight at Tom's Brook19 October Battle of Cedar Creek27 October Battle of Burgess' Mill8 November President Lincolnre-elected with 55 percent of popularvote

1865 5-7 February Battle of Hatcher's Run6 February Lee appointedCommander-in-Chief of allConfederate armies by Congress,against President Davis's wishes - fartoo late to affect the prosecution ofthe war2 March Early's last remnantdestroyed at the Battle of Waynesboro4 March Lincoln's Second InauguralAddress, 'With malice toward none ...'

13 March Confederate Congressapproves raising of black troops25 March Attack on Fort Stedmannear Petersburg29-31 March The final campaign inVirginia begins with fighting aroundDinwiddie Court House1 April Battle of Five Forks2 April Confederate governmentevacuates Richmond9 April Lee surrenders to Grant atAppomattox Court House14 April Lincoln assassinated atFord's Theater in Washington

1866 2 April State governmentshaving been installed to meetUnionist directives, PresidentAndrew Johnson officially proclaims'that the insurrection ... is at anend and is henceforth to beso regarded'

1877 The last enforced military governmentin the ex-Confederate states isremoved, and home rule is restored atthe state level

Warring sides

From innocents to warriors

No American war, and few of any other sort,has ever been fought with a lowerproportion of trained soldiers than theAmerican Civil War. The United States hadfrom its origins suffered from a deep mistrustof standing armies and professional militarymen. The nation also wallowed in anostalgic, but misguided, fondness for thenotion of an untrained but devoted citizen-militia. At the outbreak of war in 1861, theUnited States Army included fewer than15,000 officers and men; a few months laterthere would be more than one hundredtimes that many men under arms - far toomany troops for the regular army to serve asan effective cadre.

A computerized index of official servicerecords of both the Union and Confederatearmies, completed in the year 2000, has forthe first time made available hard data aboutthe number of men mustered into serviceduring the war. This is a subject about whicharguments have raged among partisans ofeach side, and of various states, since the waryears without any means of clear resolution.We now know that 1,231,006 Confederateservice records exist, and 2,918, 862 Federalrecords. Virginia supplied the largestConfederate increment, followed by Georgiaand Tennessee. New York (456,720) ledFederal recruitment, followed by-Pennsylvania and Ohio. Those threeNorthern states, in fact, among themsupplied almost as many troops as the entireConfederacy could muster. It should berecognized that the number of records doesnot indicate a precise number of men. SomeNorthern troops re-enlisted in different unitsat the expiration of a term of enlistment,and many Southern soldiers changedorganizations in the spring of 1862 underthe working of the new conscription law.Even so, the newly established totals of

Warring sides 15

service records constitute the firstunmistakable benchmark on the subject.

Civil War soldiers almost withoutexception had been civilians in 1860. Thecensus that year revealed the overwhelmingadvantages the Union enjoyed in numbers.

The seceded states had a population of9.1 million, 5.4 million of them white andtherefore directly available for military

Confederate volunteers head off for war in 1861.(Public domain)


service. The other states counted22.3 million inhabitants, and more than800,000 alien passengers arrived at Northernports during the war. The agrarianConfederacy faced even greater challenges inmateriel. The 1860 census showed the Southwith only 7 percent of the nation's industrialoutput, 8 percent of its shipping, andone-fourth of its railroad mileage.

The capacities of the warring sides,described in detail in The American Civil War:The war in the East 1861-May 1863, hadbegun by 1863 to play a steadily moreimportant role in the progress of theconflict. The United States navy heldunmistakable sway over all navigable waters,without any notable opposition. As a result,the portion of the Virginia Theater viable forConfederate operations extended no farthereast than the fall lines of the several riversflowing nominally eastward through thestate: the Potomac, the Rappahannock, theJames, and the Appomattox. Federalweaponry outmatched Southern equipmentin every way. Union infantry carried riflesalmost exclusively, while a substantialproportion of Confederates still had to makedo with smoothbores (with one-tenth therange). As the conflict wore on, Northerncavalry would enjoy the advantage ofbreech-loading carbines, and eventually ofrepeating weapons. Union artillery firedfarther and more accurately than Southern

cannon, and Northern ordnance usuallyexploded on cue, whereas a Confederatebattalion commander at Chancellorsvillereported that only one in every 15 of hisshells detonated.

By the spring of 1863, the organizationand command of the main armies of theVirginia Theater had taken on distinctivecharacteristics. The Union Army of thePotomac had been tempered into astrong, resolute, military implement, patientin the face of steadily inept leadership.If President Abraham Lincoln would everplace a capable commander over the army,and support him, the veteran organizationstood ready to be the bulwark of thenational cause. The Confederate Army ofNorthern Virginia had long enjoyed superbdirection from Lee, but without StonewallJackson to execute Lee's daring initiatives,a new mode of fighting would nowbe necessary.

As the contending armies in the VirginiaTheater moved north in the late spring of1863, away from Chancellorsville, they werepursuing a long and tortuous road thatwould lead them eventually to Gettysburg.They also were launching a new phase of theAmerican Civil War.

Tredegar Iron Works in Richmond provided invaluablewar materials, but the Confederacy had relatively fewsuch industrial facilities. (Public domain)

The fighting

The war without Jackson toLee's last stand

The spring of 1863

A great, mournful cry went up all across theConfederacy as news spread in May 1863 ofthe death of General Thomas J. 'Stonewall'Jackson, of wounds received at the Battle ofChancellorsville. A Georgia Confederatewrote dolefully on 15 May that 'all hopes ofPeace and Independence have forevervanished.' Another Confederate told his wifeback in Alabama, with more earnestnessthan literary precision: 'Stonewall Jacksonwas kild ... I think this will have a gradeal todue with this war. I think the north willwhip us soon.' General Robert E. Lee facedthe daunting task of reorganizing hisarmy in Jackson's absence, and filling itwith a sturdy spirit that could keep the'whip us soon' forecast from becoming aself-fulfilling prophecy.

Lee's stunning victory at Chancellorsvilleon 1-6 May, against daunting odds, hadgenerated enough momentum to carry theConfederate Army of Northern Virginianorthward on a new campaign. (ForChancellorsville, see Gallagher, The AmericanCivil War.) Before he could launch such aneffort, though, Lee had to reorganize hisarmy to fill the yawning chasm left byJackson's demise. He decided to go from thetwo-corps system that had worked so longand well for managing his infantry to anorganization in three corps. The veteranGeneral James Longstreet, reliable ifcontentious, kept command of the FirstCorps. General Richard S. Ewell, returningafter nine months of convalescing from awound, assumed command in late May ofJackson's old Second Corps. General A. P. Hillwon promotion to command a new ThirdCorps composed of pieces extracted from theother two, combined with a few new unitsdrawn to Virginia from service elsewhere in

the Confederacy. General J. E. B. Stuartremained in command of the army's capablecavalry arm. Lee's artillery benefited from anexcellent new organization into battalions,and from an officer corps that included manybrilliant young men; but at the same time itsuffered from inferior weaponry and at timesfrom woefully inadequate ammunition.

Across the lines, General Joseph Hooker'sArmy of the Potomac loomed in Lee's way.The seasoned Northerners in that army bynow knew their business thoroughly welland stood ready to continue their role asbulwark of the Federal Union. What theywanted and needed was a competentcommander. At Chancellorsville, Hooker haddemonstrated beyond serious contentionthat he was not such a man. The Army ofthe Potomac would finally receive a leaderwho matched its mettle in late June, but asthe 1863 campaign unfolded, Hooker'spalsied hand remained at the helm. Hisveteran corps commanders offered reliableleadership at the next level below Hooker.

After two consecutive battles along theline of the Rappahannock river, both armiesknew the countryside intimately. Lee hadwon both battles in resounding fashion, buthad not been able to exploit the victoriesinto overwhelming triumphs that destroyedhis enemy. Now he proposed to move northacross the Potomac and carry the war intothe enemy's country. Political hyperbole(including President Lincoln's famous'Gettysburg Address') always insisted that theConfederates hoped to conquer the Northand subjugate that much larger portion ofthe continent to some sort of serfdom. Suchrodomontade, of course, reflected nothing ofactual Southern aims.

Lee's move north must be recognized as araid, not an invasion designed to conquerPennsylvania or any other territory. He sought


The Campaigns in the Virginia Theater 1863-65

The fighting 19

to lift the heel of war from Virginia, not onlyfor humanitarian reasons, but also to allowthat home country to recover from hostileoccupation so that it could sustain Lee's armyin future months. The country north of thePotomac also offered a much wider field for

The Confederate high tide at Chancellorsvillepropelled Lee's army into a new campaign thatswept north past Winchester into Maryland andthen Pennsylvania, where the Federal Army of thePotomac repulsed it in the war's largest battle. Duringthe fall of 1863, the two armies clashed again in Virginiaat Bristoe Station, Rappahannock Station, and Mine Run,but none of those engagements developed into a majorbattle. The next spring, with Commander-in-ChiefU. S. Grant accompanying it. the Army of the Potomaccrossed the Rapidan river and fought at Wildernessand Spotsylvania. Although they could not defeat Lee.the Federals determinedly pushed on to the NorthAnna Riven Cold Harbor; and the outskirts of Richmondand Petersburg. After 10 months attempting tobreak into the Confederate capital, Grant finallysucceeded in April 1865 and Lee was forced tosurrender at Appomattox Court House on the 9th.

The Confederates counterattack at Brandy Station.(Painting by Don Troiani, www.historicalartprints.com)

maneuver, a military element in which Leeexcelled. An ostensible threat to the Federalpolitical capital in Washington also held outpotential advantages: knowing that his enemymust keep the city covered foreshadowed inmirror image the 1864 campaign in whichRichmond served as a similar focus and pivotfor Lee on the defensive.

Lee moved away from Fredericksburg andthe Rappahannock river line early in June1863, and headed northwestward throughpiedmont Virginia toward the Shenandoahvalley. On 9 June his cavalry force foughtone of the largest all-mounted engagementsof the war around Brandy Station. Hookerhad sent his own cavalry out with orders to'disperse and destroy' the Confederates theyfound, and the Northern troopers came closeto doing that. They completely surprised the


usually vigilant Southern mounted menearly in the morning and drove them somedistance. A rally on the low, roundedeminence of Fleetwood Hill saved the day forGeneral Stuart's men. They inflicted about1,000 casualties on the Northern attackersand suffered half that many themselves.

General Joseph Hooker. (Public domain)

Brandy Station ended as a tactical draw, butUnion troopers who had been batteredrelentlessly for two years had finally stoodup to their adversaries and now had apositive experience upon which to build.

The fighting 21

General J. E. B. ('Jeb') Stuart led most of the Confederate cavalry on a long ride around theFederal army en route to Pennsylvania, thus depriving Lee of his 'eyes and ears' as hemaneuvered toward Gettysburg. (Public domain)


The Battle of Gettysburg

'Jeb' Stuart's Southern cavalry again occupiedcenter stage as the armies sidled northwardand crossed the Potomac - or, moreaccurately, Stuart's cavalry exited stage rightand became conspicuous by their absence.While Lee pushed north, into and throughthe Shenandoah valley, Stuart embraced thechance to ride a raid entirely around theUnion army. He had done just that twicebefore, in June and October 1862. This timethe dashing maneuver backfired in deadlyfashion. The cavalry detachmentaccompanying the main force in Stuart'sabsence had neither the men nor theleadership necessary to perform the essentialfunction of screening Lee from enemy view,while simultaneously finding the enemy andtracking his progress and intentions. WhenStuart finally rejoined Lee very tardily atGettysburg, the commanding general saidquietly, but in clear rebuke, 'Well ... you arehere at last,' and 'I had hoped to see youbefore this.' Stuart's ride became one of themost-disputed subjects among postwar

Above. General George Gordon Meade took commandof the Federal Army of the Potomac scant hours beforethe Battle of Gettysburg, but still won a great victorythere. He has never received the credit he deserves forhis achievement, largely because he scorned journalistsand belonged to the wrong political party.(Public domain)

Left. Confederate General James Longstreet's behavioron 2 July remains the most controversial aspect of theBattle of Gettysburg. (Public domain)

Right. The war's largest battle engulfed the farms andhillsides around Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, on the firstthree days of July 1863. The Confederate army won atremendous victory northwest of town on 1 July andswept through the streets in triumph. The Federals madea stand on a fishhook-shaped line south of Gettysburg,taking advantage of the slopes of Cemetery Ridge andanchored on the formidable heights of Culp's Hill andLittle Round Top. Lee's efforts against the Federal righton 2-3 July met with very little success, but near theRound Tops the Confederates came close to a majorsuccess. On 3 July, with his options dwindling, and loathto return to Virginia. Lee flung his center across openfields toward Cemetery Ridge. This attack, usually knownas 'Pickett's Charge,' unfolded with immense drama andelicited tremendous courage from its participants, butyielded nothing for Lee but daunting casualties. He nowhad no choice but to retreat south toward Virginia.

The fighting 23

The Battle of Gettysburg, 1-3 July 1863


Confederates, and remains controversialto this day.

While Stuart galloped fecklessly acrossnorthern Virginia and Maryland andPennsylvania, Lee's infantry achievednotable success at Winchester, Virginia, on14-15 June. Ewell's energy and success there

prompted Southerners to hope that he wouldemerge as a sort of reincarnation ofStonewall Jackson. On through Marylandand deep into Pennsylvania the Confederatecolumns pressed. Some of them reachedCarlisle and York and the outskirts of thestate's capital city, Harrisburg. Fighting

The fighting 25

at the crossroads town of Gettysburg thatbegan on 1 July would draw all of them backsouth into the maw of the war's greatestbattle. The long columns of blue-cladUnion troops marching north throughan arc surrounding Washington also woundup adjusting their route of march for that

place. Gettysburg was a 'meetingengagement' in every sense. No one pickedthe battle site. Roads drew small contending

A nineteenth-century view looking northwest fromthe crest of Little Round Top across the scenes of theheaviest fighting in the history of North America.(Public domain)


formations together and soon everyoneelse pitched in.

The battle of 1 July 1863, consideredalone, must be adjudged one of the Army ofNorthern Virginia's greatest victories. Fightingopened that morning west of Gettysburg, afarming community of about 2,400 souls.

Confederate skirmishers ran into Northerncavalry commanded by salty, unflappableGeneral John Buford. A brigade of Southerninfantry under President Jefferson Davis'snephew, General Joseph Davis, drove forwardwith marked success, but then the greenbrigadier clumsily allowed his men to be

The fighting 27

trapped in a deep cut of an unfinishedrailroad and lost most of them.

Confederate fortunes were abetted when abullet killed Union General John F. Reynolds,a soldierly and much-admired officercommanding everything Federal on the fieldat that early hour. They benefited even more

Confederate General Lewis A. Armistead leads thedesperate 'Pickett's Charge' at the forefront, just beforebeing mortally wounded. (Painting by Don Troiani,www.historicaiartprints.com)

from the superb timing - the result of luck,not prescience - with which the freshSouthern division of General Robert E. Rodesdropped squarely onto the north flank of theFederal position. Intense fighting ensued onboth sides of the road leading fromChambersburg to Gettysburg, with successperching first upon one banner thenanother, but the arrival of Rodes's divisionand other associated troops at a fortuitouspoint doomed Federal resistance. Eventuallythe whole Union line west of town collapsedand the Confederates enjoyed a field daychasing their fleeing foe into Gettysburg.Alexander Schimmelfennig, a Prussian-borngeneral, eluded capture by hiding in a pigsty.Thousands of other men in blue becameprisoners of war.

One of the battle's most-discussed turningpoints came as Confederates converged onGettysburg from the north and west, andcontemplated riding the crest of the tidalwave of momentum they had created. Leecharacteristically left to the discretion of hisnew corps commander, General Ewell, theresponsibility for continuing the advance.Possession of the crest of a long ridge thatcurled around Gettysburg and ran east to EastCemetery Hill and Gulp's Hill wouldguarantee control of the military terrain for aconsiderable distance. Ewell equivocated,consulted, temporized - and never attacked.For the next two days, his troops would suffermightily against the same two hills, by thenstrongly occupied, attacking again and againwhere he had not chosen to fight under farbetter terms. On the evening of 1 July, Ewelldid nothing. His inaction remains highlycontroversial today. The counter-factualquestion, 'What would Jackson have donehad he been there?' is, of course,unanswerable. A North Carolina soldier whofought there thought he knew. 'We missedthe genius of Jackson,' he wrote a few dayslater. 'The simplest soldier in the ranks felt it.'


Federals scrambling to get to Gettysburgto blunt Lee's burgeoning success faced farbetter prospects than they would have a fewdays earlier. A Federal turning point in thecampaign, indeed in the entire war inVirginia, had come on 27 June when GeneralHooker submitted his resignation in a fit ofpique over having his wishes ignored.President Lincoln delightedly accepted theresignation and on 28 June General GeorgeGordon Meade reluctantly took command ofthe Army of the Potomac.

Three days later Meade was fighting thewar's largest battle. No American officer, inany war or era, has ever had so much crucialresponsibility thrust upon him with suchshort notice. Meade met the challengemasterfully, beyond any imaginable degreethat could have been expected, and far moreably than Hooker could have done. Heconfronted Lee's army at the high tide ofSouthern success, positioned deep in Federalcountry, and with Confederate numericalstrength at a peak. At Gettysburg, Meadereached the battlefield as Lee swepteverything before him late on 1 July. Againstthose odds the brand-new Federalcommander won a pivotal battle.

Meade's challenge early on 2 July was torestore confidence in his army and placeit carefully on the powerful positionavailable to him. The Federal line aroundGettysburg resembled a fishhook. The shankof the fishhook ran straight south from townalong Cemetery Ridge and ended on themassive anchor of two commanding hills,Big Round Top and Little Round Top. Thehook curled around Gettysburg, turning eastto another superb anchor at Culp's Hill.Meade's line enjoyed the obvious tacticaladvantage of high ground. Its hook alsoensured the ability to exploit interior lines,with the invaluable privilege of reinforcingfrom one point to another directly andunder cover. The sole tactical defect of theline was its vulnerability to artillery roundspouring in from across a wide arc - the'converging fire' that is an artillerist'sideal. That defect never came into play.Confederate artillery, out-gunned and

As a member of the US Congress before the war, Daniel

E. Sickles had murdered his wife's lover and got away

with the crime. At Gettysburg, he aggressively advanced

his division on 2 July and became the target of a savage

Confederate attack. (Public domain)

tacitly commanded by an ineffectualpreacher-general, never levied convergingfire against Meade's fishhook.

Although the great Confederate charge of3 July garners the most attention, Gettysburgcame to its decisive juncture on 2 July as Leetried to exploit the advantages gained on the1st. Meade resisted stoutly and to goodeffect, aided to some degree by Confederatefailings. On the Federal right, Southernassaults against Culp's Hill faltered aftermuch desperate bravery on both sides. Theattack never came close to substantialsuccess. At dusk, two brigades of Rebelspressed determinedly up the steep face ofEast Cemetery Hill - precisely where Ewellhad feared to go the previous day under farmore advantageous circumstances. Despitecanister flung into their flanks, and Federal

The fighting 29

musketry in front, the Confederates reachedthe crest and held there for some time beforeNorthern reinforcements flocked to the sitein enough numbers to expel them.Meanwhile, the most portentousConfederate initiative during the Battle ofGettysburg had faltered far down on theFederal left, near the Round Tops.

At Chancellorsville, Lee had won a greatvictory by deploying to the point of decision aflanking column led by his most trustedsubordinate, Stonewall Jackson. With Jacksondead, James Longstreet was clearly Lee'sprimary military asset. Longstreet did not wantto fight on the offensive, however, andapparently spent 1-3 July sulking over Lee'svariant view of things. Such defensivetriumphs as the Battle of Fredericksburgappealed to Longstreet (and every otherConfederate), but how often would one find apliant Ambrose Burnside willing to slaughterhis own army? Longstreet did not wish to takethe initiative at all, so only grudgingly - andvery tardily - moved away with Lee'smaneuver element. The army commanderremained near his other corps commanders,both of them brand new. After a sluggishmarch, marked by confusion and backtracking,Longstreet's column arrived opposite theFederal left in front of the two Round Tops.

The nature of the violent combat thatswept across the fields and hills south ofGettysburg on 2 July was affected in afundamental way by the impulsive actionsof Federal General Daniel E. Sickles. TheGeneral came not from a militarybackground but from the political realm,having been a powerful Congressman fromNew York. Sickles' legacy includes not justhis Civil War service, but also a series ofbumptious endeavors: he killed his wife'slover before the war, and escaped on a pleaof temporary insanity; as postwar USambassador to Spain, he had an affair withthat country's queen; and he played thecentral role in preserving Gettysburgbattlefield early in the twentieth century. InJuly 1863, Sickles always insisted, he hadsaved the battle itself for the Union, bypushing forward in front of the main line

General George E. Pickett, a foppish fellow of starkly

limited capacity, became one of the most famous names

in American military history because of the mighty

charge on 3 July 1863. He and his division did little else

during the wan (Public domain)

without Meade's permission. As Longstreetslowly approached action, Sickles movedforward into his path.

The assault by Longstreet's Confederatesdrove Sickles off his new position, and costthe Federal general his leg (after the war, aCongressman once again, Sickles tookvisiting constituents to the medical museumin Washington to show them his leg bones,donated as an exhibit). General WilliamBarksdale of Mississippi, as fiery an antebellum politician as Sickles had been, leda dramatic charge into Sickles' line.Southerners swept east and northeast ina wide arc that resulted in bitter fightingacross a landscape that became foreverfamous: The Peach Orchard; The Wheatfield;Devil's Den; Little Round Top. The latterposition held the key to that sector of thebattlefield, looking down on the others andalso commanding Cemetery Ridge to thenorth. After a desperate struggle,Confederates from Texas and Alabamareceded from the crest of the hill, leaving aghastly harvest of prostrate comrades behindthem. As darkness fell, the Federals held the

The fighting 31

key ground and Lee's great opportunity hadpassed. Controversy still rages over theefficacy of Sickles' relocation, and aboutLongstreet's lassitude in moving to battle.

Impeccable hindsight shows convincinglythat Lee's decision to attack the next day,

Confederate Colonel Waller T. Patton fell dreadfullywounded at the height of 'Pickett's Charge.' He died18 days later as a prisoner of war

Depiction of one segment of the fighting on July 3, from

the immense 19th-century cyclorama painting by

Philippoleaux, the largest piece of Gettysburg art and

probably the most famous. (Ann Ronan Picture Library)

3 July, against Meade's center, was his worstof the war. He doubtless undertook theforlorn hope because it seemed the onlyremaining option he had to get at hisenemy. The Army of Northern Virginia had


reached the end of a very long supply limb,about 120 miles (190km) from the nearestrailroad-served depot back in theShenandoah valley. Stocks of commissary,quartermaster, and ordnance stores(particularly artillery ammunition) haddwindled and could not be renewed.Overwhelming tactical success on 1 July hadyielded the opportunity for an even greatertriumph on 2 July, but that opportunitydissolved under frustrating circumstances.Lee's infantry had never failed to do what heasked of them. Might not a full freshdivision of them, just arrived on the field,with support from other units and massedartillery, break the Federal center?

In the event, they could not. About12,000 Confederates tried, in the mostrenowned attack in all of American militaryhistory. 'Pickett's Charge' actually includedabout as many men from other units as fromGeneral George E. Pickett's division, whichprompted postwar quarrels about the event'sfamous name. Confederate Colonel E. PorterAlexander massed artillery for a thunderousadvance barrage, which used up much of thetenuous supply of shells. The barrage alsofired too high against a target obscured bysmoke and dust. When the infantry steppedout, they faced a maelstrom of shell-fire,then canister at closer range, and finallymusketry in sheets as they charged past thehumble farmhouse of the Codori family. AVirginian in Pickett's command wrote: 'Onswept the column over ground covered withdead and dying men, where the earthseemed to be on fire, the smoke dense andsuffocating, the sun shut out, flames blazingon every side, friend could hardly bedistinguished from foe.'

Generals Lewis A. Armistead and RichardB. Garnett suffered mortal wounds at thefront of the attack. Garnett's body was neverrecovered from the carnage, although hissword turned up in a pawn shop years later.Fully one-half of their men went down aswell (Northern losses reached perhaps 1,500).A handful of brave Confederates broke intothe Federal line for a time and hand-to-handfighting raged around a battery near an angle

in a stone fence. A Northern major marveledat how 'the rebels ... stood there, against thefence, until they were nearly all shot down.'They had reached what often has been called'the high-water mark of the Confederacy.'

When the survivors turned back in sullenretreat, they suffered as dreadfully as on theway in. Among the Southern officersmangled was Colonel Waller Tazewell Patton,one of six brothers in the army and a great-uncle of the General Patton famous duringthe Second World War. The Colonel hadgrasped a cousin's hand, said 'it is our turnnext,' and leaped over the stone wall at theattack's high-water mark, then went downwith his lower jaw shot away. As he laydying in a Federal hospital, unable to talk,'Taz' scribbled a note to his mother: 'myonly regret is that there are no more brothersleft to defend our country.'

Fighting continued on 3 July in lesservolume on the far Federal right at Culp's Hill,and Jeb Stuart's cavalry engaged mounted foewell behind the main Union line, butPickett's Charge proved to be the final majorengagement of the Battle of Gettysburg. Eacharmy had lost about 25,000 men. During thenight of 4-5 July, Lee's army began to retreattoward the Potomac river through a violentrainstorm. The miles-long column of wagonsbearing suffering and dying men became atrain of utter misery. Meade pursued withsome energy. Skirmishing flared along theroute each day, but by 14 July Lee hadmanaged to cross the rain-swollen river backinto Virginia across a set of precariouspontoon bridges.

General Meade came in for more calumnythan praise. President Lincoln was disgustedthat he had not captured the entireConfederate force, which looked far easier ona Washington map than on a muddyMaryland ridgeline. George Meade had wonthe war's largest battle, scant hours aftertaking command, and had done so againstan enemy army that had been inevitablytriumphant theretofore; but politicians andpress, followed eventually by many historicalwriters, grumbled that he should havedone more.

The fighting 33

Meade commanded the Army of thePotomac for the rest of the war as by far itsmost successful leader. In a very real sense,he saved the Union - yet he has neverreceived much recognition for hisachievement. That is probably becauseGeneral U. S. Grant subsequently came eastat a convenient moment, when numbers andmateriel made it possible to end the war bysimply shooting down many tens ofthousands of men on both sides untilarithmetic held sway.

The fall and winter of 1863-64

The perspective of years seems to suggest thatGettysburg turned the war onto a new axis,especially when taken with Federal conquestof the Mississippi river through the fall ofVicksburg on 4 July. History is, of course, livedforward but written backward. Americansstruggling to further their opposite causes in1863 saw little of what is now said to havebeen obvious. Confederates who fought atGettysburg, and their families writing fromhome, rued the reverse they had suffered, butalmost never displayed any notion ofimpending doom. When the Yankees cameback across the Potomac, they believed, theinvaders would be as susceptible to defeat asthey always had been - and the veteranConfederate army set about to prove it.

Back on Virginian soil, Lee resumed hisadroit maneuvering to counter each Unionistinitiative, and proved to be almost uniformlysuccessful in foiling his enemy. The armiesedged southward and eastward, out of theShenandoah valley and into piedmontcountry, finally fetching up about 40 miles(64km) of latitude south of the Potomac.Through the late summer and fall of 1863,operations centered on a corridor betweenWarrenton and Culpeper and Orange. Noneof the sallies and probes evolved into amajor engagement. Lee dispatchedLongstreet in early September with one-thirdof the army's infantry to the WesternTheater, where the reinforcements wouldarrive just in time to play a crucial role in

General Ambrose Powell Hill had been one

of Lee's most capable division leaders, but at Bristoe

Station and elsewhere he failed to perform up to his

commander's expectations. (Public domain)

the Battle of Chickamauga. Two Federalcorps followed Longstreet west, where theyspent the rest of the war. Longstreet returnedto Virginia in the following spring.

Lee's reduced strength threw him squarelyon the defensive. Meade promptly pushedhis foe south of the Rapidan river inmid-September, but on 9 October Leegrasped the initiative again, as he so muchpreferred to do. The Confederates advancedcolumns around both of Meade's flanks,forcing the Federal army to fall back northbeyond Warrenton toward Manassas. A. P.Hill's troops took the lead. Hill had beenalmost invisible at Gettysburg during his firstbattle at the helm of the Third Corps. Now


he had the advance at a portentous momenton 14 October.

Unfortunately, Hill displayed more dashthan judgment. Without reconnoitering theposition, he threw two brigades of NorthCarolinians at a Union force ensconcedbehind a railroad embankment at BristoeStation. The Northerners proved to be theentire Federal II Corps, veteran andunmovable. The Carolinians fell in windrowswithout any hope of success, losing about1,400 men in a short interval. The FederalII Corps then withdrew unmolested. Leeconveyed his sad reaction to Hill in atypically restrained rebuke. As the twogenerals rode across the scene and Hillsought to explain how the disaster unfolded,Lee said quietly: 'Well, well, General, burythese poor men and let us say no moreabout it.'

Three weeks after Bristoe Station, theFederals inflicted another minor disaster onLee's army. Confederates in Virginia wereaccustomed to achieving most of their goals,and had never been driven from a fixed,well-defended position. When Lee fell backacross the Rappahannock river in theaftermath of Bristoe Station, he incautiouslyleft a tête-de-pont on the river's north bank atRappahannock Station. A reliable brigade ofLouisiana infantry occupied strongentrenchments north of the river, andartillery posted on the south bank offeredsupporting fire. When General Jubal A. Early,commanding the Confederates in the vicinity,noticed enemy strength concentratingnearby, he sent another brigade of infantryacross to support the Louisianians.

Both brigades were doomed. UnionGeneral John Sedgwick closed in on theposition with his VI Corps on 7 November1864. A bright young West Point graduate(he had just turned 24), Colonel EmoryUpton, led the advance with determinationand swept over the works. OutflankedConfederates raced for safety across thepontoon bridges that connected thebridgehead with the southern bank. Only bymeans of a daring exploit were theSoutherners able to cut loose the pontoon

The youthful Emory Upton had much to do with

the striking Federal success at Rappahannock Station.

He would be heard from again at Spotsylvania Court

House and Cold Harbor and after the war would

play a central role in the reorganization of the

United States Army. (Public domain)

bridges and put the river between themselvesand the victorious enemy. The Federals hadinflicted about 2,000 casualties, most ofthem in the form of prisoners. The youthfulUpton would be heard from again withanother daring attack the following May, andthen as a leader in reorganizing the UnitedStates Army after the war.

With the Rappahannock line breached,Meade could move into the excellentbivouac country south of that river andnorth of the Rapidan. For the next sixmonths, the Rapidan river would constitutethe military frontier in Virginia. (The river

The fighting 35

Modern aerial view of Wilderness Battlefield, looking east down the Orange Turnpike. The open spaceis Saunders Field, where the heaviest fighting raged on 5-6 May 1864. General Grant's headquarterswere situated on the north (left) of the main road, where it bends left near the top of the photo.


had been named in colonial times for BritishQueen Anne. Its rapid flow prompted settlersto call the stream the 'Rapid Anne,'subsequently shortened to Rapidan.)Skirmishing through the fall of 1863 and thefollowing winter only threatened majoroperations once, at the end of November. Onthe 26th, Confederates who had been easinginto what they thought would be winterquarters learned that Meade was moving instrength toward crossings lower on theRapidan, not far west of the familiar groundaround Chancellorsville.

Elements of the contending armiescollided on 27 November at Payne's Farmand a hot, confused fight blossomed. Muchof it raged in densely wooded country.Captain John C. Johnson of the50th Virginia, 'a large and stout man ofabout fifty years of age,' who towered overmost of his men at 6'7" of height, decidedthat his men 'were not doing as well as theyought.' To shame them into maintaining asteadier fire, Johnson stalked to the crest ofthe position, lay down on the ground,'broadside to the enemy,' and told his menthat 'if they were afraid ... they could usehim as a breastwork.' Undaunted andpragmatic, several infantrymen did just that,resting their rifles on Johnson and firing'steadily from that position until the fightwas over.' Johnson survived the gesture, andalso a chest wound he suffered in 1864 andtwo periods as a prisoner of war, to returnhome in 1865.

Once both sides had tested theiropponents around Payne's Farm, theengagement there became the nexus uponwhich a long set of parallel lines spreadacross the countryside just south of theRapidan. During the last three days ofNovember and the first day of December,men in uniforms of both colors spent moretime digging than shooting. A weather frontbrought in bitter cold and whistling wind onthe heels of a long downpour, makingeveryone miserable at the same time that itreduced the potential for major militarymovements on the region's few andpoor roads.

Meade's lines ran north-south, facing westtoward Lee's position. Between the two ranMine Run, which gave its name to theweek-long action. Meade prepared a majorturning movement around the Confederateright (southern) flank for the morning of30 November, but when the time came herecognized that his foe was ready to repulsethe attack from strong works. ThePennsylvanian courageously cancelled theattack and two days later recrossed theRapidan, having lost about 1,500 men southof the river. Lee and most of his soldiers werebitterly disappointed. 'We should never havepermitted those people to get away,'Lee seethed.

Meade recognized that sending the vainassault forward would have been popularwith President Lincoln and elsewhere inWashington, but he wrote officially, 'Icannot be a party to a wanton slaughter ofmy troops for any mere personal end.' To hiswife, Meade admitted, 'I would rather beignominiously dismissed, and sufferanything, than knowingly and wilfully havethousands of brave men slaughtered fornothing.' His estimate doubtless was correct:had he thrown in attacks that cost 10,000 (oreven 15,000) more men, he surely wouldhave enjoyed, and retain to this day, aglossier image. He might have retainedindependent control of the Army of thePotomac and emerged as the war's great heroin the North.

As the armies filed away from the MineRun earthworks, they were ending a year ofcampaigning that had taken them on broadsweeps across Virginia, Maryland, andPennsylvania. Only twice during 1863,however, had they fought full-scale, pitchedengagements. Chancellorsville was thelargest battle ever fought in Virginia, andGettysburg the costliest of the entire war; but1863 had produced far less intense combatthan the armies had experienced in 1862.The soldiers who settled into winter campsin December 1863 faced, unawares, a newyear that would bring far more fighting thanthe year just past, and under far differentcircumstances.

The fighting 37

Into the Wilderness

In May 1864, the Federal army advancedacross the Rapidan river and ended a periodof six months during which that stream had,almost without interruption, constituted themilitary frontier between the United Statesand the Confederate States. General RobertE. Lee's Army of Northern Virginia had spentthe winter spread across the rolling fieldsbeyond the right bank of the river in OrangeCounty, around Orange Court House andGordonsville and Verdiersville. GeneralGeorge G. Meade's Federal Army of thePotomac wintered in the piedmontcountryside north of the Rapidan, centeredon Culpeper Court House.

Southern troops by this time had begunto suffer markedly for want of rations, bothin volume and in quality, at least in partbecause the president of the key rail line incentral Virginia was an ante bellumimmigrant from the North who secretlyaccepted pay from the Federal Secretary ofWar. Northern troops enjoyed infinitelybetter supplies. Their army also underwent aprofound change during this winter. Meaderemained its nominal commander, andwould occupy that role to the war's end. Thenewly minted Commander-in-Chief of allFederal armies, however, established hisheadquarters next to Meade, leaving thearmy commander consigned to a secondaryprofile. Ulysses S. Grant had come east as thehero of benchmark Federal triumphs atVicksburg and Chattanooga to becommissioned into the newly created rank oflieutenant-general. For the rest of the war,Meade's army commonly appeared in thepress as 'Grant's army' because theCommander-in-Chief was with it. Writing onthe war still uses that locution, and in fact itwill appear this way in most instancesthrough the rest of this book.

As spring hardened the roads in 1864,'Grant's army' prepared to take the offensivewith a new-found determination impartedby Grant himself. A reorganizationconsolidated some of the familiar old corpsout of existence, leaving only the II, V, and

VI Corps. General Ambrose E. Burnside'sIX Corps also marched with the army. Theonce-disgraced Burnside had enoughpolitical currency to have landed back incorps command, and to be immune toMeade's orders. He would report directly toGrant, in awkward contravention of themost basic principles of unity of command.

The combined Federal force that crossedthe Rapidan at the beginning of Maynumbered about 120,000 men. Lee couldcounter with only a few more than half asmany troops, including Longstreet's infantry,newly returned from their adventures (andmis-adventures) in Tennessee and Georgia.Grant could - and did - draw oninnumerable reinforcements through thecoming campaign; the Confederatemanpower cupboard by this time hadbecome close to bare.

Grant intended to move south across theRapidan east of Lee's army and slice straightthrough 'the Wilderness' to get between hisenemy and Richmond. That would force Leeto react rapidly under circumstances inwhich his enemy could choose the terms ofengagement. Much late-twentieth-centurywriting has professed to recognize thestriking wisdom that places did not matter,only the enemy's army. Lee and hisgovernment knew better. Richmond must beheld for an array of fundamental reasons,industrial, logistical, military, political, andspiritual. When it in fact fell in April 1865,the war in Virginia ended almostconcurrently. Grant's attempt to force Lee'ssmall army to defend the approaches toRichmond in the spring of 1864 wasprecisely the right formula.

Getting through the Wilderness proved tobe far more difficult than Grant had hoped.The dense second-growth thickets that gavethe region its name covered about 70 squaremiles (180km2) on the south bank of theRapidan-Rappahannock line, about12 miles (19km) wide and six miles (9.5km)deep. When Lee received word that hisadversary had crossed the Rapidan into theWilderness, he hurled his troops eastwardand they struck the Federal right flank like a


The first clash between the war's two most famousleaders, Robert E. Lee and U. S. Grant, unfolded in thedense thickets of 'the Wilderness' on 5-6 May 1864.Grant's plan to slip across Lee's front and getbetween him and the Confederate capital atRichmond crumbled when the Confederates came infrom the west and struck him a violent blow. For twodays the fighting raged in woods and the fewclearings, notably Saunders Field and the Widow TappFarm, and along the corridors of the Orange Turnpikeand the Orange Plank Road. The Federals came closeto success in each of the sectors, which were foughtin virtual isolation from each other because of theunderbrush; but on 6 May Confederate attacksturned and shattered both Federal flanks. On 7 May,Grant moved southeast away from the Wilderness,toward Spotsylvania Court House.

thunderbolt. The Brock Road offered Grantand Meade the only practicable route

southward through the Wilderness. Twoeast-west roads served Lee as corridors ofadvance and attack. The old OrangeTurnpike ran 2.5 miles (4km) north of theparallel Orange Plank Road. Densely scrubbycountry separated them. The intersections ofthe two Orange roads with the Brock Roadnetwork became the focus of the strivings ofboth armies for two days, 5-6 May 1864.

The Battle of the Wilderness erupted onthe Orange Turnpike on the morning of the5th when Federal detachments in thatquarter saw Confederates of General RichardS. Ewell's corps threatening from the west.Grant directed Meade to attack. Meade sentGeneral Gouverneur K. Warren's V Corps.The Confederates had begun to build

The Battle of the Wilderness, 5-6 May 1864

The fighting 39

earthworks along the crest of a ridge at thewestern edge of a 40-acre (16-ha) open spaceknown locally as Saunders Field. WhenWarren's men marched in determined ranksinto the field and started up the other side,they were inaugurating a pattern thatdefined much of the subsequent two days offighting on the Turnpike. Confederatefirepower pouring down the slope intoSaunders Field, from behind defensive works,proved more than flesh and blood couldstand - both at the first attack and throughmany others that followed. An earlyUnionist surge did attain the western crest,killing Southern General John M. Jones andbreaking the line. However, Confederatespounding rapidly eastward on the Turnpikesoon ejected the interlopers and restored theposition.

Much of General John Sedgwick's FederalV Corps went to Warren's aid. Throughout5 May men on both sides, particularly theblue-clad attackers, died in the strugglefor Saunders Field. A section of guns

stranded between the lines served as amagnet for repeated hand-to-hand strife.At day's end, the initial situation aroundthe field remained unchanged despitea daunting expenditure of blood: Federalsheld the eastern edge, Confederatesthe western.

The thickets of the Wilderness, brokenby only a few rude paths and desolatefarmsteads, made maneuvering and fightingon a large scale impracticable between theTurnpike and the Plank Road. Both armiesrecognized the potential advantage of usingthe unoccupied middle ground as a means ofthreatening an exposed enemy rear; bothmade gestures toward exploiting theopportunity; neither ever managed to effecta serious lodgment.

Meanwhile, a separate battle raged on theOrange Plank Road, nearly in isolation from

The Texans turn Lee back on the Widow Tapp Farm,Wilderness Battlefield. (Painting by Don Troiani,www.historicalartprints.com)


events a few miles to the north. GeneralA. P. Hill's Confederate Third Corps movedeastward on the Plank Road. The sturdyFederal II Corps, commanded by theindomitable General Winfield Scott Hancock,interposed an obstacle between Hill and thecrucial intersection. General George W.Getty's division, extracted from VI Corps upon the Turnpike, hurried south to helpHancock hold the Brock-Plank crossroads.Bitter fighting seethed through the confusingthickets. Men died by the hundreds and fellmaimed by the thousands.

Federal strength threatened to overwhelmHill, but at the end of 5 May he had held.One-third of Lee's infantry, the First Corpsunder General James Longstreet, did notreach the battlefield at all on 5 May.Hill's troops, weary and decimated andill-organized, lay in the brush of theWilderness that night with the desolateawareness that they could not withstand aserious attack in the morning.

The arrival of Longstreet's first troops earlyon 6 May salvaged a desperate situation forLee and resulted in a moment of highpersonal drama for the Southern leader.Hancock had carefully arranged for a broadattack on both sides of the Plank Road. Soonafter dawn, he launched his assault withcharacteristic vigor. It rolled steadily forward,scattering Hill's regiments and threatening torupture Lee's entire front. Artillery had beenof little use in the thickets, but a battalion ofa dozen Confederate guns lined the woods atthe western edge of the Tapp field, a30-acre clearing around the rude cabin andmodest farm of a widow named Tapp - theonly sizable open space anywhere in thebattle zone along the Plank Road. Thecannon flung canister across the Tapp Farmspace in double-shotted doses, making theground untenable for Union infantry.Northern troops filtered around the edge ofthe clearing to get in behind the guns andcomplete the victory. Then, without any time

The final Confederate attack on 6 May sweptall the way to the Brock Road, but could nothold the position. (Public domain)

whatsoever to spare, the van of Longstreet'scolumn reached the point of crisis.

Among the first units up was the famedTexas Brigade, perhaps Lee's best shocktroops. The battles that had won the Texanstheir well-deserved renown had cost themenormous casualties: fewer than 800 of themremained to carry muskets into theWilderness that morning. As the brigademoved resolutely through the hard-pressedartillery, Lee rode quietly beside them. TheGeneral recognized his army's peril, and haddetermined to take a personal role inrepairing the rupture. When the Texansnoticed him, and recognized his intention,

The fighting 41

'a yell rent the air that must have been heardfor miles around.' The Texans urged Lee togo back, shouting that they would not goforward until he did so. A soldier (therewould later be dozens of claimants for thehonor) grasped Lee's bridle and turnedhim back.

A participant in the event, writing soonthereafter, noted that Lee had not saidmuch, but it was 'his tone and look, whicheach one of us knew were born of thedangers of the hour' that 'so infused andexcited the men.' A Texan next to theobserver, 'with tears coursing down hischeeks and yells issuing from his throat

exclaimed, "1 would charge hell itself for thatold man."'

Lee went back. The Texans went forwardand redeemed their pledge. Federal bulletshit nearly three-fourths of them within a fewminutes, but they stabilized the situationand saved the day. The 'Lee-to-the-Rear'episode immediately became an integral partof army lore. A monument at the spot todaysays simply, 'Lee to the rear, cried theTexans, May 6, 1864.'

Once Longstreet's reinforcements hadstabilized the situation, the Confederatecommanders looked for a means to regainthe initiative. They found it in an unfinished


Hundreds of helpless wounded men of both sidesburned to death when muzzle flashes light the thickets ofthe Wilderness on fire. (Public domain)

railroad - graded and filled, but not yettracked - that ran south of and parallel to thePlank Road. A mixed force of four brigadespulled from various divisions got astride therail corridor, moved east until opposite thedangling Federal left flank, then turned northand completely routed Hancock's troops. InHancock's words, the Confederates rolled uphis line 'like a wet blanket.' Most of theattackers pushed as far north as the PlankRoad. Some of them actually went into thewoods north of the road.

In the ensuing chaos, a mistaken 'friendly'volley tore into a cavalcade of Confederateofficers reconnoitering on the road. It killedGeneral Micah Jenkins and inflicted adreadful wound on Longstreet. Lee's mostcapable surviving subordinate eventuallyrecovered, but he would be out of serviceuntil long after the war had settled into asiege at Petersburg. The fatal volley,reminiscent of the mistaken fire that hadmortally wounded Stonewall Jackson nearbyexactly one year earlier, extracted all the

energy from the Confederate success. Anattack later in the day pressed all the way tothe heart of the enemy line on the BrockRoad, but in the end it produced nothingbut more losses.

While Lee inspired the Texans and thenregained the initiative on the Plank Road,General Ewell's Confederates continued tohold firm control of their crucial wood lineup on the Turnpike. General JohnB. Gordon - a non-professional soldier whowould bloom late in the conflict into aremarkable warrior - spent much of 6 Mayattempting to secure permission for anattack in the woods on the far left, whereGrant had failed to protect his right flank.Timidity ruled Ewell's behavior by this timein the war (he had lost a leg and gained anextremely strong-willed wife, withdeleterious impact upon his elan andamour-propre). By the time Gordon extractedauthority to attack, daylight was dwindling.Even so, the surprise assault captured twoYankee generals and hundreds of men, andthoroughly shattered Grant's flank. In aghastly aftermath to the Wildernessfighting, leaves and brush caught fire frommuzzle flashes and hundreds of helpless

The fighting 43

wounded men of both sides burnedto death.

For two weeks, Lee's Confederates stubbornlyresisted the Federal army under Grant and Meade inthe woods and fields around Spotsylvania CourtHouse. After Confederates won the race for the keyintersection on 8 May, both armies entrenched on asteadily widening front. On 10 May, a Federal assaultbroke into the Doles' salient and two days later about25,000 Northern troops crushed the nose of theMule Shoe. Lee hurriedly constructed a new final lineacross the base of the Mule Shoe, and easily repulsedan attack against the position on 18 May. The nextday, a brisk fight at the Harris Farm, northeast of themain battlefield, ended major action at Spotsylvania.On the 21 st, Grant moved southeast in a newattempt to interpose between Lee and Richmond.

The Battle of SpotsylvaniaCourt House

After two days of intense combat in theWilderness, Grant had lost about18,000 men, Lee perhaps 8,000 (Confederatecasualties for the last year of the war aredifficult to ascertain with any precision).Wilderness was the only major battle in theVirginia Theater in which an army had bothof its flanks shattered. Grant had vivid,immediate proof that fighting Lee would benothing at all like toying with GeneralsBragg and Johnston and Pemberton in thewest. Nothing daunted, the FederalCommander-in-Chief calmly determined

The Battle of Spotsylvania Court House, 8-21 May 1864


to press southward again, keeping thepressure on Lee.

Early on 7 May, Grant issued orders toleave the Wilderness and head southeasttoward Spotsylvania Court House, where theregional road net afforded a chance to slipbetween Lee and Richmond. When Grantturned south, despite having suffered asgrievous losses as had prompted othercommanders to return north, he put the warin Virginia onto a new track. Soldiers sensedthe new resolve when they divined thedirection of the move, and cheeredboisterously. Tens of thousands of themwould be shot in the next four weeks,but the army would continue to presssteadily southward.

The march toward Spotsylvania CourtHouse turned into a dramatic race fraughtwith mighty consequences. In a remarkablebout of prescience, Lee had ordered monthsbefore the improvement of a set of woodsroads that paralleled the Brock Road, leadingtoward Spotsylvania. He selected GeneralRichard H. Anderson, a phlegmatic officer, toreplace temporarily the wounded Longstreetat the head of the First Corps. Anderson puthis troops on the road to Spotsylvania, andfound no good place to stop because ofburning woods and narrow byways - so hekept marching all night long.

Federal progress on the far better BrockRoad faltered in the face of scattered, butdetermined, resistance from Confederatecavalry. General Philip H. Sheridan, a Grantcrony from the west, was new to commandof the Federal cavalry, which should haveshouldered the gray-clad skirmishers out ofthe way with ease. Sheridan was schemingthis night, however, about getting out fromunder Meade's orders and instead reportingdirectly to his friend Grant. As a result, theConfederate resistance held on at onesketchy position after another all night.

Early on 8 May the race to Spotsylvaniaended with Confederates controlling the keyintersection on the Spindle Farm a matter ofmoments before Meade's advance arrivedthere. The consequence of Sheridan'sindifference and Anderson's inability to stop

Confederates used felled trees covered with earth to

fabricate an intricate set of field fortifications unlike

anything that had been used earlier in the war. This view

is in the vicinity of the nose of the Mule Shoe, near what

became 'the Bloody Angle.' (Public domain)

was a very narrow margin of success for theConfederates. All day long, Federals trudgedacross an open field into Southern rifle fire,hoping to gain the intersection that theyhad lost in the race. They never succeeded,on 8 May or on several subsequent days.Thousands of them fell killed or wounded inthe forlorn attempts.

The Battle of Spotsylvania Court Housechurned across a broad stretch of country fortwo weeks, from the meeting engagement on8 May until 21 May. Never before had fieldarmies in Virginia remained in close contactfor more than a few days. Now the war waschanging, edging away from dash andmaneuver toward mighty defensive worksand, eventually, positional warfareresembling a siege.

Most of General Lee's defensive line atSpotsylvania took advantage of good groundalong a ridge that covered four miles (6.4km)of farming country between the Po and Nirivers. From the point at which the 8 Mayrace ended, units of both sides spread inboth directions, entrenching as they went.

The fighting 45

Federal reinforcements pressed southwesttoward the Po, hoping to get beyond Lee'sflank; Confederates arrived to counter them.When both armies' flanks reached the Po,Federals began to push in the oppositedirection, northeast from the Brock Road.Confederates countered that initiative too,but in the process created an unfortunateanomaly in their position.

General Edward 'Allegheny' Johnson (thenickname came from an early war victory ata place called Allegheny) led his Confederatedivision northeast from the Brock Road longafter sundown. In the inky darkness,Johnson's staff and the van of the divisionemerged from thick woods into the edge of aclearing. They could see Federal campfires inthe distance at what seemed to be a lowerelevation, so they stopped and began to erectdefensive works. By morning, theConfederate line they had fortified andextended stretched far north of the generallyeast-to-west axis of the troops nearer theBrock Road. This 'salient' swung up and backthrough a broad arc that prompted some ofthe farm lads who fought there to bestowupon it the name 'Mule Shoe.'

The Mule Shoe salient, about one mile(1.6km) deep north-to-south and half thatwide, became the paramount military featurethrough most of the Battle of Spotsylvania.The location of the line did take advantageof high ground, and it did afford protectionfor Confederate supply routes farther south;but it proved to be fatally vulnerable in atactical sense. Southern infantry erected avast, complex array of defenses of dirt andfelled trees to strengthen the salient. Theyalso constructed traverses - interior defensivewalls perpendicular to the main line - toprotect against fire coming in from hostilecountry opposite their flanks. Nofortifications, however, could extinguish theelemental defect of a salient: an enemy whobroke through at any point across the entirearc immediately had at his mercy the rear ofevery defending unit.

General Grant's strength in numbers andmateriel gave him the luxury of dictating theaction. For two weeks he intermittently

General John Sedgwick, commander of the Federal

VI Corps, declared 'they couldn't hit an elephant at

that range' just moments before a sharpshooter's bullet

killed him. (Public domain)

probed at Lee's line, occasionallybludgeoning it with a massive attack. On9 May the Army of the Potomac lost thereliable veteran commander of its VI Corps,General John Sedgwick. The corpscommander's troops had been buildingbreastworks next to the Brock Road whenlong-range Confederate rifle fire, from about650yds (600m) away, drove them from theirjobs. Sedgwick sought to inspire them to dotheir duty by standing tall. 'They couldn'thit an elephant at that range,' he said. A dullwhistle announced the passage of anotherwell-aimed bullet which whistled past. Theone after that hit Sedgwick beneath his lefteye and killed him instantly. He was thehighest-ranking Federal officer killed duringthe war.

Federals probed west of the Po, whereConfederates blocked them successfully, butthe heaviest fighting surged back and forthacross the entrenched positions in the MuleShoe salient. On 10 May, General EmoryUpton, the bright young New Yorker incommand of a Federal brigade, sold armyheadquarters on the notion of attacking a


vulnerable segment of Lee's line. Upton led adozen regiments to the edge of a wood thatlooked across 150yds (135m) of open fieldtoward the northwest corner of the MuleShoe. There a salient on the salient - a smallbulge on the corner of the larger projection -offered an attractive target. The Federalswaiting to attack dreaded the deadly firethey would face the moment they emergedfrom cover. 'I felt my gorge rise,' one ofthem wrote, 'and my stomach and intestinesshrink together in a knot ... I fully realizedthe terrible peril I was to encounter. I lookedabout in the faces of the boys around me,and they told the tale of expected death.Pulling my cap down over my eyes, Istepped out.'

Upton's direct assault surprised theConfederates - Georgians under GeneralGeorge Doles. It burst over the works,captured several hundred Southerners, andseemed poised to rupture the whole MuleShoe position; but Confederatereinforcements hurriedly sealed the shoulderof the breach, some of them led by Leehimself. Federal supports did not comeforward with the same elan Upton and hismen had shown. When the fighting wanedat dark, the breakthrough had been repulsed.

General Grant apparently consideredUpton's success as admonitory. In theWilderness, all of Grant's efforts to maneuveragainst Lee had been less than successful,and he wound up with both of the Unionflanks turned and shattered. Now Upton hadgone straight ahead. Perhaps the solutionwas simply to overwhelm the outnumberedConfederates? On 12 May, Grant launchedan immense assault intended to do just that.The immediate result was the heaviest day offighting at Spotsylvania and one of the mostintense hand-to-hand combats of the war. Inthe longer term, Grant's preliminary successon the 12th probably convinced him toadopt the notion of full-scale, head-onfrontal assaults that led to vast and futileeffusions of blood over the next few weeks.

Through the night of 11-12 May, Federaltroops marshaled opposite the northeast faceof the Mule Shoe. Relentless rain and a

pitch-black night complicated theirpreparations (one general called the resultan 'exquisitely ludicrous scene'), but by4.30 am a force of about 25,000 men hadconsolidated into a dense mass, ready toattack. General Winfield Scott Hancock sentthem forward in what would prove to be themost successful assault of its kind by Federalsduring the entire war in Virginia. Hancock'sleadership and the men's bravery contributedto the attack's initial success, but it alsobenefited from two bits of happenstance: in

The fighting 47

a dreadful stroke of bad timing, theConfederate artillery had been withdrawnfrom the Mule Shoe to be ready in caseGrant moved eastward; and the rain andhumidity had rendered most of theConfederate infantry's weapons inoperative.

The noise of the gathering enemy hadbeen audible all night to Confederates(McHenry Howard said it sounded 'likedistant falling water or machinery'), andthey had scrambled to get the artillery backin position. When the attackers approached,

Modern aerial view of Spotsylvania Court House

Battlefield, looking southeast from above the Federal lines

toward the Bloody Angle. The Confederate position stood

at the edge of the trees beyond the field. The modern

road winds down the shoulders of the Mule Shoe salient

they made an incomparable target forcanister or other artillery rounds - rollingforward in a wide, deep formation,impossible to miss. Most of the Confederateguns scurrying back toward the nose of theMule Shoe, however, arrived just in time to


For hours the combatants struggled at hand-to-handrange, separated only by fortifications made ofearth and wood. (Public domain)

be captured without firing a round. Whenthe Southern infantry leveled muskets andpulled triggers, the commander of thefamous old 'Stonewall Brigade' expected theresults he had seen many times before:volleys that knocked down the enemy inwindrows and halted the assailants'momentum. But 'instead of the leaping lineof fire and the sharp crack of the muskets,'General James A. Walker wrote in dismay,'came the pop! pop! pop! of exploding capsas the hammer fell upon them. Their powderwas damp!' The military rubric, 'Keep yourpowder dry,' belonged to earlier wars foughtwith flintlock muskets. This affair on 12 May1864 was the only major instance in whichdamp powder affected tactical events duringthe Civil War.

The Federal tide swept over the strongworks at the nose of the Mule Shoe androared on southward for several hundredyards. Then the chaos and disorientation,often as incumbent upon military success asupon military failure, dissolved the

momentum. Desperate Confederates, someled by General Lee in person (as on 6 Mayand 10 May), knit together new lines acrossthe Mule Shoe and up its sides. By dint ofintense, costly fighting they pushedHancock's Federals back to the outer edge ofthe northern tip of the works. By then bothsides had exhausted their initiative and theswirling fighting dissolved into a deadly,bloody, close encounter across theentrenchments. For 20 hours the contendingforces occupied either side of a gentle bendin the works that stretched for about 160yds(145m), making it forever famous as 'theBloody Angle' - a nom de guerre christenedwith the blood of hundreds of soldiers.

The Bloody Angle was made possible bythe tall, thick earthworks, new to the war inthis campaign. No one could have fought formore than a few minutes over the kind ofprimitive trenches in use only a few monthsbefore. The nose of the Mule Shoe featuredembattlements made of tree trunks laidlengthwise, sometimes two parallel rowswith dirt between. Dirt piled over the bulk ofthe fortification made it impenetrable byeither bullets or shells. The ditch behind theworks was deep enough to require a firing

The fighting 49

step for defenders to see to fire, through aspace between the main wall and a head logperched above it.

About 2,000 men from South Carolinaand Mississippi clung to the south face ofthe works. Far more Federals from the VI andII Corps threatened the Bloody Angle fromthe north, but numbers mattered little inthat narrow front. Most Union troops wentto ground behind the lip of a draw about40yds (37m) north of the works; others laydirectly behind the north edge of thecontested line. Brave men of both sidesleaped atop the works to fire a round thendrop back, if they survived. Others threwbayoneted rifles across like harpoons.A steady rain added misery to terror. Thetrenches filled with water 'as bloody as if itflowed from an abattoir.'

A Confederate called the scene 'a perfectpicture of gloom, destruction and death - avery Golgotha of horrors.' A Federal generalwho visited the scene described the results ofa fire so intense and long-continued 'that thebrush and logs were cut to pieces andwhipped into basket-stuff... men's flesh wastorn from the bones and the bones shattered.'Toward midnight of 12-13 May, an oak tree22 inches (56cm) thick fell. It had been hitnot by a cannonball, but by countlessthousands of bullets, which gradually nibbledtheir way through its dense bole.

Just before dawn on 13 May, theConfederate survivors finally received ordersto abandon the Bloody Angle and fall back toa new line drawn across the base of the MuleShoe - where Lee's position probably shouldhave been formed from the outset. ANortherner who visited the newly wonposition at the nose of the salient left agraphic description of the place's horrors:'Horses and men chopped into hash by thebullets ... appearing ... like piles of jelly ...The logs in the breastworks were shatteredinto splinters ... We had not only shot downan army, but also a forest.' In the aftermathof 'this most desperate struggle of the war,'one Mississippian who survived admittedthat the tension and dread of the ordeal hadshattered their nervous systems. Once they

reached safe ground, the weary veteranssimply 'sat down on the wet ground andwept. Not silently, but vociferously and long.'

Through the period 13-17 May, the Federalarmy slipped steadily eastward, thensoutheastward, extending toward and aroundthe Confederate right. This tactical measureforeshadowed Grant's strategic agenda for thenext month, during which a crablike slidingmovement to the southeast sought always toget closer to Richmond than Lee's army.Already he had unleashed Sheridan's cavalry toraid toward the Southern capital. The raidersdid not get into Richmond, but they did killthe Confederacy's incomparable cavalry leader,General J. E. B. Stuart, in fighting aroundYellow Tavern. Stuart had said 'I had rather diethan be whipped.' Lee would miss his skill inscreening and reconnaissance functions.

Although fighting flared all across thelines with regularity, the next major Federalattempt did not come until 18 May. On thatmorning, Grant launched another massivefrontal assault against Lee's troops in theirstrongly entrenched new lines across thebase of the Mule Shoe - a position thatcame to be called 'Lee's Last Line.' Upton'shead-on attack on 10 May had worked; sohad the Hancock onslaught on 12 May;perhaps what was needed was simply tobludgeon Lee. This time, though,Confederate cannon stood ready. Withoutneeding much help from supportinginfantry, they slaughtered Grant's attackerswithout the least difficulty or danger.

The Army of the Potomac recoiled afterheavy losses, never having come close totheir enemies. As General Meade wrotewearily to his wife the next day, after thethorough repulse 'even Grant thought ituseless to [continue to] knock our headsagainst a brick wall.' Most Southern infantryhardly mentioned the event in their lettersand diaries, the repulse having been so easythat it required 'but little participation of ourinfantry.' A Confederate artillery colonelwrote regretfully that the Yankee infantry'wouldn't charge with any spirit.' In the wordsof a boy from Richmond, 'the Union troopsbroke and fled.'


To the North Anna andthe James

Fighting on 19 May at the Harris Farm,northeast of the old salient position andbeyond the Ni river, brought to a close twoweeks of steady combat. Grant movedsoutheast in his continuing efforts to intrudebetween Lee and Richmond and force battleon his own terms. The two armies clashedacross and around the North Anna river,midway between Spotsylvania andRichmond, on 23-27 May. They waged nopitched engagement during that time, butjockeyed steadily for position.

The river, running roughly perpendicularto the Federal line of advance, offered onlythree usable crossings. The left (northern)bank of the stream at the fords on theeastern and western edges of the battlefieldcommanded the right bank, making it

Union engineer troops at work on the banks of theNorth Anna river, where Lee stymied Grant for fourdays in late May 1864. (Public domain)

possible for Grant to force troops across. AtOx Ford in the middle, ground made theConfederates masters of the locale.Nonchalantly, almost indifferently, Grantpushed his columns across on each flank,giving Lee a golden opportunity to defeateither side in detail. The river and itsdifficult fords markedly complicated Federaloptions, to Lee's advantage.

In 1862 or early 1863, such circumstanceswould have yielded a thorough thrashingfor Grant. In May 1864, however, Lee didnot have the means to gather in thetoothsome prize. All three of his corpscommanders were out of action, and atemporary illness had almost prostratedLee himself. He could only seethe fromhis cot: 'We must strike them a blow -we must never let them pass us again -we must strike them a blow.'

Grant steered his army southeast oncemore, from the North Anna river towardTotopotomoy Creek, ever closer toRichmond. Lee's customary interpositionkept nudging the Federals eastward even as

The fighting 51

General Evander M. Law's Alabama troops slaughteredattacking Federals at Cold Harbor. 'It was not war'Law wrote,'it was murder' (Public domain)

they pressed south. Steady but desultoryfighting at Totopotomoy led Grant towardscenes familiar from the earlier campaignsaround Richmond.

By 2 June the armies were concentratingaround Cold Harbor, where Lee's first greatvictory had been won on 27 June 1862 inthe Battle of Gaines' Mill. The Confederateline that was hurriedly entrenched at thebeginning of June 1864 ran right throughthe old battlefield; some of the 1864 fightingof greatest intensity would rage where thesame armies had jousted two years before.A Northern newspaperman described theSouthern entrenchments as 'intricate,zig-zagged lines within lines, lines protectingflanks of lines ... a maze and labyrinthof works within works and workswithout works.'

On 3 June, weary of being blocked atevery turn and always inclined towardbrutally direct action, Grant simply sentforward tens of thousands of men right intothat formidable warren of defenses, and intothe muzzles of rifles wielded by toughenedveterans. The young Northerners obliged to

participate in this disaster at Cold Harborknew what the result would be. A member ofGeneral Grant's staff noticed them pinningto their uniforms pieces of paper bearingtheir names a

Documents

ROBERT K KRICK was born...ROBERT K KRICK was born in California, and has been responsible for the preservation of several battlefields in Virginia for more than 30 years. He is the