Robert H. Wiebe_Humanizing Nationalism

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Humanizing Nationalism Author(s): Robert H. Wiebe Source: World Policy Journal, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Winter, 1996/1997), pp. 81-88Published by: and the The MIT Press World Policy InstituteStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40209507Accessed: 19-08-2015 15:10 UTC

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REC NSIDERATI NS Robert H. Wiebe is the author of Self Rule: A Cultural History of American Democracy and professor of history at Northwestern University.

Humanizing Nationalism Robert H. Wiebe

Once upon a time, nationalism was a liberal promise of freedom and fulfillment for countless millions. At the end of the nineteenth century, the French philosopher Ernest Renan considered it an elevated expression of individual choice; the Ameri- can William James judged "the attempt of a people long enslaved to attain the possession of itself, to organize its laws and govern- ment, to be free to follow its internal des- tinies according to its own ideals... the sacredest thing in this great human world."1 When Henri Pirenne and Pieter Geyl, gi- ants in their profession, threw themselves into the debate over the essential Frenchness of all Belgium versus the essential Dutch- ness of its Flemish sector, these eminent historians were acting as responsible intellectuals might be expected to act. Cham- pioning just such causes, after all, made Woodrow Wilson a world hero.

What happened to that abundance of hope and good feelings? First of all, nationalism fell in with bad company. Second, it came to be seen as the very antithesis of a conviction that modern weaponry, global economics, and planetary ecology made in- creasingly urgent: the universality of the human condition. Finally, nationalism ran afoul of powerful antipopulist sentiments that condemned almost any large number of enthusiastic people as stupid, malleable, and dangerous. The cumulative result of these bad tidings has been to demonize movements with an enormous worldwide follow- ing. We need to take stock.

Let us begin with context. Nationalism - a political expression of the desire among

people who believe they have a common ancestry and a common destiny to govern themselves in a place peculiarly identified with their history and its fulfillment - has had complicated, sometimes intimate rela- tions with the other great spatial dividers of modern times: religion, language, race, and state.

Each of these, like nationalism, has its own distinctive meaning and history. None, that is, comes wedded to nationalism. Nevertheless, if we have ready examples of a nationalism without ties to any one of them, it seems impossible to imagine a nationalism freed from all four. Overlapping, separating, competing, joining - now reinforcing, now resisting nationalism - this swirl of forces is the company that nationalism has kept.

After 1870, as nationalism spread to cover all of Europe, its collaboration with those other dividers grew closer - certainly not in all cases but in enough to constitute a trend. Irish and Polish nationalism ac- quired their exclusive Roman Catholic stamp. Orthodox religions drew lines throughout the Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. Systematic language instruction powered drives to turn "peas- ants into Frenchmen" and to populate Italy with Italians. Flemish nationalists replaced an old demand for Belgian bilingualism with a very different one for regional monolingualism.

As Czechs and Slovaks searched for ways of accentuating the division between their languages, similar preoccupations parsed their way through the Balkans. Ahad Ha'am

Humanizing Nationalism 81


set Hebrew at the center of a Jewish cultural revival; Gaelic competed for the center of Irish nationalism. Appropriately, Europe's colonial administrators concluded that by merging bands of linguistically connected Africans they could simply create tribes - Ashanti in the Gold Coast, for example, and Ibo in Nigeria.

The New Racism Race was a latecomer. More vocabulary than concept until the end of the nineteenth century, it carried largely cultural connotations, italicizing but not adding significantly to the basic nationalist idea of a distinctive people. Nineteenth-century intellectuals who gained posthumous notoriety as racial theo- rists actually had little to say on the subject. The infamous Count de Gobineau considered race an abstraction ill-suited to explain- ing real situations. Ernest Renan, granting the world's extensive biological mixes, equated race with a culture's spiritual and intellectual qualities. After 1890, however, a mildly invidious idiom turned vicious, and in the first half of the twentieth century it wove itself into the fabric of European nationalism.

Ominously, the new racism stretched to encompass anti-Semitism, by no means a predictable move. Anti-Semitism, after all, had a long history of its own quite apart from any theory of race. Centuries earlier, Christian Crusaders might have killed every Jew in the world if their technology had only allowed it. Moreover, the opening gam- bit in the latest round of anti-Semitic violence, the Russian pogroms of the 1880s, seemed to have nothing to do with race. Nevertheless, anti-Semitism was there, and across Europe the new racism swept it up. In the United States, where white racism was nationalism's closest ally, a fresh wave of theories animalized people of color, as in- creasingly elaborate caste barriers boxed in their lives.

The last among these spatial dividers, the state, has exercised by far the most

powerful - the most critical - influence on modern nationalism. A history of the lat- ter makes no sense without the former. The two emerged and developed together; each relied on the other to define itself. The distinctively modern element in modern nationalism is its political ambition, incompre- hensible except as the modern state gave it meaning. But as that perceptive pioneer Johann Gottfried von Herder noted two centuries ago, the state is no friend to nationalism: it would ignore, suppress, barter, or steal nationalism's objectives strictly to suit its own ends. The great nineteenth- century state builders, Cavour and Bis- marck, understood this perfectly. In the history of nationalism, in other words, the state has been goal and enemy wrapped in one.

In those years between 1870 and the Great War, state after state found it conven- ient to embrace nationalism as an adjunct to centralization and a source of authority. It was the state that put teeth into the pro- grams for linguistic homogeneity and the state that monopolized benefits from a cot- tage industry of those years, "the invention of tradition," in Eric Hobsbawm's famous phrase.

Such a proliferation of policies led scholars to devise a special category for them: "official nationalism." Beginning in the 1890s, Japan, a relative newcomer, mobilized the quintessential version of official nationalism by blanketing the country with instructions in patriotism and systematizing emperor- worship at its peak.

What came together early in the twentieth century set a pattern that predominated in Europe until almost mid-century, and profoundly affected the rest of the world long after that: close alliances with the dividers of religion, language, race, and state that entangled nationalism's reputation in warfare, genocide, and a seemingly endless bru- talizing of minorities and dissenters. Lesson number one from our historical tour: the tighter the layering of these dividers and the

82 WORLD POLICY JOURNAL WINTER 1996/97


higher the stack, the more rigid and dangerous the nationalism that develops. A nationalism claiming exclusive rights to a religion and a language and a race and a state is a for- midable creature indeed.

A renewed commitment to universalism around mid-century came directly out of the horrors that were associated with a nationalism run amuck. Nation-states made war; world organizations promised peace. Practi- tioners of nationalism demeaned and ex- cluded; proponents of human rights sought dignity for everyone. Scholars and scientists buried the concept of race like a rotting corpse. Humanities courses sought out a core of timeless values; studies in compara- tive religions discovered their essential agreement. Before the war, educated Ameri- cans routinely assumed human differences: the stages of civilization in the National Geo- graphic. After the war, they routinely assumed universality: the essential unity in the hugely popular photographic exhibit The Family of Man.

Scholarship on nationalism, now a thriv- ing enterprise, echoed with these univer- salistic sentiments. "I make no secret of my belief," declared Boyd Shafer, its lifelong student, "that nationalism... leads to war and destruction."2 "Nationalism," wrote Karl Popper, the high priest of philosophical ra- tionalism, "appeals to our tribal instincts, to passion and to prejudice, and to our nostal- gic desire to be relieved from the strain of individual responsibility."3

Nazi Germany was its quintessential manifestation. Long ago, Hannah Arendt and Isaiah Berlin agreed, there was a good nationalism that tolerated differences and sought universal confederation, but the twentieth century replaced it with tribal packs that would wage war against one another until, in Arendt's apocalyptic vision, "they have disappeared from the face of the earth."4

Certain conclusions followed irresistibly. In summing up his work, Karl Deutsch, the most influential scholar in the field at mid-

century, declared nationalism "obsoles- cent."5 No one could "deny," Harvard's Ru- pert Emerson thought, "that the nation and the nation-state are anachronisms in the atomic age."6 In the world of power rela- tions, "self-determination is an irrelevant conception," declared Alfred Cobban, a leading British political scientist.7 Marxists had no serious disagreement: class was real, nationalism a figment of the imagination, a de- lusion. For Tom Nairn, nationalism was "the pathology of modern developmental history" with a "built-in capacity for descent into dementia."8 As late as the 1980s, Eric Hobsbawm thought this incredible decep- tion could not last.

The Myth of the Masses But nationalism held fast. How could it be that millions of people, year after year, attached themselves to the wrong causes? The answer came from closely allied studies about mass society. People at large, it seemed, had a powerful need to be led - to escape from freedom, in the social philosopher Erich Fromm's unforgettable phrase - and virtually no defenses against dema- gogic manipulation. Not by chance had nationalism turned sour just as the masses were enfranchised, this line of reasoning continued. The unscrupulous stood waiting with an enticing package: the security of the herd, a claim to superiority, a cover for aggression.

Modern communication accomplished the rest. In that spirit, Louis Snyder, another leader in the field, treated nationalism as a branch of abnormal psychology. The circle was complete: a deadly nationalism able to resist the logic of universalism by mobi- lizing popular passions that fed a deadly nationalism.

We live with the legacy. Such standard phrases as "ultra-conservative nationalism," "aggressive nationalism," and "hard-line nationalism" express an instinctive hostility through redundance. Who can recall hear- ing about an ultra-liberal nationalism, a



peaceful nationalism, an accommodating nationalism? Oxymorons all: nationalism is hidebound, belligerent, and unyielding, we have been taught. Our range of expres- sions about it stretches only from bad to worse. How liberals and radicals use nationalism in the 1990s resembles how conserva- tives and reactionaries used communism in the 1950s.

It is time to have a closer look. But before we do, some reminders. Universal- ism has not prevailed: the earth's popula- tion continues to be separated in a host of ways. Hence we learn about nationalism, which is only one of those ways, not by contrasting it with a lost dream of universalism but by examining it in light of other dividers actually operating in our patch- work world. Moreover, it matters a great deal that people everywhere create as well as destroy, kiss as well as kill, ignore leaders as well as follow them, and generally live out the complexity that we find in our- selves even as we refuse to acknowledge it in others.

Family and Kin First of all, another look at nationalism itself, this time by way of its origins. Its closest and most sustaining companion was an unprecedented human migration. During the eighteenth century, as Europe's disease pool stabilized and public health measures raised urban survival rates, popu- lation soared. While increasing numbers tried to squeeze into an already settled countryside, more and more people moved in search of their opportunities: to Euro- pean cities, to lands across the Atlantic. The longer distances people moved, the less likely they were repeating the time- honored peasant practice of leaving to take temporary jobs only to return at the end of the season. To reach the new distant destinations, they moved along chains that the migrants themselves created: a link at the port and an inland town; a place to stay and help in getting work; a return

flow of money and tickets to pay for more passages.

Between 1800 and 1914, about 65 million native Europeans crossed the Atlan- tic. The years from 1870 to 1914, ones par- ticularly heavy in transatlantic migration, also marked a significant increase in movement from the European countryside to the cities, as the effects of a capitalist agri- culture spread and urban work boomed. Cheaper, faster transportation, crucial to these changes, also enabled increasing numbers of migrants to reverse directions, sometimes more than once. In one historian's vision, it was "a swarming or churning of people back and forth across the Atlantic."9

This extraordinary migration across the ocean and into cities moved overwhelm- ingly along chains of family and kin - sometimes fictive kin but kin of the heart nonetheless - posing an enormous challenge for hundreds of millions of people, some of whom moved, some of whom never did. Where the flows of migration were strong and persistent, they transformed the very meaning of family: who belonged, what obligations they owed one another, how they met them. But if the strains were tremendous, so were the highs from suc- cess. Migration, after all, was a strategy not simply of survival but of improvement. It sent a message not of failure but of pos- sibilities. Losses and gains, breakdown and building, migration covered the full range.

What was happening to families - indeed entire communities - was necessarily happening to their societies. Additively and atmospherically, mass migration demanded new concepts of human connectedness that reckoned with large numbers of indetermi- nately located, mobile people and gave them cultural form. As extended families reshaped themselves to sustain migration, nationalism, reconstruing kinship in collective terms, made sense of their world by affirming - literally and metaphorically - the kin system's ultimate value.



In the most practical terms, nationalism multiplied the people - the kin - on whom one might lay a claim. In the broadest terms, it gathered in a dispersed people, asserted their essential commonality, and promised them a fulfilling future. Each acted on the other: families adapting to migration, migration eliciting nationalism, nationalism reinforcing families by enveloping migration.

Nationalism made the most of the inde- terminance calling it forth. It arrived not as a program so much as a state of mind, a movement living off its expectations. For a world in flux, it became the consummate mediator between tradition and change: vali- dating timeless truths with modern means, making it plausible for people scattered here and there to picture themselves as a people fixed and whole. If traditions were always changing, all the more important that nationalists make those changes in the name of continuity. Ambiguity was nationalism's stock-in-trade.

By appreciating its intimate associa- tion with human migration, we come to appreciate nationalism's immense popular- ity. Family and kin structured lives at every social level. Severely stretching those struc- tures to accommodate migration prepared countless millions for a message affirming their basic values and resonating with ex- periences all around them - theirs, their neighbors', their neighbors' neighbors'. Only as people left home did glorifying it become important. Although cultures around the world put a distinctive stamp on nationalism, they shared that vision of an extended kinship loosely containing fluid populations.

If we begin with the proposition that the world will be divided, this is not a par- ticularly repugnant form. Families do ex- clude, of course, and at some level all exclu- sions may be invidious. Nevertheless, those separations need not involve either hatred or violence. Families are no more familial for blowing up their neighbor's home. More-

over - and this is critical as we transfer the metaphor of kinship to citizenship- ex- tended families, admittedly with a wide variation in capacities, also adopt.

What Nationalism Is Not By keeping in focus what nationalism is we can recognize what it is not. It is not religious fundamentalism demanding that the state enforce its beliefs. The Treaty of West- phalia was not a nationalist document. Na- tionalism is not militarism, which has its own doleful history. Charlemagne was not a nationalist. Let Yogi Berra be our guide: militarism is about the military, which if it has another connection - and in our time it often does not - is linked to the state. Hence the common error that Nicholas Kris- tof makes leading into an article for the New York Times magazine of August 27, 1995: "The real Chinese threat... [is] its military expansion, fueled by growing nationalism," with the proof of the nationalism, of course, in the military expansion. More generally, policies purporting to coordinate resources for the best interests of the entire country are not nationalist. Everybody competing for state leadership claims to serve the country's best interests. Mercantilists were not nationalists; nor, by the same token, are American and Japanese trade negotiators in the 1990s.

Nor is nationalism imperialism, except for the rare claim to a nation's sacred land or to the kin living on the land. In fact, imperialism almost always conflicts with the essential nationalist urge to stand apart from outsiders and combine only with kin. Once again, states are imperialist, as their predecessors were over the centuries: neither Charles V nor Louis XIV was a nationalist.

Elementary propositions such as these help to explain why it is difficult to extract the nationalist component in Nazi Germany from policies that were either antithetical or irrelevant to it. There is no question that Hitler mastered the uses of "official nationalism" - that is, state adaptations of



nationalist appeals - and that in its initial stage the Nazi's horrendous anti-Semitism tapped values in German nationalism. Nev- ertheless, Hitler's imperial ambitions even- tually swallowed all else. As an early expert on nationalism, E. H. Carr, shrewdly ob- served in 1945, Hitler was an international- ist who turned other people's nationalism to his own ends. He used Sudetenland Ger- mans to open the door into Czechoslovakia. "Danzig ist Deutsch" was the slogan, Poland the objective. Given the chance, the Nazis made war against Jews everywhere, cutting their policy loose from German nationalism and harnessing racial genocide to the might of the state. Now it was the collaborators in the Final Solution who revealed qualities in their own Polish and Hungarian and Croa- tian nationalism.

Nothing has changed the face of nationalism more profoundly than the ready avail- ability and terrible destructiveness of modern weaponry. Packing in arms and setting up shop as a leader is the formula that warlords, wreaking bloody havoc on every con- tinent of the world, have turned into the tragedy of our time. If we really cared about human life, we would concentrate our out- rage not on the drug trade but on the far deadlier arms trade.

States, not nationalists, fuel the weapons industry. Its products, however, have dra- matically narrowed the range of nationalist expression. There is Kurdish nationalism, but warlords may be shaping its future, as they already have for Somalian nationalism. What choice in loyalty do people make whose alternatives are the promise of one army's protection or death, rape, mutilation, and homelessness at the hands of another?

It may be an exaggeration for the French public philosopher, Andre Glucksmann, to explain the disintegration of Yugoslavia as "a war of the army against civilians" and an oversimplification for Vaclav Havel to at- tribute the chaos in Bosnia to "warlords."10 Nonetheless, they are onto something very important. Although nationalism belongs

in those stories, its place has been severely distorted.

The Nationalism of Imagined Kinship Whatever else, nationalism and ethnicity - that is, a sense of large-scale kin connectedness without nationalism's political agenda - are not fading away. Their endurance during the life of the Soviet Union is testimony enough. Experts at the United Nations re- port that migration, especially into the cities, is higher than ever and still rising. Moreover, global economics and communica- tions, once predicted to make all provincial attachments obsolete, may be having the op- posite effect. People who feel like bees shaken out of the hive by a cosmic corporate hand, with promises to market the honey and provide more flowers, have special rea- son to hold out for smaller-scale, more emo- tionally rewarding human connections. Instant communication spreads their mes- sages, too. Does anyone still believe those commentators who once explained a worldwide eruption of nationalism in the few years from the late 1960s to the early 1970s as so many isolated, passing circumstances: limited opportunities in the Basque country, cultural fears in Quebec, police brutal- ity in Northern Ireland, Israeli wars reviving Zionism, ghetto pressures releasing Black Power in America, and on and on? National- ist movements attend one another; people motivate other people to act out their deep feelings.

As states strain harder to meet their basic requirements - providing order and opportu- nity - they have attracted less, not more of that affection. Social theorist Benedict An- derson tells us that states still inspire soldiers to die for them, but psychologists tell us that soldiers die for their buddies. Or families? Certainly nationalism is one of the most likely countervailing forces inside the modern state, and, as social scientist Walker Connor reminds us, the nationalism of imagined kinship, when threatened, has com- piled a striking record of fighting to the



death against the officially imagined com- munity of loyal citizens.

We have also had time to reconsider those judgments about acceptable state size that a few decades ago condemned virtually any move anywhere toward "secession." Per- haps the later records of Zaire and Nigeria cast new light on the movements for Katan- gan and Biafran independence. Certainly the records of Luxembourg and Singapore should make size alone a suspect criterion. Very few of those in the 1970s or the 1990s who threw up their hands at Quebec trying to go it alone mentioned that the province compared favorably in size, resources, and development with Sweden. Was Norway's separation in 1905 a mistake?

Context is all, of course. Small, poor countries surrounded by their enemies are poor risks. Even more sobering, a proliferation of small states, the reigning expert on nationalism, Anthony Smith, informs us, "tends to produce... a large stream of exiles, refugees, and stateless persons."11 Never- theless, size is a point for discussion, not a judgment in its own right. In recent years, Slovaks and Flemings have had serious matters to dispute with Czechs and Walloons. The savaged citizens of East Timor should have been so fortunate in raising theirs.

Victims of Nationalism After noting every exaggeration and error, nationalism still can be bloody business. The irrepressible conflict between Tutsi and Hutu is a case in point. Class, ensconc- ing Tutsi privilege, has played an important role in those slaughters. So has a legacy of brutal colonial rule, including a specific Portuguese model in Angola for the Tutsi's "selective genocide" of even barely educated, modestly accomplished Hutu in 1972.

Yet nationalism - reinforced by race concepts, aggravated by religious differences, and aided by state powers from inside Bu- rundi and Rwanda as well as from African neighbors and erstwhile European masters -

lies at the center of these heartbreaking events. In this case, weapons technology is not to blame.

Nationalism can also be a trap for those on the inside. The image of family around which nationalism has commonly built is male-dominated and female-served, not simply in a way to reflect everyday experi- ences but even more to assert the time- lessness of these values. Not surprisingly, nationalism has tended to bolster customs that constrain women outside the home and subordinate them in it, at times including genital mutilation. Appropriately, nationalism weakens wherever values affirming women's individuality and equality gain strength. Although a caring nationalism is not a contradiction in terms, a feminist one seems to be.

How to relocate nationalism in this gen- dered equation is by no means clear. Cer- tainly those who dream of simply reaching into other cultures and eradicating customs that offend universal human rights vastly underestimate their task.

In any case, what we need is not a paean to nationalism but a thoughtful considera- tion of it. In an imperfect world, how would we choose to be divided? What patterns of behavior are most closely associated with which of the major dividers? Where do we find the widest latitude to be human in a collective as well as an individual sense? In addition to that line of inquiry, nationalism invites another, this time about rights. In the social theorist Alberto Melucci's terms, "First, [nationalist movements] raise questions about... the right to be different; and, second, they claim the right to autonomy, to control a specific living space."12

We come full circle to nationalism's original connection with the quest for lib- erty. Making that connection more than a giant leap of faith today depends above all on the outcome of lesson number one: how encumbered with layers of additional dividers is the nationalism we encounter? Where



nationalism shares cultural space with other loyalties rather than merging with them, its expression of a flctive kinship may provide the smoothest fit of any divides with the values of everyday life.#

Notes 1. Deborah J. Coon, '"One Moment in the

World's Salvation': Anarchism and the Radicaliza- tion of William James, "Journal of American History 83 (June 1996), p. 77.

2. Boyd C. Shafer, Faces of Nationalism: New Re- alities and Old Myths (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1972), p. xiii.

3. Karl R. Popper, The Open Society and Its Ene- mies, vol. 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), p. 49.

4. Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarian- ism (New York: World Publishing, 1958), p. 157.

5. Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Its Alter- natives (New York: Knopf, 1969), p. 173.

6. Rupert Emerson, From Empire to Nation: The Rise of Self-Assertion of African Peoples (Cam- bridge: Harvard University Press, I960), p. 378.

7. Alfred Cobban, The Nation State and Na- tional Self-Determination (New York: Thomas Y. Crowell, 1970), p. 280.

8. Tom Nairn, The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-nationalism, rev. ed. (London: Verso, 1981), p. 359.

9. Walter Nugent, Crossings: The Great Trans- atlantic Migrations, 1870-1914 (Bloomington: Indi- ana University Press, 1992), p. 3.

10. Adam Gopnik, "Paris Journal," The New Yorker, February 5, 1996, p. 36.

1 1 . Anthony D. Smith, The Ethnic Origins of Na- tions (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 219.

12. Alberto Melucci, Nomads of the Present: Social Movements and Individual Needs in Contem- porary Society, ed. John Keane and Paul Mier (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989), p. 91.



Article Contentsp. 81p. 82p. 83p. 84p. 85p. 86p. 87p. 88

Issue Table of ContentsWorld Policy Journal, Vol. 13, No. 4 (Winter, 1996/1997), pp. 1-100Volume InformationFront MatterTerrorism as Warfare: The Lessons of Military History [pp. 1-12]Gulliver in Lilliput: Japan and Asian Economic Regionalism [pp. 13-26]The Cyprus Impasse: What Next? [pp. 27-39]The Unwinnable Drug War: What Clausewitz Would Tell Us [pp. 41-51]ReflectionsNew York, New York: Cultural Life and Civic Experience in the Global City [pp. 53-60]The Happy Twilight of Washington [pp. 61-65]Uneasy Rooms: The Concept of Space in Modern Japan [pp. 67-72]

ReportageThe "New" South Africa: Violence Works [pp. 73-80]

ReconsiderationsHumanizing Nationalism [pp. 81-88]

BooksReview: Nehru's Legacy and the Condition of Indian Democracy [pp. 89-95]

CodaThe Dangers of a Foreign Policy Consensus [pp. 97-99]

Back Matter

Documents

Robert H. Wiebe_Humanizing Nationalism