RJEA Vol6 No4 European Dimension of National Parliaments in the European Union

7/27/2019 RJEA Vol6 No4 European Dimension of National Parliaments in the European Union

http://slidepdf.com/reader/full/rjea-vol6-no4-european-dimension-of-national-parliaments-in-the-european-union 1/12

ROMANIAN JOURNAL OF EUROPEAN AFFAIRS VOL. 6, NO. 4 2006

76

A. Functions and role of national

parliaments in the European Union

National parliaments in the

European Union fulfil two majorcategories of functions (13, p. 30):treaty-based parliamentary functions (constitutional ratification of treaties,implementation of the acquis commu-nautaire in the domestic legislation)and parliamentary functions outside the treaties. The first class includes the ex-post functions, meaning that nationalparliaments only become involved after

the basic decision has already beenmade. Functions outside the treatiesnevertheless enable parliaments tointervene in the decision-makingprocess. Concretely, what intervene

here are the national functions ofparliaments in the area of EU matters.

The role of national parliaments wasfirst officially recognised in the Treaty of

Maastricht of 1991, in an annex to thetreaty with the headline ‘Declaration onthe role of national parliaments in theEuropean Union’ (14, p. 213) theprimary intention of which was to opennew prospects for co-operation amongthe Member State parliaments. Thedeclaration recommended that contactsbetween the European Parliament andthe national parliaments should bestepped up, national governments were

asked to ensure that their parliamentsreceive information on Europeanmatters and encouraged regularmeetings between members of nationalparliaments.

* Endre-Sandor Erdõdi studied Economics, Specialization International Transactions (degree completedin July 2003) and European Studies and International Relations (Master degree completed in June2006) at the University of the West in Timisoara. From March until July 2005 he was a scholarship-holder of the German Bundestag (International Parliament Internship Programme -IPP). As part of atwo-year EU-Phare programme “Developing a Corps of Professional Public Managers in the RomanianCivil Service – Young Professionals Scheme (YPS)” he is currently studying European Studies (MA)at the Europa-Kolleg Hamburg.

EUROPEAN DIMENSION OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN THE

EUROPEAN UNION

Endre-Sandor Erdõdi*

Abstract.The institutions of the member states have been changed in the European integration process through the transfer of a part of their political and economic competences to the European Union. The national parliaments made no exemptions from this rule, even if they did not observed the loss of sovereignity from the very beginning. But in the ’80 and in the post-Maastricht era they realised this phenomena and the related consequences. Since then we can observe a mobilisation of the national parliaments to exert an increased influence on the decision making process in the European Council and in the Council of the EU, in order to compensate their loss of competencies in the past.This article presents the main functions of the national

parliaments and their role on European level and also tries to show the mecanisms by which they participate in defining european policies. Finally, some recommendations will be made related to the necessary measures to be taken by the Romanian Parliament in order to be an effective participant in the EU decision making process after the accession date.



A novelty is brought by theAmsterdam Treaty to which a ‘Protocol on the role of national parliaments in the European Union ’ was annexed,

containing two items:" Information for national parli-

aments by the member states byforwarding all Commission consul-tation documents and proposalsfor legislation, in good time, witha period of six month elapsingbetween a legislative proposal ismade available by the Commi-ssion and the date when it is

placed on the Council agenda fordecision for the adoption of acommon position;

" The Conference of EuropeanAffairs Committees establishingthe ‘COSAC’1 of nationalparliaments founded in Paris in1989. COSAC may address toEU decision-makers anycontribution in selected areas ofEU competence, noting that

COSAC contributions do not bindnational Parliaments.

Every year, COSAC brings togethersix members from every nationalparliament, from the EuropeanParliament as well as three MPs fromevery associate or applicant countries,with an observer’s statute. COSACregularly meets in the capital city of thecountry holding the EU rotatingpresidency at that time.

Substantial developments aresubsequent to the Convent on theFuture of Europe where therepresentatives of the nationallegislatures were in majority concretisedin the Treaty establishing a Constitutionfor Europe adopted in 2004, butcurrently experiencing a stall back inratification. Among the protocols

annexed to the Treaty, there are twothat refer to:" The role of national parliaments in

the European Union , stating a clear

obligation on behalf of the EuropeanCommission and of other EU relevantbodies to forward all Europeandocuments to the national Parliamentsof the member states;" The application of the principles of

subsidiarity and proportionality, w h e r enational Parliaments are given for thefirst time the right to raise a reasonedopinion on Commission proposals. Bythe early warning system regarding thecompliance with the principle ofsubsidiarity, where reasoned opinionson a draft European legislative act’snon-compliance with the principle ofsubsidiarity represent at least one thirdof all the votes allocated to the nationalParliaments, the draft must bereviewed. Another option of control afterthe adoption of legislative acts isthrough the European Court of Justice

that has jurisdiction in actions ongrounds of infringement of the principleof subsidiarity by a European legislativeact notified by the member states onbehalf of their national parliamentConsistently with the same line ofthinking, the Commission must submiteach year to the national parliaments ofthe member states a report on theapplication of the principle ofsubsidiarity

B. Mechanisms for the involvementof the national Parliaments in theEuropean decision-making process

National Parliaments therefore fulfil avariety of functions in Europe. Whilstthose functions that are mentioned inthe treaties somehow limit the ability ofParliaments to become involved in the

EUROPEAN DIMENSION OF NATIONAL PARLIAMENTS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION

77

1 Conférence des Organes specialiseés dans les affaires communautaires et européennes des

parlaments de l’Union européenne



European decision-making process,those unspecified in the treaties givethem broader discretion. However, theexploration of such functions is not a

purpose in itself for the legislatures ofthe member states. The enlargement ofthe competence of the EuropeanParliament while downsizing democraticdeficit in the EU, hence givingEuropean policies legitimacy presentsits own limitations, at least under thepresent social and economiccircumstances in Europe. In such acontext, it should not come as asurprise that mechanisms for the

involvement of national parliaments inthe legislation generating process arebeing developed as a measure ofconsolidating the EU democraticfundament.

A relevant element in thisdevelopment is a decision of theFederal Constitutional Court inGermany2 further to the MaastrichtTreaty being challenged by a number ofdeputies on the Bundestag on groundsof unconstitutionality. The said decisionassigns a fundamental role to nationalparliaments in effecting democraticlegitimacy at a Community level:‘Democratic legitimacy (in democraticstates) is achieved by the action of theEuropean bodies being connected tothe parliaments of the member states’(5., page 40).

In the specialised literature, too, onecan notice a trend towards recognisingthe importance of national parliamentsin the European Communities systemas well as a number of theoreticalmodels designed to strengthen theirrole in ensuring a democratic characterfor the European Union.

Starting from these premises as wellas from the experience of the Europeanintegration process that has ratherdeprived them of some of their

components, the EU member stateparliaments have developed a range ofdomestic constitutional mechanismsdesigned to augment their influence on

European policies. The following will bea review of such mechanisms withseveral references being made to thesituation in the Federal Republic ofGermany, the Bundestag in thisparticular case, given the fact that myfive-month internship there enabled aclose-up view.

Primarily, one must note that theinfluence of national parliaments ismainly being reflected by how they

control the activity of their nationalgovernments in the Council of theEuropean Union. There are two base-line systems for such control (5., page184):" The model of the ex-post control

over the ministers (a passive- reactive kind of control ), where thegovernment enjoys discretion innegotiating with the Council whileretaining responsibility for itspositions and the way it votesbefore the Parliament after thedecision has been made;

" The model of ex-ante control, by directly influencing the decision- making process (a proactive- anticipative kind of control) – the‘control by commitment’ concept –according to which the parliamentis given the legal option toactively influence the content ofthe position of the governmentbefore a decision is made in theCouncil.

Roughly, almost all parliaments ofthe member states pursue the model ofcontrol by commitment, the differenceamong them becoming notable when itcomes to the effectiveness of thepractical employment of the model. Anexception to that is the Hellenic

ENDRE-SANDOR ERDÖDI

78

2 Known by the name of îMaastricht-Entscheidung” (the Maastricht Decision)



Republic where the rights of theparliament are greatly restricted to theulterior oversight of the activity of theministers.

Irrespective of the model pursued,parliaments use the tools set out below.

1. Governments informing parliaments

Apart from traditional control tools(interpellations, hearings, interrogations,etc.) fit for overseeing the activity of thegovernment in the EU Council, inalmost all member states legalprovisions have been introduced makingit mandatory for governments to reportto parliaments on the legislativeintentions at a EU level, by transmittingto them the proposals for legislationdrafted by the European Commission,as well as to produce regular (everysemester or year) reports on Europeanaffairs before the parliament plenum.

As regards the legal foundation ofthis tool of parliamentary involvement,in Germany, France, Austria and

Portugal the obligation of thegovernment to inform the parliament isenshrined in the constitution of thosecountries. Art. 23, paragraph 2 of theGerman Constitution (Grundgesetz)reads: ‘…the federal Government isunder an obligation to inform theBundestag and the Bundesrat withoutdelay’ (15., page 23).

In the majority of the member statesthis obligation of the executive is

regulated by ordinary legislation, and byorganic legislation in the Scandinaviancountries. In Denmark, the legal basisfor the right of the Folketinget to beinformed is the EU Accession Act, art.6: ‘the Government reports to theFolketinget on developments in theEuropean Communities’ (13., page115). In the UK and Ireland, the legalfoundation is represented by theregulations of the parliaments and the

various conventions they have with the

government. In The Netherlands andLuxembourg there are no legalprovisions in that respect, but thegovernment has undertaken it to share

EU-relevant information to thelegislature. Only The Hellenic Republicis an exception to that, as it has neitherprovisions nor a unilateral obligation ofinformation taken on by thegovernment. The available controlinstruments are the annual reports thegovernment writes on the application oftreaties, and the interrogations in theparliament.

As far as the scope of the information presented by governments is concerned,two modalities can be identified in theEU:" In certain member states the

information is comprehensive andencompasses the totality of theEU activities (Denmark, Germany,Austria, Portugal, Sweden andGreat Britain);

" In most of the member states the

legal obligation to provideinformation is restricted toforwarding the official proposalsof the European Commission fornew directives or norms. The restof the documents are sent only ifrequested by the parliaments.

In conclusion, the information ofparliaments by the governmentsconsists at least in the forwarding ofthe legislative initiatives developed by

the Commission, with the exception ofGreece. In practice, however,parliaments seem to be facing a varietyof hurdles in the process of receivinginformation: documents are oftenincomplete (Italy, Portugal, Spain) orsent with delays (France, Luxembourg,Belgium, Great Britain).

Many national parliaments solicit,apart from the EU official documents,also extra information from their

governments in the form of


79



substantiation notes, information fichesor standardised memorials putting everyEuropean legislative project in apolitical, economic, social and legislativeperspective. In Austria, Denmark,Germany and Great Britaingovernments have an obligation toforward such information, and in therest of the member states additionalexplanations are only given if requestedby the parliament or by its specialisedcommittees.

A major importance presents theongoing reporting on the subsequent

developments in the negotiations on theCouncil of the European Union. Theanalysis of legislative proposals is onlythe first step in informing theparliament, since negotiations withinCOREPER3 and then in the Councilcan take an unexpected turn, and theparliaments need detailed informationon those processes in order toinfluence government positions. Inseveral member states such as Austria,Denmark, Finland, Germany and theUK, this information practice isenshrined in the constitution of thosecountries or in special laws. In themajority of the member states, theparliaments raise information regardingthe developments within the Council ofthe EU via traditional interrogation toolsas well as informally, through theirEuropean affairs and specialised

committees.Governments of all member states

are supposed to present detailedreports on the state of play of theEuropean integration and of theEuropean Union, as well as onexpected developments every sixmonths or annually. The HellenicParliament attaches special attention tosuch government reports.

2. Parliament committees on European affairs

The first parliament committee

dealing with European affairs was the‘committee for the single market and forthe free trade area’ of the GermanBundesrat, created in 1957 acting toensure that the positions of thegovernments of the German lands inthe area of European integration wouldbe considered to a greater extent bythe federal government. Following theexample of the Bundesrat, otherparliaments of the six member states at

the time also established similarcommittees in the years to come.The lower chambers of the German

Federal Parliament, the Bundestag, tookthe first step towards a committee onEuropean affairs by establishing aCouncil for Integration in 1963, with atask to take over information from thegovernment and disseminate it to thespecialised committees. Nonetheless,the Council only met a few times in five

years. A substantive change occurredas from 1979, pursuant to the firstdirect elections organised for theEuropean Parliament, abrogating thedouble mandate of the deputies, andguaranteeing a direct flow ofinformation. The Europe Committee ofthe Bundestag was established in 1983,including 11 federal and Europeandeputies. The primordial role of thecommittee was to make European

policy or decision recommendations aswell as to liaise with the Europeanparliament, therefore not having thestatute of a proper parliamentcommittee (11., page 70). Given therather ineffective performance of thecommittee, it was replaced, in 1987, bya sub-committee for the EC of theforeign affairs committee, where themembers of the European parliament


80

3 Committee of the Permanent Representatives of the Council of the European Union



were only observers. It unclear statuteand authority-related issues, thecommittee was dissolved in 1991, whenit was replaced by a Commission for

the European Communities with a roleof studying European documents,improve relations with the nationalparliaments and with the EP. Thatformula did not prove to be any moresatisfying than the ones before, beingundermined by the competition of thespecialised committees. In general,before the early 1990s, political forumsin the Bundestag had failed to deliver

and live up to the expectations whencreated, focussing on issues andthemes of principle in connection withthe European Communities rather thanactually analysing European legislativeinitiative which would remain in thecompetence of the specialisedcommittees. A large-scale changeoccurred after the entry into effect ofthe Treaty of Maastricht, when theCommittee for European Union Affairs

was established by constitutionalprovision4, with 50 members 11 ofwhom were MEPs with the statute ofobservers. The main functions of thiscommittee are the following5:" Process EU documents received

from the Government, select themand co-ordinate the subsequentanalyses procedure;

" Can turn any EU theme that mayaffect the interest of Germany

into its own item of debate,meaning that the committee canaddress any European subjectirrespective of expertise-associated competences andfollow-up on any EU policydevelopment;

" The Bundestag, under article 45in the Constitution, can empowerthe committee to represent itsplenum before the government,

which gives it a privilegedposition among the specialisedcommittees that cannot committhe plenum of the parliament inany area.

The first direct elections for theEuropean Parliament were a goodopportunity to institute a delegation tothe European Communities in France,too; those delegations had been

designed primarily as informationproviding bodies to the two houses ofthe French parliament. (5., page 102).

With the accession of the newmembers in 1972, 1986 and 1995,European affairs committees were alsoestablished within those nationalparliaments, and, in a majority of thecountries that joined the EU in 2004relevant parliament committees werealready in place on the date of

accession, with a role to oversee theintegration processes undergoing bythose countries.

Currently, there are 34 committeeson European affairs in the parliamentsof the 25 EU member states. Twelvemember states have a bicameralparliamentary system which means thateach house has its own committee, butthere are also legislatures that opted formerged committees on European

affairs, such as in Belgium, Ireland andSpain6.

In many member states there areprovisions according to which membersof the EP also have a commitment inthe national parliament as well. Inparliaments in Belgium and The


81

4 Art. 45 in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz fuer die Bundesrepublik Deutschland , Bundeszentrale fuer Politische Bildung, Bonn, 2001)5 www.bundestag.de6 www.cosac.org



Hellenic Republic, national members ofthe EP are fully-fledged members of theEuropean affairs committees as well. Ina majority of member states the MEPs

can attend the sessions of thecommittees as observers. In theScandinavian countries, the UnitedKingdom and the Netherlands theycannot attend the sessions of theEuropean affairs committees , but canbe consulted as experts in specificfields.

3. Procedure of the involvement of parliaments in the European legislative

process In principle, two kinds of procedures

can be identified in what concerns theexamination of the initiatives of theEuropean Commission and influencingdecision-making by the Council of theEuropean Union:" Centrally organised systems

(mandating systems) where thepolitical control is concentratedwith the parliament committeeso n European affairs (Austria,Belgium in the Senate, Denmark,Estonia, Finland, the HellenicRepublic, Ireland, Latvia, Lithuania,Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia.,Sweden, Spain and Hungary).The system was sourced by theDanish parliament in the 1970s,where the ‘Market Committee’ ofthe Folketinget was placed at theheart of the process that enabledit to act on behalf f theparliament and impose negotiatingpositions binding on the Danishgovernment7.Going back, as partof the system, the principaladdressee of the informationdocuments forwarded by thegovernment (Commissioninitiatives, additional information,progress on the legislative

process in the Council, regularreports) is the committee forEuropean affairs. The committeeis also competent to conduct a

political scrutiny of the Europeandocuments and to makerecommendations or take standson the conduct of therepresentatives of the governmentin the Council of Ministers of th eEU. The committee for Europeanaffairs in that way undertakes theposition of representation of theplenum, practically becoming‘ d o w n s i zed plenum’ (5., page

189) and can adopt bindingdecisions on the government. InGermany, for example, theEuropean affairs committee canbe mandated in specific cases torepresent the plenum of theBundestag.

" Decentralised systems (document- based systems) where the politicala s sessment of the Europeandocuments is shared by thespecialised committees of theparliament (Belgium in the Houseof Deputies, the Czech Republic,France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,Malta, Great Britain, theNetherlands). Despite the strongerinfluence of the specialisedcommittees, the European affairscommittees still have an importantrole in such systems, too. First,their task is to select from themyriad of EC papers the relevantones and to assign them to therelevant specialised committees.Second, they coordinate theactivity of the parliament in thearea of European affairs. Third,they take the role as an interfacebetween the government and thespecialised committees. In thebulk of the states that acceded to


82

7 Idem 6



the EU in 2004, as well as Italy,the European affairs committeesmainly perform work in the field ofthe transposition of the acquis

communautaire into the domesticlaw and are less involved in theEuropean legislation making. Thespecialised political activity iscontributed by traditional committeesof parliaments. Nevertheless, theycannot commit the plenum of theparliament while the Europeanaffairs committee in a centrallyorganised system can, and theyare only entitled to table reportsand recommendations to theplenum. In the decentralisedsystems, the lead actor in themaking of the ultimate decision isthe plenum of the parliament.

The advantage of the c e n t r a l systems compared to the decentralisedone is that the activities of theparliaments that have implications in theEuropean law-making process isconcentrated in a single place whichmeans that a closer connection can bemade between the parliament and thegovernment of a country. Thecentralised systems are alsocharacterised by a greater degree offlexibility regarding the tasks they aresupposed to fulfil in order for them tobe able to influence the decision-making process in the Council, bothfrom a time perspective and from a

political point of view.Decentralised systems present theadvantage that a member of parliamentspecialised in a national field cancapitalise on his/her competence easierin identical or similar European areasby his/her work in the specialisedcommittees. That is very important witha view to the future implementation ofEU norms into national legislations.

4. Right of the parliaments to adopt positions on European topics

This right is enshrined in the

legislation of the member states, insome even by the constitution, in therest being regulated by ordinary laws,and takes various shapes:" Consultation of the parliament : in

the majority of countries theobligation to ask the parliament toproduce a point of view beforeevery meeting of the Councilwhere final decisions are to bemade is not stated in the law. In

Austria, Denmark, Germany8

andSweden, the government mustconsult the parliament, and,should it fail to do so or shouldit not wait for a position to beadopted by the plenum of thelegislature, while the latter hasmanifested such an intention, it isconsidered in principle that thegovernment has breached theconstitution and the law. In Great

Britain, although there are nolegislative provisions to thateffect, a resolution of the Houseof Communes adopting the codeof conduct of its representative inthe Council establishes the‘parliamentary reserve’ on Europeanprojects (5., 128-129). In Francewe can find a similar situation:the government voluntarilyrecognises the right of theparliament to a ‘réserve d’examenparlementaire’, according to whichthe government agrees, in theCouncil, to a draft only after theparliament has finishes examiningit. (5., 113-115).

" Binding parliament positions : onlythe representatives of theAustrian government in the


83

8 Art 23, para.3 in the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz fuer die

Bundesrepublik Deutschland , Bundeszentrale fuer Politische Bildung, Bonn, 2001)



Council can be mandated by theNationalrat. Positions adopted bythe European affairs committeesor by the plenum of the

parliaments of the other memberstates are legally binding only onthe representatives of thosestates in the Council of the EU.However, this latter category arenot totally independents from thewill of the parliaments. Thestrongest position in relation tothe executive is with the DanishFolketinget, that enjoys broadprivileges in European affairs andthat is underlain by spontaneouscoalitions formed among thenumerous parties represented inthe parliament plus the oftenpolitical alignments where thegovernment finds itself in aminority. A similar situation canbe also found in theScandinavian countries. InGermany, the government can be

made defend a Bundestagposition only in the beginning ofthe debates in the Council. Butthere is no such statutoryobligation in that respect (4.,page 20). A failure of thegovernment to act on therecommendation of the parliamentcan be politically punished,possibly by a constructive non-confidence vote cast against the

chancellor, but it has neverhappened so far. The situation ofthe French and Britishparliaments should be looked atin the particular constitutionalcontext of those countries. InFrance, because of the weakposition of the parliamentcompared to the government theparliament cannot issue bindingpositions on the government,

therefore the extent to which the

latter chooses to comply with theparliament recommendations isgiven by mere politicalcalculations revolving around the

topic at issue. In the UK, thanksto the tight relations between theparliamentary majority and thegovernment, the House ofCommons does not enjoy anindependent power to oblige thegovernment. An interestingsituation can be found in theBenelux states, where theparliaments have waived theirrights to binding the governmentto their positions for Europeanintegration political considerations.

The mandating of therepresentatives in the Council ofMinisters of the EU is not the ‘secretweapon’ of the parliaments in imposingtheir own point of view in Europe, as itmay seem, because, after theenlargement of the qualified majorityvoting to the detriment of the unanimity

rule in the Council, countries pursuingsingular positions can no longerinfluence final decisions, even if theyare bound to the positions of theirnational parliaments. According to PeterM. Huber, in such situations, ‘theconstitutional decision for a people’ssovereignty can be subjected topressures’. (4., page 11).

5. Ex-post control and political

accountability of the governmentThe control of the action of

governments in the Council of the EUis done, in the majority of parliaments,by traditional ways , namely byinterrogating the ministers and byinterpellation debates. The non-confidence vote – another traditionalcontrol tool, does not play a major rolein punishing the government for aconduct in the Council against the

position of the parliament. Nevertheless,


84



it can be noted that in those memberstates where the parliament canwithdraw its political endorsement forindividual ministers and not from thewhole of the government only thepositions of the ministers in the EUCouncil are quite consistent with thepositions of the parliaments, not onlyfor legal considerations, but rather forpolitical considerations.

Apart from traditional methods,governments are under a duty to report on the outcomes of the negotiations inthe Council, while accounting for their

position in the negotiations. Thereporting takes place repeatedly, and isdone to the parliamentary committeeson European affairs.

In conclusion, the position of thenational parliaments of the EU memberstates on their participation in EUdecision making processes has beenstrengthened especially after the

adoption of the Treaty of Maastricht byintroducing various constitutional orlegal mechanisms. The manner ofinvolvement in the EU also presentsimportant differences.

The involvement of nationalparliaments as a plausible guarantee ofdemocratising and legitimating theaction of the European supra-nationalbodies is however a process that growstogether with the EU institutional

framework and needs an ongoingadjustment of the national structuresand mechanisms through which nationalparliaments can have a nationalinfluence on governments or anexternal influence, directly upon EUfora.

C. The Romanian Parliament in thecontext of the EU integration process

Our country officially lodged its EU

accession application on the 22nd

ofJune 1995, but negotiations proper onlycommenced early in the year 2000 (10.,page 277).

As far as the implication of theparliament in the accession process isconcerned, in 1995 the Committee forEuropean Integration of the RomanianParliament was established9, a specialcommittee working under its ownregulations but enjoying the sameprivileges as the standing committees. Itis a mixed committee of the parliament,therefore it comprises both deputiesand senators – currently 35 members.The chairperson of the committee iselected by majority, direct and openvoting by all members of thecommittee, and is nominated by thepolitical groups in the parliament. Thechairman is assisted by two deputychairpersons and by two secretaries.

The European Integration Committee

has played a major role in Romania’saccession to the EU through the manycontacts it has initiated with Europeanbodies, mainly with the EuropeanParliament and with COSAC, by anactive commitment to the accessiontalks and by expediting theapproximation of the Romanianlegislation with the Europeanrequirements and standards (6., page191).

During that time, the EuropeanIntegration Committee has acquired animportant baggage of expertise in themonitoring of the accession processand in using EU pre-accession funds,as well as in the field of the Europeanparliamentary diplomacy10. Although allthat experience is valuable, circum-


85

9 Resolution of the Parliament of Romania no. 8 of 28 June 199510 Valeriu ™tefan Zgonea (Deputy): Role of the Committee of the Romanian Parliament for European Integration , Presentation within the ‘Techniques of transposition of European Law’ Programme,

22.03.2005



stances are bound to change after ourcountry’s accession to the EU on the1st of January 2007. The Parliament of Romania will need to undergo a change

of functions and roles, to turn from a ‘ m o n i t o r ’ of the deliverance onintegration commitments into a ‘modulator’ of the EU primary and secondary legislation. In the EU, asshown above, there are variouspractices and opportunities for theinvolvement of the national parliaments,but, bore option for one or another,domestic realities must be scrutinised.In my opinion it would be

recommendable for the RomanianParliament to:" Adopt a special law regulating the

involvement of the houses in theEuropean decision-making processand legislation development,c l early specifying its rights andthe obligations incumbent on thegovernment, while also indicatingthe national mechanisms for theimplementation of the two

protocols to the Treatyestablishing a Constitution for theEuropean Union, related to thenational parliaments (The Protocolon the Role of NationalParliaments in the EuropeanUnion and the Protocol on theApplication of the Principles ofSubsidiarity and Proportionality),and of the early warning systempertaining to the latter.

" Give the committee for European integration a central role i nreceiving the EU documents fromthe government and from theEuropean Commission, inselecting and forwarding them tothe specialised committees of theparliament and in processing theresults and the recommendationsthat should be then presented tothe plenum of the two chambers.In essence, I suggest that the

Romanian Parliament should

follow the centrally organised system in contributing to theEuropean legislative process. Fora more effective co-ordination the

chairpersons of the specialisedcommittees or other membersappointed by them should attendthe sessions of the Europeanintegration committee followingthe model of the Baltic states; thesame should apply to the futureRomanian members of theEuropean Parliament;

" Mandate , whenever the situationso requires, the European

integration committee to act onbehalf of the two houses of theparliament, considering thedifficult process of decisionmaking and prolonged debatespreceding it, that is a commonpractice in the RomanianParliament. This ‘downsizedplenum’ plus a few other things –for example the members of thecommission should be recognised

integration specialists – arebound to achieve an effectiveinvolvement of the parliament inthe drafting of European policieswhile strengthening its positionbefore the government.;

" Appoint national representatives of Romania to the European institutions (the European Commi-ssion, the European Court ofJustice, so on and so forth) thus

strengthening its position in frontof the government;

" Organise regular public debates in plenary sessions in the chambers on the occasion of the six-monthreporting by the government, topresent the Commission multi-annual legislation drafting pipeline,the accession of new states tothe EU, or whenever there is aEuropean matter of relevance to

Romania. By such debates the


86




87

public opinion can be betterinformed and rendered aware ofexisting European topics, and theapproval rate of such EU-

stemmed measures could go up.The adoption of such measures calls

for a serious assessment, debates onproposals made and a consensusamong the political parties, a process

that is already behind the schedule. Wecan only hope that our parliamentrealises the importance of its activecommitment in the European Union and

undertakes the role as a democraticlegitimating binder between theRomanian people and the Europeansupra-national bodies.

References:1 Steven Andersen: The European Union: how democratic is it? , Sage Press,

London, 19962 Robert A. Dahl: Despre democra˛ie , Institutul European, Ia!i, 20033 Herbert Doering: Parliaments and Majority Rule in Western Europ e ,

Frankfurt/Main, New York, St. Martin’s Press, 19954 Peter M. Huber: Die Rolle der nationalen Parlamente bei der Rechtsetzung der EU.

Zur Sicherung und zum Ausbau der Mitwirkungsrechte des Deutschen Bundestages , Hans Seidel Stiftung e.V., Muenchen, 2001

5 Hans-Georg Kamann: Die Mitwirkung der Parlamente der Mitgliedstaaten an der europaeischen Gesetzgebung , Peter Lang – Europaeischer Verlag derWissenschaften, Frankfurt am Main, 1997

6 Susanne Kraatz, Silvia von Steindorff: Parlamente und Systemtransformation im postsozialistischen Europa , Leske und Budrich, Opladen, 2002

7 Andreas Mauer, Peter Becker: Die Europafaehigkeit der nationalen Parlamente ,SWP-Studie, Berlin, 2004

8 Andreas Maurer: Die nationalen Parlamente im Rahmen des EU-Verfassungsvertrages –Moeglichkeiten und Grenzen im neuen Europa , SWPStudie, Berlin, 2005

9 Werner Patzelt: Parlamente und ihre Funktionen. Institutionelle Mechanismen und institutionelles Lernen im Vergleich , Wiesbaden, VS-Verlag, 2003

10 Ioan Rotariu: Sistemul economiei mondiale ! i mecanismele sale de func˛ionare ,Editura Mirton, Timi!oara, 2001

11 Ruoers Schick, Hermann Schreiner: So arbeitet der Deutsche Bundestag , NDV,Rheinbreitbach, 2003

12 Carina Sprungk: Catching up with Europe: Explaining varying patterns of national parliamentary participation in EU policy-making , Paper presented at the CentralEuropean Political Science Association Conference, Budapest, 2004

13 Mattias Zier: Nationale Parlamente in der EU , V&R Unipress, Goettingen, 200514 XXX, Europaeische Union. Europaeische Gemeinschaften. Die Vertragstexte von

Maastricht mit den deutschen Begleitgesetzen , Bundeszentrale fuer politischeBildung, Bonn, 1998

15 XXX, Grundgesetz fuer die Bundesrepublik Deutschland , Bundeszentrale fuerPolitische Bildung, Bonn, 2001

16 XXX, Vertrag ueber eine Verfassung fuer Europa, Europaeische Gemeinschaften,Luxemburg, 2005

17 www.bundestag.de18 www.cdep.ro19 www.cosac.org

20 www.euparl.eu.int

Documents

RJEA Vol6 No4 European Dimension of National Parliaments in the European Union