Risking General War in Pursuit of Limited Objectives: U.S. Military ContingencyPlanning for Poland in the Wake of the 1956 Hungarian Uprising

James D. Marchio

The Journal of Military History, Vol. 66, No. 3. (Jul., 2002), pp. 783-812.

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Risking General War in Pursuit of Limited Objectives: U.S. Military Contingency Planning for Poland

in the Wake of the 1956 Hungarian Uprising

James D. Marchiol

Abstract

The Eisenhower administration secretly grappled with the issue of how to defend Poland and other East European nations in the wake of the brutal Soviet suppression of the 1956 Hungarian Uprising. Multiple working groups considered a spectrum of actions ranging from diplomatic posturing to general war in pursuit of this limited objective. Military planning revealed deficiencies in the means to defend Poland and the costly consequences of such actions. These insights ultimately produced less confrontational policies toward the Soviet Union and added to the urgency of developing more flex- ible response options to complement the nuclear doctrine of Mas- sive Retaliation.

0N 6 December 1956,United States Vice President Richard M. Nixon proclaimed to t h e world:

The United Nations has no armies that it could send to rescue the heroic freedom lighters of Hungary. There were no treaties which

1. The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. government. My thanks to Dr. Bruce Vandervort, Dr. Daniel Moran, and an anonymous reviewer for their critical comments and encouragement.

James D. Marchio (Colonel, USAF), currently Commander of U.S. Transporta- tion Command's Joint Intelligence Center, holds a Ph.D. in history from Ameri- can University in Washington, D.C. Beyond numerous assignments in the intelligence career field, he has taught military strategy and national security policy at the Joint Military Intelligence College in Washington, D.C. He has pre- viously published articles in Joint Forces Quarterly, Intelligence and Nutwnul Security and Air Power History.

Tlre Jotrr~mlof M ~ l ~ t a r yIf~story66 (July 2002): 783-5312 O Soc~eryfor Mllltary History * 783

would invoke the armed assistance of the free nations. Our only wcapon here was moral condcmnation, since the alternative was action on our part which might initiate the third and ultimate world war.2

\Vhilc recently declassified archival materials support the Vice Prcsi- dent's remarks on Hungary, this new evidence also confirms that the U.S. was working hard to ensure that it was not confronted with such limited or potentially costly options in the future. Indeed, Vice President Nixon's remarks on IIungary disguise the fact that secret military planning had been ongoing and would continue for the next six months to determine the feasibility of using military force as well as other means to prevent or halt a Soviet invasion of Poland.

\+%at actions regarding Poland did the United States consider? \Vho advocated them and why? Moreover, how were thcse plans viewed within the U.S. military community and in the Eisenhower administra- tion as a whole? And what came of thcse planning initiatives? Did this contingency planning have any lasting significance or was it just another paper exercise designed to silence hard-liners within the administration who had criticized the limited and ineffectual U.S. response to Soviet tanks in the streets of Budapest? To answer thcse questions, one must first consider U.S. actions during the IIungarian crisis and the links between U.S. military planning for Eastern Europe and the policies of President Dwight D. Eisenhower's administration toward the region.

This examination sheds new light on a topic that has received little scholarly attention to date. Most secondary sources that discuss the U.S. responses to the 1956 crises in Poland and Hungary--even recent works by Robert J . \Vatson and noted Cold \Var historian John Lewis Gaddis-

2. Richard M. Nixon, "In the Cause of Pcace and Freedom," speech delivered bcfore the Automobile hlanufacturers Association, New York, N.Y., 6 December 1956, Vital Speecltes oj'tlte Day 23 (1 January 1957).

In June 1956, workers in Poznan, Poland, had rioted against their communist bosses and attacked Communist party and police hcadquarters. In September, the rioters received open and apparently fair trials, and under ililadyslaw Gomulka, a leader who insisted on a measure of autonomy within the communist orbit but stressed continued friendship with the Soviet Union, Poland won an unprecedented measure of internal freedom for a Soviet satellite. In contrast, what began as peace- ful student protests in Hungary on 23 October 1956 turned into a violent revolt that quickly spread and forced the removal of the country's most hated communist lead- ers. On 1November, Budapest renounced the Warsaw Pact and called on the United Nations to help defend its neutrality. Soviet forces-which had been withdrawn rais- ing hopes that hloscow would accept a nonaligned Hungary-attacked early on 4 November and crushed the revolt by the end of the month. During this fighting, U.S. President Dwight D. Eisenhower pleaded with Soviet Premier Nikolai A. Bulganin to withdraw Soviet troops and accept Hungary's right to self-government. Bulganin replied that the affair was a domestic Hungarian problem of no concern to the United States.

784 * THE .IOI-R~ALOF

Risking Generul Wur in hrsuit of Limited Objectives

are quick to dismiss the military options considered, ultimately focusing on the difficulty and risk of any armed response. Gaddis, for example, wraps up his brief discussion by acknowledging that while there is uncer- tainty over what would have happened if Eisenhower had issued a warn- ing to the Soviet Union not to invade Hungary, "there is no evidence that the President ever seriously considered it."3 Other works argue that Eisenhower had ruled out the use of military means to support the "lib- eration" of Eastern Europe or "rollback of the Iron Curtain well bcfore 1956. Former Eisenhower advisor Robert R. Bowie and Professor Richard H. Immerman advance this position in their thorough and groundbreak- ing work, Waging Peace: IIow Eisenhower Shuped an Enduring Cold Wur S t r ~ t e ~ g y . ~ Finally, the paucity of scholarly litcrature on thc topic reflects the limited sources available to historians. Although some for- merly classified Cold War materials have been open for nearly two decades, the highly classified military plans and national security memo- randa detailing the measures considered have only recently become available. Thus, important aspects of U.S. policies toward Eastern Europc and links to the intensifying debate over the U.S. strategic doctrine of Flexible Response have been overlooked or under appreciated.

Resistance, War Plans, and the Hungarian Uprising

The important role that unrest in Eastern Europe played in U.S. war plans is central to understanding the military planning that transpired in the aftermath of the Hungarian Uprising. In the late 1940s it was widely believed in U.S. intelligence and diplomatic circles that "Sovietization," or consolidation of Soviet control over Eastern Europe, would adversely influence the balance of power between East and West. If the Soviets solidified their hold over the satellite states, they would have an advanced position from which to launch an assault on Western Europe, as well as a large buffer zone to protect them from Western retaliation. Moreover, the satellites were seen as providing critical manpower and material resources that could be used in the military and economic realms.

U.S. military planners and others argued that maintaining the "spirit of resistance" in Eastern Europe was thus critical to countering "Sovi- etization" efforts and preparing for a potential conflict with the U.S.S.R.

3. John Lewis Gaddis, We Know Now: Rethinking Cold Wur I-listory (New York: Clarendon Press, 1997), 23639; Robert J. Watson, Into the Missile Age, 1956-1960 (Washington: Office of Secretary of Defense, 1997), 47-74.

4. Robert R. Bowie and Richard H. Immerman, Waging Peace: Ifow Eisenhower Shaped an Enduring Cold Wur Strategy (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 158-76.

MILITARY HISTORY * 785

Passive resistance, such as "sick outs" and deliberate workcr negligence, limited the Soviets Union's cxploitable rcwards from occupation. Activc rcsistance, including sabotagc and strcet dcmonstrations, not only undermincd Sovict confidence in the reliability of their East European allics, but it also divertcd Sovict troops to rear security functions and established the nuclcus to support U.S. Special Forces that would bc inscrted to attack Sovict lincs of communication (LOC) should war erupt. The importancc of rcsistance activity was evident in U.S. war plans and in a variety of programs pursued by the Department of Dcfensc and the Central Intclligcnce Agcncy (CIA) throughout the late 1940s and carly 1950s." This was manifcstcd in the support providcd to partisan

5. See U.S. Dcpt. of the Army, Deputy Chicf of Staff for Military Operations, "A Tcntative Plan for Overt Unconventional Operations in the European Theatcr of \liar," 29 Novcmber 19.50, U.S. Army \liar College, hlilitary liistory Institute (hereafter hlliI), Carlisle Barracks, Pa.; and "Guerrilla \Varfare Concept," 9 February 1954, File 370.64, Box 15, Top Secret Correspondence 1951-58, 1951-54, Records of the Office of Chicf of Special Warfare, Rccords of thc Army Staff, Rccord Group (KG) 319, National Archives and Records Administration, Washington, D.C. (hereafter NAlL4). David E. hlurphy, the CIA deputy chief of the Berlin Operations Base from 19.54 to 1959, observed that although thc Korean conflict had degenerated into a trench war of attrition by latc 19.51, concern continued in Washington and at the headquarters of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) over a potential East-\kst conflict in Europe. Murphy citcd a 23 October 1951 NSC dircctive on covert action calling for the development of stay-behind and resistance forces and pointcd to the initiation of the Redcap dcfector program as further proof that fears of a Soviet-backed invasion of Europe persisted. Murphy asserts that thc officers of the CIA'S Office of Policy Coordination (OPC) saw their job as the application of the full range of wartime meth- ods to shake the German Democratic Republic to its foundations-to create such havoc behind Soviet forces in East Germany that a Korean-style invasion of the \Vest would be impossible. David E. Murphy, Sergei A. Kondrashev, and George Bailey, But-tleground Berlin: CLA us. KGB in the Cold Wur (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1997), 116, 123, 238; Evan Thomas, in The Very Best Men (New York: Simon and Schuster, 199.5), describes how a CIA-sponsored paramilitary force of displaced persons and 6migrCs was designed to be the shock force of the revolution. In reality it turned into a social club. Thomas, whose book is bascd on numerous interviews with former CIA officers, describes how the great ambition of Frank Wisner, CIA'S I'lans Chief, was to penetrate the East Bloc and ultimately to break it into pieces. In 1953 alone, according to one of the CIA'S in-house histories, the agency spent almost one hundred million dollars on operations in Eastern Europe. According to Thomas, Wisner believed that, given proper underground aid-arms caches, radios, propa- ganda-the local populations of Eastern Europe could be persuaded to throw off their communist oppressors. Wisner was reportedly under trcmendous pressure from the Pentagon to gear up for war with the U.S.S.R. CIA OPC vetcrans would later shrug at the dcmands: scores of coordinated, well-armed stay-behind groups to harass the Red Army as it rolled through \liestern Europe. The Pentagon also wanted OPC men trained to sabotage two thousand Russian air bases to prevent Soviet planes from tak- ing off in the evcnt of an invasion. See Thomas, The Very &st Men, 32, 34, 36-38, 136, 375.

786 * THE JOURXAL OF

Risking General Wur in Pursuit of Limited Objectives

groups in Poland and Albania and was rctlected in the enormous U.S. psychological warfare and propaganda effort mountcd by Radio Free Europe and the l'sychological Strategy Board.6 Stymicd by effcctive East Bloc security forccs and intelligence lcaks, the U.S. focuscd its cfforts on programs dcsigncd to convincc the Eastern Europcan populace that thcy had not been forgotten or abandoncd, urging thcm to rcsist communist authoritics largcly through "passive" rcsistancc.

Surprised but encouragcd by thc widespread unrest that cruptcd dur- ing the June 1953 East German Uprising, U.S. authoritics intensified thcir psychological warfarc cfforts in its aftermath but met with only limitcd success. By the end of 1954 the Eiscnhowcr administration was forced to rccvaluate its stratcgy and back away from some of its more aggrcssivc political warfarc and covcrt opcrations. The administration shiftcd its opcrational objcctives from inspiring passive resistance to encouraging nationalism and indcpcndent action by the satellite rcgimes. It also bcgan to strcss "cvolutionary rathcr than rcvolutionary change," acknowledging that bctter living conditions could comc through the communist rcgimcs if they chose to take the ncccssary action.'

Yct the opportunities presented by Sovict Communist Party Chief Nikita Khrushchev's 1956 "de-Stalinization" campaign and the June 1956 riots in Poznan, Poland, forced anothcr policy reevaluation by the Unitcd States three months bcfore the Hungarian Revolution erupted. National Sccurity Council (NSC) Policy Statement 5608-U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Sutellites in Eustern Europe-reiterated the empha- sis on evolutionary policies begun the ycar before, but also observed that thc "fluid situation in the satellitcs has increased the previously limited U.S. capabilities to influence a basic change in Soviet domination of the satcllites." Thc fermcnt in Eastern Europe in turn led to increased efforts by thc Eisenhower administration to cncouragc passivc resistance and to create "uncertainty or divisions" within the East European regime^.^

6. For a discussion of U.S. and British cfforts to aid partisan groups in Albania and Poland, see Thomas Powers, The Man IVho Kept the Secrets: Richard Helms and the CIA (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1979), 40-47; and Nicholas Bethell, Betrayed, rev. ed. of The Great 13etrayal (New York: Times Books, 1985). Besides examining the Alban- ian and Polish operations, Peter Grose's Operation Rollback: America's Secret War Behind the Iron Curtuin (New York: Houghton Miftlin, 2000), 144-89, provides a detailed discussion of cfforts to aid resistance movements in Romania and the Ukraine.

7. Valur Ingimundarson, "The East German Uprising," Diplomatic History 20 (Summer 1996): 381409; Christian Ostermann, "The United States, the East Ger- man Uprising of 1953, and the Limits of Rollback," Working Paper no. 11, Cold War International History Project (CWIHP) (December 1994); and James D. Marchio, "Rhetoric and Reality: The Eisenhower Administration and Unrest in Eastern Europe, 1953-1959" (Ph.D. diss., American University, 1990), 127-331.

8. NSC 560Wl-U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe-18 July 1956, Records of National Security Council, RG 273, NARA.

~IILITARYHISTORY * 787

Evcnts throughout Eastern Europe in the fall of 1956 formed thc cru- ciblc that shaped the Eiscnhowcr administration's subsequent contin- gcncy planning for P01and.~ The problcms and constraints encountcrcd, the actions considcred, and the policics ultimately adopted providcd the impetus and outline for these cfforts. The administration first confronted the spcctcr of Soviet intcmention in Octobcr 1956 in Poland, as Com- munist Party Chief Gomulka and his government dcfied Khrushchev and pursucd limitcd "indcpcndence" in Poland's domestic affairs.1° But the crisis that devcloped lcss than a wcek later in IIungary caught the administration cven more by surprise.ll Eisenhowcr and his staff wcre

9. Thc wealth of newly releascd materials from East European, Russian, and U.S. archivcs has provided new insights and a much broader, yet detailed picture of thc 1956 events. For an example of such ncw scholarship, sce Laslo Borhi, "Rollback, Lib- eration, Containment, or Inaction? U.S. Policy and Eastcrn Europe in the 195Os," .lournu1 of Cold War Stuclies 1 (Fall 1999): 67-110; and Jeno Gyorkel and Miklos Iiorvath, eds. , Soviet Militury Internention in Hungary: 1956 (Budapest: Central Europcan Prcss, 1999).

10. Years of political and economic oppression, party in-fighting, and Russian domination had laid the groundwork for thc "Polish conflict" well before the momen- tous month began. Unrest among the Polish masses and strife in the ranks of the Communist Party had grown with alarming rapidity since the start of 1956, especially following the U.S.S.R.'s Twentieth Party Congress. Yet it was not until the Eighth Ple- nary Meeting of the Polish Communist Party's Ccntral Committee that party strife and popular dissatisfaction finally spawncd significant political change. The Central Committee mceting was convened on 19 October 1956 with the primary purpose of detcrmining the Polish Communist Party's ncw Icadcrship. This task brought to ccn- ter stage the bittcr battle bctween Natolin (Stalinist) and Pulawy (nationalist) factions that had surfaced openly during thc summcr of 1956. The nationalists, who had gained the upper hand, proposed dissolving the entire Politburo and forcing new elec- tions in hopes of displacing several Stalinist members. The unexpected arrival of a high-ranking Soviet delegation on 19 October, headed by First Secretary Khrushchev and including \liarsaw Pact Commander Ivan Koncv and Defense Minister G. K. Zhukov, further heightened the tensions generated by the internal debate within the Polish leadership. Soviet concerns over the pace and direction of de-Stalinization in Poland and its increasingly anti-Russian tone prompted the unscheduled visit. Reportedly, Khrushchev presented the Poles with an ultimatum demanding the reten- tion of their old Politburo and a slowdown in the democratization process, threaten- ing the use of military force should the Poles not comply. Ile even accused the Polish leadership of trying to turn Poland over to the Americans after "we spilled our blood to liberate this country." In the end, the Soviets, not the Poles, backed down. For a first-hand account of the Polish crisis, see Nikita S. Khrushchcv, Khrushchec Remem- bers: The Lust Testament, trans. and ed. Strobe Talbott (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1974), 196207 .

11. One of the primary factors that discouraged Soviet intervention in Poland in October 1956 was that elements of the Polish military, as well as many of the Polish troops from the Internal Security Corps (KBW), were willing to fight on behalf of the new Polish regime. The latent danger of a clash between Soviet forces and the KBW spurred Khrushchev and Gomulka to renew efforts to find a peaceful solution. See

788 * THE JOYRSAL OF

Risking Gmerul Wur in Pursuit of Limited Objectives

immediately confrontcd with the daunting questions of whether to aid the East European uprising and, if so, how to do it without igniting gcn- era1 war. The task was made even more difficult by political and military constraints such as the lack of dircct land acccss to IIungary and a slow and rcluctant Unitcd Nations (UN). These constraints wcre further cxac- erbated by a near simultaneous crisis in the Middle East involving the clash of Egyptian and Israeli forces and the scizure of the Suez Canal by British and French troops.12

A variety of mcasurcs to aid thc "Frecdom Fighters" werc considcrcd at diffcrcnt levels in the Eiscnhowcr administration, but fcw werc actu- ally adopted or implemented, largely bccause of fear of starting World 1%- III.13 The unforcsccn opportunities in IIungary and Poland and the rapid pace of dcvclopmcnts prompted Prcsidcnt Eisenhower on 26 Octo-bcr 1956 to ordcr a comprehcnsive study of devclopments and possiblc courscs of action rcgarding Poland and Ilungary.14 Other early actions includcd the use of liadio Frce Europe to spread news of Poland's success in resisting the U.S.S.R. and to broadcast world support for 1iungary,l5 and a scrics of cabinet-level public statcmcnts of support for Poland and

hlark Kramer, "New Evidence on Soviet Decision-hlaking and the 1956 Polish and Ilungarian Crises," in CWII1P Bulletin 8/9 (Winter 199611997): 360-61. Another new Soviet report confirms that the likelihood of encountering widespread armed resis- tance was one of the major factors that deterred Soviet military intervention. Kramer, "Ilungary and Poland, 1956," in CIVIHP Bulletin 5 (Spring 1995): 53. Leszek Glu- chowski, with Edward Nalepa, "The Soviet-Polish Confrontation of October, 1956: The Situation in the Polish Internal Security Corps," \!'orking Paper no. 17, CWIHP (April 1997).

12. An Army War College thesis completed in 1963 summarized the reasons advanced for the United States's failure to intervene in Hungary. These included sur- prise, the need for a UN mandate, the neutrality of Austria, the Suez crisis, the 1954 U.S. elections, the strategy of Massive Retaliation, the situation in NATO, fear of esca- lation into general war, and existing U.S. policy. See Colonel Gerald I1. Ragsdale, U.S.A, "The Hungarian llcvolt of 1956: A Case Study of Insurgency," 8 March 1963, h.1HI.

13. For an enlightening contemporary discussion of the challenges confronted in aiding the Frecdom Fighters, see "Notes on the 39th Meeting of the Special Commit- tee on Soviet and Related Problems, Washington, 26 October 19.56," in U.S. Depart- ment of State, Foreign Relations of the United Stutes (FRUS), 1955-1957, vol. 25, Eustern Europe (Washington: GPO, 1990), 300-303.

14. National Security Council Actions, #1623, "Significant Dcvelopments Affeet- ing U.S. Security," in t('XUS, 195.5-57, 25:299.

15. A 28 October 19.56 memorandum for the Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs (ISA), directed this broadcast activity and urged that a plan for similar and other actions be developed as "ferment spreads to other satel- lites." Admiral Arthur W. Radford Papers 1953-57, Box 9, Records of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, RG 218, NARA.

hllLIT.4RY HISTORY * 789

JAMES D. MARCH10

Ilungary, as wcll as behind-thc-scenes diplomatic initiativcs to allay Soviet fears.I6

\Vhcthcr the United States should provide military forccs or aid was one of thc most prcssing and difficult issucs considered.17 Frank Wisncr, the CIA'S deputy director for plans and one of the strongest advocates of "rolling back" the Iron Curtain through paramilitary action and psycho- logical warfare, reportedly pressed CIA Dircctor Nlcn Dulles to allow the CIA covert action arm to go into opcration and insert Bmigri. battalions to aid the IIungarian insurgents in their struggle. Yct this action was largcly ruled out bccause the forces were not properly prepared and there was doubt whether thcy would be capable of standing up to Soviet tanks. If not men then perhaps arms? But cvcn this proved problem- atic.I8 According to the CIA'S in-house history, "there were no wcapons handy enough to commandeer hurricdly, we kncw too littlc, we had absolutely no picture at all of who necded wcapons, whcn, what kind,

In the end, President Eisenhower rcjcctcd two proposals to air- drop arms to the I Iungar ian~ .~~

16. For a comprehensive listing of high-levcl policy statements made by U.S. officials during the Hungarian Crisis, sce annex A to NSC 5616/2-Interim U.S. Pol- icy on Developments in Poland and klungary-19 November 1956, Iiecords of National Security Council, RG 273, NARA. The Sovicts blamed the unrest in Ilungary on the United States and displayed little understanding of the pressures leading to the IIungarian Uprising and events in Poland. Newly uncovered material from Soviet archives shows that Khrushchev attributed the turmoil to the "subversive activities of the imperialists" and believed that the departure of the Soviets from IIungary would be seen as a great victory for the Americans. See Kramcr, "New Evidence on Soviet 1)ecision-Making and the 19.56 Polish and Hungarian Crises," 364,388,390,393,395, 397, 400.

17. According to Richard Bissell, who was working in Washington a t the time and who re~ laced Wisner as the CIA'S chief of clandestine o~erat ions in 1958: "Either you give assistance and get bloody results, or you don't and appear weak and mislead your friends." "I don't remember any lucid conversations." He remembered "a lot of hand-wringing" since "no one had thought it through." Thomas, The Ve~y Best Men, 146-47.

18. In mid-October 1956, Frank Wisner and A1 Ulmer, another senior official in the clandestine service, discussed at length what, if anything, the agency could do if revolution broke out behind the Iron Curtain. Both knew that direct intervention by the United States was unlikely and that the emigre battalions supported by the CIA would probably be ineffective against Soviet tanks. Thomas, The Very Best Men, 142-43. Some sources claim that the United States did in fact insert CIA forces and support efforts by the \Vest German Gehlen organization. See Bennett Kovrig, The Myth ojLiberation: East-Central Europe i n U.S. Diplomucy a n d Politics since 1941 (Baltimore: .Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), 184.

19. Thomas, The Very Best Men, 146. 20. See William Colby and Peter Forbath, I-lonorable Men: My Lz& in the CIA

(New I'ork: Simon and Schuster, 1978), 134-3.5; John Prados, Presidents' Secret Wars: CIA a d Pentagon Covert Operations Since World War 11(New York: William

790 * THE JOVRKAL OF

Risking Gaerul Wur in Pursuit of Limited Objectives

The most extreme measure proposed involved the use of tactical nuclear weapons. Robert Amory, the CIA'S deputy director for intelli- gence, urged that the Soviets be given an ultimatum to "keep their hands off Hungary or we would not be responsible for whatever happened next." Amory argued that a "very small surgical strike at a few marshal- ing yards in those narrow valleys would seriously disrupt the Soviets' ability to move troops into Hungary." Yet, as Amory acknowledged him- self, such an action would immediately have "fired up Soviet prepara- tions for general war"; thus, while the proposal was discussed at the Policy Planning Board, it was not adopted.21

The Eisenhower administration ultimately decided not to use force in Hungary, instead relying overwhelmingly on diplomatic action, public condemnation, and the provision of humanitarian aid. Contemporary and secondary sources attribute this decision to several factors, such as the difficulty in providing aid, as well as the belief that limited interven- tion would accomplish little other than increasing the death toll and pro- longing the inevitable defeat of the Freedom Fighters. As noted in President Eisenhower's 4 November 1956 diary entry, he had limited

Morrow and Co., 1986), 124. Arms were not the only assistance not sent. According to E. Perkins McGuire, who was Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Interna- tional Security Assistance at the time, the United States had prepared supply trains to bring assistance to the "freedom fighters," but they were never sent. See Oral His- tory Interview with E. Perkins hicGuire by John Richard, 27 November 1972, OH-257, Columbia University, 1973.

21. John Ranelagh, The Agency: The Rise and Decline of the CIA (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1987), 305-7; "Interview with Robert Amory, Jr.," 26 March 1987, found in Martin Ben Swartz, "A New Look at the 1956 Hungarian Revolution: Soviet Opportunism, American Acquiescence" (Ph.D. diss., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, 1988), Appendix A. The Soviets took several mea- sures to discourage U.S. intervention in I-Iungary, including the deployment of troops along the border with Austria. Newly available Soviet archival materials highlight Soviet concerns over U.S. military actions, particularly Western aircraft in Vienna. See Kramer, "New Evidence on Soviet Decision-Making and the 1956 I'olish and Hun- garian Crises," 375, 392, 401, 404. Tension and the potential for misinterpretation during the Hungarian Revolution were further increased by the fact the U.S. Army was by coincidence on field maneuvers at that time. According to General Barksdale Hamlett, the Commander of 10th Mountain Division in Germany from 195657, "We were on winter maneuvers . . . but the whole U.S. Army, Europe was in the field deployed in battle positions. Now, it seems to be a coincidence to us that we would be in the field deployed in battle positions when that Hungarian thing crested, but there we were. And the things that went on apparently back at our home stations where the girls were all alone with just a few guards around the place. They were all frightened to death because it looked like we were in the field for the specific purpose of moving into Hungary and I must admit it sort of appeared that way to me, too." Oral History, Section 5, 11 March 1976,29, Interviewers: Colonel John J. Ridway and Lieutenant Colonel Paul B. Walter, Barksdale Hamlett Papers.

MILITARY HISTORY * 791

JAMES D. MARCH10

options available, given Hungary's geographical location and the many difficulties associated with providing military aid."

But the most significant factor in the decision not to use force in Hungary was the fear of all-out war. In the Middle East, the storm that had been brewing for months finally broke. Tensions escalated on 29 October 1956 when the Israeli Army attacked and routed Egyptian forces, capturing most of the Sinai Peninsula. The crisis deepened after France and Britain used the clash to reclaim the Sucz Canal, which had been nationalized by Egypt in July 1956. Egypt's refusal to relinquish control of the canal prompted Anglo-French bombing raids on 30 Octo-ber and fears of an even wider conflict. Beyond diverting world and U.S. attention from the Hungarian Revolution, military action in the Sinai heightened tensions as Soviet First Secrctary Khrushchcv threatened to unleash rockets against Anglo-French forces in the Suez Canal Zone unless they were withdrawn quickly. The specter of all-out conflict was further raised by Eisenhower's decision to place U.S. military forces on emergency alert as a precautionary measure.23

Criticism in the wake of the Hungarian Revolution served to shape further the military contingency planning underway for Poland. Fore- most was the charge that the United States and its military had been unprepared for such a ~ontingency.'~ Others condemned the lack of per- ceived action by the Eisenhower administration. "I do not believe," Lieu- tenant General James M. Gavin wrote, "that the Free World can endure many more 'Hungarysl-not and remain free. It cannot continue to stand by and watch a freedom-seeking nation be destroyed before its very eyes without doing something about it."2i Edmond Taylor, a psychological warfare specialist who had served earlier in the Eisenhower administra- tion, was even more damning in his criticism, noting: "The extreme cau- tion, not to say timidity, that has marked our handling of the Hungarian crisis illustrates, among other things, the paralyzing influence upon our

22. See William Bragg Ewald, Jr., Eisenhower The President, Crucial Days, 1951-1960 (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1981), 211; Roscoe Drummond and Gaston Coblentz, Duel at the Brink: John Foster Dulles' Command oj American Power (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1960), 180-81; Dwight D. Eisenhower, The White House Years: Waging Peace, 19561961 (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday and Co., 1965), 89.

23. Watson, Into the Missile Age, 64-65; Walter LaFeber, America, Russia, and the Cold War 19454990, 6th ed. (New York: McGraw Hill, 1991), 1 8 7 4 9 .

24. Dr. Ray Cline, who was present a t some of the cabinet meetings during the 1956 Hungarian crisis, told the author that the U.S. "military's attitude was that they weren't ready for war." Interview with Dr. Ray S. Cline, 2 April 1987, Washington, D.C.

25. James M. Gavin, War and Peace in the Space Age (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1958), 207.

Risking General Wur in Pursuit ojLimited Objectives

diplomacy of our military reliance upon nuclear weapons."26 Another group charged that the United States had incited the Hungarian Kevolu- tion through provocative radio broadcasts and leaflet drops.27 While thcse accusations and the events in Hungary forced an extensive review of U.S. actions during the crisis and revisions in policy, planning for a potential new crisis in Poland provided even more impetus to redress many of these charges.?"

Polish Contingency Planning-What Was Done and Why

Planning for potential U.S. intervention to support Poland against a Hungarian-like Soviet invasion apparently began in earnest in October 19.56, as "Freedom Fighters" perished in the streets of Budapest. Robert Amory recalled that he requested and promptly received an appoint- ment with General Earle G. Wheeler, the operations head and later chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS). Upon entering his office, Amory reportedly asked: "General, do you realize that World War I11 may be hours away?" Wheeler replied: "We're following the situation closely." Amory continued: "If the Polish situation explodes, their army will fight against the Russians with the desperate valor of Kosciusko and Bor- Komorowski-25 divisions strong and the land war balance in Eastern Europe will be decisively tipped in our favor if material support can only

26. Edmond Taylor, "The Lessons of Hungary," Reporter, 27 December 1956,21. 27. Regarding U.S. encouragement to Hungarians to rise up behind the Iron Cur-

tain, Thomas Polgar, a former CIA station chief in Eastern Europe, noted: "Sure, we never said rise up and revolt but there was a lot of propaganda that led the Hungari- ans to believe that we would help." Thomas, The Very Best Men, 147. For a contem- porary and formerly classified discussion of allegations concerning Kadio Free Europe reporting during the Hungarian crisis, see "Notes on 46th Meeting of the Special Com- mittee on Soviet and Relatcd Problems," Washington, D.C., 13 November 1956, in FRUS, 195.5-57, 25:436-40.

28. According to Thomas, "General [Lucian K.] Truscott was brought back after the Hungarian Uprising to quietly dismantle 'rollback.' The emigre paramilitary force was finally junked, the labor battalions were disbanded, the secret arms caches scrapped. The radios were put under tighter control. There was no more talk of lib- eration or revolt in the East Bloc. But in the spring of 1957, Frank Wisner started agi- tating for an operation to free Czechoslovakia from the Kremlin's grip." Thomas, Very Best Men, 152. Charles E. ("Chip") Bohlen, the U.S. Ambassador to the U.S.S.R. at the time, spurred this policy review with in a 14 November 1956 tclegram to the Department of State, in which he concluded that "we should re-examine our entire position in Eastern Europe with I believe recognition that in present circumstances [the] path of national Communism rather than any encouragement to armed upris- ing seems to offer best possibility for eventual recapture of independence and free- dom by peoples concerned." FRUS, 1955-57, 25:44&47.

MILITARY HISTORY + 793

be givcn them." Amory's account credits Wheeler with immcdiatcly call-ing in his staff and initiating a "crash analysis and planning p r ~ g r a m . " ~

The "program" bcgun by Wheeler was part of the overall effort by the Eisenhower administration to devise an effective response to the star-tling and fast-paced developmcnts in Poland and Ilungary. U.S. objec-tives in Poland were clearly identified during a 23 October 1956 Dcpartmcnt of State Policy Planning Staff (PPS) session. Encouraging Poland to become increasingly independent of the U.S.S.R. and averting forceful Soviet intervention in Poland wcrc thc two primary objectives advocatcd by this critical planning group, objectivcs that formcd the centerpicce of U.S. national security policy for the remainder of the Cold \.iTar.To achicve these objectives, the PPS recommended economic assis-tancc, restraincd public support, and thc preparation of an appeal to the United Nations for use in the event of Sovict intcrvention. In addition, back-channcl diplomatic efforts were proposed urging "neutralist coun-tries on whose friendship thc U.S.S.R. evidently sets store (e.g., Yugoslavia, India) . . . to tell the Soviets what a dim view they would take of such in terv~nt ion."~~

NSC Policy Statement 5616-U.S. Policy Toward Developments in Polund und Ilungury-expandcd upon the PPS's work and was pre-sented to the full National Sccurity Council on 31 Octobcr. While pri-marily conccrncd with Hungary, NSC 5616 and its subscquent revisions provided the policy guidance that would shape U.S. political, economic, and military initiativcs on Poland for the next eighteen months. NSC 5616 reflccted the earlier PPS courses of action designed to cncourage the cmcrgcnce of national communist governrncnts. It also included a ncw paragraph that dirccted "as a matter of urgency . . . a study of the situation in other European satcllites to determine U.S. courses of action in the event of futurc rcvolutionary actions or uprisings in those coun-tries which indicate a movcrnent away from control by the U.S.S.R."31 The reintroduction of Soviet military forccs into Iiungary on 4 Novem-ber, the fall of the Nagy government, and thc destruction of the IIungar-ian Frecdom Fighters all forced significant revisions to this policy paper. One of the most significant changcs contained in NSC 5616/1 concerned potential military action in Poland. A newly inserted paragraph 15 stated:

If the U.S.S.R. uses military force to repress the Gomulka regime or to reverse a further trend toward national independence, and if the Polish regime resists and makcs a timely request to the UN, the U.S.

29. Cited in Ranelagh, The Agency, 304. 30. FRUS, 1955-57, 25:259-60. 31. NSC 5616U.S. Policy Toward Developments in Poland and Hungary-31

October 195G, RG 273, NAKA.

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should initiate and be prepared to support any UN action, including the use of force, necessary to prevent the U.S.S.R. from successfully reimposing its control by force.32

Revisions to NSC 5616's paragraph 29 providcd furthcr impctus to mili-tary planning cfforts for Poland, adding the rcquiremcnt not only to undertake study but also actually to "formulate plans" in the cvcnt of future revolutionary actions or uprisings, "whethcr successful or unsuc-cessful."33

The Joint Chicfs of Staff review of NSC 5616/1 highlighted one con-cern that would be cchocd during the next two ycars. The JCS voiccd its objection to the proposcd course of action whereby the Unitcd Statcs would reassure the U.S.S.R. that "we do not look upon IIungary or the othcr Satellites as potential military allies."31 In a 14 November mcmo-randum prcpared for the Secretary of Defense, the JCS argucd that such "assuranccs would undcrmine such influences as the United States may have on the government which is cstablishcd in Hungary, and could in the future operate to our military di~advantage."~~In other words, when it came to East European satcllitcs, the JCS did not want to rule out any options, from inciting unrest to enlisting them as allies in a war against the U.S.S.R. Prcsident Eiscnhowcr approved a slightly amendcd NSC 5616/1 on 19 November despite JCS objection^.^^

One amendment contained in the revised policy paper immediately affected the JCS. Paragraph 15 now began: "Studies should immediately be made to detcrmine whcther . . . the U.S. should be prepared to sup-port any UN action, including the use of force."37Nine days later, a pre-liminary rcport on this issue prcpared by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC), in collaboration with the Joint Intelligence Commit-tee, was forwarded to the JCS. "The United States should not support UN military action," the study concluded, "for the purpose and under the conditions stated in paragraph 15 of NSC 5616/2 unless it is determined to be in the security interests of the United Statcs to engender serious risk of general war at this time and on this issue." The report argued that

32. NSC 5616/1, 13 Novembcr 1956, RG 273, NARA. 33. Ibid. 34. Ibid. 35. h,lemorandum for Secretary of Defense, 14 November 1956, JCS Decimal

Series, 1954-56, 092 (9-14-49), sec. 10, RG 218, NARA. 36. Memorandum re Interim U.S. Policy on Developments in Poland and Hun-

gary, 14 November 1956, Chronological Subseries, Box 4, November-December1956, Special Assistant Series, Office of Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (OSANSA), White House Office (WHO), Dwight D. Eisenhower Library (henceforth DDEL); the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) Memorandum on U.S. Policy Toward Developments in Poland and Hungary, 23 November 1956, JCS Decimal File 1954-56, 092 (9-14-49),sec. 10, RG 218, NARA; and NSC 5616/2.

37. NSC 5616/2.

NILITARY HISTORY 795

to be effective, any allied military force would have to be of "such mag- nitude [that it] would probably lead to general war." It did acknowledge, howcvcr, that "military action under conditions other than those envis- aged in this study might be feasible." Three courses of military action short of immcdiate general war had been considcrcd; yct the conclusion was that the implcmentation of any of these would probably lead to gen- eral ~ a r . 3 ~

The draft JSPC rcport elicited a sharp response from Chief of Naval Operations Admiral Arleigh A. Burke, and a recommcndation for signifi- cant modifications. Admiral Burke argued that the assumptions undcr which the study had becn taken were too rcstrictivc and thus "put the Joint Chiefs of Staff on rccord against taking any action to prcvent thc perpetuation or extension of Soviet power because such action entails risk of a general war." Burke criticized the failure to account for the fact that determincd UN military action might "trigger immediate revolts in East Germany and Czechoslovakia and renew the IIungarian revolt, thus facilitating the passage of UN troops through these satellites into Poland." The JSPC study, he noted, also gave "no consideration to the possibility that the U.S.S.R. itself was reluctant to become involved in general war at this time or to the possibility that a manifestation of will- ingness on the part of the United States and the United Nations to accept the risk of general war in order to accomplish this limited objective would in itself achieve the objective." Burke emphasized that, while his recommendations were not intended to play down the risk of a general war, "the time is overdue for the United States to take a firm and coura- gcous stand."39

Burke's criticisms found support among his military colleagues and forced a revision to the mcrnorandum ultimately forwarded to the Sec- retary of Defense.40 In the 3 December 1956 memorandum, the Chiefs asserted that it was feasible for the United Nations to intervene by mili- tary action in Poland. The Chiefs recommended that the United States should "participate to the extent necessary to achieve the UN objective,

38. JCS 2066/22, "Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committee on U.S. Policy Toward Developments in Poland," 28 November 1956, JCS Decimal Series, 1954-56, 092 (9-14-49), sec. 10, RG 218, NARA. These courses of military action were (1) a UN military invasion of Poland by limited ground, sea, and air forces and forcible ejection of the Soviets; (2) an atomic attack of military and military supporting targets in Poland followed by a UN military invasion; (3) threat of atomic attack on the U.S.S.R. if Soviet troops were not withdrawn from Poland.

39. Memorandum for the JCS on U.S. Policy Toward Developments in Poland, 30 November 19.56, JCS Decimal Series, 1954-56, 092 (9-14-49), sec. 10, RG 218, NARA.

40. hlemorandum for the Chairman JCS on U.S. Policy Toward Developments in Poland, 1 December 1956, Radford Papers 1953-57, 091 Poland, Box 18, RG 218, NARA.

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initially employing air action alone by forces presently available in West- ern Europe, but [be] prepared to counter Soviet reaction by attacking Soviet lines of communication and the sources of Soviet airpower." Such a course of action, they recognized, ran the risk of general war. Nonethe- less, the memo urgcd that, time permitting, a clear warning should be given to the Soviets that "immediate military action would follow any Soviet use of military force to re-impose its control in Poland."41

Discussion of potential Soviet intervention in Poland and how the United States should respond continued in many parts of the Eisenhower administration during December.** The 3 December JCS assessment and a study by the Assistant Secretary of Defense, International Security Affairs (ISA), were sent to the NSC Planning Board to aid in preparing a general study of the political, intelligence, and military implications of the contingency outlined in paragraph 15 of NSC 5616/2.43 The ISA study was of particular significance since it advocated a politico-military concept involving the use of UN forces with "limited military capabilities seeking limited objectives," a concept that would remain a key element in future plans. The centerpiece of the proposal was the insertion of a UN force composed of two hundred- to five hundred-man contingents from smaller countries, such as the Netherlands, Brazil, Yugoslavia, India, and South Africa, which would be armed only with their individual weapons. This UN task force would insulate the Polish government from the Soviet military while setting the stage for UN-sponsored negotiations. The

41. NSC 561(5/2-Interim U.S. Policy on Developments in Poland and Hungary, Memorandum for NSC on Interim U.S. Policy on Developments in Poland and Hun- gary, 20 December 1956, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 19, NSC Series, OSANSA, WHO, DDEL; Memorandum for Secretary of Defense on U.S. Policy Toward Develop- ments in Poland, 3 December 1956, JCS Decimal Series, 1954-56,092 (9-14-49), sec. 10, RG 218, NARA.

42. Discussion of potential Soviet intervention in Poland occupied a key part of the agenda during the 58th Meeting of the Special Committee on Soviet and Related Problems on 19 December 1956. At this session, the Defense Department represen- tative acknowledged his department's concern and work on this issue. He noted that "Defense assumed that our ability to control or influence events was limited and that the question therefore was what we did if such a revolt actually happened. It was inclined to think that the best course would be prompt UN intercession or interven- tion." FRUS, 1955-57, 2.5:532. Planning activity continued within the Joint Strategic Plans Committee (JSPC) as well. Memorandum for the JSPC on U.S. Policy Toward Developments in Poland, 5 December 1956, JCS Decimal Series 1957,092 (9-14-49), sec. 11, RG 218, NARA.

43. U.S. Policy Toward Poland in 2066/26-2066157, JCS 2066/27, 28 December 1956, forwards the 20 December 1956 Memorandum for the NSC on Interim U.S. Pol- icy on Developments in Poland and Hungary as well as 3 December 1956 JCS mem- orandum for SECDEF, and the 18 December 1956 ISA memorandum for the SECDEF, Collection-JCS Papers, Operational Archives Branch, Naval Historical Center, Wash- ington, D.C. (henceforth NHCWDC).

SIILITARY HISTORY * 797

JAMES D. h~URCIIIO

force's composition, it was thought, would minimize the risk that this initial action might precipitate a Sovict decision to launch a general war, since no major Westcrn power contributcd to the force. At the samc time, the ISA study recognized that "U.S. support of or acquiescence in the initial UN decision would carry with it a comrnitmcnt, real or implied, of action"; thus, U.S. credibility would be at stakc.14

The Eisenhower administration's planning efforts culminated in early February 1957 in the circulation of NSC 5705-U.S. Policy Toward Certuin Contingencies in PoLund-for review and comment.15 This paper examined the consequenccs for U.S. interests of alternative courses of action, including steps short of the use of force and the use of forcc to prevent the U.S.S.R. from rcirnposing its control over Poland. NSC 5705's balanced discussion of potential options cndcd with the sobering conclusion that the United States faccd esscntially equally undcsirable choices in attempting to prcvent or reverse Soviet military action in Poland. "In the evcnt of Soviet initiation of military action in Poland," NSC 5705 observcd, "no course available to the Unitcd States could be expected certainly to prevent scrious damage to U.S. interests." On one hand, measurcs avoiding the use of force or employing limited means-such as inserting lightly armed UN observers-were unlikely to deter thc Soviets. NSC 5705 was clear that "only if the Soviets were con- vinced, by whatever means, that the United States was determined to apply all-out force against the U.S.S.R. itself, would the Soviet leaders seriously consider withdrawing their forces."l6 Such a course of action obviously greatly incrcased the risk of gcncral war. Yet the policy paper also recognized that even a "passive attitude" would not eliminate the risk of general war. Failure to intervene might be interpreted as a lack of resolve by the United States and could undermine the credibility of U.S. commitments, possibly spurring conflicts elsewhere, such as the Far East. Thus the key was to reduce the chance of the use of military force by the U.S.S.R. against the Polish government by encouraging only peaccful change in Poland and avoiding disorder.

44. Ibid. 45. NSC 5705-U.S. Policy Toward Certain Contingencies in Poland--8 Febru-

ary 1957, Lot File 63D351, General Records of the Department of State, RG 59, NAM.

46. Ibid. Three courses of action involving the use of force were considered in NSC 5705. These ranged from inserting lightly armed UN police into Warsaw for the purpose of screening the Polish government from Soviet forces, to an extreme course advocating the use of all available power, up to and including nuclear weapons. Also examined was a middle course of action designed to produce stalemate or to defeat Soviet forces only in Poland. It was recognized, however, that this could be "success- ful only if, the U.S.S.R. also were willing to localize the war; even then it would be necessary to attack lines of communication in the U.S.S.R. itself in order to produce a stalemate or defeat the Soviets."

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NSC 5705 drew criticism from several quarters. As stated in an inter- nal U.S. Navy summary of JCS action on NSC 5705: "No one liked this paper very much, but it was agreed that the JCS could not do much about it."47 Both the Statc Departmcnt and JCS objected to paragraph 10, questioning the judgment that the Soviets would necessarily back down in Poland "if the United States made it clear to them that U.S. objectives were limited to the restoration of Polish independen~e . "~qhe JCS also expressed concern with the means proposed to ensure that the conflict over Poland remained localized. They recommended deleting any suggestion that attacking lines of communication in the U.S.S.R. itself should bc considcred as part of this middle course of action, argu- ing that "attacking lines of communication in the U.S.S.R. would be bound to enlarge the war." Navy reservations went evcn beyond this to the whole concept of limiting any conflict with the U.S.S.R. As noted in a background paper prepared for the Chief of Naval Operations on NSC 5705, "the papcr as modified by the JSPC still contains the thought that military action against Sovict forces and targets in the U.S.S.R. would result in something less than general war. This is considered fallacious rcasoning and should be removed from the paper."49 The basis for the use of U.S. military force was another area of disagreement. The JCS argued that the U.S. decision should be bascd solely on the ultimate security of the United States and not on whether a failure to intervcne would "create the belief at home and abroad that the United States would . . . retreat from interests it had previously been willing to defend.".i0

Interagency jousting over NSC 5705 ended at the NSC meeting on 21 February 1957. Judgments concerning the positions and views of key members of the Eisenhower administration on NSC 5705 are limited by the fact that most of the discussion at this NSC session remains classi- fied. Nonetheless, the amended draft approved by the President that day incorporated most of the revisions recommended by the JCS and State

47. U.S. Policy Toward Poland in 2066/26-206667, JCS 2066/29, 15 February 1957, Decision on JCS 2066/29 on U.S. Policy Toward Certain Contingencies in Poland, Collection-JCS Papers, NHCWDC.

48. Memorandum for Secretary of State from C. Burke Elbrick on U.S. Policy Toward Certain Contingencics in Poland-NSC 5705, 18 February 1957, and Memo- randum for SECDEF on Draft Statement of Policy on U.S. Policy Toward Certain Con- tingencies in Poland, 15 February 1957, Lot File 63D351, RG 59, NARA.

49. JCS 2066/29, 15 February 19.57, Decision on JCS 2066/299 on U.S. Policy Toward Certain Contingencies in Poland, Memorandum for CNO, 13 February 1957, NHCWDC.

50. Memorandum for SECDEF on Draft Statement of Policy on U.S. Policy Toward Certain Contingencies in Poland, 15 February 1957, Lot File 63D351, RG 59, NARA.

Department. Continued disagreement over paragraph 10 and the likeli- hood that the U.S.S.R. would "back down" when informed of limited U.S. objectives for Poland was resolvcd by noting the objcctions in a foot- note.51

U.S. planning efforts during the next six months focuscd on identi- fying and developing alternatives to a menu of unpalatable options- backing down, taking ineffective mcasures, or risking general war. An interagency Committee on Contingencies in Poland met frequently in March 1957 to discuss measures to deter as well as to respond to poten- tial Soviet intervention in Poland." One avenue of planning was linked to NSC 5705's paragraph 17 and efforts to reduce the chances that the Sovicts would use military force against thc Polish government. Thc other, ticd to paragraph 18, set forth courscs of action should Soviet mil- itary action against Poland appear imminent or actually occur.j3 Thc purpose of this planning was not only to develop potential measures, but also to have thc Operations Coordinating Board (OCB) ultimately assign rcsponsibilitics and monitor thc progress of each agency in implement- ing the approved courscs of action. Draft studies on each paragraph were circulated in late March and early April for revicw.

"Operational Guidance With Respect to Poland (Paragraph 17(a) of NSC 570511)" contained the key elements of what would formally be incorporated into a significant revision of overall policy toward Eastern Europe a year latcr." The policy paper strcssed the importance of the Gomulka government and its success in cstablishing a "national com- munist" regime capable of exercising a greater degree of independence from thc U.S.S.R. Poland was seen as a critical first step in the desired

51. NSC 5705/1-U.S. Policy Toward Certain Contingencies in Poland-25 Feb-ruary 19.57, Lot File 63D351, RG 59, NAKA. The differences over the role in creating a UN expeditionary force were resolved by deleting paragraph 20. NSC 5705/1 was sent to the Department of Defense for implementation in March 1957 and then for- warded to the U.S. combatant commands in April. JCS 2066/31, SECDEF memoran- dum on U.S. Policy Toward Certain Contingencies in Poland, 18 hlarch 1957, and memorandum for USCINCEUR and ClNC US Naval Forces, Eastern Atlantic and Mediterranean, on U.S. Policy Toward Certain Contingencies in Poland, 22 April 1957, JCS Decimal File, 19.57 092 (9-14-49), sec. 12, RG 218, NARA.

52. Memorandum of Meeting of Ad Hoc Committee on Contingencies in Poland, 25 March 19.57, OCB Central Files Series, Box 54, OCB 091. Poland (3), NSC Staff: Papers, 1948-61, WI10, DDEL.

53. Memorandum for Board Assistants on Operational Guidance with Respect to Poland Courses of Action to lmplcment Paragraph 18 of NSC 5705/1, 1April 1957, OCB Central Files Series, Box 54, OCB 091. Poland (4), NSC Staff: Papers, 1948-61, WHO, DDEL.

54. The emphasis on avoiding incitement and encouraging evolutionary change in Poland and Eastern Europe was evident in both NSC 5808-U.S. Policy Toward Poland-16 April 1958, and NSC 5811-U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet-Dominated Nations in Eastern Europe-24 May 1958, RG 273, NARA.

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direction of achieving U.S. objectives in Eastern Europe. Poland's exam- ple, the paper noted, was perhaps of even more importance than Yugoslav leader Tito's 1948 break with the U.S.S.R." Beyond clarifying U.S. objectives and Poland's key role in their pursuit, this study identi- fied a potentially dangerous conflict between several of the general courses of action set forth in NSC 560811-U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Sutellites in Eustern Europe-and the policy advocated in para- graph 17(a) of NSC 570.511." This conflict involved NSC 5608 measures designed to create and exploit dissatisfaction behind the Iron Curtain, measures that ran directly counter to NSC 5705's admonition to "seck independence from Soviet control gradually and without internal disor- der." The policy guidance for paragraph 17 thus strongly warned against any U.S. efforts, via the media or otherwise, to "encourage thc use of force, sabotage, rioting or guerrilla operations by the Polish population." It also emphasized that while encouraging the I'olcs, "the U.S. should make clear that it does not seek Poland as a military ally against the U.S.S.R." But efforts to reassure the U.S.S.R. should "avoid giving the impression that under no circumstances would United States come to the aid of Poland in opposing Soviet aggression." As acknowledged in the policy paper, fostering evolutionary development required that the United States help maintain Polish morale and advocate peaceful, long- term efforts.5i

JCS interest was much greater in the companion paper-"U.S. Courses of Action to Implement Paragraph 18 of NSC 570511."js This paper emphasized that the "first priority should be to maintain a climate

55. Other reflections of how important Poland's "break with the U.S.S.K. was considered can be found in National Intelligence Estimate (NIE) 12-57-Stability of the Soviet Satellite Structure-which concludes that "Poland's success in maintain- ing its present limited degree of independence is a key factor affecting the future political development in Eastern Europe." FRUS, 1955-57, 2.5:.579; Jacob Beam, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs, argued in a 23 March 1957 memorandum to the Secretary of State that the "Gomulka regime continues to rep- resent the most important development in the Soviet bloc since Tito's expulsion in 1948." FRUS, 1955-57, 25:594.

56. NSC 5608/1-U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe- 18 July 1956, RG 273, NARA.

57. JCS 2066132, Operational Guidance with Respect to Poland, Paragraphs 17(a) and 18 of NSC 5705/1, 18 April 1957, JCS Decimal Files, 1957, 092 (9-14-49), sec. 11,KG 218, NARA; "Operational Guidance With Respect to Poland," 26 hlarch 1957, and "Operational Guidance with Respect to Poland," 2 April 1957, OCB Cen- tral Files Series, Box 54, OCB 091. Poland (4), NSC Staff: Papers, 1948-61, WHO, DDEL.

58. Some formatting and organizational changes were made to these studies in April 1957. The Ad Hoc Working Group on Contingencies in Poland, which had pre- pared the paper on implementing paragraph 18, recast it into an operational Guid- ance paper and a contingency study. The contingency study formed an annex to the

MILIT.~RY HISTORY * 801

JAMES D. MARCH10

that would discourage the Kremlin from ever reaching a decision to intervene." Accomplishing this objective would require making the costs of military intervention high to the Soviets as well as minimizing the need for such a move. The study recognized that this would not be easy: "Efforts at advance deterrence of the U.S.S.R. will require successful exe- cution of a highly complex tightrope act on the part of U.S. policy mak- ers and operators."j9 Operationally, it would require a mix of measures to discourage the Poles from openly revolting, reassure the Soviets as to U.S. intentions, and marshal world opinion against the principle of Soviet use of force in the satellites. Another basket of courses of action was designed to strengthen U.S. capability to deter the Soviets effectively should it appear they had decided upon military intervention. These included everything from laying the groundwork for a UN resolution on military intervention to "preparations . . . for appropriate covert activity, including possible support of Polish resistance and diversionary activi- ties in other satellites, against the event of Soviet intervention in Poland." Even preparations for the use of military force in Poland were advocated. These steps were not to be "provocative" but were to be "suf- ficiently extensive and realistic as to insure freedom of action on the part of the U.S. if a crisis situation did arise."60

Neither policy paper generated significant opposition, but only the paragraph 17 paper was approved at a 1May OCB meeting61 The OCB

Operational Guidance paper; Memorandum for OCB on Operational Guidance with Respect to Poland, Paragraph 18 of NSC 570Y1, 12 April 1957, OCB Central Files Series, Box 54, OCB 091. Poland (6), NSC Staff: Papers, 1948-61, WHO, DDEL.

59. JCS 2066/32, Operational Guidance with Respect to Poland, Paragraphs 17(a) and 18 of NSC 5705/1,18 April 1957;Memorandum for the OCB on Operational Guidance with Respect to Deterring the U.S.S.R. from Military Action Against Poland, Paragraph 18 of NSC 5705, 12 April 1957, JCS Decimal Series, 19.57, sec. 12, RG 218, NARA; Operational Guidance With Respect to Poland, 26 March 1957, and Opera- tional Guidance with Respect to Poland, 12 April 1957.

60. Memorandum for the OCB on Operational Guidance with Respect to Deter- ring the U.S.S.R. from Military Action Against Poland, Paragraph 18 of NSC 5705, 12 April 1957.

61. In fact, according to a Navy after-action report, the JCS "agreed that this paper [paragraph 171 was worthless." U.S. Policy Toward Poland in 206612&2066/57, JCS 2066/33, 26 April 1957, Decision on JCS 2066/33 on Operational Guidance with Respect to Poland, Paragraphs 17(a) and 18 of NSC 5705/1, U.S. Policy Toward Cer- tain Contingencies in Poland, Collection-JCS Papers, NHCWDC; Extract from OCB Minutes, 3 May 1957, OCB Central File Series, Box 54, OCB 091. Poland (7), NSC Staff Papers, 1948-61, WHO, DDEL; Changes recommended by the State Department to the paragraph 18 paper can be found in a 19 April 1957 memo as part of JCS 206602, Operational Guidance with Respect to Poland, Paragraphs 17(a) and 18 of NSC 570511, 18 April 1957. The JCS concluded that the programs to implement para- graph 17(a), being nonmilitary, were "not within the purview of the JCS," while the "Operational Guidance on military courses of action to implement paragraph 18

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returned the paragraph 18paper to the Ad Hoc Working Group on Con- tingencies in Poland, directing that it be revised to reflect any unresolved questions and that the desirability of converting the paper into a check- list of possible courscs of action be c0nsidered.6~ Twelve days later, the working group recommended that the "Operational Guidance with Respect to Deterring Soviet Military Action Against Poland" be dropped for two reasons. First, the aim of deterring Soviet action was met by the guidance paper prepared under paragraph 17(a) and by paragraph 2 of the new checklist. Second and more important, "in view of existing cir- cumstances, actions with relation to the Soviet Union suggested by the subject paper might tend to exacerbate Polish-Soviet relations, thereby increasing the possibility of the Soviet military intervention which thc U.S. wishes to avoid."63 Therefore the Ad Hoc Contingency Working Group recommended that the present annex be noted as a contingency paper for reference purposes, with certain revisions.

The OCB did not concur in the recommendation of the working group. Nevertheless, some member agencies believed that the paper would serve a useful reference purpose as background in connection with current actions relating to Poland and agreed that the paper would be retained in the files of those agencies for this purpose. Thus the OCB agreed that this paper would not be considered as constituting approved courses of action to be taken at this time.M This decision paralleled one made in response to NSC 5616/2's requirement that studies and courses of action be prepared in the event of future revolutionary actions in other European satellites. As in the case of Poland, these papers were "not action papers but are checklists of possible courses of action for

appears possible of accomplishment, if required, and are [sic] compatible with basic U.S. military policy." JCS 2066133, Report by the Joint Strategic Plans Committce on Operational Guidance with Respect to Poland Paragraphs 17(a) and 18 of NSC 5705/1, 19 April 19.57, JCS Decimal Series, 1957, 092 (9-14-49), sec. 12, and Memo- randum for the SECDEF, Operational Guidance with Respect to Poland Paragraphs 17(a) and 18 of NSC 5705/1, 26 April 1957, Sec. 11,RG 218, NARA.

62. Extract from OCB Minutes, 3 May 1957, and Memorandum for OCB on Checklist of Possible Courses of Action in the Event of Soviet Military Action Against Poland, 1 3 May 1957, Box 54, OCB 091. Poland (8), OCB Central File Series, Box 54, OCB 091. Poland (7), NSC Staff: Papers, 194841 , WHO, DDEL.

63. Memorandum for OCB on Checklist of Possible Courses of Action in the Event of Soviet Military Action Against Poland, 13 May 1957, OCB Central Files Series, Box 54, OCB 091. Poland (8), NSC Staff: Papers, 1948-61, WHO, DDEL.

64. OCB Minutes Meeting of 15 May 1957, OCB Central Files Series, Box 54, OCB 091. Poland (8),NSC Staff: Papers, 1948-61, \WO, LIDEL. This did in fact hap- pen. A 24 June 1957 ISA memorandum on Operational Guidance with Respect to Poland forwarded the 15 May 1957 OCB decision directing that these checklists be filed for possible future use. JCS Decimal Series, 1957, 092 (9-14-49), sec. 13, RG 218, NARA.

MILITARY HISTORY + 803

JAMES D. h.tZRCIII0

consideration if developments should require U.S. action." The check- lists were in no way "regarded as policy rccommendations for approval at this time" and wcre forwarded to various organizations for their infor- mation and use as appropriate.6"

Discord over turning general guidancc into operational action was pre- sent within the Dcpartrnent of Defense as wcll. "U.S. Plans for Develop- ments in Polandn-a report drafted by the Joint Stratcgic I'lans Committee in collaboration with the Joint Logistics Plans Committee, thc Joint Intelligence Committee, and the Joint Subsidiary Activities Com- mittce-sparked opposition from scveral quarter^.^ This report encom- passed dctailcd plans for U.S. military participation in possible UN military action in Poland as envisioned in paragraph 15of NSC 561612. These plans provided "the basis for further detailed operational planning by appropri- ate military agencies." One difference surfaced over whether it was appro- priate to assess "matters bearing on thc question of r i sk at this time.6i But an even more significant divcrgence arose over whether early, forceful action by the United States and the United Nations and a perceived will- ingness by the United Statcs to use military force would force the Soviets to back down. Ilere the Navy submitted a proposal to resolve the split. Its revision strengthened the proposed U.S. actions at thc same time that it emphasized that success was unlikely. The revision read: "The U.S.S.R. should be informed that the U.S. is determined to apply force against the U.S.S.R. itself if necessary in fulfillment of UN objectives and that these objectives are limited to restoration of Polish independence. Ilowever, even though the U.S. made this position clear to the Soviet leaders, it is highly unlikely that they would back down."@ While differing on the risk

65. Checklists were prepared on the Soviet Zone of Germany, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Bulgaria, and Albania. They included an estimate of the situation, political and military considerations, assumptions, and courses of action under the different assumptions. It was stresscd that these wcre "contingency papers in a twofold sense-first, in the sense that they each assume diverse sets of factual circumstances, and secondly, in the sense that there is no firm United States policy for the situations described in the various assumptions." NSC 560811-U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe (I) , hlemorandum Lay to NSC on Contingency Studies on Eastern European Satellites, 26 August 1957, NSC Series, Policy Papers Subseries, Box 17, OSANSA, WHO, DDEL.

66. U.S. Policy Toward Poland in 2066l26-2066157, JCS 2066l34, 7 May 1957, Decision on JCS 2066/34 on U.S. I'lans for Developments in Poland, Collection-JCS Papers, NHCWDC; Memorandum for JCS on JSPS 99818 "U.S. Plans for Developments in I'oland," 6 hlay 1957, JCS Decimal File, 1957, 092 (9-14-49), sec. 12, RG 218, NARA.

67. JCS 2066/34, 7 May 1957, Decision on JCS 2066134 on U.S. Plans for Devel- opments in Poland, NHCilrDC.

68. Memorandum for JCS on JSPS 99818 U.S. Plans for Developments in Poland, 6 May 1957.

Risking Generul Wur in Pursuit of Limited Objectives

and outcome, the plan evidenced agreement on how to apply military force to dcter or defeat Soviet intervention in Poland.

The five-phase contingency plan was designed to discourage thc U.S.S.R. in its military operations while allowing lceway for Sovict acqui- cscence. Crucial to the plan was the impcrative to localize action and prevent hostilities from developing into a general war. To do this, the contingency plan included a variety of measures that spanned the mili- tary spectrum of conflict. These measures ranged from stimulating an anti-Communist rcvolt in East Gcrmany in phase I1 to supporting a UN invasion of Poland and striking Soviet sanctuary targets and LOCs as rcquired to accomplish UN objectives during Phase V." Phase IV was particularly critical sincc it was designcd to "indicate the UN willingness to localize hostilities in Poland while emphasizing a dctcrmination to prevent a Soviet military repression in Poland." U.S. military action in this phase initially would involve only air assets using non-atomic weap0ns.7~ But by Phase V rcadiness to implement U.S. war plans- including the insertion of unconvcntional forces to prcparc the Polish population for partisan warfare-was required. The plan also noted that the lack of a UN force might force the United States to act nila ate rally.'^ ~ecognizingthese remaining challenges and the requirement to conduct further planning, the JCS tasked U.S. Commander-in-Chicf Europe (USCINCEUR) to transform this contingency plan into detailed opera- tional plans appropriate for possible exe~ution.~"

69. Ibid. During Phase 111, the United States would support the introduction of UN forces into Poland. Although only likely during Phase V, the plan also stated that the JCS would direct employmcnt of nuclear weapons on a selective target basis in Poland when such weapons were required.

70. Additional efforts would be made to localize the conflict by striking known concentrations of Soviet forces and preventing reinforcements from being introduced.

71. Despite the likelihood that NATO forces would be involved in any effort to defend Poland, I found little evidence that NATO allies were actively involved in this contingency planning for Poland. This lack of involvement may reflect the fact that such sensitive military planning was being initially done in "U.S. only channels" for security reasons. Limited access to still-classified NATO records may likewise obscure consultations with NATO allies on defending Poland.

72. Efforts to maintain contingency plans in case of uprisings in Eastern Europe continued until a t least 1960. A 7 May 1959 directive on the OCB Operations Plan for the Soviet-Dominated Nations in Eastern Europe designated the Assistant Secretary of Defense (ISA) as the Department of Defense point of contact and tasked the DOD with primary responsibility for maintaining "military contingency plans which would enable the U.S. to assist, should it be desirable at the time, any revolutionary out- break that may occur within the dominated nations." The JCS was requested to report periodically on the progress of implementing this course of action. A follow-on memo revalidated this reauirement and forwarded the task to USCINCEUR for action. U.S. Policy Toward polaid in 2066/26-2966/57, 7 May 1959, JCS 2066152 and 11 Octobcr 1960, JCS 2067/57, Collection-JSC Papers, NHCWDC.

.\IILIT;\RY HISTORY * 805

JAMES D. MARCH10

Aftermath

With the initial contingency planning called for in NSC 5616/2 com- pleted, the Eisenhowcr administration pushed forth implementing a number of modest efforts during the next ten months to encourage Poland's "evolution" and indep~ndence.'~ But by year's end it had become clear that the interim measures quickly pulled together in the aftermath of the I-Iungarian Revolution needed revision. As OCB staffer Roy Melbourne so presciently observed in a December 1957 memo: "The difficulty in our present policy papers for the Satellitcs is that we are try- ing to ride the two horses of encouraging 'evolutionary communism' and of stimulating actions presumably designed to roll back cornm~nism."~~ Between March and May 1958, new NSC policy papers on Poland and Eastern Europe were drafted, approved, and disseminated for implc- mentation. These policy papers were noteworthy for their continuity with NSC 5705 and the planning work completcd in 1957. At the same time they continued to evidence disagreement within the Eisenhowcr administration on how unrest behind the Iron Curtain should be nur- tured and used to advance U.S. interests.

NSC 5808-U.S. Policy Towurd Polund-highlighted this continuity as well as changes in the East European landscape. By early 1958, the situation in Poland appeared less volatile and Soviet intervention less likely. Nonetheless, U.S. authorities recognized that the situation in Poland would remain "potentially dangerous" as long as the U.S.S.R. attempted to limit Polish aspirations for greater national independence. The conclusions reached in NSC 5808 therefore differed little from those a year earlier. While disagreement arose within the NSC over whether one paragraph in the policy document adequately captured the consid- erations contained in NSC 5705/1, all agreed that U.S. options in con- fronting potential Soviet intervention were limited and unattractive. When asked for his views, General Maxwell D. Taylor, Army Chief of Staff, remarked that "he personally could not see much hope in any of the actions proposed to be taken by the United States in the event of Soviet military action against Poland." In response, Eisenhower's national security advisor, General Robert Cutler, explained the great dif- ficulties foreseen by the Planning Board in the contingency of Soviet mil-

73. In 1957-58 the United States agreed to provide Poland with $55 million in loans and 8138 million in agricultural surpluses in hopes of promoting a gradual evo- lution in Poland toward greater freedom and independence. Briefing Note for Planning Board Meeting re NSC 580811, 14 April 1958, NSC Series, Briefing Notes Subseries, Box 15, Poland, U.S. Policy Toward, OSANSA, WHO, DDEL.

74. Soviet-Dominated Nations-Eastem Europe, Memorandum to Mr. Frederick Dearborn, 16 December 1957, OCB Series, Subject Subseries, Box 6, OSANSA, 1952-61, WHO, DDEL.

Risking Generul Wur in Pursuit ofLimited Objectives

itary action against Poland. Reitcrating the judgments contained in NSC 5705, Cutler noted: "These difficulties were applicable whether we took positivc action ourselvcs or avoided taking any positive a~ t ion . "~"

NSC 5808 also renewed debate over U.S. policies toward unrest in Poland and elscwhcre in Eastern Europe. Echoing concerns raised a ycar earlier during the drafting of the "Operational Guidance With Respect to Poland," the State Department and CIA asserted that the 1956 policy guidance covering "spontaneous rnanifcstations of discontent and oppo- sition" in the satellite nations should no longer apply to P0land.~6 The Defcnse Departmcnt argued to the contrary. The ensuing NSC discussion saw President Eisenhower voice his support for having the appendix con- tinuc to apply to Poland. IIe told the NSC that "while we were trying to do our best to encourage Poland to break away from the Soviet Union, we must not have any illusions on the point that Poland was still essen- tially a satellite of the U.S.S.R." Similarly, while initially opposing its application, Secrctary of State John Foster Dulles reversed his position after rereading the document, offering that he saw "nothing in this Appendix which made it inapplicable to Poland." Apparently the Presi- dent and his top advisors believed that the policy emphasis on "evolu- tion" contained in NSC 5808 did not preclude support for spontaneous discontent or nationalism in Poland. But the "net results" of such actions, just as in 1956, must be cxpected to "exert pressures for release from Soviet domination." Moreover, any operations that might "involve or lead to local violence" retained the requirement to secure approval by thc Secretary of State or the President him~elf . '~

NSC 5811-U.S. Policy Towurd the Soviet-Dominuted Nutions in Eustern Europe--continued this debate on how actively thc United States should support unrcst behind the Iron Curtain. While the JCS found the policy statement acceptable from a military point of view, they argued that the draft was too "passive" in its approach to encouraging

75. Disagreement over whether paragraph 38 should be included in NSC 5808 was ultimately resolved by deleting the paragraph. Annex A to NSC 5808/1-Consid- eration Upon Which Paragraph 3 3 is Based-performed this role. As a slightly revised version of NSC 5705/1, the annex included the same conclusions and considerations contained in the 1957 policy paper. Memorandum on Discussion at the 362nd Meet- ing of the NSC, 15 April 1958, NSC Series, Box 10, NSC Summaries of Discussion, Ann \%itman File, Dwight D. Eisenhower (DDE) Papers as President of the U.S., 1953-61, DDEL; U.S. Policy Toward Poland in 2066/262066/57, JCS 2066/45, 18 April 1958, U.S. Policy Toward Poland (NSC 5808/1), Collection-JCS Papers, NI-ICWDC.

76. Memorandum on Discussion at the 362nd Meeting of the NSC, 15 April 1958, NSC Series, Box 10, NSC Summaries of Discussion, Ann W i t m a n File, DDE Papers as President of the U.S., 1953-61, DDEL; "Appendix to NSC 5608/1," U.S. Pol- icy Toward the Soviet Satellites in Eastern Europe, 18 July 1956, RG 273, NARA.

77. Ibid.

MILITARY HISTORY * 807

dissident activity in the satellites. The recommended JCS changes went so far as to argue that "violent uprisings, rioting or guerrilla operations should be encouraged but only on a calculated basis when we are ready to cope with Russian reaction." The JCS reasoning was to "insure more positive U.S. support of nationalistic groups and anti-Soviet pressures whilc at the same timc avoiding premature or misguided actions by the dominated p c o p l ~ s . " ~ ~ These differences wcre aircd during the 22 May 19.58 NSC session in which NSC 5811 was considered. JCS Chairman General Nathan El Twining reiterated the JCS view that the identified paragraphs in NSC 5811 as currently written were "much too weak." Sccretary Dulles countered, noting his disagrecrnent with the JCS posi- tion and Twining's assessment. Hc went on to explain:

\Ire in State Department believe that the best hope of bringing about an acceptable evolution toward greater freedom for the satellites is the exertion by the satellites of constant pressures on the Soviet Union and on their own regimes, in the hope of effecting a change in the thinking of the Soviet rulers. Thus the Soviet rulers may ulti- mately come to realize that it is in their own best interests to be sur- rounded by free and relatively friendly countries, rather than as at present by a serics of bitterly hostile satellites states. How to exert this pressure was a very delicate matter, but it seemed reasonably wcll covered by the limited-distribution Appendix to NSC .5608/1.i9

Secretary Dulles emphasized his particular dislike for the proposed JCS revision-"while encouraging the dominated people to seek their goals, and without. resort to premature violent actions." He felt that the pro- posed course of action was "dangerous" and that the phrase should be omitted. Eisenhower, despite some confusion on the wording, sided with his Secretary of State and excluded the suggested JCS revisions in the policy paper he later approved.s0

Despite failing to carry the day on NSC 5811, the JCS continued to hold "hard-line" views on the role of unrest in Poland and Eastern Europe, seemingly at odds with the overall administration policy in the months that followed. Echoing themes raised five years earlier, the JCS saw pressure on the Soviet Bloc as the key to winning the Cold War and accelerating the dcmise of the Soviet Union." Former JCS Chairman

78. NSC 5811-U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet-Dominated Nations in Eastern Europe-9 May 1958, RG 273, NARA; JSC 2066/49, Report by the Joint Strategic Sur- vey Committee on U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet-Dominated Nations in Eastern Europe (NSC 5811), JCS Decimal Series 1958,092 (9-14-49), see. 14, RG 218, NARA.

79. U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations oj'the United States (FRUS), 1958-1960, vol. 10, pt. 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus (Washing- ton: GPO, 1993), 14.

80. Ibid., 14-31. 81. Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peuce, 145, 159-65.

808 * THE JOVRX.SL OF

Risking Generul Wur in Fursuit of Limited Objectives

Admiral Arthur W. Radford expresscd these sentiments best when he told a congressional committee in May 1959: "I think that the pressure is on the Communists-particularly in the handling of satellite nations- that we should go out of our way to encourage and keep that pressure going," noting they "may crack under the strain.'7s2

Implications

The significance of U.S. contingency planning to defend Poland in the aftermath of the Hungarian Revolution was far-reaching. Thesc efforts clearly highlighted the problems that would confront and guidc subsequent administrations in advancing U.S. interests in Eastern Europe as well as the difficulties inhcrcnt in any effort to use limited mil- itary force in the nuclear age." U.S. failings during the Hungarian Rcvo- lution and the realization that there was little that could be done in Poland reinforced an overall policy trend toward evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, actions to encourage change in Eastern Europe. Avoiding incitement, as advocated in the NSC 5705 paragraph 17 paper, was certainly the best way to prevent the difficult military challenges of deterring or defeating a Soviet intervention. Nonetheless, the debate and disagreement over the plans developed illustrated the internal contra- dictions and competing agendas that hindered U.S. policy during the early Cold War. This new evidence reveals that, despite U.S. policy and

82. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Selected Executive Session IIeurings oj'the Committee, 1 9 5 7 4 0 vol. 20, Mutual Security Prcgmm Part 7 (Washington: GPO, 1983), 321.

83. The continuity in the challenges confronting U.S. East European policy and in the approach adopted in NSC .5705/1 was evident during the 1989 collapse of com- munism in Poland and elsewhere in Eastern Europe. As Tadeusz Mazowiecki, Poland's first noncommunist prime minister in post-World War I1 history, observed a decade later about the 1989 revolutions: "It is not understood well enough that if these changes had failed in our country, if we had not been able to conduct them as we did, in a peaceful way, avoiding all very dangerous provocations from the other side. . . . I think it would have made things difficult for [the United States] and the other coun- tries." Quoted in "Poland: Anti-Communist Movement Showed the Way," by Jefim Fistein, Radio Free Europe Special Report: "Ten Years After the Fall of Communism in East Central Europe," 4 November 1999 at: http://www.rferl.org/nea/speciaV lOyears/index.html. Even the limited options available to the United States in East- ern Europe in 1989 had not changed from 1957. As NIE 11/12-89 warned: "In prac- tice, however, our ability to influence the grand alternatives-reform or retrenchment, crisis or stability-will remain limited; we can at best encourage evo- lutionary movement toward internal liberalization and greater independence from Soviet tutelage." NIE 11/12-9-88, "Soviet Policy Toward Eastern Europe Under Gor- bachev," May 1988, found in Benjamin B. Fischer, ed., At the Cold War's End: U.S. Intelligence on the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, 1989-1 991 (Washington: GPO, 1999), 151-77.

411LITARY HISTORY * 809

JAMES D. h,tARCIIIO

rhetoric emphasizing evolution and non-violent change, U.S. military planning still called for supporting and nourishing unrest in Eastern Europe." Unrest was a key part of military plans to defend Poland as well as the conccpt of operations should the United States become cngagcd with the U.S.S.11. in a general war.

The U.S. experience in Hungary and contingency planning for Poland had important military fallout as well. These experiences pro-vidcd the advocates of "Flexible Responsep-the strategic doctrine for-mally adoptcd by the Kennedy administration-additional justification to dcvelop a full range of military options, including tactical nuclear weapons and largcr convcntional forces." Preceding but echoing many of the themes contained in the Top Secret 1957 Gaither Committee Kcport conccrning the vulnerability of the country's population and strategic nuclear forces to Sovict attack, the findings contained in NSC 570.5 illustrated the nccd for conventional and nuclear military options short of general war." Critics and civilian nuclear strategists like I-Ienry A. Kissinger argued that Hungary was only the latest crisis demonstrat-ing the need for a limited war doctrine and capabilities to complement, not replace, the doctrine of Massive Retaliation.&' The requirement to potentially support partisan movements in Poland and elsewhere in Eastern Europe and to insert U.S. Special Forces should Polish contin-gency plans be implementcd was undoubtedly used by advocates in the army to expand these units and other non-nuclear capabilities. U.S. shortcomings in responding to the I-Iungarian Revolution were cited by scvcral studies completcd at the Army \liar College in 1958 as furthcr justification for dcvcloping a more balanced range of military capabilities and options.sh

84. U.S. Dept. of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Military Operations, "A Concept for U.S. Unconventional Warfare Operations in a Situation of General War," 29 April 1957, MIII.

85. Richard Smoke provides an excellent overvicw of the key elements that ulti-mately coalesced into the doctrine of Flexible Response in National Security and the Nuclear Dilemma, 2d ed. (New York: Random House, 1987), 90-94.

86. David L. Snead's, The Guither Committee, Eisenhower, a w l the Cold War (Columbus: Ohio State University Press, 1999) forcefully argues that the Gaither Report "significantly influenced Eisenhower's national security policies for the remainder of his presidency" (p. 3). He also asserts that the "similarities between the committee's recommendations and the [Kennedy] administration's flexible response strategy are readily apparent" (p. 159).

87. Henry A. Kissinger,Nuclear Weapons and Foreign Policy (New York: Harper and Brothers, 19-57), 144-45.

88. See Colonel Richard G. Bulgin, USAF, "Ilungary-A Policy Error and Future Doctrine," Student Thesis, 19 March 1958, formerly classified Secret, and Lieutenant Colonel Leo B. Joncs, U.S.A, "Hungary--Correct Decision?", Student Thesis, 7 April 1958, U.S. Army War College, MHI. Jones, for example, recommended, based on his

810 THE JO~RNALOF

Risking General War in Pursuit of Limited Objectives

At the same time, opponents of limited war, such as Eisenhower, took solace from the Polish contingency ~lanning.~' Planning for thc defense of Poland was clcarly one of the first case studics in the whole debate over how force could or could not be used either to deter or defeat an opponent in an era of nuclear A r m a g c d d ~ n . ~ ~ The conclusion arrived at in 1957 was the same one rcached in the decades that fol- lowed. Although the United Statcs had "the military rcsourccs to inter- vene," it was not necessarily the "wise or prudent course of action."'l Morcover, while every effort would be made to confine the conflict to Poland, the JCS recognized that preventing cscalation to general war was problematic, particularly in an area of such vital interest to the U.S.S.R.

In conclusion, the newly declassified sources reveal that thcrc was much more substance to the Eisenhower administration's rhetoric of support for Eastern Europe than previously thought. Soviet tanks in the

study, that: "(1) the United Statcs formulate and implement a new strategy respon- sive to its objectives in the satellites; (2) the military program in support of the new strategy provide forces more evenly balanced in land and air power and capable of employment on a graduated basis; and (3) the United States initiate action in the United Nations Organization to establish neutral observer teams capable of being dis- patched immediately to the scene of any international disorder to report details of the disturbance promptly and factually to the Sccurity Council or the General Assembly." For an excellent summary of the U.S. Army's battle for less reliance on nuclear weapons during the 195Os, see A. J. Bacevich, "The Paradox of Professionalism: Eisenhower, Ridgway, and the Challenge to Civilian Control, 19.53-1955," Journul oj' Military History 61 (April 1997): 303-33.

89. Campbell Craig, in Destroying the Village: Eisenhower and Thermonuclear War (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998), 69, argues that after 1956 Eiscn- howcr made the primary objective of his presidency the avoidance of a thermonu- clear war with the Soviet Union. He sought to do this by making American military policy so dangerous that his advisers would find it impossible to push Eisenhower toward war and away from compromise. Andrew P. N. Erdmann argues along the same lines in his essay "'War No Longer Has Any Logic Whatever': Dwight D. Eisenhower and the Thermonuclear Revolution," in John Lewis Gaddis, Philip H. Gordon, Ernest R. May, and Jonathan Rosenberg, eds., Cold War Statesmen Confront the Bomb: Nuclear Diplomacy Since 1945 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 87-119. See also Bowie and Immerman, Waging Peace, 24-52.

90. Efforts to defend Poland were mentioned by Robert Cutler, Eisenhower's National Security Advisor, during a 28 February 1957 NSC discussion of NSC 5707- Review of Basic National Security Policy-19 February 1957. Debate centered on the assumption contained in NSC 5707 that "any war in which nuclear weapons were used would necessarily develop into general nuclear war and the United States using nuclear weapons against hloscow." U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS), 19554957,vol. 19, National Security Policy (Wishington: GPO, 1990), 430-31.

91. U.S. Policy Toward Poland in 2066/262066/57, JCS 2066/49, 20 hlay 1958, Decision on JCS 2066/49 on U.S. Policy Toward the Soviet-Dominated Nations in Eastern Europe (NSC 5811), Collection-JCS Papers, NHCWDC.

3lILITARY HISTORY * 811

strcets of Budapest had spurred far more than a spate of public statc- ments of support and humanitarian aid for the valiant Hungarian Free- dom Fighters. The Eisenhower administration's highest ranking military and political leaders grappled over the next two years with the difficult problem of how to defend Poland and to ensure that the United States was better prepared to respond to a "Hungarian" situation in the future. Multiple working groups as well as several critical NSC policy papers considered in dctail a spectrum of actions ranging from diplomatic pos- turing and UN intervention with lightly armcd forces to supporting unrest in Eastern Europe with U.S. Special Forces and employing nuclear wcapons against Soviet lines of communication. Although initial asscssmcnts were generally optimistic, further study and policy develop- ment led to less sanguine conclusions about the ability and willingness of the United States to risk general war in pursuit of limited objectives in Eastern Europe. It became all too clear that the options to defend Poland wcre problematic and that a final decision on whether to use military force had to be postponed.92 For while Poland, like much of the rest of Eastern Europe, was a political and military asset to the United States in the Cold War, it also represented a large liability. Planning to defend Poland dramatically demonstrated how high those costs could be if the bill came due and how the measurcs to deter intervention might precip- itate the Soviet intervention they wcre designed to stop.

92. NSC 570.5 observed: "However, a decision as to whether or not the United States will initiate or support the use of force in Poland, directly or in directly, can- not be made in advance. Poland is not so vital to our national security interests that we must a t this time reach a decision to defend it from a Soviet attempt to reimpose control by force. Conversely, Poland cannot be written off as area in which under no circumstances would it be essential to U.S. interest to support the use of force. Only the circumstances existing at the time that such a crisis arises . . . can provide a sound basis for making such a decision." NSC 5705-U.S. Policy Toward Certain Con- tingencies in Poland--8 February 19.57, Lot File 63D351, General Records of the Departmcnt of State, RG 59, NAKA.

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Risking General War in Pursuit of Limited Objectives: U.S. Military Contingency Planningfor Poland in the Wake of the 1956 Hungarian UprisingJames D. MarchioThe Journal of Military History, Vol. 66, No. 3. (Jul., 2002), pp. 783-812.Stable URL:

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88 The Paradox of Professionalism: Eisenhower, Ridgway, and the Challenge to CivilianControl, 1953-1955A. J. BacevichThe Journal of Military History, Vol. 61, No. 2. (Apr., 1997), pp. 303-333.Stable URL:

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