RISK ASSESSMENT - environmentclearance.nic.in€¦ · Risk Assessment may be carried out to serve the following objectives: ... Descent and landing accidents, taxi and takeoff mishaps,

FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT ASSESSMENT REPORT

For Expansion of Lucknow Airport in respect of Construction of New Integrated Terminal Building and Allied Facilities at Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh.

Project Proponent: Airports Authority of India, Lucknow

Environment Consultant: Greencindia Consulting Private

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RISK ASSESSMENT

RISK ASSESSMENT

Risk analysis (RA) deals with the identification and quantification of risks of the airport equipment/ facilities

and airport personnel and nearby human being who may get exposed to accidents resulting from the

hazards at the airport.

Risk analysis and risk assessment provides details on Risk Assessment techniques used to determine risk

posed to people who work inside or live near hazardous facilities, and to aid in preparing effective

emergency response plans by delineating a Disaster Management Plan (DMP).

Hence, RA is an invaluable method for making informed risk based process safety and environmental

impact planning decisions, as well as being fundamental to any decisions while siting a facility.

Risk Assessment may be carried out to serve the following objectives:

Identification of safety areas

Identification of hazard sources

To find out values of magnitude and severity of consequences for each hazard.

Suggest risk mitigation measures based on engineering judgement, reliability and risk analysis

approaches as appropriate to each hazard.

Disaster Management Plan.

Purpose of Risk Assessment

Although the purpose of risk assessment includes the prevention of occupational risks, and this should

always be goal, it will not always be achievable in practice. Where elimination of risks is not possible, the

risks should be reduced and the residual risk controlled. At a later stage, as part of a review programme,

such residual risk will be reassessed and the possibility of elimination of the risk, perhaps in the light of new

knowledge, can be reconsidered.

The purpose of this risk assessment is to evaluate the adequacy of the airport and aircraft security. This

risk assessment provides a structured qualitative assessment of the operational environment. It addresses

sensitivity, threats, vulnerabilities, risks and safeguards. The assessment recommends cost-effective

safeguards to mitigate threats and associated exploitable vulnerabilities. Conceptual Framework of risk

assessment is shown in Figure 1.





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Figure 1: Conceptual Framework of Risk Assessment

HAZARD IDENTIFICATION

Identification of causes and types of hazards is the primary task for planning for risk assessment. Hazard

can happen because of the nature of fuels/ chemicals handled and also the nature of process involved,

associated toxic release, fire and explosion and aircraft accidents.

An aviation accident is the worst nightmare of every pilot, crew or passenger that has ever ridden in an

aircraft. Although air travel is one of the safest forms of transportation, accidents do happen with dramatic

and terrifying results. The causes of these aviation accidents vary greatly depending on specific

circumstances and problems that may develop during the flight process.

Human error, Runway, Descent and landing accidents, taxi and takeoff mishaps, mechanical failures, pilot

errors, fuel mismanagement, and poor weather are only some of the many plights that can lead to injuries

or death in the sky. In many situations these incidents can be completely avoided through careful

preparation and effective safety techniques. When flight crew and pilots do their jobs correctly, aviation

accidents are much less likely to occur.

Hazard during Construction Phase

The main risks associated with the construction hazards of theairport project are mainly electrical and

mechanical failures or lack of safety precautions. During the construction phase, the responsibility of

maintaining safety is jointly on the project developer and the deployed contractors. The risks and hazards

associated with various construction activities and their control measures/ mitigation measures or safe

working practices are listed in Table 2.

Table 1: Risk & Hazard Associated and Control Measures Risks & Hazards Associated with Construction Control Measures

Manual Handling

Strains and sprains

Incorrect lifting

Exercise/warm up

Get help when needed

Control loads





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Risks & Hazards Associated with Construction Control Measures

Too heavy loads

Twisting

Bending

Repetitive movement

Rest breaks/ no exhaustion

No rapid movement/ twisting/ bending/ repetitive movement

Good housekeeping

Falls - Slips - Trips

Falls on same level

Falls to surfaces below

Poor house-keeping

Slippery surfaces

Uneven surfaces

Poor access to work areas

Unloading materials

Wind

Falling objects

Good Housekeeping

Tidy workplace

Guardrails, handholds, harnesses, hole cover, hoarding, no

slippery floors/ trip hazards

Clear/ safe access to work areas & egress from work areas

Dust/ water controlled environment as much as possible

Fire

Flammable liquids/gases like LPG, diesel storage

area and combustible building materials

Poor housekeeping

Grinding sparks

Open flames, absence of fire hydrant network.

Combustible/ flammable materials properly stored/ used

Good housekeeping

Fire extinguishers made available & fire hydrant network

with reserve Fire water (as per NFPA Code)

Emergency preparedness plan in case of fire or collapse of

structure.

Regular mock drills

Absence of Personal Protective Equipment

Lack of adequate footwear

Head protection

Hearing/eye protection

Respiratory protection

Gloves, goggles

Head/face - footwear - hearing/ eye - skin – respiratory

protection provided

Training for use of PPEs

Proper maintenance of PPEs

Electricity

Electrocution

Overhead/underground services

Any leads damaged or poorly insulated

Temporary repairs

No testing and tagging

Circuits overloaded

Nonuse of protective devices.

All electrical equipment in good condition and earthed

No temporary repairs

No exposed wires & good insulation

No overloading

Use of protective devices

Testing and tagging

No overhead/ underground services

Scaffolding

Poor foundation

Lack of ladder access

Insufficient planking

Lack of guardrails and toe boards

Insufficient ties or other means

All scaffolds incorrectly braced or stabilized to

prevent overturning.

All scaffolds correctly braced and stabilized

3:1 height to base ratio

Firm foundation, plumb and level

Ladder access provided and used

Proper platform

Planks secured

Guardrails and toe boards





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Risks & Hazards Associated with Construction Control Measures

Ladders

Carrying loads

Not secured against dislodgement

Defective ladders

Not sufficient length

Wrong positions

Incorrectly placed (angles, in access ways, vehicle

movements

Secured against movement or footed

Ladders in good condition and regularly inspected for faults

Extend 1m above platform and placed at 4:1 angle

Out of access ways, vehicle movements

No carrying loads while climbing

3 points of contact

Use for access only, not working platforms

Excavations

Trench collapse

Undetected underground services

Falls

Hazardous atmosphere

Knowledge of Soil stability

No water accumulation and pumping facilities

Material 600mm from edge

Clear of suspended loads

Hard hats/PPE

Ladders

Atmospheric testing

Traffic controls

Emergency Plan.

Noise

Unknown noise levels

Known noise levels over 85 decibels

Levels below 85 decibels

Proper protections.

Falling Material

Fall during carrying / lifting materials

Dislodged tools and materials from overhead work

areas.

Materials to be secured

kept away from edge

toe boards

Use of hard hats

Cranes & Lifts

Display of carrying capacity i.e. loads (No. Of

person), incorrectly slung, defective lifting

equipment, unsecured loads, craning in close

proximity to building

Falls

Falling materials.

Periodic testing by competent authority

Correctly slung/secured loads, lifting equipment good

condition

Use of proper hand signals

Falls while unloading controlled

Visitors Presence at site

Falls

Struck by dropped materials

Road accidents

Insufficient hoarding or fencing - pedestrian access

past site

Mechanical plant movement on and off site

Sufficient hoarding

Fencing and barricades

Safe pedestrian access past site traffic management for

loading and delivery

Construction separated from occupied areas of projects.

Hazard during Operation Phase

Natural Disasters





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Natural Disasters are often sudden and intense and results in considerable destruction, injuries and death

disrupting normal life as well as the process of development. Disasters due to natural calamity could be as

follows:

Earthquake

Flood

Storms/ Cloud burst/lightning/extreme weather conditions

Aircraft Accident Related Disasters

Aircraft accident occurs near and within the airport during landing/take-off/taxing due to malfunctioning of

some mechanism like undercarriage, failure of hydraulic power supply, non-functioning of one or more

engines, malfunctioning of landing gear, sudden fire in aircraft while enrooting, unforeseen circumstances

in which pilot loses control over aircraft and improper signaling by air traffic control tower (ATC). Disasters

due to emergencies could be as follows:

Aircraft accident at airport;

Aircraft accident off airport; and

Hazardous material emergency, hydrocarbon spills followed by fire

Terror Attack, Plane Hijack, Sabotage

The threat of bombing vital installations by enemy action or sabotage cannot be ruled out near and within

the airport. Since airports are vital facilities prone to terror attack/ sabotage or plane hijacking, the threat to

an airport could be from ground as well as from the air. Disasters due to external factors are on account of

unlawful seizure, sabotage and bomb threat.

FUEL STORAGE AT AIRPORT

Fuel storage area has been one of the prime concerns as far as airport risk and hazards are concerned.

There will be no fuel storages at the proposed airport site but drums of High Speed Diesel (HSD) for the

DG sets will be available at the site. It is proposed that the oil company which will supply the fuel for the

proposed airport will will bring oil tankers inside and provide the necessary arrangements for filling. Any

accident the tanker meets during filling inside airport will cause accidental spillage on concrete surface and

related risks as mentioned below.

RISK MODELLING

Simulation of each identified hazardous chemical for consequence analysis has been done by using

ALOHA. ALOHA (Areal Locations of Hazardous Atmospheres) is a computer program designed to model

chemical releases for emergency responders and planners. It can estimate how a toxic cloud might

disperse after a chemical release—as well as several fires and explosions scenarios.

ALOHA is designed to produce reasonable results quickly enough to be of use to responders during a real

emergency. Therefore, ALOHA’s calculations represent a compromise between accuracy and speed. Many

of ALOHA’s features were developed to quickly assist the responder. For example, ALOHA:





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• Minimizes data entry errors by cross-checking the input values and warning the user if the value is

unlikely or not physically possible.

• Contains its own chemical library with physical properties for approximately 1,000 common hazardous

chemicals so that users do not have to enter that data.

In the present case, a prediction has been done assuming most unfavorable meteorological condition like

low wind speed of 1 m/s and stable atmospheric condition F. In case of an accident of tanker, the aviation

fuel will spill on ground, may cause toxic fume dispersion, may catch fire and cause thermal radiation or the

vapor cloud may travel and meeting an ignition source, may explode causing pressure waves and

damaging structures. All these possible situations have been predicted with affected distance of Level of

Concern (LOC).

Key Program Features

• Generates a variety of scenario-specific output, including threat zone pictures, threats at specific

locations, and source strength graphs.

• Calculates how quickly chemicals are escaping from tanks and puddles, and predicts how those

release rates change over time.

• Models many release scenarios like:

1. Toxic gas clouds,

2. BLEVEs (Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapor Explosions),

3. Jet fires,

4. Vapor cloud explosions, and

5. Pool fires.

6. Evaluates different types of hazard (depending on the release scenario): toxicity, flammability,

thermal radiation, and overpressure.

ALOHA is developed jointly by the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and the U.S.

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ALOHA model needs site specific information to calculate solar insolation like location name, latitude and

longitude of location and its elevation. It can model both light gases using Gaussian Model and heavy

gases using DEGADIS. It also needs building type, building surroundings, wind speed, direction (from

meteorological measurement), wind measuring heights, ground roughness, cloud cover, stability class,

inversion and humidity. It also needs storage tank type and orientation, tank dimension, state of chemical,

temperature inside the stank, diameter of assumed or actual accidental opening in tank, leak type and

assumed or actual height of opening ALOHA software was used to model the effects of each scenario

taking into consideration the usual atmospheric conditions as well as the worst case atmospheric

conditions. ALOHA is a computer program designed especially for use by people responding to chemical

releases when an accident has taken place, as well as for emergency planning. ALOHA models key

hazards - toxicity, flammability, thermal radiation (heat) and overpressure (explosion, blast force) - related

to chemical releases that result in toxic gas dispersions, fires and/or explosions. ALOHA allows for the

specification of concentration limits for the purpose of consequence assessment (e.g., assessment of

human health risks from contaminant plume exposure).





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Damage Criteria used in the project

The hazardous categories is modeled in Table 3.

Table 2: Hazard categories modeled in ALOHA Scenario\Source Tank Puddle

Vapor cloud (flash fire) Flammable area Flammable area

Vapor cloud (explosion) Overpressure Overpressure

Vapor cloud (Dispersion of Toxic vapor) Toxic vapors Toxic vapors

Pool fire Thermal radiation Thermal radiation

BLEVE (fireball) Thermal radiation NA

(A) Thermal Damage

The thermal radiation effects on people depend upon the length of time they are exposed to a specific

thermal radiation level. ALOHA uses three threshold values (measured in kilowatts per square meter) to

create the default threat zones:

Red: >10 kW/ m2. -- potentially lethal within 60 sec;

Orange: >5 kW/ m2 -- second-degree burns within 60 sec; and

Yellow: >2 kW/ m2 -- pain within 60 sec.

Longer exposure durations, even at a lower thermal radiation level, can produce serious physiological

effects. The threat zones displayed by ALOHA represent thermal radiation levels of certain hazardous

chemicals in the environment in case it is under fire.

(B) Overpressure:

This is a case of explosion due to overpressure in tank or a vapour cloud explosion when it meets a spark

on the way. The threat zones are as follows:

Red: 8.0 psi (Destruction to Buildings)

Orange: 3.5 psi (Serious Injury Likely)

Yellow: 1.0 psi (Shatters Glass)

(C) Toxic release:

For toxic release, there are several hazard classification systems in use. Some chemicals have not been

classified in every system. ALOHA determines its default toxic Level of Concern (LOC) values based on the

following:

PACs: Protective Action Criteria

This dataset combines all three common public exposure guideline systems (AEGLs, ERPGs, and TEELs)

and implements a hierarchy-based system. (AEGLs are used preferentially, followed by ERPGs, and then

TEELs.) If ALOHA is defaulting to the PAC values, it means that there are no AEGL or ERPG values in the

ALOHA chemical library for that substance. In this case, the PAC values will be the TEEL values. TEELs

are derived using existing LOCs and by manipulating current data. This process is less intensive than the

AEGL or ERPG process, and TEELs have been defined for more than 3,000 chemicals.





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1) Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs)

Acute Exposure Guideline Levels (AEGLs) are Toxic Levels of Concern (LOCs) that is used to predict the

area where a toxic gas concentration might be high enough to harm people. The guidelines define three-

tiered AEGLs as follows:

AEGL-1: The airborne concentration of a substance above which it is predicted that the general population,

including susceptible individuals, could experience notable discomfort, irritation, or certain asymptomatic

non-sensory effects. However, the effects are not disabling and are transient and reversible upon cessation

of exposure.

AEGL-2: The airborne concentration of a substance above which it is predicted that the general population,

including susceptible individuals, could experience irreversible or other serious, long-lasting adverse health

effects or an impaired ability to escape.

AEGL-3: The airborne concentration of a substance above which it is predicted that thegeneral population,

including susceptible individuals, could experience life-threatening health effects or death.

2) The Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPGs)

The American Industrial Hygiene Association (AIHA) has issued three levels of ERPG values based on

toxic effect of the chemical for use in evaluating the effects of accidental chemical releases on the general

public. The Emergency Response Planning Guidelines (ERPGs) are Toxic Levels of Concern (LOCs) that

is used to predict the area where a toxic gas concentration might be high enough to harm people. The

ERPGs are three tiered guidelines with one common denominator: 1-hour contact duration. Each guideline

identifies the substance, its chemical and structural properties, animal toxicology data, human experience,

existing exposure guidelines, the rationale behind the selected value, and a list of references.

ERPG 1: The maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals could

be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing other than mild transient adverse health effects or

perceiving a clearly defined, objectionable odour.

ERPG 2: The maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals could be

exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects or

symptoms which could impair an individual's ability to take protective action.

ERPG 3: The maximum airborne concentration below which it is believed that nearly all individuals could

be exposed for up to 1 hour without experiencing or developing life threatening health effects.

The most important point about the ERPGs is that they do not contain safety factors usually incorporated

into exposure guidelines. Rather, they estimate how the general public would react to chemical exposure.

Just below the ERPG-1, for example, most people would detect the chemical and may experience

temporary mild effects. Just below the ERPG-3, on the other hand, it is estimated that the effects would be

severe, although not life-threatening. The ERPG should serve as a planning tool, not a standard to protect

the public.





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3) Temporary Emergency Exposure Levels (TEELs)

There are three TEEL levels that are important for responders to consider:

TEEL-1: Maximum concentration in air below which it is believed nearly all individuals could be exposed

without experiencing other than mild transient health effects or perceiving a clearly defined objectionable

odour.


without experiencing or developing irreversible or other serious health effects or symptoms that could

impair their abilities to take protective action.


without experiencing or developing life-threatening health effects.

4) Immediate Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH)

Immediately Dangerous to Life or Health (IDLH) level is a limit originally established for selecting

respirators for use in workplaces by the National Institute for Occupational Safety and Health (NIOSH). A

chemical's IDLH is an estimate of the maximum concentration in the air to which a healthy worker could be

exposed without suffering permanent or escape-impairing health effects. It was recommended that

appropriate respirator (as per NIOSH) be kept handy/easily available.

The IDLH was not designed to be an exposure limit for the general population. It does not take into account

the greater sensitivity of some people, such as children and the elderly.

For AEGLs, ERPGs and TEELs, the rank number increase with the hazard level, so that AEGL-3 is more

hazardous than AEGL-1. Typically, the “3” values are used for the most hazardous (red) threat zones

because they represent the threshold concentration above which health effects may be life threatening.

Input Used For ALOHA Modeling

SITE DATA:

Location: Chillawan Village, Lucknow, Uttar Pradesh

ATMOSPHERIC DATA: (MANUAL INPUT OF DATA)

Wind: 1 m/s from North (NNE).

Ground Roughness: Open Country

Air Temperature: 22.9° C

Stability Class: F

Relative Humidity: 50 %

Consequences Analysis for Failure Scenarios of Hazardous Chemicals

CHEMICAL NAME: N-Heptane and Isooctane are major constituents of Aviation Fuel. The

modelling has been done for both as follows:

N-Heptane:





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Molecular Weight: 100.20 g/mol.

CAS Number: 142-82-5

PAC-1: 500 ppm PAC-2: 830 ppm PAC-3: 5000 ppm

IDLH: 750 ppm LEL: 10500 ppm UEL: 67000 ppm

Ambient Boiling Point: 97.9° C

Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: 0.011 atm.

Source Strength:

Tank Diameter/Length: 2 meters/9.55 meters

Source State: Liquid

Source Temperature: 22.9 Degree Celsius

A. Leaking Tank, Chemical is not burning & forms an evaporating puddle

Case I: Toxic Area of Vapor Cloud

THREAT ZONE:

Model Run: Heavy Gas

Red : 35 meters --- (5000 ppm = PAC-3)

Note: Threat zone was not drawn because effects of near-field patchiness make dispersion predictions less

reliable for short distances.

Orange: 149 meters --- (830 ppm = PAC-2)

Yellow: 216 meters --- (500 ppm = PAC-1)

Figure 2: Toxic Release threat zone for N-Heptane





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Case II: Flammable Area of Vapor Cloud

THREAT ZONE:

Threat Modeled: Flammable Area of Vapor Cloud


Red : 29 meters --- (6300 ppm = 60% LEL = Flame Pockets)

Note: Threat zone was not drawn because effects of near-field patchiness make dispersion predictions less

reliable for short distances.

Yellow: 125 meters --- (1050 ppm = 10% LEL)

Figure 3:Flammable area of Vapor Cloud for N-Heptane

Case III: Blast: Vapor Cloud Explosion

THREAT ZONE:

Threat Modeled: Overpressure (blast force) from vapor cloud explosion

Type of Ignition: Ignited by spark or flame

Level of Congestion: Congested


Red : LOC was never exceeded --- (8.0 psi = destruction of buildings)

Orange: 19 meters --- (3.5 psi = serious injury likely)

Yellow: 44 meters --- (1.0 psi = shatters glass)





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Figure 4: Blast Vapor Cloud Explosion for N-Heptane

B. Leaking Tank, Chemical is burning & forms a pool fire

THREAT ZONE:

Threat Modeled: Thermal radiation from pool fire

Red : 23 meters --- (10.0 kW/(sq m) = potentially lethal within 60 sec)

Orange: 34 meters --- (5.0 kW/(sq m) = 2nd degree burns within 60 sec)

Yellow: 54 meters --- (2.0 kW/(sq m) = pain within 60 sec)





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Figure 5: Thermal Radiation from Pool Fire for N-Heptane

C. BLEVE, tank explodes & Chemical burns in a fireball

THREAT ZONE:

Threat Modeled: Thermal radiation from fireball




Figure 6: BLEVE, Thermal Radiation from Fireball for N-Heptane

Isooctane

Molecular Weight: 100.20 g/mol.

CAS Number: 142-82-5

PAC-1: 500 ppm PAC-2: 830 ppm PAC-3: 5000 ppm

IDLH: 750 ppm LEL: 10500 ppm UEL: 67000 ppm

Ambient Boiling Point: 97.9° C

Vapor Pressure at Ambient Temperature: 0.011 atm.

Source Strength:

Tank Diameter/Length:2 meters/9.55 meters

Source State: Liquid

Source Temperature: 22.9 Degree Celsius

A. Leaking Tank, Chemical is not burning & forms an evaporating puddle

Case I: Toxic Area of Vapor Cloud





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THREAT ZONE:


Red : 72 meters --- (5000 ppm = PAC-3)

Orange: 188 meters --- (830 ppm = PAC-2)

Yellow: 366 meters --- (230 ppm = PAC-1)

Fig 7: Toxic area of Vapor cloud for Isooctane

Case II: Flammable Area of Vapor Cloud

THREAT ZONE:

Threat Modeled: Flammable Area of Vapor Cloud


Red : 66 meters --- (5700 ppm = 60% LEL = Flame Pockets)

Yellow: 175 meters --- (950 ppm = 10% LEL)





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Figure 8: Flammable area of vapor cloud for Isooctane

Case III: Blast, Vapor Cloud Explosion

THREAT ZONE:

Threat Modeled: Overpressure (Blast force) from vapor cloud explosion

Type of Ignition: Ignited by spark or flame

Level of Congestion: Congested


Red : LOC was never exceeded --- (8.0 psi = destruction of buildings)

Orange: 52 meters --- (3.5 psi = serious injury likely)

Yellow: 80 meters --- (1.0 psi = shatters glass)





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Figure 9: Thermal Radiation from Fireball for Isooctane

B. Leaking Tank, Chemical is burning & forms a pool fire

THREAT ZONE:

Threat Modeled: Thermal radiation from pool fire




Figure 10: Thermal Radiation from Pool Fire for Isooctane





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C. Leaking Tank, Chemical is burning & forms a pool fire

THREAT ZONE:

Threat Modeled: Thermal radiation from fireball




Figure 11: BLEVE, Thermal Radiation from Pool Fire for Isooctane

SUMMARY OF ALOHA RESULTS

The summarization of the results obtained from Risk Modelling Assessment if given in Table 3.

Table 3: Summarization of ALOHA Results

Situation Affected Distance (m) Remarks

Red Orange Yellow

N- HEPTANE

Leaking Tank,

Chemical is

not burning

&forms an

evaporating

puddle

Toxic Area of

Vapor Cloud 35 149 216

Flammable Area

of Vapor Cloud 29 125

Blast: Vapor

Cloud Explosion 0 19 44

Leaking Tank,

Chemical is

burning &

forms a pool

Thermal radiation

23 34 54





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Situation Affected Distance (m) Remarks

Red Orange Yellow

fire.

BLEVE, tank

explodes &

Chemical

burns in a

fireball.

Thermal radiation 323 456 711

ISOOCTANE

Leaking Tank,

Chemical is

not burning &

forms an

evaporating

puddle

Toxic Area of

Vapor Cloud 72 188 366

Flammable Area

of Vapor Cloud 66 175

Blast: Vapor

Cloud Explosion 0 52 80

Leaking Tank,

Chemical is

burning &

forms a pool

fire

Thermal

radiation

20 31 50

BLEVE, tank

explodes&

Chemical

burns in a

fireball.

Thermal

radiation

323 457 712 Say 1000m

Conclusion: As per the result obtained from ALOHA, it has been interpreted that the worst case scenario

will be explosion of tank and the chemical will burn in a fireball (BLEVE). The effect of this scenario

will be up to a distance of 712m. Therefore it requires immediate evacuation of population say up to 1000m

and provide immediate medical facilities for injured persons as mentioned in Disaster Management Plan.

DISASTER MANAGEMENT PLAN

Disaster

A disaster can be defined as an "occurrence of such magnitude so as to create a situation in which normal

pattern of life within a facility is suddenly disrupted, adversely affecting not only the personnel and property

within the facility but also in its vicinity."

A Disaster Management Plan (DMP) is an integral part of an Airport operation for effective and safe

management of technical and non-technical emergencies. This is important for effective management of an

emergency situation to minimize losses to people, property and both at and around the Airport.

The objectives of the emergency planning are to describe the Airport's emergency response organization,

the resources available and applicable response actions. Thus, the objectives of emergency response plan

can be summarized as follows:





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Rapid control and containment of the hazardous situation;

Minimizing the risk and impact of an event/accident; and

Effective rehabilitation of the affected persons, and prevention of damage to property.

Disaster control plan gives ideas to plan in advance to avoid & minimize the damage in all aspects. It is a

team effort & remarkably pays if due attention is paid in time to plan & execute the action plan for disaster

control.

On-site Incidents

Some of occurrence may result in on-site implications like:

Fire and/or explosion;

Leakage of flammable material;

Release of toxic material (accident/sabotage);

Crash landing;

Bomb threat; and

Natural calamities like earthquake, flooding, thunderstorms etc.

Off-site Incidents

Incidents having off-site effects can be:

Fire and/or explosion on site;

Leakage of flammable material on site;

Release of toxic material (accident/sabotage) on site;

Air raids; and

Crashing of aircraft i.e. while landing or Take-off.

Accidents may take place on site or off site. In case of accidents as mentioned in modeling, the effect may

spread upto about 1000m beyond the accident site, which is considered inside the airport. There should

be plans to evacuate population especially from downwind distances 1000m away from boundary as given

in Table 3.

Other Incidents

Other incidents, which can also result in a disaster, are:

Agitation/forced entry by external group of People;

Sabotage; and

Hijacking

An important aspect of the disaster is its unforeseen nature. Thus, by definition itself, a disaster is

impossible to control completely. However, occurrence of events, which lead to a disaster, may be

minimized through proper technology and engineering practices. The DMP plan should be prepared in

accordance with the Civil Aviation requirement laid down by the Director General of Civil Aviation (DGCA),

the National Disaster Management Act, 2005, the National Building Code as well as various code





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provisions of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) including other International conventions

and acts.

Emergency Resources and Equipment’s

High mast lighting on generator trailers is essential for protracted night operations. A source for fuel for

the generators should be identified.

A trailer equipped with sufficient backboards and stretchers to accommodate 250+ causalities.

Sufficient body bags and causality identification tags.

A trailer mounted medical disaster kit containing long shelf life items such as bandages, compresses,

splints, trauma kits etc.

Tents and tarpaulins for use during inclement weather.

A trailer / container with stakes, heavy hammer, colored tape and poles to mark are at an accident

site and to identify triage sites and evacuation routes. These stakes can also be used to mark

locations where bodies, voice and flight recorders, and aircraft parts are found.

Heavy cranes to lift debris during rescue activities

Buses and other vehicles to transport ambulatory passengers.

Vehicles to transport dead to temporary morgue.

Tow bars and wing / fuselage jacks for all aircraft types using airport.

Pneumatic lifting bags and compressors.

Heavy cranes and forklifts.

Aircraft loading equipment and tow tractors.

Emergency Procedures

Rough Weather Emergency

In case of storm approaching the area, prior warning will be received. Therefore, the radio room must

receive daily weather forecast, which must be signed by the Air Traffic Controller or his designated officer.

It is strongly suggested that specific weather report be prepared or obtained, as it would be more accurate

than general report and three stages of operation control shall be followed:

Green Status: This status applies when weather is good. Operations can go on smoothly as

planned.

Yellow Status: This is an alert stage when rough weather is expected or may be expected, hence

alert must be maintained with all precautions with emergency status but operations can continue.

Red Status: Emergency situation- operations suspended. All activities are to be controlled by the

designated officer of the Airport.

Aircraft Crash within Airport Fire Service Turn-out Area

The Airport Fire Service turnout area shall include the entire airport area as well as the areas in the vicinity

of the airport up to an arc of a circle centered at the runway threshold of 5 km radius, and 3 km from the

perimeter of the airport.





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Crash action is declared for aircraft accidents on the aerodrome as well as off the aerodrome. The Air

Traffic Controller shall activate the crash alarm immediately if one of the following events occurs:

When the aircraft accident/crash is sighted by the Air Traffic Controller or the sighting is reported to

the Air Traffic Control by any of the reliable sources.

When the aircraft has been cleared to land and fails to land within 5 minutes of the estimated time

of landing and the communication with the pilot is not able to be re-established.

During poor visibility- when the Air Traffic Controller is unable to sight the runway, and the aircraft,

which has been cleared for take-off or land, fails to respond to the Air Traffic Control's repeated

calls.

Aircraft Crash outside Airport Fire Service Turn-out Area

If an aircraft accident occurs outside the Turnout Area, the procedures for Crash Action outside the Airport

Fire Service Turnout Area shall be as followed.

The decision to declare the Crash Action rests with the Air Traffic Control.

Local Fire Service will be fully in charge and resume command of the aircraft fire-fighting and rescue

operations at the crash site.

State Authorities/District Administration will be overall in charge of all ground operations at the scene.

All the other agencies and services involved will activate their respective emergency operations plans

to support the State Authorities/District Administration in the mitigation of the aircraft accident.

Fire on the Ground (Aircraft Movement Area)

An aircraft can catch fire when it is taxing in the movement area or parked at an aerobridge or remote bay.

Such a scenario can arise from a defect or malicious act, and may develop into a major disaster. The

resources required to mitigate are thus identical to that of an aircraft crash within the Airport Fire Service

Turnout Area.

When the aircraft on the ground catches fire and is sighted by the Air Traffic Controller or reported to the Air

Traffic Control by any reliable sources, the Air Traffic Controller shall activate the Airport Fire Service

through the crash alarm communication system and provide details of the aircraft fire, for example:

Location of aircraft;

Nature of fire (e.g. undercarriage fire, engine fire);

Number of Passenger on Board (POB); and

Presence of dangerous goods, if known.

The Air Traffic Controller shall give clearance to the responding fire vehicles to enter the runway/taxiway as

soon as possible.

Fire on the Ground (Airport Buildings & Installations)

Fire may occur at any of the airport installations and buildings. If out of control, such a fire may cripple the

key airport facilities and disrupt the normal airport operations. During a fire occurrence, however small it

may appear to be, person who discovers it shall:





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Raise the fire alarm via the nearest manual call point. If no manual call point is readily available, raise

the alarm by other available means;

Inform the Airport Fire Service immediately of the exact location of the fire; and

Operate a suitable fire extinguisher where readily available, or any water hose reel within range.

Bomb Emergency Management

Bomb threats by their very nature indicate the very real potential for serious damage to aircraft, buildings

and property, as well as the potential for serious injuries or loss of life. A bomb threat could be written,

recorded, or communicated orally. Every threat must be taken seriously and dealt with in such a way as to

not create panic. The call recipient must remember to do many things, all of which will aid in the search for

the device and provide authorities with as much information as possible for their later investigation. The

following immediate actions are suggested:

Any aircraft that is suspected of carrying a bomb should be parked in Isolated Bay Area.

All passengers should be evacuated immediately by the fastest means whilst the local or airport police

arrange for bomb disposal experts to attend and search the aircraft. All baggage should be left on

board until it has been searched and cleared. Airport rescue and fire services should be standby at

point no less than 300m from air craft and predetermined procedure for bomb alerts should take into

account the calling of local authority services of fire, police, ambulance and hospitals.

Air traffic control must maintain continuous communication with the rescue and firefighting services to

ensure that they are kept updated in relation to any change in distressed aircraft condition.

To attend to bomb threat calls received to aircraft, terminal building, vital installations and arising from

unclaimed observed insides/outside the airport and safe neutralization of explosives devices found.

As soon as an emergency is envisaged/occurs, the Emergency chief or his alternate shall promptly

communicate the information by a telephone or any other quickest mode of communication to the

Inspector of Police, highest administrative officer and Fire brigade. The information should include the

location in question and the degree of emergency (anticipated, eminent or actual).

To conduct regular training of airport security police and staff, airline agencies working at the airport.

This training is based for identification of explosives.

Forced Landing of Hijacked Aircraft

Every airport is faced with a threat of hijacked aircraft forced to land at the aerodrome all airports have

standard operating procedures to deal with such eventualities. An outline of the procedure to be followed to

manage this contingency is given below.

A separate isolated parking place away from the parking aprons and far away from the terminal

complex is earmarked for parking such aircraft after it has landed.

All messages from the hijackers are to be relayed by air traffic control to the concerned agencies.

Information must be promptly given to local police department, State Government Authorities and

concern Airline Company.

Information will also be passed to neighboring airports for alert through airport officials and IAF

authorities.

Fire tender and ambulance be kept ready for emergency situations.





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Local hospital, fire services and ambulance services made alert for possible aid.

Onsite and Offsite Emergency Plan

On-Site Emergency: If accident / incident takes places in an Airport, its effects are confined to the Airport

premises, involving only the persons working in the Airport and the property inside the Airport it is called as

On-site Emergency.

Off-Site Emergency: If the accident is such that it affects inside the Aircraft are uncontrollable and it may

spread outside the Airport and affect the premises, it is called as Off-site Emergency.

The main objectives of an emergency plan are to control and contain the incident/ accident and if possible,

eliminate it and to minimize the effects of the incident on person, property and environment. Each Airport

should prepare an emergency plan incorporating details of action to be taken in case of any major accident/

disaster occurring inside the Airport. The plan should cover all types of major accident/ occurrences and

identify the risk involved in the airport. Mock drills on the plan should be carried out periodically to make the

plan foolproof and persons are made fully prepared to fight against any incident in the airport.

The Emergency Control Centre (ECC) shall ensure a mock drill of the onsite emergency plan is conducted

at least one in every six months. A detailed report of the mock drill conducted under rule shall be made

immediately available to the Inspector and Chief Inspector. Main elements of On-site Emergency plans:-

Leadership and Administration,

Role and Responsibilities of Key Personnel,

Emergency action,

Light and Power,

Source of energy control,

Protective and rescue equipment,

Communication,

Medical care,

Mutual Aid,

Public relation,

Protection of vital records and

Training and

Periodical revision of plan.

Onsite Emergency Plan

The emergency action plan includes:

Emergency Control Centre: The operations to handle the emergency are directed and coordinated by

emergency control center. The facilities will be made available in the emergency control are:

a) Internal and external communication.

b) Computer and other essential records.

c) Daily attendance of workmen employed in Airport.

d) Pollution records.





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e) Walky-talky.

Assembly Points: A safe place far away from the Airport has been pre-determined as assembly point

where in case of emergency personnel evacuated from the affected areas are to be assembled. The Airport

workers, contract workers and visitors will assemble in assembly point in case of emergency and the time

office clerk should take their attendance so as to assess the missing person during emergency.

The Key Personnel for Onsite Emergency: The General Manager of the airport will act as main

controller. His duties are to

a) Assess the magnitude of the situation and decide whether the evacuation of staff from the Airport is

needed.

b) Exercise and direct operational control over areas other than those affected.

c) Direct and control rehabilitation of affected area after emergency.

d) Intimate Off-site Emergency controller if the emergency spreads beyond the Airport premises and

likely to affect the surrounding area etc.

Escape Route: The escape route from Airport should be clearly marked. The escape route is the shortest

route to reach out of the affected area to open area, which leads to assembly point. This route should be

indicated on the layout plan attached to the On-site Emergency Plan.

Evacuation Plan: All non-essential staff should be evacuated from the emergency site. As soon as the

emergency siren rings the staffs have to move to the assembly point. The closing procedure in case of

emergency should be prepared and kept ready and responsible person should be nominated for the

purpose.

Emergency Facilities: The following facilities will be provided at Airport to tackle any emergency at any

time.

Fire protection and firefighting facilities.

Emergency lighting and standby power.

Emergency equipment and rescue equipment

a. Breathing apparatus with compressed air cylinder.

b. Fire proximity suit.

c. Resuscitator.

d. Water gel Blanket.

e. Low temperature suit.

f. First aid kit.

g. Stretchers.

h. Torches.

i. Ladders.

Offsite Emergency Plan

Central Control Committee has the following actions to be executed:

Incident and Environment Control Committee.





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Fire Control Committee.

Traffic control, Law and order, Evacuation and Rehabilitation Committee.

Medical help, Ambulance and Hospital Committee.

Welfare, Restoration and Resumption Committee.

Utility and Engineering Services Committee.

Press, Publicity and Public Relations Committee.

TRAINING AND EDUCATION

Regular training would be provided to all personnel who have a role in planning and operational response

to an emergency. The main goal of training for emergencies is to enable the participants to understand their

roles in the response organization, the tasks associated with each position and the procedures for

maintaining effective communications with other response functions and individuals. The training objectives

are:

To familiarize personnel with the contents and manner of implementation of the plan and its

procedures;

To train personnel in the performance of the specific duties assigned to them in the plan and in the

applicable implementation procedures;

To keep personnel informed of any changes in the plan and the implementing procedures;

To maintain a high degree of preparedness at all levels of the Emergency Response Organization

Train new personnel who may have moved within the facility organization;

Test the validity, effectiveness, timing and content of the plan; and

Update and modify the plan on the basis of experience acquired through exercises and drills.

MOCK DRILLS AND EXERCISES

Mock drills constitute another important component of emergency preparedness. They refer to the re-

enactment, under the assumption of a mock scenario, of the implementation of response actions to be

taken during an emergency. Emergency drills and integrated exercises have the following objectives.

To test, efficiency, timing, and content of the plan and implementing procedures;

To ensure, that the emergency organization personnel are familiar with their duties and

responsibilities by demonstration;

Provide hands-on experience with the procedures to be implemented during emergency; and

Maintain emergency preparedness.

The frequency of the drills would vary depending on the severity of the hazard. However, drills would be

conducted once in a year. Scenarios may be developed in such a manner as to accomplish more than one

event objective. Drills and exercises will be conducted as realistically as is reasonably practicable.

Planning for drills and exercises would include:





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The basic objectives;

The dates, times and places;

The participating organizations;

The events to be simulated;

An approximate schedule of events;

Arrangements for qualified observers; and

An appropriate critique of drills/exercises with participants

Evaluation of drills and exercises would be carried out which would include comments from the participants

and observers. Discrepancies noted by the drill observers during the drill shall be pointed out during the

drill. The individual responsible for conducting the drill or exercise would prepare a written evaluation of the

drill or exercise. The evaluation would include assessments and recommendations on:

Areas that require immediate correction;

Areas where additional training is needed;

Suggested modifications to the plan or procedures; and

Deficiencies in equipment, training, and facilities.

The evaluation of a drill or exercise shall be submitted to the Terminal Manager for review and acceptance

who shall then determine the corrective actions to be taken and assign the responsibility to appropriate

personnel. The Safety In-charge would track all approved drill and exercise corrective actions as a means

of assuring that corrections are made in a reasonable amount of time, and shall advise the Terminal

Manager of the status of implementation of corrective actions.

Records of drills, exercises, evaluations, and corrective actions would be duly maintained.

UPDATING OF EMERGENCY PLAN

The Lucknow Airports Emergency Plan and implementing procedures would be reviewed and updated to

ensure compliance with relevant regulations and applicable state and local emergency plans. The need for

updating is based on following aspects:

Written evaluations of mock drills exercises which identify deficiencies or more desirable methods,

procedures, or organizations;

Changes in key personnel involved in the organization;

Changes in the facility organization structure;

Changes in regulations;

Recommendations received from other organizations and state agencies.

Documents

RISK ASSESSMENT - environmentclearance.nic.in€¦ · Risk Assessment may be carried out to serve the following objectives: ... Descent and landing accidents, taxi and takeoff mishaps,